The arte of reason, rightly termed, witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.

The arte of reason, rightly termed, witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.

Table of contents

Title page

¶ To the right honorable Lorde, Walter, Earle of Essex, Uiscount Hereford and Lord Ferris of Chartley, Lord Bourghchier, and Louaine, and Knight of the mo•… honorable order of the Garter: Raphe Leuer vvisheth encrease of knovvledge, vvith the true feare of god.

The Forespeache.

§

¶THE FIRSTE booke of Witcraft.

1

VVhat VVitcraft is.

The partes of a reason.

VVhat vvordes are.

The first deuiding of vvordes.

The second deuision of vvordes.

The thirde deuision of vvordes.

Certaine preceptes or generall rules to be learned afore ye enter into the treatise of the storehouses.

Of the ten storehouses, and of their vse.

Of the ten Demaunders.

Of Substaunce the first Storehouse. Chap. 2.

Hovv substaunce is deuided.

Of certayne peculiar rules vvhich belong to the storehouse of substance.

1

2

3

4

5

6

Hovv Substance is deuided.

Of the seconde Storehouse called Quantitie. Chap. 3.

Hovv Quantitie is deuided.

Another diuision of Quantitie.

Of the propreties of Quantitie.

Of the thirde Storehouse called Qualitie. Chap. 4.

Of the deuision of Qualitie.

Of Qualities first roome.

Of Qualities second roome.

Of Qualities thirde roome.

Of Quantities fourth roome.

Of Qualified things.

Of the propreties of qualities, and of qualified things.

Of Respecting vvoordes. Chapter. 5.

The propreties of respecting vvordes.

1

2

3

4

5

Of dooing and sufferyng. Chapter. 6.

Of the propreties of dooing and suffering.

1

2

Of the tvvo Storehouses, VVhere, and VVhen. Chapter. 7.

Hovv, vvhere and vvhen, are deuided.

Of the ninth Storehouse, called Placing. Chap. 8.

Of the tenth Storehouse called hauing. Chap. 9.

That Storehouses helpe to inlarge a matter, and that euerye vvord may after a sorte be deduced through them all.

Woordes exempted out of the Storehouses. Chap. 10.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

Hovv vvordes of double vnderstanding maye be knovven. Chap. 11.

1

2

3

4

5

Of disagreeable vvordes. Chap. 12.

VVhat difference there is betvvene depriuyng termes and contrarye termes.

Hovve many vvayes one thing is said to be afore or after another. Chap. 13.

Of the beeing of things at once. Chapter. 14.

Of mouing. Chap. 14.

Of contrarietie in mouing.

The second boke of Witcraft.

Chap. 1.

VVhat a saying is.

That there are diuers kyndes of sayings, and vvhich of them are proper to this arte.

Of the Shevvsay, and firste vvhat a shevvsaye is. Chap. 2.

The matter of a shevvsay.

Of a Novvne.

Of a Verbe.

Of the forme of a shevvsay, and vvhat appertayneth to the perfecte knovvledge therof.

VVhich is a simple shevvsaye and one and vvhiche is a compounded shevvsay and many.

Of the tvvo orders of a simple shevvsaye.

Of the foresets and back sets that are in a simple shevvesaye. Chap. 3.

To vvhat vse foresettes and backesettes serue.

To knovve vvhat respecte the backset hath to the foreset in euery simple shevvsaye of the seconde order.

Of a sayvvhat, and of things that are handled and intreated of in lyke maner that it is. Chap. 4.

Generall rules appertyning to a sayvvhat.

1

2

3

4

5

Of a Propretie. Chapter. 5.

1

2

3

4

VVhy vvee intreate in this place of selfe thinges and kinreds, and vvhat they are. Chap. 6.

Of selfe things.

Of a kinrede.

Of a Kynde. Chapter. 7.

Of a difference. Chap. 8.

Hovv differences are deuided.

Of an Inbeer. Chap. 9.

Hovv inbeers are deuided.

Of the tourning of a shevvsay. Chapter. 10.

Of a yeasay, and a naysay. Chapter. 11.

Of the quantitie of a shevvsay. Chapter. 12.

Of signes and marks vvhich shevv the quantitie and qualitie of eche shevvesay. Chapter. 13.

Of a true and a false shevvsay. Chapter. 14.

To knovv vvhich is a necessarie shevvsay, vvhich is an vnpossible shevvsay, and vvhich is a chanceable shevvsay. Cha. 15.

Of gaynsaying shevvsayes. Chapter. 16.

Of Shevvesayes that are of lyke force. Chap. 17.

Of a compounded Shevvsay. Chap. 18.

Of Shevvsayes compounded by adding the manner of beyng or not beynge. Chap. 19.

Of the affirming or denying of a Shevvsay compounded by adding the manner of beyng or not beyng.

Hovv Shevvsayes compounded by adding the manner of being or not being follovv one vpon another.

The thyrd booke of Witcraft.

Chap. 1.

VVhat a reason is.

That there are but tvvo kindes of reasons and what either kind is. Chapter. 2.

Examples of a reason by example.

Of a Reason by rule.

VVhat diuersitie there is betvvixt a reason by example, and a reason by rule. Chapter. 3.

VVhat things are chiefely to be noted in a reason by rule.

Of the matter vvhereof a reason by rule is made. Chap. 4.

VVhat names the three Shevvsayes haue, vvhich are in a reason by rule.

Of the three termes vvhich are in a reason by rule.

Of the forme of a reason by rule. Chapter. 5.

Hovve many vvayes a reason by rule may bee made.

The names of the particular seates, and vvhat is generally to be lerned in eche one of them. Chap. 6.

Proper seates appointed for eche ranke.

Of the first ranke. Chap. 7.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the first ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the firste ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the thyrde seate of the firste ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourthe seate of the first ranke.

Of the seconde ranke. Chap. 3.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the second ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the second ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the third seat of the seconde ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the seconde ranke.

Of the thirde Ranke. Chap. 4.

VVhat maner of termes, vvill serue to make a reason in the first seate of the third ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the second seat of the thirde ranke.

VVhat manner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the third seat of the thirde ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the thirde ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fifte seat of the thirde ranke.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the sixte seat of the thirde ranke.

If either of the foresayes be left oute of a reason by rule, to knovve vvhich it is. Chap. 10.

To knovve in hovv many seates eche endsay may be concluded.

The fourth Boke of Witcraft.

Of Inuention or fynding out of argumentes. Chap. 1.

Of the first generall place called Substance. Chap. 2.

Other generall rules appertayning to a sayvvhat.

Examples of argumentes deduced of a sayvvhat.

The vse of this place.

Of the generall terme. Chap. 3.

Rules belonging to the generall terme by the vvhiche thou maist also learne the vse of this place.

Of the special terme. Chap. 4.

Rules belonging to the speciall.

Of the proper terme. Chap. 5.

The vse of this place.

Of the vvhole and of his partes. Chapter. 6.

Examples of partes, prouing, or disprouing an vvhole.

Examples of a vvhole prouing or disprouing the partes.

The vse of these tvvo places.

Rules belonging to an vvhole or to a parte.

Of the ofsprings. Chap. 7.

Hovv of springs are deuided.

Rules belonging to an Ofspring.

Example.

Of Quantitie. Chap. 8.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in number.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in bignesse.

Of Qualitie. Chap. 9.

Of Povver.

Hovve argumentes holde of povver or vvant of povver.

Of VVill.

Hovv VVill is deuided.

The vse of this place.

Of dispositions.

Examples of disposition, or manners.

Of sensible qualities.

Examples.

Of affections.

Examples of affections.

Of passions.

The vse of this place.

Examples of Passions.

Of Forme.

The deuision of forme and fashion.

Examples of Forme.

Of the causes. Chap. 10.

The deuision of causes.

Examples of the causes.

Rules appertaining to the Matter and the Forme.

Hovve vvorkmen are deuided.

Generall rules belonging to vvorkmen.

Generall rules and principles gathered of an ende.

Of the Effect of things. Chap. 11.

Hovve vvorkes and effectes are deuided.

Rules gathered of an effect, or of the vvorke that is done.

An example of an Effecte.

Of preparation. Chap. 12.

Hovve preparation is deuided.

Rules belonging to preparation.

An example of preparation.

Of doing. Chap. 13.

Hovv doings and laboure are deuided.

Rules of Laboure.

An example of Doing.

Of Suffering, and of his diuision. Chapter. 14.

An example of Suffering.

Of time and place. Chap. 15.

An example of place.

An example of time.

Of the vse of these tvvo places.

Of Order. Chap. 16.

The vse of this place.

An example of Order.

Of Hauing. Chap. 17.

Of Commers. Chap. 18.

Of the vse of these places.

Examples.

Of comparison. Chap. 19.

Rules belonging to the equall.

Rules of the likelier.

Rules of the vnlikelier.

Of a similitude. Chap. 20.

Of VVitnesses. Chap. 21.

Hovv VVitnesse is deuided.

Of Gaynsets. Chap. 22.

Of respecting termes and yokefelovves.

Hovve reasons doe holde of yokefelovves and respecting termes.

Examples.

Of depriuing termes.

Hovve to decerne contrarie sayings, vvhich are contrarie by reason of termes, and not by reason of qualitie.

Of the vse of this place.

Of those that are termed more then contraries.

Of the differing terme. Chap. 23.

Of the vse of this place.

Of Deuision, the 24▪ Chap.

Hovve deuision is deuided.

Rules belonging to this place.

Examples.

Of Proportion. Chap. 25.

A generall lesson for Inuention, teaching the vse of our third and fourth booke. Chap. 26.

Hovv doubtfull Questions and demaundes are to be handeled. Chap. 27.

VVhat a Question or demaunde is.

Faultes escaped.

¶ A note to vnderstand the meaning of newe deuised Termes.

§

§

§

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THE ARTE of Reason, rightly termed, Witcraft, teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute.

Made by Raphe Leuer.

Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties Iniunctions.

¶ Imprinted at London, by H. Bynneman, dwelling in Knightrider streate, at the signe of the Mermayde. Anno. 1573.

These Bookes are to be solde at his Shop at the Northvvest dore of Paules church.

¶ To the right honorable Lorde, Walter, Earle of Essex, Uiscount Hereford and Lord Ferris of Chartley, Lord Bourghchier, and Louaine, and Knight of the mo [...] honorable order of the Garter: Raphe Leuer vvisheth encrease of knovvledge, vvith the true feare of god.

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IT pleased you, ( [...]ighte honorable) aboute nine yeares ago, to accepte me into your seruice: and being then desirous to studye the arte of reasoning, ye made me your reader: and vsed at sundry times to conferre vvith me in that kinde of learning. There vvas in you (be it spoken to the praise of God, and vvithout all suspition of flaterie) both a gentle nature, easie to be ttained to take pleasure in studie: and also a sharpnes of vvit, readie to conceiue at the first anye doctrine that vvas orderlye taught. So that doubtlesse, if there had not bene a lacke in [Page] me, your L. had long ago profited righte vvell in this arte. The lacke vvhich vvas in mee then, and vvhich I novve remember vvith greife, vvas this: I vsed no good trade to cause your L. to take pleasure in studye, and not to faile of your appointed houres. Verilye it is requisite in all them, vvhich shalbe readers to men of noble birth, that besides knovvledge and diligence to teach, they haue also a certaine sleight, and cunning, to cause their scholers to delight in learning: and so to vse the matter, that personages of high estate be neither dravven from the loue of their booke, by to muche forced exercise: nor suffered to lose their appointed time of studie, for lacke of a graue and alurable calling vpon, for the one breedeth a lothsomnesse, and the other a forgetfulnesse. But albeit that your L. hath had losse through my lacke of skill in thys point, yet it so falleth out novv, that manye are like to make gaine of your losse. For the lacke vvhich vvas in me, vvhē I serued your honour, hath since bene the chiefe occasion vvhy I haue vvritten this booke, to make some parte of recompence to you. In consideration [Page] vvhereof, I most humblye desire you, to take in good parte, that I dedicate this simple vvorke vnto your L. for my desire is, that it maye pas [...]e foorth vnder your protection. If you like vvell of it, I shall not onely thinke my paines vvell bestovved: but my self also to haue a sufficient defence against all ill reportes. Martine Bucer read ouer this arte, in his old days, and renevved in his age, the rules that he learned thereof in his youth. If you minde to renevve your studie, and once againe to assaye, vvhat you can do to obtaine this excellent arte, I offer vnto you my seruice and diligence, as maye best stande vvith your pleasure and my calling. The rules of this arte are generall, and vpon them grovveth a general knovvledge. VVho hath a pregnant vvit, and is cunning in this facultie, shall haue both to speake, and to iudge, of any matter vvhatsoeuer. If learning be ioyned to vertue and honour, so that they three take place in one person at once, it is a vvonder to see, hovve all mens eyes are bent vppon such a one, and vvhat hope they conceyue of his vveldoing. My prayer is therfore, that your L. may so consider [Page] of this, that as you, in tvvo of these, do exceede almost all: so in the third ye might not be inferior to manye. But hauing alvvayes afore your eyes the feare of God, the loue of your Prince, and the duety, you doe ovve to the common vvealth, your L. may liue many ioyfull dayes vvith your louing spouse, increase your noble house vvith immortall fame, and finally, at the good time appointed, rest vvith the Lorde Christ for euer.

The Forespeache.

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TO proue that the arte of Reasoning may be taught in englishe, I reason thus: First, we Englishmen haue wits, as wel as men of other nations haue: Wherby we conceyue what standeth with reason, and is well doone, and what séemeth to be so, and is not. Wée haue also framed vnto our selues a language, wherby we do expresse by voyce or writing, all deuises that wée conceyue in our mynde: and do by this means let men looke into our heartes, and sée what wée thinke. Then, as Englishe men can compasse this Arte by wit: so can they also declare and sette it foorth by speache. Nowe whereas a number of men doe suppose, that our language hath no words litte to expresse the rules of this Arte: and where as some men do argue, that it must néedes be so, bycause they that speake or write thereof at large, vse termes and wordes, that no mere English man can vnderstande: It is playn, that neyther their supposition is true: nor [Page] yet their reason good. For as time doth inuent a newe forme of building, a straunge fashion of apparell, and a newe kinde of artillerie, and munitions: so doe men by consent of speache, frame and deuise new names, fit to make knowen their strange deuises. As for straunge and inckhorne termes, (vsed of many without cause) they argue a misuse to be in the speaker: but they proue not directly, that there is anye lacke in oure language: no more then the rudenes of Lawyers latine, proueth that there is a want of good wordes in the Latine tonnge. I sée and confesse, that there be Plura rerum, quàm verborum genera, (that is, moe things, then there are words to expresse things by) and do know withall, that Aristotle founde that want in the Gréeke tongue, whiche for finenesse of speache, and store of woordes, farre excelleth all other languages. Yet is there this helpe in speache, that we ofte vse manye wormes to expresse one thing: yea & sometimes one word is vsed to signifie sundry matters. Moreouer, one language boroweth of another, and where there is want, [Page] men sometimes deuise newe names and compounded termes. So that after a man hath conceyued anye newe deuise in hys heade, and is desirous to haue the same published, and made common to manye, he findeth euer some shifte, by one meane or other, to make the same knowen. And bycause there is none so good a waye to do it by, as speache, man maketh that hys chiefe meane. Thus ye may sée the originall groundworke, & beginning of artes, Man firste doth conceyue trim deuises in his heade, and then (as the Poetes doe feigne of Iupiter) is pained as a womā in trauaile, till he haue vttered and published them, to be sene, & commended of others. So that when as artes are begon at the first by one, and after laboured by many, they grow by continuance of time to perfection, as well in the vtteraunce of the speache, as in the deuise of the minde. As for deuising of newe termes, and compo [...] ding of wordes, our tongue hath a speciall grace, wherein it excelleth many other, & is comparable with the best. The cause is, for that the moste parte of Englyshe [Page] woordes are shorte, and stande on one si [...] lable a péece. So that two or thrée of them are ofte times fitly ioyned in one.

Of these kinde of wordes, I haue deuysed many, and am now to giue a reason of my dooing. But first I desire thée (gentle Reader) not to scoffe at them afore thou knowe what they meane: or that thou hast founde out thy selfe, or learned of others, more apte and fit termes then they are. And if any mā do cast out a reason, and say, Loquendum vt vulgus, that is to say, he that speaketh, must vse such termes as the common people is in vre withall: and therfore that we may not deuise newe names, but reteyne and vse the olde. I answer, this common saying taketh place, where there are words alredy extant, and in vse, fit to make the minde of the speaker, knowne to his audience: but the matter standes not so with vs. Therefore consider the case as it is: An arte is to be taughte in that toung, in which [...] it was neuer written afore. Nowe the question lyeth, whether it were better to borrowe termes of some other toung, in whiche this sayde Arte hath bene written: and by a litle chaunge of pronouncing, [Page] to séeke to make them Englishe wordes, whiche are none in déede: or else of simple vsual wordes, to make compounded termes, whose seuerall partes considered alone, are familiar and knowne to all english men? For trial hereof, I wish you to aske of an english man, who vnderstandeth neither Gréek nor Latin, what he conceiueth in his mind, when he heareth this word a backset, and what he doth conceiue when he heareth this terme a Predicate. And doubtlesse he must confesse, if he consider ye matter aright or haue any sharpnesse of wit at al, that by a backset, he conceiueth a thing that muste be set after, and by a predicate, that he doth vnderstande nothing at all. The like shall fall foorth when comparison is made, betwixt any of our new termes compounded of true english words, and the inkhorne termes deriued of straunge and forain languages: For he that is an englishman born, and vnderstandeth no toung but his owne, shal at the first, eyther conceiue the meaning of oure words by himself, or else soon learne them vpon an other mās instruction and teaching: but for these inkhorne termes, it is certaine, [Page] that he shall neither vnderstande them by himselfe: nor keepe them in remembraunce when he is taught theyr signification of others, bicause the worde can make him no helpe. We therfore, that deuise vnderstandable termes, compounded of true & auncient english woords, do rather maintain and continue the antiquitie of our mother tongue: then they, that with inckhorne termes doe chaunge and corrupt the same, making a mingle mangle of their natiue speache, and not obseruing the propertie thereof. They that will haue no newe woordes deuised where there is want, seme not well to consider howe speache groweth, or wherefore it was deuised by man: For names are not giuen vnto things afore the things themselues be inuented. Therfore olde names will not serue to make newe deuises knowen. It is a fondnesse (I graunt) to deuise newe names, where there are olde in vse, which agréeing to the propertie of the speach, may serue the turne well enoughe. For no man is of power to change or to make a language when he will: but when fit names are deuised and spoken, they force the hearers to [Page] like of them and to vse them: and so do they by consent of manye, growe to a speache. Therfore (gentle reader) if thou doubt, what is ment, by any of our strange and new deuised termes, consider their partes, as they are taken by themselues alone: and the consideration of the partes, shall leade thée to the knowledge of the whole. But if thys shall not serue thy turne, thou maist looke in the table placed in the end of our booke, and it shall shewe thée in order their meanyng, eyther by numbers referring thée to the places, where they are plainely taughte: or making some shorte exposition of them, if there be none in the booke afore. There shalbe added also (for some mens better contentation) the Latine termes. And thus much, for proufe, that this arte maye be taught in oure mother tongue, and for defence of the termes that we haue deuised to teache and set foorth the same. Newe let vs aunswere them, which iudge it hurtfull, to haue thys arte written and setfoorth in englishe. They builde chiefely vppon two poyntes. Fyrst they suppose, that it shoulde bée a greate decaye and hynderaunce vnto learnyng. [Page] Secondlye, that it shoulde minister vnto many, matter of contentiō and strife. The first part of their supposition is proued to be false by plaine experience: for what mā of experience and wit seeth not, that learning did neuer so flourishe in England in our forefathers dayes, as it doth now, and hathe done of late, euen since men haue begon to write of Artes in our englishe tongue? And as for contentiō, which groweth betwixt partie and partie, when they argue and dispute of matters to and fro: that is no fault to be imputed or ascribed vnto arte: but an infirmitie and heate of choller, incident to the nature of sharpe wits, and commonly chancing▪ when men leaue the cause, and bestowe their speache vpon by matters: which thing the arte of reason reproueth, terming it a shift, and a wranglers point. But let vs consider the profite that commeth of this arte, so shall wée beste sée, that learning hath no enemies, but them that are ignoraunt, & those which know not what profite commeth of knowledge. This arte serueth to manye singular purposes. For she doth not onely [Page] teach an order to reason wittily of doubtfull matters, and to speake forceably of them either of or on, But she also yeldeth to them, that are cunning and experte in hir, a generall vnderstanding to iudge of all matters whatsoeuer, and to discerne what is saide or done according to reason, and what is not. And where euery particular science hath but one speciall matter to intreate of, as Arithmeticke to intreate of numbers, Geometrie of bignesse, Physicke of health, &c. This facultie that wée here speake of, is tyed to no speciall matter: but taketh in hand the debating of all things, so farre as wit and reason can extende. Hir preceptes are verye generall, and are vsed for groundes, and principles in all sciences. She trieth whether y• rules of arte be true or false: she is a searching facultie, by reason whereof she teacheth a man the sooner to espy, what is right, what is wrong, what maketh for him, and what maketh against him. But to speake more particularly of hir worke, shée sorteth all wordes, and placeth euery kind by it selfe, eaching what they signifie, as they are [Page] considered, and taken alone: shée declareth what sense words do make, whē they are coupled and knit together: shée painteth foorth the perfect forme of a reasō by rule. And to conclude, shée doth minister matter to confirme, and laye foorth a troth: and teacheth a way, howe to disproue, and discouer an errour. He that is cunnyng in this facultye, shall seme ignoraunt in no learning: and who that is altogether vnséene in this, can be depely seene in none. Doubtlesse a wise man must néedes take great pleasure, and wonder, to see a fewe rules lead men to an infinite knowledge. These things I trowe may profite many, sure I am, they can harme none. A scholer or one that is but a beginner, maye not thinke that he should vnderstande at the first sight, if perchaunce he reade in thys booke at aduenture here or there: For the rules of this Arte are couched together like to billets in a pile of wood: so y• things that are layd downe in order, must be orderlye taken vp: neither doe men draw [...] out billettes at the breast of the pile: but they ascend to the toppe, and taking them [Page] in order as they rise, they quickly dispa [...] mu [...]e with ease: otherwyse they shall hardlye in long time, writh out one from amonges manye. And though these [...]les and termes sems harde at the [...] all strange and vnacquainted thin [...] [...]) yet vse shall make them easye. And [...] vnderstanding of hard pointes, vse these helpes. First consider with yourselfe▪ what the authors purpose is in [...] place, how that speciall point may agrée with the generall issue: then seke to know, what euery word in the sentence maye signifie by it selfe alone: & after weigh what sense they [...]ake as they are all knit, and coupled together: then trie if ought maye [...] put to the sentence, or taken from it, to make it plainer or truer▪ Last of all, seeke for diuers and [...] examples▪ &c. by these meanes ye shall at the length not onely vnderstande the meaning of that ye reade, but also discerne▪ & iudge, whether the saying be true or false: plaine, or obscure. Now to let euerie writer haue his deserued praise, I confesse (to them that desire to knowe whom I folow) that in my thrée firste bookes, I [...]ely folow Aristotle: both for matter, & [Page] also for order: who is in my iudgement, an author, y• farre passeth all prophane writers: not onely for that [...]he writeth more true, and profitable things then others do: but also, for that his manner, and trade of writing, is more perfect and playner, then any others is y• I haue red. As for Ciceronians & suger tongued fellowes, which labour more for fi [...]nes of speach, then for knowledge of good matter, they oft speake much to small purpose, and shaking foorth a number of choise words, and picked sentences, they hinder good learning, wyth their fond [...]hatte. But in my fourth booke, which intreateth of the places, & sheweth a way how to prouide store of arguments: I haue thought good neither fully to folow Aristotle: nor yet anye other that I haue séene. For Aristotles inuention serueth best, for vniuersitie men, when a question is broughte to some generall issue, as to proue that the backset is, or is not, the saywhat, the kinde, the propertie, or the Inbeer of the foreset. Howbeit, men vse in disputing or writing, to argue to and fro, neuer bringing the matter that lyeth in [Page] question, to anye of these foure generall issues. Nowe thoughe the latter writers, thinke they finde iust fault with Aristotle in this behalfe: yet in mine opinion, they themselues neither deuise so many places as may be deuised for store of matter: nor yet name them, or handle them so aptly or handsomly as is méete. If it be my happe, dissenting from all men in this pointe, to finde out a playner and more easye waye, then hath bene found out heretofore, thou oughtest (gentle reader) neither to blame their lacke of skill: nor much to praise my mending. For Artes are like to Okes, which by litle and litle grow a long time, afore they come to their ful bignesse. That one mā beginneth, another oft times furthereth and mendeth: and yet more praise to be giuē to the beginner, then to the furtherer or mender, if the first did finde moe good things, then the folower did adde. Experience teacheth, that eche thing which is inuented by man, hath a beginning, hath an increase, and hath also in time a full ripenesse. Nowe although eche worke is most commendable when it is brought to [Page] his full perfectiō: yet where the workme [...] are many, there is oft times more prayse to be giuen to hym that begynneth a good worke, then to him that endeth it. For if ye consider the bookes that are now printed, and compare them with the bookes that were printed at the first (Lord) what a diuersity is there, and how much do the last exceede the first? Yet if ye wil compare the first and the last Printer together, and seke whether deserueth more praise and commendation: ye shall finde that the first did farre excéede the last. For the last had helpe of manye, and the firste had helpe of none. So that the first lighteth the candle of knowledge (as it were) and the seconde doth but snuffe it. This I write, for that some adding but patches to other mens workes, and after publishing the whole in their owne name, conueigh to themselues (as it were by stealth) the fame & prayse that others doe deserue. As for those that marre y• thing they take in hand to mend, do not only publishe to ye world their own vnskilsulnesse, in finding out any profitable matter: but also doe bewray their vnhabilitie [Page] to iudge of things well found out to their handes. To such I say, it is farre easier for a meane craftes man, to make a worke of his owne deuise, then to finishe the work, that a cunning mā hath begon. I write thus much, bicause some men by suche kinde of dealing, haue misused both my doings & my name. For the booke, named the Philosophers game, and printed about nine yeares ago, is entituled to bée set foorth by Kaphe Leuer, and to be augmented by one W. F. But I assure thee (gentle reader) that, ye pamphlet or worke neuer passed from mée, with so many & so grosse ouersightes, as in the booke nowe printed are common to be sene. For triall wherof, I referre my self to the copy that this day is extant in sundry of my frendes handes. Surely I thinke my selfe muche discredited, and that great wrong is offred vnto me, for that the same is set forth, and suffred to passe vnder my name, without my knowledge, or assent. Reason would, that eche man should beare the blame of his owne deault. But I maruell most at him, which woulde correcte and augment [Page] the tables that I drew forth, for beginners to loke on, when they played at this game. For sure I am, that I comprised in them, both plainly and briefly, all the examples of taking and triumphing, which are possible to be founde, in that kind of exercise. Nowe hath this correcter or augmenter (terme him as ye will) altered, and changed mine examples, in an hundreth places, and moe: committing in eche place, a manifest errour: either leauing out them which are necessary: or interlacing them, which are altogether impertinent to this playe, or vtterly false, and not agréeing, to the rules and principles of Arithmeticke. It were therfore to be wished, y• no mans work shuld be printed, nor no mans name put to any worke, excepte the partie firste knew therof, and were welwilling therevnto: and that they which take in hand to amend or augmēt another mans writing, should vse certaine markes, whreby eche mans doing might appeare by it selfe. So should eche person beare the report of hys owne desert, whether it were good or bad. There are two common markes, y• thys [Page] arte shooteth at: the first is, to make a good reason: the second is, to shewe the faultes of an ill reason. Of the first, I haue written so much, as I thought conuenient and méete: of the second, I mind to write hereafter, if the Lorde God shall make mée able, and occasion me so to do. In the mean time, I haue yelded to the earnest request of my frendes: and haue published thys first part, without the seconde: not mynding for mine own ease to stay that, which is thoughte, will yelde present profite to many. Learne thou (gentle reader) by this which is alreadye written, to make true reasons, and to vse an vpright kind of dealyng: and then shall no coloured or deceiueable arguments driue thée from the trueth, or leade thée into errour. Farewell from Duresme, the. 24. of Nouember. 1572.

§

§

In the table of the faultes, reade for Fol. syde, and for ly [...]e, verse. And knovve, that a shevvsay in Latina is called Pronunciatum, Enunciatio, or Propositi [...]. Why I terme it so, looke. 66. 11.

¶THE FIRSTE booke of Witcraft.

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1

VVhat VVitcraft is.

1 WItcraft is a cunning to frame and to answere a reason.

The partes of a reason.

2 A reason standeth of certayn sayings, and a saying of wordes.

3 So that wordes are the firste and the least partes of a reason: and therfore first to be taught and learned.

4 For he that will kéepe a good trade in teaching, must begin with small and easy matters at the first, and by them procéede to greater and harder poyntes, so farre till at the last he attayne to the ende, which is first in purpose, and last in woorke.

VVhat vvordes are.

5 Words are voyces framed with hart and toung, vttering the thoughtes of the mynde.

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The first deuiding of vvordes.

6 Wordes eyther agrée in sounde, and differ in meaning: or they agrée in meaning, and differ in sounde: or they agrée in bothe: or else they dissent in both.

7 They of the fyrste sorte maye [...]ée termed Lykesounding wordes: They of y• secōd sort, like meaning words: They of the thyrde sorte, playne [...]: [...]ng wordes: and they of the fourth sorte, wordes fully differing one from an other.

Wordes

Lykesounding.

Lykemeaning.

Playnemeaning.

Fully differing.

8 Lykesounding wordes, are woordes of double vnderstandyng, whiche haue one sounde of letters, and accordyng to that one sounde, diuers say whats, expressing sundrie substances.

9 For example thus: The Woodcocke hath let my woodcocke flye away.

10 Nowe thys worde Woodcocke in bothe places of thys [...]ne sentence, for sounde of letters is one and the same:

11 But if ye séeke the true meaning of [Page] this worde Woodcocke, as it is twice placed in this one saying: ye shal fynde in eyther place, a sundry sayewhat, expressing in the first place, an vnwittie man:

12 And in the second place, a bird haunting the woods, and making his flyght of pleasure onely in the twylight.

13 The double vnderstanding of wordes and sayings, must be warely marked, and declaration made of theyr sundrye meanings: that it may certainely be knowen, in what sense they are to be taken.

14 Wordes restrayned to one saywhat ar no lōger words of double vnderstādīg.

15 Lykemeanyng wordes are one in meaning, and diuers in sound as rich, welthie: colour, hue, quickning, bar [...]e, yest:

16 Plainmeaning words haue one soūd, & according to that one soūd, one saywhat.

17 Here we vnderstand such a saywhat as declareth the substance of a thing: and not such a one as only noteth y• force & signification of a worde.

18 Words fully dissenting are such as haue neyther one sound, nor one saywhat: as an herbe, and a trée.

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The second deuision of vvordes.

19 Wordes are also thus deuided, some signifie a thing that hathe his beeing by it selfe: some signifie a thing that hath his beeing in an other.

20 The firste maye be called an Inholder: the seconde an Inbeer. For example thus: Man, beast, herbe, trée, corne, grasse, stones, mettall, fire, ayre, water, earth, and all other substaunces bodyed, or bodylesse, are Inholders:

21 But length, breadth, thicknesse, weight, measure, number, power, shape, vertue, cunning, sleight, vice, ignorance, heate, calde, moystnesse, drynesse, and all other wordes placed in any storehouse, (excepte the storehouse of substance) are inbeers.

an | Inholder | is called in latin | Subiectū.
Inbeer | Accidens.

The thirde deuision of vvordes.

22 There is a third deuision of wordes to be likewise considered.

23 For some wordes are common, and are affirmed of many things, as man is [Page] sayde of many seuerall men.

24 Some are sole wordes, and are sayd but of one thing alone: as Iohn, or this man, are sayd of no moe men then one.

a
common sole
worde.

Certaine preceptes or generall rules to be learned afore ye enter into the treatise of the storehouses.

25 Ther are rules in euery arte, which authors vse as groundes and sure principles, not to be denyed or doubted of.

26 For if nothing shoulde be cleare and certaine of it selfe: then should we be driuen by wranglers from point to point, to make reason vppon reason infinitely, and neuer come to issue of any one matter.

27 Therfore hath God appoynted some things to be euident and certaine of them selues, that they mighte be as stayes to mans wit, and as helpes to fynde out and to discusse things that are not so euident as they are.

[Page] 28 And this is the cause why ye maye not aske of a Principle why so? yet maye principles bée opened to beginners by examples,

29 Whyche is a kynde of proofe by Experience, thoughe it bée no proofe by rule.

30 A common Inholder is sayde of others: but it hathe not hys béeing in an other.

31 A sole Inholder is neyther sayde of any other thing, besides it selfe: nor yet hath his béeyng in any thing, but in it selfe.

32 A common Inbeer is bothe sayde of others: and hathe also his béeyng in others too.

33 A sole Inbeer, hath his béeing in an other: but it is not sayde of any other.

34 Diuers kyndes, whereof one is not subiecte to an other, haue sundrye kynreds, and sundrie differences, as a wight and an arte.

35 For the kinreds of a wyghte, are man and beaste: but the kinreds of arte are, The arte of numbryng, the arte of measuring, witcrafte, speachcraft, starrecrafte. [Page] &c.

36 Agayne, the differences of a wight are flyable, goable, swimmable, and créepable: For one wight differeth from an other by these meanes:

37 But the differēces of artes are, some to teache, to number: some to measure: some to speake: some to reason: some to tel things to come.

Of the ten storehouses, and of their vse.

38 There are tenne generall woordes whiche maye well be called storehouses, not onely for the store of woordes, which they conteyne (comprising all playn meaning wordes,)

39 But also for the good order they kéepe in placing of wordes in their particular roumes, with bréefe rules, (as notes sette on packets,) declaring theyr nature and properties.

40 So that storehouses teach ye nature of simple wordes as they are considered by thē selues. For there is no playnmeaning worde but it signifyeth eyther,

The names of the storehouses.

a

Substance.

Quantitie.

Qualitie.

Respecte.

Dooing.

Suffering.

Where.

When.

Placing.

Hauing.

Of the ten Demaunders.

41 There are also ten demaunders, euery one peculiarlye perteyning to som [...] one storehouse.

The names of the ten demaunders.

1 What?

2 Howe muche, or how many?

3 Whatkynone?

4 To whome, or then what?

5 Dooing what?

6 Suffering what?

7 Where?

8 When?

9 Howe placed?

10 Hauing what?

[Page] 42 What? demaundeth a substance: how much or how many? demaund a quantitie: whatkinone? demaundeth a qualitye: to whom? or then what? demaūde a respecting terme: doing what? demaundeth a doing: suffering what? demaundeth a suffering: where? and when? demaunde tyme and place, with some circumstance either of the person, of the fact, or of the matter: how placed? demaundeth a placing: and hauing what? demaundeth an hauing.

43 For example thus. If you bée asked what is a man? ye must aunswere that which doth appertaine to the substance of a man, saying a mā is a wight indued with sense and reason.

44 But if ye be asked, howe much is a man? or howe many men are they? then must ye aunswere such matter, as pertaineth to the quantitie of a man.

45 And saye for his bignes, according to his length, bredth, thicknes, talnes, grossenes, and so forth, and for the multitude, according to the number they be of, more or lesse.

46 If ye be asked whatkinone is a man? [Page] ye must aunswere, suche thynges as appertaine to the qualitie of a man, as wise, folishe, liberall, couetous, learned, ignoraunt, a runner, lame, sober, hastye swart, faire, blacke, foule, proper, yll fa [...]ored or such like.

47 If ye be asked to whō? or then what? man is this or that: ye must aunswere, father to his sonne: husbande to his wyfe: higher then this thing, or lower then that, which aunswere standeth of respectyng termes.

48 If ye be asked what doth a man? ye must aunswere that a man diggeth, ploweth, soweth, reapeth, buyldeth, playeth, hauketh, hunteth, rydeth, goeth, walketh, which wordes and such like are placed in the Storehouse of doing.

49 If inquirie bée had, what this man or that man hath suffered: y• returne is made that hée hath béene spoyled, robbed, maymed, stiefeled, killed, and these wordes doe importe a suffering.

50 If ye bée asked where thys or that man is? ye must aunswere, wythin, abroade, at home, from home, in the [Page] Citie, or in the fielde, whych sayinges are referred to the Storehouse where.

51 If ye be asked when this man or that man dyd this or that: yée must aunswere, an houre, a daye, a weeke, a moneth, a yeare ago, which sayinges are ascribed to the Storehouse when.

52 If ye bée asked how is man placed? ye must aunswere, he lyeth, be sitteth, he boweth, he leaneth, he frowneth, he smileth, whych woordes doe euer thsynuate a placing.

53 If ye bée asked how man is appareled or furnished: ye must aunswere, he is naked, clothed, armed, weaponed, booted, shodde, frended, monyed, wyued, whych woordes doe alwayes importe an hauing.

54 Here yée must take héede that euery demaunder haue suche an aunswere shappen vnto it, as maye bée placed in the Storehouse, whereto the Demaunder properlye belongeth: other wayes, yée shall not aunswere directlye nor to the purpose.

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Of Substaunce the first Storehouse. Chap. 2.

1 Substaunce is an inholder, the verye groundworke, stay, and vpholder, of quantities, qualities, and all other inbeers.

Hovv substaunce is deuided.

2 There is a sole substance, and a common substaunce.

A
Sole
Substaunce.

Common

3 A Sole substaunce, is a substaunce peculiar and proper to one selfe thing alone, as Iohn, William, this man, or that man.

4 For although many men be called by the name of Iohn, or William, yet when wée adde Iohn, William, or anye other proper name to man, or els adde this, or that to any common worde: wée meane to separate it from all other thinges, and to poynt out a sole thing: so that though these names bée referred to many men, yet the thing meant by them is one selfething.

5 A common substaunce is either a kinred, [Page] or a kynd, conteyning many sole substaunces, as a horse is a kinred, conteining al particuler horses: and a wight is a kynd conteyning al kinredes of beastes, flying, swymming, going, créeping, drawing, or stilstanding.

Of certayne peculiar rules vvhich belong to the storehouse of substance.

1

6 A Sole substaunce is neither sayde of another: nor yet hath being in another.

7 That a sole substaunce is not saide of another it is plaine by examples.

8 For Iohn is verified of nothing in the world, but of himselfe.

9 He is verified of himselfe when wée saye, this man is Iohn, for in this saying, Iohn and this man signifie both one substaunce, though the termes be diuers.

10 And where wée saye, that a sole substaunce hath no being in another, it is proued of the generall rule: which is,

11 That euery substaunce hath a being by it selfe: and not a beyng in another thing.

[Page] 12 That hath beyng by it selfe, whych is knowen to stande in nature by it selfe, and to haue néede of no other thyng, to supporte and beare vp his beyng, as an horse, an Oxe. &c.

13 But that hath beyng in an other thyng, and no staye of it selfe, whych is in an other not as a parte, and yet can not bée wythout the thyng in whych it is.

14 As learning is in man, as no part [...] man, and yet can not bée wythoute man, or some other substance apt for the same: as for substaunces they haue beyng of themselues, and néede no other thing to support them.

2

15 Sole substaunces occupye at one tyme, but one place. Common substances are in no place properly and fitly.

16 Wée saye properly and fitly, because they are sayde, vnfitly and after a sorte, to bée in manye places at once: by reason, all their partes (which are Sole substances) doe at one moment of tyme, eche one occupy his seuerall roume.

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3

17 A part of any sole substance is no substāce: but if it be cut of frō his whole, thē is it no lōger a part, but a substāce by it selfe.

18 For if the partes of a Sole substance shoulde be substaunces: then shoulde there [...]ee no diuersitye betwéene a common and a Sole substaunce.

19 For they differ in this, y• a Sole substāce conteineth but one substance where a cōmon substāce conteyneth many: now where euery whole conteyneth many par tes, it shoulde folow, y• if euery parte of a Sole substance were a substaunce: the [...] should Sole substaunces conteyne manye substances, as common substaunces do.

20 How bée it, in very deede a Sole substaunce conteyneth many partes and is but one substaunce in the whole.

4

21 Sole substances are most properly called substaunces: among common substaunces that alwaies which is nerer to a Sole substaunce is mere properly called a substaunce, then that which is further of: as kinred rather then kynd: yet substāces [Page] of like condition and sort, do admit no degrées of more or lesse.

22 As one man is no more a substaunce, nor no lesse a substaunce then an other mā is: this man rather then this horse.

23 For though this man bée greatter or lesser, worse or better then that man is: yet they are not so saide, in respect of substaunce: but in respecte of quantityes and qualities.

24 The lyke reason may serue for kinreds and for kindes.

5

25 Sole substaunces receyue contraries by a certaine chaunge that is in them selues, as one man some times good, some times bad, some times hote, some tymes colde.

26 Certaine other things may receyue contraryes as well as sole substances do.

37 For this saying: Socrates is sicke, maye bee bothe true and false at diuers tymes.

28 Yet is there this diuersitie, that whē sole substaunces do receyue contraries, it is euer by a certayne chaunge, which is in [Page] [...]e substaunces themselues: but when a saying receyueth contraryes, there is no chaunge in the saying, but in the matter expressed by the saying.

6

29 One substance is not contrary to an other substance, neither is there any other thing contrary to a substance at all.

30 For contraries are two inbeers which driue by course one another oute of their inholder▪ as hote and cold driue one an other out of some bodied substance.

31 Thoughe water driue aire, and aire water out of some vessell: yet these and such like driue eche other as out of a place, being inholders, and not as out of an inholder being inbeers.

32 Euery Sole substaunce standeth of one inholder and many inbeers, in suche sort that neither the inholder coulde haue any being, if all inbeers were taken from it: neither could the inbeers, haue their being alone by them selues, without some inholder, to support and beare them.

33 The thing that standeth of one inhol [...]er, [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] and many inbeers, is called a sole substaunce: for example thus.

34 Any one man is a Sole substance, hys inbeers are length, grossenes, talnes, yeares, vertue, vice, learnyng, ignoraunce, sight, hearing, smelling, tasting, féelyng, sowernesse, swéetenesse, color, shape, beautye, doyng, suffering, office, Lordship, and other thyngs in manner infinite: hys inholder is that Sole nature, that beareth all these.

35 Now as quantities, qualityes, and other inbeers can not bée but in some substaunce: so Sole substaunces should haue no beyng in deede, if all inbeers were seque [...]red and taken from them.

36 Further if all Sole substaunces were taken awaye, then shoulde both all common substaunces be taken away, and all inbeers too.

Hovv Substance is deuided.

37 Substaunce doth admit manye deuisions accordyng to hys manyfolde and gaynse [...] differences, as. 1. a bodyed substaunce, [Page] a bodylesse substaunce. 2. a mortall substaunce, animmortall substaunce. 3. a naturall substaunce, an artificiall substaunce, or a substaunce partlye artificiall partly natural. 4. a lyuing substance, a lyuelesse substaunce. 5. a féelyng substaunce, a substance voyde of sense. 6. a reasonable substaunce, a wytlesse substaunce. 7. a moueable substaunce, an immoueable substaunce. 8. a tame substaunce, a wylde substaunce. 9. an earthlye substaunce, a watery substaunce, an airye substance, a [...]yerye substance. [...]c.

Here foloweth the table of Substaunce.

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Of the seconde Storehouse called Quantitie. Chap. 3.

1 Quantitie is that whereby all thinges are knowne, how many or how fewe, how much or how litle they are.

Hovv Quantitie is deuided.

2 Some quantities stand of seuered and [...]ncoupled partes: as number, speach: [...] of partes that are [...]ed and [...]ed together by some common bounder: as a line, an ouershew, a body, time and place.

3 A common bounder is the end of one thyng and th [...] beginnyng of another, and [...]et part of neither.

The cō mō boū der of a | Lyne | is a | Pricke
Ouershew | Lyne
Body | Ouershew
Tyme | Moment
Place | Lyne

4 That the partes of number are not ioyned or knit together [...] anye common boūder it is plain by particular examples.

[Page] 5 For thrée and fiue being the partes of eight▪ are not coupled together by any cō mon bounder: neither can one shew in a number any common bounder where the partes do meete and ioyne together.

6 The like may be said of speech, for though sillables and words haue some more time in pronouncing, & some lesse, yet are they not ioyned one to another, without pause at all, for then there should be no distinction in speache.

7 That speache is placed in this storehouse, it is plain, bicause it is measured by sillables short and long.

Another diuision of Quantitie.

8 Quantitie admitteth also this diuision that some stande of partes which haue a placing one by another, some stand of parts which haue no placing at all.

9 A line, an ouershew, a body and a place stand of parts that haue a placing, for that their parts are séene to lye somewhere.

10 But in number no mā can shew how his partes are placed one by another, or where they are set, or how they are ioyned [Page] or coupled together.

11 The like may be saide of tyme, for séeing the partes of tyme stay not, howe can they admit any placing.

12 Yet there is an order among the part [...] of time and number: bycause one tyme commeth before, and another time cōmeth after, and in the natural rewe of numbers one is reckned afore two, and two afore thrée, but placing of partes are not eyther in number or time.

13 The like maye be said of speache also, for eche worde and syllable passeth away as it is spoken, so that the partes of speach tarye not, nor stay not to haue anye placing.

14 The least thing that can be imagyned in a number is one: and the least thing that can be imagyned in a lyne is a pricke: here note that one is a parte of eche number, but a pricke is a bounder of a lyne and therfore no part therof.

15 A number is a multitude of ones.

16 A lyne is length without bredth.

17 An ouershew is length, and bredth, without thicknesse.

[Page] 18 A body is length, breadth, and thicknesse.

19 No man can mount by adding to the greatest number: nor come by diuidyng to the smallest bignesse.

20 For as number is able euer to admytte some number to bee added to it, to make it bygger: so is bignesse able euer to admit some bignes to bée taken from it to make it lesse.

21 For euerye bodye is deuisible and hable to bée deuyded into many bodyes, and euerye ouershewe into manye ouershewes, and euerye lyne into manye lynes: and all bygnesse consisteth in these thrée.

23 All kynde of measures which are consydered in respecte onely of length, are referred vnto a lyne, as an intch, a foote, a pace, a fatham, a myle. &c.

24 And those that are consydered in respecte of Length and breadth, are referred vnto an ouershewe, as a tryangle, a foursquare, a circle, a r [...]de, an aker. &c▪

25 And those that are considered in respect [Page] of length, bredth, & thicknesse, are referred vnto a body, as a foote of tymber, a tun [...] of timber, or any other measure where respect is had to these thrée kinds of bignesse.

26 All other measures & weightes which haue no respecte to length, bredth or thicknes, are referred vnto nūber, as an ounce, a pound, a stone, a pynt, a pottle, a peny, a [...]rote, a shilling &c.

27 Tyme is a space or number measured by the course of the heauens, as a mynute, an houre, a day, a wéeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world.

28 A place is an hollow ouershew of an hollow body.

29 These things afore rehearsed, are properlie of them selues called quantities, other thynges vnfitlye, that is, not of them selues but by reason of another, to wit, respect had vnto these.

30 For wée vse sometymes to say, here is muche whyte, or here is a long worke, for that the ouershew where the white is is much: or that the tyme is long while the worke was a doyng.

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Of the propreties of Quantitie.

31 One quantitie is not contrarie to an other: As for many and fewe, greate and little, they are not quantities, but respecting wordes, neyther are they contraries at all.

32 Respecting words they are, for thinges are sayd to be many or fewe: greate or little, in respecte of others of the same kynde: else shoulde there neuer be little hill, or greate musterséede: fewe in a Citie, or many in cribbe.

33 And contraries they are not, bicause they may be said of one thing at one time, as twentie in respect of two are many, but in respect of a thousand, they are but few: so Gogmagog hilles in respect of the Sophisters hilles by Cambridge are greate: but in respecte of the Alpes, they are but small. These therefore and suche lyke, as hang only vpon respect, can haue no contraries at all.

34 One quantitie is bygger or lesser then an other is, as sixtéene is a bigger quantitie then sixe: and a shilling is a lesser quantitie then a pound: yet is not one [Page] [...]e quantitie rather a quantitie, or lesse sayde to be a quantitie then an other.

35 For sixe are as well a quantitie a [...] [...]xscore: and a long lyne is no more a line then a short lyne is.

36 This is a thing moste peculiar and propre to quantitie, that by it things shold [...]e equal or vnequall one to an other.

37 As one body is equall or vnequal to an other body: one ouershewe equall or vnequal to an other ouershewe: one lyne to an other line: one time to another time: one place to an other place: one number to an other number: as for like and vnlyke they are euer sayde of qualities proprely, as one color like or vnlike to an other colour: one voyce lyke or vnlike to an other voyce: one fashion ly [...]è or vnlyke to an other fashion.

Of the thirde Storehouse called Qualitie. Chap. 4.

1 Qualitie is that wherby men are led to knowe whatkinone eche thing is.

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Of the deuision of Qualitie.

2 This storehouse is parted vnto foure seuerall roomes.

3 The firste roome conteyneth those qualities which are giuen to the inholder by nature, and those also which come by reason nature is letted of hir course.

4 The second roome conteyneth those which the inholder getteth by doyng.

5 The thirde conteyneth sensible qualities, and affections of the mind.

6 The fourth conteineth the shape and forme of euery thing.

Of Qualities first roome.

7 In the first roome are placed all the powers eyther of the bodye alone, of the soule alone, or of that, that standeth of thē both: to this place are added also, al weaknesse and want of power naturall.

8 Weakenesse and want, differ in thys, for that of Weakenesse there bothe procéede imperfecte actions: but of [Page] [...]ant there can aryse no action at all.

9 As blearednesse causeth a man thrugh weakenesse of sight to iudge vnperfectely of colours: but blyndnesse through wa [...]t of sight, lettes a man to giue any iudgement of colour at all.

10 Power is a gifte of nature, wherby the Inholder may the better doe, or with lesse harme suffer.

11 The common Inholder of wordes placed in this roume is very generall. For there is no substance which hath not some power.

12 Here is to be noted, that no inholder is sayde to want any power, which eyther nature hath not appointed it should haue: or else the tyme of hauing it, is not fully expired.

13 For it is vnproprely said, that either a stone, or a chylde newe borne, wanteth power to goe or to runne of it selfe. For God hath not ordeyned that a stone shuld goe or runne at all: and the tyme is not yet come, for a newe borne chylde to doe eyther.

14 But if the tyme bée fully expyred [Page] when as nature hath appoynted, that children should goe and runne of themselues, and that certain children at that tyme can doe neyther: then may it well be sayde, that suche children lacke power to go, and are lame.

15 Here is to be noted, that from power to want, wée may fall both by nature and by chaunce: but to returne from want to power agayne, it is impossible.

16 As from sight to blyndnesse, from speache to dumbnesse, we may fall at any tyme: but the returne from dumbnesse to speache, or from blyndenesse to sight, is a thing that can not be broughte to passe, eyther by arte, or nature, or anye other meane, (Gods extraordinarie dooings only excepted.)

17 Note further, that the power is not alwayes taken awaye where the instrument is hurt for a tyme, or letted: as if a mans eyes, toung, and eares, were so hurt for a tyme, or letted, that hée coulde neyther heare, speake, nor sée,

18 Yet were it not for all that to bée sayde, that the power of his seeing, speaking [Page] or hearing were taken awaye or diminished: but rather that the action and worke of his eares, toung, and eyes, were letted for a tyme.

19 If the instrumente of sense be so hurt, that it be vncurable, and neuer able to do any part of his woorke, then do wée saye, that the power is vtterly destroyed or taken away.

20 Memorie of things past, iudgemēt of things present, forsight of things to come, & other qualities of the mynd, as they are giuen to any inholder by nature, are placed in the first roome of qualitie: but as they are increased by arte and diligence, in the seconde.

Of Qualities second roome.

21 Qualities that are gotten by dooing, are eyther déepely rooted in their inholder, and continue in it long: or else they come and goe lightly, and tarie but a short time.

22 Uertue, vice, sciēce, knowledge, arte, crafte, cunning, sleyght, vr [...]. &c. whiche a man can not soone alter and chaunge, are [Page] are suche dispositions, as commonly take déepe roote in their inholder, and by reason of long vse, and many actions wherof they growe and spring, they maye bée called grounded dispositions.

23 But sodeyn anger, light displesure, small knowledge, a smattering sight. &c. for that they spring and ryse of fewe actions, come & go lightly, and therefore may be termed wauering dispositions, these béeing as it were, the first entrie into setled dispositions.

24 The inholder of qualities placed in this roome is not so generall, as is the inholder of those of the firste roome. For this inholder is but eche wight, which by practise can attayne to any good or badde trade, in dooing of things well or yll.

Of Qualities thirde roome.

25 In the third roome of this storehouse wée place all suche qualities as eyther proprely moue one of the fiue senses: as coloure moueth sighte: sounde hearing: sauours smellyng: tast tastyng: heate [Page] colde, moystnesse, drynesse, hardnesse, softnesse, and feeling.

26 Or else the affections of the mynde, as mirth, gladnesse, grief and feare, with other affections whiche spring of these in maner infinite: as mercie, pitie, loue, lenitie, softnesse of mynde, hope, affiaunce, trust, enuie, hate, disdayne, spyte, distrust, contempte, palenesse, blushing, trembling. &c.

27 Affections consydered as they are giuen of nature, muste bée placed in the firste roome of thys storehouse: but consydered as they are gotten by dooing, in the seconds: and béeyng taken as they moue the outward or the inward sense, in the third: we sée, heare, smell, tast, & feele,

28 By receiuing a certaine influence, and suffering of an action that doeth procéede from the thing séene, hearde, smelt, tasted, or felte, into suche partes of eche wightes bodie, as hath in it those foresayd senses.

Of Quantities fourth roome.

29 In this roome are placed the forme & figure, shape, and fashion of euery thing.

[Page] 30 The inholder of words in the third or fourth roome of this storehouse, is the same that is of those whiche are placed in the first roome.

Of Qualified things.

31 There are certayne wordes whiche do signifie qualified things, relation had, bothe to the qualitie, and to the inholder thereof.

32 As a iust man, a liberal man, a craftesman, a lame man: or iust, liberal, lame, withoute adding the inholder in whyche they are. These are to be placed in the roomes of the qualities, wherof they are deriued.

Of the propreties of qualities, and of qualified things.

33 Some qualities and qualified things haue contraries, and some haue none: as right is contrarie to wrong: and a righteous man is contrary to an vnrighteous man.

34 But qualities and qualified things whiche are placed in the first and fourthe roome: yea and many of those which are [Page] placed in the seconde and thirde roome, of this storehouse, admitte no contraries at all.

35 Qualities and things qualified, admit degrées of more and lesse, as among many learned men it is commonly seene that one is more or lesse learned then an other.

36 This rule taketh place not in all. For among many circles, triangles, and squares, one is not sayde to bée rather a circle, then an other: or rather a triangle, or a square.

37 Here is to be noted, that qualities considered as they are in fome inholder, admitte degrées of more and lesse: but if ye in minde seuer them from their inholder, and consider them apart, (as ye define them and tell what they are) then doe they admitte no degrées of more or lesse.

38 For all and euery arte of Physike doe equally and indifferently agree to the say what of Physike: but Hippocrates physike, and [...] physicke admit degrees, the one béeyng more and the other [Page] lesse, and so dothe Fuchsius physicke alone considered, when he had great experience, and when he had small.

39 To make things lyke or vnlyke, is a worke belonging only to qualitie.

40 If any man gaynsay this rule, affirming that it is commonly and truely sayde, howe that one man is lyke or vnlike to an other, in going, ryding or speaking: which things béeing deedes and no qualities, the foresayde rule maye séeme vntrue:

41 It may be answered, that the lykelynesse standth not in the action it selfe proprely and in very déede: but in the maner of dooing, which is referred to the store house of qualitie.

42 For the murtherer and the hangman doe both kill and committe one generall action: yet the maner of dooing in them is diuers, whiche causeth the one to be guiltie, and the other guiltlesse.

43 For it is not the déede, but the maner of dooing, that maketh the cryme.

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Of Respecting vvoordes. Chapter. 5.

1 Respecting wordes be of two sortes, some are called respecting words proprely: some are termed respectyng woordes in parte.

2 Respecting woords, proprely so called, are two yokefelowes, whose nature and being is, the one to depende and haue his béeing vppon the other, as a husbande, a wyfe, a maister, a seruaunt.

3 Respecting words in part depend not so straightly eche vpon other, that of force they must bée and cease to be both at once: but the one may be though the other were not at all: as knowledge and knowable:

4 For though there were no reasonable creature in the whole world, (which thing presupposed there could be no knowledge) yet should many things remain to be knowen, whiche maye be termed, and are in déede, knowable.

5 Though one husbande haue manye wyues: one father, manye sonnes and daughters: one frend, many frendes: one [Page] king, many kingdomes: yet these béeing many in numbre, beare no other respect to their yokefellowes, nor their yokefelowes to them, then if they were but one a péece.

6 For he is as wel a husband, a father, a frende, a king, that hathe but one wyfe, one chylde, one frende, one kingdome, as he that hath neuer so many: so that many and fewe in this case, haue all one respect in reason.

The propreties of respecting vvordes.

1

7 Respecting wordes proprely so called are and cease to bée bothe at once: but respecting wordes in parte doe not so.

2

8 He that knoweth and is able to saye what one of the respectyng woordes is: muste of force knowe and be able to saye what the other is also.

3

9 There are degrées in some respecting wordes, but not in all:

10 For one man beeing lyke to many [Page] men, may be lyker to one man than to an other: but one father can be no more, nor no lesse a father to one chylde than to an other.

4

11 Some also haue cōtraries, some none at all, as bondage is contrary to libertie: riches to pouertie: but single, double, thréefolde, father, mother, and suche lyke, haue no contraries at all.

5

12 Respecting wordes depende and hang eche vppon other: and so that one of them is not afore or after an other in tyme.

13 In this storehouse are placed al wordes that signifie any comparison or proportion, any equalnesse, or vnequalnesse, any lykelynesse or vnlykelynesse, anye office or officer, anye cause or effecte, anye whole, or any parte, any ende, or meanes tending to anye ende, anye age, any degrée, anye diuersitie of kynde, anye kinrede or affinitie, any societie or fellowshippe, and other moe in manner infinite.

[Page] 14 If ye doubte in what storehouse to place any word, the surest way is to place it here.

15 For many kynds and kinreds which considered by them selues alone, are to be placed in some other storehouse, may (vppon respect had with others) be also right well assigned vnto this.

Of dooing and sufferyng. Chapter. 6.

1 Dooing and sufferyng are respectyng wordes, and differ not in matter, but in respecte.

2 For they bothe are but one mouyng, whiche considered as a thing being in the inholder from whence it commeth, is called a dooing: But if the same mouing or action be referred to the inholder whyche receyueth it, then it is called a suffering. For example thus.

3 The murtherer and the murthered, cōmunicate in one mouing or deed: which deed or mouing considered as it commeth from the murtherer, is an action or doing: But consydered as it is receyued of the [Page] thing that is murthered, it is a suffering.

4 Of this it is playne, that dooing is a mouing, procéeding from the dooer: and suffering is a mouing receyued of the sufferer.

Of the propreties of dooing and suffering.

1

5 Dooing and suffring are both at once, and one is not afore nor after an other.

2

6 Doing and suffering are in two dyuers inholders: yet may two bodies meeting togither in one acte, be bothe doers and bothe sufferers at once: as when two cuppes doe pushe together, eyther putting force vnto other, and eyther receyuyng force from other.

7 They admitte degrées of more and lesse: and some haue contraries, and some haue not.

Of the tvvo Storehouses, VVhere, and VVhen. Chapter. 7.

1 Where and when, differ from place and tyme, for that they haue alwayes respecte [Page] vnto some matter that was mentioned afore: where as time and place are knowen and defined as they are considered by themselues, without respect had to any other thing.

2 For if any man should heare one saye where? (no talke had afore hand) he would straight way thinke with him self, where what? looking for some person, fact or matter, that he might appoynt to some place, thereby to aunswere the question.

3 Therefore where, is not a place but a declaring of things which shal be, are, or haue bene in place.

4 And when, is not a time, but a shewing of things done or to be done in time.

Hovv, vvhere and vvhen, are deuided.

5 As time and place are deuided, so are where and when.

6 Tyme is deuided into tyme to come, time present, and time past.

7 It may also be many other wayes deuided, by reason of the manifold varietie of matters that chaunce in it.

8 As the time of warre, y• time of peace, [Page] the time of dearth, the tyme of plenty, the tyme of sicknesse, the time of health, the time of shutting in the dores, the tyme of opening of the dores.

9 Furthermore, spring, summer, haruest, winter, are seuerall seasons and tymes of the yeare.

10 Likewise a minute, an hour, a day, a wéeke, a moneth, a yeare, an age, a world, are common wordes, vsed of men to note and set forth particular times.

11 There are sixe differences of place, as aboue, beneath, on the right side, on the left side, afore, and behind.

12 These are two wayes taken, eyther as they are placed in respecte to vs warde: or els as they are appoynted by nature.

13 Althoughe aboue and beneath: on the ryghte syde, and on the lefte: afore, and behynd: in respect to vs warde, bee not alwayes one and the same, but alter as wee are altered: yet in nature they are alwayes certayne.

14 For aboue, by nature is that where vnto light things ascend.

[Page] 15 Beneath, that where vnto heauye things descend.

16 The right syde, which is toward the Weast.

17 The left side, which is toward y• East.

18 Afore, which is towarde the South.

19 Behind, which is toward the North.

20 For trées and plantes haue héeles, which whiles they growe in the earth, are alwayes toward the North.

21 Aboue and beneath, are the begynninges of length: the right side, and the lefte syde, are the beginnings of bredth: afore and behind, are the beginninges of thicknesse.

22 Places are thus deuided, some are naturall, some artificiall, some fained, some neare, some farre of: some holy, some prophane: some common, some priuate: some healthful, some contagious: some fertill, some baren: some hote, some colde, some temperate.

23 There are manye other deuisions of time and place, and they in maner infinit: but of these fewe anye meane wit maye with ease finde oute manye moe to serue [Page] his purpose as he shal be occasioned.

Of the ninth Storehouse, called Placing. Chap. 8.

1 This Storehouse conteineth al words that signifie any placing, setting, or ordering of a thing, as to hang, to sit, to lye, to bowe, to bend, to compasse, to mowe, to fleare, to frowne, to bée scattered, to be imbaulmed, to be inrolled. &c.

2 Here is to be noted, that frowning taken for a mouing, is an action: but beyng taken for the browes knit and drawne to gether: it is a placing.

3 Words placed in this Storehouse, haue no contraries at all, some admit degrées of more and lesse, and some do not.

Of the tenth Storehouse called hauing. Chap. 9.

1 Some take hauing onely for an apparelling, howbeit, it is much more larglye taken.

2 As for an apparelling, it is but eyther when one thyng is hanged vpon another, as when a horse is trapped,

[Page] 3 Or when one thing is set to another, as when a shaft is fethered,

4 Or els when one thing compasseth an other in part, or in whole, as when one is ringed or armed.

5 But hauing, is of anye thing whatsoeuer, whether the thing had be a substance a quantitie, a qualitie, or els referred to any other of the Storehouses, or of things exempted out of the Storehouses.

6 And therfore this storehouse teacheth vs not so muche to consider the nature of the thinges that are had: as to marke what commeth of the hauing of suche and such things.

7 Many men thinke, that many wordes placed in this Storehouse, admit degrées of more and lesse: and that some haue contraryes also.

8 Bicause it is commonly said that some men are better monyed then others, better frended, better weapned: and that thys man is armed, and that man vnarmed: that he is frended, and he foed.

9 Howbeit, if the matter bée throughly [...]ted, the increase and the contrarietie [Page] standeth not in the hauing of these things: but in the things that are had.

10 Though euery plain meaning worde haue his proper place in some one Storehouse alone: yet may the same indirectly & after a sort be also referred to some other.

11 As a father is properlye a respecting word: but indirectly he may bée taken for a substaunce, bicause a father is a man, which is properly a substaunce.

12 The cause is, for that thinges which directly perteine to an inholder, are so [...]e tymes in common speach indirectly sayd [...] of hys inbeer.

13 And againe, such thinges as properly belong to some inbeer: are sayde of hys inholder.

14 So we saye, a lyne is an inholder of straightnesse: yet indirectly, for directly a bodyed substaunce, is the proper inholder of straightnesse, and not a line.

That Storehouses helpe to inlarge a matter, and that euerye vvord may after a sorte be deduced through them all.

[Page] 15 The Storehouses serue: not onely to teache vs the sorce and nature of ech plain meanyng word, as whether it doth signifye a substaunce, a quantitie, a qualitie, a respect &c.

16 But they serue also to amplifie and to set for the a matter at large, and then they teache vs to séeke the substaunce, the quantitie, the qualitie, the respecte, th [...] place, the tyme, the ordering and the hauing of the thing wée speake of, and so to deduce one woorde throughe all the Storehouses. Which though it bée properly placed in some one: yet indirectlye and after a sorte, it maye be deduced and brought through them all.

Woordes exempted out of the Storehouses. Chap. 10.

1 These nyne kinde of words following, are exempted out of the Storehouses, as not properly placed in any one of them.

1

2 The words of art inuented to expresse y• rules of any sciēce, as a nown, a pronown, [Page] a verbe, &c. a foreset, a backset, a shewsay. &c.

2

3 Unperfite wordes, which by them selues teach the hearers no matter, but serue onely, to helpe to furnishe out a sentence, and to make it perfite, as, or, if and, &c.

3

4 Wordes that signifie lacke or want of any natural power, as, dumbnesse, deaffenesse, darkenesse. &c.

4

5 Wordes that signifie matters which are not in déede, but are fayned to bee, as Hobthrus, rawhed, purgatorie.

5

6 Wordes that signifie a parte of any whole thing, as an hand, a soote, a legge, an arme: so long as they remaine partes not seuered from their whole.

6

7 God for that he is infinite, and not able to be comprehended of any thing, howbeit some men doe iudge him to be a most perfect substaunce.

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7

8 Wordes that signifie all things without destinction, as a thyng, a matter, a whatsicallit.

9 The Storehouses are called generall wordes, for that they containe manye, but these may be termed surmounting generalls, bycause they containe all.

8

10 Two or moe wordes expressing matter that is contained in diuers Storehouses, as a white horse a righteous man.

11 For white and righteous are placed in one Storehouse: and man and horse in another.

9

12 Wordes of double vnderstanding: for these afore they bée restrayned to one saywhat, maye haue place in diuers Storehouses: and therefore vnfit to be assygned to one.

Hovv vvordes of double vnderstanding maye be knovven. Chap. 11.

1 What like sounding wordes are, and [Page] howe in arguing and conference of talke they are to be restrained to signify but one thing, we haue said afore.

2 Now for the better discussing of y• matter, we shall shew a meane how one maye be sure, that this or that word is of double vnderstanding: and yelde a reason for the same.

3 But here we wil onely set forth certain rules, to discerne such as cannot easely bée perceyued of many: for those which easely shew themselues, néede no teacher.

1

4 First if anye of his gay [...]ettes bée of double vnderstanding: then is the principall also, as:

5 Sharp, is a word of double vnderstanding: for his contrarie gainset, in voyce is, flat: and in edge, dull.

6 Therefore it must folow of necessiti [...] that it is not one sharpnesse, which is contrarye to flatnes in voyce, and to dulnesse in edge.

2

7 If it be found to be in many storehouses, as this worde grey sig [...]fiyng a beast [Page] that pastureth in the night, is a substance: but signifying a colour mixed, and made of blacke and white, it is a qualitie.

3

8 If it be perceyued by dyuers senses, as clearenesse, for it is not one and the same clearenes that is sene & heard: the one consisting in colour and the other in sound.

4

9 If his ofspring be diuersly taken, then is his originall also: or contrary wise if in the originall there be doublenesse, then is there dublenesse in the ofspring too, as,

10 If to iudge rightly [...]e two wayes takē, the one to gyue sentence accordyng to the euidence broughte in: the other to gyue sentence accordyng to the truthe of the matter:

11 Then must a ryghteous iudge be two wayes taken, that is, righteous so farre as [...]idence leadeth: and righteous so farre as truth requireth.

5

12 If a worde haue diuers saywhattes, not differyng onely in wordes, but also in meaning.

[Page] 13 And here it is sometimes good to consider the say whattes of wordes as they are defined and set forth wh [...] they are coupled and ioyned with other wordes.

14 For taking so much awaye from the saywhattes, as is proper to ech worde annexed to the originall: the rest in all the saywhattes, must be one and the same.

15 For example thus: if ye ioyne to this word cleare, aire, and voyce, defining a cleare aire, and a cleare voyce seuerally: and then after take so muche from either say what, as properly apperteyneth to aire and voyce: the rest that remayneth in both the saywhattes, shal be one, if cleare were a plaine meaning word.

16 Nowe the thing that remaineth▪ is not one, and therefore cleare is diuersly taken.

17 For a cleare voyce is a voyce pleasant to the eare, wythout horsenesse, or iarring.

18 But a cleare aire, is an aire voyde of cloudes: so that voice, and aire, taken from these two saywhattes, the rest that remaineth is not one in them both.

[Page] 19 For pleasant to the eare, and wythout horsenesse or iarring, is a thing dissenting muche from that which is voyd of cloudes.

20 By these meanes and suche lyke, woordes are proued to bée of double vnderstanding,

Of disagreeable vvordes. Chap. 12.

1 Wordes which cannot be coupled and ioyned together in a true & perfect yeasay, are either differing wordes, or gainsettes.

2 Differing wordes, are those whereof one differeth from many, in lyke manner and sort.

3 Gaynsettes are two disagréeable words wherof the one so setteth foote against the other, as against no other thyng in lyke sort: in so muche that neither the one can be affirmed of the other: neither they both of any third thing, at one time, and in one respecte.

4 These gaynsets are deuided into foure sortes: into contrarye termes, respectyng terms, depriuing terms, & denying terms.

[Page] 5 What contrarie termes and respecting termes are: we haue said afore.

6 Depriuing termes are taken in thys place, not onelye for wordes that note a want of naturall power: but for wante and power compared together, as Lighte, Darknesse.

7 In lyke manner denying termes are taken, both for the yeaword, which affirmeth: and also for the nayword, which denyeth: as a man, no man: a stone, no stone.

8 Here is to be noted that the nayword, which is infinite, conteyneth all thinges, saue his yeaward, which hath his limitation and is certain, and as they both are said of no one [...]hing, so the one of them is verified of euery thing.

VVhat difference there is betvvene depriuyng termes and contrarye termes.

9 Depry [...]ing termes differ from contrary termes which haue no meane, for that the one of such contrary termes, must at all tymes be in his inholder: where as [Page] the depriuing termes, may for a tyme bée both absent.

10 I meane the time, afore power commeth to the inholder by nature.

11 Now from contrarye termes whych haue a meane, they differ in this:

12 For that there is a time appointed by nature, when as the one of the depriuing termes must of force bee saide of hys inholder: but of contraryes which haue a meane, there is at no tyme anye suche necessitie.

13 For example thus. After nyne dayes that a bitch hathe whelped, hir whelpes must of force either see or bée blinde: but afore the time be expired that nature hath set and appoynted that whelpes shoulde sée in, ye can not ryghtlye saye that the whelpes are either blind or do sée.

14 As for white, and blacke, which are contraryes that haue a meane, they haue no suche force in a whelpe at anye tyme, that the one muste bée in it, and the other from it,

15 Bicause the whelpes may at all times be of some other meane colour.

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Hovve many vvayes one thing is said to be afore or after another. Chap. 13.

1 The first and principall way that one thing is sayde to bée afore another, is, in tyme.

2 For that whych is more auncient, is said to be afore that, which had his being in a latter season.

3 As, King Henry the eight, was in time afore King Edward the sixt.

4 The second way that one thing is said to bée afore another, is, by nature: as when the being of the latter, inforceth, a beyng of the former, but contrarye wise, the sequele of the former, shall not inferre a necessary sequele of the latter.

5 The kynd and the kinred, the general and the special, are fit examples to teache the meaning of this rule.

6 For if there be a man here, it foloweth of force, that the same bée a wight: but the sequele on the contrarye parte, is not good: that if there be a wight here, the same should be a man▪

[Page] 7 For there are many wightes whiche are no men.

8 Therefore wée holde, that the general is in nat [...]re afore the speciall, and that Iohn, William, and other seuerall men, muste firste be substaunces, creatures, bodies, and wightes, afore they come to be men.

9 The third way that one thing is said to be afore an other, is, when things goe one afore an other in order: as letters are lerned afore syllables, and syllables afore words: substance is placed afore a quantitie, and quantitie afore qualitie.

10 The fourth waye that one thing is sayde to be afore an other, is, when one thyng passeth and excéedeth an other in woorthynesse: as the king is a [...]ore his subiect in honoure: the maister afore his seruant, by estimation:

11 For that the King and the mayster, passe and excéede, the subiect and the seruant, in worthinesse.

12 Of this it is cleare, that one thyng is sayde to be afore an other foure manner of wayes: as,

Afore in

1 tyme.

2 nature.

3 [...].

4 woorthynesse.

13 After, is so many wayes taken as afore is.

14 For gaynsettes haue lyke trade in teaching: and he that knoweth one gaynset, must needes know the other.

Of the beeing of things at once. Chapter. 14.

1 Those things are most proprely sayd to bee at once, whiche are doone, or haue their beeing, bothe at one tyme.

2 As twinnes are bothe at ones: or as the Eclipse of the Sunne and the direct [...] placing of the Moone, betwéene our sighte and it, are bothe at once.

3 In nature those things are sayd to be at once, which are suche as the beeing of the one, followeth vppon the being of the other, and yet neyther of them cause of others béeing.

4 As a husbande and a wyfe, a double [Page] parte, and an halfepart, are bothe at once by nature.

5 For if there be a wyfe, then is there a husbande: and if there be a husbande, then is there a wyfe.

6 Againe, if there be a thing that is a double part: then is there a thing, that is an halfe part to that double.

7 And yet is an husband no more cause of the béeing of a wyfe, then a wyfe cause of the beyng of an husband: nor a double parte any more the cause of an half part, then an halfe parte is cause of a double parte.

8 Membres of one diuysion are also sayd to be all at once, as,

9 Man and beaste béeyng membres of one deuisyon, are supposed by Nature to bée bothe at once, and one of them not to be afore or after an other.

10 But a man and a wight are not both at once, in the respect of nature.

11 Bicause a wighte is mannes generall, and Nature alwayes supposeth the generall, to be afore his specials.

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Of mouing. Chap. 14.

1 Mouing is not only taken for the passing of a bodied substaunce from place to place: but mouyng is also taken for the begetting or corrupting of a substance: for the increasing or diminishing of a quantitie: or else for the altering of a qualitie.

2 Begetting or ingēoring is a mouing, making that to bée in déede, whiche afore was but in power to be.

3 Corrupting is a mouing, causing that thing not to bée whych afore had a beeing.

4 Begetting and corrutyng are but one mouing, considering the acte in it self, being in déed but one act, and done at once.

5 They differ, onely in respecte of the sundrye bodyes, wherevnto they are referred.

6 For whatsoeuer is corrupted, is corrupted into some thing, that succéedeth in his place:

7 And whatsoeuer is ingendred or begotten, ariseth of some thing, which ceaseth to be, that the other may succéede in his roome. For example thus:

8 In the burning of wood or any other [Page] matter, thys acte referred vnto the wood that is burned, is called a corrupting: for it taketh away the wood, and causeth it to haue no longer a beeing in nature.

9 But if you referre the selfe same act of burning, vnto the smoke, flame, & ashes that arise of the wood, when it is consumed by fire: it is called an ingendring or begetting.

10 Nowe looke howe the wood consumeth by little and little: and so doe ashes, smoake, and flame, arise and spring.

11 So that a man may playnly sée, that as one substance passeth away, and is cō sumed to naughte: an other substunce springeth vp, and succeedeth in his roome.

12 And agayne, as one substance commeth vp and is begotten, an other substance [...]asseth to be, and makes (as a mā would say) roome for it: For else it coulde not haue any béeing in nature at all.

13 Ther is no space or distance of time, betwixt begetting, and corrupting: neither is the one of them before, or after an other, but both at once, euen at one instant and moment of time.

[Page] 14 If this were not, ye should bée forced to graunte, that eyther two bodyes myghte bée in one place at once: or else that there were a place in nature vtterly voyde of any bodie at all.

15 For whē a new thing is made, which must fill a place by it self, and no former thing taken awaye to make roome for it: th [...]r must be either a voyd place in nature to receiue it: or else there must be two bodies in one place at once, that whiche is newly made, and that which was afore.

16 Nowe neyther of these two wayes can be, as wée may learne by many experimentes.

17 Therfore it followeth of necessitie, that the bringing in of a newe bodie into the frame of nature, is a taking awaye of some former body, whiche had a beeing in the same frame afore.

18 Increasing is a mouyng that causeth a greater quantitie: and diminishing that causeth a lesse.

19 Altering is a chaunging from qualitie to qualitie: as when a man chaungeth from vertue to vice.

[Page] 20 Many men d [...] hold an opinion, that nothyng can be increased or diminished in quantitie: but that the same doth withall admitte an alteration of qualitie▪ a chaunge of place, and an ingendring of substaunce.

21 Howebéeit experience doth teach the contrarie.

22 For a square iuste compassyng the two sydes of a fouresquare platte, augmenteth the quantitie, and nothyng altereth the for [...]e thereof.

23 Lykewyse, when things are altered in any qualitie, they are not of force withall, eyther increased or diminished: ingendred or corrupted: or else moued from place to place.

24 The forme of a square in numbres is this, [...] [...] in bignesse this [...]

25 The forme of a fouresquare platte in numbres is this, [...] [...] in bygnesse, thys, [...]

26 Mouing in oure Englishe tongue is most proprely, and in manner altogither taken for mouing in place, so that it being [Page] but a parte, boroweth in our speache, th [...] name of hys whole: for that it hathe no speciall name of his owne, as other particular mouings haue.

Of contrarietie in mouing.

27 Generally, rest is contrarie to mouing: but particularly begetting is contrarie to corrupting: and increasing to diminishing: and mouing in place, to resting in place: or else mouing vpwards contrarie to mouing downeward.

28 And as for alteration which is a mouing in qualitie, it hath eyther rest from suche a mouing, to bée his contrarie: or else a chaunge into a contrarie▪ qualitie.

The second boke of Witcraft.

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Chap. 1.

1 IN our former booke we haue intreated of the Storehouses, shewing the nature and dis [...]nction of wordes, and began wyth that whych was the smallest part, and portion of this arte.

2 It followeth nowe in due order, that from woordes wee procéede to intreate of sayings, for that sayings are immediatlye framed of wordes.

3 Both words and sayings are meanes to expresse the thoughtes of the minde: but sayings expresse the thoughts of the mind, as matter is coupled to matter: and words expresse the thoughtes of the minde without any ioyning of thyngs together at all.

4 Thoughtes of the minde, and matters wherof men vse to speake and to write, vs in all countryes one and the same in kind: but letters and the voyce whereby suche things are vttered, are not.

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VVhat a saying is.

5 A saying is a voyce whose seueral partes do by consent signifie some matter.

6 I saye by consent, for that euery language or speache groweth by consent, and is learned by imitating and followyng of others: neither is there any toung gyuen naturally to man without a teacher, as weeping and laughing are.

That there are diuers kyndes of sayings, and vvhich of them are proper to this arte.

7 There is a perfect saying, and an vnperfect saying.

8 A perfect saying maketh a perfect sense of it self, as, man is mortall.

9 An vnperfect saying causeth the hearer to looke for moe woordes to make vp a full meanyng, as, man mortall.

10 Agayne a perfecte saying is deuided into three sortes, into a shewsay, a bidsaye, and a wishsaye.

11 In the firste wée shewe or declare, in [Page] the seconde wée bid or commaunde, in the thirde wee wyshe or desire things to be or not to bée.

12 For example thus: Iohn commeth hether, is a shewsay: come hether Iohn, a biosaye: I woulde Iohn came hether, a wishsaye.

13 Of these the shewsaye onelye appertayneth to thys arte, for it onely maye be true or false.

Of the Shevvsay, and firste vvhat a shevvsaye is. Chap. 2.

1 A shewsaye is a perfecte saying standing of a nowne and a shewing verbe.

The matter of a shevvsay.

2 A nowne and a verbe are the matter wherof a shewsay doth stand.

Of a Novvne.

3 A nowne is a voyce signifying some thing by consent, & noting besids no difference of tyme, whose partes seuerally taken, signifie no matter: as a mā, an herbe, [Page] an house, vertue, righteousnes. &c.

4 As for letters and syllables, they signifie a sounde onely, and doe not further importe any matter.

5 An houre, a day, a moneth, a yeare, doe lymit and appoynte tymes: but yet they note no difference of tyme, as the Uerbe doth, who euer includeth either tyms presente, tyme past, or tyme to come, which are ryghtlye called the diff [...]rences of tyme.

Of a Verbe.

6 A Uerbe is a woorde notyng some difference of tyme, vnto the which if yee adde a nowne in fitte order, there dothe aryse a perfect vnderstandyng, as, is, was, shalbe.

Of the forme of a shevvsay, and vvhat appertayneth to the perfecte knovvledge therof.

7 Moe thyngs appertayne to the forme of a shewsay then to the matter.

8 For to the forme it appertayneth to [Page] consider whether the shewsaye be simple or compounded, one or manye: secondlye whether it bee a shewsaye of the fyrste order or of the seconde: thyrdlye, howe the backeset agreeth or disagreeth wyth the foresette: fourthly, how the one of them maye bee changed into the roume or place of the other: fiftlye, which shewsaye is generall, whyche speciall: 6, which affirmeth whyche denyeth: 7, which is true, which is false: 8, which is an impossible shewsaye, whych is a necessarye shewsaye, and whych is a chaunceable shewsaye: 9, what gaynsettes eche shewsaye hathe: 10, whyche bée shewsayes of lyke force and strength.

VVhich is a simple shevvsaye and one and vvhiche is a compounded shevvsay and many.

9 A symple shewsaye standeth of one Uerbe: as man is mortall. A compounded shewsaye of manye: as if you marry my Daughter I make you myne heire: or impossible it is, that a stone shoulde haue feelyng.

[Page] 10 Often times in a shewsaye one verbe is but once spoken: and yet the meaning of the same shewsaye requireth the same verbe to bée diuers times vnderstand: such a shewsaye is compounded, and not one, but manye.

11 For, Iohn and William are riche and in health, is not one shewsaye, but manye: for it is as muche to laye, as Iohn is riche: Iohn is in health: William is riche: William is in health.

12 Firste wee will intreate of a simple shewsay, and after of a compounded shewsay, in his proper place and order.

Of the tvvo orders of a simple shevvsaye.

13 There are twoo orders of a simple shewsaye: a shewsaye of the firste order, sheweth onely the being or not being of a thing, as, man is, or, man is not.

14 A shewsaye of the second order, affirmeth or denyeth one thyng of another, as, man is iust: man is not iust.

15 A shewsay of the first order, standeth euer but of one nowne and one verbe: a [Page] shewesaye of the secoude order, of twoo nownes and one verbe, one alwayes placed afore, and another after the verbe.

Of the foresets and back sets that are in a simple shevvesaye. Chap. 3.

1 The foreset is a nowne placed afore the verbe, and the backset after, as, man is iuste: man is the foreset, and iust, is the backeset.

2 Sometymes a whole sentence or a clause of a sentence is a backset, or a foreset: as to rise earely is a holesome thing: in this shewsay, to rise earely, is the foreset, and a holesome thing is the backsette, they both supplying the roome and office of an nowne.

To vvhat vse foresettes and backesettes serue.

3 The storehouses serue to shew the nature of wordes as they are taken and considered by themselues alone.

4 The foreset & backset of a shewsay declare the respecte that wordes haue one to [Page] an other, as they are coupled and linkes together in a perfect saying.

To knovve vvhat respecte the backset hath to the foreset in euery simple shevvsaye of the seconde order.

5 If the backset [...]is deuided and parted a sunder from the foreset by a naysay, then doth it but eyther differ from it, or els it is a gainset to it.

6 What differing words and gaynsets are, we haue shewed afore in the. 12. Chapter of the first booke.

7 If it be affirmed & coupled to the foreset by a yeasay: then muste the foreset and backset be such as either may be saide of other turne for turne, or not [...]ide.

8 If either may be said of other turne for turne, then is the one of them the kindred, and the other his saywhat: or els one the kindred and the other his propertie.

9 For onelye the saywhat and the propertie compared to the kindred, maye bée said of it, and it of them, turne for turne: but the saywhat expresseth what the kindred [Page] is, and the propretie doth not.

10 If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and the foreset can not be laid in lyke sort of it agayn: then is the backset to be reckened, eyther in the number of those thinges, that are vsed to be placed in the sayewhat of the foreset, or not vsed to be placed there.

11 If the backsette be [...] the number of those that are vsed to be placed in the saywhat of the foreset: then is it either y• kind or the difference: for a saywhat standeth of these two.

12 If the backset be sayd of the foreset, and be neyther his sayewhat, propretie, nor difference: then is it an Inbeer.

13 For that we count an Inbeer, which being in a thing, is neyther his saywhat, propretie, kinde, nor difference.

Of a sayvvhat, and of things that are handled and intreated of in lyke maner that it is. Chap. 4.

1 A saywhat is a saying, shewing what a thing is, as man is a wighte, indued [Page] with sense and reason.

2 Those that make declaration of any thing by a worde, or by any other means whatsoeuer commeth to hande, do not by and by giue a perfect saywhat, of the thing they take in hand to speake of.

3 Yet suche declarations, bicause they are handled and intreated of in like forme and manner, that a saywhat is, are taken in arguing, as a thing that occupieth the roome and place of a saywhat.

4 For he that sayeth the formoste of yonder companie, is the Kyng: Or thys citie is Londō: or to behold, is to sée: wold séeme after a sorte, to expresse the thyng whereof he speaketh.

Generall rules appertyning to a sayvvhat.

5 Fiue poyntes are to be obserued in a perfect saywhat.

1

6 First, that the saywhat shewe what the kinred is.

2

7 Secondly, that it conteyne neyther [Page] more nor lesse matter, then it shoulde.

3

8 Thirdely, that it stande of the next kynde, hauing moste propre differences put therto.

4

9 Fourthly, that it be playne.

5

10 Fiftly, that it be bréefe.

Of a Propretie. Chapter. 5.

1 A propretie dothe not expresse what the kinred is, as the saywhat dothe: but is sayde of the kinred, and the kinred said of it turne for turne: as eche man is apt to langh: and eche thyng apte to laughe, is a man.

2 No man accompteth that for a propretie, whyche is in any other thing than in one kinred: or whych chaunceth to be in one kindred, but for a tyme.

3 If any suche thyng be sayde to bée a propretie, it is not proprely so to be taken: but a propretie for a tyme, or in respect of an other: and thus there are foure sorts of propreties.

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1

4 Some appertaine to one kindred alone, though not to all the selfe things of that kindred: as to be cunning in physike, pert [...]yneth only to man, but not to eachs man.

2

5 Some appertayne to eche selfe thing of one kinred: and yet not to that kinred alone: as to haue two eyes appertayneth to all men, but not only to man.

3

6 Some appertayne to one kindred alone, and to eche selfe thing of that kinred: but not at al tymes: as to ware grayheaded in age, appertayneth only to man, and to eache man that is aged, but not at all tymes.

4

7 Some apertain to one kinred alone, to eche self thing of that kinred, and at all tymes: As feelyng appertaineth only to a wyghte, to eche wyghte, and at all tymes. And thys is moste proprely called a propretie.

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VVhy vvee intreate in this place of selfe thinges and kinreds, and vvhat they are. Chap. 6.

1 Many selfe things make a kinred, and many kinreds, a kinde. Therfore to proceede by order from the lessc to the more, wee here interlace the treatise of self thinges and kinreds.

Of selfe things.

2 A selfe thing is that whiche is sayd but of one solo thing alone: as London, Englande, this man, or this horsse.

3 Selfe things are not proprely handeled of any a [...]te, but so far as they are conteyned in some kinred or kinde.

4 For arte intreateth of general masters: as physike teacheth not to cure William, or Robert, but man thus or thus diseased.

Of a kinrede.

5 A kinred is sayde of many, differing but in number onely, and aunswerabl [...] when drmaunde is m [...]r, what self t [...]nges are.

6 Or t [...]us, a kinred is that, whyche is contained of a kinde, or whereto a kynde [Page] is answerable, when it is demanded what a kinred is.

7 The first of these saywhats appertayneth to the lowest kinred: the other two saye whattes appertayne to a large kinred.

8 The lowest kinred is next vnto selfe things, and euer called a kinred, w [...]er it be compared to selfe things that are vnder it: or to the kynde that is above it.

9 A large kinred is that whiche deth other kinreds vnder it, and maye be taken both for a kinred (as it is referred to the kind that is aboue it:) or for a kynd (as it is sayde of kinreds that are vnder it.)

10 For example thus: A wight is a large kinred, for it hathe vnder it, a man, and a beast, whiche are kinreds them selues: so that if ye referre a wighte to a substance, then is it a kinred: but when ye referre a wight to a mā, or a beas [...], then is it a kynd conteynyng many kinredes of wyghtes vnder it.

Of a Kynde. Chapter. 7.

1 A kynde is that whyche is sayde of [Page] many kinreds, and answerable when it is demaunded what kinreds are.

2 As a wight is a kynd, for it is sayd of man and beast, which are many kinreds.

3 And if it be demaunded what a man or a beast is, y• answere ought to be made, man is a wight, or a beast is a wight.

4 There is a generall kinde and a speciall kynde.

5 A generall kynde is that whiche is [...]aken always for a kynd, as euer referred to that which is vnder it: such are the te [...] generall wordes called storehouses.

6 A speciall kynde is that which may [...] both a kynd, and a kinred: as a wighte is a kinde, referred to a man: but referred to a creature, it is a kinred.

7 The thing that is placed in any storehouse, is in that respect alwayes, eyther a selfe thing, a kinred, or a kinde.

8 Selfe thing [...] are sayd but of one: kinred, and kyndes [...] many.

9 All kinreds are specialls, which lye betwixte the lowest kinred and the generall kinde.

10 We must neuer by ascēding amount [Page] aboue the generall kinde: neyther by discending fall beneath the lowest kinred.

11 For selfe thyngs to vs are infinite, and do not belong to arte, but are iudged by sense: And by surmountyng generals we are not taught.

12 For they contayne all things without disc [...]ion.

Of a difference. Chap. 8.

1 A difference is a marke wherby one thing is discerned from an other.

Hovv differences are deuided.

There are thrée sortes of differences, a common difference, a propre difference, and a most propre difference.

3 A common difference is a remouable marke, wherby a thing differeth from it selfe, or from some other thing, by any maner of meanes.

4 A propre difference is an inseparable mark (chaunceable notwithstanding) wherby one thing differeth from another.

5 A most propre difference is that which [Page] is that whiche is sayde of many differing in kinred, when we demaunde whatkin a one, a thing is.

6 This difference is eyther taken in a saywhat to shew [...] what a kinred is: or in a diuision to [...] a kynde.

7 A difference differeth from a propretie, for a propretie is sayde [...]ut of one kinred: and a difference of many kinreds.

8 One worde according to diuers respects, may be both a difference, and a propretie: as feeling referred to a wight, is a propretie: and compared to a man, it is a difference.

Of an Inbeer. Chap. 9.

1 An Inbeer is that which may be or not be in one selfe inholder.

Hovv inbeers are deuided.

2 There are two sortes of inbéers, one remoueable, the other vnremoueable.

3 A remoueable Inbeer may in deede be seuered from hys inholder: as knowledge from a man.

4 An vnremoueable inbéer maye in [Page] thought, but not in déede be seuered from his inholder: as blacknesse from a crowe, and heate from fire.

Of the tourning of a shevvsay. Chapter. 10.

1 The tourning of a shewsay is the remouing of the backset into the roome of the foreset.

2 There is a right tourning of a shewsay and a wrong tourning.

3 A shewsay is rightly tourned when as both are necessarily true: but if when ye haue tourned a shewsay, the one shewsay be false, and the other true: then is the shewsay tourned amisse.

4 Agayne a shewsay is rightly tourned two ways: either when the signe doth remayne, whether it [...] generall or particular: or else when the generall signe is rebated into the particular.

5 The generall naysay, and the particular yeasay are rightly turned, whē their signes and marks remayne: as no man is a stone, and no stone is a man: or some mē [Page] are apte to swim, and some things apt to swim are men.

6 The generall yeasay is not rightly tourned, but when the generall signe is rebated into the particular: as all men are creatures: and some creatures are men.

7 The particular naysay, is not of force apte to be tourned at all.

8 Bycause the kinde may be denied of his kinred in parte: but the kinred (béeing wholly conteyned vnder the kind) cannot againe be denyed of him in parte.

9 For we may wel say: some creatures are no men: but we can not rightly saye, some men are no creatures.

10 When the backset is a saywhat or a propertie, the generall yeasay is rightly tourned, the generall signe not rebated.

11 As all men are apt to laugh: and all thinges apte to laugh are men, or euery man, is a wighte indued with sense and reason: and eche wight indued with sense and reason is a man.

12 These sayings and suche like are thus tourned, not by force of anye rule [Page] that perteyneth to the turning of a shewsay: but by reason the foreset and backset of suche shewsayes, are termes that may indifferently be sayd eche of other, turne for turne.

Of a yeasay, and a naysay. Chapter. 11.

1 Euery simple shewsay, whether it be of the first order, or of the second order, is eyther a yeasay, or a naysay.

2 A yeasaye of the fyrste order, affyrmethe the béeyng of a thyng, as man is.

3 A yeasay of the seconde order, coupleth the backset to the foreset, and affirmeth one thing of an other: as man is a wyghte.

4 A nayesaye of the fyrste order, denyeth a thyng to bée: as, man is not.

5 A naysay of the seconde order, denyeth a thing to be this or that: as, man is not an angell.

[Page]

Of the quantitie of a shevvsay. Chapter. 12.

1 The quantitie of a shewsaye dependeth onely vpon the foreset.

2 For as the forset is generally, or particularly taken: so is the shewsay either a generall or a particular saying.

3 If the foreset be a sole worde, then is the shewsaye singular: as London is a Citie.

4 But if the foresette bée a common worde, then hathe it, eyther an vniuersall signe before it, and is called an vniuersall shewsay: as, all men are creatures: or else a particular signe, and is called a particular shewsay: as, some men are learned: or else it hath no signe at all, and then it is called an vndetermined shewsay: as, man is mortall.

5 The singular and vndetermyned shewsayes, are alwayes taken in a reason, as particulars.

6 No shewsay is true, where the backset béeing a common woorde, hath an vniuersall signe ioyned vnto it: as, All men [Page] are all creatures: or men are al creatures.

7 But in a singular shewsay it may [...] ▪ as, these men are all the frendes, I haue.

Of signes and marks vvhich shevv the quantitie and qualitie of eche shevvesay. Chapter. 13.

1 There are foure sortes of signes and markes, so termed, bycause they note the quantitie and qualitie of euery shewsay.

a | Generall yeamarke | as | all
Generall naymarke | none
Particular yemarke | some
Particular naymark | somenot

2 The particular naymarke is commonly expressed in oure mother tong, by two wordes, some and not (some other wordes alwayes being placed betwixte them:) for we vse not to saye, some not men are learned: but some men are not learned.

[Page]

Of a true and a false shevvsay. Chapter. 14.

1 If men do affirme that thing to bée, which is not: or do denye that thing to be, which is: they make a lye, and their shewsay or saying is false.

2 But if that thing be in déede, whiche they affirme to be: or if that thing be not in déede, whiche they denye to be: then is their saying true.

3 So that the truth or falshod of mens sayings, dependeth wholly of the matter, that is vttered by their words.

4 To know whether eche matter fall out according to this or that mans saying, or not: it apperteyneth not onely to witcraft to decide, but eche saying is tryed to be true, or false, by that arte where vnto it doth properly appertaine.

To knovv vvhich is a necessarie shevvsay, vvhich is an vnpossible shevvsay, and vvhich is a chanceable shevvsay. Cha. 15.

1 If the backset be a saywhat, a propretie, [Page] a kynde, a difference, or a naturall and an vnremoueable Inbéer: the shewsay is necessarie.

2 If the backsette be a remoueable inbeer, the shewsay is chaunceable.

3 But if the backset be none of these: then is it an vnpossible shewsay.

4 A necessarie shewsay differeth from an vnpossible shewsay: for that, this is alwayes false: and the former always tru [...].

Of gaynsaying shevvsayes. Chapter. 16.

1 Gaynsaying shewsays are two shewsayes, the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysay, chaunging neyther foreset, backset, nor verbe.

2 There are thrée sortes of gaynsaying shewsays: Contrarie shewsays: lesse than contrarie shewsays: and more than contrarie shewsayes.

3 Contraries are two generall shewsayes, the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysay: as eche man is good: and, no man is good.

[Page] 4 Lesse then contraryes are two particular shewsayes: the one a yeasaye, and the other a naysaye: as some men are good, and some men are not good.

5 More then contraryes are two shewsayes, the one being generall, the other particuler: the one a yeasaye, the other a naysay: as all men are good, and some men are not good: or no man is good, and some men are good.

6 Contraryes are neuer bothe true: yet chaunceth it sometimes that they are both false: as when the backset is a remoueable inbeer: as eche man is learned, and no man is learned.

7 Lesse then contraryes are neuer both false, but maye in chaunceable such sayes bee bothe true: as some men are learned, and some are not learned.

8 More then contraryes are most repugnant one to another: for if the one be true, the other of necessitie is false: or if the one bee false, the other of necessitie is true: as all men are learned: and, some men are not learned: or no man is learned, & some man is learned.

[Page]

Of Shevvesayes that are of lyke force. Chap. 17.

1 Those shewesayes are of lyke force and strength which differ in wordes and agrée in meaning.

2 It doth properlye pertaine to grammer and not to Witcrafte, to knowe which sayinges agrée in sense, and which do not.

3 Yet for so muche as artes are knit together, in such a bande of knowledge, that no man can bée cunning in anye one, but he must haue some knowledge in manye, they doe by vsurpation some times borow one of an other, so muche as doth serue their present purpose.

4 Therfore many writers of Witcraft, intreate in this place, of shewesayes that are of lyke force, onely by reason of thys nay word (not) diuersly placed afore, or after tho signes.

5 But here is to be noted, that the same rules hold not in our Englishe tongue y• [Page] the Latyns vse hereof in their tongue.

6 Therefore take these as certaine: and as for the rest, know that either they are not in vse, or [...]they helde not in such sort as the Latin authors do appoint.

7 In oure mother tongue wée vse to [...]e this woorde (not) eyther onelye afore the sygne: or onely after the signe, as for to place it afore the signe, and a [...]ter two, in one sentence, it standeth not with the propertie of our speache.

8 (Not) ioyned in a shewesaye, to a generall yeamarke, altereth the qualitie and diminisheth the quantitie thereof, and makes the saying all one, whether it bee placed afore or after the signe.

9 For of a generall yeasay, it makes a particular naysaye: as not all that speake you faire, are your frendes: or all that speake you faire are not your frendes.

These two sayinges are both one in sense and meanyng: and as muche to saye as some that speake you fayre are not your frendes.

10 Nowe it is playne that this last sentence is a particular naysay: therefore the [Page] two former sayinges, muste néedes bée so too, beyng of like force and value that it is of.

11 If (not) be placed in a shewesaye before a particular yeamarke, it altereth the qualitie, and augmenteth the quantitie thereof, for not one is as muche to saye, as none.

12 (Not) beyng placed afore fewe, signifyeth manye: and beyng placed afore manye signifieth fewe.

13 Moe wayes of placyng of (not) afore the signe to make anye good sense in our mother tongue, I finde not.

14 These fewe examples doe shewe all in small roome, that is necessarye to bée spoken of, touching this matter.

1 Not all are All are not | is as much to say as | 1 some are not
2 Not one is | 2 none are
3 Not a fewe | 3 manye
4 Not many | 4 a fewe

[Page]

Of a compounded Shevvsay. Chap. 18.

1 What a compounded shewsay is, wée haue said afore, side. 66. verse. 9.

2 There are two sortes of compounded shewsayes.

3 They of the first sort do speake with adding of, if, and, or, cause, or time.

4 They of the second sort, adde the maner of beyng by some one of these foure preambles, as: it chaunceth: it is possible: it is vnpossible: it is necessarye: or els by som other termes of like force, that these, or some one of these is of.

5 A shewsay compounded with, an (if), maye be called an ifsaye, and doth simplelye neither affirme nor denye, but vppon condition, as, if ye doe wel, ye shal be well reported: or if yée doe yll, yee shall not bée well reported.

6 In these two sayings nothing is affirmed simplye or deuided, but vpon condition of well doyng, or yll.

7 A shewsay comp [...]unded with (and) is called a coupling shewsay, & this is neuer [Page] true, except all partes be true.

8 As Iohn, William, and Robert are learned, is not true: excepte all partes bée true: but false it is, when any parte is vntrue.

9 Also Iohn is learned, discrete and riche: this sayinge is false, if Iohn be eyther not learned, not discrete, or not riche: and true it is not, but when all the things recyted, take place in him.

10 A shewsaye compounded with (or) is a parting shewsaye, and is true when any parte is true: and neuer false [...]cepte all partes be false: as Iohn, Robert, or William, is at home.

11 This is true if any of them be at home: false, when none of them is at home.

12 A shewsay compounded with adding the cause: as, because you serued faithfully I giue you this forme: and a shewsay compounded with condition of time: as, when I dye you shall haue my land, may well be referred to an ifsaye: for in affirming and denying, they obserue the same lawe that it doth.

[Page]

Of Shevvsayes compounded by adding the manner of beyng or not beynge. Chap. 19.

1 There are foure Preambles, wherby the maner of being or not being of things, is set forth.

as

it chanceth.

it is possible.

it is vnpossible.

it is necessary.

2 When anye shewesaye hath anye of these preambles put vnto it, then it is called a shewsaye compounded by adding the manner of being, or not beyng.

3 Two things are chiefly to be handled in these compounded shewsayes.

4 The first is to shewe, when they affirme and when they denye: the seconde is to shewe, how they agree and how they folow eche vpon other.

[Page]

Of the affirming or denying of a Shevvsay compounded by adding the manner of beyng or not beyng.

5 Generally they neuer denie, but when this nayworde (not) is placed afore the preamble.

6 For if it bée not put to at all: or else placed after the preamble, they affirme.

7 For example, it chaunced that Iohn comming from London, was robbed: the naysaye is, it did not chaunce, that Iohn comming from London was robbed.

8 As for this saying, it chaunced that Iohn commyng from London, was not robbed, is a yeasay: and thus in like maner of the rest.

9 This saying it is vnpossible, for man to flye, is in forme and maner of speaking, a yeasay, and in meaning a naysay.

Hovv Shevvsayes compounded by adding the manner of being or not being follovv one vpon another.

10 Shewsaies compounded by adding the manner of being, or not beyng folow one vpon another, but not in like sort.

It chaunceth to be | hath these folowing vpon it | 1 | 1 it is possible to be
2 it is not vnpossible to be
3 it is not necessary to be
It chaunceth not to be | 2 | 1 it is possible not to be
2 it is not vnpossible not to be
3 it is not necessarye not to be
It dothe not chance to be | 3 | 1 it is not possible to be
2 it is vnpossible to be
3 it is necessarye not to be
It dothe not chance not to be | 4 | 1 it is not possible not to be
2 it is vnpossible not to be
3 it is necessarye to be

[Page] 11 For where we afore deuided a shewsay, Side. 87. ver. 1 reckning some to be [...], some necessary, some vnpossible, we had [...] how the foreset was coupled or not coupled to the ba [...]kset vpon the sequele of the matter.

12 But here deuiding a shewsay, into a chaunceable shewsay, a possible shewsaye, an vnpossible shewsay, and into a nessarye shewsay, we doe respect the pr [...]amble onely for the naming of the shewsay. As for the truth of such sayings, that is to bee considered, as it falleth forth in matter vttered by them.

The thyrd booke of Witcraft.

[Page]

Chap. 1.

1 WE haue spokē heretofore of words and sayings: it remaineth that we nowe proceede to intreate of a reason.

2 Let vs therefore here set downe those things which are necessarilye required for the due vnderstanding of a perfect reason.

3 First wée will shewe what a reason is: secondlye we will declare how manye kindes of reasons there are: thirdlye wée will lay forth the parts of a reason: fourthly, we will tell howe such partes are to be found out, and how they are to be ordered and disposed, to make a reason that shall inferre a necessary endsaye.

VVhat a reason is.

4 A reason is a compounded shewsaye, prouing that which lyeth in controuersie by knowne and graunted sayings.

[Page] 5 For euen as certaine words must bée coupled together in due order to make a perfect sentence: so muste certaine shewesayes be ioyned together in a due [...] to make a perfect re [...]son.

That there are but tvvo kindes of reasons and what either kind is. Chapter. 2.

1 There are but two wayes to proue a doubtful matter.

2 For either we rise by examples of selfethings and specialls, to the knowl [...]dge of the generall: or els contrarywise we fall by the rule of the generall, to the knowledge of speciall and selfethings.

3 The first way may be called a reason by example: the seconde a reason by rule.

Examples of a reason by example.

4 If a skilfull Lawyer be the best Lawyer: and a skilfull Mariner the best Mariner: and a skilfull Phisition, the best Phisition: then is he accompted best in eche arte, that hath most skill therin.

5 Another: all light things ascende: for smoke, breath, flame, and fire do so.

[Page] 6 Here are we brought by diuers particulars [...] by examples, to come to the knowledge of two generall rules.

7 The fir [...]t rul [...] is, that he is best artificer, that hath most skill in his arte.

8 The s [...]conde is, that all light things ascende.

Of a Reason by rule.

9 A reason by rule, is a reason that standeth of three shewesayes, framed in suche sorte, that two of them being graunted to be true, the third must by force of them be true also: for example thus.

All light things ascend,

Breath is light,

therefore,

Doth breath ascende.

10 For he that graunteth that all lyghte things do ascend, & also that breth is light, must néedes graunt by force of these, that breath doth ascend too.

VVhat diuersitie there is betvvixt a reason by example, and a reason by rule. Chapter. 3.

1 A reason by example pertaineth so common sense and experience.

[Page] A reason by rule belongeth to arte.

2 A reason by example serueth to proue the principles of arte, by certaine▪ particular examples: A reason by rule proueth particular cases by principles and generall rules.

3 So that a reason by example ascendeth to the general: a reason by rule descendeth to the particular.

4 A reason by example allureth the ignorant: a reason by rule forceth the learned.

5 The number of shewesayes in a reason by example are vncertaine, somtimes many, and sometimes sewe: but the number of shewesayes in a reason by rule, is euer certaine, and so that they are neuer moe nor lesse but three.

VVhat things are chiefely to be noted in a reason by rule.

6 There are in a reason by rule (as in eche other thing whatsoeuer) two speciall poyntes to bee mack▪ the matter, and the forme.

[Page]

Of the matter vvhereof a reason by rule is made. Chap. 4.

1 Thrée shewesayes, and thrée termes, are the matter wherof a reason by rule is made: but shewesayes are néerer, and termes further of.

2 For a reason is resolued into shewsayes, and shewesayes are resolued into termes.

VVhat names the three Shevvsayes haue, vvhich are in a reason by rule.

3 The two first shewsayes that are placed in a reason by rule, are called foresayes, the third may be t [...]rmed, an endsay.

4 This is proued, and they doe proue.

5 This is first in purpose, and last in order: they are first in order, and last in finding out.

6 When you goe precisely to worke, you must expresse three shewsayes in ech reason [Page] that is made by rule: yet men in writing, and common speache, vse oft to leaue out some one of them.

7 When any one is left oute, to knowe which it is: ye shall haue a rule for it hereafter.

Of the three termes vvhich are in a reason by rule.

8 The thrée termes that are chiefly to be noted in a reason by rule, and whereof the thrée foresayd shewsayes are made, be thus named: the generall terme: the speciall terme: the prouing terme: eche terme being twice repeted in one reason.

the
generall
terme.

speciall

prouing

9 The backser of the endsay, is alwayes the generall terme.

10 And the foreset of the endsaye is euer the speciall terme.

11 The prouing term is that terme, which is placed in both the foresayes: and is the meane whereby the other two termes agrée or disagrée among themselues, in the endsaye.

[Page]

Of the forme of a reason by rule. Chapter. 5.

1 After ye haue thus generally considered of the matter of a reason by rule: ye must procéede to the forme.

2 Which is in very déede nothing else but a right ordering and disposing of the matter.

3 For it standeth in the righte placing of the termes: and in the due quantitie and qualitie of the shewsayes.

4 So that when the three termes are ryghtly placed in eche shewsay, and when the due quantitie and qualitie of shewsays is kept withal: then is the forme of a reason by rule alwais necessarie, and the endsay is true, by force of the foresayes.

5 But if either the termes be not rightly ordred, or that the due quantitie & qualitie of shewsayes be not kepte: then the forme of the reason is not good, and that reason it selfe, is in deede, a deceyuable reason.

6 Nowe for the placing of the termes, there are rankes deuised, and for the furnishing of the shewsayes with due quantitie [Page] & qualitie there are seates appoynted.

7 So that the rankes teach where the thrée termes are placed in eche shewsaye: and the seates tel what quantitie and qualitie the thrée shewsayes must haue wherof a reason by rule is framed.

8 A ranke is a rew of seates, teaching where the three termes are placed in eche shewsaye of a reason.

9 A Seate is a speciall forme of arguing, notyng the quantitie and qualitie of eche shewsay, which is placed in a reason by rule.

10 There are thrée rankes or rewes of seates, where all reasons framed by [...]ule, are couched.

The
1
ranke.

2

3

11 The firste ranke is a rewe of those seates, which euer place the prouing terme betwixt the general and the special terme, in suche sort, that it be vnder the generall, and aboue the special.

[Page] 12 The seconde ranke placeth the prouing terme aboue the general and the speciall terme, so that it is sayde of them bothe.

13 The third ranke placeth the prouing terme beneath them bothe, so that they both are sayde of it.

14 This is further to be marked concerning the ordering of the termes, that the general terme and the prouing terme, make always the fyrst foresaye: the prouing terme and the speciall terme make the seconde foresay: and the generall and the speciall terme make the endsay.

Hovve many vvayes a reason by rule may bee made.

15 A reason by rule maye be directely framed fouretéene wayes, and moe ways it can not. Foure ways in the first ranke: and foure wayes in the second ranke: and sixe wayes in the thirde ranke.

16 Now for these four [...] seueral fourmes of arguyng, there are foureteene woordes artificially inuented, eche worde [Page] appoynted to his propre seate, which parte [...] into thrée syllables a p [...]ce, serue for diuers purposes.

The names of the particular seates, and vvhat is generally to be lerned in eche one of them. Chap. 6.

1 The foure seates which are placed in the first rank, are thus named and ordred.

The

Firste

Bar ba ra.

Second

Ce la rent.

Thirde

Da ri j.

Fourth

Fe ri o.

[Page] 2 The foure seates that are placed in the seconde ranke, are named and ordered thus.

The

Firste

Ces a re.

Second

Cam es tres.

Third

Fes ti no.

Fourth

Ba ro co.

3 The sixe seates whiche are placed in the thyrde ranke, are named and ordered thus.

The

Firste

Da rap ti.

Second

Fe lap ton.

Thirde

Dis am is.

Fourth

Da tis i.

Fifte

Bo car do.

Sixte

Fe ris on.

4 For cleerenesse and memorie sake, I thinke it good to set forth the names of the [Page] seates, as they are appoynted to their seueral rankes, in foure englishe verses.

Proper seates appointed for eche ranke.

Barbara, celarent, darii, ferio, to the firste ranke.

Cesare, Camestres, festino, Baroco, darapti: Felapton, Disamis, datisi. Bocardo, Ferison. Sixe last here downe sette, be seates proper aye to the thirde ranke.

6 Besides the name of eche particular seate, learne also of thys that followeth, what matter eche one of these artificiall wordes doth include in it selfe.

7 Firste, as eche reason by rule standeth of thrée shewesayes: So eche seate is parted into thrée syllables. The firste syllable is sette agaynst the fyrst foresaye, the seconde syllable agaynste the seconde foresay, the third syllable agaynst the endsaye.

8 The fyrste and capitall letter of eche worde sheweth to what seate eche vnperfect [Page] reason must be reduced vnto.

9 For the reasons made in the seconde and third ranke, must (or they be accompted perfecte) be reduced to those seates of the first ranke, whiche beginne with the same capitall letter that they doe: as,

Baroco
to Barbara.

Bocardo

Cesare
to Celarent.

Camestres

Darapti
to Darii.

Disamis

Datisi

Festino
to Ferio.

Felapton

Ferison

10 M. p. s. c. shewe how the vnperfect [...] seates must be reduced.

11 M. noteth, that the foresayes must be chaunged eche into others place.

12 P. noteth a turning of the shewsay, with rebatement of the signe.

[Page] 13 S. Noteth a turning of the shews a without rebatement of the signe.

14 C. If it be not placed in the first syllable, noteth a reducing of the reason by way of impossibilitie.

15 The vowels note the quantitie and qualitie of eche shewsay: as,

A E I O
noteth that the shewsay set agaynst it, must be a
generall yeasay, generall naysay, particular yeasay, particular naysay.

16 The reste of the Letters serue to no purpose, but to make vp the verse.

17 Although this which we haue nowe sayd concerning the matter and forme of a reason by rule, may seeme to a pregnant wit, to be sufficient: yet to make the matter playne to beginners, and to those that lackes an instructer: we wil declare what manner of three termes will serue, and howe they must be furnished and set foorth with quantitie and qualitie, to make a good reason in euery particular seate, setting foorth the same by plaine examples.

Of the first ranke. Chap. 7.

1 To this rank are assigned four seatt, [Page] as is aforesayd, in the first seate is concluded a generall yeasaye: in the seconde a generall naysay: in the thyrde a particular yeasay: in the fourth a particular naysaye: So that there is no shewsay which maye not be proued in the seates of the first ranke.

2 The prouing terme in thys ranke, is placed betwixt the generall and the speciall terme.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the first ranke.

3 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof the firste maye wholly be sayde of the seconde, and that the second also may wholly be sayde of the thirde, they do serue to make a reason in Barbara concluding that the first terme is generally sayde of the thirde: as,

1 Creature | this is y• | general | terme.
2 Wight | prouing
3 Man | speciall

[Page]

[figure]

4 If ye will laye foorth this reason at large, and furnishe euery shewsay w [...]h due quantitie and qualitie, you must vtter it thus.

Bar ba ra

All wights are cereatures,

All men are wightes, therfore

All men are creatures.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the firste ranke.

5 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is wholly denyed of the second, and the seconde wholly affirmed of the thirde: they serue to make a reason in Celarent, concluding that the firste terme is generally denyed of the thirde: as,

1 Natural | this is y• | general | term:
2 lerned by imitatiō | prouing
3 langage | speciall

[Page]

[figure]

6 Set this reason downe at large thus

Ce la rēt

nothīg lerned by imitatiō is natural

euery lāguage is lerned by imitatiō, therfore,

No language is naturall.

VVhat maner of termes vvil serue to make a reason in the thyrde seate of the firste ranke.

7 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first is wholly affirmed of the second, and the second partly affirmed of the third, they serue to make a reason in Darii, concluding that the first terme is affirmed of the thirde in parte:

1 Cōmendable | this is y• | general | terme
2 Uertues | prouing
3 Sparing | speciall

[figure]

[Page] 8 Set this reason downe at large thus.

Da ri i

All vertues are commendable

Some kinde of sparing is a vertue therfore,

Some kind of sparing is cōmēdable

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourthe seate of the first ranke.

9 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first is wholly denyed of the seconde, and the secōd partly affirmed of the third, they serue to make a reason in Ferio: concluding that the firste terme is denied of the thirde in part: as,

1 To be vsed | this is y• | general | terme
2 wāton tricks | prouing
3 daunces | speciall

[figure]

10 Sette this reason downe at large thus.

Feri o

No wanton tricke is to be vsed,

Som daunces are wāton tricks, therfore

Some daunces are not to be vsed.

11 If the termes wherof you be willed to make a reason by rule, beare not suche respect one to an other, as is sette foorth in these foresayde rules: knowe for a certaintie, that no good reason can be made of them: to be placed in the seates of the first ranke.

12 For when the thrée termes are such as none can truly be sayde of an other: or when the first is sayde of the seconde but in parts: or the seconde is denyed of the third, eyther in whole, or in part: y• reason that is made of suche termes, hath no necessarie sequele, but is called in Gréeke [...], that is a reason which standeth in ranke and maketh a shewe of an argument, but it is not placed in any seat that kéepeth a necessarie forme of arguing.

Of the seconde ranke. Chap. 3.

1 In the second rank the prouing term is the backsette in both the forsayes: and [Page] as the thrée termes are placed in order, it is the highest.

2 To this ranke belongeth also foure seates: two generals, and two specials: but they all serue to disproue, and none of them to proue.

3 For it foloweth not, bicause one kind is sayd of two differing kinreds: that therfore the one kinred should be sayd and affirmed of the other.

For though all wheat be corne, and all rie be corne too: yet it followeth not therfore, that any rie is wheat, or any wheate rye.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fyrste seate of the second ranke.

4 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first is wholly denyed of the seconde, and wholly affirmed of the thirde: they serue to make a reason in Cesare, concluding that the seconde terme is wholly denyed of the thirde: as,

1 to haue a talād | this is y• | prouing | term.
2 tame by nature | general
3 hauke | speciall

[Page]

[figure]

5 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Ces a re

Nothing tame by nature hath a taland,

All haukes haue talandes therfore,

No hauke is tame by nature.

6 C. in this word Cesare, sheweth that the reasons placed in this seate, muste bée reduced vnto Celarent: and S. telleth how, euen by turning of the firste foresay without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the seconde seate of the second ranke.

7 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof y• first is wholly affirmed of y• secōd, & wholly [Page] denied of the thirde, they serue to make a reason in Camestres concluding that the second is wholy denied of the third: as,

1 to haue a talant | this is the | prouing | term
2 hauke | generall
3 tame | speciall

[figure]

8 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Cam es tres

All haukes haue talands

no tame foule by nature hath a taland therefore

no tame foule by nature is a hauke

9 C. in this worde Camestres, sheweth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Celarent: and M. and the [Page] two S. S. teach howe, to wit, that the foresayes must be chaunged eche into ethers place: & that the seconde foresaye and the endsaye, must both be turned without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the third seat of the seconde ranke.

10 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is wholy denied of the second, and affirmed of the third in part, they serue to make a reason in Festino, concluding that the second is denied of the third in part: as,

1 Forbidden

2 Lawfull

3 Apparell.

[figure]

[Page] 11 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fes ti no

No lawfull thing is forbidden,

Some apparell is forbidden, therefore

Some apparell is not lawfull.

12 F. In this word Festino sheweth that the reasons placed in this seat must be reduced to Ferio: and S. sheweth howe, euen by turning the first foresaye, wythoute rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the seconde ranke.

13 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof the first is wholy affirmed of the second: and denied of the third in part, they serue to make a reason in Baroco, concluding that the seconde is denied of the thirde in part: as,

1 Indifferent | this is y• | prouing | terme
2 Lawfull | general
3 Apparell | speciall

[Page]

[figure]

14 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Ba ro co

All lawfull things are indifferent,

Some apparell is not indifferent, therfore,

Some apparell is not lawfull.

15 B. In Baroco noteth that the reasons placed in this seate muste bee reduced to Barbara and C. sheweth that they must be reduced by waye of impossibilitie, taking a sentence more then a contrarye to the endsay with the first foresaye, and concluding more then a contrary shewsay to the seconde foresay: as,

Bar ba ra

All lawfull things are indifferent,

All apparell is lawfull, therefore

All apparell is indifferent.

16 The endsaye in this reason is manifestly false, therefore one of the foresayes must néedes be false too, but the first foresaye it can not be, for that was graūted to be true in the first reason, therfore it must néedes be the seconde, whose more then contrary shewsay, was denied to be true afore, so that by this meanes y• answerer is forced to graunt that which can not be, to wit, that more then contrary shewsaies should both be false.

Of the thirde Ranke. Chap. 4.

1 In this ranke the prouing terme is the foreset in bothe the foresayes, and as the three termes bée placed in order, it is the lowest.

To this ranke belongeth sixe seates, thrée yeascates and thrée nayscats, but all concludyng particular sentences.

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VVhat maner of termes, vvill serue to make a reason in the first seate of the third ranke.

2 When ye haue thrée termes wherof the first and the second, are both saide of y• third generally, they serue to make a reason in Darapti, concluding that the firste must néedes be said of ye second in part: as,

1 Euill | this is the | generall | terme
2 Creatures | speciall
3 Deuils | prouing

[figure]

3 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Da rap ti

All Deuils are euill,

All Deuils are creatures, therefore,

Some creatures are euill.

4 D. In this word Darapti, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Da [...] and P. sheweth howe they must be reduced, euen by turning of the seconde foresaye, without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the second seat of the thirde ranke.

5 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is generally denyed of the third, and the second generally affirmed of it too, they serue to make a reason in Felapton, concluding that the first is denyed of the second in part: as,

1 Forgottē vpon (the sudden | this is the | general | term
2 A gottē qualititie | speciall
3 Arte. | prouing

[Page]

[figure]

8 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fe lap ton

No arte is forgotten vpō the sudden,

All artes are gotten qualities, therefore,

Some gotten qualitie is not forgotten vpon the sudden.

7 F. In this word Felapton, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat are reduced to Ferio, and P. sheweth how they must be reduced, euen by turning of the seconde foresay without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat manner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the third seat of the thirde ranke.

9 When ye haue thrée termes wherof [Page] the first is said in part of the third, and the second wholy affirmed of it too: they serue to make a reason in Disamis, concluding that the firste is saide of the seconde in part: as,

1 Necessary | this is the | generall | term
2 Better for the present time | speciall
3 Correction | prouing

[figure]

9 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Di [...] am is

Some correction is necessary,

All correctiō is bitter for the present time, therefore

Some thing bitter for the present time is necessary.

[Page] 10 D. In this word Disamis, noteth that the reasons placed in this seate, are reduced to Darij: and the two. S. S. and M. shew how they must be reduced.

11 For the two. S. S. do note, yt the first foresay and the endsaye must be turned without rebatement of the signe: & M. noteth that the foresayes must be chaunged eche into others place.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fourth seate of the thirde ranke.

12 When ye haue thrée termes whereof the first is generally said of the thirde, and the second is saide therof but in part: they serue to make a reason in Datisi, concluding that the generall is saide of the speciall in part: as,

1 Reprouable | this is y• | general | terme
2 Magistrate | speciall
3 Offender | prouing

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[figure]

13 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Da tis i

All offenders are to be reproued,

Some offender is a magistrate, therefore,

Some magistrate is reprouable.

14 D. In this worde Datisi, noteth that the reasons placed in this seate, are to bée reduced to Darij: and S [...]eweth how they must be reduced, euen by turning the seconde foresaye, without rebatement of the signe.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the fifte seat of the thirde ranke.

15 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof [Page] the firste is denyed of the thirde in parte, and the seconde wholy affirmed of it too: they serue to make a reason in Bocardo, concluding that the firste is denied of the second in part.

1 Euill | this is the | general | term
3 Minister | speciall
3 True preacher | prouing

[figure]

16 Set downe this reason at large thus,

Bo car do

Some true preacher is not euill,

All true preachers are ministers, therefore,

Some minister is not euill.

[Page] 17 B. In this worde Bocardo, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Barbara: and C. sheweth how, to wit, by forcing the aduersarye to graunt an impossibilitie in reason, which in Bocardo is done thus.

18 Ye must take more then a contrarye to the endsay, with the second foresay, and conclude more then a contrary to the first foresaye: for example,

Bar ba ra

All Ministers are euill,

All true preachers are ministers, therefore,

All true preachers are euill.

For the rest, looke the. 16. sentence of the thirde chapter.

VVhat maner of termes vvill serue to make a reason in the sixte seat of the thirde ranke.

19 When ye haue thrée termes, wherof the first is generally denied of the thirde, and the second affirmed of it in part: they serue to make a reason in Ferison, concluding [Page] that the generall is denied of the speciall in part: as,

1 Pleasaunt | this is the | generall | terme
2 Profitable | speciall
3 Correction | prouing

[figure]

20 Set downe this reason at large thus.

Fe ris on

No correction is pleasaunt,

Some correction is profitable, therefore,

Some profitable thing is not pleasāt.

21 F. In this word Ferison, noteth that the reasons placed in this seat, must be reduced to Ferio: and▪ S. sheweth howe, euen by turning the second foresaye withoute rebatement of signe.

[Page] 22 In this ranke, no forme of arguing is good, where the second foresay is a naysay: that is to saye, when the speciall terme, is denyed of the prouing terme, either wholy or in part.

If either of the foresayes be left oute of a reason by rule, to knovve vvhich it is. Chap. 10.

1 If the backset be one in both the shewsayes, the seconde foresaye wanteth, either in the first, or the thirde ranke.

2 But if the foreset be one in bothe the shewsayes, the firste foresaye wanteth, either in the first, or the second ranke.

3 If ye haue two shewsayes, concluding a reason, and one worde a foreset in the first, and a backset in the later, there wanteth the seconde foresaye in the seconde ranke.

4 If ye haue two shewsayes concludyng a reason, and one woorde a backset in the firste, and a foresette in the latter, [Page] there wanteth the firste, foresaye in the thirde ranke.

5 Trie these rules by the examples set foorth already in eche seat, and ye shall sée they neuer fayle.

To knovve in hovv many seates eche endsay may be concluded.

1 An vniuersall yeasaye is onely proued in Barbara.

2 An vniuersall naysaye is thrée wayes concluded, in Celarent, Cesare, and Camestres.

3 A particular yeasay is foure wayes proued, in Darij, Darapti, Disamis, and Datisi.

4 A particular naysaye is concluded in sixe seates, in Ferio, Festino, Baroco, Felapton, Bocardo, Ferison.

5 By this it is plaine, that an vniuersall yeasaye is moste harde to proue, and most easie to disproue: & that a particular naysaye is most easy to proue, and most hard to disproue.

The fourth Boke of Witcraft.

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Of Inuention or fynding out of argumentes. Chap. 1.

1 HOwe the prouing terme must lye, to the foresette and backsette of eche demaunde, that a necessarie reason may bée made of thrée termes, wée haue shewed afore, in our thirde booke.

2 It foloweth nowe, that wée teache a way, to get store of prouing termes.

3 For as the good and ready marchaunt prouideth store of sundry wares, and sorteth euery kinde by it selfe, adding special markes for his better direction, that hée may with conuenient spéede fit and serue his customer whē he calleth: So the quick and sharpe reasoner, must gather general rules together, and place them in order, that he may haue in a redinesse when néed shall be, store of reasons, for proofe or disproofe of matters in doubt.

[Page] 4 Therfore is witcraft wel deuided of the Grecians into two parts: wherof the firste is called in Gréeke [...], that is to say, in englishe, the decerning part: the other is called [...], as muche to saye, as the finding parte.

5 This, for that by searching it fyndeth oute the prouing terme: The other, not only for that it iudgeth of the forme of an argument: but also for that it descryeth the truth and falshode of al sentences: and noteth the force, and signification of wordès.

6 Some men doe thinke, that the fynding part, is first to be taught, and that by the course of nature it ought to come afore the other in order.

7 For as he that will make an house, first prouideth timber, stone, bricke, clay, lyme, nayles, pinnes, and other thinges, wherof he will haue his house to be buylded: and after hireth workemen, to sette these thinges together, and to frame them in order: which doone, his deuised house is finished and made: Euen so the cunning reasoner first findeth out (say they) by the [Page] vse of the places, the matter whervppon he will speake: and after séeketh by the rules of a perfect reason, how to order and dispose the same.

8 This reason in my iudgemente serueth neither for him that woulde practise Witcrafte, nor for him that shoulde teache it.

9 For how can a man eyther inuent or teach any good reasons, to proue matters that lye in doubt, the nature of sentences and wordes, being not first knowne?

10 Seing eche question stādeth of them and is not thoroughly knowne, afore the force of eche woord be deepely considered, with due consideration had, how the wordes, agree or disagrée in a perfect sentence.

11 Now to returne this similitude, and to make it good against oure aduersaries, we saye:

12 No craftesman can fitte hymselfe of stuffe, afore hée hath cast in his mynde the shape and forme of the thing, that hee will make.

13 In lyke maner, no good reasoner can fynde out the prouing terme, by the vse of [Page] the places, afore hée haue learned by the rules of a perfect reason, what maner of prouing terme will serue his purpose.

14 That is to say, how ye prouing terme in the two foresayes, must be coupled or vncoupled to y• forset or backset of y• question, that y• same may be directly concluded.

15 By this it is playne, that the shape of a thing that is to be made, would firste be deuised in mynde, afore the stuffe were prouided:

16 Otherwyse, it will commonly fall foorth, that there will bée eyther losse in prouiding to muche, or lacke in prouiding to little.

17 Wée haue therfore in our thrée former bookes, spoken of the decerning part of Witcrafte, and haue reserued the fynding parte to be intreated of in this oure fourth Booke.

18 But here I aduise thée of one thing (gentle reader) that thou looke not, that I should set foorth all the places, whereof men vse to gather arguments, and omitte none.

19 For that thing I suppose no man [Page] hathe doone heretofore: nor shal do hereafter.

20 Neyther is it one mannes worke to begin and ende an art, in suche sort, as nothing can be sayd more.

21 It is well if we wryte that, whiche may profite many: neither is it fit to leaue many good things vndene, or many profitable things vntaught, bycause we cannot do and say, all that is good and profitable.

22 Nowe bicause the tenne storehouses are fit for inuention, I haue thought good to appoynt them for places.

23 And where as there are diuers other places besides, which can not conueniently be referred to any of the ten storehouses, I haue added and interlaced them in suche order, as I iudged was fittest, either for memorie or inuention.

24 The generall places whiche I haue gathered out of sundry authors, to yelde a reasoner store of argumentes, are in number twentie and two: I thinke good to name and order them thus.

Of

1 Substance.

2 Quantitie.

3 Qualitie.

4 The cause.

5 The effecte.

6 Preparation.

7 Dooing.

8 Suffering.

9 Tyme.

10 Place.

11 Order.

12 Hauing.

13 The forecommers.

14 The aftercommers.

15 The withcommers.

16 The lykelyer.

17 The vnlykelyer.

18 The aslyke.

19 A similitude.

20 Witnesses.

21 Oaynsettes.

22 The differing terme.

23 Deuision.

24 Proportion.

25 These places maye bée reduced to a fewe generall poyntes, and diuers wryters [Page] vse so to doe.

26 Howbeit in myne opinion that hind [...]reth Inuention, and forceth further matter vppon wordes, then their vsuall sign [...]cation doth beare.

27 Deuision doubtlesse is a necessarie meane to teache by: and it furthereth lerning very much, to passe by deuision from poynt to poynt: so that you take that occasion which nature or arte offereth, and kéep the propretie of y• spéech which ye vse

28 In discoursing vppon the places, I mean [...]o kéepe this order.

29 First I will define the place, and after deuide it: then I will set downe certayne generall rules, in eche particular place, that the groundeworke and chiefe cause of a reson may be vewed & cōsidered.

30 Fourthly, I will adde exāples y• a beginner may lern by imitatiō to do y• like.

31 Finally I will tel how reasons held of eche place, and howe they holde not: that the diligent reader maye sée, what sequele there foloweth in reason vppon the groundes and principles of inuention.

32 If any one of these fiue poynts be (at [Page] any tyme) omitted, it is eyther for that such things néede not to be spoken of (béeing very playne of themselues) or for that they are sufficiētly entreated of elsewhere.

33 For that which hath bene taughte heretofore, and may séeme necessarie to be interlaced in the discourse of the places, I passe euer of purpose.

34 Poynting thée (gentle reader,) neuerthelesse, by two numbres, where theu mayst at the first sight, fynd out that which else were necessarie to be here repeted.

Of the first generall place called Substance. Chap. 2.

1 He that wyll discourse orderly, and search a matter to the bottom, must begin with the substāce of the thing he speaketh of.

2 Substance is takē here more largely then it was in the first storehous [...].

3 For there it was taken only for a thing that had his being by it selfe: but here substance is taken for any thing that is necessarily required in the [...]scentiall [Page] being of an other, and it is deuided into seuen partes.

4 The saywhat, the generall terme, the speciall terme, the proper terme, the whole, the parte, and the ofspring.

5 Euery one of these haue sundry rules, and argumentes gathered of them holde not all alike, therefore we will entreate of them seuerally.

6 What a say what is, and howe many sortes and kindes there are, what things haue the same order and trade of arguing that a saywhat hath, and what fiue special points do appertayne vnto it, looke side 73. Chapter. 4.

Other generall rules appertayning to a sayvvhat.

7 Whatsoeuer the saywhat doth declare and set forth, the same in that respect is a kindred, and neither a selfe thing, nor a kinde.

8 The saywhat and the kindred (that is to say, the thing declared and set for the by the saywhat) differ only in words and termes, and not in substance of matter.

[Page] 9 And therfore nothing (cōcerning sense and meaning) is conteyned in the one, but the same also is comprised in the other.

10 And whatsoeuer is denyed or sayd of the o [...]e, may in like sort, be denied or sayd of the other.

Examples of argumentes deduced of a sayvvhat.

11 Eche man is mortal, for euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.

12 If you will set downe this reason in frame, according to the precise rules afore giuen, dot this.

Bar ba ra

Euery wight indued with reason and sense is mortall.

But euery man is a wyghte indued with reason and sense, therfore,

Euery man is mortall.

13 Euery wighte indued wyth reason and sense, is the saywhat of man: so that it béeing mortall, forceth man to be mortall too, by the generall rule of the saywhat. [...]erse. 9.

14 Again thus, death maketh an end of eche man: therfore euery man is mortall, frame this reason in rule thus.

Bar ba ra

[...]ch thing ended by death is mortal

Euery man is ended by death,

Therfore eche man is mortall.

The vse of this place.

15 The first reason is taken of the saywhat of man: the seconde of the saywhat of mortall.

16 For necessarie reasons may be deduced aswel from the sayewhat of the endesayes backset, as from the saywhat of the endsayes fores [...]t, and that to proue or disproue in differently.

Of the generall terme. Chap. 3.

1 In séeking out of arguments, we take that for the general terme, which may be truly answered of many specials, whē demaunde is made what they are.

2 As when ye demaund what stoutnes or manhood is, the right answere must be, that manhod is a vertue: in lyke maner if ye aske what temperance is, the fittest answere lyeth, that temperaunce also is a vertue.

3 Therfore vertue compared to manhoode and temperance, is a generall.

4 [...]ere note that to these and such like [Page] demaunds the nexte generall is rather to be answered then that which is further of.

5 For when I am asked what a peach is, I shall come néerer to the matter, if I say it is a frute, then if I answere and say it is a creature or a substance.

6 But mine answere should be furmost off from satisfying of mine hearer, if I should say it were a thing.

7 Bycause he that answereth so generally, makes no distinction in matter, but leaues the demander in as great doubt as he was in at the first.

Rules belonging to the generall terme by the vvhiche thou maist also learne the vse of this place.

8 Al things are cōteyned in the general that are conteyned in any speciall.

9 For if life, reason, sense, learning, wil, cūning, &c. be in man, the same things are also of force in a wighte, in a creature, and in a substance, whiche thrée are all generalls to man.

10 What thing soeuer may be generally affirmed of the generall, the same thing also may be generally affirmed of [Page] euery one of his specials.

11 The generall is generally taken, when an vniuersall signe is ioyned to it, and it not diminished of his quantitie by any nayword, as when ye say, eche earthly creature is mortall.

12 Upon this generall, generally granted, you may wel conclude, that euery mā is mortall.

13 But when a generall word is ioyned to a particular signe, or granted in a shewsay to be true without any signe at al, then it maketh no sufficiēt proofe of the special.

14 As when it is alledged, that a wight or some wight is learned, these things being granted, do not of force inferre that all men or some men are learned, more then any other earthly creature that hath sése.

15 Howbeit, if the general be generally graunted, it maketh good proofe of all and euery one of his specials: for who so granteth euery earthly wighte to be mortall, granteth also by good sequele in reason, that al men, and al beasts are mortal too.

16 What thing soeuer is denied of the generall, without restraint of any particular [Page] signe, the same thing may séeme wel, to be denied of any of his specials.

17 For if it be wel sayd, learning is not gotten with ease: it is also well sayd: witcraft is not gotten with ease, speechcrafte, starcraft, Physike, lawe, or any other kind of learning.

18 But if any thing be denied of the general, by restraint of the particular signe, y• same is not therfore denied of any of his specials, but of certaine, suche as the restraint may séeme to limitte.

19 For though I graūt y• som houseduck flieth not, yet am not I thereby forced to say, ye wildduck [...]ieth not, seing y• restraint may séem to be made but to the tame duck.

20 No generall is affirmed of any speciall ofspringingly.

21 For it cānot be truly affirmed, ye witnesse is [...]lored, séeing witnes is a colour, and the inholder of witnesse is coloured, be it cloath, wooll, yarne, or any thyng else that is accustomed to be dyed or coloured.

Of the special terme. Chap. 4.

1 The speciall is here taken for that wherof the generall may be sayde, when [Page] demaund is made of the speciall, and question asked what it is.

Rules belonging to the speciall.

2 Whatsoeuer is sayd of the speciall in part, is sayd also of the general in part.

2 For if some men be learned, some wight is learned.

2 But on the other side in the behalfe of the generall this rule holdeth not.

3 For it foloweth not though some wight be foure footed, that therfore man shuld bée foure footed too.

4 Whatsoeuer is graunted to be in any speciall, must of force be graunted to be in all his generals.

5 If al the specials be graunted, they are sufficient to proue or disproue the general generally, one or many are not.

8 Al specials a [...] partakers of their general indifferētly, [...]out respect of more or lesse.

9 For an Egle is no rather nor no more a birde or a foule, then an Oule is, nor an Oule more or lesse then a Wrenne: but they and all other foules equally and indifferently, are named and be in déede birdes, without degrée of more or lesse.

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Of the proper terme. Chap. 5.

1 What a propertie is, how many kinds of properties there be, what rules may be gathered of the propertie, for proofe of a doubtfull matter: loke in the second boke, where we entreated of a propertie, beginning at the 75. side, the fifth chapter, and ye shal find y• may suffice to serue y• turne.

The vse of this place.

2 Of that which is most properly called a propertie, necessarie reasons are made, either to proue ye kinred, or to disproue it.

3 But of the other three kinds, the reasons are not of like force, which thing may well be sene by examples thus.

4 Concerning that which is most properly called a propertie, this is a firme and good profe.

5 Here is present that which is apt to laugh, therefore a man is here present.

6 Or to disproue, here is not presente that which is apte to laugh, therefore no man is here present.

7 Thus it appeareth, that of suche properties as this is, necessarie reasons are gathered either to proue or disproue indifferently.

[Page] 8 Bycause the kinred and this kinde of propertie are necessarily annexed one to another and are neuer seuered asunder.

9 Now properties which appertaine to the first and thirde kinde, they serue well to proue the kindred, but they serue not to disproue it.

10 For it foloweth well, one cunning in Phisicke is present: or one that is gray headed, is present: Ergo a man is present.

11 But these sequels are naught, here is none that is cunning in Phisicke, Ergo here is no man.

12 Or here is none gray headed for age, Ergo here is no man.

13 For there are many men being neither cunning in Phisicke nor graye headed.

14 But there is none either cunning in Phisicke or graye headed, but that he is a man.

15 Bicause therfore these properties appertaine to self things of one seueral kinred, it must néedes be good in reason, that where the propertie is graunted to bée, there must be also the kinred.

[Page] 16 For that onely in it the propertie hath his being.

17 The second kind of propertie serueth to disproue the kinred: but it will not alwaies of force serue to proue it.

18 For this is a necessary reason, no two footed thing is present, therefore man is not present.

19 But to proue a man present, it is not sufficient to say, that which hath two féete is present, for manye things els besides man, haue two féete.

Of the vvhole and of his partes. Chapter. 6.

1 The whole and the parte, are like in some things to the generall and the speciall, in so much that it may be said (after a sort) that the generall is a whole to all his specialls: and eche speciall is a parte and portion of his generall, how be it in deede they differ much.

2 For a whole and a part are self things: and selfe things are said but of one.

3 A generall and a speciall are common things: & commō things are said of many.

[Page] 4 Further the generall is affirmed of all his specials: eche speciall bearing both the name and the say what of his generall.

5 The whole is not said of his parts, but standeth of them: neither do the partes admit the apt say what of the whole, though they (somtimes) haue the same name that the whole hath.

6 For though euery parte of a bone bée called a bene, and euery part of a stone be named a stone, yet the sayewhat of the whole is one, and the saywhat of ech parte is another.

7 Let that be taken for a whole, which is a self thing deuided into sundry parts: and that for a part, which is a peece and portion of such a whole.

8 The whole and the parts are respecting termes: for there is no whole, but in respect of parts, nor there can be no parts but in respect of a whole.

9 Therefore in defining of the one, we must of force make mention of the other.

10 Partes are thus deuided: some are necessary parts, some are parts tending to profite, some to pleasure.

[Page] 11 Necessarye partes are againe thus deuided.

12 Some are so necessary that the whole can haue no being without them: some are very necessary partes to the well being of an whole, and yet not so necessary but that it may haue a being without them.

13 The head, the necke, and the hart, are very necessarye partes of a man, and so is the matter and the forme of eche whole thing, bée it naturall, or artificiall: without these partes the whole can haue no being at all.

14 Hande, arme, foote, legge, and suche like partes, are very necessary for man, if he shall liue well: yet not so necessarye to any, but that he may both be named a mā, and be a man in déede without them.

15 The forme is more worthy then the matter.

16 For when the forme is atchéeued, the whole is finished, & the matter is brought to his appoynted ende, which els without forme shall lye voyde of vse, and come to no profite.

17 This may be learned at a fonde builder, [Page] who bestowing greate cost in prouiding bricke, timber, lime, claye, and other stuffe to builde an house, letteth all come to wast, afore he bring them in frame and adde for me to his matter.

18 Further, some partes are chiefe parts and of great importance, some are meane partes and of small value.

19 One principall parte, will weigh against a multitude of meane partes, and such as are of small weight and value.

Examples of partes, prouing, or disprouing an vvhole.

20 To proue thus: his coate is wel made for the coller is well, the body is well, the fleues are wel, and the pleates are al wel.

21 Againe, to disproue on this sort: this house is not wel builded, for the roufe wil not well auoyde water, the walles stande not righte vp, neyther is the foundation sure and fast.

22 But if the case so stande that ye cannot alledge al, or manye chiefe partes, yet [Page] alledge one: for one principall parte will serue for disproufe or disprayfe of the whole.

Examples of a vvhole prouing or disprouing the partes.

23 To proue: this coate is well made, therfore the coller, bodye, sleeues, and the pleates therof are well made too.

24 To disproue: this ceate is not good, therefore of force eyther the stuffe or the fashion therof is not good.

The vse of these tvvo places.

25 Argumentes holde of these places diuersly, some beyng necessary, some prouable, some variable, and that as well when the partes are alledged to proue or dysproue the whole: as when the whole is aledged for proofe or disproofe of his partes.

26 If all partes be recited eyther to proue or disproue: to praise or dispraise the whole, the argumēt is necessary: if many, [Page] it is probable: if one or a fewe, it is variable.

27 For though one principall parte bée good and of force, to disproue or disprayse foe whole: yet one or fewe partes of small value are not.

28 For if the head be naught, the whole body is naught too.

29 But it foloweth not, thoughe some one, or some fewe pynnes in an house be rotten or yll driuen, that the whole house shoulde bee sayd to be ill and naught therfore.

30 One or many parts, whether they be principall or of small importance, are not alwayes of force to proue or to prayse a whole.

31 For a song that standeth of foure parts, that is to saye of the base, the meane, the triple, and the contratenor, is not therfore fine and good, because two or thrée partes be excellently well song.

32 For in such whole things as song and melody are, all the partes are necessarily required to be good, otherwise there shalbe a discorde and a iarre in the whole.

[Page] 33 Neither is it a good reason to say this image is wel painted bycause the haire of the head and of the beard, the nailes of the fingers and of the toes be liuely expressd and set forth.

34 For if many or one principall parte bée omitted, a let maye bee in it or them, why the sequele is not good.

Rules belonging to an vvhole or to a parte.

35 Euery whole is bigger then any one of his partes.

36 A whole is equall to all his partes.

37 One parte is not equall in quantitie nor comparable in worthinesse with hys whole.

38 A corruptible parte in time may be both afore and after his whole.

39 As the timber and nailes of a shippe maye haue a being bothe afore the shippe be made, and after it is taken asunder.

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Of the ofsprings. Chap. 7.

1 An ofspring is properly taken, eyther for a nowne adiectiue deriued of a nowne substantiue: or for the aduerbe y• groweth (as it were) and springeth therof.

2 As of vertue is deriued a vertuous man, a vertuous thing, and vertuously: of health, healthfull, and healthfully.

3 But ofsprings here are taken as well for the nowne substantiue, which is the originall: as for the nowne adiectiue and aduerbe which are the deriuals.

4 For arguments are gathered indifferently as well of the deriuals to proue or disproue the originall: as of the originall to proue or disproue the deriuals: bothe kinds properly appert [...]ining to this place.

Hovv of springs are deuided.

5 Some are ofsprings in meaning and not in name, as goodnesse and wel: some in name and not in meaning, as sleep [...] and sleepingly: some in bothe, as vertue and vertuously.

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Rules belonging to an Ofspring.

6 Ofsprings haue like sequele in reasoning.

7 For as one originall is affirmed or denied of another: so is one deriuall, affirmed or denied of another.

8 And contrarywise, as one deri [...] all is affirmed or denied of another: so is one originall said or not said of another.

9 For example thus: if wealth be a goodnes, thē things procuring wealth are good things: & to liue wealthely is to liue well.

10 Againe, if to iudge erroniously, bee to iudge falsely, then is errour falshood.

11 Or if erroniously, be not falsely: then is not errour falshood.

12 Erroniously to iudge, & falsly to iudge, differ in this, for that he y• iudgeth falsely, hath alwayes a purpose to deceyue: when as he that iudgeth erroniously, swarueth from the truth, & yet not for lacke of good will, which thing when it chaunceth, the partie can not properlye be called a false iudge, nor his errour falshood.

[Page] 13 This rule holdeth not in those ofsprings which are ofspringsonly in name: for it foloweth not, though sléepe be a goodnes, and though those things that procure sleepe, be good things too, that therfore, that which is sleepingly done, should be saide to be well done: neither is he properly to bee called a sléeper, that sleepeth: but hee that sléepeth to much.

14 So that sléep, a sléeper, and sléepingly, being ofsprings in terme and name, and not in sense and meaning, folow not one vppon another in reasoning, as the other two sortes of ofsprings do.

Example.

15 I am an huswife, therfore huswifenes should appertaine vnto mée.

Of Quantitie. Chap. 8.

1 After that consideration is had of so muche as pertaineth to the substance of a matter, it foloweth next inorder, to consider that, which belongeth to the quantitie thereof.

2 Quantitie consisteth in number, weight, and bignesse.

[Page] 3 Of quantitie we haue intreated in one [...]rite booke side. 20. chap. 3. vnto the which place the diligent reader muste haue recourse, if he doe not well remember what was saide there.

4 It shalbe sufficient for vs to set down here certaine examples, thereby to teache the ignorant how reasons are gathered of this place.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in number.

5 If you will builde with spéede, hire many laborers: for many handes make radde woorke.

6 And againe, striue not against many: for force lieth in a multitude.

7 Item, pardon mée this fault: it is the firste.

8 Item, forgeue this second trespasse: for twice is not often.

9 The force of these and suche like reasons consist in number.

Examples of reasons vvhich consist in bignesse.

10 My shooes are euer ill made: for they [Page] neuer fit mée, but are alwayes eyther to long, or to short, to wide, or to streight.

11 These arguments are framed onely of bignesse.

12 But sometimes bignesse and number runne ioyntlye together, sometymes number and weight, as in these.

13 It is past your handreache, being thrée yardes highe.

14 Or it is more then you can spanne, being twelue intches broad.

15 Or it is more then you can fatham, being a yard square.

16 Or it farre passeth your lift, being an hundreth weight.

Of Qualitie. Chap. 9.

1 There is greater varietie of the quality of eche thing, then of the quantitie.

2 What qualitie is, and howe it is deuided ye may learne in the. 4 Chap. of oure first booke.

3 But here, in deuiding of qualitie, I mind to folow that deuision, which experience hath taught to be moste agreable to common [Page] practise.

4 For they that do throughly fift the qualitie of a thing, vse to conūder.

the
Power
therof.

Will

Disposition

Sensible qualities

Affections

Passions

Shape

Of Povver.

5 No déede is atchieued, excepte power and will concurre, and méete together: it either want, the worke ceaseth.

6 It is to bee considered, whether the power lye in one, or in many: whether it be néere or far of: what it can do by it self, and what, if it beioyned and coupled with others.

Hovve argumentes holde of povver or vvant of povver.

7 Argumentes taken of the want of power, are good and necessarye to disproue: for this reason is of force. Hee had no [Page] strength or power to doe this déede: Ergo he did it not.

8 But argumentes grounded vpon power, that he could do such a facte, and concluding thervpon y• he did it, are not good: for many good men can do ill deedes, which they will not doe: and ill men can do good déedes, which they do not.

9 Thoughe power bée not sufficient to proue a fact to bée done: yet is power profitable to perswade, and to exhorte, that a thing maye be done. And the reasons gathered therof, are probable.

10 For if you would perswade a man to take warre, building, or any other enterprise in hand: your purpose shal be greatly furthered, if ye proue that the matter once begon, maye be well accomplished, eyther with ease or with honour.

Of VVill.

11 Will is a desire of the minde, to doe, to speake, or to thinke.

Hovv VVill is deuided.

12 There is a good will, and an ill will.

[Page] 13 A good wil in our english tong, is not alwayes taken for a will to worke that which is good: but for a readines, when the person is prest of himself, not needing any forraine occasion to pricke him forward.

14 An euill will is a will constrayned, and vrged by some outward meanes.

15 The first is called a freewill: and the second, a forced will.

The vse of this place.

16 If the will of the doer be forced, and not frée, he loseth the praise of his weldoing in vertue, but not in arte.

17 For no deede can be good or vertuous on the doers behalfe, except it be done vpon a good intent: the intent can not be good, if the will be constrained.

18 But in deedes that are wrought by arte, wee praise the cunning of the craftes man, nothing considering with what good will he wrought his worke.

19 If a man be constrained to doe ill against his will, there is a double consideration to be had: one of the force, another of the harme.

[Page] 20 If the harme be small, and the force great, the partie is to be holden excused: but if the facte bee haynous, no con [...]raint can make the doer vnblameable, muche lesse if the force were smal, or suche as he myght haue withstand without any great perill.

21 Thoughe will bée not sufficiente to proue an acte to be done: yet may wil deserue prayse or dispraise, euen in them that want power to doo good or yll.

22 For this reason is not good, he wold haue done wrong, therfore he did wrong in deede.

23 But these are good, he would fayne do well, therfore he deserueth thankes: or he would fayne do harme, therfore he deserueth blame.

Of dispositions.

24 Consider whether they be good or ill: and whether they be settled and rooted in the partie, that he cannot soon leaue them: or that they be subiecte to sodeyn chaunge, and without continuaunce.

[Page] 25 They of the firste sorte serue to enlarge, or to increase a matter, eyther in praise of the good, or disprayse of the badde: they of the second sort, are rather fit to extenuate, then to amplifie.

26 Here we haue to cōsider the maners of the partie, his entertaynment, the vsage of himselfe, his vertues, his vices, his cunning, his knowledge, his ignoraunce, his craft, his sleyght, his trickes, his knacks, his prankes, his touches. &c.

Examples of disposition, or manners.

27 Place not this fellowe in any office: for he is negligent, and a riotous person.

28 B [...]ie not this gelding: for he is restie.

29 Commit not your lyfe into this Physitians handes: for hee is ignoraunt in his booke, and lacketh experience.

30 Laye no wager vpon the running of this greyhound: for he vseth to lye off.

Of sensible qualities.

31 The vse of this place is very common, [Page] and yeldeth many argumentes, some gathered of the colour, which the eye séeth: some of the voyce, whiche the eare heareth: some of the fauor, which the nose smelleth: and some of the tast, which the toung decerneth: some of hotnesse, coldnesse, moystnesse, drynesse, hardnesse, softnesse. &c. whiche féeling iudgeth.

Examples.

32 Take thys cloth, the colour is good.

33 Choose this boy querister, for his voice is swéete and pleasant.

34 Get some gréene herbs and Mayfloures, for a good smell is comfortable.

35 Dippe youre meate in vineger, and it shall taste the better.

36 This grounde is waterish, therfore it is not good to be sowen.

Of affections.

37 There are diuers opinions cōcerning affections: some men hold, that all affections are euill, and that no good man will vse or nourishe any of them: some hold, that many of them are good, and that they are giuen of God vnto man, for sundry good purposes.

[Page] 38 Doubtlesse mercie, pitie, loue, anger, spite, disdayn, hope, affiance, hate, distrust, contempt, enuie, malice, mirth, gladnesse, greefe, and feare, &c. are oft alledged as good matter to proue or disproue, to exhorte, or dissuade.

Examples of affections.

39 I will not be his seruant, he is too testie: he will not long dwell in one opinion, for hée is fickle headed: this bitche will not hunt, for she is proude.

Of passions.

40 Some take passions for any affection, be it greate or small: but in oure English speeche we vse this terme, when wée would expresse a vehement pang, eyther of the bodie, or of the mynde.

The vse of this place.

41 If a fault be committed, through any passion or pang, eyther of the mynde or bodie, the pang shall excuse the fact, if the pacient himself were no cause herof at al.

42 If he were some occasion, yet not the chiefe occasion therof, then it shall extenuate [Page] the facte:

43 But if he was the onely cause, or the chiefe cause of his owne maladie: then the passion procureth to the partie, neyther pardon nor pitie: for it is commonly and truely sayde: He that will kill when he is drunke, shall be hanged when he is sobre.

Examples of Passions.

44 This mans déede of gifte, is not good in the lawe: for he was straughte, and besides himselfe, when he sealed it.

45 Take héede of that Dogge, for he is madde.

Of Forme.

46 Forme, fashion, shape and making: are counted of some, as parte of a thyng, and so they be in very deede, if the matter bée narrowly considered: howebéeit, a parte (by the iudgement of the common sorte) is taken onely for a bodyed portion of a sole substaunce: and manye reasons are gathered of the forme of a thyng, by them which neyther thinke forme or fashion any parte at all.

47 Wée will therefore make forme a [Page] place by it selfe, folowing that in arte, which we learne to be common in practise.

48 Fairenes and fauour appertaine to this place, they differ in this, that fairenesse [...] sisteth chiefly in colour, and fauoure in proportion.

The deuision of forme and fashion.

49 There is a newe fashion and an olde fashion: a straunge fashion, and an vsual fashion: a trimme fashion, and a rude fashion: a commodious fashion, and an vnprofitable fashion. &c.

Examples of Forme.

50 My yong Lord will loue my lady his wyfe righte well: for she is bothe faire and well fauoured.

51 This horsse and this greyhounde can not choose but be good: there is such trimme making in them both.

Of the causes. Chap. 10.

1 No man is saide to knowe anye thyng throughly, afore he know the causes therof.

2 A cause is a meane, wherby any thing is made to haue a being.

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The deuision of causes.

3 There are foure causes: the matter, the forme, the workman, and the ende.

The

1 Matter.

2 Forme.

3 Woorkman.

4 Ende.

4 Matter is the stuffe, whereof a thing is made.

5 Formeis the sh [...]e and fashion, which added to the matter, maketh the thing perfect, and yeldeth both [...]ame and béeing thervnto.

6 Woorkmen are doers, from whence mouing first commeth.

7 An ende is the vse of a thyng that is made, causing the workman to take the enterprise in hande.

8 Of this it is playne, that matter without forme is vnprofitable stuffe: and that forme is not added to the matter withoute a workeman: nor that any thing worketh, except it be moued by some profitable ende.

9 Therfor do authors knit these four causes [Page] togyther, which knowledge are very profitable: and reasons are gathered of them very orderly.

Examples of the causes.

10 As if I say: My bootes are good, for they keep out wete wel: Myne argument is taken of the matter: for the cause is the goodnesse of the leather, whereof my bootes are made:

11 But if I saye, I lyke my bootes wel, for they are fit for me, and well shapen: my reason is taken of the forme, whiche consisteth in the fashion of the boote.

12 If I say, My bootes are well made: for he that made them is a cunning shoemaker: my reason taketh his force of the workeman.

13 If I say, I make my bootes thus, for I mynde to ryde drye: my reason taketh his force of the ende, whiche is the vse, I purpose to haue of my bootes.

14 Thoughe forme and matter maye well for bréefenesse sake, bée reckened as partes, and so be referred to the first generall place whiche we called substaunce, bicause the cause séemeth to be without the [Page] thing, where as these haue their béeing in the thing: nay rather the thing it selfe is nothing else but the forme and matter ioyned together, and taken as one: yet in common speach, we neuer séeme otherwise to consider of a part, then as it is a bodied portion of some whole.

15 Therefore haue I made Matter and Forme, places by themselues.

16 If any man be contentious, and say, that it is but that, to teache one thing often: I aunswer, that it is no inconuenience, that one argument (vpon sundry respects) be referred to sundrie places.

Rules appertaining to the Matter and the Forme.

17 The matter may be good of a thyng, though the forme [...] ill: as the golde in the ring may be good, and the fashion of the ring nought.

18 Agayne, the forme may be good, and the matter nought: as the shoe maye bee well made, and yet the leather kéepe oute no water.

[Page] 19 So that nothing can be ill, whose form and matter are both good: nor nothing can be good, if eyther his matter or his forme be ill.

Hovve vvorkmen are deuided.

20 There are thrée kyndes of workers: some things doe worke as nature teacheth them: some as reason guydeth them: and some at aduenture.

21 The first worketh of necessitie, the seconde of fréewill, the third by chaunce.

22 Workemen are also many sundrye wayes deuided: for some do worke thinges in common, and some do things alone: some worke more in short tyme, and do it ill, and some work little in long tyme, and do it wel: some worke for pleasure, and some for profite: some of force, and some of fréewill. &c.

Generall rules belonging to vvorkmen.

23 When there are naturall and necessarie workemen, there muste néedes be necessarie and naturall woorkes.

[Page] 24 And againe, where the worke is necessarie, and naturall, there the workeman must bée so too.

25 One workeman alone can not doe a common worke.

26 He worketh fast inough, that worketh that well, which he doth.

27 And he worketh ouerfasic, that doth any thing ill, or amisse.

28 He worketh well, that worketh with aduisement.

29 And he ofte faulteth in his work, that hasteth to muche.

30 He is a singular workeman that will ridde much in shorte tyme, and doe it well withall.

Generall rules and principles gathered of an ende.

31 If the ende of a thing be good and lawfull, then is the preparation, and all things tending to that ende, lawfull too.

32 For if it be lawful to fight in defence of of a mannes countrey, then is warre, and [Page] the vse of a mans weapon lawfull:

54 But if the ende be vnlawfull, and ill, then are all thinges ill, and vnlawfull, that are appointed to that ende.

Of the Effect of things. Chap. 11.

1 After wée haue searched out the causes of thinges, it behoueth vs to consider their effect: which is nothing else, but the workmans déede.

Hovve vvorkes and effectes are deuided.

2 Some workes are doone only with the bodie: some only with the mynde: some by helpe of them both: some are workes that tende to profite: some to pleasure: some are vaine, tending to no good vse at all: there is a long woorke, and a short woorke: a slowe worke, and a quicke worke, an ill worke, and a good woorke. &c.

Rules gathered of an effect, or of the vvorke that is done.

3 If the worke be well done, the cost that [Page] is made therevppon, is well bestowed, and the workeman deserueth his praise.

4 If the worke be not more worth, then the coast that is bestowed vppon it, there is laboure lost.

5 That worke is good, whiche commendeth the workeman, and that a naughty worke which putteth the doer to shame.

6 The worke of the mind in good things is alwayes more excellente, then the worke of the body: but in il things, it is farre worse.

An example of an Effecte.

7 Fuchsius was a good Phisitian: for hée hath done many notable cures.

8 If ye will set downe this reason at large, do thus:

Da ri i

Whosoeuer hath doone many notable cures was a good Phisitian,

But Fuchsius hathe done many notable cures, therefore

Fuchsius was a notable Phisitian.

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Of preparation. Chap. 12.

1 As the efficient cause doth alwayes respect an effect: so doth the end or finall cause require a preparation.

2 By preparation I understande not only the acte of prouiding: but the things also y• are prepared, as meanes to bring a purpose or deuise to passe.

Hovve preparation is deuided.

3 Preparation is eyther greate or small, sumptuous or meane: open, or secrete: lawfull or vnlawfull: to muche, to little, or in a meane.

Rules belonging to preparation.

4 If preparation be made, there muste néedes be an ende purposed: but contrarywise it followeth not, that yf there bée an ende purposed, there shoulde bée by and by preparation made, bycause the ende is in purpose, afore the means can be gotten, that are prepared for an ende.

5 Agayne, if preparation be not made▪ [Page] nor things prouided that are necessarily required for an ende: it foloweth that the end is not obteyned.

An example of preparation.

6 There will be warre, for there is a generall muster taken through the whole realme: a number of souldiers are prest into wages, the Quéenes Ships furnished with men, vitayle, and shot: and greate prouiding of armoure.

Of doing. Chap. 13.

1 No doer, or efficiente cause, can make any worke: nor no preparation will serue to obteyne any ende without doing. Therefore in mine opinion, the storehouse of doing followeth right aptly in this place. For doing is the laboure that is taken in making of a worke, which bringeth the workeman by meanes (as by steps and degrées) to hys appointed end.

Hovv doings and laboure are deuided.

2 Some dooinges leaue a woorke which [Page] remayneth to be séene after the labor is ended, as the doing that is bestowed in building an house, leaueth an house to be vewed and séene when the worke is finished.

3 Some doings leaue behinde them no suche worke, as may be séene with eie, and yet a worke too, as the trauaile and payne that is taken in getting of learning.

4 Learning is the worke that remayneth of the laboure, which though it cannot be vewed by the eie, yet maye it not therefore be called no worke, or sayde not to remaine.

5 For learning remayneth in déede in the minde of man, and differeth much from the paine that was taken in getting of it.

6 Agayne, there is a sharpe laboure, a softe laboure, and a meane laboure: the firste serueth for spéede, the seconde for ease, the thirde for continuance.

Rules of Laboure.

7 That laboure is well bestowed that bringeth forth a good worke.

[Page] 8 That is lost labour, and in vaine, that faileth of his appointed ende.

9 Haste in doing maketh waste in the woorke: as the common saying is: haste [...]keth waste.

An example of Doing.

10 These are ill men: for they sweare, they dice, they rauishe, they robbe, they kyll.

Of Suffering, and of his diuision. Chapter. 14.

1 We must consider, whether the suffering be in the body, in the minde, or in external things: as what losse the party hath sustained, what domage, what pain, what sicknesse, what griefe. &c.

An example of Suffering.

2 He loueth mée entirelye: for hée hath ventured his life, and sustained great dyspleasure for my sake.

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Of time and place. Chap. 15.

1 What place and time are, loke in our first booke the. 24. side, and. 27. 28. verses.

2 And for the deuision of time looke. 41. [...]de, beginning at the. 6. verse, and so forth till ye come to the twelfth.

3 And to knowe howe places are deuided, looke the. 43. side, and the. 22. verse.

An example of place.

4 I had no libertie this moneth to bée where I woulde: for I was all this time in prison.

An example of time.

5 Aristotle was not king Alexanders scholemaister: for Aristotle was deade a [...]ore king Alexander was borne.

Of the vse of these tvvo places.

6 Necessarye argumentes maye be gathered [Page] of time and place to disproue: but to proue or perswade, they are but probable.

7 For this reason holdeth of force: the partie that is accused, to haue done thys murther, was not in that place, where the fact was don, or had no being at that time: Ergo he is not giltie of that crime.

8 Nowe if you reason, he was there at that time, and none sene there but hee: it argueth a probabilitie, that he should haue bene the doer, but it forceth no necessitie.

Of Order. Chap. 16.

1 Order is a thing very necessarye in all matters. For no armie is of force, excepte the men be in araye and in order: no house can stand except the timber and stone bée laide in due order: no fire will burne, except the stickes and the coales lie in order: no writing can be red except y• letters be set in order: no talke can bée vnderstanded, except the woords be spoken in order: to conclude, nothing is weldon, that is not [Page] done in order: and nothing is ill done, but that is done out of order.

The vse of this place.

2 This place yeldeth manye probable argumentes, to perswade or disswade, to praise or dispraise.

3 But necessary reasons to proue a facte to be done or not done, it yeldeth fewe.

4 Thoughe placing, of it selfe (narowly sifted) admit no degrées of more or lesse: yet when the ordering of one thyng is compared to the ordering of another, cō mon speache vseth to make degrées, and to saye one thing is better ordered, then another.

5 For we vse to say: the armie is in better order nowe, then it was afore: or the common weale is better gouerned now, then it hath bene heretofore.

An example of Order.

6 The state of the common weale must [Page] néedes soone change, all things are so farr [...] out of order.

Of Hauing. Chap. 17.

1 Argumentes are taken of Hauing, when the force of the reason dependeth of the Hauing of a thing, and not of the thing that is had or possessed.

2 As when it is said: come not neare this beare: for she hath whelpes.

3 The force of this reason lieth not in the whelpe: but in hauing of a whelpe.

4 This place is very common, and argumentes rise thereof very rifely.

5 As if I saye: he hath a weapon, take héede of him.

6 Item, he hath good frendes, much money, and an hautie stomacke, therfore medle not with him.

7 Item, he hath corne of his owne, what néedes he to borow, or bie in the market.

Of Commers. Chap. 18.

1 Commers are a generall place, containing [Page] forecommers, aftercommers, and withcommers.

2 For some things comming afore hand, are signes and warnings of that which is to come: some things folowing after, are remembrances and monumentes of that which hath bene: and diuers things vsing to chance at once, are witnesses and assurances one of another.

Of the vse of these places.

3 Forecommers serue to proue that a thing shal be, or shall not be: and they appertaine to the time to come.

4 Aftercommers, serue to proue, that a thing hath bene, or hath not bene: and they appertaine to the time past.

5 Withcommers serue to proue that a thing is or is not: and they pertaine to the time present.

6 If the commers chance alwayes after one sorte: then are the reasons deduced therof necessarye.

7 If they chance often, or for the more parte: then are the argumentes taken of [Page] them likely and probable.

8 If they chance but seldome, and misse as oft as they hitte: then the reasons gathered of them are coniecturall, and prognosticallike, as oft false as true.

Examples.

9 Of forecommers we reason thus: whē those things come to passe, then doe these and these things folowe: but these forethings are come, therefore the aftercommers will folowe.

10 For example thus: if it be a ruddie euening, & a gray morning, thē the day folowing shalbe faire: but yesternight was ruddie, and this morning is graye, this days therfore will be faire.

11 Of aftercōmers we reason thus: these things cannot be, but such and such things went before: seing then the aftercommers are past, the forecommers are past also, as for example: this woman geueth milke, Ergo she hath had a childe: for geuing of milke commeth after hauing a childe.

12 Of withcommers thus: the sword was solemnly caried abrode in the court: Ergo. [Page] the Quéenes maiestie was there.

13 Item, if you will haue warre, looke for cost, trouble, and daunger, for these are incident, and cleaue to euery person, that will liue in warres.

14 He hath a cough, a stitch, and an ague: Ergo, he hath the pl [...]uresie.

Of comparison. Chap. 19.

1 When two or moe are compared together in any one thing: eyther they are equall, and of like force concerning the matter in which they are compared: or vnequall, and of vnlike force therin.

2 If they be equall, and of like value: then they serue indifferentlye turne for turne, one to proue, or disproue another.

3 But if one excéede another in anye degrée of worthinesse: then the reasons that are taken of the likelier, holde well to disproue: and the reasons taken of the vnliklier, hold well to proue: but contrarywise, the reasons are not good.

4 For the likelier will not proue the vnlikelier: nor the vnlikelier will not [Page] proue the likelier.

5 For it is no good reason to say, the lord of the soyle may sell the wood of this Lordship, Ergo the tenauntes may sell it: or the tenauntes may not sell principall timber, Ergo, the Lord may not.

6 Nowe the Lorde is the likelyer to make suche a sale: and the tenauntes the vnlikelier.

Rules belonging to the equall.

7 Among equal things this is a general rule, looke what is good or lawfull in one, the same shalbe good or lawful in another: and what is ill or vnlawfull in one, the same shalbe ill or vnlawfull in another.

8 Item, looke what one can or cannot: the rest in like manner can, or cannot: otherwise they are not equall.

9 With thine equall thou shalte haue equall lawe and portion: like labour, like wage: like paine, like reward: like fault, lyke punishement: and generally like requireth like.

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Rules of the likelier.

10 That the likelier cannot, the vnlikelier much lesse can.

11 That will please the worthier, maye content the meaner.

12 Loke what wyll not fit the lykelyer, the same will not fit the more vnlike.

Rules of the vnlikelier.

13 That which the vnlikelier can compasse, may be compassed of the likelier.

14 Loke what will serue the vnlikelier, the same will serue the likelier.

15 That which will not please the meaner, will ill please the better.

16 They that take the likelier to be that which is more: and the vnlikelier to bée that whych is lesse: and the aslyke to bée that which is equall in quantitie, and so terme these places, places of y• more, of the lesse, and of the equall, are foulye deceyued.

17 For likelier, vnlikelier, and aslike, consiste in other things, as well as in quantitie: wheras more, lesse, and equall, [Page] (if they be properly considered) consist onlye in quantitie.

18 Further, often times the argument that is taken of the likelier is grounded vppon the lesser quantitie, and that argument that is taken of the vnlikelier, vpon the greater quantitie, which thing should neuer be, if their supposition were true.

19 For if I say, two are likelier to spéede then thrée, therefore sende not thrée, but two:

20 The reason is grounded vppon two, the likelier to disproue thrée the vnlikelier, yet are two in verye déede the lesser number, and thrée the bigger.

21 Therfore likelier and vnlikelier, are not alwayes more and lesse in respecte of quantitie, but likelier is that which is of more possibilitie in reason: and vnlikelier that which is of lesse possibilitie, and that in any respect whatsoeuer.

Of a similitude. Chap. 20.

1 A similitude is properlye no place but a kind of reasoning, when the liklines [Page] of one thyng argueth (as it were by example) the lyke sequele in reason of another thing: for example sake, thus.

2 As the frée postyng horse maye not long together galloppe vpon the spurre: so the sharpe and pregnant wytte, maye not muche wythout intermission, bée forced to muse vppon difficulte and harde matters.

3 Learned men in arguing, make small accompt of any similitude.

4 For by a similitude you maye as soone proue a wrong matter, as a righte: yet doe men of great iudgement vse it, but rather to perswade and leade the simple and the ignoraunt, then to force and ouercome the wittie aduersarie.

5 For a good and a shamefast nature, yeldeth in that, whych he séeth so liuelie expressed in another thing, that by no shift of reason, he can make any resistance.

6 It is good for makyng or aunswering of a similitude, to learne wherein thyngs agrée or disagrée.

7 A similitude is well answered, when an vnliklinesse is shewed in that matter, [Page] wherein diuers things were sayde to bée like.

Of VVitnesses. Chap. 21.

1 Witnesse is the worde, writte, or déed of a credible person, prouing a matter that lieth in doubt.

Hovv VVitnesse is deuided.

2 The witnesses vpon whose authoritis proofes are grounded, are either heauenly, earthly, or infernall.

3 Gods word, his wonders, his miracles, and his message, sent to men by angels, and Prophetes, are alledged as heauenly witnesses:

4 Law, custome, othe, bargain, writings, sayings, and so forth, are accompted as humaine witnesses, and such as are taken of the credite of man:

5 Coniuring, witchcraft, appearing of ghostes, oracles and answeres of diuels, [Page] are infernall and vngodlye witnesses, vsed onelye of the wicked, and suffered of God for a punishement to deceyue them, that will not beléeue the true meanes that god hath appoynted.

6 Witnesses are not so muche founde out by the arte and cunning of the spokesman: as they doe arise of the matter it selfe, and are ministred to him by the information of others.

7 Therfore, arte teacheth not so muche to finde oute witnesses: as to vrge them forceablely for prouse of the matter that lyeth in question.

Of Gaynsets. Chap. 22.

1 I thinke it néedlesse, here to repeate, how many kindes of gaynsettes there bée: what eche kind is, wherin they differ one from another: or what els hathe bene spoken of them in oure former Bookes: bycause it may suffice the diligent reader, to be referred by oure marginall note, to those places where these things are intreated of at large.

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Of respecting termes and yokefelovves.

2 Respecting termes may well bée named yokefelowes, for that they are knit, and coupled together with a certain band of societie.

3 For the maister, and the seruaunt: the parentes, and the children: the goodman and the goodwife: the landlorde, and the tenaunt: the guest, and the hoste: and all other respecting terms, are alwaies coupled and ioyned together in some kinde of felowship.

Hovve reasons doe holde of yokefelovves and respecting termes.

4 When reasons are gathered of yokefelowes to proue the being, or not being the one of the other, they are necessary: but when they are taken of the duetie and affection, that is or should be betwene them, then are they but probable.

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Examples.

5 He is a father, therefore he hathe a sonne: he is not my guest, therefore I am not his hoste: these and suche like are necessary reasons.

6 But if I saye, the iudge will take my parte, for he is my frende: or if I saye, he wyll iudge against me, bycause he is my foe: or els my matter shall haue good successe in the lawe, for I pertaine to the Courte: these and suche like reasons, take their force vpon respecte, and are but probable reasons, not necessary argumentes, and such as holde of force.

Of depriuing termes.

7 Naturall power and want of naturall power, compared together, and one proued or disproued by another, are taken for depriuing termes.

8 Wée vse to reason vppon them in this sorte: he séeth, therefore he is not [Page] blynde: or agayne, hée is blynde, therfore he seeth not.

9 This kinde of reasoning alwayes foloweth of force, that where the power is, ther can not be the want: and where wante is, there can not be the power.

10 Wee may also reason vpon the depriuing termes, on this sort and maner.

11 If lack of sight be a lack of some sense, then must sight it selfe néedes be a sense: or if sight it selfe be a sense, then must lacke of sight, be a lacke of sense too.

12 Here is to be noted, that this place serueth as well to proue the wante by the power: as contrarywise to proue the power by the want.

13 Now for contraries this is to be noted: that arguments gathered of them, take their force, sometyme of contrary termes, sometymes of contrarie sayings.

14 Contrarie sayings are here taken not only for two generall shewsayes, which differ in qualitie, and make no chaunge at all, eyther of foreset or backset (as was sayde in 3. verse of the. 88.. side) but also those are contrarie sayings, whiche stande of contrarie [Page] termes, and doe appertayn to contrarie maners, be the sayings particular or general.

Hovve to decerne contrarie sayings, vvhich are contrarie by reason of termes, and not by reason of qualitie.

15 When the foresette and backset of a shewesay, haue eyther of them a contrarye terme, then those foure contrarye termes, may two seuerall wayes bée coupled togyther, to make contrarie sayings:

16 Eyther when the forset is one in both the shewsayes, and the backsets be contraries: or else when the backsette is one, and the foresets contraries.

17 But and if bothe the foreset and backset in two shewsayes be contrary eche to other: then those sentences stande of contrarie termes, but they are not contrarie sayings: bicause suche are of lyke ioyce in reason, neyther is there any resistance in the sayings, but a contrarietie in the termes.

18 They that think this rule obscure and strange, may by this example that foloweth and suche lyke, make it to themselues familiar and playn: as thus,

[Page] 19 Uertue is worthie prayse: the foreset of this shewsaye, hath vice to his contrarie, and the backsette, hath blame. Nowe these foure contrarie termes, Uertue, vice, prayse, and blame, are two seuerall wayes coupled together in shewesayes, to make contrarie sayings.

20 Either when the foreset remayneth one in both the shewsayes, the backsets being contraries: as,

Uertue is

worthy prayse,

worthy blame. or,

Uice is

worthy prayse,

worthy blame.

Or else when the backset is one, and the foresets are contraries: as,

Uertue | is worthie prayse. or,
Uice
Uertue | is worthie blame.
Uice

21 But and if the foresayd foure terms be coupled any third way togither, to make two shewsayes: the shewsayes themselues shall not be contrary, though the termes wherof they stand be contrarie, as they are cōpared one with another: For example thus:

Uertue | is worthie | prayse
Uice | blame. or,
Uertue | is worthie | blame
Uice | prayse.

22 For the two firste are bothe true and good: and the other two are both false and ill. Nowe for the two firste, it is reason good inough, to say, they are both true and good, ergo, they ar not contrary sayings. For one true saying is neuer contrary to an other true saying: nor one good thing, is neuer contrary to an other good thing.

23 But for the two seconde sayings, it is no sufficient argument, to say, they are both false, or both ill, ergo, they are not contrary sayings: bicause an ill thing, may be contrary to a good thing, and to an ill thing too: and a false saying may be contrary, as well to a false saying as to a true. Therfore it behoueth to adde this withall, that they are both of like choice, and may bothe at once fall to be in one man.

24 For a man may both praise vertue & blame vice, and yet vse therein no contrarietie of speach at al, which thing could not be, if they were contraries in déede.

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Of the vse of this place.

25 Of this place wée maye gather bothe probable and necessary arguments, to proue or to disproue.

26 For if I argue thus: Socrates is sick: Ergo he is not in health: or say, this lyne is not streight, Ergo it is crooked: the reasons are necessarie, and doe inforce the one a béeing, the other a not béeing.

27 But and if I reason on this wyse, and say, The lawe alloweth mée to prayse well doers, though I can not proue they did wel, Ergo the lawe suffereth mée lykewyse, to disprayse ill dooers, thoughe I wante witnesse to proue they did yll: My reason may séeme probable: for that it standeth wyth reason, that contrary maners should haue contrarie fame and report.

28 Yet is it not necessarie, séeing it doth not generally holde: neyther is it lawfull in a good common wealthe: for one man alone without sufficient proufe to disprayse, though to prayse it be lawful, bycause there ryseth no suche stryfe about prayse, as doth commonly aboute disprayse: therefore [...]or [Page] quietnesse sake, the law forbiddeth the one: and for an incouragement to well dooing, it alloweth the other.

Of those that are termed more then contraries.

29 Arguments gathered of those whiche we terme more then contraries, are always necessarie, eyther to proue, or to disproue, taking their force, somtimes of the worde, sometymes of the saying.

30 Of the worde, bycause the yeaword and nayeworde are of suche propretie and force, that if one of them be sayde of any thing, the other can not be sayd of the same.

31 And againe, if the one be not, the other is: he therefore that proueth the one, doth consequentely disproue the other: and he that doth remoue the one, inforceth the other.

32 Of the saying, bicause that more then contrary sayings, are euer one true, and an other false,

33 Therefore, if this saying (All fayre women are good) be false: then this saying, [Page] (Some faire women are not good) muste néedes be true: and againe, if this saying (some faire women are good) be true, then is this saying (no faire women are good) false.

24 This place shall yelde necessarie argumentes also of the worde, when wée change the termes, and argue thus: If man be a creature, then that which is no creature is no man: and againe, if no creature bée no manne, then is euery manne a creature.

25 This kind of arguing is alwayes necessary, excepte the backset be a chanceable inbeer to the foreset, and then the argumēte is not necessarie, bycause the chanceable inbéer may be saide, and not saide of his inholder: and therefore this reason holdeth not, man is iust, Ergo he that is not iust, is no man.

26 Those argumentes that driue men to an impossibilitie in reason, are commonlye gathered of this place: and the rule wherevppon they bée grounded, is moste certayne, in so muche that some Authoures laboure to proue all [Page] principles by it, and makes it an only stay▪ why wranglers cānot proceed [...] to an endlesse worke.

Of the differing terme. Chap. 23.

1 Thinges differ one from an o [...]her by thrée seueral degrées: the first, is by kynde: the seconde, by kinred: the third, by spec [...]all béeing.

2 Specials whiche are not comprysed vnder one next generall, differ in kynde: as a man and an oke: for the nexte generall [...] man, is a wight: and the next general to an oke, is a trée: therefore a man and an Oke differ in kynde, bycause they are conteyned vnder diuers kyndes, whereof one is not comprised of an other.

3 Selfe things conteyned vnder dyuers kinreds, and also the kinreds them selues conteyned vnder one next kynde, differ in kinred: As this horsse and this asse: or an horsse and an asse: for notwithstanding that these agrée in their kynde (by reason that eche kynde is indifferently sayde of things that are vnder it) yet notwithstanding they [Page] playnely differ in kinred, an horsse and an asse béeing diuers kinreds themselues: and this horsse and this asse béeing selfe thinges conteyned vnder diuers kinreds.

4 Diuers selfe things conteyned vnder one lowest kinred, though they agrée bothe in kinde and in kinred: yet do they differ in speciall béeing: as Iohn and William, this man and that man. For Iohn is as well a man and a wight as William is: and William as well as Iohn: so that they neyther dissent in kinred nor in kynd: neuerthelesse they dissent much in speciall béeing: for one of them hathe not the same speciall beeing that the other hath.

5 Looke howe many wayes there are for things to dissent: and so many wayes are there also for them to assent: for gaynsettes haue one order and trade of learning.

6 Things that dissent in kind, dissent also in kinred, and in speciall béeing: and things that agrée in special béeing, agree also in kinred, and in kinde: But it foloweth not that those things which dissent in speciall béeing: should also dissent in kinred, or in kynd: nor that those thinges which agrée in kynde or [Page] in kinred, shoulde therefore agrée in speciall béeing. So that they dissent most tha differ in kynde: and they agrée néerest that agrée in speciall béeing.

7 When thinges vpon dyuers respectes are ryghtely sayde, eyther to agrée, or disagrée: then vse this distinction of agréeing, or dissenting, as may best serue youre present purpose.

Of the vse of this place.

8 Thys place yeldeth necessarye argumentes to disproue, as when ye argue and saye: Yonder is a skarcrowe, and therefore no man: or an Horsse, and then no Asse: Or it is Wyllyam, and not Iohn.

9 These reasons and suche lyke, are of force, bycause of thinges whiche dissent in generall or specal béeing, it cannot be, that one of them shiould be that thing, which an other of them is.

10 But to proue this place, yeldeth no necessarie arguments, except it be vpon some graunted supposition: as when it is suppos [...]d and iudged of the gaynesayers, that [Page] the thing whereabout they striue, is eythe [...] an Horsse or an Asse: then if one of the gaynsayers proue the thing in controuersie, to be no horsse: it followeth by force of the supposition graunted, that it is an Asse.

Of Deuision, the 24▪ Chap.

1 That Deuision is a place by it selfe seuered from other particular places, and that specyall Argumentes are gathered thereof, it is manyfeste, in as muche as certayne generall Rules for proufe or disprou [...]e of doubtfull matters belong, vnto it, whyche can not fitly be referred to any other particular place.

2 Wée will therefore intreate of Deuision héere among the places: And for that there is greate and necessarye vse thereof, we will speake of it at large.

3 For besydes that it serueth for Inuention, and fyndyng oute of Reasons to proue matters, the whyche lye in doubte: it hemmethe in the sp [...]aker [Page] with certayne listes and boundes, that hée can not lightly digresse from his purpose: it occasioneth the hearer to marke howe euerie parte of the Deuision is prosecuted and handeled in order: it amplifyeth and serueth well to dilate and laye foorth a matter at large: It sharpeneth our memorie, and makes vs better able to call things too remembrance, by reason that in a Deuision things are layd foorth by number and order: it lyghteneth oure vnderstandyng, making an [...]asie and spéedy entrance into the cause: Fynally, an Oration withoute a deuision, maye well bée compared to a stragglyng Armye: For as those men of warre, bée they neuer so experte o [...] couragious of them selues, are of no force to giue battell, whyles they wander out of battell araye: euen so, wordes and sentences be they neuer so apt, picked, or trimme, are of no strengthe to persuade, when they are vttered withoute a deuision, cast (as it were) on heapes, without order, and tending to no speciall issue.

Hovve deuision is deuided.

4 There is a deuision of matter: and a [Page] deuision of wordes.

5 Matter is deuided, when a discourse is reduced and brought vnto certayne speciall poyntes.

6 The deuision of woords, is thrée wayes considered: when a woorde of double vnderstanding is deuided into his seuerall significatiōs: or when an whole is deuided into his partes: or else when a generall is deuided into his specials.

7 Here note, that thoughe euerye one of these foure wayes bée in common spéech named and taken for a deuision, yet for learning sake, and to make a diuersitie amongst them, eche one hath his seuerall and propr [...] name. The first béeing called an ordring of the cause: the seconde, a distinction of wordes: the thirde, a partyng of an wholé: and the fourth, a deuiding of a generall.

8 Deuision differeth from partition, for that in a deuision, the generall is alwayes verified of his specials: where as in a partition the whole is not truely sayde of hys partes. Distinction diffreth from them both: for they deuide matter, and it deuideth wordes or termes onely. The ordering of the [Page] cause differeth from them thrée: for it intreateth of compounded matter: and they of thinges, as they are consydered withoute composition not coupled together in anye perfect sentence.

Rules belonging to this place.

9 A deuision ought to be playne, perfect, and briefe.

10 For playnnesse, ye oughte to séeke vsuall termes, and to auoyde borowed spéeche as much as conueni [...]ntly ye can.

11 For perfectnesse, ye must sée that ther [...] be in the membres, neither too much, nor too little: that is to say, that nothing be reckned amōg the membres, which is not comprised in the whole: nor any thyng cōteyned of the whole, whyche is not set foorth among the membres: that one membre bée not comprehended of an other membre: nor that any one thing be found to be vnder dyuers membres.

12 And for briefenesse, yée muste bryng your Deuision into as small a compasse as [Page] may be: yet so, that if ye can not come to your purpose by your firste deuision: ye ef [...] soone deuide the partes, and that so o [...]e as néede shall require: But here ye muste beware, that yée doo not euercharge or confounde the memorie of youre hearers, with many or confused deuisions.

Examples.

13 Your sugred talke wanteth one chiefe poynt of cunning. For in manye of youre Orations, eyther yée make an vnperfecte D [...]uisyon: or else yée vse too make none at all.

14 The matter wée stryue for, is conteyned vnder the firste parte of the Deuision: therefore ye doe wrong (the Deuision béeing good) to say, that it is conteyned vnder the seconde parte.

15 This thing is within the compasse [...]f the principall: therefore of force it muste eyther bée a membre thereof: Or at the leaste be conteyned vnder one of the members.

[Page]

Of Proportion. Chap. 25.

1 There are thrée sundry kyndes of proportions, taking their names of thrée seuerall artes, Arithmeticall, Musical, and Geometricall.

2 As for the two first, they serue nothing for oure purpose, bycause no good reasons can be gathered of them: wée will therefore intreate onely of the thirde:

3 Which Aristotle bréefly defineth thus, expressyng it to bée an equalitie of reason: But to make thys sayewhat somewhat playne to them that are ignorant in Geometrie, It is to bée noted: that Geometricall proportion standeth alwayes in foure termes at the least: whereof the first hath that respect to the seconde, that the thirde hath to the fourth.

4 As. 2. 4. 8. 16. for loke what respecte two beareth to four: and the same respect eight beareth to sixtene, either of them being an halfe part of that number, where vnto they are referred.

[Page] 5 Now then, he that will be perfecte in Geometricall proportion, must first learn the fiue generall respectes that all numbers beare one to another, and howe by the knowledge of these fiue generall respectes, he maye come to know the name and value of all particular respectes what soeuer: whiche thing ye maye doe wyth small payne, thus:

6 Euerye bigger number compared to a lesser number, doth either, 1, contayne it certaine times exactly, and neither more nor lesse: 2, or els but once and one parte more: 3, or els once and many partes moe: 4, or els many times and one parte more: 5, or els at the vtmost it containeth it many times, and many partes m [...]e.

7 The first is called manyfolde: the seconde an whole with one parte more: the thirde, an whole with many partes m [...]: the fourth manyfolde with one part more: and the fift is termed, manyfold with many partes m [...]e.

8 Agayne, deuide these generall respectes into certayn of their seuerall kyndes, and ye shall sée, as it were, howe to fynde [Page] out the proper name of any respect whatsoeuer: I meane of two vnequall numbers compared together.

9 Manyfold is deuided into

twofolde | as | 2 | to | 1 | or as | 4 | to | 2
thréefold | 3 | 1 | 6 | 2
fourefold &c. | 4 | 1 | 8 | 2

10 Here may ye sée, that foure hath that respecte vnto two, that two hath to one: and that the proper name of this respecte is termed twofold.

11 Againe that sixe do beare themselues so to two, as thrée doe to one: and that the speciall name of this respecte is called thréefolde.

12 And also that eight do so often tymes force two, as foure do one: and that their particular respect is fourefold.

13 Now then if I argue and say that sixe must yéelde thrée, for foure do yéelde two: mine argument taketh his force of the rule of proportion: bycause sixe beare that equalitie in reason to thrée, that foure doe to two.

14 And so of anye foure numbers in all [Page] these examples, which stand in rewe one against another: ye may gather necessarye reasons as well to proue as to disproue.

15 And consequently thus may ye doe, with any other foure things whatsoeuer, when two, to two, beare like equalitie of reason eche to other.

16 An whole with one part more is deuided into an whole with an

halfe parte | as | 3 | to | 2 | or as | 6 | to | 4
third parte | 4 | 3 | 8 | 6
fourth part &c. | 5 | 4 | 10 | 8

17 An whole with many partes m [...]e, is deuided into an whole with

twothird pts | as | 5 | to | 3 | or as | 10 | to | 6
threfourt pts | 7 | 4 | 14 | 8
fourfift parts &c. | 9 | 5 | 18 | 10

[Page] 18 Manyfold with one part more, is deuided

into

twofolde with a | halfe parte more | as | 5 | to | 2 | or as | 10 | to | 4
third parte more | 7 | 3 | 14 | 6
fourth part more &c. | 9 | 4 | 18 | 8

thréefold with a | halfe parte more | as | 7 | to | 2 | or as | 14 | to | 4
third parte more | 10 | 3 | 20 | 6
fourth part more &c. | 13 | 4 | 26 | 8

fourefold with a &c. | halfe parte more | as | 9 | to | 2 | or as | 18 | to | 4
third parte more | 13 | 3 | 26 | 6
fourth part more &c. | 17 | 4 | 34 | 8

[Page] 19 Manyfold with many parts moe, is deuided

into

twofolde with | two third partes moe | as | 8 | to | 3 | or as | 16 | to | 6
thre fourth parts moe | 11 | 4 | 22 | 8
foure fift partes moe &c. | 14 | 5 | 28 | 10

thréefold with | two third partes moe | as | 11 | to | 3 | or as | 22 | to | 6
thrée fourth parts moe | 15 | 4 | 30 | 8
foure fifte parts moe &c. | 19 | 5 | 38 | 10

fourefold with | two third partes moe | as | 14 | to | 3 | or as | 28 | to | 6
thre fourth parts moe | 19 | 4 | 38 | 8
foure fifte parts moe &c. | 24 | 5 | 48 | 10

[Page] 20 I haue set [...]oorthe these particular respectes, for that by them, and suche lyke, ye maye solute all suche questions, as are wroughte in Arithmeticke by the rule of thrée, or as some doe terme it, by the golden rul [...]: which in verye déede is the rule of proportion.

21 But there men are taught to worke by multiplication and deuision, whyche make the matter harde to them, that are ignoraunt in that arte, and hide (as it were) the grounde and cause, why vppon suche woorkyng it should so fall forth: but here yée shall at the fyrste sighte, d [...] cyde the matter, perceyuing withall the reason thereof.

22 For if it be demaunded and said. ii [...]. s̄ in one yeare doe gayne xv [...]. s̄. howe manye shillings shall. v [...]. s̄. gayne: ye maye aunswere and saye: seyng. ii [...]. s̄. are fyue tymes in. xv [...]. s̄. wyth two thyrde partes moe, I know that the summe demaunded muste contayne. v [...]. shillings fyue tymes and two thyrde partes moe of. v [...]. s̄. nowe then. xxxv. s̄. contayning. v [...]. s̄. fiue times, and [...]ourtene groates beyng two thyrde [Page] partes of. v [...]. s̄: I sée playnely that. v [...]. s̄. doe gayne in one yeare. xxxix. s̄. vi [...]. [...]. and that the reason thereof is, for that. v [...]. s̄. are iuste, so ofte in. xxxix. s̄. vi [...]. [...]. as. ii [...]. s̄. are in. xv [...]. s̄.

A generall lesson for Inuention, teaching the vse of our third and fourth booke. Chap. 26.

1 Aristotle in shewing a meane how to finde the prouing terme, maketh but thrée places, the place of the foreset, the place of the backset, and the place of the biset.

The place of the

Foreset

Backset

Biset.

2 Foresets are called in Latine Anteceilentia, bicause they come alwaies in a sentence afore y• verbe: backsets are termed [Page] Consequentia, because they come after: bisets are named in Greeke [...] bycause they are neuer knitte together in a yeasay: but alwayes sundred by a naysay.

3 Doubtless [...] this deuision is very trim and natura [...]l: [...]or when the prouing terme is taken in the foresayes with the generall or special terme, it is either coupled to them by a yeasaye, or seuered from them by a naysay.

4 If it be coupled to them in a yeasaye, it is either placed afore or after the verbe: if it be placed afore, it beareth the name of a [...]oreset: if it be set after the verbe, then [...]oth it take the name of a backset: but if it be sundred from them by a naisay, then is it termed a biset, whether it be placed afore or after.

5 So that the prouing terme, compared eith [...]r to the generall terme, or the special term, must needes beare one of these thrée generall respectes: that is either to be a foreset, a backset, or a biset.

6 And bycause the prouing terme is repeted in euery reason by rule, twice, it followeth that it muste alwayes beare a [Page] double respect, one to the generall terme, and another to the speciall terme, these two termes beyng euer extant, and plaine to be sens in the question it selfe.

7 This thing is set forth in our thyrde booke, both by rules and examples, and that both plainely, and at large: bicause it is a thing most necessary for a reasoner to be [...]nning and expert in.

8 Thus ye must euer marke, that where a reason by rule standeth but of three termes, two of them are euer contained in the conclusion, and therefore [...]uident to bée seene in the question at the firste, the thirde terme is that which we call the prouing terme, & which we vse as a meane, whereby to conclude the matter that lieth in question, and so bring oure purpose to passe.

9 Nowe, howe the prouing term [...] must lye to the other two termes, that the question in controuersie maye be concluded ye muste learne by the fouretene seates set foorth at large in our third booke, considering with your self, what maner of shewsay the question doth containe, and in how [Page] many particular seates, the same maye b [...] concluded, and so shall ye plainely learne the double respect, that the prouing terme must beare to the other two termes, I meane the generall terme, and the speciall terme.

10 This done, ye must drawe your qu [...]stion through the places, that is to saye, yée must drawe the wordes of your question through the plac [...]s, and when ye find any worde in any particular place, which beareth that respect to the generall and speciall terme, that the rules of the third booke require, know ye of a certaintie, that that is the prouing terme, & the meanes wherby ye may worke your feate.

11 So that ye muste conne by hart, and haue on your fingers endes, the fourtene seates expressed in our third booke: and the 44. particular places set forth in this oure fourth booke▪ I thinke it good to name and order them thus:

[Page]

1 Saywhat.
Substaunce.

2 Generall terme.

3 Speciall terme.

4 Propertie.

5 Whole.

6 Partes.

7 Ofspring.

8 Number.
Quantitie.

9 Weight.

10 Bignesse.

11 Power.
Qualitie.

12 Will.

13 Dispositions.

14 Qualities perceiued by sense.

15 Affections.

16 Passions.

17 Forme.

18 Matter, or stuffe.
Causes.

19 Forme.

20 Workman, or doer.

21 Ende.

22 Effect, or worke.

23 Preparation and meanes to obtaine an ende.

24 Doyng.

[Page] 25 Suffering.

26 Time.

27 Place.

28 Order.

29 Hauing.

30 Forecommers.
Commers.

31 Aftercommers.

32 Withcommers

33 Likelier.

34 Unlikelier.

35 Aslike.

36 Similitude.

37 Witnesses.

38 Respecting termes, or yokefelowes
Gainset [...].

39 Depriuing termes

40 Contraries

41 More then contraries, or denying termes.

42 Differing termes.

43 Deuision.

44 Proportion.

[Page]

Hovv doubtfull Questions and demaundes are to be handeled. Chap. 27.

1 Nowe that we haue sufficientlye intreated of words, of sentences, of reasons, and of the places: it remayneth that wée also intreat of a probable demaund, shewing an easye trade and way, howe doubt [...]ll questions are to be discussed.

VVhat a Question or demaunde is.

2 A question or a demaunde is a shewsaye, requiring a yea, or a nay: as, do fishes breath in the waters, or no?

3 If you aunswere this demaunde, and make your choise, saying: either that fishes doe take breath vnder the water: or that they do not: ye make of a question a shewsaye.

4 But if ye procéede further, and adde a reason why ye so saye, in concluding of

[...]

Faultes escaped.

[Page]

Fol. 60. lin. 9. for chap. 14. reade chapter. 15.

Fol. 82. chap. 10. here note that the. 11. &. 12. chapters woulde haue bene placed afore the. 10.

Fol. 84. 1. the first, reade of the first: And agayn in the same verse is of, strike out of.

Fol. 92. lin. 14. smlal, reade small.

Fol. 98. lin. 11. for where, strike out for.

Fol. 142. in place of

13 forecommers,

14 aftercommers,

15 withcommers.

they would haue bene set thus,
13 commers
1 forecommers

2 aftercommers,

3 withcommers.

Fol. 158. lin. 25. prouable, reade probable.

Fol. 176. lin. 9. whyche knowe, reade which foreknow.

¶ A note to vnderstand the meaning of newe deuised Termes.

[Page]

FYrste consider the partes of eche compounded terme: then turne to that place in our Booke, which the two numbers do poynt foorth, that are set vpon the word: And if thou be a Latiniste, take also that helpe, whyche the Latine terme dothe yelde.

Altering. 62. 19. alteratio.

a Bounder. 20. 3. so called, for that it poynteth foorth the vtmost reach of any thing, terminus.

a Backsette. 71. 1. praedicatum, consequens, attributum.

a Begetting or an ingendring, or a creating 60. 2 generatio, o [...]tus.

Contraries. 70. 30. &. 88. 3. contraria, aduersa.

Corrupting. 60. 3. corruptio, interitus.

Depriuing termes. 54. 6. priuatiua.

Denying termes. 54. 7. contradictoria, negantia.

[Page] Difference. 80. 1. differentia.

Diminishing. 62. 18. diminutio.

the Decerning part. 138. 4. Iudicium.

an Endsay. 103. 3. Conclusio. And after this latine worde, called a Conclusion. I call it an Endsaye, bicause it is a saying that maketh an ende of a reason.

a Foreset 7. 11. Subiectum, antecedens.

Foresayes. 103. 3. praemissae.

a Grounded disposition. 30. 22. habitus.

Gaynsets. 53. 3. opposita, contraria.

y• Generall terme. 104. 9. maius extremum, maior terminus.

an Hauing. 45. 5. habitus.

an Inholder. 4. 19. Subiectum.

an Inbeer. 4. 19. Accidens. It may be called also an Indweller, for that it resteth and dwelleth (as it were) in an other.

an Increasing. 62. 18. augmentatio.

an Ifsaye. 93▪ 5. propositio conditionalis.

a Kynde. 78. 1. genus.

a Kinred. 77. 5. species, forma.

Lykesounding woordes. 2. 8. aequiuoca, so termed, bycause in name and sound, they are lyke, though they haue sundry meanyngs.

[Page] More then contrarie sayings. 89. 5. propositiones contradictoriae, so called, for that there is greatter repugnancie in them, then in contrarie sayings.

Mouing. 60. 1. motus.

a Naysay. 84. 4. 5. negatio.

Ofsprings. 161. 1. coniugata denominatiua.

an Ouershew. 22. 17. superficies. so called, bicause it doth shewe the vtmost face, and viewe of a bodied thing.

Playnmeaning wordes. 3. 16. vniuoca.

a Placing. 44. 1. situs.

a Propretie. 75. 1. proprium.

a Parting shewesaye. 94. 10. propositio disiunctiua.

Preambles. 95. 1. modi.

The Prouing terme. 104. 11. medium.

Respecting termes, which may also be called yokefelowes. 63. 3. relata, relatiua, ad aliquid.

a Reason by example. 100. 2. Inductio.

a Reason by rule. 100. ratiocinatio.

a Ranke. 106. 8. figura. 2.

a Saywhat. 73. 1. definitio. corruptly called a definition: but for y• it is a saying which telleth what a thing is, it may more aptly [Page] be called a saywhat.

a Selfe thing, or a sole thing. 5. 24. &. 72. 2. Indiuiduum.

Surmountyng generals. 49. 8. transcendentia.

a Storehouse. 7. 38. praedicamentum, attributum.

y• Speciall terme. 104. 10. minus extremum, minor terminus.

a Seate. 106. 9. modus.

Want of naturall power, commonly called priuation. 27. 8. priuatio.

a Wauering disposition. 31. 23. dispositio.

a Wight. 146. 13. animal.

Witcraf [...]. 1. 1. virtus vel ratio disserendi If those names be alwayes accompted the best, which doe moste playnly teache the hearer the meanyng of the thyng, that they are appoynted to expresse: doubtelesse neyther Logicke, nor Dialect can be thought so fit an Englishe worde to expresse and set foorth the Arte of reason by, as Witcraft is, seeing that Wit in oure mother toung is oft taken for reason: and crafte is the aunciente English woorde, whereby wée haue vsed to expresse an [Page] Arte: whiche two wordes knit together in Witcrafte, do [...] signifie the Arte that teacheth witte and reason. And why shoulde handcrafte and witchecraft bée good englishe names? and Starcraft and Witcrafte bée none? the simples béeing knowne, and the composition lyke.

a Yeasaye. 84.

4. affirmatio.

5.

§

§

¶ Imprinted at London by Henrie Bynneman, dwelling in Knightriders streate, at the signe of the Marmayde. ANNO. 1573.

And are to be solde at his Shoppe at the Northvvest dore of Paules Church.

[Page]

[figure]

[Page]

Information about this book

Title statement

The arte of reason, rightly termed, witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions.

Lever, Ralph, d. 1584.

Edition statement

1573

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Text Creation Partnership,

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2004-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

ID [DLPS]

A05388

ID [STC]

STC 15541

ID [STC]

ESTC S109424

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

99845071

ID [PROQUEST]

99845071

ID [VID]

9947

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(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A05388)

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— The arte of reason, rightly termed, witcraft teaching a perfect way to argue and dispute. Made by Raphe Leuer. Seene and allowed according to the order appointed in the Queenes Maiesties iniunctions., Lever, Ralph, d. 1584..

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[24], 233, [7] p.

By H. Bynneman, dwelling in Knightrider streate, at the signe of the Mermayde. Anno. 1573. These bookes are to be solde at his shop at the northvvest dore of Paules church,. Imprinted at London :: [1573]. (Reproduction of the original in the Henry E. Huntington Library and Art Gallery.)

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