CHAP. I.
How far we may seeke to expresse what by light of Na­ture, or otherwayes, may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence, or his Attributes.

FIrst, if every particular man, or bodie generable, have precedent causes of their beings; their whole generations must of necessity have some cause: o­therwise all should not be of one kinde or nature. Now this progresse from effects unto their causes, or betwixt causes subordinate, cannot be infinite: but as all progressive motion supposeth some rest or stay, whence it proceedeth, so must this progresse, whereof I speake, take beginning from some cause, which hath no cause of its being. And this is that incomprehensible Essence, which wee seeke.

2 But whereunto shall wee liken him? Things compared alwayes agree in some one kind, or have (at least) a common measure. Is then this cause of causes contained in any predicamentall ranck of be­ing? Or can our conceipt of any thing therein con­tained, be truly fitted unto him? Or may his infi­nite and incomprehensible nature be rightly moul­ded within the circumference of mans shallow braine? One thing it is to represent the infinite Es­sence, another to illustrate this truth, that he cannot be represented. Though nothing can exactly re­semble him, yet some things there be which better notifie how farre he is beyond all resemblance or [Page 4] comparison, then others can doe. By variety of such resemblances as his works afford, may our ad­miration of his incomprehensiblenesse bee raised higher and higher, and with our admiration thus raised, will our longing after his presence still be en­larged. The nature of things finite and limited, no Philosopher can so exactly expresse, as Painters may their outward lineaments. But as some sensible objects, besides their proper shape or character, imprint a kinde of dislike or pleasance in creatures sensitive: so have our purest and most exact con­ceipts intellectuall certaine symptomaticall impres­sions annexed, which inwardly affect us; though we cannot outwardly so expresse them, as they may imprint the like affection in others. Hence it is that the more right resemblances we make to our selves of any thing, the greater will be the symptomati­call impression of the latent truth; some part or shadow whereof appeareth in every thing, where­to it can truly be compared. And though we can­not in this life come to a cleare view of that nature, which we most desire to see; yet is it a worke wor­thy our paines, to erect our thoughts, by varietie of resemblances (made with due observance of de­corum) unto an horizon more ample then ordinary; in whose skirts or edges, wee may behold some scattered rayes of that glorious light, which is ut­terly set unto men, whose thoughts soare not with­out the circumference of this visible world; for all we see with ou [...] bodily eyes, is but an hemisphere of midnight darknesse, to the habitation of Saints, and seat o [...] blisse.

[Page 5] 3 The rule of decorum in all resemblances of things amiable or glorious is, that as well the sim­ple termes of comparison be sightly and handsome, as the proportion betweene them exact. Supposing the ods of valorous strength betweene Aiax and or­dinary Trojanes, to have beene as great, as Homer would have us beleeve it was; the manner of this Champions retreat, being overcharged with the multitude of his Enemies, could not more exqui­sitely be resembled, than by a company of children, driving an hungry hard-skinned Asse with bats or staves out of a corne-field or meadow. The Asse cannot, by such weaklings, be driven so hard, but he will feed as he goes; nor could Aiax be charged so fiercely by his impotent foes, but that he fought still as he fled. The proportion is approved, as most exact, by aNec dictis erit ullus bonos, si cum actus ab urbe Daunius hostili Teucris urgentibus heros, Vix pugna absistit, simili [...] dicetur Asello, Qu [...]m pueri laeto pascentem pinguia in agro Ordea stipitibus duris detrudere tendunt, Instantes, quatiunt (que) sudes per terga, per armos. Ille autem campo vix cedere, & inter eundum Saepe hic atque illic avidis insistere malis: Omnia conveniunt, rerum (que), simillima imago est. Credo equidem, sed turpe pecus, nec Turnus Asellum, Turnus avia atavis (que) pote [...]s dignabitur heros. Aptius hanc speciem referat Leo, quem neque tergae Ira dare, aut virtus patitur, neque sufficit unus Tendere tot contra, telis (que) obstare sequentum. Hieron. Vida Poet. lib. 2. teacher of Poetry that was his Arts Master, who not­withstanding, with the same breath disallows the invention, as no way applyable unto Turnus, at least in the courtly censure of those times wherein Virgil wrote. Be the congruity betweene the termes never so exquisite or pleasant; the Asse notwithstanding is no amiable creature, nor can wisedome or valour, for his many base properties willingly brook comparison with him in any. More [Page 6] fitly (as this Author thinketh) might Turnus his heroicall spirit have beene paralleld by a Lion, which though unable to sustaine the fierce pursuit of many hunters, yet cannot be enforced to any o­ther march, then Passant gardant.

4 But wee must allow the Poet (whose chiefe art is to please his Readers appetite with pleasant sauces, more then with solid meates,) to bee more dainty and curious in this kinde, than it is requisite the School-divine or Philosopher should be: albeit neither of them need much to feare, lest their dis­courses be too comely, so solidity of truth bee the ground of their comelinesse. No courtly Poet is more observant of the former rule of decorum in their comparisons, than the holy Prophets are. Thus hath the Lord spoken unto mee (saith Esaias, cap. 31. vers. 4.) Like as the Lion, and the young Lion roring on his prey, when a multitude of shepheards is called forth against him, hee will not bee afraid of their voice, nor abase himselfe for the noise of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for mount Sion, and for the hill thereof. SaintEt hic quidem omnium morbus est trium gene­rum quae proposui: & eorum scili­cet qui se­cundum corpus de Deo sapi­unt, & eo­rum qui se­cundum spi­ritualem creaturam sicuti est a­nima; & eorum qui ne (que) secun­dum corpus, ne (que) secun­dū spiritua­lē creaturā, et tamen de Deo falsa existimant: eo remotiores à vero, quo id quod sapiunt, nec in corpore reperitur, nec in facto & condito spi­ritu, nec in ipso creatore. Qui enim opinatur Deum (verbi gratia) candidum vel rutilum, fal­litur; sed tamen haec inventantur in corpore. Rursum, qui opinatur Deum nunc obliviscentem, nunc recordantē, vel si quid hujusmodi est; nihilominus in errore est: sed tamen haec inveniun­tur in animo. Qui autem putant ejus esse potentiae Deum, ut seipsum ipse genuerit: eo plus errant, quòd non solum Deus ita non est, sed nec spiritualis nec corporalis creatura. Nulla enim res omnino est, quae seipsum gignat ut sit. Aug. de Trinit. lib. 1. cap. 1. Austin hath noted three sorts of errors in setting forth the divine nature: of which, two go upon false grounds, the other is altogether groundlesse. Some (saith he) there be that seeke to measure things spirituall by the best knowledge which they have gotten (by [Page 7] sence or art) of things bodily. Others doe fit the Deity with the nature and properties of the hu­mane soule, and from this false ground frame many deceiptfull and crooked rules, whilest they endea­vour to draw the picture or image of the immu­table Essence. A third sort there be, which by too much straining to transcend every mutable crea­ture, patch up such conceipts, as cannot possibly hang together, either upon created or increated na­tures, and these rove further from the truth then doe the former. As (to use his instance) He which thinkes God to be bright or yellow, is much de­ceived; yet his errour wants not a cloke, in as much as these colours have some being (from God) in bodies. His errour againe is as great, that thinkes God sometimes forgets, and sometimes cals things forgotten to minde; yet this vicissitude of memo­rie and oblivion, hath place in the humane soule, which in many things is like the Creator. But hee which makes the Divine nature so powerfull, as to produce or beget it selfe, quite misseth not the marke onely, but the Butt, and shoots (as it were) out of the field: for nothing possible can possibly give it selfe being or existence.

5 But though in no wise wee may avouch such grosse impossibilities of him, to whom nothing is impossible; yet must we often use fictions or suppo­sitions of things scarce possible, to last so long till we have moulded conceipts of the Essence and At­tributes incomprehensible, more lively and sem­blable, then can be taken either from the humane soule alone, or from bodies naturall. To main­taine [Page 8] it as a Philosophical truth, that God is the soule of this universe, is an impious errourIn the 5. Book, Sec­tion 3. before con­demned, as a grand seminary of Idolatry. Yet by imagining the humane soule to be as really existent in every place, whereto the cogitations of it can reach, as it is in our bodies, or rather to exercise the same motive power over the greatest bodily substance in this world, that it doth over our fin­gers, able to weild the Heavens or Elements with as great facility and speed, as we doe our thoughts or breath: We may, by this fiction, gaine a more true modell or shadow of Gods infinite efficacy, then any one created substance can furnish us with­all. But whilest we thus, by imagination, transfuse our conceipts of the best life and motion, which we know, into this great Sphere, which we see, or (which sute better to the immutable and infinite essence) into bodies abstract or mathematicall: we must make such a compound as Tacitus would have made of two noble Romanes: Demptis utriusque vitiis solae virtutes misceantur: The imperfections of both being sifted from them, their perfections onely must be ingredients in this compound. Yet may we not thinke, that the divine nature, which we seeke to expresse by them, consists of perfections infinite, so united or compounded. We must yet use a fur­ther extraction of our conceits, ere wee apply them to his incomprehensible nature.

CHAP. 2.
Containing two philosophicall Maximes which lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite and incom­pre [...]ensible Essence.

VNto every Student that with observance ordinary will sur­vey any Philosophicall tract of causes,1 two maine springs or fountaines doe in a manner dis­cover themselves: which were they as well opened and drawne, as some others of lesse consequence are, wee might baptize most A­theists in the one, and confirme good Christians in the other. The naturall current of the one directly caries us to an independant cause; from whose illi­mited essence and nature, the later affords us an ocu­lar or visible derivation of those generall attributes, whereof faith infused giveth us the true taste and relish. The former wee may draw to this head, [Whatsoever hath limits or bounds of being, hath some distinct cause or author of being.] As impossible it is, any thing should take limits of being, as begin­ning of being from it selfe. For beginning of being is one especiall limit of being.

2 This Maxime is simply convertible, [What­soever hath cause of being hath also limits of being.] because it hath beginning of being: for [Omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principia­tum,] Every cause is the active beginning or begin­ner of being, and an active beginning essentially in­cludes [Page 10] a beginning passive, as fashionable to it, as the marke or impression is to the stampe. Or in plainer English, thus; Where there is a beginning or beginner, there is somewhat begunne. Where the cause is prae [...]xistent in time, the distinction or li­mits of things caused or begun, are as easily seene as the divers surfaces of bodies severed in place. But where the cause hath onely precedence of nature and not of time, (as it falleth out in things caused by concomitance or resultance,) the limits or con­fines of their being seeme confounded, or as hardly distinguishable as the divers surfaces of two bodies glued together. Yet as wee rightly gather that if the bodies be of severall kindes, each hath its pro­per surface, though the point of distinction bee in­visible to our eyes: so whatsoever we conceive to have dependance upon another, wee necessarily conceive it to have proper limits of being, or at least a distinct beginning of being from the other, though as it were ingrafted in it. But whether we conceive effects and causes distinctly as they are in nature, or in grosse, so long as wee acknowledge them (this or that way conceived) to be finite and limited, wee must acknowledge some cause of their limitation, which (as we suppose) cannot be distinct from the cause of their being.

3 Why men in these dayes are not Gyants, why Gyants, in former, were but men, are two Problems which the meere naturalist could easily assoyle by this reason, for substance one and the same. The vigour of causes productive or conser­vative of vegetables, of man especially, from which [Page 11] he receiveth nutrition and augmentation, is lesse now then it hath beene at least before the Flood; though but finite and limited, when it was greatest. Why vegetables of greatest vigour, ingrosse not the properties of others lesse vigorous, but rest contented with a greater numericall measure of their owne specificall vertues; is, by the former reason as plaine. For in that they have not their being from themselves, they can take no more then is given; nor can the natures whence they are pro­pagated, convey them a better title of being, then themselves have. This as the seale communicates his fashion to the waxe, so doth the limited force or vertue of causes, alwayes imprint bounds and li­mits upon their effects. If further it be demanded, why the Elements having the opportunity of mu­tuall vicinity, to wreake their naturall enmities or hostilities, doe not each trespasse more grievously upon other; as why the restlesse or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth, which cannot flye from any wrong or violence offered; or why the Heavens, having so great a prerogative by height of place, largenesse of compasse, and indefatigable motion, do not dispossesse the higher Elements of their seat? The naturalist would plead the warrant of Natures Charter, which had set them their distinct bounds and limits by an everlasting undis­pensable law. Yet is nature in his language alwaies an internall or essentiall part of some bodies, within which it is necessarily confined. As the nature of the Heavens hath not so much as liberty of egresse into neighbour Elements, nor the proper formes [Page 12] of these, (upon what exigence or assaults soever made against them in their territories,) so much as right of removall or flitting into lower Elements. Or, in case it be pretended that these particular na­tures, have a nature more generall for their presi­dent; yet this, whether one above the rest, or an aggregation onely of all the rest, is still confined to this visible world, and both so hidebound with the utmost sphere, that they cannot grow greater or enlarge their strength. So that nature taken in what sense the Naturalist lists, cannot be said so properly to set bounds or limits to bodies naturall, as to bee bounded or limited in them. Or to speake more properly, Nature her selfe did not make, but is that very domestique law, by which they are bounded, and therefore, in no case, can dispense with it. And in that she is a law, (for the most part, but not abso­lutely indispensable) shee necessarily supposeth a Lawgiver; who, if he have no Law set him by any superiour (as we must of necessity come in fine to some one in this kinde supreame) hee can have no such limits or bounds, as he hath set to nature, and things naturall. He neither is any part of this visible frame, which we see, nor can he be inclosed within the utmost sphere. And thus by following the issue of the former fountaine, we are arived in the latter, which fully discovered, opens it selfe into a bound­lesse Ocean. Whatsoever hath no cause of being can have no limits or bounds of being.

4 And Being, may bee limited or illimited two wayes: Either for number of kindes and natures contained in it, or for quantity and intensive per­fection [Page 13] of every severall kinde. Of things visible, we see the most perfect are but perfect in some one kinde, they possesse not the entire perfection of o­thers; and that perfection, whereof they have the just propriety, is not actually infinite, [...] finite and limited. Whatsoever thus is, it was as possible for it not to have beene, and is as possible for it not to be, as to be but of this or that kinde, not all that is, or hath being. Even those substances which we call immortall, as the heaven of heavens, with all their inhabitants, be they Angels or Archangels, Princi­palities or Thrones, enjoy the perpetuall tenour of their actuall existence, not from their essence, but from the decree of their Maker. Manent cuncta non quia aeterna sunt, sed quia defenduntur curâ re­gentis. Immortalia tutore non egent, haec conservat artifex, fragilitatem materiae vi sua vincens. Seneca Epist. 58. All things continue in being, not because they are eternall, but because they are defended by the providence of their Governour. Things immortall need no guardian or protector. But the maker of all things preserveth these things (which we see conti­nue in being) overmatching the frailty of the matter by his power. In this mans philosophy nothing which is made, can be by nature immortall, though many things be perpetually preserved from perish­ing. Nothing which is immortall, can bee made. He grossely erred, if hee were of the same opinion with some others of theMittamus animum ad illa quae ae­terna sunt. Miremur in sublimi vo­litantes re­rum on niū formas▪ De­um (que) inter illa versan­tem, & pro­videntem, quemadmo­dum quae immortalia facere non potuit, quia materia pro­hibebat, de­fendat à morte, ac ratione vi­tium corpo­ris vincat. Senec. ib. Whether for thus saying hee fall under the censure of Muretus in his an­notations upon this place, I re­fer it to the judicious Reader. Impie stulta veterum opinio, Deum voluisse quidem à primo omnia immortalia facere, sed non potuisse, propter materiae vitium. Quasi non, ut caetera omnia, ita materiam condiderit, ac procrearit Deus. Recte Lacta [...]tius, Idem materiae fictor est, q [...]i & rerum ma­teria constantium. Ancient, that God had a [Page 14] desire to make things immortall, but could not by reason of the frailty or untowardlinesse of the mat­ter. But that things made out of the matter, or made at all, could be immortall by nature, he rightly affirmed. For to be immortall in his language, is to be without beginning, without dependance. And what so is, hath an eternall necessity of existence. Absolute necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, or of not being alwayes what it is, and as it is, implies an absolute necessity of being or of existence infinite; which cannot reside save only in the totality or absolute fulnesse of all being pos­sible. The greatest fulnesse of finite existence con­ceiveable, cannot reach beyond al possibility of non-existence, nor can possibility of non-existence, and perpetuall actuall existence, be indissolubly wedded in any finite nature, save only by his infinite power, who essentially is, or whose essence is to exist, or to be the inexhaustible fountaine of all being. The ne­cessary supposall, or acknowledgement of such an infinite or essentially existent power, cannot more strongly or more perspicuously be inferred, than by the reduction of known effects unto their causes, & of these causative entities (whose number and ranks are finite) into one prime essence, whence al of them are derived; it self being underivable frō any cause, or essence conceivable. In that this prime essence hath no cause of being, it can have no beginning of be­ing. And yet is beginning of being, the first & prime limit of being, without whose precedence, other bounds or limits of being, cannot follow.

5 If that which Philosophers suppose to be the [Page 15] root of incorruption in the heavens, can brooke no limits of duration, but must bee imagined without end or beginning; why should it content it selfe with limits of extension? seeing duration is but a kinde of extension, seeing motion, magnitude, and time, by their rules in other cases, hold exact pro­portion. Things caused (as induction manifesteth) are alwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes. Nor are there two causes (much lesse two causalities,) one of their being, another of their li­mitation or restraint to this or that set kinde of be­ing. For whatsoever gives being to any thing, gives it the beginning of being. As Sophroniscus was the true cause why Socrates was in that age wherein he lived, not before or after; why he was a man not a beast, an Athenian, not a Barbarian. Quicquid dat formam, dat omnia consequentia for­mam: whatsoever gives forme of being to any thing, gives all the appurtenances to the forme: is a Physi­call Maxime which supposeth another Metaphysi­call, Quicquid dat esse, dat proprietates esse: That which gives being unto any thing, gives likewise the properties of such being as it hath. Now limits of being, are essentiall properties of that essence or being, wherin they are found. And distinct bounds or limits are included in the distinct forme of being, which every thing hath from its cause. Actuall essence or existence it selfe, is distributed to every thing that hath cause of being, as it were sealed up in its proper forme or kind of being. It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing, as for any thing that is, to take limits or set forme of being from no­thing. [Page 16] That which hath nothing to give it being, can have nothing to give it limits or bounds of be­ing. And as no entity can take its being, or begin­ning of being from it selfe; so neither can it take bounds or limits from it selfe, but must have them from some other. The prime essence or first cause of all things that are, as it hath no precedent cause of existence, nor can it be cause of existence to it self; so neither can it have any cause of limits without it selfe, nor can it be any cause of limits to it selfe. It remaines then, that it must bee an essence illimited, and thus to be without bounds or limits, is the for­mall effect or consequence of being it selfe, or of that which truly is, without any cause precedent to give it being, or make it what it is.

6 So essentially is the conceipt of being without bounds or limits, included in our conceipt of being without cause precedent, that if we should, by way of supposition, give any imaginary entity leave to take beginning or possession of being from it selfe, without the warrant of any cause precedent to ap­point or measure it out some distinct portion or forme of being: thus much being once by imagina­tion granted, wee could not (by any imagination possible) debarre this entity from absolute necessi­ty of being for ever after whatsoever it listed to be, or from being all things, rather than any one thing.

Of the Heathens, many did hold an uncreated Chaos praeexistent to the frame of this Vniverse: and Philosophers, to this day, maintaine an ingene­rable matter, which actually is not any body, but indifferent to be made every body. Let us but sup­pose; [Page 17] First the one, or other of them to be as Ho­mogeneall in it selfe, as the ayre or water: Secondly, to be able to actuate, or Proteus-like to transforme it selfe into a better state than now it hath, without the helpe of any agent or efficient; and then, as it could have no cause, so can there bee no reason gi­ven, to restraine it from taking all bodily perfection possible to it selfe. And if it bee true, which some teach, that this prime matter hath neither proper quantity nor quality, what should hinder it to take both without measure, supposing it might bee its one carver of those endowments? Or imagine there were such a vacuity, where the world now is, as we Christians beleeve there was before it was made, and onely one of Democritus casuall Atoms, or some meere possibility or appetite of the matter, left free, venire in vacuum, to give it selfe full and perfect act without curbe or restraint of any superi­our power or sharer to cry halfe mine with it, or make claime to the nature of any actuall entity lost; it being supposed to be able to take any one nature upon it, what should either hinder or further it, to assume the nature of earth, rather than of water, or of these two, rather than of any other Element, or of any simple bodies, rather than of mixt or com­pounded substances, or of bodily substances, rather than spirituall, or of all these, rather than of their metaphysicall eminences, and perfections? Or whilst we imagine it, without cause of existence or begin­ning, no reason imaginable could confine it to any set place of residence or extension: no cause could bee alledged why it should take possession of the [Page 18] center, rather than of the circumference of this V­niverse, as now it stands, or of both these rather than of the whole sphere, or of the whole sphere rather than of all extensive space imaginable. Only the very supposition of taking beginning though without cause, doth put a limit to its duration; because this kinde of beginning, being but imagi­nary, depends upon our imagination, as upon its true cause. And yet even thus considered, me thinks it should extend its existence both waies, and draw a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes. Or (not imagining the beginning) let us imagine it only to have true present being without any cause precedent to push it forward, or superiour guide to appoint it a set course; and it is not within the compasse of imagination, why the duration of it should not reach as farre the one way as the other. as farre beyond all imagination of time past, as of time to come, why it should not comprehend all duration imaginable by way of present possession, or supereminent permanency, without admission of any deflux, division, or succession, for continua­tion of its existence.

7 If it bee objected, that any thing may follow from supposition or imagination of impossibilities, the reply is easie. The objection is either false, or true in a sense, which no way impeacheth, but ra­ther approves that kinde of arguing. True it is, there is almost nothing in nature so impossible, as it may not be the possible consequent of some im­possibility supposed or granted: but of every par­ticular impossibility supposed or imagined, the pos­sible [Page 19] Qui scho­las regūt, ia id nobis ex­ploratū reli­querūt: tale esse condi­tionalis pro­positionis naturam si­ve conditio­nem, ut ex­istente falso quod ante­cedit, & etiam quod subsequitur, possit rema­nere vera conditiona­lis. Pasq. c. 1. ad Rō. fol. 65 Though it were im­possible for an Angell from hea­ven to preach any other Gos­pell than Paul had preached, and impos­sible like­wise for a­ny Angell of heaven to be accursed, yet S. Pauls conditionall proposition was true; If an Angell from heaven should preach any other Gospell, he should be accursed. In like manner this supposition or conditionall [If any thing could take beginning from it selfe, it should be infinite] is true: although both these positions be false; First, that any thing can take beginning from it self: Secondly, that any thing which hath begin­ning can be infinite. And this only is absolutely true, That which truly is without all beginning, is absolutely infinite.consequences are not infinite; neither such nor so many as we list to make them; they are de­terminate by nature. Now we cannot conceive it to be in nature more impossible for a meere logical possibility, really and truely to take beginning of actuall being onely from it selfe, then it is for that which is supposed & imagined thus to take begin­ning, to be restrained either to any determinat kind or part of being, or to bee confined to any set place or residence. Or if any mislike these imaginarie models, let him (now he hath givē us leave to make them, and vouchsafed to looke upon them) utterly cancell or deface them. The everlasting edifice to whose erection they are destinated, is this; ‘Such as we cannot cōceive that not to be, which we con­ceive to take beginning of being from it selfe without any cause precedent; such of necessity must we conceive and beleeve him to bee indeed, who neither tooke beginning from himselfe, nor had it given by any, but is the beginning of being, the sole maker of all things that bee, being him­selfe without beginning, without dependance o [...] any cause, without subordination to any guide, to appoint his kinde, to limit his place, or prescribe his time of being.’ He is in all these, and whatso­ever branch or portion of being imaginable, truely and really infinite, the quintessence or excellency [Page 20] of all perfections (whether numericall or specifical) incident to al sorts or degrees of Beings numerable.

CHAP. 1.
Of infinity in Beeing, or of absolute infinitie: and the right definition of it by the ancient Philosophers.

1 WEre the question proposed in for­mall termes [An inter nihil & aliquid detur medium,] Whether something or nothing may admit a meane or middle nature: few answerers in the Schools would make choice of the affirmative: If any did, hee might easily be thus opposed: Every meane be­twixt two is either by participation of both ex­treames, (as lukewarme is neither hot nor cold, but a mixture of both;) or a meane by abnegation, as being capable of neither. So a stone, though in it be not blinde, yet cannot see; and is therefore such a meane as we now speake of, (i) medium abnegatio­nis, betwixt sight and blindnesse. That which is not (so is nothing) can communicate no kinde of being (for it hath none,) unto any thing; therefore it is impossible there should bee any meane of par­ticipation betwixt nothing and something. And to finde a meane betwixt them, by abnegation, that is, any thing which is neither something nor nothing, is as hard, as to assigne a space or vacancy betweene a line and the point that terminates it. What name [Page 21] soever we propose, unlesse it have some degree or portion of entity answering to it, we may justly say, it is just nothing. These reasons notwithstanding though they firmely hold in secular disputes of pre­dicamentall or numerable Entities, yet the infinite Essence comes not within the lists of this division. Is he then a meane between something and nothing, rather an excellency too transcendent, to be compre­hended under the name of something, or of any thing; for this were to make him aIdem ab­solutum, quod et De­um dicimꝰ, non ca­dit in nu­mero cum omni alio, ut quod De­us & coe­lum, sint plura, aut duo, aut alia, & di­versa; sicut nec coelum est idem absolutum, ut coelum quod est aliud à ter­ra. Et quia idem abso­lutum est actu omnis formae for­mabilis for­ma, non po­test forma esse extra idem. Quo enim res est eadem sibi­ipsi, forma agit, quòd autem est allerialias est, quia non est idem absolutum, hoc est omnis formae forma. Est igitur idem absolutum, principium, medium, & finis, omnis formae, & actus absolutus omnis potentiae. Cusan. de Genes. dialog. pag. 128. numerable part of being. On the other side, we should avouch as much under our hand, as the foole said in his heart, if we did cōprehend him under the other extream. To say there is no God, or that God is nothing, are speeches altogether equivolent, both equally false, and alike blasphemous. Fully contradictory to their falshood, and in direct opposition to their blasphe­mie, we may more safely say and think, that God is one, yet no one thing. And if we avouch him to be all, our meaning is, he is a great deale more than all things. The Latine ens, which universally taken, directly answers to our English every thing, or any thing; (asLib. de ente & uno. Mirandula well observes) faciem con­creti habet, it beares the face or image of a concrete. And every concrete takes its name from that nature, whereof it participates; which nature, notwithstan­ding by reason of its simple, pure, and perfect essence, cannot brooke the same name which it bestowes on others. Nothing is truly tearmed hot, or white, but [Page 22] from participation of heat or whitenesse; yet to say heat is hot, or whitenesse white, is a speech as im­proper and unnaturall, as it would bee to style the Kings Majesty, Lord President, chiefe Iustice of some Court, or with some other inferiour title, meerely dependent on supreame Majesty. Heat then is that from which things are called, as by par­ticipation of it, they truly are, hot; Whitenesse, that, from whose particiration, things are termed white. This shall we speake of God, so we speake of him as best befits his supreame Majesty, that hee is no one thing, but rather one, from whose most pure & per­fect being, all things are said to bee, what they are. That man is one thing, and the earth another, that any thing is sayd to be, what it is, includes a partici­pation of his being, whose proper name isEx. 3. 14. I am: whose essence is the very quintessence, the incom­prehensible and indiminishable fulnesse of that, without which, wee can neither affirme or deny ought of that which is [...] the onely foundation of every thing, that can bee named alone, the onely bond of all things that can bee combined or linckt together. SayCum pri­mum in­gressus Aca­demiam su­eris, occur­ret tibi Par­menides, qui unicum demonstra­bit Deum essererum omnium ideas, id est, exemplaria rationes (que) eminentissi­mè conti­nentem vel producen­tem. Occur­ret Melis­sus et Zeno, qui solum Deum reve­ra esse de­monstrent, caetera verò videri. Marcil. Fi­cin. Epist. 8. pag. 866. we then not onely, that He is one, but that he onely is: And that in him the eminent totality or perfection of every thing, to whom this title, Is, can be imparted, is contained. Angels and immortall spirits are, but they are not Being it selfe, that is, they are what they are, by participation of his Essence, who onely is, who alone comprehends all things.

2 Of the greatest Angell which he hath created, or of the most noble intelligent Spirit which the [Page 23] Philosophers imagined, were he present, or did we know the place of his residence, we might without wrong say, This Angell, or yonder Intelligence; or speake of either, as of a numerable part, though a principall one of this Vniverse. For though his nature be much more perfect then ours is, and hee according to the perfection of his nature, much more excellent then his fellow Angels are: his per­fections neverthelesse have their bounds and limits, not uncapable of these demonstrative signes, This, Here, or Yonder, &c. He neither containes the spe­cificall perfection of our nature, nor the numericall of his Fellowes, within the measure of his perfecti­on. In his kind then he is most perfect, yet is he not that perfection which he hath in him, but the recep­tacle of it; And if he have perfection onely in him, without being himselfe perfection, Quid habet quod non accepit? All he hath must bee participated or borrowed from perfection it selfe. And of his bor­rowed perfections, one neither properly is another, nor are all or any of them, what he is. His power is not the same that his wisedome is; his wisedome is not his goodness, nor his goodnesse his life. Sathan and his Angels have life, though they have lost their goodnesse; and their power to practise, is lesse than their wit to plot mischiefe and villany. The best, the wisest, or mightiest of those immortall Spirits, which kept their stations, is not able, either by his meere power to give being to things that are not, or life to livelesse creatures; his wisedome cannot inspire wisedome into creatures indued with life; his goodnesse is no fountaine whence grace may [Page 24] be derived into the heart of man. But when we say God is one, or God onely is, in this indivisible unity, we include all multiplicity. Nor can wee say more of him in fewer words than Seneca hath done; Est totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides: Hee is the absolute totality of all and every part of being or perfection, which we see in things visible, or conceive in substances invisible.

3 By the same analogy of speech that wee say a statue, or picture, though made after life, is, no true man; we are bound to say, and thinke, that no crea­ture (the best of which is but the image of God; his being, at the best, but participated) truly is. It is their chiefe grace to be true shadows of true being. O [...] as it is usuall with Divines to enstyle Christ, the true Samuel, David himselfe, the right Salomon, the onely Sampson: not that they thinke the stories of those mens lives, were onely faigned legends for good example, (or that no such persons had ever truly beene,) but because they did foreshadow one far more excellent, than themselves, in whom that was really and fully exhibited, which was only pre­figured in them. So we say God alone Is, because the totality and fulnesse of that being is in him, whose representation is in his creatures. Thus much is included in all those sacred passages, wher­in he saith of himselfe, I am He, I am God, and there is none besides. Thus much many comments yet extant in the Ancient Philosophy of the Heathens, being compared with these texts, would fully in­forme us.

4 The Stoicks appropriate the name of essence unto [Page 25] God, & unto the matter, which they foolishly con­ceive to be coeternall with him,Vide Sene­cam Ep. 58. & Muretū in annot. able to overmatch the benignity of his active power, by its passive un­towardlinesse. How ever, they held nothing wor­thy the title of Essence, which was not [...] in­dependently everlastingly. Plotines Philosophy was more divine, unlesse perhaps he gave too much to his Demoniacall or Angelicall spirits, as many o­thers, not conceiving any creation but out of the matter praeexistent, seeme to allot a kinde of inde­pendent Being to immateriall substances. An error easie to have beene checkt, had the favourers of it beene put in mind, that these their demi-gods by ne­cessary consequence of this opinion, must have beene acknowledged infinite in Being. Whereas the true notion of such infinitie, by the apparent grounds of true Philosophy, is onely proper, onely possible unto One; because it entirely includeth all that can be; and, All, absolutely excludes all plu­rality. From this principle rightly sounded, did Plato deny things sensible truly to be, or (as Seneca paraphrases upon his Text) they make a shew only, or put on a countenance of being for a time, being uncapable of the stability or solidity of true being. So far was this divine Philosopher from their here­fie, which acknowledged an independent being in immateriall substances, that (to the Aristotelicall Christian his shame)Dijs à se factis pro­misit Deus non factus immortali­tatem; quod impossible est, se dixit esse factu­rum. Sic enim eum locutum narrat Pla­to, &c. vide Aug. lib. 22. de civ. Dei cap. 26. Et Solum in 4. senten. di­stin. 43. q. 1. art. 2. Et Platoriem ipsum in Times. p. 41 hee derives their immorta­lity, not from the immaterialitie or excellency of their nature, but from the speciall grant or Charter of their Maker; as if dissolution or finall expiration were due to them as they are creatures; albeit the [Page 26] execution of it were everlastingly differed from their first creation. These termes of being, is, or are, &c. which are so common to al things, that without them, we can neither make enquiry after any thing, nor distinguish it from nothing, are attributed by the same Philosopher to this eternall Maker of all things, after such an eminent and soveraigne man­ner, as may not be communicated to any other. So the name of Poet (to useSecun­dum ex his quae sunt, ponit Plato, quod eminet et exuperat omnia. Hoc ait per ex­cellentiam esse, ut Poe­ta cōmuni­ter dicitur: omnibus enim versus facientibus hoc nomen est: Sed iam apud Graecos in unius notam ces­sit. Homerū intelligas cum audie­ris Poetam. Quid ergo hoc est? Deus scilicet ma­ior ac, po­tentior cun­ctis. Seneca ep. 58. Quid per Ideas in­telligat. Pla­to, vide ibid. et apud Muretum in annotat. Seneca his comment upon Plato his dialect) absolutely or demonstrative­ly taken, was Homers peculiar title throughout Greece, albeit the name of Poet was common in that time to all versifiers. The Poet Homer was a tautology amongst the Graecians, but Poet Aeschy­lus, or Poet Euripides none. A greater tautology or solaecisme it had beene in Platoes Divinity, to have said of God, as we doe of our selves or of An­gels, he is something, every thing, or the most ex­cellent thing. Enough it was to have said he is One, or. He is All, although he should have hit his or the Anoient Philosophers meaning best, that had said, he is, [...], He that is. Or as the Apostle comments upon Gods name revealed to Moses, He which was, is, and which is to come, [...].

5 Parmenides much more ancient then Plato, did not deny (unlesse Simplicius one of Aristotles fol­lowers double with us) all distinction, either nume­ricall or specificall, or more generall, betweene the visible or intelligible parts of this Vniverse. Any member of which division, being granted, multitude and division would necessarily follow. [...]] This is the chiefest name of the eternall and most blessed God, so cal­led of his Essence, be­ing, or ex­istence, which is, simply one, Deut 6. 4. The force of this, name, the holy Ghost openeth He that is, that was, and that will bee, or is to come, Rev. 1. 48. & 4. 8. & 11. 17. & 16. 5. And the forme of the Hebrew name implyeth so much, Je being a signe of the time to come, Ieheveh, he will be, H [...], of the time present, Hoveh, he that is; and Vah of the time past, Havah, he was. It im­porteth that God is, and hath his being of himselfe from before all worlds: [Isa. 44. 6.] that he giveth being or existence unto all things, and in him all are and doe consist, [Acts 17. 25] That he giveth being unto his word, effecting whatsoever hee hath spoken, whether promises, [Exod. 6. 3. Esay 45. 2, 3.] or threatnings, [Ezek. 5. 17. and 7. 27] It is in effect the same that Ehieh, I will be, or I am, as God calleth himselfe, Exod. 3. 14. Of this the Gentiles named the greatest God Iove and Iupiter, that is, Iah-Father, of the shorter name Iah, mentioned Psal. 68. 5. And Varro the learnest of the Romanes, thought Iove to bee the God of the Iewes. August. lib. 1. de consen. Euan. cap. 22. Hereof also in Greeke writers hee is called Iao Diodor. Sicul lib. 2. cap. 5. Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib. 5. Macrob. lib. 1. Saturnal. cap. 18. But in the Greeke tongue the name Iehovah cannot rightly bee pronounced, and for it the Greeke Bibles have Lord, which the new Testament followeth, as Marke 12. 29. from Deut. 6. 4. and elsewhere usually; and the Hebrew Text some­time putteth Adonai Lord, or Elobim God, for Ievovah, as Psalme 57. 10. com­pared with Psalme 108. 4. 2. Chron. 25. 24. with 2 Kings 14. 14. Ainsworth upon Psal. 83. 19. But how many or great soever, the parts of multitude were, in [Page 27] his opiniō, they truly were not, in respect of that uni­tie, whence they had their originall. That speech of this sage Philosopher, Omnia unum sunt, which A­ristotle, in the first entry into his new Philosophy, stumbles at as a Paradoxe, was an orthodoxall prin­ciple of true Divintie. Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, (perhaps better) although he exprest his meaning in a poeticall manner, more apt to bee mistaken, though rightly taken, more magnificent and much apter to occasion admiration. The speech it selfe will naturally beare this construction, Multitude of things visible, is but the multiplyed shadow of invisible independent unitie: things sensible, or by imagination numerable, are but so many severall representations of his incomprehen­sible being, who is one; not as one is part of multi­tude, [Page 28] yet most truly One, because indivisible and un­multipliable, as wanting nothing, as most entirely possessing all that can accrue by multiplication: most truly One, because He onely is, and unto his being nought can be added, nought detracted from it, by the increase or diminution of other beings. Or in Parmenides meaning, He so is, that if al things numerable should lose that being which they have, or be annihilated, all might be found againe in him, and be restored with Iobs restitution, to their won­ted estate, without diminution of his soveraigne being. For whatsoever now is, heretofore hath bin, or can be extant, besides Him; hath a more excel­lent manner of being, treasured up in his eternall and infinite Essence, than may with safety be com­mitted to its owne charge or custody.

6 Happy had it beene for Aristotle himselfe, and not amisse for us, if he had imployed his extraordi­nary talent of wit, in setting forth that infinite trea­sure of wisdome, whence he received it; or spent his daies in contēplation of that unity, whēce al things whereof he wrote, had their beginning, rather thā in decyphering their severall natures and perfecti­ons, altogether omitting the essentiall references, or dependencies, which they had from him; unlesse this mirror of nature, had bin of their number, who infatuated (as the Apostle speakes) by divine wise­dome, became vaine in their imaginatiōs; he might have perceived his owne definition of such infinity as he imagined in the divisibility of Magnitude or succession of time, to have beene (as Plato speakes of Time it selfe) but a moveable image of that true [Page 29] and solid infinity, whose definition, being well as­signed by others, was censoriously rejected by him; or such a floating shadow of it swimming in his braine, as the Sun or Starres imprint in a swift run­ning streame. A perfect definition should bee so fitted to the entire nature of the thing defined, or to the thing it selfe absolutely considered, as the barke is to the tree, or other visible surfaces to the bodies which they environ: To expresse some particular properties or branches, much lesse some references or considerations of it, is not enough. The question then being absolutely proposed Quid est infinitum? What is infinity? or what is it to be infinite? The definitive and satisfactory an­swer must bee such, as shall expresse not the nature of infinity in succession onely or in division, not in this or that respect only, or according to some par­ticular abstraction or consideration; but the nature of infinity simply and absolutely considered. That only is absolutely and properly infinite, which is infinite not according to one conceipt or kinde of infinity, but that which is infinite in Being. This was that infinity which the Ancients well defined, when they said, Infinitum est extra quod nihil est: Infinity is that without which nothing is, or can be. For as infinity in longitude, includes all length con­ceiveable, and infinity in solid magnitudes, all di­mensions imaginable; so must infinite being include all Being possible; and it is impossible for any thing to be without or besides that, wherein all being pos­sible is contained. Thus did these ancient Heathens feele after and seeke, and in a manner find, that Lord [Page 30] under the notion of unum and infinitum, in whom, as S. Paul saith, (Act. 17. 28.) we live, and move, and have our being. His words will beare or rather pre­suppose that improvement, which is necessarily in­cluded in the Ancients definition of absolute infini­tie, It is impossible that any thing living should have life, that any thing moveable should move, that life or motion should have the least degree of being, save only in Him, who onely is. For as the same Apostle there saith, vers. 25. He giveth to all, life and breath, and all things. The very first beginnings, the first and last degrees of such being as they have. Ari­stotle then came farre short of the truth in saying, Infinitum est extra quod semper aliquid est, That is infinite, which never hath so much, but it is alwaies getting more. The truth is, Aristotle did not, could not deny the definition assigned by the Ancients, to be a true and perfect definition of absolute infi­nity, or of infinity in being. Wherein then, or up­on what grounds did he dissent from them? Either in that he did not acknowledge any such absolute infinity or infinite being, as the Ancients beleeved; or else did suppose, that they held this visible world or some bodily magnitude to be so actually and ab­solutely infinite, as the former definition doth im­port. Concerning this latter sort of infinity, what­soever the ancient Philosophers did, we Christians doe not dissent from Aristotle: for we deny any bodily magnitude actually infinite. But that there is an absolute infinity, or an Essence actually and absolutely infinite, may be necessarily inferred from those branches of that infinity which consists not [Page 31] in act, but in possibility, or succession, which Ari­stotle rightly acknowledged, and well defined. For, whence should al the parts of this visible world pos­sibly get any new portion of time, any succession or addition to their present being or duration, which now they have not; save onely from his in­finite and inexhaustible store, who, before all times, had so much of being in every kind, as he could not possibly either get any more, or lose a dramme of what he had; albeit through every moment of du­ration divisible, he furnished all things, that are (as hee could doe more) with as much perfection, as they are capable of, that is, all of them with per­fection or being in it selfe finite, but in some of them without limit of duration. But are all things in him? or such only as include perfection? or shall wee say perfections are in him, rather than in the things themselves? And if so, whether shall we say hee is one perfection, or all perfections?

CHAP. 4.
There is no plurality of perfections in the infinite Es­sence, albeit the perfection of all things be in Him. Of the absolute identity of the Divine Essence and Attributes.

1 HEE argued like himselfe that said, We must either allow the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense; because sense is never found with­out a body. What was it then in [Page 32] his Philosophy, which framed the organs of bodily sense? a body already organized and indued with sense? or a spirit (virtus formatrix) which rather is in the body, than is a body it selfe? And if this spirit frame the organs by its owne skill, Epicurus should in reason have afforded it both sense and reason in greater measure than hee had himselfe; who, out of the same matter, could not make so much as one haire white or blacke; much lesse the most exquisit instruments of sense. But if this spirit, by which, in Philosophers opinions, our bodies are produced, work not by art, but is only set on work by the supreame Artificer; seeing he can make it to do more without sense & reason, thā Epicurus could doe, by all his art or philosophicall skill: wee must needs grant sense (& reason) to be in Him, yet such, or in such a sort, as befits his Majesty, not such as Vide La­ctant. lib. 1. de ira Dei. Et Betule­um in com. Epicurus took delight in. Our argument is groun­ded on the Psalmists Philosophy. Vnderstand yee bruitish among the people, and yee fooles when will yee be wise? He that planted the eare shall he not heare? He that formed the eyes, shall hee not see? Hee that chastiseth the Heathen, shall not he correct? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know? Psal. 94. 8, 9, 10. Yet as wee say that He onely is, and all things numerable are but meere shadowes of His being; so wee must hold, that hearing, sight, and reason are in him, according to their idaeall patterns or perfections, not according to those imperfect pictures, which communicated to men and beasts, distinguish them from vegetables or livelesse crea­tures; whose perfections likewise are in him. But [Page 33] some things perhaps there be, which have no por­tion of perfection, as the prime matter, or some like dead or dull masse. For how shall that, which is but a body, be in him that hath no body? That Maxime, Idem est non esse, & non apparere, is not so true in matters of civill proofe or allegation, as the other stemme of the same root, Idem est non esse & non operari, is in nature. To be without efficacie or operation, or to serve unto no use, is all one, as not to be at all. Or, rather, so to be, hath the same proportion to simple non-being, as nihil agere, to otiosum esse. To be without use or operation is more remote from true being, and worse in nature, than simply not to be. If any such things there be, how should we say they are in God, in whom is nothing but perfection? Yet of things without proper use or operation, there might be some peculiar end best knowne to their Maker; if it were but to commend the perfection which other creatures borrow from him, and to stirre up our thankfulnesse, that we nei­ther are such dull masses our selves, nor are troubled with harbouring or supporting them. But even these, if any such there were, could not be existent or extra causas, unlesse they truely were in Him. What is it then for all things that are, or their per­fections to be in Him?

2 For all things to be in Him, is no more then that He alone can produce them without seed or matter precedent. All things, not extant onely, but possible, are in his wisedome, as the Edifice is in the Artificers head: all things againe are in his power, as strength or force to move our limbes, is [Page 34] in our sinewes or motive faculty. The perfections of all things are truly said to be in Him, in as much as whatsoever is, or can bee done by their efficacy or vertue, Hee alone can doe without them. Hee could feed all the beasts of the field without grasse, heale every disease, without herbe, mettall, or other matter of medicine, by his sole word, not uttered by breathing, or any other kinde of motion; not distinct from his life or essence. Hee is life it selfe; yet is not his life supported by any corporeall masse, or praeexistent nature, nor clothed with such sense as ours is: for sense, in as much as it cannot be without a corporeall organ, is an imperfect kind of knowledge. Paine hee cannot feele as we doe, because that tendeth to destruction, which is the period of imperfection: yet what soever paine any sensible or materiall object can inflict upon us, He alone can inflict the same in an higher degree. The measure of paine, likewise, which we feele by sense, He knows much better without sense or feeling of it. But when wee say all things are in Him, after a more excellent manner, than they are or can bee in themselves: Wee must not conceipt a multitude or diversity of excellencies in his Essence, answering to the severall natures of things created: We must not imagine one excellencie sutable to elementary bodies, another to mixt, a third to vegetables, a fourth to sense, &c. one to the humane nature, ano­ther to the Angelicall. And ifTertium genus est eo­rū quae pro­priè sunt: innumera­bilia haec sunt, sed ex­tra nostrum posita con­spectū. Qua sunt, inter­rogas? Pro­pria Plato­nis suppellex est. Ideas vo [...]at, ex quibus quae­cun (que) vide­mus, omnia fiunt, & ad quas cuncta formantur. Hae immor­tales, immu­tabiles, in­violabiles sunt. Quid sit Idea, id est, quid Platoni esse videatur, audi. Idea est eorū quae naturâ fiūt exemplar ae [...]ernum. Sword [...]. ep. [...]8. Plato in Timaeo ait Ideas nunquam fieri, semper esse: corporea autem omnia nunquam esse, semper fieri. Vide Cusan. Dialog. de Genesi, quomodo idem, identificando, plurali­tatem producit. Plato meant there [Page 35] were as many severall Idaea's eternally extant, whe­ther in the first cause of things, or without Him, as there were substances specifically distinct one from another; his opinion may neither be follow­ed, nor approved by any Christian. In all these, Divine Excellency, as one face in many glasses of different frame, is diversly represented, being in it selfe more truly one than any other entity, that is termed one, or then any bond of union betweene things united. Of natures extant, some, to our ca­pacity, represent Him better, some worse; not the meanest or basest, but is in some sort like Him; not the most excellent creature that is, not all the ex­cellencies of all, can so fully represent his nature, as an Apes shadow doth a Mans body. But what in other cases would seeme most strange, infinite va­riety best sets forth the admirable excellency of his indivisible unity.

3 Touching the question proposed, Whether he were one excellency or all excellencies? whether he were one perfection, or all perfections, Respondent ultima primis. The answer is in a manner given in the beginning of this Discourse. Though hee that saith God is all perfections, excepts none, yet hee in­cludes onely perfections numerable and participa­ted: And to say He were onely one perfection, im­plyes onely perfection limited, and therefore per­fection borrowed, not independent. Or admitting there be a meane betweene all, or some perfections, and one perfection, which may fitly be expressed by all perfection: yet he that should thus say [God is the universall unity or totality of perfection] had need [Page 36] to distinguish acurately of universality and totality, and define Vniversale ante rem▪ more exquisitely than the Platonickes doe; that he may acquit his meaning, from suspition of such totality, or univer­sality, as ariseth not onely by aggregation of parts, but whose extent is no more than equall to all its parts. For every other universall or whole, is fully equalized by all the parts taken together; whereas the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds all particular natures or perfections possible, though in number they could be infinite. It is then (if any man list so to speake) such a totality or universality, as cannot bee augmented, much lesse made up by multi­plication of any other perfection, though prosecu­ted in infinitum; neither diminishable or exhau­stible by multiplicity or division of particulars de­rived from it. But whether wee consider this His infinite Essence in it selfe, or, as it eminently con­taines all things possible; the incomprehensibility of it is in both respects more fully intimated (ex­prest it cannot be) by indefinite formes of speech; than by addition of any definite termes, whether of singularity, universality, or totality. Hee speakes more fully and more safely, that saith, God is being it selfe, or perfection it selfe; than he that saith, he is the onely being, or all being, the onely perfection, or all perfection, the totality of being and of perfecti­on. So all plurality be excluded, we expresse his be­ing and perfection best, by leaving them, as they tru­ly are, without all quantity.

4 That all plurality, not onely of Idaeall per­fections answering to the natures of things nume­rable [Page 37] or created, but of internall perfections, whose different titles necessarily breed plurality of con­ceits in us; must be excluded from the true, ortho­doxall intellectuall apprehension of the illimited Essence, may from the former maine principle be thus evinced. In that Hee is without beginning, without end, without all cause of being, without dependence; we cannot imagine, or at least our un­derstanding must correct our imaginations, if they shall suggest, his power to bee as the stemme, wise­dome, goodnesse, and other like atributes, as bran­ches growing from his being or essence, as from the Root. For if his Being or Essence be absolutely in­dependent, it is absolutely illimited; and being such, what could limit or restraine it from being life, from being power, from being wisedome, from being goodnesse, from being infinitely, whatsoever any thing that hath being is?Deus verò multiplici­ter dicitur, magnus, bo­nus, sapiens, [...]eatus, ve­rus, & quic­quid aliud non indignè Dei vide­tur. Sed eadem mag­nitudo ejus est, quae sa­pientia: non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute. Et eadem bonitas quae sapientia, & magnitudo, & ea­dem veritas, quae illa omnia. Et non est ibi aliud beatum esse, & aliud magnum, aut sapien­tem, aut verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse. Nec quoniam Trinitas est, ideo tri­plex putandus est: al [...]oqui minor erit, Pater solus, aut Filius s [...]lus, quam simul Pater & Filius▪ August. de Trinitate lib. 6. cap. 7. He that affirmes any of these attributes to bee what another is not, or divine Essence not to bee identically what all those are, must grant as well the Attributes, as the Essence to be finite and limited. If power in God have a being distinct from wisedome, and wisedome another being distinct from goodnesse, one must needs want so much of infinite being, as another hath of proper being distinct from it, and, at the best, they can bee but infinite secundùm quid, or in their ranke. Againe if any of them be, what Essence [Page 38] identically is not; Essence cannot bee infinite, be­cause wisedome, power and being have their severall beings distinct from it. And the nearer these come (whether severally or joyntly considered) to the nature of true infinity, the more naked and impo­tent they leave their mother-Essence, if we once grant Essence and them to bee distinct, as Parents and children, or as root and branch, or to what use should powerlesse Essence serve? to support these branches of infinity? this it could not doe without infinite power. And those branches, if they need a root or supportance, their being must needs bee dependent, and therefore limited.

5 From the former definition of absolute infi­nity, [Infinitum est extra quod nihil est] We may conclude, that unlesse all power, unlesse all wisedome, unlesse all goodnesse, unlesse all that truly is, or can possibly be supposed to have true being, bee identi­cally contained in Gods Essence; He could not be absolutely infinite or illimited in being. Whatso­ever is uncapable of limit, is uncapable of division or numericall difference: For wheresoever it can be truly said, This is one, and that another, or This is, and is not That, each hath distinct limits. But seeing our imagination or phantasie is divisible, and our purest intellectuall conceipts of infinity, but finite; we cannot thinke of God as infinite in power, infinite in wisedome and in Essence; but wee must frame a conceit of power distinct from our conceit of Essence, and a conceit of wisedome distinct from both. And this plurality of conceipts in us, usu­ally brings forth a conceit of plurality betwixt his [Page 39] Essence, and his Attributes; unlesse our understan­dings be vigilant and attentive to correct our phan­tasies, by this following, and the like knowne Phi­losophicall truth. As we cannot contemplate in­corporeal substances without imagination of some corporeall forme, and yet the understanding con­stantly denyes them to bee like their pictures pre­sented to it by the phantasie, or to have any such corporeall forme as it doth paint them in: so in this case, notwithstanding the plurality of our im­perfect conceipts, or multiplicity of perfections imagined by us, in our contemplations of the God­head; we must stedfastly beleeve, and acknowledge, that He infinitely is, what all these severall repre­sentations intimate: not by composition, or mix­ture of perfections severally infinite, but by indivisi­ble unity of independent and illimited Being. And as it is a maxime most infallible in naturall philoso­phie [Vis unita fortior] Force, otherwise the same, is alwaies greater united, than being scattered or diffused: so is the metaphysicall extract of it, more eminently true in Divinity. The indivisible unity of illimited being or perfection, is, in every respect imaginable, more excellent and soveraigne than all infinite perfections, by imagination possibly could be, so they were, though never so strictly, but uni­ted. From this fundamentall truth of Gods abso­lute infinity by indivisible unity, wee may inferre, He is powerfull above all conceit of infinite power, rooted in the same Essence with infinite wisedome, and partaker of all her fruits, but not identically the same with her. Wise He is, beyond all conceit of in­finite [Page 40] wisedome, though sworne confederate with infinite power, or linked with it, or with other per­fectiōs, in any other bond, but not in absolute iden­titie. Good likewise He is above all possible conceit of infinite goodnesse, though indissol [...]bly match­ed with all other perfections that can bee concei­ved, unlesse they be conceived (as we must beleeve in Him they are) different onely in name or mans conceit, but indivisibly agreeing with it in the inter­nall unity and identity of nature and Essence. Last­ly, the immensity of his Majesty, and infinity of duration, common to his Essence and all his Attri­butes, infinitely exceed all conceit of infinite suc­cession or extension, whose parts cannot be actual­ly and indivisibly the same, one with another, or with the whole.

This is the bottomlesse and boundlesse Ocean of admiration, wherein contemplative wits may bathe themselves with great delight, but whereinto they cannot dive, without great danger; That the totality of every conceiveable excellency and per­fection, should be contained, after a manner farre more excellent in unity indivisible, then if their na­tures, which they hold thus in common, were laid out in severall, without any bounds prescribed, be­sides infinities proper to each kinde.

6 But seeing our imaginations have a more sen­sible apprehension of greatnesse, exprest under the notion of totality or divisible infinity, then under the conceipt of indivisible unity; and seeing every whole, seemes much greater, when it is resolved into parts, (as a mile by land, whose severall quar­ters [Page 41] or lesse portions, are distinctly represented to our eyes, seemes much longer than two miles by water, whose levell surface affords no distinct repre­sentation of parts, or diversity of aspect) it will bee very behoovefull to unfold some principall branches of being or perfection, whose infinitie or totality is eminently contained in the unity of in­finite Being. For being thus sorted by imagination into their severall ranks, like so many numbers in a table ready for addition, the understanding may with admiration guesse at the product, like an A­rithmetician, which had gone so far in Geometri­call progression, that he could not number the last and compleat summe; yet acknowledgeth that the progresse in nature, can admit no end or limit. Or though we could thus proceed by addition or mul­tiplication of perfections in infinitum, we were still to allow the understanding to use the improove­ment of the former rule, Vis unita fortior: Or to admit the Platonickes conceipt, concerning the masculine force of unity in respect of pluralities ef­feminate weaknesse, to bee in this point more Or­thodoxall than in any.

CHAP. 5.
Of Divine Immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof infinity in magnitude, or space ima­ginary is the shadow.

ORder of nature leads us first to ex­plicate two branches of perfecti­on infinite, 1 that answer unto a kind of infinitie, so frequent and obvious to our thoughts, that our imaginations will hardly suffer it to be severed from those subjects, which our understandings by light of reason may, and by the eye of faith, must confesse to bee finite, to wit, time and place. The cause of this difficultie in abstraction, was signifiedIn the 5. Booke. Section 2. before to be this. No event there is observed by sense, but is husked in the circumstance of place and time, whence it is, that these two accompany many Phantasmes, after they [Page 43] bee winnowed from all the rest, into the closet of the understāding. The conceit of mathematicall or metaphysicall space, is so naturally annexed to our imagination of time and place physicall; that albeit reason, aswell as Scripture demonstrate the world to be, for Physicall magnitude, finite; yet our phan­tasies cannot be curbed from running into imagina­ry locall distance, beyond the utmost surface of this goodly visible worke of God, yea beyond the hea­ven of heavens. The Philosopher, which thought all place or locall distance to bee contained within the utmost sphere, it beeing contained in nothing else (for extra coelum nihil est, was his saying) might in congruity have granted, a like termination, or cir­cumscription of succession or time; unto which notwithstanding our imaginations will not easily subscribe. For though our understanding oft re­fute their errour, which deny the beginning of Time; yet our senses still nurse an imaginary suc­cessive duration much longer before the creation of this visible world, than the continuation of it hath beene. And (which is much to bee admired) some Schoole-braines have beene so puzled in pas­sing this unsoundable gulfe, as to suspect that God, which is now in every place of the world created by Him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time, before the creation was attempted. Thus have they made place commensurable to his immensitie, and succession, or time coequall to his eternitie. But what could they answere us, if we should demand, whether this duration, or locall distance, wherein they imagine God to have beene [Page 44] before the Creation, were created by Him, or not? whether they were truly something, or meerly no­thing? If they held them to be meerly nothing, they should have told us, that they had a reall imaginati­on of an infinite space, which really was not: and therefore could not bee truely tearmed imaginary space before the world was created. For it is one thing to imagine an infinite space, and another to avouch there was an infinite imaginarie space be­fore they could have any imagination of it. Hee that made the world and all that is in it, is not much beholding to those men, for building him an infi­nite Castle, not in the Ayre (which had no being before the Creation) but in that which neither thē was, nor since hath had any being, save onely in the vanishing imaginations of men which have perish­ed. For if this imaginary space were any more thā a meere imagination, it was surely created by God. Had then this imaginary space another space or di­stance-locall, or this imaginary time or successive duration, another duration, wherin to be produced? or doe they make this imaginary time or place ful­ly commensurable to eternity or immensity? If God from eternity had been in any other infinity besides himselfe, hee could not be said to be incom­prehensible. By this imaginary space no realty can bee truely meant besides God himselfe, whom the Axioma hic proponit R. David. Tu reples omnem lo­cum, & comprehen­dis, & nullo loco com­prehenderis, nec ullus te locus com­plecti, & contineri potest. Hinc Haebraei etiā Deum indi­gitant voca­bulo [...] locum, quum dicunt, Be­nedictus locus [...] Cujus appel­lationis R. Elias in Tisbite ad­fert auplicē rationem. Quia Deus instar loci omnia com plectitur, ip se autem à nullo comprehenditur. Qui autē hodie contendant Deū esse corpus coelo inclusum, minus rectè sentiunt, quam Iudaeorum Rabbini. Dolendum est ista contraria errata hodie defendi. Quidā disputant et asserunt corpus Christi esse uti (que): et tamen negant esse spiritum praesertim im­mensum & infinitum. Alij negantes Deum esse spiritum simplicem, faciunt corporeum, & loco circumser [...]nt▪ C [...]ppen in Psal 139. ver. 7 [...] Quo ibo à spiritu tuo.Hebrews enstyle by the name of place; to wit, in­finite.

[Page 45] 2 But what shall we answer unto these or the like captious demands of the Atheist: If the world, if time, if place, which now are, had not been from everlasting? where was your God when these were not, some where, or no where? If no where, Hee and Nothing might be fellow residents. In respect of eternity or immensity, no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Vniverse is so like unto Him, as this negation of all things, which we describe by the name of Nothing. It hath no begin­ning or end of dayes. Nothing or the negation of all things, as it is the object of our positive conceit, is more like unto Him than any one thing, in that no distinct or proper place of residence can bee as­signed to nothing, or to the negation of all things: Yet most unlike him, in that it is truly and abso­lutely no where, not in it selfe. Non entis, non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio, That which is not can have no capacity to accept any condition of being, it can have no right or title to bee termed it selfe. We may truly say some objective conceipts are nothing: but we cannot rightly conceive, that nothing should have any degree or kinde of being; and want of being is the worst kinde of barrennesse that can be imagined. We cannot imagine it should bring forth any degree or ranke of being. It can­not be mother to that which possibly may bee; it cannot be nurse to that which is. But of God wee cannot absolutely say, He was no where, before the world was made; we must use this limitation [Hee was no where save in Himselfe:] But such and so in Himselfe, that He was more than all things, longer [Page 46] than time, greater than place, more infinite than ca­pacity it selfe, uncapable of circumscription or com­mensurability, able to limit time and place, (or what­soever we conceive to be by succession or addition infinite,) by his essentiall presence, or coexistence more than penetrative; being so in both, in all things that are, as nothing possibly could have beginning, or continuance of being, unlesse He were in them, as the center of their supportance; yet so as they cannot environ or encompasse him. The absolute infinity of his being includes an absolute impossibi­lity of his being onely in things, that are, or may be, though by his power those may be in number, by succession, infinite.

3 Had the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy, eclipsed the lustre of his glorious pre­sence, in that late prodigious Questionists braine, which would bring us out of the sunne-shine of the Gospell into old Aegyptian darknesse: For as some well conjecture, this error of inclosing God in the heavens, and excluding his essentiall presence from this inferiour world, was first brought forth in Ae­gypt, but so ill taken, as it could not be propagated to many nations; entertained by few Philosophers of better sort, Aristotle or the Author of the Booke de mundo ad Alexandrum, excepted; from whose opinion Verstius did herein dissent, that hee held God to be everywhere by his power, and immedi­ate providence: His error notwithstanding, is ex­ceeding grosse and unsufferable, in that hee makes his infinite power, wisedome, and goodnesse, in whose sweet harmony Divine Providence especially con­sists, [Page 47] but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majesty: as if his infinite Majesty onely were full compere to his Essence, unfitting to bee imployed abroad, or to keep residence any where, save in the Court of Heaven. Or if his power and wisedome be joynt assessors with his Essence in the heavens, and yet reach withall unto the earth, unto every thing within this Canopy, which is spred betwixt us and his glorious presence: His power, his wisedome, &c. may in some sort be held more infinite than his Essence, as being in many places where it is not. But for God to be everywhere here on earth, or in the region under the earth, by his wisedome, by his power, or by his goodnesse, is perhaps in his lan­guage no more, than that the effects of these Attri­butes are every where, that all things as well in earth as in heaven, are essentially subject to that eternall Law, which he hath appointed them; that every creature doth as constantly fulfill his will, and obey his power, in his absence, as if it were penetrated by his presence; that the eye of his knowledge pierceth every corner of the world, and seeth the secrets of mens hearts, as clearly, as if it were resi­dent in their centers. And in part, unto this pur­pose, some great Schoolemen distinguish the man­ner of Gods being in all things, by his essence, by his power, by his presence. Let us take it as possible to supposition or imagination, (what by the habit of Christian faith, we are fully perswaded to bee in it selfe impossible) what by light of reason might be demonstrated to imply a manifest contradiction to any well-setled understanding, viz. [That infinite [Page 48] Essence or Being it selfe should not be every-where es­sentially present, or that infinite power should not bee able to reach every possible effect:] yet should al things that are, be present to him, whose name, whose best description is [I am.] Nothing could be done or said without his presence, that is, without his per­fect notice. And in this sense perhaps it hath beene rightly avouched by some good Authors, whose meaning hath beene much mistaken, or wilfully perverted by others, That all things as well future as past, are alike present to Him, who was every where (before there was any distinction of times;) because nothing can bee said or done, without his perfect knowledge or just notice. Nothing can be begun, continued, or finished, without his expresse war­rant or intuitive permission. He hath a vigilant eye over all things that are, or possibly can be. Or ta­king it againe as not impossible to imagination, that divine knowledge were not so truly infinite as wee beleeve it is; yet admitting his power to bee truly infinite, nothing could be done, said, or intended, without its concourse, operation, or assistance. So that he might be everywhere by his infinite power, albeit his knowledge were not infinite; or every­where by his infinite knowledge, albeit his power were but finite. But by the infallible consequence of these indemonstrable principles, it will necessa­rily follow, That his Essence, being as was shewed before, truly infinite, nor world, nor time, nor place, nor power, nor wisedome, nor any thing possible can be where it is not, it must needs be, where any thing is, or possibly may be. He is in every center [Page 49] of bodily or materiall substances, in every point imaginable of this visible Vniverse, as an essentiall root, whence all and every part of what is besides him spring, without waste or diffusion of his sub­stance, without nutriment or sustentation from a­ny other root or element. The conservation of im­material or illocall substances, is from the benefit of his essentiall presence. Materialls are daily made and renewed by the transient efficacy of his crea­tive power.

4 Doe we make these collections only, or doth not the Scripture teach this Philosophy also? Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God farre off? Ier. 23. 23. Nothing is, nothing can be without the reach of his power, his omnipotency cannot be confined within the places that are: for his hand hath made them all, not as Prisons to inclose his Essence, not as manicles to hinder the exercise of his mightie arme. Can any hide himselfe in secret places, that I shall not see him? saith the Lord, Ibid. vers. 24. This is a formall demand of our assent unto the infinitie of his knowledge. These are two speciall, but not the onely wayes of his being eve­ry where, which the Scripture teacheth: for there followes a third, which after the manner of our un­derstanding, is the root or foundation of al the rest; that indeed, from which the two former branches are most necessarily inferred, Doe not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord. Doth He fill heaven and earth by his power, or by his knowledge onely? Nay, but most properly and in the first place by his essentiall presence. For his Essence is infinitely po­werfull, [Page 50] infinitely wise.

His filling the earth as well as heaven, by his es­sentiall presence, cannot be denyed but from one of these two reasons following.

Either, That his Essence is altogether uncapable of intimate coexistence, with such grosse and base creatures, as the parts of this inferiour world:

Or else, Because it is his will, to abstract or with­hold his essentiall presence from them.

To affirme the former part, to wit, That his na­ture is uncapable of intimate coexistence with any nature created by Him, is to deny his omnipotency; as all, by necessary consequence, doe, which grant not the immensity of his Essence. For what can withstand or withdraw his Essence from piercing the earth, as well as heaven? Not the hardnesse of it, not the loathsomnesse of the vile bodies contai­ned in it. If either of these qualitites, or ought be­sides, could deny the admission of his essentiall pre­sence, he were not omnipotent, because not able to place his Essence in that locall space, in which, were it filled with more subtill or more glorious bodies, it might as well reside, as in the heavens. Suppose he should (as no doubt hee is able) annihilate the earth, and create a new heaven in the space where­in it now is, or demolish his present heavenly seat, or turne it into a baser masse then this earth is; were it not possible for him to bee in this new hea­ven by his essentiall presence, or should he be nei­ther in it, nor in the new earth? If hee could not be here, he were in this respect more impotent than the Angels, who can change their mansions when they mislike them.

[Page 51] 5 Shall wee then take the latter part of the for­mer division, and say, It is his will and pleasure to withdraw his Essence from this lower roome of his own Edifice, whiles it remaines so ill garnished, as now it is? If hee have made heaven his habita­tion by choice, not by necessity of his immensity, with which all places, as we contend, must neces­sarily be filled; hee might relinquish it by the like free choice of some other mansion, which he could make for himselfe as pleasant and beautifull: yea, Hee might by the like freedome of will, come and dwell with us here on earth. So that in conclusion, he which admitteth Gods wil to be free, but denies the absolute immensity of his Essence, makes him capable of locall motion or migration from place to place. And such motion necessarily includeth mu­tability, which is altogether incompatible with in­finity. Reason grounded on Scripture, will warrant us to conclude from the former principle, that hee which hath no cause of being, can have no limits of being, no bounds beyond which it cannot be. Es­sence or being illimited cannot possibly bee distin­guished by severalties of internall perfections, though united: much lesse can it be distinguished or limited by any place, whether reall or imagina­rie. In that he is the authorlesse Author of all being, it is altogether as impossible for Him not to bee in every thing that is, as it is for any thing to be with­out Him. The indivisible unity of his infinite Es­sence is the center and supporter of all things, the conservation of place, and that which holdeth things divisible from resolving into nothing.

[Page 52] 6 Dominus ipse est Deus in coelo sursum & in ter­ra deorsum: The Lord (saith Moses) hee is God in heaven above, and in the earth below, Deut. 4. 39. yet saith Salomon, 1 King. 8. 27. Behold the heavens, and the heavens of heavens are not able to containe thee. May we say then, Hee is as truely without the hea­vens, as he is in them? or that he is where nothing is with Him? surely, hee was when nothing was, and then hee was where nothing was besides him­selfe. Or peradventure before the creation of all things numerable, there neither was whē nor where, but only an incomprehensible perfection of indivi­sible immensity and eternity; which would still be the same, though neither heaven nor earth, nor any thing in them should any more be. We may not so place him without the heavens, as to cloath him with any imaginary space, or give the checke to his immensity by any parallel distance locall. But hee is said to be without the heavens, in as much as his infinite Essence cannot bee contained in them, but necessarily containes them. Hee is so with­out them, or if you will, beyond them, that albeit a thousand more Worlds were stowed by His powerfull hand each above other, and all above this; Hee should by vertue of His infi­nite Essence, not by free choyce of will, or mutation of place, bee as intimately coexistent to every part of them, as Hee now is to any part of this Heaven and Earth which wee see. This attribute of Divine immensitie was ac­knowledged, and excellently expressed by ma­ny of the Ancient Philosophers, but most pi­thily [Page 53] by some of the Ancient Fathers. Before all things, saithAnte om­nia enim Deus erat solus, ipse si­bi & mun­dus & lo­cus, & om­nia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus praeter il­lum. Caete­rum ne tunc quidem so­lus: habebat enim secum quam habe­bat in se­metipso, ra­tionem suā scilicet. Ter­tul. adversus Praxean. cap. 5. Tertullian, God was alone, and hee was to himselfe, world, place, and all things. The manner of his coexistence with the world, De confu­sione lin­guarum. Philo the Iew well expressed: God filleth all things, yet is contained in none, containing all. The vicinity of His Essence preserveth their Essences more truly than the symbolizing qualities of their naturall places doe. And even this efficacy of symbolizing or preserving qualities, flowes as im­mediately from his essentiall presence, as the passive aptitude of bodies preserved by them, doth. The more the places are through which bodies naturall swiftly move, the lesse properly they are in them. In analogy to this condition of naturall bodies, the more capable man is of all knowledge, the more lyable his capacity is to distraction, as consisting ra­ther in united perfections, than in firme and indivi­sible unity of perfection. And therefore it is often said of most pregnant wits, qui ubi (que) est, nusquam est, He that is every where, is no where. Or he that in­gageth himselfe to all courses of life, goeth through with none. But of God, who is perfection it selfe, not by aggregation, but by absolute unity of Es­sence; that of Saint Bernard is most admirably verified, Nusquam est, & [...]bi (que) est, Hee is no where, because no place whether reall or imaginary can comprehend or containe him: He is every where, because no body, no space, or spirituall substance can exclude his presence, or avoid the penetration of his Essence. But Saint Gregories Character of Gods ubiquitary presence and immensity, is more [Page 54] lively and full. Deus est intra omnia non inclusus, extra omnia non exclusus, supra omnia non elatus; God is within all things, yet not shut up, or inclo­sed in them; he is without all things, yet not exclu­ded from them; hee is above all things, yet not ele­vated or exalted by them; hee is below all things, yet not burdened or depressed by them. Greg. in Psal. 139.

7 Anselmus notwithstanding (had not long custome or generall consent prescribed too strōgly against him) would have reformed this kinde of speech, Deus est in omni loco, God is in every place, by changing one particle, Deus est cum omni loco, God is with every place. This Criticisme of his, though well approved by some good writers; whilest they dispute against such as say God was every where, before any place was, yet (in my opi­nion) the use of it, were it as common as the other, which he sought by this to correct, would cōceale much matter of admiration, (which the descripti­on of immensity used by Saint Bernard and others promptly suggests) if not occasion or suggest an er­roneous imagination of coextension in the Divine Essence. The bodies which are contained in places, are truly said to be with the places which containe them, and the places with them; and wee may di­stributively averre, that every body is with every place, and every bodily substance is with its mathe­maticall dimen [...]ions, in the same place with it. But so to be in every place, in every least part of e­very body, as not to bee contained in any or all of them, though we should multiply them in infinitū, [Page 55] doth exclude all conceipt or coextension with thē, and much better notifie the indivisible unitie of Gods immensity, & the incōprehensiblenes of his essentiall presence, than if wee should say he were with every place. But as no Characters of the in­comprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence doe so well befit it, as these that intimate more to our cogitations than we can in words expresse: So of this kinde I have found none, from which I have re­ceived so full instruction, or reaped the like fruits of admiration, as from that of Trismegist, Deus est sphaera, cujus Centrum est ubi (que), cujus peripheria nus­quam, God is a sphere, whose Center is every­where, whose circumference is no where. Not the least particle of this universall Globe or sphere, but is supported by the indivisible unity of his Essence, as by an internall Center. And yet neither the ut­most circumference of this visible world, nor any circumference conceiveable, can so circumscribe or comprehend his essentiall presence, that it might bee said, thus farre it reacheth and no further. For albeit hee would crowne the convexity of these Heavens with others, so much higher and more spacious, than these Heavens, as these are than the Earth, and continue this course unto the worlds end: yet all should bee comprehended in his Es­sence; it could not be comprehended in any. Their circumference should still be somewhere, whereas his Essence, though still inlarging (by this supposed daily exercise of his power) the bounds of its actu­all coexistence with these new creatures, is in it selfe altogether boundlesse. Omnipotency it selfe, [Page 56] cannot pitch a circumference to it, because nothing can be, but it must be in it, which onely truly is, and cannot bee contained in any thing imaginable. In that all things are contained in him, he is rightly re­sembled by a sphere, which is of al figures the most capacious. In that all things cannot comprehend him, He is rightly resembled by a sphere whose cir­cumference is no where.

8 Two points notwithstanding in the former resemblance seeme difficult to mens conceipts; but more difficult it is fully to expresse what may rightly be conceived concerning them. The former difficulty is, how a Center should be conceived to be every where: The second, how the indivisibi­lity of Gods presence in every place, should bee compared unto a Center. To the former it may be sayd, That as the divine Essence by reason of its ab­solute infinity, hath an absolute necessity of coex­istence with space or magnitude infinite: so were it possible there should bee (as some Divines hold it possible there may be) a magnitude or materiall sphere actually infinite; this magnitude could have no set point for its Center, but of every point de­signable in it, wee might avouch this is the Center as well as that. Every point should have the nega­tive properties of a sphericall Center; there could be no inequality betweene the distances of severall points from the circumference of that which is in­finite, and hath no bounds of magnitude. To the second difficulty it may bee said, The manner of di­vine presence or coexistence to every place or par­cell of bodies visible, is rightly compared unto a [Page 53] Center, in that it hath no diversity of parts, but is indivisibly present to all and every part of things divisible. His presence againe is herein like to mag­nitude actually infinite, in that it can have no cir­cumference. But whether the divine Essence may have as perfect actuall coexistence to every point or Center, as it hath to every least portion of mag­nitudes divisible, cannot so cleerely bee inferred from the indivisibility of divine immensity, because the indivisibility of Centers or points, and of spiri­tuall substances are Heterogeneall, and Heteroge­nealls are oft-times assymmetrall, that is, not exactly commensurable. Hence the most subtill Schoole-men or metaphysicall Divines, as well ancient as moderne, resolve it as a point irresoluble by hu­mane wit, whether a mathematicall point or Cen­ter can be the compleat and definitive place of an Angell, albeit they hold the Angelicall natures to bee as truely indivisible, as points or Centers are. But it is one thing for an immateriall or spirituall Essence to have true coexistence with every Cen­ter, another to be confined to a Center, or to have a definitive place or coexistence in it. And what­soever may bee thought of Angells; of the Divine Essence we may say, that he is as properly in every Center as in every place, seting wee acknowledge Him to bee alike incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both. The manner of his indivisibility we con­ceive by his coexistence to a Center. His incom­prehensiblenesse, by his coexistence to all spaces or places imaginable, without coextension to any, without comprehension in all. We may in no case [Page 58] imagine, that there is more of God, or that God is more fully in a great space than in a little; in the whole world, than in a man or little world. For this once granted, an Asses head should participate the essentiall presence of the Deity in greater measure than a mans heart doth. But in what respects God is said to bee more specially present in one place than in another, or to be present with some, and ab­sent from others: hereafter.

9 The absolute perfection of this Attribute, in whose right apprehension or conceipt many other divine perfections, according to our manner of conceiving them, are as it were couched or lodged, may best bee gathered by opposition to the imper­fections of bodies or materiall magnitudes. A body though of Homogeneall nature, suppose a Pole or stone fixed in the earth, invironed above with water and the ayre, can have no coexistence with these di­vers bodies, otherwise than according to the diver­sity of its owne parts: that part of it which hath coexistence with the ayre, can have no coexistence with the earth or water. Farre otherwise it is in God, whose absolute infinity in that it is not com­posed of parts, but consists in perfect unity, cannot bee coexistent to any place after any other manner than He is coexistent to all, that is, by indivisible unity or identity, Wheresoever He is (and Hee is every where,) He is unity it selfe, infinity it selfe, im­mensity it selfe, perfection it selfe, power it selfe. All these branches of quantity, in which we seek to in­grasse so many sorts of infinities, thereby to ex­presse or resemble His incomprehensible nature, [Page 59] do flow from participation of his infinite presence. Vnlesse He were infinitie or immensity it selfe, there could be no magnitude, no measure quantitative, by whose multiplication wee could in any sort ga­ther or guesse what immensitie or infinitie meant. That imaginary infinitie which wee conceive by succession or composition of parts (for their seve­rall extensions finite, though in number infinite) is but a transient raye or beame of that actuall and stable infinitenesse, which Hee possesseth in perfect unitie, without any imaginary diversity of parts united. Had his immensity any diversity of parts, there should be more power in many parts, than in one, or few: unto the full exercise of his whole po­wer or force, there should bee a concurrence of all parts required: & this concurrence of parts in num­ber infinite, would perhaps be impossible. Infinitum transire non potest. At the least, were divine power so lodged in divine immensitie, as strēgth or power is in our bodily faculties, it could not bee so omnipo­tent, as we beleeve it is. Our strength or force is al­waies increased by unition or cōtraction of severall parts; His power can receive no increase seeing his immensity excludes al division, & doth not so pro­perly include, but rather properly is, Vnity it selfe.

10 The Prophets and other holy men in their patheticall expressions sometime speake of God as farre absent, because his powerfull presence is not manifested in such sort as they could wish. Oh that thou wouldest rend the Heavens (saith the Prophet Esa. c. 64. 1.) that thou wouldest come downe, that the mountaines might flow down at thy presence: As when [Page 56] the melting fire burneth, the fire causeth the waters to boile: to make thy name knowne to thine adversaries, that the Nations may tremble at thy presence. When thou diddest terrible things which wee looked not for, thou camest downe, the mountaines flowed downe at thy presence. But to indoctrinate us, that this de­scription of his powerfull presence did include no dogmaticall assertion of his locall descent, no deny­all of his being everywhere, or filling every place by his essentiall presence: the same Prophet else­where pictures out his immensity to us under the shape of a Gyant able to squeze the whole Globe of Heaven, Earth & waters; Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand? & meted out heaven with his span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in his three fingers (after such a manner as men take up dust or sand) and weighed the mountaines in scales, and the hills in a ballance? Esay 40. 12. Be­hold the Nations are as a drop of a Bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the Ballance. Behold, he taketh up the Isles as a very little thing. All Nations before him are as nothing, and they are accounted to him lesse than nothing and vanity, vers. 15. 17. Thus hee linketh his essentiall presence with his power and knowledge. Why sayest thou O Iacob, and speakest O Israel; My way is hid from the Lord, and my Iudgement is passed over from my God? Hast thou not knowne? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the Earth fainteth not, neither is wearie? there is no search­ing of his understanding. vers. 27, 28. Yet Iob in his anguish had almost said as Iacob did; O that [Page 61] I knew where I might finde him! that I might come e­ven to his seat! I would know the words which he would answer me & understand what he would say unto me. Behold, I go forward but he is not there, and backward but I cannot perceive him: On the left hand where he doth worke, but I cannot behold him: he hideth him­selfe on the right hand, that I cannot see him. Iob 23. 3, 5, 8, 9. But though he might hide himselfe from Iob, yet could not Iob hide himselfe or his wayes from him: for so he confesseth in the next words, He knoweth the way which I take, vers. 10. Whither shall I goe (saith the Psalmist) from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flye from thy presence? If I ascend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the mor­ning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me, &c. Psal. 139. vers. 7, 8, 9, 10. Thou hast possest my reines; thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe. These and the like straines of other godly men, argue a sympathy of Gods essentiall presence, not onely invironing their bodies, but penetrating their soules, and diffused through their hearts. His coexistence with all, his essentiall presence or inha­bitation in all, is the same, although the worldly minded take no notice of it. And when it is sayd, that he beholdeth or knoweth the ungodly afarre off, this language fitly expresseth their conceit of him, and of his essence. They consider not, that hee is alwayes neere unto them, alwayes about them, al­wayes within them, but in heaven onely, whither their thoughts seldome ascend. And according to [Page 62] their misconceit of him, so it happens to them, they imagine him to be farre distant from them, and his helpe and succour in their distresse comes slowly to them, as if it had too farre to goe.

CHAP. 6.
Of Eternity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof successive duration or the imaginary infinity of time, is the modell.

1 WHatsoever hath beene, or right­ly may be conceived of divine immensity, will in proportion as well suit unto eternity. And unto this Divine Attribute is that of Tertullian as applyable: [Ante omnia Deus erat solus, & erat sibi tempus, mun­dus, & omnia:] Before all things were, God was, and he was unto himselfe time, the world, and all things else. We cannot properly say, He was in time be­fore he made the world. For as Saint Augustine acutely collects, if he which alwayes is, and was, and is to come, had alwayes beene in time; hee could not have beene before all times, nor could he be, as we beleeve he is, as truly before all times future, as before all times past. His eternity then, is the in­exhaustible fountain or infinite Ocean, from which time or duration successive (in what finite substan­ces soever they bee seated,) with all their severall branches or appurtenances, doe perpetually flow; and unto eternity, they have if not the same propor­tion, [Page 63] yet the same references, the same dependan­ces on it, which finite and created magnitudes have to Divine immensity.Vide Ter­tul. in Apo­loget. cap. 48▪ As there was from all eter­nity a possibility for us to bee before wee were; so our actuall being or existence, whilest it lasteth, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actuation or filling of this capacity. Life (sensi­tive especially) is but the motion or progresse of this capacity towards that which fills it, or as it were a continuall sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actuall being, from somewhat prae­existent. Vnlesse the vegetables, by which our life is continued, had existence before they become our nutriment, they could not possibly nourish us, or continue us in that estate of being which we have. Nor could these Vegetables themselves ex­ist, unlesse they did draw their existence or conti­nuation of their being, from that which did every way exist before them; and unto which they doe by motion or continuation of their being approch. So that future times, and all things contained in time it selfe, presuppose a fountaine of life, as truly praeexistent to their future terminations or moti­ons, as it was to their beginnings. That description of time [tempus edax rerum,] as if it were the devou­rer of all things which are subject to alteration, did rellish more of poeticall wit, than of any metaphy­sicall truth. For if time did devoure al things which are brought forth in time, what is it that could pos­sibly nourish them, or continue their being from their beginning to their end? whilest the time ap­pointed for them lasts, they cannot possibly be con­sumed [Page 64] or perish. Nothing there is that doth or can desire its owne destruction, nor long after the pre­sence or fruition of that, which doth devoure or destroy it. All things naturally desire the continu­ation of such being, as they have; which notwith­standing things temporall cannot have, but from the continuation or fruition of time. Time then it is not, but their owne motions or endeavors to injoy or entertaine time approching, which doth waste or consume things temporall. We naturally seeke to catch time, and it is the nature of time, though con­tinually caught, not to be held by us. This nimble­nesse of time, is so like unto the swift progresse of motion, that some acknowledge no difference at all betweene them. Whereas in true Philosophy, the length of time passing by us, is onely notified by motion. Motion in true observation goes one way, and drives time another, as the streame which runnes Eastward, turnes the Wheele Westward. Our actuall being or existence slides from us with time, and our capacity of being, continuing still the same, runnes on still, being alwayes internally mo­ved with desire of actuation or replenishment. And this replenishment cannot otherwise bee gotten, than by gaining a new coexistence with time ap­proaching, whose office, designed by Eternity, it is to repaire the ruines which motions present or past have wrought in our corruptible substances. The best of our life, the very being of things generable (asA rebus generalibus si abstuleris ipsum erit; cum in per­petuâ ac­quisitione versentur, subitò non esse contin­git. Rebus autem, quae non sunt ta­le, si ipsum erit adjun­xeris, acci­dit à se [...]e ipsius esse labi. Ma­nifestum enim ex hoc fuerit, ipsum esse non es­se illis inna­tum, si fiat ex eo quod futurum sit, & factum fuerit, & sit in posterum faciendum. Videtur e­nim in re­bus generabi libus id po­tissimum ei­sentia esse, scilicet tra­ctus quidam ab ipso esse ex genera­tionis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat, quando non sit ulterius, idque ipsum quod dicitur, est in eis existete, ac si quis quicquā ex hoc ductu circumcidat, vita comminui. Qua propter & esse diminui, & universo quidē esse eiusmodi oportet, quous (que) sic erit. Quam­ [...]rem ad ipsum esse futurum natura festinat, ne (que) vult qui [...]scere, quippe cum esse sibi hauri­at dum ali [...]d quiddam at (que) aliud agit, movetur (que) in orbem quodam essentia desiderio. Plot. Emead. 3. pag. 328. Plotinus excellently observes) is but as a con­tinuall draught or receipt of beeing from the inex­haustible fountaine of life. Nature, saith he, (mea­ning [Page 65] the nature of things generable) hastens unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seeing it drawes or suckes in that being which it hath by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle with desire of Essence or of Being what it is. Nor are we men, or any creatures (spe­cially generable) permitted to draw or sucke so much of our proper being from the fountaine of E­ternity, at once, or in any one point of time, as we list. We have our portions of life or selfe-fruition distributed piece-meale and sparingly unto us, lest too much put into our hands at once, might make us prodigall of the whole stock. As may yonglings by their parents too much bounty towards them, whilest their experience is small, overthrow them­selves and their posterity. And nimblest wits, for the most part, runne through largest fortunes in least time; usually shortning their dayes by taking up pleasures (due in their season) beforehand, seek­ing as it were to enjoy the fruits of many yeres du­ration all at once. Whereas fruition of delights and pleasures should be measured by the capacity of our estate or condition; as wise men fit their expences according to the tenour of their revennues.

2 Albeit the constant motion of the Sunne and Moone be appointed by the Creator as a common standard for the measuring of all times: yet every thing temporall, or endowed with duration mea­surable [Page 66] by the motion of the heavens, hath its pro­per time, which in all of them is no other than a par­ticipation of eternity. And hee should define the severall branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher the severall actuatiōs, draughts or replenishments, which are derived from the infi­nite fountaine of life & being, to fill the capacities, or satiate the internall desires of things temporall. And albeit the motion of the heavens bee constant and uniforme; yet the duration of things temporall or sublunary (though measured by their constant motion) is capable of internall contraction and di­latation. Some things have a kind of a double du­ration, and runne a course of time as it were inden­ted. Life, albeit in it selfe most sweet, yet in us is often charged with soSee Ec­clesiasticus 41. 2. great a measure of sowre occurrences, that were it at all or most times, as some whiles it is, the fruition of it could not quite the paines we are put to in preserving it. And the worse our estate is, the longer it seemeth to bee such, because vitall existence or duration, through distraction of mind, or vehement motion, seemeth divided into more parts, then without such impul­sions it could take notice of. In griefe or paine wee strive to thrust time present apace from us, that some other may come better attended. In delight or pleasure wee seeke to arrest it, and wish to have our joyfull moments fixed, or to have them still to returne and goe, so that wee might prolong our daies by living the same times over and over again, as men often walke longer in pleasant gardens, then in vast fields, by often resuming the same short [Page 67] walkes. Were it possible for us to stay those grate­full parcels of time, till new ones come with like supply; the current of pleasure, thus damnd vp, would swell; and our fruition of such imperfect existence as we have, would be much more perfect and entire. But seeing the pleasure of borrowed life, is to the identity of being, but as water to the pipe, through which it runnes; all the remedy wee have against welcome times departing from us, is to regain the like, and make up the unity of our ex­istence of selfe-fruition by equivalency. The gluts or gushes of pleasure, may at one time bee much greater than at another, yet still transient, never consistent. The fruition of them cannot possibly be entire: begotten and dying in every moment; they are, and they are not in a manner, both at once; so that we lose them as we gaine them.

3 The Angelicall natures, albeit they account not the continuation of their duration, nor number the portions of their participation of eternity, by the motion of the heavens, as being not fed with expectance of that time or successiō, whose oppor­tunites wee watchfully attend: yet their desires (more fervent by much then we have any) to conti­nue what they are, witness they have not all that in present possession, w^ch is allotted to their compleat duration. Nothing, being the foundation as well of angelical excellēcies, as of our mediocrities, makes them uncapable of that entire selfe-fruition, which is essentiall to him which made thē of nothing, be­ing made of none. He, as he is of himselfe without beginning, so is he entirely in himselfe, and can ac­quire [Page 68] nothing by succession. He desires not his own duration, w^ch none can give him, nor needs he to de­sire it, because it is alway entirely & indivisibly pre­sent, without possility of addition. For how should Essence it selfe, or infinity of being, get ought to morrow, which to day it hath not; or lose ought to day which yesterday it had. The first branch of im­possibility w^ch we can conceive as incident to him, that is thus truly infinite, is, not all times to con­taine within himselfe all fulnesse of joy, however possible. He is life it selfe, & therfore life truly infi­nite. And infinite life, being infinitely sweet, con­taineth joy truly infinite; altogether uncapable of any addition or diminution. As in a body infinite (could any such be) there could be no middle or ex­treams; so neither can infinite life admit any parts, as being indivisible into duration subsequent & pre­cedent. Natures, capable of these differences, have alwayes the one accomplished by the other. Time comming (as we said before) repaires the losses of time going, and perfects or supports things natu­rall by successive continuance of present being. But perfection it selfe can no more bee perfected, than whitenesse can be dyed white. Life, or Essence infi­nite, excludes vacuity, or capacity of resumed acts to fill up the measure of actuall existence, or fruiti­on of being. In that he is [...], All-sufficient, he can want nothing; and to him that can want no­thing, all must be present. We must then conceive of the Divine Essence, as infinite, not onely in life, but in the degrees or acts of life: which in the eter­nall cannot be many, but onely take the denomina­tion [Page 69] of plurality, from things decreed. As Hee is said Everlasting with reference to the perpetuity of succession, which still supposeth his interminate existence, as present to the whole and every part of it. Consider him in himselfe, and He is every way indivisibly infinite, and interminable; not onely be­cause Hee had no beginning, nor shall have ending: For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the Heavens have beene created from Ever­lasting; whose revolutions neverthelesse or succes­sive parts of motion, should have beene truly nu­merable, and therefore terminable; whence what­soever had beene contained within their circuit, should still have gotten somewhat which before it had not, either addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of their first existence, or some new Acts of life, of sense, or reason. But un­to Essence infinite, none of these can accrue. If they could, as yet he should not be, nor ever could Hee bee actually eternall, but everlastingly onely by succession. For Eternity, as Boetius hath well de­fined it, is the entire or totall possession of intermina­ble life, all at once or together. Howbeit these termes of totall fruition or possession, may seeme to in­clude some parts, though not in the life possessed, yet in the possession of it; which (I take it) was farre from this good Authors meaning. What meant he then to use such tearmes? onely to exclude succes­sion, which hath a totality of Being, but not alto­gether, or all at once. As the next houre, and what­soever shall have successive duration in it, shall bee wholly and fully existent; but so as one part shall [Page 70] goe before, another come after. So is not that du­ration which is interminable. But in what sense to­tality is attributed to essence or duration infinite, will better appeare in the issue of these explicati­ons. This definition of Boetius, though concei­ved in such termes as might minister occasion of wrangling in subtile disputes; doth notwithstan­ding imprint a more lively character or notion of the Everliving God his infinite happinesse, than Aquinas definition doth, though very artificial: [Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine prin­cipio, & fine, mensurâ carens,] Eternity, is a dura­tion uniforme, and permanent, without beginning or end, uncapable of measure.

4 ButAc si quis aeternitatem ita descrip­serit, scilicet vitam jam infinitam ex eo quod sit universa; nihil (que) amit­tat, cum ni­hil vel prae­terierit, vel sit futurum; alioquin jam tota nō esset: is pro­fecto proxi­mè ad defi­nitionem e­jus accedet. Quod enim deinceps subditur, scilicet totā esse, nihil (que) amittere, expositio quaedam est ejus quod dicebatur, scilicet (vita jam infini­ta) Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 329. Plotin (in mine opinion) gives a more deepe and full apprehension of it in fewer tearmes; [Aeternitas est vita infinita] Eternity is infinitie of life. And such we gather it to be, because it is the university or totality of life, and can lose nothing, in that nothing of it is past, nothing to come. He addes withall, that these termes of Being, All, whole, or losing nothing, are added onely for explication of that, which is sufficiently contained in these words, Infinite life. In the same Treatise he excel­lently observes, when we say, That is Eternal, which alwayes is: (as the Greeke [...] verbatim signifies) thisNon aliud quiddam est ens, aliud vero semperens, sicut ne (que) aliud est Philosophus, aliud ve­ro Philosophus verus. Verumtamen quia nonnulli Philosophiam simulant adjunction est Phi­losophus verus. Sic & enti ipsum semper & ipsi semper adjungitur Ens, adeò ut dicatur [...] .i. semper ens, unde dicitur [...] .i. aevum. Qua propter sic accipiendum est ipsum semper cum ente, ut vere ens nobis significet. Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4 p. 329. alway, is added for declaration sake, and yet being assumed to expresse the uncorruptiblenesse, [Page 71] or indeficiency of that which is Eternall; it breeds a wandring imagination of plurality or indivisibility of duration. The best medicine, by his prescripti­on, for purging our brains of this erroneous fancy, were to enstyle Eternity onely with the name of Entity or Being. But as being is a name sufficient to expresse Essence, and Essence it selfe, or essence inde­pendent a full expression of Eternity: yet because some Philosophers comprise generation, or the be­ing of things generable under the name of Essence, it was behooveful for our better instruction, to say, that is Eternall, which alwaies is, & cannot cease to be. Whereas in true Philosophicall contemplation, it is not one thing, truly to bee, and alwayes to Be. There is no greater difference betwixt these two, than to be a Philosopher, and to be a true Philoso­pher. Now there can be no truth in saying, he is a Philosopher, who is no true Philosopher, for [ens & verum convertuntur] The Entity of every thing necessarily includes the truth of every thing. Not­withstanding because some doe counterfeit Philo­sophy, or falsly usurpe the name of Philosophers; we give the title with an addition to such as wel de­serve it, and enstyle them, by way of difference from the others, true Philosophers. And in like manner, when we say, That is eternall, which alwayes is; wee seeke to notifie no more by this universall note, Alwaies, then that it hath a true and no counterfeit, no second-hand or dependent Being.

Another secondary and subordinate use of the universall signe, alwayes, added to entity, is, to inti­mate the interminable, indistinguishable & indivi­visible [Page 72] power, which needeth nothing besides that which it actually and for the present hath. Now it hath All, that is or can bee, in that it truly Is: for true entity is absolute totality, and unto totalitie, nothing is wanting. But that which is in time com­prehended, how perfect or totall soever it may bee in its kinde, besides other wants, alway needs some­what to come, never fully besped of time. On the contrary, that which so is, as it needs no after being, and cannot be brought within the lists of time, ei­ther determinate, or in succession infinite, but now hath whatsoever is expedient to bee had: this is that, which our notion of Eternity hunteth after. That which thus is, hath not its Essence or Being delivered unto it enwrapt in quantity, but is pre­cedent to all quantity or mensuration. Farre otherwise have things generable their being, as it were spun out from divisibility. The very first be­ing which they have supposeth quantity, and as much as is cut off from the draught or extension of their duration, so much they lose of their being or perfection.

5 Ignorance of this Plotinicall Philosophie hath much perplext some Logi [...]ians, questioning whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man, or corps, or both. To be both implyes a contradiction; these two negative pro­positions being simply convertible, No corps can be a man, no man can bee a corps. And yet there is as much reason, that he should in this instant bee both as either. For true resolution we are to say, He was a man, and shall be a corps, or he ceaseth to bee [Page 73] the one, and begins to be the other. But the Being or existence of both being mensurable by time, must needs bee divisible, and for this reason, not comprehensible by an instant which is indivisible. But Plotins conclusion is, whilest wee seeke to fit that which truly is, with any portion of measure or degree of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, loseth its indivisible nature; We must then leave it (as it is) indivisible, as well in life or opera­tion, as in Essence, and yet infinite in both.

Of time, no part truly is, but the present, which is never the same: and as one questioned (in that age wherein the Art of Navigation was imperfect) whether Navigators were to be reckoned amongst the dead or the living: So it is more doubtfull then determinable, whether time participate more of being, or of not being; yet as is time, such is the nature of things brought forth in time. But Eternity (being the duration of Him who onely Is, being made of none, but Maker of all things, and the dispenser of Time it selfe into its portions) asAd 7. Plo­tin. lib. En­nead. 3. Fi­cinus describes it, is as a fixed instant or perma­nent Center, which needs no succession for sup­ply; all sufficient to support it selfe, and all things else. The same Writer not unfitly compares Eter­nity to a Center in a Circle; and time to the points or extremities of the lines in the Circumference, alwayes so moving about the Center, that were it an eye, it might view them all at once. Yet must we not hold Eternity to be indivisible, after the same manner that points or Centers are. These are indi­visible, because they want the perfection of that [Page 74] quantity, whose parts they couple. Eternity is in­divisible by positive infinite, as containing all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner, then they can be contained in time it selfe, which (as Plato wittily observes) is a moveable image of Eternity. This difference be­twixt the indivisibility of an instant or moment, and Eternity, may perhaps make the solution of that seeming contradiction lesse difficult then it is to some great Schoolemens apprehensions: [Pe­trus in aeternitate agrotat, Et, Petrus in aeternitate nō aegrotat.] Peter is sick in eternity, Peter is not sicke in eternity. This affirmation & deniall, in one and the same indivisible instant or limited portion of time, would inferrean indivisible contradiction, which in eternity they doe not. And yet is Eternity more indivisible than an instant, but indivisible after ano­ther manner.

6 But I know not how it comes to passe, that the true shadow of perfection it selfe, is oft-times more apparant in things most imperfect. Natures more perfect (by a borrowed perfection) hold the meane betweene them; Out of both we may spell more than we can put together, for right expres­sing the nature of perfectiō it selfe. The prime mat­ter, though of things created most imperfect, is of creatures sublunary, most like unto the Creator, in being ingenerable and incorruptible; in that it is the Alpha whence all things generable spring, and the Omega into which they are resolved: Yet is the prime matter most contrary to its Maker, in that wherein it doth resemble Him. It is in a sort or [Page 75] manner, all things generable, but perfectly nothing, as wanting the true unity of Entity, or determinate Being. The Creator or Essence it selfe, is the in­comprehensible perfection of all things, without participation of their imperfections. The Earth againe is like the Eternall Founder in permanency and immobility, but this it hath from its naturall dulnesse; whereas the perfection of this shadow is in Him from the infinite vigour of his vitality. The swift motions of the Heavens, or motion as swift as we may imagine, is as a middle terme of proporti­on between the Earths immobility, and the super­motion, or more then infinite mobility of the Dei­tie, which we tearme the infinite vigour of his vi­tality. Instants in this are most like Eternity, in that an infinite number of them added together, yeelds no increase of quantity: Nor doth Eternity re­ceive addition from succession infinite, which most unlike it in being divisible, doth yet better expresse the positive infinity of it, than instants can doe. E­ternity againe, is like a fixed Center, because indivi­sibly immutable; yet withall most like a circle. And Trismegists description of the Deity, commutatis commutandis, as well exemplifies the Eternity, as the immensity of his nature. Eternity is a circular duration, whose instants are, alwayes, whose termi­nations or extremities never were, never shall be: It is coexistent to every parcell of time, but not circum­scriptible by any: succession infinite cannot be coe­quall to it. For albeit the motion of the Heavens, or other notifications of duration divisible, should continue the same, without interruption or End: [Page 76] yet every period and draught of time, we can ima­gine, shall still fall within Eternity, now totally ex­istent; and which hath beene, is, and ever will be un­to every minute or scrupe of time, that hath beene, is, or shall be, alike everlastingly coexistent, not by acquisition of any new successive parts, but by in­divisible and interminable unity.

7 We cannot perhaps properly say, that God shall be after all times or durations to come; for du­ration must flow from His Everlasting Being with­out end. And what can be after that which hath no end? And here we suppose, that albeit time or dura­tion successive had their actuall beginning with the creatures: yet there shal be, or may be, if not a time, yet some duration successively infinite. And that onely is after this manner, infinite, unto which somewhat of the same kinde may still bee added. Thus, as in the continued and divisible quantities, [non datur minimum.] There is no fraction so little, but may be lesse; and as in numbers [non datur max­imum] There is no number so great, but it may be made greater by addition: so in successive durati­on [non datur ultimum.] It may be truly said to last for ever, because it can have no last portion. But howsoever we cannot properly, or without expo­sing our speech to captious exceptions, say, that eternity shal be after all time or duration successive; (seeing this may seeme to import, that duration or succession shall finally cease:) yet that eternity (be­ing duration, actually, interminably and indivisibly, not successively, infinite) now is, and ever was, as infinitely praeexistent or precedent to all ages, or [Page 77] successions comming towards us, one way; as it is and was to the worlds nativity, or the first out-go­ing of time, the other way. This is a point which we must beleeve, if we rightly beleeve God to bee Eternall, or know what Eternity is. A point, which would to God they had seriously and in heart con­sidered, which have had Gods eternall decree and the awards of it, most frequently in their mouthes and pens. And he is no Christian that would deny whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed be­fore all worlds: So is he no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian Divine, that shall refer or retract the tenor of this speech [Before all worlds] to that only which is past, before the world began. Whatsoever can be more properly said or concei­ved to be past, then to be yet to come, or to bee in every moment of time designable, can have no property of Eternity. For that onely is Eternall, which alwayes is, and so alwaies is, that it hath pre­cedence or praeexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever wee looke upon them, or take their beginning, whether backwards or forwards. It was a great oversight (or rather want of insight into the nature of this great Sphere or visible world) in Lactantius, (otherwise a learned Christi­an) not onely to deny there were any Antipodes, but to censure the Philosophers (which had gone before him) of grosse ignorance or infatuation, for avouching this truth, now manifested to meaner Scholars, or more illiterate Christians, than any which Lactantius taught. A greater ignorance it would be in us which acknowledge this truth, to [Page 78] say these Antipodes were under the earth, and the inhabitants of Europe and Africa onely above it; or that the Heavens were as farre under our Anti­podes, as they are above us. For whosoever walkes on the earth, whether in this Region or that, whe­ther at the halfe or full Antipodes, is above the earth. And every part of the Heavens unto which the lookes of men are erected, as well the Nadir as the Zenith, as well the South pole as the North-pole is above the earth. And as the Heavens are every way above the Earth, so is Eternity every way be­fore all worlds, before all times. As we beleeve this visible world and all things in it, had a beginning; so we expect it shall have an end: Now the eye of Eternall Providence lookes through the world, through all the severall ages, successions, or durati­ons in the world; as well from the last end to their first beginning, as from their first beginning to their last end. There is no period of time to us imagina­ble, which is not so invironed by Eternity, as the Earth or Center is with the Heavens; save onely that the Heavens are finite, and Eternity infinite. So that the Heavens though far every way, are no way infinitely above the Earth; whereas Eternity or Gods eternall decree, are every way infinitely before all worlds, before all times. In this sense, were it possible, the world might have beene crea­ted, or motions continued from everlasting; the Eternall, notwithstanding, should have been ever­lastingly before them. For that period of motion which must terminate the next million of yeares, shall have coexistence with Eternity now existent; [Page 79] whose infinity doth not grow with succession, nor extend it selfe with motion; but stands immovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as wel in respect of any set draught or point, whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Hea­vens, whence time tooke beginning. Or, to speake as we thinke, it is impossible to conceive any dura­tion to be without beginning and ending; without conceiving it circular, and altogether void of suc­cession. Notwithstanding, if any list to imagine time both wayes everlasting; the continuity of it may be best conceived by the uninterrupted fluxe of an instant; and the stability of eternity, by the retraction of such a perpetuall fluxe into one du­rable o [...] permanent instant.

8 O [...], not to suffer the remembrance of childish sports altogether to passe without any use or obser­vation, if not for composing some greatest contro­versies amongst learned men, yet for facilitating contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy, whether sacred or humane, affords to the conceit of the most curious. The difficulty is, how eternity being permanent and indivisible, should have coexistence with succession or motion. We have seene a Top turne so swiftly upon the same center, in a manner, that it seemed rather to sleepe or rest, than to move. And whilest it thus swiftly moved, any bright marke or conspicuous spot, how little soever, seemed to be turned into an entire and permanent circle. Seeing motion thus swift, may be procured by a weake arme, it will be [Page 80] no hard supposal to conceit that a mover of strength and vigour infinite, should be able to move a body in a moment. Admit then the highest visible sphere should be moved about in a moment; all the several parts of successive motion, which now it hath, would be contracted into perfect unity: which whether it should be called a cessation from moti­on, or a vigorous rest, or a supermotion, actually containing in it parts of motion successively infinit, were not so easie to determine. If thus it were mo­ved about in an instant, the nature of it supposed to be incorruptible, and the mover immortall, remain­ing still in the same strength and minde; he would not move it more slowly this day or yeare, than he did the former. This supposition admitted, there should bee not onely parts successively infinite of one revolution, but revolutions successiuely infinit in one and the same instant. Or to speake more properly; As these revolutions should not proper­ly be termed motion, but rather the product of mo­tions infinitely swift, united or made up into a vi­gorous permanency: so should not the duration of one or of all these revolutions bee accounted as an instant or portion of time, but a kinde of eternity or duration indivisibly permanent. The motion of the eight sphere supposed to be such as hath beene said, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sunne moving successively as now it doth, should have locall coexistence to eve­rie starre in the eight Sphere, to every point of the Eclipticke circle wherein it moves, at one and the selfe same instant, or in every least parcell of time. [Page 81] Every Star in the eighth sphere, every point should be converted into a permanent circle; and so in one circle there should be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there bee points or divisibilities in the Ecliptique circle. Thus in Him that is eternall, are Beings infinite, and in Eternity are actually con­tained durations in succession infinite. The former supposition admitted, we could not say that the in­feriour Orbes, moving as now they doe, did move after the eighth Sphere, but that the times of their motion were eminently contained in it. For the eighth Sphere being moved in an instant, should lose the divisibility of time, and the nature of moti­on, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect, (as if it no way comprised them,) but by swallowing up time or division successively or potentially infinite, into an actuall permanency. By this supposition of passive motion made infinite­ly swift, by the strength of the mover, and impro­ved into a kinde of actuall indivisible permanency, we may conceive of the first Movers Eternity, as Mathematicians conceive the true nature of a Sphere, by imagining it to be produced by the mo­tion of a semicircle upon the Axis. For let the E­ternall be but thus imagined to bee an intellectuall sphere, capable of momentary motion or revolu­tion throughout this world; and the indivisible co­existence of his infinity, to every part of time and place, will be very conceivable. Yet as Mathema­ticians perswade not themselves, their figures are produced by motion, but rightly conceive their nature to be such without any production, as if they [Page 82] were so produced: so let eternall duration bee esteemed more indivisible, than the unity of moti­on conceived as infinitely swift, yet not made indi­visible by such swiftnesse of motion, but indivisible onely of it selfe, and by the infinite vigour of his vi­tall essence, wherein all the perfection of motion or rest, are (if I may so speake) indivisibly tem­pered, or (lest I should bee mistaken) eminently contained. The same proportion which motion contracted into stability hath unto succession, hath divine Essence to all other Essences, eminently con­taining all, no one kinde formally. This divine Es­sence, whose essentiall property we conceive Eter­nity to be, is truly the totality of being;De hac duplice to­talitate, vi­de Marsil. Ficinum ad 7. Plotin. lib. Ennea­dis. 3. a totality not aggregated of parts, but rather (as Plotine inti­mates) producing all other parts or kindes of being. Eternity likewise is a totality of duration, not ag­gregated of parts, nor capable of accesse or additi­on; but rather a totality from which all durations or successions flow, without resolution or diminu­tion of its infinite integrity. As if a body should cast many shadowes of divers shapes in a running streame, the shadowes vanish and are repayred in every moment, without any diminution of the bodie.

CHAP. 7.
Of the infinity of Divine Power.

1 THe circumstances of time and place are presupposed, the one as spectator, the other as stage to all things, which wanting place or time, or be­ing it self, present themselves anew in their proper shape and forme. But of things so presented, operation or power in their kinde is the native and immedi­ate property. Nothing that hath any proper seat or existence numerable in this spacious Amphithe­atre, but is fitted for acting some part or other use­full for the maintenance of the whole. Now all o­peration or power, which (according to the varie­ty of things created) is manifold and diverse, doth give but such a shadow of that infinite power, which is eminently contained in the union of infi­nite Essence, as time and place did of his immensity and eternity. The force and vertue of some things may perhaps more properly be termed strength or power passive, then operation. Howbeit even in the earth and earthly bodies, by nature most dull, there is a power or strength to sustaine waights laid upon them; a power to resist contrary impulsi­ons, which perhaps essentially includes an active force or operation; a power of swaying to the center, which is no more passive than active, but a [Page 84] meane betwixt both. Even in the dullest body that is, there is a secret force or slow activity to assimi­late other things to themselves, or to preserve sym­bolizing natures. In bodies lesse grosse and more unapt to resist violence offered, as in the windes, vapours, or exhalations, or in the spirits or influ­ences which guide our bodies, we may perceive an active force or power motive fully answerable to the greatest passive strength or resistance. Other E­lements or mixt bodies, are indued with an opera­tive power of producing the like, or destroying contraries. Celestiall bodies, the Sunne especially, have a productive force to bring forth plants out of their roots, to nourish and continue life in al things. It is perhaps impossible, for any thing, that hath not being of it selfe, to receive infinity of being in any kind from another, though infinite. Impossible for the fire, because the substance of it is finite, to be infinitely hot; but were it such, it would be infinite in operation.

2 As the Author or first setter forth of all things operative, who alone truly is, surpasseth all conceit of any distinct or numerable branch of being: so is his power more eminently infinite in every kinde, than all the united powers of severall natures, each supposed infinitely operative in its owne kinde, and for number likewise infinite, can bee conceived to be. Now what was generally observed before, that things by nature most imperfect, doe oftentimes best shadow divine perfections, hath place againe in this particular. Gods infinite power is clearliest manifested in creatures which seem least powerful. [Page 85] Where wast thou (said God toCap. 38. vers. 4, 5, 6. Iob) when I laid the foundations of the Earth? declare if thou hast under­standing. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof? The excellent majesty of this speech, sufficiently testifies it was uttered by God himselfe, though taken from his mouth, by the pen of man. But setting aside the ma­jesticke phrase or resemblance, farre surmounting all resemblance all observance of poeticall decorum; What cleerer fountaine of deeper admiration, can the eye of mans understanding looke into, then this, that not onely every corner stone in the world with its full burthen, but all the mighty buildings or erections, which are seene upon the whole sur­face of the earth; yea the whole earth it selfe, with all the mountaines and rockes upon it, with all the metalls or massie substance that are within it, should be borne up by that which is lesse than any corner stone, by that which indeed is no body or substance, not so much as a meere angle or corner. Yet so it hath pleased Him, by whose wisedome the foundations of the earth were layd; to make that little point or indivisible Center; which is far­thest removed from our sight, the most conspicu­ous place and seate of that indivisible power which is infinite. Let Mathematicians imagine what rules or reasons of equipendence they list, their last resolution of all supportance into the Center, must suppose the same truth which the Aegyptian Magicians confessed, [Hic digitus [Page 86] Dei est] The finger of God is here. Impossible it were for that, which in it selfe is matter of nothing, im­pregnably to support all things supportable; unlesse it were supported by the finger of God. And yet if we conceive of Him, as Isaias describes Him, all the strength and power that is manifested in the supportance of the whole earth, and all therein, is not the strength of his little finger. Yea though wee should imagine, that as the waight of solids amounts according to their masse or quantity: so the sustentative force, which is chambered up in the Center, should be multiplyed according to the severall portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable: yet this imagination of force so multiplyed, it being divisible, could not equalize that true and reall conceipt of force di­vine, which ariseth from consideration, that it is in­divisibly seated, throughout immensity. To uphold earths innumerable much weightier and massier than this is, which borne by him, beareth all things; would be no burthen to his power sustentative: (so from the effects, his power, though in it selfe one, must receive from us plurality of denominations.) And yet fully commensurable to this power susten­tative, is his active strength or power motive. He that spans the Heavens with his fist, could tosse this Vniverse with greater ease, than a Gyant doth a Tennis Ball, throughout the boundlesse Courts of immensity. Rocks of Adamant would sooner dis­solve with the least fillep of his finger, than bubbles of water with the breath of Canons.

3 Our admiration of this his active power, [Page 87] which we conceive as incomprehensible, and alto­gether uncapable of increase, may bee raised by cal­culating the imaginary degrees of active powers increase in creatures divisible, as well in quantity, as operation. Though Powder converted into smoake, be the common mother of all force, which issueth from the terrible mouth of the Gunne: yet the Canon sends forth his bullet (though more apt to resist externall motion) with greater violence than the Sachar: and every Ordinance exceeds o­ther in force of battery, according to the quantity of the charge or length of barrell. But were it pos­sible for the same quantity of steele or iron, to bee as speedily converted into such a fiery vapour, as gunpowder is; the blow would be ten times more irresistible then any, that Gunpowder out of the same close concavity, can make. The reason is plaine; the more solid or massie the substance to be dissolved, is, the greater quantity would it yeeld of fire, or other rarer substance, into which it were dis­solved. And the greater the quantity, the more vio­lent is the contraction of it into the same narrow roome: and the more violent the contraction is, the more vehement is the eruption, and the ejacu­lation swifter. Thus from vapours rarified or ge­nerated in greater quantity, than the concavities of the earth, wherein they are imprisoned without vent, is naturally capable of; doe Earthquakes be­come so terrible: These and the like experiments bring forth this generall rule, The active strength of bodies multiplieth, according to the manner of con­traction or close unition of parts concurring to the im­pulsion [Page 88] or eruption: So doth the active force or vi­gour of motion, alwayes increase, according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates. Now though the most active and powerfull essence can­not be encompassed with walls of brass, nor cham­bred up in vaults of steele, albeit much wider than the heavens; yet doth it every where more strictly gird it selfe with strength then the least or weakest body can be girt. For what bonds can we prescribe so strict, so close or firme, as is the bond of indivi­sible unity, which cannot possibly burst or admit eruption, wherein notwithstanding infinite power doth as intirely and totally encampe it selfe, as in immensity. How incomparably then doth His active strength exceed all conceipt or comparison? The vehemency of his motive power, whose infi­nite Essence swallowes up the infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant, and of motion in vigo­rous rest; cannot bee exprest by motion so swift and strong, as would beare levell from the Sunne setting in the West, to the Moon rising in the East. To cast the fixed Starres downe to the Center, or hoyse the Earth up to the Heavens, within the twinkling of an eye, or to send both in a moment beyond the extremities of this visible world, into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued, would not straine his power motive. For, all this we sup­pose to be lesse then to bring nothing unto some­thing, or something to such perfection, as some of his creatures enjoy. Howbeit even such as take the fullest measure of perfection from his immen­sity, must derive their pedigree by the mothers [Page 89] side, from meere nothing or vacuity. Homo, saith S. Austine, terrae filius, nihili nepos; Man is the son of the earth, and the grandchilde of nothing. And when he shall come unto the height of his glory, he cannot forget, he must remember, that the worme was his sister, and the creeping thing the sonne of his mother. To produce as many worlds out of nothing, as the Sunne each yeare doth Herbes or Plants out of the moistned Earth, would breed no cumbrance to his power or force productive. To maintaine, repaire, or continue all these in the same state, whilest he makes as many moe, would neither exhaust nor hinder his conservative vertue. Multi­plicity or variety greater than wee can imagine of workes most wonderfull, all managed at one and the same time, could worke no distraction in his thoughts, no defatigation in his Essence. From the unity of these and the like branches of power, all in him most eminently infinite, doth the at­tribute of Omnipotency take its denomination, whose contents, so farre as they concerne the strengthning of our faith, shall hereafter be un­foulded.

CHAP. 8.
Of the infinity of Divine Wisedome. That it is as im­possible for any thing to fall out without Gods know­ledge, as to have existence without his power or es­sentiall presence.

1 BVt power in every kinde thus eminently infinite, could not be so omnipotent, as we must beleeve it; did it not in this absolute unity of all variety possesse other branches of be­ing, according to the like emi­nency or infinity of perfection. Strength or power, if meerely naturall or destitute of correspondent wisedome, to comprehend, manage, and direct it, might bring forth effects in their kinde truly infi­nite, whose ill forecast or untowardly combinati­ons, neverthelesse, would in the issue argue lamen­table impotency, rather then omnipotency. And hard it would be to give instance almost in any sub­ject, wherein a double portion of wit matched with halfe the strength, would not effect more, or more to the purpose, then a triple portion of strength, with halfe so much wit. Archimedes did not come so farre short of Polyphemus in strength or bulk of body, as the wonderfull works wrought by his Mathematicall skill, did exceed any that the Gyant could attempt.

2 Every choice is better or worse accordingly as it more or lesse participates of true wisedome: [Page 91] And most unwise should that choice justly be estee­med, which would not give wisedome prehemi­nence to power. Knowledge then, might wise men choose their owne endowments, would be desired in greater measure then strength. Wisedome, saith the Wiseman, is the beginning of the wayes of God. And shall not that branch of being, by which all things were made, by which every created essence hath its bounds and limits, be possest by Him, (who gave them being and set them bounds,) without all bounds or limits! above all measure? Yes, what­soever branch of being wee could rightly desire or make choice of before others: the inexhaustible fountaine of being hath not chosen, but is naturally possest of, as the better. And therefore if we may so speake, though both be absolutely infinite; his wisedome is greater then his power, to which it serves as guide or guardian. And as the excellency of the Artificers skill often recompences the defect of stuffe or matter: so the infinity of wisedome or knowledge seemes, in a manner, to evacuate the ne­cessity of power or force distinct from it. Howbe­it I will not in this place, or in our native dialect, enter that nice dispute, which some Schoolemen have done; Whether Gods Essence and Knowledge be formally his Power. But whilest we conceive Power and Wisedome as two attributes formally distinct, (at least, to ordinary conceipts,) we may conceive Wisedome to be the father, and Power the mother of all his workes of wonder. As for Philo and other Platonicks that make Knowledge the mother of all Gods workes, it is probable they dreamed of a crea­ted [Page 92] Knowledge, or perhaps under these termes, they cover some transformed Notion of the second per­son in Trinity, who is the Wisedome of the Father, by whom also he created all things: who as he is the onely begotten Sonne from eternity, so is hee likewise a joint Parent of all things created in time by the Father; as Eve was in some sort Adams daughter, and yet a true mother of all that call him father. But here we speake not of that wisedome of God, which is personall; but of the wisedome of the Godhead, as it is essentially and indivisibly infinite in the whole Trinity.

3 Wisedome, as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge, from which it differs not, save only in the dignity or usefulnesse of matters knowne, or in the more perfect maner of knowing them. Though no man be wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many things, and not be very wise. But if we speake of Knowledge divine, not as re­strained in our conceipt to this or that particular, but simply, as it comprehends all things, the name of Wisedome in every respect best befits it: for though many things knowne by him, whilest com­pared with others more notable, seeme base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the meere matter or forme, or physi­call properties, but the Creators power, or skill ma­nifested in it. How much more may the vilest creatures, whilest he lookes upon his owne worke in it, and the use whereto he appointed it, be right­ly reputed excellent? He knowes as much of every [Page 93] Creature, as can be knowne of it, and much more than man possibly can know: and thus he knoweth not onely all things that are, but all that possibly may bee. This argues wisedome truly infinite; whose right conceit must be framed by those bro­ken conceipts which we have of the modell of it.

4 Of wisedome then or usefull knowledge, the parts or offices are two: The one stedfastly to pro­pose a right end: The other, to make and prose­quute a right choice of meanes for effecting it. Hu­mane wisedome is oft-times blinde in both, and usually lame in the latter. Neither can we clearly discerne true good from apparent; nor doe our consultions alwayes carry eaven, to the mistaken markes whereat we ayme; but be the end proposed good or bad, so it be much affected, the lesse choice of meanes is lest, the more eagerly wee apply our selves unto their use, and strive as it were, to straine out successe by close embracing them. And for this reason, ignorance or want of reason to forecast va­riety of meanes for bringing about our much desi­red ends, is the mother of selfe-will and impatience. For what is selfe-will, if a man should define it, but a stiffe adherence to some one or few particular meanes, neither onely nor chiefly necessary to the maine point? And wits conscious of their owne weakness, for conquering what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath, or violence, as par­tiall or mercenary seconds to assist them. Whereas hee that out of fertility of invention, can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteeme [Page 94] the losse or miscariage of some one or two. How­beit, as mans wit in this case is but finite, so his pa­tience cannot be compleat. Even the wisest will be moved to wrath or violence, or other foule play, if the game whereat he shoots be faire and good, and most of his strings already broken. Nor can he be absolutely secure of good successe, so long as the issue is subject to contingency, and may fall with­out the Horizon of his foresight and contrivance. But wisedome infinite doth compleatly arme the Omnipotent Majesty (if I may so speake) with infi­nite patience and long-suffering, towards such as every minute of their lives violently thwart and crosse some or other particular meanes, which he had ordained for his glory and their good. Hee is light, saith the Apostle, and in him is no darknesse. He distinguisheth the fruits of light from fruits of darknesse, before they are, even before he gave them possibility of being. As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he discernes to be truly good, as for his infinite Essence to shrinke in being. Many things may (as every thing that is evill doth) fall out against his will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation. That which in its owne nature (as being made such by his unal­terable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not ca­suall in respect of his providence or eternall wise­dome. In that he fully comprehends the number of all meanes possible, and can mixe the severall possibilities of their miscariage, in what degree or proportion he list: he may, and oft-times doth, in­evitably forecast the full accomplishment of his [Page 95] proposed ends, by multiplicity of meanes, in them­selves not inevitable, but contingent. So that, suc­cesse is onely necessary to the last, yet not absolute­ly necessary unto it. All the necessity it hath is oft­times gotten by casuall miscariage of the possibili­ties bestowed upon the former: as if he ordained the apprehension of a Traytor, or of a Malefactor, by an hundred meanes, all by the immutable decree alike possible, and equally probable; if ninety and nine doe misse, the hundreth and last, by the rules of Eternall Wisedome, must of necessity take. But in that it was possible for the former to have taken, successe falls to this last, not by absolute necessity, but as it were by lott; for it might have beene pre­vented by the former, by supposall onely of whose miscariage it is now necessary. And yet successe it selfe, or the accomplishment of the end proposed by infinite wisedome, was absolutely necessary and immutable.

5 There is a fallacy, though the simplest one that ever was set to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent wits of these latter ages, with some of the former, have beene pitifully intangled. The snare, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselves to catch them, they thus frame or set, Whatsoever God hath decreed, must of necessity come to passe: But God hath decreed every thing that is: Therefore every thing that is, comes to passe of neces­sity. All things are necessary at least in respect of Gods decree. The extract or corrallary whereof, in briefe, is this: It is impossible for ought, that is not, to bee: for ought that hath beene, not to have beene, for ought [Page 96] that is, not to be; impossible for ought to be hereafter, that shall not be. But if it be (as here I suppose) ve­ry consonant to infinite wisedome; altogether ne­cessary to infinite goodnesse; and no way impos­sible for infinite power, to decree contingency as well as necessity; or that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; a conclu­sion quite contradictory to that late inferred, wil be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime, or major proposition matched with a minor of our choosing. Let the major proposition stand as it did before, [Whatsoever God hath decreed must of ne­cessity come to passe] with this additionall, Nothing can come to passe otherwise than God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe. The minor proposition, which (if our choice may stand) shall be consort to the major, is this, But God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity, or, that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; Therefore of necessity there must bee contingency, or effects contin­gent. The immediate consequence whereof is this, There is an absolute necessity, that some things which have not beene, might have beene; That some things which have beene, might not have beene. That some things which are not, might be; That some things which are, might not be: That some things which shall not be hereafter, might bee; That some things which shall be hereafter, might not be. But as ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned errour once con­ceived, was quickly delivered of a second, which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknow­ing things future, from an infallible necessity (as [Page 97] they conceived it) laid upon them (before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisedome, and wisedome es­sentially includeth knowledge: shall we then grant that Gods Knowledge is antecedent, and his fore­knowledge consequent to his decrees? or shall we say he did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, because he did most certainly foreknow it, or, that hee did therefore certainly foreknow it, because hee had irresistibly decreed it? Most certaine it is, that he did as per­fectly foresee or foreknow all the obliquities of their malice & blasphemy against Christ, as he did their very acts or doings: if those could be distin­guished from their acts or doings. Briefly, to ad­mit the former conclusion; That the Eternall fore­knowes all things, because he decrees them; or, that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree; were to imprison his infinite wisedome, in his selfe-fettered power; to restraine the Eternall Majestie from using such liberty in his everlasting decrees, as some earthly Monarchs usurpe in causes tempo­rall or civill: For, Papae nunquam ligat sibi manus; The Pope (as they say) never tyeth his owne hands, by any Grant or Patents: which is a fault in him; onely because he is otherwise very faulty, and un­sufficient to support or weild so high a prerogative with upright constancy. But, in that Holy and mighty One, the reservation of such liberty (as a­non we intimate) is a point of high perfection.

6 That to be able to decree an absolute contin­gency as well as necessity, is an essentiall branch of [Page 98] Omnipotency or power infinite, shall (by the assi­stance of this Power) be clearly demonstrated in the Article of Creation. That God did omnipo­tently decree a contingency in humane actions, that the execution of this decree is a necessary conse­quent of his communicative goodnesse, (a conse­quent so necessary, that unlesse this be granted, we cannot acknowledge him to be truly good, much lesse infinitely good,) shall (by the favour of this his Goodness) be fully declared in the Treatise of mans fall, and of sinnes entrance into the World by it. That which in this place wee take as granted, is, ‘That Gods wisedome is no lesse infinite than his power; that he perfectly foreknowes, whatsoe­ver by his omnipotency can be done; that his po­wer and wisedome are fully commensurable to his immensity and eternity; that all these rules following, are exactly parallell in true Divinity.’

‘Gods Presence is not circumscriptible by the coexistence of his creatures; He is in every one of them as a Center, and all of them are in Him as in a circumference capable not of them only but of all that possibly can bee; onely uncapable of Circumscription or Equality.’

‘His Eternity is more than commensurable to time or any duration of created Entities: It is in every duration as a permanent instant; and all durations are contained in it, as a fluent instant in a set time, or as noonetide in the whole day.’

‘His Power likewise may not be confined to ef­fects that are, have beene, or shall bee: the pro­duction of every thing out of nothing, argues it [Page 99] to be truly infinite; and yet the production of all, is to the infinity of it, not so much as a beame of light which is strained through a needles eye, is to the body of the Sunne, or to all the light dif­fused throughout the world.’

Least of all may his infinite wisedome be compre­hended within those effects which by his power have been produced, or which it now doth or here­after shall produce. But looke how farre his immen­sity exceeds all reall or compleat space, or his E­ternity succession, or the duration of things created, or his Power all things already reduced from possi­bility to actuall existence; so farre doth his infinite Wisedome surmount the most exact knowledge that can bee imagined of all things already ereated and their actions. Nothing that is, could have borne any part in the world, without the light or directi­on of his Knowledge: and yet that measure of his Knowledge which can bee gathered from the full harmony of this Vniverse, is lesse in respect of it ab­solutely considered, then skill to number digits, is to the entire or exact knowledge of all proportions or other arithmeticall rules or affections, that can arise from their multiplications or divisions. The causes, properties, & hidden vertues of each thing created, are better knowne to Him, than so much of them as we see or perceive by any other sense, is to us: and yet He knowes whatsoever by infinite power pos­sibly might have beene, but now is not, whatsoever hereafter may be, though it never shall be; as per­fectly as he doth the things which at this instant are, heretofore have beene, or hereafter must be.

[Page 100] 7 The subject wherein this his incomprehensible wisedome exhibits the most liuely and surest appre­hensions, for drawing our hearts after it in admira­tion; is the harmony or mixture of contingency with necessity. And this, most conspicuous in mo­derating the free thoughts of Men or Angells, and ordaining them to the certaine and necessary ac­complishment of his glory. The contingent means which by his permission and donation, these crea­tures may use for attaining their severall ends, or private good, may be successively infinite. And yet, albeit the utmost possibilities of their varieties and incōstancies, were reduced to act, the ends not­withstanding, which his infinite wisedome hath forecast in their creation, should by any course of many thousands, which they may take, be as inevi­tably brought to passe, as if no choice or freedome had beene left them; or as if every succeeding thought had been drawne on by the former, and al linked to that which hee first inspired, or by his ir­resistible power produced, with indissoluble chains of Adamantine Fate. We would esteeme it great wisdome or cunning (to use S. Austines illustratiō) in a Fowler to be able to catch againe all the Birds, w^ch he had formerly caught, after he had permitted every one of them to take wings and flye which way they listed. God hath nets every where spred, for catching such as his wisedome suffers to flye farthest from him, or most to decline the wayes which in his goodnesse he had appointed for thē: and (which is most of all to be admired) the very freedome or variety of mens thoughts, so they be [Page 101] permitted to imploy them according to their owne liking, becomes their most inevitable, and most in­extricable snare. For all their thoughts are actually numbred in his infinite wisedome, and the award of every thought determinately measured, or defi­ned by his Eternall Decree. So farre is freedome of choice or contingency from being incompati­ble with the immutability of Gods will, that with­out this infinite variety of choice or freedome of thought in man and Angels, wee cannot rightly conceive him to be as infinitely wise, as his decree is immutable.

8 Free it was for mee to have thought or done somewhat in every minute of the last yeare, where­by the whole frame of my cogitations or actions for this yeare following might have beene altered: and yet should God have beene as true and princi­pall a cause of this alteration, and of every thought and deed thus altered; as he is of those that de facto are past, or of that which I now thinke or doe. Nor should his will or pleasure (as some object) depend on mine, but mine though contingently free, necessarily subject unto his. For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell, he hath ever­lastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent; which needs no other cause or meanes to produce it, but onely the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into Act. For what way soever (of ma­ny equally possible) mans will doth encline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. Did we that which we [Page 102] doe not, but might doe; many things would inevi­tably follow, which now doe not. Nor doe the things, which at this instant befall me, come to passe, because he absolutely decreed them, and none but them (as we say) in the first place; But because hee decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things, which hee knew I would doe, which notwithstanding hee both knew and had decreed, that I might not have done. For whatsoever I should have done and have let undone, there was a reall possibility to have done it; though not inhae­rent in me, yet intituled unto mee in particular by Gods Decree; untill some demerit of mine or my forefathers, did cut off the entaile, and interrupt the successefull influence. For here I will not dispute, how farre the sinnes of Parents may prejudice their Children; but these termes should, or might, being referred to matters of duty; are as infallible signes in Divinity, as in Grammar, of a potentiall, what we should have done or might have done, was possible for us to have done, by that decree whence all po­wer and possibility, not meerely logicall, is deri­ved. So then, both that which might befall me if I did otherwise, and that which now befals mee do­ing as I doe, flow alike immediately from the ab­solute necessity of his eternall decree: whose in­comprehensible wisedome herein appeares most admirable; that though the variety in this kinde were infinite, yet should it comprehend all; not one thing could fall without the actuall circumfe­rence of it.

9 The generall reason, why most Christian [Page 103] writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to speake more consequently to what they rightly conceive, concerning other branches of divine absolute infinitenesse, than concerning his infinite knowledge, is, because all creatures without exception, are true participants of Gods other At­tributes, besides his wisedome or knowledge. For even the meanest creature, the worme or gnat, hath a portion of that being, of that power, of that dura­tion, which in him are infinite: and that portion of these attributes which they have, or that quantity of being which they have, is a participation of his immensity. But of his knowledge or wisedome, men and Angels (the manner of whose knowledge is to men for the most part unknowne) are of all his creatures the onely participants. And (as hath been observed before) those rules are alwayes the most cleare and certaine, and most easily gathered; which are gathered from an uniforme identity of particu­lars, in variety of subjects. Those universall rules (on the contrary) are hardly gathered, or (without ac­curate observation) are lesse certaine, which can be experienced onely in some one or fewer subjects. Another speciall reason why we doe not conceive so magnificently or so orthodoxally of Gods knowledge, as were fitting; is, because we want fit tearmes to expresse them in. For seeing words are taken as the proper vesture of our thoughts & con­ceipts; and seeing most men are apt to conceive or judge rather according to the vesture or outward appearance of things, than according to the inward truth: it is almost impossible for us not to trans­forme [Page 104] the manner of Gods knowledge or decrees, into the similitude of our owne conceipts, conjec­tures, or resolutions; so long as we put no other ve­sture or expressions upon Gods decree or know­ledge, than were fitted for our owne. To salve this inconvenience, or to prevent the occasion of this errour,Quomodo est praescius, dum nulla nisi quae fu­tura sunt, praesciātur? Et scimus quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cujus oculos prae­terita nulla sunt, prae­sentia non transeunt, futura non veniunt: quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus prospec­tu praesto est, & omne quod prae­sens est, scire potest potius quam prae­scire. Greg. lib. 20. in Iob. cap. 24. Et paulo post, In illo, nec praeterita, nec futura reperiri quaeunt, sed cuncta mutabilia immutabiliter durant; & quae in seipsis simul existere non possunt, illi simul omnia assistunt, nihil (que) in illo praeterit quod transit: quia in aeternitate ejus modo quodam in­comprehensibili, cuncta volumina saeculorum transeuntia manent, currentia stant. Vide Pe­trum Damianum in ep. 4. de omnipotentia, & Ludovicum Ballaster Hierologiae, cap. 3. Saint Gregory moves this doubt: How we can say there is any praescience or foreknow­ledge in God, seeing onely those things can be pro­perly said to be foreknowne, which are to come: whereas we know, that nothing is future unto God, before whose eye, no things are past; things present doe not passe by Him, things future doe not come, upon Him. Whatsoever hath beene to us, is yet in his view; and whatsoever is present, may rather be said to be knowne than foreknowne. To the same purpose Saint Austine would have Gods know­ledge of things which are to come, to bee tearmed rather science than praescience or foresight; seeing all things are present to God. But these two great lights of the Latine Church, with some others that follow these for their guides, have not in this argu­ment exprest themselves so clearly or so accurately as that their expressions can passe without question or exception in the Schooles. We may not say (nor did Saint Austine or Saint Gregory, as I presume, thinke) that God doth not see or know a distincti­on betweene times past, present, or to come, more [Page 105] cleerely than we doe. If then he distinguish times present from times past or future, how is it said by St. Gregory; that nothing to him is future, nothing past? If these differences of time or of succession be reall; the Eternall knowes these differences much better than we doe. And if he know a difference between things present, past, and to come; to be pre­sent, past, or to come, is not all one in respect of his Eternall knowledge. If God, as all grant, be before all worlds; his knowledge being coeternall to his being, must needs be before all worlds. And Saint Austine himselfe grants a scientia a science or know­ledge in God most infallible, of all things that have beene, are, or shall be; before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the world it selfe, and of all things in it. Now all know­ledge of things not yet present, but to come, is fore­knowledge: to determine or decree things fu­ture, is to predetermine or foredecree them. And seeing God from Eternity hath both knowne and decreed the things that then were not; he is said to have foreknowne and foredecreed them. So then God foreknowes, and man foreknowes; God hath decreed, and man hath decreed. But the difference between the manner of their foreknowing and de­creeing, being not oft-times wel expressed by lear­ned writers or teachers, and seldome duely consi­dered by their Readers or hearers; the identity of words wherewith we expresse our own foreknow­ledge & Gods foreknowledge, begets a similitude of conceipt, or will hardly suffer us rightly to con­ceive [Page 106] the true difference betweene the nature and manner of humane wisedome, and wisedome divine. And this hath beene the fertile nursery of many errours in this Argument, which now and hereaf­ter we shall endeavour to displant: imitating the Heralds, who are often enforced to give the same Coat to divers parties; but alwayes with some dif­ference, remarkeable to such as are conversant in the mysteries of their Art.

10 Our knowledge of things to come is many wayes imperfect; (and foreknowledge onely) be­cause the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of our selves, as yet can reach unto that point of time, wherein things so knowne, get first existence. We looke on them as on things afarre off, which we expected to meet; for as things past resemble moueables going from us, so things future seem to come upon us. And whiles they get being, which before they had not; we get continuance of being, and of knowledge, which before we had not; that is, we gaine a reall coexistence with them: For if the daies, or thred of our life should be cut off before the things foreknowne by us come to passe, or get actuall being; wee could not possibly haue coex­istence with them. Such being or duration as they have, is too short the one way, & our existence too short the other way, to make up this knot or bond of mutuall relation, which wee call coexistence: There must be on our part, a continuatiō or length­ning of that existence which we have; and on their part, a growth into that actuall being, which whilest they are meerely future, they have not; be­fore [Page 107] wee and they can bee truely said to exist toge­ther. Now if we shall mold the manner of Gods foreknowledge of things future in our owne con­ceipt or foreknowledge of them, we shall erroneous­ly collect; that, seeing wee cannot infallibly fore­know future Contingents, so neither could they be infallibly fore-knowne by God; if to him or in re­spect of his decree, they were contingents, and not necessarily predetermined.

And some there be, which push our pronenesse to this errour forward, by another; not distin­guishing betweene contingency and uncertainty, they argue thus;

But they consider not that there is a twofold un­certainty: one formally relative: another onely denominative or fundamentall. That which is re­latively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne; for so it should bee certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine. But a future contingent, as it is contin­gent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty; although it usually be in part the foundatiō or Cofounder of it. For relative un­certainty, or that uncertainty which is so termed with relation unto knowledge, results partly from the nature of the object, suppose a future Contin­gent or Event mutable; partly and more principal­ly, from the imperfection of the knowledge, in re­spect [Page 108] of which it is said uncertaine. But the same effect or event, which is in part the foundation of uncertaintie, with respect to finite or unperfect knowledge, may bee the distinct and proper object of knowledge in it selfe infallible, or of knowledge infinite. Now if we grant, that there is any know­ledge in it selfe infallible, we cannot imagine that any thing possible (yet is every future Contingent, though we consider it as contingently future, pos­sible) should bee uncertaine unto such knowledge. We should againe consider, that the Eternall Pro­vidence, doth neither know or foreknow Contin­gents future, by interposed or expiring Acts; but by interminable and Eternall Knowledge, in which there is no succession, nothing future, nothing past. And without the interposition of some determi­ning or expiring Acts, there can bee no errour in men; no man erres while hee is in the search of truth, or whilest he suspends his Iudgement. Take then away the imperfection of our knowledge or iudgement, whilest it is in suspense; which is igno­rance, rather than errour; and it better resembles divine knowledge, than our actuall resolutions or determinations doe.

11 The best knowledge which we can have of things contingent, is but conjecturall: and of things meerly casuall, we cannot have so much as a true conjecturall knowledge; for, those things we tearme casuall, w^ch are without the reach or sphere of our forecast or conjecture. And hence it is, that the actuall exhibition of any event, whether casuall or contingent, doth alwaies actuate, increase, or per­fect [Page 109] our knowledge. The true reason why we can­not certainly foreknow events contingent, is be­cause our Essence & Knowledge are but finite: so that things contingent are not so contained in us, that if we could perfectly know our selves, wee might perfectly know them. But in the Divine Essence all reall effects, all events possible, whether ne­cessary, casuall, or contingent, are eminently con­tained, the perfect knowledge of his owne Es­sence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge not onely of all things that have beene, are, or shall bee, but of all things that might have beene, or possibly may be. For as Gods Essence is pre­sent in every place, as it were an ubiquitary cen­ter; so is his Eternity or infinite duration indivi­sibly coexistent to every part of succession; and yet withall is round about it. Hee it is, that drives things future upon us, being from Eternity as well beyond them, as on this side of them. Though hee should create other creatures without the circumference of this world, they should be all within his presence, without which, it is impos­sible ought besides him, should have any existence: yet should he not properly gaine any new existence in them, but onely take a denomination of coexi­stence with them; because they have existence in Him, which before they had not. Thus, admitting the branches of Contingency or indifferent possi­bilities never reduced to act, to be in our apprehen­sion numberlesse; yet whensoever any thing comes to passe, which might not have beene, it cannot fall without the sphere of Gods actuall knowledge, [Page 110] which is fully commensurable to Eternity and Im­mensity; and therefore is not onely coexistent to every successive act, but doth environ whole succes­sion. And whether of such things as possibly may be, more or fewer bee reduced to act; nothing ac­crewes to Eternall Knowledge, no new act can bee produced in it, by the casuall event; but only that which was eternally knowne, having now gotten actuall coexistence with Eternity, bestowes this ex­trinsecall denomination upon the Eternall Crea­tor, It was foreknowne from eternity; that is, in plaine language, knowne, when it was not, by Him that more properly alwayes indivisibly, is, then was be­fore it. And being such, his knowledge of things, which, in respect of us are onely future and fore­knowne, doth as truly resemble, or rather containe our knowledge of things past or presēt, as of things to come. Now for us to apprehend a thing past, under the nature of a thing contingent, is not im­possible. And though we certainly know it to bee already past, yet this certainty of our knowledge, doth not perswade us, that it came to passe certain­ly, or inevitably; but is very compatible with our conceipt of its contingency or casuall production, whilest it was present. Our knowledge of such things past or present, is necessary; but the event it selfe is not therefore necessary, nor to bee termed necessary in respect of our knowledge. Much lesse may we say, either that contingent effects are neces­sary, or that no effects are not necessary, in respect of Gods decree or foreknowledge of them. For if we beleeve that Gods foreknowledge of all events [Page 111] to come, be they of what kinde they possibly may bee, is more cleare and more infallible than our best knowledge of things past or present; the ne­cessary infallibility of his knowledge, can neither adde any degree of necessity to the nature of the events foreknowne, nor take one jo [...] of contingen­cy from them. God should not be absolutely infi­nite either in Essence or in Knowledge, if the abso­lute infallibility of his foreknowledge, or the im­possibility of his not erring in his predictions, were in it selfe grounded upon, or to be inferred by us, from the absolute necessity of the event, rather than from the absolute infinity of his wisedome. For those effects which being otherwise in their nature contingent, it is in our power (by Gods permission, by circumspection and forecast) to alter by laying a necessity upon them, which before they had not; we are able (after this necessity laid upon them by our selves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell, al­beit our knowledge still remaine but finite. Now, that some events, which are to day, in themselves and by Gods decree, truly contingent, may by our industry and circumspection, become to morrow truly necessary, no intelligent Christian Divine will (I hope) deny; or if any doe deny it, we shall be able (by Gods assistance) positively to demon­strate the truth of this our assertion, and withall demonstrate the dangerous inconveniences of the contradictory opinion, in the Treatise of Divine providence. In the meane time, to finish this prin­cipall stemme of Divine providence, to wit, his in­finite Wisedome; and the dependance which things [Page 112] temporall have upon his eternall knowledge: Suc­cession we imagine as a scrole containing severall columnes of contingency or indifferent possibilities; of which onely so many, or so much of any, as in revolution of time, take inke, and are unfoulded, become visible to Men and Angels. But the Al­mighty looketh on all things, as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past: his infinite and eternall wisedome, doth not onely encompasse all things that come to passe, as the Circumference doth the Center; but penetrates the whole scrole of succession from end to end and from corner to corner, more clearly then the Suns brightnesse doth the perspicuous or purified Ayre. Those Columnes of meere possibilities never actu­ated, which his finger from Eternity hath drawne in Characters secret and invisible to his Creatures, are alike distinct and legible to his glorious eye, as those others whose first draught, being as secretly and invisibly fashioned by him, man or other se­cond causes by his concourse, fill with actuall or sensible existence; as the Embroyderer doth the Drawers obscure patterne, with conspicuous bran­ches of silke, gold, or silver.

12 But lest we may be thought to reade the An­cients with no greater reverence, than we do some moderne Writers from whom wee freely dissent, without any impulsion of envy or vainglory, let us for conclusion of this long discourse, a little reflect upon the testimonies before avouched out of S. Austine, and out of S. Gregory. The truth then at which these two learned Fathers aimed, & which, [Page 113] in the charitable construction of such as read them with reverence, they did not misse, may bee fully comprised in these observations following, which are but necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered. Whereas S. Gregory saith, Vnto God nothing is past, nothing to come; the true con­struction of his meaning is, that in Gods knowledge of things past, present, or to come, there is nihil fu­turum, nihil praeteritum, no such difference of time or duration, as we expresse by these words, future or past: for it alwayes is, and so perfectly alwayes is, that nothing can be added to it by succession or variety of events, be they necessary, casuall, or con­tingent. But as his Eternal knowledge of all things, doth not make all things, which he knowes, to be e­ternall (no not in respect of his Eternall Decree or Knowledge, for he eternally decrees and knowes things temporall and mutable:) so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge, make all things so known by him, to be immutable or absolutely necessary, either in themselves or in respect of his Eternall Knowledge. Onely this we are bound to beleeve, and this is all that we may in this argument safely say: [Gods Knowledge of things mutable & unnecessary, is absolutely neces­sary, because absolutely infinite.] Againe, it is most true which S. Gregory saith; that things future doe not come upon God as they doe upon us; that things present do not passe him, or from him, as they do from us. Whilest things present passe from us, we likewise passe from them: for we continually lose that portion of duration or coexistence which [Page 114] wee had with them; alwayes gaining, whilest our glasse is in running, a new [...]rit or link of coexistēce with that which is next to come. Nothing, in this sense, can passe by God or from God, because He alwayes is, and the manner of his duration is indi­visible: He cannot lose any existence by antiquity, nor gaine any new portion of duration, by everla­sting continuance. Times passing exonerate them­selves into the Ocean of his infinite duration, with­out inlarging it; times comming incessantly flow from it, without diminution of it. Times future a­gaine, are said to come upon us, or to meet us; be­cause our duration or existence cannot reach to fu­ture things, whilest they are future: the very An­gels are not of so long standing or duration to day, as they shall bee to morrow: unlesse things future did come towards them, and as it were meet them, they should have no coexistence with them. In this sense, times future cannot be said to come upon God, because he alwayes is, and exists every way before them. His duration is yesterday, to day, to morrow, the same for ever; and every way the same without addition of quantity, without alteration of nature or quality: and in it are all things that are. So much of being as things future can bee said to have, they have it in him and from him: so much of being as there remaines of things past, remaineth in Him, and things present, even presence it selfe, cannot for a moment subsist, without Him.

CHAP. 9.
Of Divine Immutability.

1 WIth these stemmes of Divine perfection hitherto exprest, another presents it selfe to our contemplation, which some Schoole-men have moulded in the same conceipt with Eternity; of which, o­thers conceive it to bee the off-spring. Vs it suffi­ceth, that the true explication of the former, con­firmes the truth of this attribute, whose briefe ex­plication we now seeke. And perhaps, if I should speake properly, the Knowledge of it, is the Off-spring of our right knowledge of the former. The attribute it selfe, whose truth in former disputes hath beene supposed, is Divine Immutability; which may be thus demonstrated.

2 All mutation supposeth a defect or imperfec­tion, either in respect of the terme, whence, or into which, the change is made; and therefore can have no place in absolute or abstract perfection, or in Essence infinite. More particularly, all mutation or change, is either in essence, in quantity, in place, or in quality; under which we comprehend all vitall endeavors, all acts of the Will or Vnderstanding. In essence or nature, it is impossible the totality and fountaine of Essence should admit any change, as impossible for him which hath no author of being, [Page 116] not to bee alwayes what hee is; as for that which now is not, to take his being to it selfe: unto infinit perfection (for such he is) what can accrew? On the other side, nothing can fall from it, but must fall into him; seeing, He is in being infinite. And in that he filleth every place by his essentiall pre­sence, it is impossible hee should move from place to place, or be carryed by any circular motion, be­ing indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined. And as his Immensitie could not be entended or contracted by extension of new mag­nitudes, or by diminution or annihilation of the old; so neither can his Eternity, bee shortned or lenghtned by continuation of succession, or expi­ration of time or motion. Power, in like sort, truly infinite, can admit no intension or remission, in en­deavors; but moveth all things without motion, and worketh all things without labour or toyle in­herent: For all things are made, and brought to no­thing, by his sole will or word. Nor speakes hee ought, which from Eternity hee hath not spoken; albeit succeding ages have still new messengers of his eternall will and Word, All flesh is as grasse, and all the glory of man as the power of the grasse; the grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away. But the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And yet this was that word of the Gospell, which seemed then first to be preached unto them.

3 All the difficulty wherewith flesh and blood in this article are usually assaulted, or seeme to them­selves to be beset, is, how his will or counsaile should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free: [Page 117] but supposing, what we often promise, and once for all (by his assistance) shall undoubtedly prove; that absolute contingency or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of his Eternall decree, as necessity in other workes of nature: I see not what appearance of difficulty can present it selfe, to such, as beare the two for­mer principles before mentioned levell in their mindes and thoughts; the one, that God is absolute infinite in Being: the other, that Hee is absolutely perfect, according to all the branches of Beeing or perfection by us conceiveable; or, more than all these, Perfection it selfe. Now in things that have any better portion of Being, wherein they can truly delight; it is, to our apprehension, a degree or portion of perfection to have an immutable state of such Being; an imperfection, to be subject to alteration or change. But, whether their estate bee mutable or immutable, it is a greater perfecti­on to be free in their operations, than to be restrai­ned to some one or few particulars, without any choice or variety of subjects, wherein they may exercise their operative faculties. Bruitish, or meer­ly sensitive creatures have a delectable kinde of Be­ing, whose continuance they desire; but without all variety of choice, or desire of any better being, although the best being they have be subject to al­teration or change. Men are free in their operati­ons; but mutable and subject to alteration, as well in their nature, as in their operations, or in the ob­jects of their freedome; and yet are more excellent than the visible Heavens, which are not obnoxious [Page 118] to alteration or corruption. So that, if the Heavens, or other incorruptible substances, had their free­dome of choice, which men have; they would bee more perfect and excellent creatures than man is: Or, if man were as immortall as they are, he would be incomparably more perfect than they can bee, without the freedome of choyce or will, which (as we now suppose) is the inseparable consequent, or companion of reason or intellectuall knowledge. But, though freedome be in it selfe a great perfection; yet to be free to do evil, is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome. And this their mutability, though in it selfe an imperfection, yet is an imperfection neces­sarily praerequired, or praesupposed to the perfecti­on of the creature. For no creature can bee truly perfect by nature, but by the will and pleasure of the Creator. And it is his will and pleasure, to make them mutable, before they be immutably happy. But the Creator of all things, in that He is absolute­ly perfect, even Perfection it selfe, is essentially im­mutable, essentially free, and immutably happy; be­cause infinitely good. Yet if we compare these at­tributes amongst themselves, immutability is the ground or supporter, not the Crowne or perfection of freedome, but freedome rather the perfection of immutabilitie. Yet were freedome in it selfe, how perfect and complete soever it were, no absolute perfection, unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse. Absolute immutability and absolute freedome, may very well stand together, even in our conceipts; so they be rightly joyned, or sorted. To [Page 119] be freely immutable, implyes a contradiction; if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true con­ceipt of infinite Being. To be freely immutable, is a branch of imperfection or impotency; which might put al those perfections, which are contained in that nature which is no otherwise than freely immutable, upon the hazard. If the divine Essence were freely immutable, or free in respect of his im­mutability, whether of nature or goodnesse; it were possible for him to put off these two attributes, and to eloath himselfe with mutability, which is al­wayes charged with possibility of doing amisse. But to be immutably free, is no point of imperfec­tion; but rather the period of perfection; and ne­cessarily inferres this perfection (which wee call freedome) to be as unchangeable as the Attributes of power, of wisedome, of eternity, or goodnesse are. The excellency of his nature and Essence ne­cessarily includes an Eternall liberty or freedome in the exercise of his omnipotent power, and in the influence or communication of his goodnesse; Free it is for him, from Everlasting to Everlasting, om­nipotently to decree as well a mutability in the ac­tions of some things created, as a necessity or im­mutability in the course or operation of nature in­animate: That the course of mans life, or the finall doome awarded to every man (though that must be awarded unto all according to the diversity of their courses,) should be immutable; because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent Decree; hath no more colour of truth, than to say the Om­nipotent [Page 120] Creator, must needs be blacke because he made the Crowes and Ebony blacke; or white, be­cause he made the Snow and Swannes white; or greene and yellow, because hee made the Gold yellow, and the Popinjayes greene: Or that hee should be of all colours, because the Rainbow is his creature. Let us beleeve then, that He is ever­lastingly and immutably free, to make creatures of what kinde it pleaseth Him, that he hath printed a resemblance of his freedome in the mutability of this inferiour world, and hath left a modell of his immutability in the celestiall and immortall substances. But the more immutable Hee is, the more irresistible we conceive his power to bee: or the greater his wisedome is, the lesse preventa­ble the contrivances of it are: the worse it would be with such as have to deale with Him, were not his goodnesse (which is the rule of his Eternall Decree) immutably as great, as He himselfe, or his other Attributes are.

CHAP. 10.
Of the eternall and immutable Decree.

1 FRom all, or most of the former speculations, concerning the se­verall branches of the divine At­tributes or perfections, somwhat may be gathered, not unusefull for rectifying or bettering our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent de­cree. [Page 121] A point, though in all ages most difficult, yet in this age become so common, and so farre exten­ded, that no Divine can adventure upon any other service profitable for the present estate of Christs Militant Church, but he shall be enforced either to make his passage through it, or come so nigh unto it, that hee must, in good manners, doe homage un­to it. That this Decree is for its tenour, immutable, (if wee take it in the abstract, or as it is in God) is cleare from the attribute last handled; that the same Decree, is irresistible in its executions, or that the things decreed are inevitable, is evident from the attribute of Gods infinite Power or Omnipo­tency. That this immutable irresistible Decree, is Eternall, or before all Times, no man questions. Yet is it not agreed upon by all, either what a De­cree is, or what it is to be Eternall. All least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde, the true im­portances of an Eternall Decree. To this purpose have the former speculations concerning Eternity, and Gods infinite wisedome beene praemised; Lest, by the incogitant use of these and the like Scrip­ture Phrases, [God foreknowes or hath decreed all things from Eternity;] that slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant or unattentive Reader; with whose dreames many deceived, have thought and spoken of Gods Decree or predetermination of things to come, as of Acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; And by a consequent errour, resolve that it is as impossible, for any thing to be otherwise than it is, will be, or hath beene; as it is to recall that againe, which is already past. In [Page 122] which conceipt, though they doe not expressely speake or thinke it, they necessarily involve thus much [That God by his Eternall and powerfull Decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistable and unretractible swingde; and since onely lookes upon it, with an awfull eye, as Masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they goe the way they are commanded.] But it is a rule in Divinity, not contradicted, (for ought I know) by any Christian, that there is altogether as great need and use of power and wisedome infinite, to ma­nage the world, as there was at first to make it, Pa­ter meus operatur adhuc (saith theIoh. 5. 17. Wisedome of God) et ego operor. My Father worketh hitherto, and I worke. And as hee ceaseth not to worke, so doth he never cease to decree. Omnia Ephes. 1. 11. operatur se­cundum consilium voluntatis suae. Hee worketh all things according to the counsell of his Will. So that al­beit the Counsell of his Will, by which hee work­eth, be Eternall; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Shall we say then, he hath not decreed what­soever doth or shall befall us? Yes, in this sense we may, [He doth not now first begin to decree thē:] but in as much as his Decrees have no end, wee should remember withall, that hee now decrees them. And it were much safer for every man in particular to looke on Gods Decree concerning himselfe, as present or coexistent to his whole course of life; rather than on it, as it was before the world, or in Adam: for so we shall thinke of it, as of an Act past and finished, which hath de­nounced sentence upon us, more irrevocable [Page 123] than the Lawes of the Medes and Persians. How­beit even these lawes, whiles they were in making, suppose that Liberty in their Makers, which they utterly tooke from them being once enacted.

2 Gods Decrees are like theirs, in that they are in themselves unalterable: but not in that they make some evills, which befall others, inevitable; or some casuall inconveniences, unamendable. No wisedome, but that which is infinite, and an Eter­nall Law in it selfe, foreseeing all things that possi­bly can bee, hath just warrant to make Decrees for men everlastingly immutable. Too strict oblige­ment unto Lawes positive, or Decrees unalterable, deprives both Lawgivers and others of their native Liberty and opportunity of doing good. Were the Popes wisedome and integrity parallell to that supereminent dignity, which he challengeth; it were not amisse for the body whereof hee is the lawfull head, if he exercised the same power over his Grants or Acts, that hee doth over his breath: alwayes reserving a liberty to send them forth, or call them in, to enlarge, contract, or invert them, according to exigences or occasions present. To alter his opinion of men, as they doe theirs in points of usefull doctrine, or their demeanours in matters of life; curbing him this yeare, whom hee priviledged the last yeare; now punishing where he lately rewarded; and, shortly after, rewarding where now hee punisheth; would argue no muta­bility of mind, or unsetled fickle disposition, but rather immoveable constancy; if so in all these changes he truly observed the rule of Iustice, which [Page 124] because it is alwayes one and the same, and never varies, must needs afford different measures to dif­ferent deserts, and fit contrary dispositions with contrary recompences. But seeing Princes and Governours, are made of the same corrupted mold with those, whom they governe; oft-times expo­sed by height of place to greater blasts of mutabili­tie, and inconstancy, than their inferiours; Publicke Lawes have beene sought out by most Nations, to runne like a straight line, betwixt two distorted and crooked ones; and to bee as a firme, or barre, be­tweene the tumultuous and raging passions of Princes and subjects, which every foot (as we say) would fall foule were they not thus fended off, one from the other. Vpon this consideration many Conquerours have beene content to sheathe up a great part of their illimited power (retayning some competent prerogatives to themselves and their successors) in publicke Edicts or Lawes, not alto­gether so unalterable as the Lawes of the Medes and Persians: yet lesse subject to change, then Lords purposes, or Princes pleasures: and every Act wher­to they passe their consent, restraines them of some former liberty, and abates somewhat of their pre­sent greatnesse; to whose length or continnance (as Theopompus observed) much by this meanes, is added; and it were better to live an hundred yeares, (as hee said) with ingenuous health and strength, then to swagger it for twenty, with gyantly force, or Athleticall constitution. And albeit the Law (which is a common looking glasse to direct the Prince in commanding, and the subject in obeying) [Page 125] may sometimes lay out authority, and sometimes obedience, or inflict punishment one while, and dis­pense rewards another while, in measure greater or lesse, than a wise & just Arbitrator, chosen for these particular purposes, would allow of; yet hath it beene thought fittest for all parts, rather to brooke these interposed mischiefes, then to be perpetually subject to the former inconveniences of the Papa­cie; if the Popes (such as they are) or other Princes should practise according to the Canonists rule, Papa nunquam ligat sibi manus, The Pope never tyes his owne hands.

3 But the unerrable rule of everlasting Iustice, who from eternity decrees, whatsoever may bee, and foresees whatsoever will be, (because Heaven and Earth may sooner passe than his words or acts) passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of Iurisdiction. What grant or pro­mise soever he make, cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie, for a moment of time: they last no longer than durante beneplacito: seeing gra­cious Equity, and onely it, is his everlasting plea­sure. He ever was, ever is, and ever shall be, alike indifferent and free to recompence every man ac­cording to his present wayes. And in that, hee al­waies searcheth the very hart and secret thoughts, and never ceaseth to decree; his one and indivisibly everlasting decree, without any variety or shadow of change in it selfe; fits all the changes, severall dispositions, and contingent actions of Men and Angels, as exactly, as if he did conceive, and shape a new Law, for every one of them; and they are [Page 126] conceived and brought forth, as wel befitting them as the skin doth the body, which nature hath en­wrapped in it. No man living (I take it) will a­vouch any absolute necessity from all Eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the Priesthood, or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims: For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty. I demand then, whether within the compass of time, or in eternity, as praeexistent to Elies dayes, he past any act that could restraine his eternall liberty of honouring Elies families, as well as any others in their time? To say, He did, were impiety; because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immuta­bility. What shall we say then? The deposition of his race, the sudden death and destruction of his sonnes, were not at all absolutely necessary, but ne­cessary onely upon supposed miscariage of the pos­sible meanes and opportunities, which hee had gi­ven them for honouring him. And that eternall decree, [They that dishonour mee, them will I disho­nour,] as coexistent to the full measure of this their transgression, by it shapes their punishment.

4 To thinke of Gods eternall decree with admi­ration void of danger; we must conceive it, as the immediate Axis or Center, upon which every suc­cessive or contingent act revolves: and yet withall, that, wherein the whole frame of succession or con­tingency is fully comprehended, as an unconstant movable Sphere in a farre greater quiescent, or ra­ther in such a one (as in the description of Eternity was imagined) which hath drawne all the successive [Page 127] parts of motion, into an indivisible unity of durati­on permanent. Every part of the larger Sphere (this, swallowing up motion, in vigorous rest) should have coexistence locall with all and every part of the next moveable Sphere under it, move it as slowly and swiftly, as the latitude of successive motion can admit. Whilest we thus conceive of Gods eternall decree, and of his foreknowledge, (included in our conceipt of it) according to the Analogy of what we must beleeve, concerning the manner of his ubiquitary presence or immensity: we shall have no occasion to suspect, that his neces­sary foreknowledge of what we doe, should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibi­lity of doing otherwise. Rather, we may by this supposall, beleeve that as probable, and perceive in part the manner how it is so, which shall by Gods assistance be demonstrated to be de facto most true. As, first, that the Omnipotent doth eternally de­cree an absolute contingency in most humane acts: Secondly, that this eternall act or decree (which we thus conceive to be throughout the whole suc­cession of time, in every place indivisibly coexistent to each humane thought or action) doth not only perpetually support our faculties, but withall un­cessantly inspire them with contingency in their choice: that is, it so moves them, as they may with­out lett or incumbrance, move themselves more wayes then one: And yet, even whilest it so moves them, it withall inevitably effects the proportioned consequents, which from everlasting were fore­ordained to the choices, which we make, be they [Page 128] good or bad; or according to the severall degrees of good or evill done by us, or of our affections or desires to doe them.

CHAP. 11.
Of transcendentall goodnesse: and of the infinity of it in the Divine nature.

1 IF in assigning reasons of Ma­ximes or proverbiall spee­ches, wee might not bee thought to fetch light be­yond the Sunne; we should say, Life unto things living is therefore sweet, because it is a principall stemme of being, as sweetnesse like­wise is of goodnesse. However, we may resolve this Physicall Axiome, into a Metaphysicall: Omne ens qua ens est bonum; Vnto every thing, its owne proper being is good. Poyson, though noysome to man, to the Aspe is pleasant, so is venome to the Toad, and the Adder delighteth in his sting. In things inani­mate, there should be no reluctance of contrary or hostile qualities, unlesse each had a kinde of grate­full right or interest in their owne being, and were taught by nature to fight for it, as men doe for their lives or goods. This is that goodnesse which we call entitative or transcendentall. A goodnesse equally, alike truly communicated to al things that are, from his goodnesse who onely is; but not participated equally, or according to equality, by all. For as the [Page 129] least vessell that is filled to the brimme, is as full as the greatest that can be, and yet the quantity of li­quor contained in them equally full, is most une­quall: So, albeit the entitative being of the Flye, Ant, or Worme, be unto them as good as mans be­ing is to man: (For even the Ant or Flye being vext, or Wormes trod upon, will bewray their spleene, and labour as it were to right themselves for the losse or prejudice which they suffer in their Entitative goodnesse, by doing harmes to their tormentors) yet is mans being simply much better than the being of Ants or Wormes. And much worse were that Man, than any Beast, that with Gryllus in the Poet, would like to change his hu­mane nature, for a bruitish. This excesse of entita­tive goodnesse, by which one creature excelleth another, accreweth partly from the excellency of the specificall Nature of Entity which it accompa­nieth; as there is more Entitative goodnesse is be­ing a Man than in being a Lyon; and more in being a Lyon, than in being some inferiour ignoble Beast: it partly accreweth according to the greater or les­ser measure, wherein severall creatures enjoy their specificall Nature. Men though by nature equall, are not equally happy, either in body or minde. Bodily life in it selfe is sweet, and is so apprehen­ded by most; yet is lothsome to some; who (as we say) doe not enjoy themselves, as none of us fully doe. Sensitive appetites may be in some mea­sure satisfied by course, not all at once. The com­pleat fruition of goodnesse incident to one, defeats another (though capable of greater pleasure) for [Page 130] the time, of what it most desires. Venter non habet aures, The Belly pinched with hunger must be satisfi­ed with meat, so must the thirsty throat bee with drinke, before the eares can sucke in the pleasant sound of musicke, or the eye feed it selfe with fresh colours or proportions. Too much pampering bo­dily senses, starves the minde; and deepe contem­plation feedes the mind, but pines the body Of ma­king many Bookes (saithEccles. 12 12. Salomon) there is no end; and much study is a wearinesse of the flesh The more Knowledge we get, the greater capacity wee leave unsatisfied; so that we can never seize upon the in­tire possession of our owne selves: and contempla­tion (as the wise King speaketh) were vanity, did we use the pleasures of it any otherwise, thā as pledges or earnest of a better life to come. And albeit man, in this life, could possesse himselfe as intirely as the Angels doe their Angelicall Natures, yet could not his entitative goodnesse or felicity, be so great as theirs is; because the proper patrimony which he possesseth, is neither so ample nor so fruitfull. God alone is infinite, in being infinitely perfect; and he alone, infinitely enjoyes his intire being, or perfection. The tenure of his infinite joy or hap­pinesse, is infinitely firme, infinitely secured of be­ing alway what it is; never wanting so much as a moment of time, to inlarge or perfect it by conti­nuance, uncapable of any inlargement or increase for the present. But this entitative or transcenden­tall goodnesse, is not that which wee now seeke; whereto notwithstanding it may lead us. For even amongst visible creatures, the better every one is [Page 131] in its kind, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. The truest mea­sure of their internall or proper excellencies, is their beneficial use or service in this great Vniverse, whereof they are parts. What Creature is there almost in this whole visible Sphere, but specially in this inferiour part, which is not beholden to the Sunne; from whose comfortable heat, Nothing (as thePsa. 19. 9. Psalmist speakes) can bee hid? It is, at least of livelesse or meere bodies, in it selfe, the best and fai­rest; and farre the best to others. And God (as it seemes) for this purpose, sends forth this his most conspicuous and goodly messenger, every morning like a bridegroome bedeckt with light and come­linesse, to invite our eyes to looke up unto the Hils whence commeth our Helpe: upon whose tops he hath pitched his glorious Throne, at whose right hand is fulnesse of pleasures everlasting. And from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall or transcen­dent joy and happinesse, sweet streames of perpetu­all joy and comfort, more uncessantly issue, than light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery. That of men the chiefe inhabitants of this great Vale, many are not so happy as they might be, the chiefe causes are; that, either they doe not firmely beleeve the internall happinesse of their Creator, to be absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are; or else consider not in their harts, that the absolute in­finitie of this his internall happinesse, is an essentiall cause of goodnesse (in it kinde, infinite) unto all o­thers, so farre as they are capable of it; and capable of it all reasonable creatures, by creation, are: none [Page 132] but themselves can make them uncapable of happi­nesse, at least, in succession or duration, infinite. Goodnesse is the nature of God; and it is the nature of goodnesse to communicate it selfe unto others, un­to all that are not over growne with evill: of which goodnesse it selfe can be no cause or author.

CHAP. 12.
Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodness communicative, or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature.

1 THe father of Epicures, wil have more than his sonnes, to con­sent with him, that imbecili­ty and indigence, are the usu­all parents of Pitie, Bountie, Kindnesse, or other like bran­ches of communicative hu­mane goodness. Whilest we ned not others helpe, we little think in what need they stand of ours. The Prince in his jollity, can hardly compassionate the beggers misery: nor knowes the Begger how to bemone decayed Nobles: whose condition is more miserable than his owne, though so it seemes not unto him; who would thinke he had fully conque­red want, were hee but furnished with such sup­plies of meat, drinke, and clothing, as these have alwayes ready at hand. That sympathy, which in livelesse or reasonlesse creatures, naturally flowes from similitude of internal qualities, seldome breaks [Page 133] forth in men; but either from experimentall re­membrance of what lately hath, or from apprehen­sion of what shortly may befall themselves: sight of the like afflictions in others, as wee have lately felt, revives the phantasmes or affections which were companions of our mourning; and by so pity­ing of our owne former plight, we pity them.

2 But albeit Epicurus observation may seeme in a manner universall, whilest applyed to its proper subject, Man in his corrupt state; yet when he tran­scends à genere ad genus, from our corruptible na­ture to the divine nature, which is immortall; his inference is of the same stampe with those fooles inductions, that concluded in their hearts, There was no God. The divine nature (saith he) is not pene­trable by mercy or pity: Why so? Will you heare a bruit make Enthymems? Because these finde no entrance into the hearts of men, but through some breach of defect or indigence. It is well this slow­bellyed evill beast, could grant mans nature not to bee altogether so bad or cruell, as want might not tame it, and make it gentle and kinde. But would not bruit qeasts, so they might speake, disclaime his conclusion; that true felicity, or fulnesse of all con­tentment possible, should make the divine nature worse, than want and misery doth the humane? Surely, there is somewhat else amisse in that, which is made better by defect. Nor could wealth and ho­nour make the mighty unmindefull of others, but by making them first forget themselves. The ex­ternalls whereon our desires fasten, so captivate the humane soule, that she cannot doe as she would, or [Page 134] as nature teacheth her; but these strings being cut, she followes her native sway. And in a good sense it was most true, which a Master of a better sect, than Epicurus founded, hath taught; Nemo sponte malus.

3 Lust in old Age, Pride in Beggars, and shift­ing in men overflowing with wealth, seeme to tran­scend the nature of sinnes, and are monsters in cor­rupted nature; because, not begotten by temptati­ons, they in a manner beget themselves: yet scarce shall we finde an old man so prone to Lust, a rich man so delighted in shuffling, an Epicure so addic­ted to his pleasure, or any at all so ill affected either in himselfe or towards other; that being askt, wold not professe his desire to deserve well of others, to be liberall, to be upright, compassionate, just and bountifull. For though continuāce in bad custome, induce in a sort, another nature; yet can it not trans­port any man so farre beyond himselfe, or miscarry his thoughts so much, but he shall feele some secret impulsions unto goodnesse, and some retractions from evill. But as Quod pleros (que) in emendabi­les facit, omnium a­liarum ar­tium pecca­ta, artifici­bus pudori sunt offen­dunt (que): er­rantem in vita peccata delectant. Non gaudet navigio Gubernator everso, non gaudet egro Medicus elato, non gaudet Orator, si patroniculpareus cecidit. At contra, omnibus crimen suum voluptati est. Laetatur ille Adul­terio, in quod irritatus est ipsa difficultate: laetatur ille circumscriptione furt [...] (que) nec ante illi culpa, quam culpae fortuna displicuit. Id prava consuetudine evenit. Alioqui ut scias, sub­esse animis, etiam in pessima abductis, boni sensum, nec ignorari turpe, sed negligi, omnes peccata dissimulant, & quamvis feliciter cesserint, fructu illorum utuntur, ipsa subducunt. At bona conscientia prodire vult, & conspici. Ipsa nequitia tenebras timet. Eleganter itá­que ab Epicuro dictum pute, Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi fides non potest. Aut si hoc modo melius hunc explicari posse juditas sensum: Ideo non prodest latere pec­cantibus, quia latendi etiam si facultatem habent, fiduciam non habent. Ita est, tuta scelera esse possent: secura non possunt, Seneca Epist. 97. Seneca well observes, It is no [Page 135] marvaile that we do not amend what we know to be a­misse in ourselves; seeing errors in every other mystery or profession, make the professor ashamed: Onely such as erre in matter of life & manners are delighted with their errours. The Mariner takes no delight to see his vessell overturned, nor the Physitian in sending his Patient before his time unto his grave. The Oratour rejoyceth not when his Clyent is through his errour overthrowne. Contrariwise, every criminous person is delighted with his crime. One solaceth himselfe in Adultery, and taketh courage to prosecute his desires from the very difficulty of accomplishing thē. Another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft; never displeased with his faultinesse, untill it prove unfortu­nate. All are apt to dissemble their faults, being con­tent when they fall out fortunately, to reape the fruit of them, whilest they subduct the faults of them; but, a good conscience delighteth to set it selfe forth and to have notice taken of it, whereas naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe. And as Epicurus elegantly saith, A malefactor may have the hap, but not the assu­rance to be undiscovered. But (as this Author re­plyes) what availes it him not to have his naughti­nesse discovered, without hope or assurance that it shall not be discovered. His conclusion is, Naughtines may be safe, but it can never be secure.

4 The reason why their naughtinesse an never be warranted with security, is; because conscience in men most vicious, still beares evidence against them, that they live not as shee would have them. For (as Seneca in the same place well observes) though bad custome may worke a delight in naughti­nesse, [Page 136] yet even in minds drencht in the very dreggs of filthinesse, there still remaines a sense of goodnesse: nor is it so much our want of knowledge, as of our right estimate of what we know to be nought, which maketh naughtinesse to be so little abhorred. The minde of man, in that it is indued with reason, hath the rules of Equity imprinted in it; which it alwaies seekes to instampe upon the inferior faculties of the soule. But this divine light of reason, hath as small force to kindle the love of vertue in hearts overgrowne with sensuall desires, as the Sunne in a mist, hath to set moist stuffe on fire. The unsetled affections of youth, somtimes admit the impression of these ide­all characters, in actuall retired speculations; so will the water take the same shape from the seale, which the waxe doth, but hold it no longer than the seale is held upon it. The heart, which maturity of years hath hardened with vast desires, will as hardly bee wrought into a new forme, as the stone, which can­not take any other shape, but only by losing some of its masse or substance; yet if those vast desires be cut off, or their hopes of supplyes from externalls in­terecepted; the soule, thus freed, becomes more fa­shionable unto reason. Affability, which is as the superficiall draught of reason indeavouring to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse; is as naturall [...] Epicure, as to another man, so long as the exercise of it is not prejudiciall to his belly. And the less his desires were to satisfie it, the larger would the extension of his bowels of compassion be towards his brethren, or poore neighbours; some drops of kindnesse may distill from him in the over­flow [Page 137] of plentie or store sufficient to feed both eye and appetite. But in the daies of scarcity, he suckes in cruelty as wine, and feedes upon the needy as up­on delicates: Were there no more sweet morsels in the market then would serve one man; not one of this crew, but would cut them out of his Fathers throat, rather than suffer his owne weasand to bee defeated of its intemperate expectations. Indi­gence then, though Epicurus could not see so much, is, upon different occasions, the mother as well of cruelty and oppression, as of bounty or pitty.

2 From doing to all, as we would be done unto by any, nothing doth hinder us so much (if ought befides doe hinder us at all) as our conceipted or opinative want of somewhat, which either for the present we doe, or hereafter may stand in need off, for satisfying the variety or unconstant longings of our unknowne desires. How well soever they may speake or protest, experience schooles us; not to trust any that fixe their expectations upon great matters, or have one eye alwayes upon their pri­vate ends, but with this limitation; if the premisses they now make shal not crosse their opportunities, when matters come to tryall. But if wee know a man of meanes, more than competent for maintai­ning that estate wherein his constant resolution hath pitcht content, one otherwise of tempe­rate desires, and composed affections, able to discerne what is fitting betwixt man and man; we thinke him a fit rule for directing others, a patterne whereto would all conforme themselves, nothing [Page 138] should goe amisse in Church or Common weale. No man that conceives his owne cause to bee just and good, but would commend it to his arbi [...]re­ment before anothers. For▪ internall moderation mixt with outward competency, is the onely sup­porter of true constancy. Yet cannot this mixture, in any created Essence bee so firme or permanent, but possibilities or opportunities of satisfying some internall latent capacities, by externall proffers, may dissolve it. For finite existence hath possibi­lity of nonexistence to controll it, and possibility of nonexistence includes possibility of being other­wise than it is. And therefore it is never impossi­ble to finite being either to lose it selfe, or change his properties. A more particular root of this con­tingency, or unconstancy in reasonable creatures or intelligent, is the infinite capacity of their conceits or desires; within whose compasse their finite mo­tions may become excentricke and irregular, as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere. The desires of collapsed Angells, were once tuned by their Creator in as perfect harmony as any creatures could be: They had all cōpetency that could be de­sired, whether of internall faculties, or of objects to cōtent thē. Howbeit, whilst the chiefe Ringleader of this rebellious Rout, sought to satisfie this infi­nitie of his desire; not by participation of his joy­full presence, who was infinitely good; but by af­fecting that greatnesse and Majesty infinite, which he was enabled to conceive, but whereof his nature was more uncaple than a whirry of an Argoes-eyes saile; his capacities did overcope. And his in­temperate [Page 139] longings, while he was in travell of this prodigious birth, hath imprinted that vgly shape upon him, which now he beares. Hee is become the monstrous brood of his owne monstrous and deformed desires; his mouth opening too wide to swallow that which is incomprehensible, could ne­ver since be shut; his ravenous appetite cannot bee satisfied. Like the grave he feedes on rottennesse, and by continuall gnawing and devouring that which cannot satiate, he continually encreaseth his unquenchable hunger. His will is wedded unto mischiefe, and affecteth nothing but that which is by nature evill; & amongst evills that most greedily and uncessantly, which is most contrary to infinite goodness. The first man by this monsters impulsi­on, reaching too high for that which hee could not compasse, did put himselfe from off the ap­pointed Center of his rest and revolutions; and since continueth irregular and unconstant in all his motions, thoughts, and actions. In him, in our selves, in the whole nature (besides that part which hath firme union with the infinite Es­sence) wee finde the Maxime infallibly verified, Mota facilius moventur. By our first Parents needlesse yeelding to one temptation, wee are not able to resist any; Our resolutions to follow that which wee acknowledge to bee good, or our ad­haerence unto that infinite goodness, from which he divorced his will; can neuer in this life bee so firme and strong, but the allurements to contrary evills, may bee so great or so cunningly proposed by the great Tempter, that, without especiall grace [Page 140] we cannot resist their attractions. Since our inter­nall harmonie betwixt soule and body; and mutu­all correspondency of each faculty with other, was dissolved, no externalls can consort with us. Iust competency seemes too little, all of us being as easily led by abundance, as driven by want, to doe evill. And, which is worst of all, our earnest attempts to doe that which is good and right, drawes iniquity after them; and whiles wee take too hastie, or unweildy ayme at our owne welfare, others harmes fall under our levell.

6 That which most improoveth the force of temptations, whether suggested by want or indigence, or by other occasions or opportu­nities; is the inequalitie, partly of our naturall propensions, partly of meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances. Wealth, in some men, gets the start of Wit, and overswayes them (otherwise not much mis-in­clined) unto such vanities, as usually are neither bredd nor nursed, but by abundance. Others wits over-reach their revenues; and imboldens them to stretch their projects or inventions be­yond the rules of right and equity. Some mens bodies overgrow their soules; and these are easily impelled to act any boysterous mis­chiefe: Others being impotent of bodie, strive so much the more to furnish their mindes with subtill inventions or commodious expe­rience: and by making too much use of the com­mon Proverbe, [Hee that is weake had need to bee wilie,] are easily tempted to practise un­lawfull [Page 141] policie, with delight; as the onely preser­vative against contempt, or as an instrument of revenge upon such as they hate or feare. And it would goe much against the course of com­mon experience, if that wilinesse which hath weaknesse for its foundation, should not be of­ten enforced to cover or shelter it selfe with craft and fraud. To love our owne wills, is an im­potency naturall unto all. And wee love them the better, at least more strongly, when we per­ceive them set on that which in it selfe is good. Whence it is that our desires of doing many things which are good and commendable, often draw us to use meanes not so commendable, for their accomplishment. Many, out of an extraordina­rie good will unto the poore, thinke it no robbery to cozen the rich; or to dispense with publike Lawes, for gratifying some private friend, whose welfare in conscience they are bound to tender. Vnto these, and many like enormities, the infinite Capacity of finite Existence gave first possibility of being, and the inequality of our internall pro­pensions, which can never fitly match or hold just proportion with externall occurrences, gives life and improvement.

7 But in the incomprehensible Sphere, which hath Vbiquity for its Center, and Omnipotency for its Axis; whose numberlesse lines are all pos­sible perfections, measurelesse; there is no place for exorbitancie. One branch of Being, cannot mis-sway or over-toppe another; all being so great and firme, as none can bee greater or [Page 142] firmer; being not united, but possessed in such per­fect unity, as prevents all possibility of distraction or division. Shall wee say then, hee possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have? Or ra­ther, he alwayes infinitely is, without all possibili­ty of not being, whatsoever possibly can be. And though being infinite, he can doe all things; yet can he not desire to perfect himselfe, or to be greater or better than he is. In that he neither can feare the impayrement, nor wish the inlargement of his own estate; all outward imployments of his power are for the good of his creatures. His will to have them when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodnesse; which is so a­bundantly sufficient to his infinite being, that the overflowing of it is the fountaine of all things be­sides, which are good. Nothing besides him could possibly have beene, unlesse he were in power and in being, infinite. And unlesse his infinite being had beene infinitely good, nothing besides him, should actually have beene, or beene indowed with such being, as all things that actually are, have from him. The proper being of every thing, which actually is, or at least the continuance or amendment of such being, is infinitely desired by all, as being the stamp or impression of his infinite goodnesse, which is a­like truly, though not equally, or in the same mea­sure communicated to all things that are. The Entity of every thing is good to it selfe, and most desired.

8 And though these first assurances of his good­nesse and loving kindnesse, be usually requited on [Page 143] mans part with unkindnesse and despight: yet the greatnesse of his Majesty, never swayes him to sud­den revenge. Quite contrary to the corrupt nature of man, (whose goodnesse usually is ill-thriven by his over-growing greatnes:) the unresistible strength of his Almighty power, is the unmovable pillar of moderation and mercifull forbearance. The grea­test potency of man being but finite, the higher it growes, the apter it is to be overtopt with jealous impotency. The greatest Monarch that is, may be prevented by others, (of whose power he is jea­lous) in the exercise of his power or authority o­ver him; unlesse he carefully watch his time, and fit seasons, or take opportunity when it is offered, for accomplishing his projects. But of God, saith the Wiseman, Wisd. 12. 18. Thou mustring thy power judgest with equity, and orderest, or governest us with great favour; for thou maist use power when thou wilt. And his will is to use it, when men will not beleeve that he is of full power to doe what hee will; as the same Wiseman expresseth, vers. 17. But more full unto our present purpose, are the sayings of the same Wiseman, vers. 15, 16. For so much then as thou art righteous thy selfe, thou orderest all things righteously; thinking it not agreeable with thy power to condemne him that hath not deserved to be punished. For thy power is the beginning of righteousnesse, and because thou art the Lord of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all. Though this Author be not, yet this passage in him, is canonicall, and fully consonant to Gods owne words to Ionah, Chap. 4. 10, 11. Then said the Lord, thou hast had pitie on the Gourd, for the which [Page 144] thou hast not labored, neither madest it to grow, which came up in a night, and perished in a night: And should not I spare Nineveh that great City, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons, that cannot discerne between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle? Amongst great men▪ many oppresse their tenants: but what Lord would spoile his proper inheritance, whereto no other can be in­tituled; or eate out the heart of that ground which hee cannot alienate or demise? What Architect would deface his owne worke, unlesse the image of his unskilfulnesse (whereof the Creator cannot bee impeached) be so apparant in it, as he cannot but blush to behold it? Or who would leave a goodly foundation bare or naked, unlesse he be unable to reare it up without injustice? Now seeing the En­titative Good of proper being, is the foundation of that true happinesse which flowes from more spe­ciall participation of Gods presence; wheresoever he hath laid the one, it is to all that rightly consider his Wisedome, Truth, and Goodnesse, an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other. As his nature is immutable, so are his gifts without repentance. The current of his joyfull be­neficence, can admit no intermission, much lesse admixture of any evill. Sorrow, woe, and misery, must seeke some other Originall; they have no hid­den vent, or secret issue from the Ocean of Ioy and Happinesse.

9 As the fountaine of bodily light cannot send forth darknesse, but uniformly diffuseth light; and light onely throughout this visible Sphere: so can­not [Page 145] the infinite Ocean of true felicity, send forth a­ny influence, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse; wherewith every creature capable of them, was sowne in its first creation. And, as it is the property of light propagated or diffused from the Sunne, to make such bodies as are capable of its penetration (as Glasses, Chrystall, Pearle, &c.) secondary fountains of light to others: so doth the influence of divine goodnesse, inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others as he hath done to them; that is, of being secondary authors or instruments of good to all. But such as wilfully strive against the streame of his over-flowing goodnesse, or boysterously coun­terblast the sweet and placide spirations of celesti­all influence, become creators of their owne woe, and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish. Yet so essentiall it is unto this infinite Fountaine of goodnesse, however provoked, to send forth onely streames of life; and such is the vertue of the streames which issue from him, that as well the evill and miseries which miscreants pro­cure unto themselves, as their mischievous intenti­ons towards others, infallibly occasion increase of joy and happinesse unto all that give free passage unto their current. And this current of life, which issueth from this infinite Ocean, never dryes up, is never wasted by diffusion: The more it is dammed or quarved by opposition of the sonnes of darke­nesse, the more plentifully it overflowes the sonnes of light. All the good which one refuseth or put­teth from thē, returnes in full measure to the other.

[Page 146] But if the miseries which wicked spirits, or their conforts, either suffer themselves, or intend to others, worke good to those that receive the in­fluence of infinite goodnesse; might he not with­out prejudice, or imputation, inspire these cast­awayes with such mischievous thoughts, or at least intend their woe and misery, as these are occasions or meanes of others happinesse, or of his glory? Wee are indeed forbid to doe evill that good may ensue; but if it bee his will to have reprobates doe or suffer evill for the good of his chosen, shall not both bee good, as willed by him, whose will (in that hee hath absolute dominion over all his creatures) is the rule of goodnesse?

CHAP. 13.
In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse.

1 BAd was the doctrine, and worse the application or use,Sunt qui scribunt, Anaxarchum sophis [...]am consolandi ejus causa accersi [...]um, ad eum ve­nisse, quum­que cuban­tem atque suspirantem offendisset, arridentem dixisse, igno­rare ipsum cur veteres sapientes Iustitiam Iovi assiden­tem fece­rint: nimi­rum quia quicquid à Iove decer­nitur, id juste factum esse censeri debent. Op­portere igi­tur, quae à magno Rege fierent, justa existimari; primum quidem ab ipso Rege, deinde à caeteris mortalibus. Atque hoc quidem dicto non nihil solatii Alexandro attulisse. Ego vero majoris errati quam prioris autorem Alexandro Anaxarchum fuisse censeo, si illam viri sa­pientis sententiam esse statuit. Arrian. de expedit. Alex. lib. 4. which Anaxarchus would have ga­thered from some Hierogly­phicall devices of Antiquity; wherein Iustice was painted as Iupiters assistant in his Re­giment. Hereby, saith this Sophister unto Alex­ander, (then bitterly lamenting the death of his dea­rest Friend Clytus, whom he had newly slaine in his temelent rage) your Majesty is given to understād, that the decrees of great Monarchs, who are a kinde of Gods on earth, must bee reputed Oracles of Iustice, and their practices may not bee reputed unjust either by themselves, or by others. But this sophisticall inversion of these Ancients meaning, was too palpable to please either the wiser or ho­nester sort of Heathen, though living in those cor­rupt times. For albeit many of them conceived of Iupiter, as of a great King, subject to rage and passi­on, yet all of them held Iustice for an upright, milde and vertuous Lady; ready alwayes to mitigate, ne­ver [Page 148] to ratifie his rigorous decrees; alwayes tempe­ring his wrath with equity. The true Iehovah, as he needes no sweet-tongued consort to moderate his anger, as Abigail did Davids; so hath he no use of such Sophisters as Anaxarchus, to justifie the e­quity of his decrees, by his Omnipotent Soveraign­ty or absolute dominion over all his creatures.

2 To derogate ought from his power, who is able to destroy both soule and body in hell fire, I know is dangerous; & to compare the prerogatives of most absolute earthly Princes with his, would be more odious. Yet this comparison I may safely make:Quanto superior est Deus homi­ne, tam mea malitia est [...]nferior bo­nitate eius, ut qualitate ita etiam quantitate. Anselm. in meditat. cap. 8. He doth not more infinitely exceed the most impotent wretch on earth in power and great­nesse, than he doth the greatest Monarch the world hath, or ever had, in Mercy, Iustice, and Loving-kindnesse; nor is his will the rule of Goodnesse, be­cause the designes thereof are backt by infinite po­wer; but because holines doth so rule his power, and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoyne, or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patternes of equity. His will revealed doth sufficiently warrant all our actions, because we know, that he wils nothing but what is just and good; but this no way hindereth, but rather supposeth Iustice and Goodnesse to be more essen­tiall objects of his will, than they are of ours. And therefore when it is said [Things are good because God wils them] this illative infers only the cause of our knowledge, not of the goodness w^ch we know: and the logicall resolution of this vulgar Dialect, would be this, We know this or that to be good, because [Page 149] Gods will revealed commends it for such. But his will revealed commends it for such, because it was in it nature good; for unlesse such it had bin, he had not willed it. These principles though unquestionable to such as fetch their Divinity from the Fountaine, will perhaps in the judgement of others that never taste it but in trenches, be liable to these exceptiōs.

3 If the goodnesse of every thing presuppose its being, & nothing can be without Gods wil, what cā be good (we speake in order of nature, not of time) before God wills it? Of being or goodnesse actu­ally existent in any creature, it is most true, neither can be without some precedent Act of Gods will. But as there is a logicall possibility presupposed to the working of the Almighty power: so is there a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature, to the Act or exercise of his will. And unto some things considered as logically possible; this goodnesse objective is so essentially annexed; that if it bee his will to give them actuall being, they must of neces­sity be actually good; nor can hee that can doe all things, will their contraries. Hee might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his Familie. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable crea­tures, was no object of power omnipotent; much lesse doth his omnipotency enable him to worke ought contradictory to his owne nature or essenti­all goodnesse. As is the man, so is his strength, and as is the nature of the willer, such are the objects of his will. Simile gaudet simili. To long after such meats as feed diseasefull humors, is naturall to eve­ry [Page 150] disease. And our nature being corrupted, whets our appetites to such things as are agreeable to the praedominant corruption wherewith it is tainted, not to the purity wherein it was created. To will onely that which is consonant to his nature, is so much more essentiall to God, than unto us, by how much his nature is more simple than ours is. And seeing it is essentiall purity, altogether uncapable of corruption, his will cannot pitch but on that which is pure and holy. Whence the prime rule of all goodnesse, without himselfe, is consonancy to his essentiall purity and Iustice. For as much as thou art righteous thy selfe thou orderest all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable to thy power to condemne him that hath not deserved to bee punished. Wisedome 12. 15. He loveth truth and sincere dea­ling, because he himselfe is true and just. That ve­racity which is coeternall to his Essence, includes an everlasting enmity unto treachery, fraud, and perjury; his immortally spotlesse and unchangea­ble purity, cannot approve of lust and intemperan­cy, or condemne chastity in any person, at any time. Nor could he have given a Law, as some lawlesse Lawgivers have done, for the authorizing of pro­miscuous or preposterous lust. To legitimate vio­lence, or entitle oppression unto the inheritance be­queath [...]d to conscionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of omnipotency; it can­not be ratified by any Parliament of the Trinitie blest for ever. The practise, or countenance of these and the like, are evill; not in us onely, to whom they are forbidden; but so evill in themselves, that [Page 151] the Almighty could not but forbid and condemne thē, as profest enemies to his most sacred Majesty.

4 To square great mens actions to the dictates of reason or nature, given in their good dayes, or to bring their wills within compasse of any con­stant Law; seemes greater violence, than if we should seeke to fashion their bodies by handsome well proportioned garments, but much too strait. And yet we see by daily experience, that such as are most impatient of regulation or restraint, are most importunate to have their owne unruly wills, the rules of their inferiours minds and consciences. To doe otherwise than they would have them, though they alleage the dictates both of reason and Gods word, will admit no appeale from the censure of peevishnesse or perversenesse. But for them to set constant patternes of that morality or good beha­viour, whose defects in inferiours they either pu­nish or make advantage of; is reputed a kinde of Pedantisme, or Mechanicall servitude. To request such performances, seemes as harsh, as if we should intreat them to set us copies, or songs, or take pains in teaching us some honest trade. And seeing infe­riours are secretly blinded with this pride of heart; which breakes forth more violently in superiours; most of both rankes, measure Gods will by their owne. But if wee will condemne this impatience of restraint, as a fault in our selves, we must of neces­sity acquit the Almighty from the like. The infi­nite greatnesse of his Majesty, cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of Righteousnesse as he sets us to follow. That inte­grity [Page 152] wherewith our first nature was cloathed, was but the Image of his Holinesse. And hee that requires us to be holy, as He is holy, or perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect; exacts not of us, that wee should be as holy and perfect as Hee is, in any point of his imitable perfections. Every part of that ho­linesse which becommeth Saints, is in the best of them, but as the materiall forme in an house built of untowardly stuffe, by unskilfull hands: but in Him, according to the exactest Mathematicall or I­daeall forme, that the cunningest Architect hath in his head. The best examples of goodnesse, we can conceive, are but as dead pictures of those everli­ving ones, which He expresseth in his workes. All his decrees concerning man, are not in themselves onely, but to mans eyes that looke not on them a squint, so straight and just, that hee will referre the tryall unto the deliberate and sober thoughts of his Enemies. Is not my way equall? Are not your waies unequall? Ezek. 18. 25.

5 This may instruct us, that those patternes of Holinesse or perfections which wee are bound to imitate in Him, are not to be taken from his bare Commandement, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternall practices which hee hath exhibited; as so many expresse or manifest proofes, that his will is alwayes Holy and Iust: albeit wee cannot alwaies so expressely discerne the manner how it is just and holy in some particular Commandements; but must implicitely beleeve it to bee such in them, be­cause it is so eminently and apparantly holy and [Page 153] just in those perfections, whereof our generall du­ties are the imperfect representations. Of all his morall commandements, not one there is, whose sincere practise doth not in part make vs truely like him; & we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed, that we may be cōformable to his nature; without conformity wherevnto, we cannot parti­cipate of his happinesse; For, Happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature. The antece­dent of Lactantius Argument. [Qui nos irasci jubet, is uti (que) irascitur,] .i. He that biddeth us be angry, is certainly angry himselfe,] is not so certaine or au­thentique, and the inference is somewhat doubtfull. But out of all question, he that bids us unfaignedly blesse our persecutors, doth unfaignedly tender his blessings to such as persecute Him in his members. He that seriously exhorts us to bee mercifull and kind to all, sheweth kindnesse to the most unkinde. That charity which hee hath injoyned every man towards all (his greatest enemies not excepted) though we consider it in the most charitably mind­ed Martyrs, in whose death it seemed to shine, were but as weake sparkles, or vanishing smoak, of those infinite and eternall flames of love, which burst out in him toward such, as have deserved worse at his hands, than any Tyrant of his tormented servants. That truth and fidelity, which he exacts of us, the faithfulnesse of Abraham himselfe; is but a little mappe, or narrow surface of that infinite soliditie of truth, whereon his promises are founded. Betweene the chastity and temperance of purest virgins, and his eternall purity, there is the like true correspon­dency; [Page 154] but not so great, as there is betwixt the dross and corpulency, and the refined or sublima­ted spirits of the same bodies. Or could that rule which is the fulfilling of the whole Law & the Pro­phets, Doe unto every man as we would be done unto; be exactly fulfilled by us; it would be but a slender, though a true modell or representation of his eter­nall equity. He that honoureth me, him will I honor. For in this, and the like, he expects no more than the inward affection of mortall hearts, or prayses of man whose breath is in his nostrils, being ready out of his goodnesse, to recompence these silly services, with glory, love and happiness everlasting. But doth he intend thus well to all, or destruction unto some, as it is a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves? If so he did, we might be exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evill that good might ensue. For the only reason why we are boūd not to doe so, is because in so doing we should be­come unlike our heavenly Father, and not be perfect as he is perfect. But as he turnes the voluntary evils of some, to the good of others; so may wee, and ought to consecrate such forfeitures, as legally fall into our hands to pious uses; or better the states of such as tender publike welfare, by others deserved harmes.

6 Be it then granted, (which is the root of all objections against these resolutions) that Gods glo­ry must as well appeare in the punishment of the Reprobate, as in the beatifying of the Elect; the consequence will bee quite contrary to that which their objections would hence inferre; For, if the [Page 155] foundation of Gods glory, bee as sure in the one case, as in the other; the manner of his dealing with both must be alike perfect, and alike behove­full for us to follow. Sine bonitate (saith Seneca) nulla majestas, Goodnesse is the foundation of glory. Now, were it true, that he did intend evill to some, before they had committed any (though not as evill to them, but as a meanes of others good) or absolutely ordained them to eternall inevitable mi­sery, for the advancement of his owne glory; wee should not sinne, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing Iudas to pay Peter, or in feeding the hungry, such especially as be of the houshold of Faith, with the spoiles of ungodly rich men, or unbeleevers. More war­rantable it were to guesse at the perfection of his Iustice towards the wicked, and of his bounty to­wards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitatiō of it in earthly gods. To procure the com­mon good without intention of harme to any, and with admission of as few private mischiefes as may be, is the chiefe praise of great States-men. And it is the glory of Princes, to encourage all men unto vertuous courses by good example, gratious ex­hortations, and unpartiall distribution of publike honors or commodities: and yet withall to inflict disgrace upon haughty contemners of those graci­ous allurements; and to bee sterne in execution of Iustice (without fauour) upon notorious trans­gressors of wholesome Lawes. Yet not to use severity without sorrow, nor draw blood but by way of medicine; for preserving of their [Page 156] Crownes and dignities, for maintenance of publike peace, or for preventing the like diseases in other particular members of the same body. Magistrates that would mind these matters, more than raysing themselves, their friends, or posterity, more than life it selfe, which they owe unto their Countrey; should exhibite us a true model, though (God wot) but a slender one of our heavenly Fathers wisdome and loving kindnesse: first in drawing men to re­pentance, by gratious promises, and unfaigned pro­posalls of inestimable rewards for their service: Secondly, in making the wicked and obstinate de­spisers of his infinite goodnesse, serve to the mani­festation of his endlesse glory, and confirmation of those that love him in the immortal state of happi­nesse. These prints of his Fatherly care and Iustice, are yet fresh to bee seene in his proceedings with ungratious Cain. And the Lord said unto Cain, why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? if thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou dost not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him, Gen. 4. ver. 6, 7. Severe punishment for doing evill, with­out precedent loving instructions, or good encou­ragement to doe well, is the naturall off-spring of unnaturalnesse. It beares no shadow of that justice or equity, whose glorious patterne shines most brightly in our heavenly Father.

CHAP. 14.
Of God infinite love to mankinde.

1 IF the Apostles authority could not perswade us to beleeve, his reasons would inforce us to grant, that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and the same mouth, are contrary to the course of na­ture, and argue the nature of man, (in whom alone this discord is found) to be much out of tune. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my brethren, these things ought not so to be. Iam. 3. 10. For nature in other things gives you a better example. Doth a fountaine send forth at the same place, sweet water and bitter? Can the Figtree, my brethren, beare Olive berries? either a Vine figs? &c. These and the like fountaines of naturall truth, are as open to us, as they were to him, and wee should much wrong both this Ambassador of Christ, and Gods image in our selves, if we did beleeve them only for his authority, and not for their owne native perspi­cuity. The best use of Apostolique [...]authority, in these allegations, is to warrant our use of the like, though in matters divine: not one of his instances but holds as truly in God, as in man; not one but receiveth a necessary increase of strength, from the indivisible unity of the divine Essence. For a Fig-tree to beare Olive berries, is lesse impossible, than for the tree of life to bring forth death. To cause [Page 158] the Vine bring forth Figs, were not so hard a point of husbandry, as to derive cursednesse or misery from the fountaine of blisse. For a Spring to send forth water sweet and bitter, fresh and salt, at one and the same place, is more compatible with any reasonable conceipt, than for hate or harmefull in­tentions to have any issue from pure love. But God is love: yea, love is his Essence as Creator. In that he is the Author of being, hee is the Author of good­nesse to all things that are, (Being, unto every thing in its owne proper being, is good) and goodnesse in an intelligent Don [...]r, is alwayes the fruit of Love. Hence saith the Wiseman, of him that is wisest of all, of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived: He hateth nothing that he hath made. For even their being, and that goodnesse which accompanies it, is an undoubted pledge of his love. If to blesse God the maker, and to curse men which are made after his similitude, argue (in the Apostles supposall) a dissolution of that internall harmony, which should be in the humane nature: to hate some, and love o­thers of his best creatures, all being made after his owne image; would necessarily infer a greater di­straction in the indivisible Essence, besides the con­tradiction which it implyes to infinite goodnes. To love the workes of his owne hands, is more essenti­all to him, that made all things out of meere love, than it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible: and if his love be, as he is, truly infinite, it must ex­tend to all, seeing all are lesse than infinite.

2 Love, were it perfect in us, would perfectly fulfill Gods Law, and make up a compleate body [Page 159] or System of morall goodnes. Now the most abso­lute perfection of that love, whereof the humane nature (though uncorrupted) could bee capable, would be but an imperfect shadow of our heavenly Fathers most perfect love; which hath the same proportion to his goodnesse, that love in us (were it as perfect as it possibly might bee) should have to our morall goodnesse. That is, it is his compleat communicative goodnes. And though these two in him bee rather different names, than divers attri­butes, yet wee love his goodnes better, whiles it is attired with the name of Love. For, of men that doe us equall good turnes, we love them best, whom we conceive to love us most: and loving kindnesse seemes good and lovely, even in the eyes of such as reape no profit from it, besides the sight of it. The very exercise of it in others, excites our weake in­clinations to the like: and our inclinations moved, stir up a speculative assent or secret verdict of con­science, to approve that truth which wee cannot follow in the practice: Beatius est dare, quam acci­pere: It is a more blessed thing to give, than to receive. No man measureth that which wee call a good na­ture (as of men some are better natured than others) either by the means it hath to benefit, or by the be­nefits bestowed; but by the fervency of unfaigned good will, and hearty desires of doing good to all. This is that wherein (especially when it is holpen by grace) we most resemble the divine nature, which is infinitely better than the humane nature (though ta­kē at the best) not only in respect of his ability to do good, but of his good wil to do the best that may be. [Page 160] And this his good will exceeds ours, not intensively only, but extensively. For we are bound to imitate him as well in the extension of our unfaigned good will towards all, as in the fervency of our desires to do the best good we can to some, because his loving kindnes to man is both waies infinitly perfect, Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wise­dome, nor the strong man glory in his strength, neither the rich man glory in his riches: But let him that glo­rieth, glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me; that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindnes, judgement, and righteousnesse in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord. Ier. 9. 23, 24. The first then & most native issue of infinite good­nesse, is the exercise of bounty or loving kindnesse, which floweth from it, without matter or motive to incite it. This is that which gave being, and with being, some portion of goodnesse unto all things that are; it alters the name, but not the nature in the current. To prevent others with good turnes be­fore they can expect or deserve them, is the highest point of bounty, whereto the ability of man can reach. But God gave vs that we most desire, pro­per being, with the appurtenances, before we could desire it; for it is the foundation of all desire. From Bounty or loving kindnesse, or from that Good­nesse whence they spring, Mercy and Compassion differ only in the extrinsecall denomination taken from different objects. Compassion is good will to­wards others, provoked from notice of their mise­rie: and Mercy is but an excesse of Bounty, not e­stranged from ill deservers, in distresse; so long as [Page 161] the exercise of it breedes no harme to such as are more capable of bountifull love and favour. This incompossibility betweene the exercise of Mercy and bounty towards particulars ill deserving, and the preservation of common good, occasioneth the interposition of Iustice punitive; whose exercise is in a sort, unnaturall to the Father of mercy. For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Lamen. 3. 33. Nothing in good men can pro­voke it towards offenders, but the good of others deserving either better or not so ill, which might grow worse by evill doers impunity. To take plea­sure in the paine or torture of notorious malefac­tors, is a note of inhumanity: their just punishment is onely so farre justly pleasant, as it procures either our owne, or others welfare; or avoydance of those grievances, which they more justly suffer, than wee or others of the same societie, should doe. The more kind and loving men by nature are, the more unwilling they are to punish, unlesse it be for these respects. How greatly then doth it goe against his nature, who is loving kindnesse it selfe, to punish the workes of his owne hands; Man especially, who is more deare unto him, than any child can be unto his Father, for hee is the Father of all mankind? For it is he that made us, and not we our selves; not those whom we call Fathers of our flesh, for even they likewise were made by Him. Hence he saith, Call no mā Father on earth, for one is your Father w^ch is in Heaven, Mat. 23. ver. 9. Is the title his pecu­liar, more than the realty answering to it? Is he more willing to bee called the onely Father of all [Page 162] the sonnes of men, than to doe the kinde office of a Father to them? No, like as a Father pittieth his owne children, so the Lord pitieth them that feare him, For he knoweth our frame, he remembreth we are but dust. Psal. 103. 13, 14. It seemes this Psalmist either was or had a most kinde and loving Father, and hence illustrates the kindnesse of his Heauenly Father, by the best modell of kindnesse which hee knew. But if God truly be a father of all mankind, he certainly exceeds all other fathers as farre in fa­therly kindnesse, as hee doth men in any branch of goodnesse or perfection. This is the first foun­dation of our Faith, layd by his onely Sonne: Ad multi­plicandum quippe san­ctorum sa­pientiam proficit, quod postulata tardè perci­piunt, ut ex dilatione crescat desi­derium, ex desiderio in­tellectus au­geatur. In­tellectus ve­rò cum in­tenditur, ejus in De­um arden­tior affectus aperitur. Affectus au­tem ad pro­meranda coelestia tanto fit capax, quanto fue­rit expec­tando lon­ganimis. Greg. lib. 20. moral. in Iob ca. 24. Aske and it shall be given unto you, seeke and ye shall finde, knocke and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth, and he that seeketh, findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, whom if his sonne aske bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he aske a fish, will hee give him a serpent, Math. 7 [...] vers. 7, 8, 9, 10. Every Father that heard Him, would have beene ready to have answered no; yet none so ready or carefull as they should be, to give or provide best things for their children, because all besides him are evill Fa­thers. If ye then being evill know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Fa­ther which is in Heaven, give good things to them that aske him, ver. 11. Hee is then so much more willing to give good things to his children, as he is better or greater than other Parents. His love to all men, seeing all are his sonnes, by a more pecu­liar reference than Abraham was Adams, or Isaac [Page 163] Abrahams, is infinitely greater than any Parents beare to the fruits of their bodies. Mortall fathers love children when they have them; but love to themselves, or want of means to immortalize their owne persons, makes them desire to have children. The onely wise immortall God (who is all-sufficient to all, most to himselfe, unacquainted with want of whatsoever can bee desired) out of the abundance of his free bounty and meere loving kindnesse, did first desire our being; and having given it us, doth much more love us, after we are instamped with his Image. For he sowes not wheate, to reape tares; nor did he inspire man with the breath of life, that he might bring forth death.

3 The Heathens conceived this title of Father, as too narrow for fully comprehending all referen­ces of loving kindnesse betwixt their great Iupiter and other Demigods or men.

And another PoetOrpheus. Vide Apul. in lib. de mundo. [...] Forcatulli lib. 5. p. 703.,

And because the affection of mothers, especially to their young and tender Ones, is most tender: the true Almighty hath deigned to exemplifie his ten­der mercy and compassion towards Israel, as Da­vid did Ionathans love towards him; far surpassing the love of women, yea of mothers to their chil­dren. Sion had said, the Lord hath forsaken me, and [Page 154] my God hath forgotten mee. But her Lord replyes, Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget, yet will I not forget thee, Esay 49. ver. 15. And if his love could sufficiently bee ex­pressed by these dearest references amongst men, whose naturall affection towards their tender brood (in respect of meaner creatures) is much aba­ted by wrong use of reason (as many mothers by greatnesse of place, or curiosity of education, are lesse compassionate towards their children, then other silly women are) he hath chosen the most af­fectionate female amongst reasonlesse creatures, to blazon his tender care and loving protection over ill-deserving children: How often would I have ga­thered thy children together, even as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings! Math. 23. ver. 37. Finally, as he gives much more to our being, than our earthly Parents, whom we suppose to give us being; so all the sweet fruits or comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers towards their chil­dren, of husbands towards their wives, or of bre­thren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or one friend to another (their sinfulnesse onely excepted) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. To witnesse this truth unto us, the son of God was made both father, and brother and hus­band to our nature, &c. Every reference or kinde office, whereof reasonable creatures are mutually capable, every other creature (though voyd of rea­son, so not voyd of love and naturall affection) may expresse some part of our heavenly Fathers loving [Page 165] kindnesse: but the love of all, though infinitely in­creased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalize his love towards every particular soule created by him. Feare of death or other danger, hath such joynt interest with love, (as well in the heart of man, as in other creatures) that, albeit they would doe more for their yong ones than they doe, if they could, yet they doe not usually so much as they might: not so much for their model of wit or strength, as God for his part though infinite in wisedome & power doth for the sonnes of men. He that feareth none, but is feared of al, he that needs no Counsellor, but hath the heart of Prince and Counsellor in his hand, makes protestation in his serious griefe, that he hath done all for his unfruitfull vineyard that he could, as much as possibly could be done for it. Or, if his serious protestations cannot deserve credit with deceitfull man, his solemne oath is witnesse of greater love than hath beene mentioned, of greater than the heart of man is able to conceive, even towards such as all their life time have hated Him. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyes.

If besides the authority of these and infinite more sacred texts most perspicuous in themselves, the interpretation of the Church, be required for establishing of the doctrine delivered; the whole ancient Church some peeces of Saint Austine one­ly excepted, which may bee counterpoyzed with other parts of the same Fathers writings, is ready to give joynt verdict for us. And whether the re­strictions [Page 166] which some reformed Churches have endeavoured to lay upon Gods promises, be com­patible with the doctrine of the English Church, comes in the next place to be examined.

CHAP. 15.
What the Church of England doth teach concer­ning the extent of Gods love: of the distinction of sin­gula generum, and genera singulorum: of the di­stinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti.

1WHat middle course soever the Church of England doth hold, or may take for compromising con­tentions betweene some other re­formed Churches in points of E­lection and Reprobation, of free wil or mans ability, before the state of regeneratiō: She doth not in her publike and authorized doctrine come short of any Church this day extant, in the extent of Gods unspeakable love to mankind. No nationall Councell, though assembled for that pur­pose, could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love, than the Church our mother, even from the beginning of re­formation, hath done; as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, for preventing schismes or distraction in opinions a­mongst her sonnes. First, she injoynes us to beseech God to have mercy upon all men. This was the practice of the Ancient Church, which in her opi­nion, needed no reformation. A practice injoyned [Page 167] by1 Tim. 2. 1 S. Paul, I exhort or desire first of all, that suppli­cations, prayers, intercessions, and giving thankes be made for all men. If any man shall seeke to lay that restraint upon this place, which S. Austine some­where doth, as if the word [all men] did import only genera singulorum [all sorts of men,] not, singula gene­rum, [every particular man:] the scanning of the words following, the sifting of the matter contai­ned in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other reall circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease than it can be laid upon it. Wee are commanded to pray for no more▪ than them, whose salvation we are unfai­nedly to desire, otherwise our prayers were hypo­criticall. Are we then to desire the salvation of some men onely, as they are dispersed here and there, throughout all nations, sorts, or conditions of men, or for every man of what condition soever, of what sort or nation soever he be? The Apostle exhorts us to pray for Kings (not excepting the most malig­nant enemies which the Christians then had) and for all that be in authority. And if we must pray for all that are in authority, with fervency of desire, that they may come unto the knowledge of the truth; then questionlesse, wee are to desire, wee are to pray for the salvation of all and every one, which are under authority. God is no accepter of per­sons; nor will the Omnipotent permit us so to re­spect the persons of the mighty in our prayers, as that we should pray that all and every one of them might become Peeres of the heavenly Ierusalem, and but some choice or selected ones of the mea­ner [Page 168] sort might bee admitted into the same society. Wee must pray then for high and low, rich and poore, without excepting any, either in particular or indefinitely. The reason why our prayers for all men must be universall, is, because wee are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men; not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our uniuersall consideration. The reason againe, why wee are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men uni­versally considered, is, because wee must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. Vnto this uni­versall desire, wee must adde our best endeavours that saving truth may be imparted unto all; because it is our heavenly Fathers will, his unfaigned will, that all should come to the knowledge of truth.

2 Both parts of this inference [as first, that it is our duty to pray for all sorts of men, and for every man of what sort soever: And secondly, that we are there­fore to pray thus universally, because it is Gods will, not onely that we should thus pray, but that all with­out exception shold come unto the truth and be saved] are expressely included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England to bee used upon the most solemne day of devotions. The Collects or Praiers are in number three. The first, Almighty God we beseech thee graciously to behold this thy family for the which our Lord Iesus Christ was contented to be betrayed, and given up into the hands of wicked men, and to suffer death upon the Crosse, &c. The tenour of this petition, if we respect onely the forme, is in­definite not universall: but every Logician knows, and every Divine should consider, that the neces­sity [Page 169] of the matter, whether in prayers or proposi­tions, will stretch the indefinite forme wherewith it is instamped, as farre as an absolute universall. That the forme of this petition is in the intention of the Church of England, to be as farre extended as we have said (that is) [to all and every one of the con­gregation present] the prayer following puts out of question. For in that wee are taught to pray for the whole Church, and for every member of it. Al­mighty and everlasting God, by whose spirit the whole body of the Church is governed and sanctified: re­ceive our supplications and prayers, which we offer be­fore thee for all estates of men in thy holy Congregati­on; that every member of the same, in his vocation and ministery, may truly and godly serve thee. &c. If here it be excepted, that albeit this prayer be conceived in termes formally universall, yet is the universall forme of it to be no further extended, than its pro­per matter or subject; and that (as will be alleaged) is the mysticall live-body of Christ, whose extent, or the number of whose members, is to us un­knowne: the third and last prayer will clearely quit this exception, and free both the former pe­titions, from these or the like restrictions. For in the last prayer wee are taught to pray for all and e­very one which are out of the Church, that they may bee brought into the Church, and bee made partakers with us of Gods mercy, and the common salvation. Mercifull God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be conver­ted and live: have mercy upon all Iewes, Turkes, In­fidells, [Page 170] and heretiques, and take from them all igno­rance, hardnesse of heart; and contempt of thy Word▪ And so fetch them home, blessed Lord, to thy flocke, that they may bee saved among the remnant of the true Israelites, and be made one fold, under one shep­heard Iesus Christ our Lord. If God therefore will not the death of any Iew, Turke or Infidell, because of nothing hee made them men: wee may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidells, hee hath made Christians; to whom he hath vouchsafed the ordinary meanes of salvation, and daily invites, by his messengers, to imbrace them. Hee which made all things without invitation, out of meere love, made nothing hatefull; nor is it possible that the unerring fountaine of truth and love, should cast his dislike, much lesse fix his hatred upon any thing that was not first in it nature odious. Nothing can make the creature hatefull or odious to the Crea­tor, besides its hatred or enmity of that love, by which it was created, and by which he sought the restauration of it when it was lost. Nor is it every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God, but a full measure of it, which utterly exempts man from his love; as that reverendHooper in his Pre­face to the ten Com­mande­ments. See Parag. 8 of this chapter. Bishop and glorious Martyr, one of the first Reformers of the Religion profest in this Land, observes.

3 If with these authorized devotions we com­pare the doctrine of our Church in the publike ca­techisme, what can bee more cleare, then that as God the Father doth love all mankind, without ex­ception; so the Sonne of God did redeeme not [Page 171] some onely of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken: First wee are taught to beleve in God the Father who made us and all the world. Now, if the Church our mother have in the former prayers truly taught us, that God hateth nothing which he hath made; this will bring forth another truth: viz. That either there be some men which are not of Gods making; or else that hee hateth no man (not Esau) as he is a man, but as a sinner, but as an enemy or contemner of his goodnesse. And con­sequently to this branch or corollary of this for­mer truth, wee are in the same Catechisme, in the very next place taught to beleeve in God the Son who hath redeemed us and all mankind. And if all mankind were redeemed by him, than all of this kind were unfeignedly loved; none were hated by him. And though in the same place, wee are taught to beleeve in the holy Ghost as in the sanctifier of all that are sanctified, yet this wee are taught with this caveat, that he doth sanctifie al the elect people of God, not all mankind. All then are not sancti­fied by God the holy Ghost, which are redeemed by God the Sonne, nor doth God the Father be­stow all his spirituall blessings upon all whom hee doth unfeignedly love, or on whom hee hath be­stowed the blessing of Baptisme as the seale or pledge of their redemption. All these inferences are so cleere, that the consideration of them makes us doubt, whether such amongst us, as teach the contrary to any of these, have at any time subscri­bed unto the booke of Common prayers, or whe­ther they had read it before they did subscribe un­to [Page 172] it or contradict it. That this universall extent of Gods love, and of the redemption wrought by Christ, is a fundamentall principle, whereon many serious and fruitfull exhortations in the booke of Homilies are immediately grounded, shall (by Gods assistance) appeare in the Article concerning Christ. For a concludent proofe that God doth unfeignedly will, not genera singulorum, all sorts of men onely; but singula generum, every one of all sorts to be saved; take it briefely thus: All they which are saved, and all they which are not saved, make up both parts of the former distinction or di­vision to the full. But God will have all to bee saved which are saved; he likewise willeth the salva­tion of all such, as are not saved, that is, of such as dye: therefore he willeth the salvation of every one of all sorts. That God doth will the salvation of all that are saved, no man ever questioned; that God did will not the life, but death of such as dyed, the Iewes (Gods owne people) did sometimes more then question: and to prevent the like querulous murmurings of misbeliefe in others, he once for all interposed his solemne oath; As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyeth, but ra­ther that he should repent and live. None then can be saved whom God would not have saved; many are not saved, whom God would have saved.

4 But how, or by what Will doth he will that they should be saved that are not saved? Doth he will their salvatiō by his revealed, not by his secret will? Doth he give signification onely of his good will towards them, whereas his good will and plea­sure, [Page 173] is not finally to doe them any reall good? This I take to be the meaning of voluntas signi, and be­neplaciti. But, it being granted, that God doth will the salvation of all men, by his revealed will, or vo­luntate signi; This alone will sufficiently inferre our intended conclusion [That he truly wils the salvati­on of all, without the exemption of any.] Vpon such as contradict this doctrine, it lyes upon them to prove not the negative onely, that God doth not will the salvation of all by his secret will; but this positive particular, that God doth nill or unwill the salvation of some by his secret will, whose salvati­on he willeth by his revealed will. Now if it be an­swered, that he doth by his secret will or good plea­sure, unwill or nill the salvation of the same parties to whom he willeth salvation by his will revealed or signified; they must (without remedy) acknow­ledge the one or the other member of this division: as, either [that there be two wils in God of as dif­ferent inclinations ad extra, as the reasonable and sensitive appetite are in man:] or [that there is a manifest contradiction in the object of one and the same Divine Will.] That, All men should be saved, and that some men should not be saved, implyeth as formall a contradiction, as to say, [All men are li­ving creatures, some men are no living creatures.] Now that all men should bee living creatures, and that some men should not be living creatures, falls not within the object of Omnipotency. And if the will of God, be at truly undivided in it selfe, as the omnipotent power is: it is no lesse impossible that the salvation of all, and the non-salvation of some [Page 174] should be the object, or true parts of the object of one and the same divine will undivided in it selfe, than that the actuall salvation of all, and the actuall and finall condemnation of some, or the non-salva­tion of all, should be really effected by the omnipo­tent power. Whether this divine will be clearly re­vealed, or in part revealed, and in part reserved or secret in respect of us, all is one; so this will in it selfe and in its nature, bee but one, and undivided. The manifestation or reservation of it, or whatso­ever other references it may have to us, can neither increase nor abate the former contradiction in the object. Or if voluntas signi, bee not essentially the same with voluntas beneplaciti, there is a manifest contradiction or contrariety betwixt them: If the salvation of all bee the object of the one, and the non-salvation or reprobation of others, be the ob­ject of the other.

5 Yet doe we not (like rigorous Critiques) so much intend the utter banishment of this distincti­on out of the confines of Divinity, as the confine­ment of it to its proper seat and place. Rightly con­fined or limited, it may beare faith and allegiance to the truth, and open some passages for clearing some branches of it: But permitted to use that extent of liberty which hath beene given to it by some, it wil make way for canonization [...] [...]esuiticall perjuries, for deification of mentall evasions or reservations. Let us compare Iesuiticall practices with that pat­terne, which is the necessary resultance of some mens interpretation of Gods oath in this case. Were this interrogatory put to any Iesuiticall As­sassinat, [Page 175] imagine a powder-plotter; [Doe you will or intend the ruine of the King or State, or doe you know of any such project or intendment?] there is none of this crue so mischievously minded, but would be ready to sweare unto this negative [As the Lord liveth, and as I hope for life and salvation by him, I neither intend the ruine of King or State, nor doe I know of any conspiracy against him.] And yet in case the event should evidently disco­ver his protestation to be most false; yet would he rest perswaded, that this or the like mentall evasion or reservation [I neither intended the ruine of King or State, so they would become Romane Catholiques; nor did I know of any conspiracy against them, with minde or purpose to reveale it unto them,] may be a preservative more than sufficient, a soveraigne An­tidote against the sinne of perjury, which hee had swallowed or harboured in his brest; specially if the concealement of his treason, make for the good of the Church. To put the like interrogatory un­to the Almighty Iudge, concerning the ruine or welfare of men, no Magistrate, no authority of earth hath any power. Yet hee, to free himselfe from that foule aspersion, which the Iewes had cast upon him (as if such as perished in their sinnes, had therefore perished, because it was his will and plea­sure they should not live but dye,) hath interposed his often mentioned voluntary oath; As I live, I will not the death of him that dyes, but rather that he should live. Shall it here bee enough to make an­swer for him, interpretando, by interpreting his meaning to be this? I doe not will the death of [Page 176] him that dyes, so he will repent, which I know he cannot doe: nor doe I will his non-repentance, with purpose to make this part of my will knowne to him; however, according to my secret and reser­ved will, I have resolved never to grant him the meanes, without which he cannot possibly repent; whereas without repentance hee cannot live but must dye. But, did Gods oath give men no better assurance than this interpretation of it doth, I see no reason (yet heartily wish, that others might see more) why any man should so much blame the Iesuites, for secret evasions or mentall reservations in matter of oath. For the performance of our oaths in the best manner that wee are capable of, is but an observance of a particular branch of that generall precept, Be ye perfect as your heavenly Fa­ther is perfect. Who then can justly challenge the Iesuite of imperfection or falshood, much lesse of perjury, for secret evasions or mentall reservations, when his life is called in question; if once it bee granted, that the God of truth, in matter of oath concerning the eternall life or death of more men than the Iesuites have to deale with, doth use the like?

6 In matters then determined by Divine Oath, the distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti, can have no place; specially in their doctrine who make the bare entity or personall being of men, the im­mediate object of the immutable decree concern­ing life and death everlasting. For the entity or personall being of man, is so indivisible, that an uni­versall negation, and a particular affirmation of the [Page 177] same thing, [to wit, Salvation] falling upon man, as man, or upon the personall being of men, drawes to the strictest point of contradiction. Farre ever be it from us to thinke, that God should sweare un­to this universall negative, ‘I will not the death of the man that dyeth; and yet beleeve withall, that he wils the death of some men that dye, as they are men, or as they are the sonnes of Adam: that hee should by his secret or reserved will, recall any part of his will declared by oath; that hee should proclaime an universall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam under the seale of his oath, and yet exempt many from all possibility of receiving any benefit by it.’

7 Shall we then conclude that the former di­stinction hath no use at all in Divinity? Or if this conclusion be too rigorous, let us see in what cases it may have place, or to what particulars it may bee confined. First, it hath place in matters of threat­ning, or of plagues not denounced by oath. Thus God, by his Prophet Ionas, did signifie his will to have Nineveh destroyed at forty dayes end; this was voluntas signi; and he truly intended what hee signified: yet was it his voluntas beneplaciti, his good will and pleasure at the very same time, that the Ninevites should repent and live. And by their repentance, his good will and pleasure was fulfilled in their safety. But in this case there was no con­trariety betweene Gods will declared or signified .i. [voluntas signi] and his good will and pleasure, .i. [voluntas beneplaciti]; no contradiction in the object of his will however considered, for that was [Page 178] not one and the same, but much different, in respect of Gods will signified by Ionas; and of his good will and pleasure, which, not signified by him, was fulfilled. One and the same immutable will or de­cree of God did from eternity award two doomes, much different, unto Ninevch; taking it as it stood affected when Ionas threatned destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected; and taking it as it proved, upon the judgement threatned. All the alteration was in Nineveh, none in Gods will or de­cree: and Nineveh being altered to the better, the selfe same rule of Iustice, doth not deale with it af­ter the selfe same manner. The doome or sentence could not bee the same without some alteration in the Iudge, who is unalterable. And in that hee is unalterably Iust and Good, his doome or award, was of necessity to alter, as the object of it altered. Deus saepe mutat sententiam, nunquam consilium. Gods unchangeable will or counsell doth often change his doome or sentence. The same rule holds thus farre true in matter of blessing or promise not confirmed by oath: upon the parties alteration un­to worse, unto whom the promise is made, the blessing promised may be revoked, without any al­teration of Gods will or counsell. Yet may we not say, that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life, is so truely the object of his good will and pleasure, as the life and salvation of them is, unto whom he threatneth destruction. The same distinctiō is of good use in some extraordina­rie cases, or as applyed to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity, and are [Page 179] cut off from all possibility of repentance. Thus God willed Pharaoh to let his people goe out of Egypt, and signified this his will unto him by Moses and Aaron, in mighty signes and wonders. This was voluntas signi, onely, not voluntas beneplaciti. For though it were his good will and pleasure, that his people should depart out of Egypt; yet was it no branch of this his good will and pleasure, that Pha­raoh should now repent or bee willing to let them goe. Rather it was his good will and pleasure (spe­cially after the seventh plague) to have the heart of Pharaoh hardned. And yet after his heart was so hardned, that it could not repent, God so punished him, as if it had beene free and possible for him to repent, and grant a friendly passe unto his people. But Pharaohs case was extraordinary; his punish­ment so exemplary, as not to be drawne into ex­ample. For as our Apostle intimates, it was an ar­gument of Gods great mercy and long suffering, to permit Pharaoh to live any longer on earth, after he was become a vessell of wrath destinated to ever­lasting punishment in hell. The reason why God thus plagued Pharaoh, for not doing that which now he could not doe (all possibility of amendment being taken from him) was to teach all generations following, by his fearefull end, to beware of his desperate beginnings, of struggling with God, or of persecuting them, whose patronage hee had in peculiar manner undertaken. And here again, there is no contradiction betweene these two propositi­on [God from all eternity did will the death of Pha­raoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but [Page 180] rather the life of Pharaoh. For albeit Pharaoh con­tinued one and the same man, from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all this time continue one and the same object of Gods immutable will and eternall decree. This object did alter as Pharaohs dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbours altered. There is no contrariety, much lesse any contradiction, betweene these [God un­faignedly loveth all men; God doth not love, but hate the Reprobate, although they be men, yea the greatest part of men.] For here the object of his love and hate is not the same; he loves all men un­faignedly as they are men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity: but ha­ving made up that, or having their soules betroa­thed unto wickednesse, he hates them. His hate of them as Reprobates; is no lesse necessary or usuall, than his love of them as men. But though he neces­sarily bates them being once become Reprobates, or having made up the full measure of iniquity: yet was there no necessity layd upon them by his eter­nall decree, to make up such a measure of iniquity.

8 How these deductions will consort with some moderne Catechismes I doe not know: sure I am they are consonant to the opinion of that learned Bishop and blessed Martyr in his Preface to his ex­positions of the ten Commandements; a fit Cate­chisme for a Bishop to make. Every man is called in the Scripture, wicked, and the enemy of God; for the privation and lacke of faith and love, that he oweth to God. Et impii vocantur, qui non omnino sunt pii; that is, They are called wicked that in all [Page 181] things honour not God, beleeve not in God, and observe not his Commandements as they should doe; which we cannot do by reason of this natu­rall infirmity, or hatred of the flesh, as Paul calleth it, against God. In this sense taketh Paul this word, wicked. So must we interpret St. Paul and take his words; or else no man should be damned. Now we know that Paul himselfe, St. Iohn, and Christ dam­neth the contemners of God, or such as willingly continue in sinne, and will not repent. Those the Scripture excludeth from the generall promise of grace. Thou seest by the places afore rehearsed, that though wee cannot beleeve in God as un­doubtedly as is required, by reason of this our natu­rall sicknesse and disease, yet for Christs sake in the judgement of God wee are accounted as faithfull beleevers, for whose sake this naturall disease and sicknesse is pardoned, by what name soever S. Paul calleth the naturall infirmity, or originall sinne in man. And this imperfection or naturall sicknesse taken of Adam, excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ, except wee transgresse the limits and bounds of this originall sinne by our owne folly and malice; and either of a contempt or hate of Gods word, we fall into sinne, and trans­forme our selves into the image of the devill. Then wee exclude by this meanes our selves from the promises and merits of Christ, who only received our infirmities, and originall disease, and not the contempt of him, and his Law.

CHAP. 16.
In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his Vineyard, or for such as perish.

1 TO found both parts of a contradiction in truth, fals not within the Sphere of omnipotency, and we may with consent of al Divines, maintaine it to be impossi­ble. The true originall as­well of our aptnesse to con­ceive difficulties in the points proposed, as our ignorance in assoyling them, is because we extend not this Maxime so far as it naturally would reach; and the reason why we [Page 183] extend it not so farre, is our pronenesse to extend our owne power to the utmost, and, for the most part farther then justice or true goodnesse can ac­company it. It is our nature to be humorous, and the nature of humor to be unconstant. Fortunes character may be every sonne of Adams Motto: Tantum constans in levitate, Onely constant in un­constancy. And being such, nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature; nothing that is truly and constantly the same, but will one time or other contradict our changeable and inconstant humors. And these enraged with contradiction, doe, (Tyrant-like) arme power, without just tryall or examination, without either respect or reve­rence, against whatsoever contradicts them. The right use of power in creatures meerely sensitive, is to satiate their appetites of sense: for nothing hath power to move it selfe, but what is sensitive: and, all power, whether of body or minde, was be­stowed on man for the execution of his will, or ac­complishing his desire of good: but, since his will, by his fall, became irregular, and his desires cor­rupt; his power is become like a common officer, or undercommander to all his unruly appetites, do­mineering by turne or succession; all other incli­nations being under the command of it. So the wise man hath charactered the resolution of volup­tuous men, cap. 1. 6. Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures like as in youth. And ver. 11. Let our strength be the Law of justice; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth. Even in such as are by [Page 184] most esteemed good men and sober, those notions of truth and equity which are naturall and implan­ted, are so weake and ill taken; that, rather than up­start carnall appetites or desires which custome countenanceth, should be enraged through their reluctance, they presently yeeld their consents to such proposalls, as (were they resolute, firme and constant) would as offensively contradict them, as punishment or paine doth our sense of pleasure. Vnto such proposalls we often yeeld, as are impos­sible to be approved by Equity; to whom we usu­ally professe our dearest love and allegiance, with promises to frame our lives by her rules. But love in us (whether one simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations, all rooted in one Center,) is not alike set on divers objects. Hence, when it comes to opposition be­tweene sense and reason, betweene our selves, our private friends, and common equity, it divides it selfe unequally. The particular inconveniences whereto we are daily exposed, by the inordinate love of the world, and the flesh, are infinite; all may be reduced to these two originalls: First, it blindes our judgements, and makes our intentions seeme upright and just to our partiall desires, or at least not incompatible with the rules of equity; when as, to impartiall judgements, they are palpably un­just. Secondly, having blinded our judgements, it forthwith abuseth our power or authority; to effect whatsoever is not, for the present, apprehen­ded for a grosse and evident wrong. So that no­thing whereon our love or liking is for the present [Page 185] mainly set, seemes any way impossible unto us; un­lesse it bee altogether without the compasse of our power: And, through the variousnesse of our hu­merous disposition, that, which we cannot like or admit to day, will be allowed of to morrow. But though there bee none that doth good, no not one, yet some there be doe lesse evill than others. And seeing those amongst us, whose love to equity is more strong and constant than their neighbours, are alwayes drawne with greater difficulty to dis­pense with truth or approve unjustice; the conse­quence necessarily amounting from this experi­mented truth, is, That ‘[if any mans judgement in matters of equity and justice were infallible, and his love to justice and knowne equity alto­gether constant and invincible, it would bee im­possible for him to transgresse in judgement.]’ Thus as well the strength of unconstant humorous desires, as the faintnesse of love or equity (both which most men may experience in themselves) as the contrary vertues, which they may observe in some few joyntly conspire to rectifie our conceit of God, in whom the Ideall perfection, of the ones integrity and constancy, is without all mixture of the others vice or humorous impotency.

2 The first rule for right extending the former Maxime [To make both parts of a contradiction true, is no part of the object of power omnipotent] would be this; Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered, or as it hath the maste­ry over weake inclinations unto equity, necessarily imply a direct and manifest contradiction unto [Page 186] some Divine Attributes, no lesse infinite or immu­table than Almighty power. Hence it followes, that many effects or designes, which seeme possible to the humane nature, may bee impossible or most incongruous to the Divine. It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye & cozen, or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiors; albeit the ones riches or others power, were infi­nitely increased, without internall increase of their fidelity. But to him that is eternally true and just, yea eternall truth and justice, it is as impossible to speak an untruth, or doe wrong, as for truth to be a lye, or justice to be unjust. Many things then are po­ssible to meere power, which are impossible to it, as linkt with truth or love; and many things againe possible to it, as linkt with these, which yet directly contradict the eternall patterne of justice or good­nesse; and are by consequent impossible to the Al­mighty, who is no lesse just and good, then power­full. Many Pyrats by Sea, or Robbers by Land, might they injoy but halfe the power & authority for a Month, whereof ordinary Princes by inheri­tance are possest; would doe their companions and friends more good, and worke their enemies grea­ter spoyle in this short space, than any Monarch can doe in his whole raigne, which holds it a point of Majestie to moderate his actions by that Princely rule; Princeps id potest quod jure potest, Princes can do no more than they can doe justly. In this sense, I think we may truly say, all before Christ were theeves & robbers, or in respect of him very unjust; not Abra­ham, David, Ezekiah, Iosias, not one of the Pro­phets, [Page 187] might they have but halfe that power and au­thority cōmitted to them over Angels for a night, which the Son of God from everlasting had, with­out robbery; but would have thought it very possi­ble to have removed the Romane Army with as great terror, losse and disgrace, as the Angell of the Lord sometimes had done the Assyrians, from Ieru­salems-siege; whose fatall destruction, God incar­nate cleerly foreseeing, bewailed with teares, but would not, but could not prevent. For to the King of everlasting righteousnesse, that onely was possi­ble, which was justly possible. And though he were a Father to Israel, and the Prince of peace, yet he approves a most bloody and mercilesse warre, be­fore an unjust peace, and disgracefull to Eternall Majestie; for so the Prophet had said in his name, before, There is no peace unto the wicked; to such as stubbornely abandon the wayes of peace, and wil­fully neglect saving health, so often and lovingly tendred unto them; Hos salus ipsa servare non potuit, and shall infinite power save them, whom infinite salvation cannot save?

3 To have smitten the men of Sodom with blind­nesse, before lust had entred in at their eyes; had beene a worke as easie to Almighty power, as blinding them in the attempt or prosecution of lust conceived. But that contradiction which the pre­vention of this sinne, did not imply unto Gods power, it did (all circumstances considered) neces­sarily imply unto his Iustice; by whose immutable and eternall rules, they were left unguarded against these foule temptions, for wilfull contempt of [Page 188] his goodnesse, for abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse. But did it imply any contradictiō to his goodnesse or loving kindnesse, to have pre­vented the Sodomites former contempt or abuse of them? Out of question it did, unto his eternall e­quity; for all his waies are mercy and truth. And these Sodomites wilfulnesse presupposed, the eter­nall rule of his goodnesse and loving kindnesse, had appointed justice to debarre them, as now they are, from reaping those fruits, whereof his good­nesse, as they were men, had made them capable. The principle whence the just proofe of these seeming paradoxes, as also the right explication of all difficulties in this argument, must be derived, is a Schoole Maxime borrowed from orthodoxall antiquity, now not much used, but of much use in true Divinity, and for this reason to bee more fully insisted upon, in the Treatise of mans first estate. The Maxime it self is briefly thus; It is impossible for mā or other created substance, to be absolutely impeccable from his creation. Onely He that is infinite in be­ing, is infinitely good; and infinite goodnesse onely implyes an absolute impossibility of being bad. As God onely essentially is, so hee onely is essentially and immutably good; all things besides him are or sometimes were subject to mutability, aswell in Essence as in their state and condition. Power om­nipotent could not from the first Creation, have pared off all mutabilitie from mans morall good­nesse, without perishing the onely possible root of his eternall and immutable happinesse. To decline to evill, implyes no contradiction to Being simply, [Page 189] but onely to omnipotent being: it is so possible to all Creatures, that without this possibility, it were (as we shall afterwards prove) impossible for them to be truly like their Creator, for a moment in that attribute, whose participation is the only assurance of their eternall weale. If God either by his om­nipotent power, or infinite wisedome, had necessa­rily (though without any violence) restrained this possibility in man, of declining from good to evill, man had forthwith ceased to have beene truly and inherently good, and ceasing to be such, had utter­ly lost all possibilities of that estate, whose pledge or earnest he received in his creation. Gods good­nesse is his happinesse. And his participative good­nesse is the foundation of mans happinesse. So that not Gods justice onely, but that loving kindnesse whereby hee created man, and appointed him as heyre apparent of life eternall, did remove all neces­sity from his will, because the imposition of neces­sity (whether laid upon him by power or wisdome infinite) had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein it was onely possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation. Now that was not Gods essentiall or im­mutable goodnesse, for that is incommunicable. All the goodnesse man is capable of, doth but ex­presse Gods goodnesse communicative. It is the stampe of it communicated. As God then did com­municate his goodnesse to his creatures, not by ne­cessity but freely, so could not the creature be truly good (that is like his God) by necessity but freely. Nor was it possible for him to have beene either [Page 190] confirmed in such goodnesse as he had, or transla­ted to everlasting happinesse; but by continuing freely good for some space, or lesse evill, than by the liberty which God by his immutable law had given him in his creation, hee possibly might have beene. Continuing good, though but for a while, without necessity, the riches of Gods free bounty, had beene continually increased towards him, and had finally established him in everlasting blisse by confirmation of him in true goodnesse, or by inve­sting him with immortality. Since his fall wee are not usually capable of mercy or of the increase of his bounty; much lesse of these everlasting fruits whereof blessings temporall are the pledges; but by free abstinence from some evills, unto whose practices, the possibility of our corrupted nature might be improved. And albeit we doe not alway that which is in its nature evill, yet we can doe no­thing well, but even the good which we do we doe it naughtily: yet unlesse we doe both lesse evill, and the good which we do lesse naughtily than we pos­sibly might doe, God still diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us; and by inhibiting the sweet influence of his gracious providence, suffers us to fall from one wickednesse to another, be­ing prone to runne headlong into all, if once the reines of our unruly appetites, bee given into our unweildie hands. Farre bee it from any sonne of Adam to thinke hee is able with­out Gods love and favour to withdraw himselfe from the extremities of mischiefe, much lesse to doe such good as may make him capable of well-doing. [Page 191] So strong is our love to sinfull pleasures, since our first parents gave the reines unto our ap­petite, that none can recall themselves or repent, without the attractions of infinite love. And yet many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace, because they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it to true repentance. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse, saith the Apostle, Rom. 2. 4. his forbearance and long suffering, not knowing that the goodnesse of God leadeth thee to re­pentance? Of whom speakes he thus? of such one­ly as truly repent, and by patient continuance in wel-doing, seeke for glory, honour, and immorta­lity? nay, but, of them who for hardnesse of heart, cannot repent; but treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judg­ment of God.

4 Were the riches of his bounty therefore fai­ned, or did hee onely profer, but not purpose to draw them unto repentance, which repented not? this is no part of our heavenly Fathers perfection, no fruit of that wisedome which is from above, but a point of earthly policy devoid of honesty; a meere tricke of wordly wit, to whose practice nothing but weaknesse and impotence to accomplish great desires, can mis-incline mans corrupted nature. But doth it not argue the like impotency, though no such want of integrity in God, not to effect what he wils more ardently and more unfainedly, than man can doe the increase or continuance of his welfare, or avoidance of endlesse misery? No; it being sup­posed (as we have said) that man is not capable of [Page 192] endlesse joyes, unlesse he will be wrought by meere love, without the impulsions of unresistible power, unfaignedly to love him that hath prepared them for him; the same infinite love which continually drawes him unto repentance, was in congruity to leave him a possibility not to be drawne by it. For coactive penitency, would have frustrated the end to which repentance is but a meane subordinate. The imployment or exercise of Gods almighty po­wer to make men repent against their wils, or be­fore they were wrought to a willingnesse by the sweet attractions of his infinite love, or by threat­nings of judgements not infinite or irresistible, would be like the indeavors of a loving Father, more strong than circumspect, who out of pity to his sonne, whom he sees ready to be choked with water, should strangle him by violent haling him to the shore. Most men by ascribing that unto Gods power which is the peculiar and essentiall effect of his love, doe finally misse of that good, which both infallibly conspire to poure, without measure, upon all such as take right and orderly hold of them. How shall wee then fasten our faith to them aright? we are to beleeve, that Gods infi­nite power shall effect without controule or checke of any thing in heaven or earth, all things possible for their endlesse good, that truly love him; but constraines no mans will to love him, being alwaies armed against wilfull neglectors of his unfaigned love. No man would argue his love to be lesse than infinite, because not able to produce the effects of infinite power: and as little reason wee have to [Page 193] thinke, that power, though infinite, should bee the true immediate parent of love, which never springs in any reasonable creature, but from the seedes of love or lovelines sown in the humane soule, though they doe not alwayes prosper. Constraint, because it is the proper and immediate effect of power, is a companion fit for lust; whose satisfaction breedes rather a loathing of the parties constrained, than any good wil or purpose to reward them for being unwilling, unloving, or impatient passives; nothing but true unforced love, can yeeld contentment un­to love. Needy man, to whom benevolences though wrested are ever gratefull, cannot bee indu­ced to love the parties from whom they are wre­sted. For, Non tantum ingratum sed invisum est be­neficium superbè datum: Good offices whilest they are presented by pride, are not onely ungratefull but odi­ous. But God who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth no man; as he esteemes no gifts (how­soever given) so he alwayes detests the niggardly backwardnesse, and loves the cheerfulnesse of the giver.

5 From these discussions the truth of the former rule, with the right solution of the maine probleme proposed, may bee illustrated, by examples of di­vers kinds in subjects knowne and familiar. Be the charge never so great, so the exonerations be well nigh equal, the incoms are lesse than if their charge were little, and their exonerations none. Or, be a mans revenues never so large, so his necessary ex­pences be no lesse, hee shall not bee able to doe as much for his friend in some reall kindnesse, as hee [Page 194] whose estate is not halfe so great, if so his annuall expences be tenne times lesse. In like case, though mans love to his dearest friend, be (in respect of Gods love to us) but faint, and his power but small; yet because his love to justice is much lesse, or ra­ther his partiality greater, hee oft-times effects that for his temporall good, which God though infi­nite in power, doth not effect for those whom hee infinitely loves. For the bequests or grants made unto man by his infinite love, must undergoe the examination of justice and equitie. What are alike infinite, before they passe the irrevocable seale of infinite power, one of these cannot attempt, much lesse absolutely bring ought to passe, without the others consent. Infinite love cannot oversway, ei­ther Gods incomprehensible wisedome to devise, or his omnipotency to practise meanes for mans salvation, which contradict the unchangeable rules of infinite equity. His love is as truly indivisible, as infinite; and is for this reason more indissolubly linkt unto the unchangeable rules of his owne justice or equity, than unto mankinde, whose good­nesse in his best estate, was but mutable; nor are any of Adams posterity so capable of that infinite mer­cie, wherewith God embraceth them, as Gods Iustice and Majestie are of his infinite Love. These being as He is absolutely immutable, are through­out eternity immutably loved of him, who indivi­sibly is Majestie, Iustice, Love, immutable.

CHAP. 17.
The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as pe­rish, testified by our Saviour, and by S. Paul.

1 THese are no Paradoxes, but plaine truth; without whose acknowledgement, wee shall hardly finde any true sense or good meaning in Gods pro­testations of sorrow for his peoples plagues, or in his ex­postulations of their unthankfulnesse, or in his kind invitations of them to repentance, which never re­pent, or in his tender profers of salvation to those which perish. I have spred out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people, which walketh in a way that was not good, after their owne thoughts, &c. Isay 65. 2. His infinite power expects their conversion, as the Mariner doth the turning of the Tyde; but may not transport them into the land of Promise, untill his Loving-kindnesse have converted them. The unremovable rules of eternall equity, will not suffer him to stretch out his hands any farther than he doth, towards the sonnes of men; and when the measure of their iniquity is accomplished, his infi­nite Iustice will not suffer him to stretch them out so farre any longer. Albeit hee cannot then with­out unfaigned sorrow, withdraw them from those to whom in love unfaigned hee hath stretcht them out. Thus Ierusalems iniquity come to the full [Page 196] did fill our Redeemers heart with woe, and his eyes with teares. If thou hadst knowne, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace; but now they are hid from thine eyes: Luke 19. 42. Did he speake this as man, or doth not the Spirit say the same? Hee that spake this, spake nothing but words of spirit and life, nothing but the words of God, if we may beleeve that he meant as he hath spoken. I have not spoken (saithIoh. 12. 49, 50. Hee) of my selfe, but the Father which sent me, hee gave me a comman­dement, what I should say, and what I should speake: whatsoever I speake therefore, even as the Father said unto me so I speake. His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards thē, from that exact con­formity which his spotlesse and blessed soule held with Gods infinite love; and yet restrained againe by that conformity, which it as exactly held with the eternall rules of Gods infinite justice or equity: and from these different motions or distractions, thus occasioned from that indissoluble uniō of his divisible soule, with these two different attributes of the indivisible nature, were his teares squeezed out. He wept then as man, not as God; and yet in this humane passion, did visibly act that part which God before his incarnation had penned, as a sen­sible memoriall of his unconceivable love. O that my people had hearkned unto me: and Israel had wal­ked in my wayes; I should soone have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversa­ries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted themselves unto him but their time should have endu­red for ever. He should have fed them also with the [Page 197] finest wheat, and with honey out of the Rocke should I have satisfied thee. Psalm. 81. vers. 13, 14, 15, 16. Wheat and Honey, here promised, were Emblemes of better blessings purposed towards them. And thus avouching this his purpose, under no chara­cter of courtly complement, but in the forme of legall assurance; his words are undoubted tokens of unfeigned love and desire unquenchable of their welfare, that did not prosper. Israel might have said, as Ierusalem afterwards did of her sorrow; Was there ever any love like unto this love wherewith the Lord imbraced mee in the dayes of my youth. Notwithstanding this excessive fervency of His loving kindnesse (whose will is infinite) laid no necessity upon their wils to whom hee wished all this good. They had a liberty left them by eter­nall equity, to refuse it. Hee out of the wishes of his bounty as he protesteth, was ready to poure out his best blessings according to the immensity of his loving kindnesse, so Israel would open his mouth wide to receive them. But my people (saith he) would not hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of mee; so I gave them up unto their owne hearts lust; and they walked in their owne counsells. Psal. 81. vers. 11, 12.

2 Lord, who had sinned, the heathen people or their forefathers in like manner as Israel did, that in times past thou sufferedst them all to walke in their owne wayes? Acts 14. 16. They that observe lying vanities forsake their owne mercy, saith the Prophet Ionah. 2. 8. Never hadst thou given them up to their owne hearts lust, to treasure up wrath against [Page 198] the day of wrath, had they not despised the riches of thy bounty; whose current, neverthelesse was not altogether diverted from their posterity. To them thou leftest not thy selfe without a witnesse, in that thou didst good, and gavest them raine from hea­ven in fruitfull seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse. To all nations even in the time of darknesse, when they were strangers from thee; these and the like temporall and sensible blessings, were unquestionable earnests of thy everlasting love, since more fully manifested; For thou so lo­vedst the world (not Israel onely) that thou gavest thine onely begotten son, to the end that who so belee­ved in him, should not perish but have everlasting life. What further argumēt of Gods infinite love, could flesh & blood desire; thā the Son of Gods volunta­ry suffring that, in our flesh, by his Fathers appoint­ment, w^ch, unto flesh and blood seemes most distast­full? That this love was unfaignedly tendered to all, at least, that have heard or hereafter may heare of it, without exception; what demonstration from the effect, can be more certaine, what consequence more infallible, thā the inference of this truth is frō a sacred truth received by all good Christians, viz. [Al such as have heard Gods love in Christ proclaimed and not beleeved in it, shall in the day of Iudgement appeare guilty of greater sinnes, than their forefathers could be endited of; and undergoe more bitter death, than any corruption drawne from Adam, if Christ had never suffered, could have bred.] I shall no way wrong the Apostle in unfolding his exhortations to the Athenians thus farre; but they rather offer the [Page 199] spirit by which hee spake, some kinde of violence, that would contract his meaning shorter. The times of this ignorance (before Christs death) God winked at, but now commandeth all men every where to re­pent; Because hee hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousnesse, by that man whom hee hath ordained, whereof he hath given assu­rance unto all men, in that hee hath raised him from the dead, Acts 17. 30, 31.

3 Why all men in the world have not heard of Gods infinite love thus manifested, many causes may hereafter bee assigned, all grounded upon Gods infinite Iustice or Mercy. Of Christs death many which heard not might have heard; many which are not, might have bin partakers; save only for their free and voluntary progresse from evill to worse, or wilfull refusall of Gods loving kindnesse daily profered to them in such pledges, as they were well content to swallow; foolishly esteeming these good in themselves, being good onely as they plight the truth of Gods love to them, which he manifested in the death of his Sonne. With this manifestation of his love, many againe out of meere mercy have not beene acquainted; lest the sight of the medicine might have caused their dis­case to rage, and make their case more lamentably desperate.

CHAP. 18.
Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods un­feigned love to such as perish, a principall meanes or occasion why so many perish.

1 BVt if the most part of men, as we cannot deny, doe finally perish, what shall it availe to revive this doctrine of Gods infinite love to all; by whose fruitlesse issue, he rather is made an infinit looser, than men any gainers? As for God, he hath frō eternity infallibly forecast the entire redemption, of his infinite love, which unto us may seeme utterly cast away. And of men, if many dye, whom he would have live (for his will is, that all should bee saved, and come to the know­ledge of the truth) the fault is their owne, or their instructers; that seeke not the prevention of their miscariage; by acquainting them with this coelesti­all fountaine of saving truth; whose taste we labor to exhibite unto all, because the want of it, in ob­servation of the heathen, is the first spring of hu­mane miseryHeu primae scelerum causae mor­talibus agris Naturam nescire De [...]m. Silius Ita­licus. lib. 4. de be [...]o pu­n [...].. Or, in language more plaine, or pertinent to the argument proposed, most men reape no benefit from Gods unspeakeable love; be­cause not considering it to be his nature, they doe not beleeve it to be as he is, truly infinite, unfeign­edly extended to all that call him Maker. But had the doctrines, which those divine Oracles [God is love, and would have all men to bee saued] naturally [Page 201] afford, beene for these forty yeeres last past, as ge­nerally taught, and their right use continually prest, with as great zeale and fervency, as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree, for electing some, and reprobating most, in that space have beene, the plentifull increase of Gods glory, and his peo­ples comfort throughout this land, might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries, as would have put their malicious mouths to silence. Who would not be willing to be saved, if hee were fully perswaded, that God did will his salvation in particular; because hee protests hee wills not the death of any, but the repentance of all, that all might live? Or were the particulars of this doc­trine, unto whose generality, every loyall member of the Church of England hath subscribed, general­ly taught & beleeved; all would unfeignedly endea­vour with fervent alacrity to be truely happy, be­cause none could suspect himselfe to bee excluded from his unfeigned and fervent love, who is true happinesse. Whose love and goodnesse is so great, that hee cannot passe any act, whereby any of his creatures should bee debarred either from being like him in love and goodnesse; or being such, from being like him in true happinesse: But alas, while the world is borne in hand, that the Creator oft-times dispenseth the blessings of this life, not as un­doubted pledges of a better, but deales with most men, as man doth with beasts, feeding them fattest which are appointed first to bee slaine: the magnificent praises of his bounty secretly nurseth such a misperswasion in most men of his [Page 202] goodnesse; (at least towards them) as the Epigram­m [...]tist had of a professed Benefactor, that shewed him (as he thought) little kindnesse in great Bene­volence.

2 The frequency of sinister respects in dispen­sing of secular dignities or benevolences, makes such as are truly kind, to be either unregarded, or mistrusted by such as stand in neede of their kind­nesse. And as fishes in beaten waters, will nibble at the bait, although they suspect the hooke: so the world hath learned the wit to take good turnes, and not to be taken by them; as suspecting them to bee profered in cunning rather than in true kindnesse: and cunning, where it is discovered or suspected, is usually requited with craft; love onely hath just title unto love. The most part in­deed are so worldly wise, that none but fooles will easily trust them; howbeit our naturall mistrust of others, makes all of us a great deale worse than we would be. And as if we thought it a sinne or point of uncharitablenesse, to prove other mens conjec­tures, that measure our dispositions by their owne, altogether false; wee fit our demeanours to their misdeemings of us, and resolve rather to do amisse; than they should thinke amisse. Howbeit even in [Page 203] this perfidious and faithlesse age, the old saying is, not quite out of date: Ipsa fides habita obligat fidē. Many would be more trusty than they are; and do much better by us than they doe, would we whol­ly commit our selves to their trust and kindnesse. Now, though by mans goodnesse or badness, God can neither become worse nor better in himselfe; yet the riches of his bounty, or communication of his goodnesse, are still multiplyed towards those that stedfastly beleeve him to bee such as hee is: One, whom all are bound to love; because hee is so kind and loving; one whom all may safely trust, be­cause his loving kindnesse is so utterly void of par­tiality, being armed with power and justice infi­nite. Thy righteousnesse is like the great mountaines, thy judgements are like the great deepe; O Lord thou preservest man and beast. How excellent is thy louing kindnesse, O God! therefore the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings. Psal. 36. ver. 6, 7. This especially should move all to admire his loving kindnesse, that he loved all without any other motive than his owne meere goodnesse or loving kindnesse, either to incline his will or stirre up his power to give them a being like his owne: We love him (saith Saint Iohn) be­cause he loved us first. Doe all then whom hee un­feignedly loves, love him vnfeignedly? Would God they did: for so (as his will is) all should bee saved. Did then the Apostle meane that his love to us, is no true cause of our love to him? yes; yet not simply as it is in him, but as being unfeignedly in him it is truly apprehended by us. Ingenuous [Page 204] love is never lawfully begotten, or fully concei­ved but from an apprehension of true lovelinesse in the object; and nothing can bee more lovely then love it selfe, when it is firmely apprehended or un­doubtedly knowne.

3 Though secret consciousnesse of our owne un­lovelinesse, in the state of nature, makes us oft-times too mistrustfull of others love: Yet unto our na­ture unregenerate and overgrowne with corrupti­on, it is almost impossible, not to love them whose love to us we assuredly know to be unfaigned; un­lesse their behaviour be very loathsome. Howbeit even so we love their persons, though not their pre­sence, wherewith againe we willingly dispense, if it may gratifie us in other things, which we much desire. That which makes the worlds condemna­tion so just, that infinite mercy may not dispence with it, is mens dull backwardnesse to love him, of whose glorious beauty, the most glorious, most admired creatures are but fleeting shadowes, no true pictures. Him of whose infinite love and un­feigned preventions in unrecompensable benefits, all the pleasures wee take in health, the joy of strength, the sweetnesse of life it selfe; and whatso­ever in it is good and lovely, are infallible pledges, and yet his intention in free bestowing them is to bind himselfe (more strictly than man is bound by receiving the just price of what he bargaines for) to instate us in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life.

Hee requires nothing at our hand, but that wee may be more capable of his loving kindnesse, by [Page 205] drawing still nearer and nearer to him, with all our hearts, with all our soules, and with all our strength; of whose least portion he is sole maker and preser­ver; of all whose motions hee is sole author and guide. From participation of his favour or presence, whatsoever is good in them, is undoubtedly ca­pable of increase. The services wherein the eter­nall King requires demonstration of this our love, are not so hard, as those which wee willingly per­forme to corruptible men, not invested with any shadow of his lovelinesse, nor seasoned with any tincture of his loving kindnesse; to men, that can­not be so beneficiall as loving to their friends, nor halfe so loving as they are lovely, though their lovelinesse come farre short of their greatnesse. Far otherwise it is with him, whose Greatnesse and Majesty are truly infinite: hee is as glorious and lovely as great, as loving as lovely, and yet withall no lesse beneficiall than loving to those which love him, and doe his will.

4 This unfaigned love of him, raised from be­leefe of his loving kindnes toward us, is as the first conception or plantation of true happines, to which once truly planted, whatsoever in this life can befal us,Rom. 8. 28. serves as nutriment. Diligentibus Deum omnia operantur in bonum. Wee know that all things worke together for good, to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose.

As this Article of his goodnesse and love is to be prest before any other, so the first and most natu­rall deduction, that can be made from this or any other sacred principle; and that which every one [Page 206] when hee first comes to enjoy the use of reason, should be taught to make by heart, is this: He that gave mee life indued with sense, and beautified my sense with reason, before I could desire one or other of them, or know what being meant; hath doubtlesse a purpose to give me with them, whatsoever good things my heart, my sense or reason can desire; even life or being as farre surpassing all goodnesse, flesh and blood can conceive or desire, as this present life, I now enjoy, doth my former not being, or my desirelesse want of being what now I am. These are principles, which elsewhere (by Gods assistance) shall bee more at large extended: yet would I have the Reader ever to remēber, that the infinite love, wherewith God sought us when we were not, by which he found out a beginning for mankind, fitted as a foundation for endlesse life, can never be indissolubly betroth­ed unto the bare beeing which hee bestowed upon us. The finall contract betwixt him and us, neces­sarily presupposeth a bond or linke of mutuall love. There is no meanes possible for us to be made bet­ter or happier than we are, but by unfaigned loving him, which out of love hath made us what we are. Nor are we what we are, because he is, or from his Essence onely, but because he was loving to us. And after our love to him enclasped with his unspeaka­ble and unchangeable love to us, whose apprehen­sion must beget it; the faith by which it is begot­ten in us, assures our soules of all the good meanes the infinitie of goodnesse may vouchsafe to grant, the infinity of wisedome can contrive, or power omnipotent is able to practise; for attaining the [Page 207] end whereto his infinite love from all Eternities doth ordaine us. And who could desire better en­couragement or assurance more strong then this, for the recompence of all his labours? or if all this cannot suffice to allure us, hee hath set feare be­hind us to impell us unto goodnesse; or rather be­fore us, to turne us backe from evill.

CHAP. 19.
How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge.

1 BVt if God as wee have said bee love, shall not his love be like his nature, altogether unchangeable? How then shall hee punish his beloved Creatures, or have anger, hate, or jealousie, any place or seat in the Omnipotent Ma­jestie? Can these consort with infinite mercie? Many Philosophers have freed God from anger, making him Author onely of grace, and favour to­wards men. And I could wish their heresies had beene better refuted than they are, or at least, that men would bee better perswaded of such refutati­on, as Lactantius hath bestowed upon them, al­beit I will not bind my selfe to stand to his decision of this point, but rather illustrate by instance or ex­periment, how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfaigned love.

2 Few mens hearts would have served them [Page 208] to have dealt with their owne bowels as Torquatus did with his. Howbeit in all that mighty people amongst whom he lived, I am perswaded but a few had taken the like care and paines to traine up their children in the most commendable qualities of that age. Not one would have adventured his owne person further, to have rescued his sonne from the enemy, or justified him in any honourable quarrell. In these and the like points, he had, and, upon just occasion,Meroveo certe auget probitatis famam at (que) justitiae ne­catus filius, justissimas uti (que) ob cau­sas, ne quis ipsi dirita­tem in alie­nos falso exprobet li­beros, vel in suos inau­ditam saevi­tiam nullis fultam rationibus: quales nec Posthumius Tiburtus, nec T. Manlius Torquatus olim habuere. Foreatulus de Gallorum Imperio & Philosophia. lib. 5. Et Paulo post. Posthumus Dicta­tor, quia Aulus filius injustus praesidiis egressus hostes fuderat, victorem audacem caedi se­curi jussit: at Torquatus itidem Latino bello, Cos. filium à Metio Tusculanorum Duce pro­vocatum, & forte detractandae pugnae pudore incensum, ac spolia referentem, mactari à lictore mandavit: jure forsitan, cum, teste Paulo Iurisconsulto, parentibus Romanis anti­quior esset disciplina militaris charitate liberorum. At qui Gelaor Merovei filius in pa­trem contumax, in cives procax, in omnes superbus & injurius, pudicis matronis vim in­tulerat, p [...]tres & maritos terrnerat, ceciderat foederatos ac amicos Franci nominis lacessie­rat. Cum (que) ex amicissimis aulicis quispiam objecisset Meroveo Lucium Gellium Censorem Romanum, qui filio novercam solicitanti, & praeter [...] parricidium meditanti, ac propemo­dum convicto, ignovisset, & in reatu constitutum absolvi diligentissime curasset: Ille, in­quit, boni patru functus est officio, ego boni Ducis: qui debellare hostes didici, & socios honorificè tractare, eorum (que) ulcisci injurias. would further have manifested, as much unfained love, as any father could unto his sonne; more than the imbecility of sex would suffer a ten­der hearted mother, to make proofe of. Doth then the adjudging of this his owne son to death, rightly argue he loved him lesse than other parents did their children, whose worse deserts they would not have sentenced so severely? No: it rather proves love and care of martiall discipline, and hate to par­tiality in administration of civill Iustice, to have beene much greater in him, than in other parents of his time. The more just and equall the law hee transgressed was, or might have beene (as for illu­stration [Page 209] sake we will suppose it to have been a law most equall and just) the more it commends his im­partiall severity, that would not suffer the violation of it goe unpunished in his dearest sonne; whom the more desirous hee was to make like himselfe in religious observance of Martiall Discipline, and practice of Iustice towards the enemy; the readier he was to doe justice upon him for doing the con­trary. That excessive love, which he bare unto his person, whilest his hopefull beginnings did seeme to promise an accomplishment of those martiall vertues, whose first draught hee himselfe had well expressed; turnes into extreame severity and indig­nation, after he proves transgressor of those funda­mentall rules, by which he had taken his direction; and unto whose observance his desire of posterity was destinated. So it falls out by the unalterable course of nature, or rather by a Law more transcen­dent and immutable than nature it selfe, that a lesse love being chained (by references of subordinati­on betweene the objects loved) with a greater, can­not dislinke it selfe without some deeper touch of displeasure, than if the bond or reference had beene none. The neerer the reference, or the stricter the bond; the more violent will the rupture be, and the dissociation more unpleasant: As there is no en­mity to the enmity of brethren, if the knot of bro­therly kindnesse once fully untie: The reason is, be­cause our love to our brethren, is neerest united with the love of our selves, unto which all other love is in some sort subordinate. True affection is alwayes most displeased, where it is most defeated; [Page 210] where most is deservedly expected and least perfor­med. Now as partiality towards our selves, and indulgence to our inordinate desires, oft-times be­gets desire of revenge upon unnaturall or unkinde brethren: so doth the constant and unpartiall love of equity and wholesome Lawes, naturally bring forth just severity towards presumptuous neglec­ters of them whose persons wee love no lesse, than they do that would plead with teares for their im­punity. Towards them, unto whom wee would give reall proofe of more tender and true affection, than their partiall abetters doe, could wee winne them, by these or other warrantable means, to link their love with ours, or to love that best which most deserveth loue. As Seleucus loved his son (for saving the one of whose eyes, (both being forfait by the law) he was cōtented to lose one of his own) more dearely than most princely mothers do their children, for he loved him as himselfe, yet could not dispence either with himselfe, or his sonne, be­cause he loved the publike law, and common good, that might accrue by this singular example of Iu­stice; better than either, better than both.

3 For every man to love himselfe best, is in our judgement no breach, but rather a foundation of charitie. Alaw to whose performance every man is bound in matters of necessity concerning this life, or in whatsoever may concerne the life to come; though not in cases of secular honour or preferment, wherein Proximus quis (que) sibi, must (by the law of conscience, and fundamentall rule of Christianitie) give place to Detur digniori. But [Page 211] nothing can be so worthy of love or honour as God; who will we, nill we, doth and must enjoy this li­berty or priviledge of loving himselfe best. And if he love himselfe better than he doth any creature, he must love equity and justice better than he doth any man; for he himselfe is equity it selfe, the eter­nall patterne as well of Iustice as of Mercy; he can­not be unjustly mercifull towards those men, whom he loves more dearely than any man doth himselfe. And in as much as goodnesse it selfe is the essentiall object of his will, he loves nothing absolutely and irrevocably, but that which is absolutely & immu­tably good. So was not man in his first creation, much less is he such in his collapsed estate; and yet Gods love (so super infinite is it) extends it selfe un­to our nature so collapsed and polluted with cor­ruption, which he infinitely hates. This his love, which knowes no limit in it selfe, is limited in its effects towards men, by the correspondency which they hold or lose with that absolute goodnesse, or with those eternall rules of equity, justice, or mer­cy, in which his will is to haue man made like him. Such as have beene either in re or spe, though not as they should bee, yet such as either infinite loving kindnesse can vouchsafe to accept, to cherish, or encourage to goe forward as they haue begunne; or infinite mercy to tollerate in expectation of their repentance, or aversion from their wonted courses: these, if once they finally dissolve the correspondency, which they held with Mer­cie, or burst the linke which they had in Gods love, (with reference to that goodnesse, wherto the [Page 212] riches of his bounty daily inviteth them) his dis­pleasure towards them kindles according to the measure of his former mercies or loving kindnesse. If being illuminated by his Spirit, they finally as­sociate themselves to the sonnes of darknesse, or ha­ving put on Christ in baptisme, they resume their swinish habit, and make a sport of wallowing in the mire; the sweet fountaines of joy and comfort, which were opened to them as they were Gods creatures, not uncapable of his infinite mercy, prove floods of wo & misery to them as they are sworne servants of sinne and corruption: For, hate to fil­thinesse and uncleanness, is essentially and formally included in Gods love of absolute goodnesse, righte­ousnesse and true holinesse. And the displeasure or indignation which he beares to these, must needes seize on their persons that have covered thēselves with them, as with a garment; and to whose soules they sticke more closely than their skinnes doe to their bodies, or their flesh unto their bones.

CHAP. 20.
Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge, their is no change or alteration at all in God, but onely in men and in their actions. Gods will is al­wayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall, with tormens everlasting.

1THe summe of all is this; love was the Mother of all his workes, and (if I may so speake) the fertility of his power and Essence. And seeing it is his nature as Cre­ator, and cannot change: no part of our nature (seeing every part was created by him) can bee utterly ex­cluded from all fruits of his love; untill the sinister use of that contingencie wherewith hee indued it, or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill, come to that height as to imply a con­tradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouch­safe them any favour. Whether naturall inclinati­ons unto evill, may bee thus farre improved in the children by their forefathers or no, is disputable; but in another place. Concerning Infants (save onely) so farre as neglect of duties to be performed to them, may concerne their Elders, seeing the Scripture in this point is silent, I have no minde here or elsewhere to dispute. If faith they have, or [Page 214] such holinesse as becommeth Saints; neither are begotten by our writing or preaching, nor is the written word the rule of theirs as of all others faith that are of yeares. And unto them onely that can heare or reade, or have the use of reason, I write and speake this, as well for their comfort and en­couragement to follow goodnes, or for their terror, lest they follow evill. ‘Love, much greater than a­ny creature owes or performes, or is capable of, either in respect of himselfe, or in others, is the essentiall and sole fruit of Gods antecedent will, whether concerning our nature as it was in the first man, or now is in the severall persons deri­ved from him. And of this love every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted; all, are as so many ties or handles to draw us un­to him, from whom we are separated onely by dissimilitude; our very natures being otherwise linkt to his being, with bonds of strictest refe­rence or dependency.’ On the contrary, Wrath and Severity are the proper effects of his consequent will, that is, they are the infallible consequents of our neglecting and despising his will revealed for our good, or sweet promises of saving health. The full explication and necessary use of this di­stinction, hath taken up its place, in the Articles of Creation, or Divine Providence. Thus much of it may serve our present turn. That Gods absolute wil was to have man capable of Heaven & Hel, of joyes and miseries immortall. That this absolute will whose possible objects are two, is in the first place set on mans eternall and everlasting joy, more fer­vently [Page 215] than man can conceive; yet not so, as to contradict it selfe by frustrating the contrary possi­bility, which unto man it had appointed. That Gods anger never kindles, but out of the ashes of his flaming love despised. Nor doth the turning of tender love and compassion, into severity & wrath, presuppose or argue any change or turning in the Father of lights and everlasting mercy; it is wholly seated in mens irregular deviation from that course which by the appointment of his antecedent will they should and might have taken (whereto his fa­therly kindnesse did still invite them) unto whose crooked wayes, which they doe, but should not follow; from which the same infinite goodnesse doth still allure them by every temporall blessing, and deterre them by every crosse and plague that doth befall them.

2 This bodily Sunne, which wee see, never changeth with the Moone, his light, his heat are still the same; yet one and the same heat in the spring time, refresheth our bodies here in this Land; but scortcheth such as, brought up in this clime, journey in the sands of Affricke. His beames reflected on bodies solid, but of corruptible and changeable nature, often inflame matter capable of combustion. But (as some Philosophers thinke) wold not annoy us (unless by too much light) were we in that aethereall or coelestiall region wherein it moves. At least, were our bodies of the like sub­stance with the heavens; the vicinity of it would rather comfort than torment us. Thus is the Fa­ther of lights a refreshing flame of unquenchable [Page 216] love, to such as are drawne by love to be like him in purity of life, but a consuming fire to such as he beholdeth a farre off; to such as run from him by making themselves most unlike unto him. No sonnes of Adam there be, which in some measure or other had not some taste or participation of his bountie. And the measure of his wrath is but e­quall to the riches of his bounty despised. To whom this infinite treasure of his bounty hath beene most liberally opened, it proves in the end a storehouse of wrath and torments, unlesse it final­ly draw them to repentance: According to the height of that exaltation whereunto his antecedent will had designed them, shall the degrees of their depression be in hell for not being exalted by it. Nor doth any man in that lake of torments, suffer paines more against his will, than he had done ma­ny things against the will of his righteous Iudge daily leading him to repenttnce. The flames of hell take their scantling from the flames of Gods love neglected; they may not, they cannot exceede the measure of this neglect. Or to knit up this point with evidence of sacred truth; God alwaies proportioneth his plagues or punishments in just equality to mens sinnes. And the onely rule for measuring sinne or transgression right, must bee taken from the degrees of mans opposition to Gods delight or pleasure in his salvation. Not so much as a dramme of his delight or pleasure can be abated, not a scruple of his will, but must finally be accomplished. The measure of his delight in mans repentance or salvation, shall beee exactly satisfied [Page 217] and fulfilled. Mans repentance he loves as hee is infinite in mercy and in bounty: mans punish­ment he doth not love at all in it selfe, yet doth hee punish as hee is infinitely just, or as hee infinitely loveth justice. This is but the extract of Wisedomes speech, Prov. 1. vers. 24. Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded: But yee have set at nought all my counsell, and would none of my reproofe: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mocke when your feare commeth, When your feare commeth as desolation, and your de­struction commeth as a whirlewind; when distresse and anguish commeth upon you: Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seeke me eare­ly, but they shall not finde mee: For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the feare of the Lord. They would none of my counsel: they despised all my re­proofe. Therefore shall they eate of the fruit of their owne way, and be filled with their owne devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fooles shall destroy them. But who so harkeneth unto me, shall dwell safely, and be quiet from feare of evill.

And it were to be wished, that some moderne Divines, would better explicate than they doe a schoole tenet, held by many, concerning Gods punishing sinners in the life to come, citra condig­num, that is, lesse than they deserve. For by how much their punishment is lesse than the rule of di­vine Iustice exacts: so much of that delight or good pleasure which God should have reaped from their salvation, may seeme by this remission [Page 218] to be diminished. But this point I leave to the judi­cious Readers consideration, who may inform him­selfe from theQuod in fine versus 9. dicitur, Mesericor­dia ejus s [...] ­per omnia opera ejus, hoc, inquit Calv. ne (que) absurdum, ne (que) durum videri de­bet. Nam cum pec [...]ata nostra totum mundum involvant Dei male­dictione, v­bi (que) locus est misericor­diae Dei ut brutis etiam animalibus subveniat. Hunc locum tractat Zan­chius de na­tura Dei. l. 4. c. 4. q. 4 Quam magna sit Dei miseri­cordia▪ i. Deus de justitia sua multum semper remittit. It reprobri cum postea puniuntur non pro meritis puniuntur [Haec Zanchij sententia] in igitur remittit illis propter satisfactionem Christi, an sine ulla satisfa­ctione? [Verba Coppen.] Notandum hic in Diabolis & reprobis condemnatis, post hanc vitam non videri quaerenda misericordiae divinae vestigia. Coppen in Psal. 145. 9. videtur Zanchij expositio contradicere lac. c. 2. v. 13 Damnatio [...] ei qui non praestitit miseris ordiam. Expositors of that sacred Maxime. His mercy is above all his works. Psal. 145. 9.

3 To thinke God should punish sinne unlesse it were truly against his will, or any sinne more deep­ly than it is against his will and pleasure, is one of those three grosse transformations of the divine na­ture, which Saint Augustine refutes. For thus to doe is neither incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable. Most of us, are by nature cholericke, and often take offence where none is given, and almost alwayes greater than is justly gi­ven; But to be offended with any thing, that goes not against their present wills, is a way wardnesse of men, whereof the humane nature is uncapable. To punish any, which doe not contradict their wills, is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabi­tants of Hell. It is the mutability of our wills or multiplicity of humors, which makes us so hard to be pleased. Our minds (at lest our affections) are set upon one thing fasting, upon another full; on this to day, on that to morrow; on sweet meates in health, on sowre in sicknesse; on kindnesse in mirth, on cruelty in anger; and because each hath his severall inconstant motions, wee cannot hold consort long together, without crossing or thwar­ring. But no man ever offended by merrily consor­ting [Page 219] with his brother disposed to mirth; nor by consenting to wreake his will, whilest hee was in rage. No man ever punished his servant for doing that which for the present he would have him doe; nor doe the Devills themselves vex the wicked (till Gods justice overtake them) but the godly; because the one doth what they would, the other what they would not have him doe; neither could displease them, were it not their wicked will to have all as bad and miserable as themselves. Could the dam­ned by their suffering, either ease these tormentors, of paine, or abate their malice; they would be lesse displeased at them, and lesse displeased, torment them lesse. And, whom then have they made the subject of their thoughts, or did they rather dreame than thinke on God, that sometimes write as if it were not as much against Gods will to have men dye, as it is against mans will to suffer death. For they suffer death, not because God delighteth in it, but that Gods will may be fulfilled in their suffering or passion, according to the measure it hath beene neglected or opposed, by their actions.

4 But though the rule of justice bee exactly ob­served in proportioning their paines to the degrees or fervency of his love neglected; yet seeing the continuance of their neglect was but temporall, how stands it with his justice to make their paines eternall? The doubt were pertinent, if the immor­tall happinesse, wherunto the riches of Gods boun­tie, did daily lead them during their pilgrimage on earth, whereof they had sweet promises and full assurance, had not farther exceeded all the plea­sures [Page 220] of this mortall life, for whose purchase, they morgaged their hopes of immortality, than the paines of hell doe these grievances or corrections, which caused them murmure against their heaven­ly Father. In this sense we may maintaine what Mirandula in another doth: that no man is everlast­ingly punished for temporall offences as commit­ted against God. How then? Man wilfully ex­changing his everlasting inheritance for momen­tany and transient pleasures, becomes the Author of his owne woe, and reapes the fruit of his rash For I reckon, that the sufferings of this pre­sent time, are not worthy to be compa­red with the glory which shall be revealed in us. Rom. 8. 18.bargaines, and so makes up that measure of Gods glory and pleasure, by his eternall sufferings, which he might and would not doe, by eternall participa­tion of his joyfull presence.Quod si Christo salus nostra tam chara fuit, & tam charò con­stitit, quid est quare nostram ipsi salutem tantopere negligamus? Quibus supplicijs, & qua ignominia sempiterna non sumus digni, modicum laborem prore obtinenda tam praetiosa recusantes? Quomòdo nos effugie [...]us (in­quit Paulus) si tantum neglexerimus salutem? Acosta con. 3. de circumcisione. And it is more than just, (for it is justice tempered with abundant mer­cy) that they should suffer everlasting paines, who not twice, or thrice, or seven times onely, but more than seventy times seven times, have wilfully refused to accomplish Gods eternall pleasure by accepting the sweet profers of their eternall joy. In every moment of this life, we have a pledge of his bounty to assure us of a better inheritance, the very first neglect whereof, might in justice con­demne us to everlasting bondage. The often and perpetuall neglect, turnes flames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire. For if love and mercy bee his property as hee is Crea­tor and preserver of all mankinde: his love [Page 221] (as was said before) must needs be more indissolu­bly set on those attributes than on man. The end of his love to man, is to make him happy by be­ing like him in the love of goodnesse: Now the more he loves him with reference to this end, or the oftner hee pardons him for neglecting or refu­sing the meanes that draw unto it; the greater is his wrath against impenitency, or finall contempt of his loving mercy. This is hisIsa. 42. 14 I have long time hol­den my peace, I have been still and re­frained my selfe: now will I cry like a tra­vailing woman, I wil destroy & devoure at once. most deare and ten­der attribute, which being foully wronged will not suffer justice to sleepe.

Patientia laesa sit furor. Long restraint of anger upon just and frequent provocations, makes the out-bursting of it, though unseemely and violent, seeme not altogether unjust nor immoderate. Al­beit the forme and manner of proceeding, which humane patience much abused, usually observes in taking revenge, cannot in exact justice bee warran­ted or approved: yet this excesse of anger, or delin­quency in the forme, is so tempered with matter of equity, that it makes those actions of patient men much abused, seeme excusable, which in o­thers would be intollerable. The ideall perfection of this rule of equity, thus often corrupted by humane passions, is in the Divine Nature, without mixture of such passion or perturbation, as is pic­tured out to the terror of the ungodly in the pro­pheticall characters or descriptions of his anger. Et excitatus est tanquam dormiens Dominus, &c. Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleepe, and like a mightie man that shouteth by reason of wine: Psal. 78. 65. Although he be a Father to all, and seeme [Page 222] to winke at his sonnes enormities: yet when hee a­wakes, he hath a curse in store, for such as abuse his patience, and make a mocke of his threatnings; more bitter than that which Noah bestowed on Cham. To attribute patience to him, and to deny him wrath and indignation; were, in Lactantius his judgement, to inrich his goodnesse, by robbing his Majesty.Ex his ap­paret vanas esse ratio­nes Philoso­phorum, qui Deum putant sine ira: & in­ter caeteras laudes ejus id ponunt, quod est contra ipsā majestatem. Regnum hoc imperi­um (que) terre­num, nisi metus cu­stodiat, sol­vitur. Au­fer iram Regi, non modo nemo parebit, sed etiem de fastigio praecipitabitur. Imo vero cuilibet humili eripe hunc affectum, quis eum non spoliabit? quis non deridebit? Lactantius cap. 23. de ira Dei. p. 477. The reasons of those Philosophers are apparently vaine, which thinke that God cannot bee angry. For even earthly Empire or Soveraignty, forthwith dissolves, unlesse it be held together by fear. Take anger from a King, and in stead of obedience, he shall be throwne headlong from the height of dignity. Yea take anger from a man of meaner ranke, and hee shall become a prey to all, a laughing-stock to all.

5 I am not ignorant what censures passe upon this Author for his incommodious speeches in this argument of Gods wrath or anger. His words, I must confesse, sound somewhat harsh, to eares ac­customed to the harmony of refined Scholastique Dialect. YetHacte­nus mihi magna contentio suit cum Lactantio, dum humanis rationibus, divinam iram ex humana metiretur fragilitate. Iam autem, quia dicit iram Dei sicut ipsum etiam Deum, eternam, nihil habeo quod repugnem. Nam ex syncrisi divinae atque humanae irae intelligas, ipsum de divina longe aliter quam de humana loqui: neque esse accidens quod in Deum non cadit, sed proprium, quia ira Dei à justitia Dei nihil differt. Iustitia verò Dei exeterna lage manet, contra quam si quis deliquerit, vindictam nimirum illius Dei sentiet, apud quem nul­lus vel temporum vel locorum terminus est. Betuleius in Com. in cap. 21. Lactant. de ira Dei. Betuleius, a man too learned, and too well seene in Lactantius, to let grosse faults pass without espiall, and too ingenuous to spare his cen­sure upon errors espyed; after long quaerulous de­batements, chides himselfe friends with his Au­thor: [Page 223] whose meaning in conclusion he acknowled­geth to be Orthodoxall and good; albeit his cha­racters of divine wrath in the premisses, may seeme better to fit the fragility of humane peevishnesse, than the Majesty of the Almighty Iudge. His phrase (perhaps) might be excused in part, by the security of those times wherein he wrote; his fault (if any fault it were not to speake precisely in an age more precise for maintaining the elegancy or life of style, than the right use or logicall propriety of words) is too common to most Writers yet, and consisteth onely in appropriating that to the Divine Nature, which is attributed to it onely by extrinsecall deno­mination. But leaving his phrase (about which perhaps he himselfe would not have wrangled) his argument holds thus farre true: God is more deep­ly displeased with sinne, than man is, though his displeasure bee not cloathed with such passions, as mans anger is: and yet the motions of the crea­tures appointed to execute his wrath, are more fu­rious than any mans passions in extreamest fury can bee. What mans voice is like his thunder? What Tyrants frownes like to a lowring sky, breathing out stormes of fire and brimstone? Yet are the most terrible sounds, which the creatures can present, but as so many ecchoes of his angry voice; the most dreadfull spectacles that Heaven or Earth, or the intermediate Elements can afford, but copies of his irefull countenance. Howbe it this change or altera­tion in the creature proceeds from him without a­ny internall passion or alteration. Immotus movet: He moveth all things, being himselfe immoveable.

[Page 224] 6 But as Lactantius may bee so farre justified, as we have said, so perhaps he is inexcusable in avou­ching anger to bee as naturall to GOD, as mer­cie, love, and favour are. To him that duely considers his infinite goodnesse, it may seeme im­possible that hee should bee moved by us, or by any thing in us, to mercy; seeing, asDeus ex se sumil se­minarium miserendi, quod judi­cat & con­demnat nos, eum quo­dammodo cogimus, ut longe aliter de corde ipsius mise­ratio quam animadver. sio procede­re videatur. Bernard. Ser. 5. in na­tal. Dom. Saint Ber­nard well observes, he hath the seminary of mercy in himselfe, and cannot take the seeds of it from any other. The fruits of it, wee may, by ill deserving, so hinder, that they shall never take nor prosper in our selves; but to punish or condemne us, we in a sort constraine him. And though he be the Author as well of punish­ment as of compassion, yet the manner how these two opposite attributes, in respect of us proceed from him, is much different; the one is naturall to him, and much better than any naturall comfort unto us; the other is in a sort to him unnaturall, and most unnaturall and unpleasant unto us: for as S. Vide Hie­rom. in cap. 1. Mich. vi­de Riberam in 1. Mich. num. 5. Et in 4. Mal. num. 4. Ierome saith, God when he punisheth, doth in a man­ner, relinquish his nature, and therefore when he pro­ceeds to punishment, he is said to goe out of his place, and to worke alienum opus, a strange or uncouth worke. The wicked and reprobate, after this life, shall alwayes see and feele his anger: But though they see him thus, immediately, they doe not see his nature so immediately as the Elect shall doe, to whom he shewes himselfe in love; this is his pro­per visage, the live-character of his native counte­nance. The manifestation of his anger in what part of the world soever, or in what manner soever made, is a veile or vizard put betweene him and the [Page 225] Reprobate, lest they shold see the light of his coun­tenance and be made whole. Hence, in the sentence of condemnation, it shall be said, Depart from mee yee cursed into everlasting fire. From his essentiall presence they cannot, but from the light of his countenance or joyfull presence, they must of ne­cessity depart. For were it possible for them to be­hold it, no torments could take hold of them; the reflex of it upon whom soever it lighteth, createth joy; the fruition of it, is that happinesse which we seeke. To conclude: Lactantius rightly inferres, It were impossible sinne should not be odious to him, to whom goodnesse is pleasant and delightfull. Now his dispeasure at sinne, is the true cause of all displea­sant motions or alterations in the creatures. His er­rour, albeit we take him at the worst, was not great: and as it may easily be committed by others, so it may as quickly be rectified, if wee say, that Anger and Hate are by consequent, or upon supposall of sinne, as necessary to the Divine Nature, as Love and Mercy, but not so naturall. But how either Love or Anger, both of them being either formally passions, or indissolubly linkt with passions, may be rightly conceived to be in God, is a point worth explication.

CHAP. 21.
How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy, or other af­fections are in the Divine Nature.

NO affection or operation that es­sentially includes imperfection, can properly be attributed to per­fection it selfe. But if the imper­fection be onely accidentall, that is, such as may bee severed from the affection; the affection after such separation made, may without meaphor (in some Schoole­mens judgement) be ascribed to God. Hence the same Schoolemen will have distributive justice to be in him, after a more peculiar manner than com­mutative justice is; because commutative justice (as they alledge) essentially includes rationem dati, & accepti; somewhat mutually given and taken. Mercy likewise is (in their judgements) more pro­perly in God, than anger or revenge; because it may bee abstracted from compassion, which is an imperfectiō annexed, but not essential to the reliefe of others misery, wherein mercy (as they contend) formally consists. It sufficeth us, that such affecti­ons or morall qualities as in us formally and essen­tially include imperfectiō, may be contained in the Divine Essence; though not formally, yet eminent­ly, and most truly, as we suppose anger is. For in this point wee rather approve ofDe Ira Dei, cap. 21. Lactantius his Divinity, than ofQuotiens impetu o­pus est non irascitur, sed exurgit, & in quan­tum puta­vit opus esse concitatur remittitur (que) non aliter quam quae tormentis exprimun­tur tela, in potestate mittentis sunt, in quantum torque an­tur. Sen. lib. 1. de ira. cap. 9. Ita aut ira non est, aut inutilis est. Ibid. Seneca's Philosophy. Hee that bids us be angry and sin not, seeks not the utter ex­tirpation, but the moderation of anger, Qui ergo [Page 227] irasci nos jubet, ipse uti (que) irascitur; He that bids us be angry, is doubtlesse upon just occasion angry himselfe. Nor should we sin, if we were angry onely as he is angry; or at those things onely that displease him, so far as they are displeasing to him; And were we as much inclined to mercy and loving kindnesse as we are to anger, the motions of the one would ar­gue as great passion as the motiōs of the other. But seeingDum ergo ad verba mutabilita­tis nostrae descenditur, ex iis qui­busdam gradibus factis ascen­det qui petest ad in­communica­bilitatem Dei, ut ride­at sine zelo zelantem, sine ira ira­scentem, sine dolore & penitentia, penitentems, sine misero corde, mis [...] ­ricordem, sine praevi­sionibus praescien­tem. Greg­moral. lib. 20. in 30. cap. Iob. Gods mercy which is proposed unto us for a patterne, is (if I may so speake) more reall and trnly affectionate in him than his anger, the difficul­ty how either should be in him is the same, or not much different: How can there be true compassi­on without passion, without motion or mutation? In many men it is observable; that the better use they have of reason, the lesse they participate of af­fection: and to cary those matters with moderati­on, which others can neither accomplish nor affect without excesse of passion or perturbation, is a per­fection peculiar to good education, much & choice experience or true learning. And thus by proporti­on they argue, that God who is infinitly wise, must be as utterly void of passiō, though he be truly said mercifull in respect of the event. The conclusion is truer than the reason assigned. And in most men whom the world accounteth wise or subtile, reason doth not so much moderate as devoure affections of that rank we treat of. The cunningest heads have commonly most deceitfull or unmercifull hearts: and want of passion often argues want of religion, if not abundance of habituated atheism or irreligiō. Every mans passions are for the most part mode­rate [Page 228] in matters w^ch he either least affects or minds the most. Perpetuall minding, especially of world­ly matters, coucheth the affections in an equall ha­bit or constant temper; which is not easily moved, unlesse it be directly or strongly thwarted. Desires once stifned with hope of advantage by close solli­citation, secret cariage, or cunning contrivance; take small notice of violent oppositions which ap­parantly either overshoot, or come short of the game they lye in wait for. But even such moderate politiques, if their nets be once discovered and the prey caught from them, fall into Achitophels pas­sion. Indignation and mercy, because incompati­ble with such meanes as serve best to politique ends, are held the companions of fooles. And unto the world so they seeme, because they are the pro­per passions of reason throughly apprehending the true worth of matters spirituall. For though gra­vity or good education may decently figure the outward motions; yet is it impossible not to bee vehemently moved, at the miscariage of those things, which we most esteeme. And the wiser we are in matters spirituall, the higher wee esteeme the promulgation of religion, the good of Gods Church, and promotion of his glory. The better experience we have of his goodnesse; the more we pity their case which as yet never tasted it: the more compassionate wee are to all that are in that misery whence we are redeemed. Did we esteeme these or other duties of spiritual life, as they deserve: the ex­treamest fits of passion, which any worldly wise man can be cast into, wold seem but as light flashes [Page 229] to those flames of zeale and indignation w^ch the ve­ry sight of this misguided world, would forthwith kindle in our brests. It is not then Gods infinit wis­dome which swallowes up all passion, or exempts him from those affections which essentially include perturbation; for so the most zealous and compas­sionate should be most unlike him in heavenly wis­dome. But as the swift motion of the heaven, bet­ter expresseth his immobility or vigorous rest, then the dull stability of the earth. So doth the vehe­mency of zeale, of indignation, or other passions of the godly (so the motives be weighty and just) ex­hibite a more lively resemblance of his immutabili­ty or want of passion, then the Stoicall apathy, or worldings insensibility in matters spirituall can doe.

2 How we should in godly passions bee likest GOD in whom is no passion; or how those ver­tues or affections which are formally in us, should bee eminently in him; cannot by my barren ima­gination bee better illustrated, then by compa­ring the circle in some properties with other fi­gures. A circle, in some mens definitive language, is but a circular line; and to any mans sense (as in some respects (perhaps) reason must acknow­ledge) it is rather one line, then a comprehensi­on of different lines, or a multitude of sides inclo­sed in angles. And from the unity of it perhaps it is, that many flexible bodies, as wands or small rods of iron, brasse, &c. which presently breake if you presse them into angles, or seek to frame them into any other figure, will bee drawne without danger into a circular forme. Notwithstanding [Page 230] some infallible mathematicall rules there be exprest in tearmes which in strict property of speech (or univocally) agree only to figures consisting of sides and angles; whose truth and use, reason expe­rienceth to bee most eminently true in the Circle. Take a Quadrangle ten yards in length, and foure in bredth, another eight yards in length, and sixe in bredth, a third seven yards every way: The cir­cumference of all three is equall 28. yards; so is not the superficiall quantity, but of the first 40. yards, of the second 48. of the third 49. The same inducti­on alike sensible in other many-sided figures, af­foords this generall unquestionable rule;Inter figu­ras [...], ordinator [...] est capacior. Among figures of the same kind, whose circumference is e­quall, that whose sides are most equall, are most ca­pacious. Yet frame a five-angled figure whose whol circumference is but 28. yards, though the sides be not equall, the superficiall quantity of it will bee greater, then the superficiall quantity of the former square: and yet a sixe-angled figure of the same circumference, though the sides be unequall, will bee more capacious then that. And still the more you encrease the number of angles, though without any encrease of the circumference, the greater will the capacity or superficiall quantity of the figures be, specially if the sides be not unequall. From this evident induction ariseth a second tryed rule in the Mathematique.Inter figu­ras [...] Heteroge­neas termi­natior est capacior. Amongst figures of divers kinds, whose circumferences are equall, that which hath most angles, is alwayes most capaci­ous. The circle which to our sense seemes neither to have sides, nor angles; by a double title groun­ded [Page 231] on both the former rules, hath the prehemi­nence for capacity of all other figures. It is more uniforme than any other, or rather the abstract or patterne of uniformity in figures, admitting neither difference of ranckes, or sorts, as triangles, qua­drangles, or other many-sided figures doe: nor of inequality betweene its owne internall parts or lines: neither can one circle bee more capacious then another of the same circumference: nor can any line in the same circle bee longer then another that is drawne from one part of the circumference, to another, through the same center. It is then in this respect more capacious then any other figure, because it is most uniforme. The sides of other fi­gures may be exactly equall, but the distance of e­very part of their circumference from the center, cannot admit such equality, as every part of the cir­cles circumference doth. The circle againe is more capacious then any other figure, because more full of angles. for the angles which it no where hath univocally, formally, or conspicuous to sense; rea­son apprehends it to have every where eminently. For as the Philosopher tells us, it is [...], a totan­gle, and so hath the prerogative or royalty, though not the propriety of the second Rule. It is more capacious than any other figure, not onely because it is more ordinate or uniforme, but withall, because it hath more angles than any other figures can have; even as many as can be imagined, it being a totangle.

3 This analogy betweene sides and angles as they are found in the circle and in other figures, [Page 232] mee thinkes well expresseth that analogy which Schoole Divines assigne betweene wisedome, sci­ence, love, hatred, goodnesse, desire, &c. as they are found in God and in man. For no one name or title of any affection can be univocally attributed to the Creator and to the creature: and yet the rules of equity, of mercy, of Iustice, of patience, of anger, of love, which we are commanded to follow, though not without passion or affection, are most truly observed by him: yea their truth in him is infinitely eminent: so farre must we be from con­ceiting him to bee without ardent love, without true and unfaigned good will to us, without wrath burning like fire to consume his adversaries, be­cause he is without all passion. He is most loving, yet never moved with love, because he is eternally wholly love; He is most compassionate, yet never moved with compassion, because he is eternally wholly compassion; He is most jealous of his glo­ry and a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet ne­ver moved with jealousie, yet never passionate in re­venge; because to such as provoke his punitive ju­stice, hee is eternally severity and revenge it selfe. Againe, how the indivisible Essence should bee wholly love, and wholly displeasure, wholly mer­cy, and wholly severity, I cannot better illustrate then by the circle, the true embleme of his eterni­tie, which is as truly [...] as [...], as well all sides, as all angles. And being such, the sides and angles cannot be distinguished in it: but the sides are angles, and the angles sides; at least they are, if not essentially, yet penetratively the same. The [Page 233] circle likewise is as truely [...] and [...], of equall sides and equall angles, as [...] & [...] a totangle or totilater; and did it not contiaine mul­tiplicitie of sides, as well as of angles in most exact and eminent uniformity, it could not have the full prerogative of the former rules. Nor could the indivisible essence either be so great or excellent in himselfe, or a moderator of all things so powerfull and just, as wee beleeve hee is; unlesse he did emi­nently containe the perfections of all things possi­ble as well as of any one.

4 Some Philosophers have placed the humane nature, as a line diameter or aequilibrium in this vi­sible sphere; making man the measure of all things, as participating all other natures: much what after the same manner that mixt bodies con­taine the force and vertues of the elements. And mans nature, til it was corrupt, did (without doubt) include such an eminent uniformity to all things created, as the eye doth unto colours. As hee was then the true image of God for his essence; so did he in this property, beare a true shadow of the di­vine prerogative, whose essence, though, for num­ber or greatnesse of perfections contained in it, al­together measurelesse, is the most true and exqui­site measure of all things that are, or possibly can be: All the conditions or properties of measure assign­ed by the Philosopher are as truly contained in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but farre more eminently. A measure it is, not appliable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversitie of parts, [Page 234] which it hath none, for it is immutably, eternally and indivisibly the same: and unto it the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things, are actu­ally applyed, in that they have actuall being. It is impossible the immutable Creator should be fitted to any thing created; but in that he is immutable, and yet eminently containeth all things in his indi­visible essence, he eternally and immutably fits all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable. Being all things else, hee is fitnesse it selfe in a most eminent and excellent manner: the present disposition of every thing, either, whiles it first begins to be, or continues the same, or whiles it is in the change or motion (whether from good to evill, or from evill to good, from evill to worse, or from good to better) is more exquisitely fitted in it owne kind, by eternall, immutable and incom­parable fitnesse; then it could be by any other mea­sure, which the Creator himselfe could create with it, or devise for it, after the alteration or change were accomplished. In that he is indivisibly One, and yet eminently All, See Esay 66. 14, 15, 16. he is immutable, contrariety it selfe unto contraries:Ezek. 7. 4. Arithmeticall equality it selfe to things equall, Geometrically equall to things unequall;Deut. 7. 9, 10. according to every degree of their unequall capacities, in what sort soever. And as of his other attributes one truly and really is ano­ther, so in respect of man, his measure is his judge­ment or retribution whether of rewards or punish­ments, not the rule onely by which he rewards or punisheth. Vnto man in his first creation, and whiles he continued as he created him, he was and [Page 235] would have continued bountie it selfe; unto man yet as he is his creature, he is love it selfe: and unto man made by his own folly an impotent wretched and miserable creature, hee is so entyrely mercy and compassion if selfe, that were there a distinct god of love, or a goddesse of mercy, or two infi­nite living abstracts of meere love, and meere mer­cie; they could not be so loving and mercifull unto man touched with the sense of his owne miseries, nor solicite him so seriously and perpetually unto repentance as he doth, who is entirely infinite mer­cy, but not mercy only. Vnto the truly penitent he is so truly and entirely gratiousnesse it selfe, that if there were a Trinity of such abstract Graces, as the Poets have faigned, they could be but a figure or picture of his solid and infinite gratiousnesse. Vn­to the elect and throughly sanctified, he is so truely and entirely felicity and salvation it selfe; that if the Heathen goddesses, Felicitas and Salus, or Pla­toes Idea of true happinesse might be inspired with life and sense;Qui quoti­die contem­nit Deum, etiam quoti­die judica­tur, non ma­nifesto sed occulto judi­cio, non a­perto sed ta­men certo: occultiora saepe sunt certiora ma­nifestioribus Coppen. in Psal. 7. they could not communicate halfe that happinesse to any one man (though they wold choose his hart for their closet, or actuate his reaso­nable soule as it doth the sensitive) that is imparted by him to al his chosen, who is entirely infinite hap­pinesse, but not happinesse onely. For unto the im­penitent and despisers of his bountie, of his love, his mercy, grace, and salvation; he is justice, indig­nation, and severity it selfe. Nemesis her selfe were she enabled with spirit, life and power much grea­ter then the Heathens ascribed unto her, and per­mitted to rage without controle of any superiour [Page 236] law; should not bee able with all the assistance the Furies could afford her,Etiam Dei [...] est ipsius [...] Coppen. ibid. to render vengeance unto Satan and his wicked Angles, in such full and ex­quisite measure as the just Iudge will doe in that last dreadfull day. Then shall he truely appeare to be, as our Apostle speakes, All in All: the infinite ab­stract of all those powers which the heathens ado­red for gods, as authors either of good or of evill: Then shall he fully appeare to be mercy, goodness, grace and felicity; Nemesis, pav [...]r, and terrour it selfe; the indivisible, and incomprehensible Idea of all things which in this life our love did seeke after, or our feare naturally laboured to avoyd: The onely loadstone whereto our love, our desire in our creation were directed, was his goodnesse and loving kindnesse. And feare was implanted in our nature as an Helme or Rudder to divert us from his immutable justice or indignation; which are as rockes immoveable, against whom whosoever shall carelessely or presumptuously runne, must everla­stingly perish without redemption.

CHAP. 1.
The Title of Almighty is not personall to the Father, but essentiall to the Godhead.

IN further explication of this Article, it is ad­ded in the NICENE CREEDE, I beleeve in one God the Father Al­mighty. This title of Almighty or Omni­potency, is not given to the Sonne, or to the Holy Ghost, nor are ei­ther of them expresly enstyled by the name of God, in the Creede. The omission of the title of [Page 2] God, and of the Attribute Almightie, (which is proper to the Godhead) when the persons of the Sonne and of the Holy Ghost with their severall of­fices are described; may administer this scruple to men, not much conversant in these great mysteries, [Whether the Father onely be God, or onely Almigh­tie, or the onely God Almightie, in such sort as the Sonne and holy Ghost are not.] To say the Father onely is God, or the Father onely is Almightie, were to wrong the Sonne and Holy Ghost; to both whose Persons these titles are due: and our Faith in this point of the Trinitie, above all others, must be uniforme and unpartiall, without respect of Persons. And for the better instruction of such as did not fully apprehend the right meaning of the Apostolique Creede, this uniformi­tie of our Faith is expresly taught by Athana­sius. Such as the Father is, such is the Sonne, and such is the holy Ghost: the Father is God, the Sonne is God, and the holy Ghost is God: the Father is Almightie, the Sonne is Almighty, and the holy Ghost Almightie: yet shall we often reade in Scriptures, and in Wri­ters Orthodoxal, euen in Athanasius himselfe, [that the Father is the onely God.] So saith the Sonne of God, Iohn 17. vers. 3. This is life eternall, that they may know thee, the onely true God, and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Doth Christ therefore deny himselfe to be the onely true God? or rather is it a part of our beleefe, and of our Saviours meaning in that place, that wee must know not onely God the Father, but Iesus Christ also, whom hee hath sent, to be the onely true God? And though it be [Page 3] not in that place expressed, yet it is necessarily im­plyed in other Scriptures, that the holy Ghost is the onely true God. No Christian may question this Proposition, (Pater est solus Deus) The Father is the onely God: nor this, (Filius est solus Deus) The Sonne is the onely God: nor this third, (Spiritus sanctus est solus Deus) The holy Ghost is the onely God. The Father likewise is the onely Almightie, the Sonne likewise is the onely Almightie, and the holy Ghost the onely Almightie: on whom our Faith is joyntly and uniformly set. This uniformi­tie of our Faith hath for its object, the unitie of na­ture in the Trinitie. But to say (Solus Pater est Deus, solus Pater est omnipotens) The Father one­ly is God, or the Father onely is Almightie; The Son onely is God, or the Sonne onely is Almightie; The holy Ghost onely is Almightie: were more then he­resie, grosse infidelitie. For every one of these speeches include a deniall both of the coequalitie of their persons, and of the unitie of their nature. Of the ground of this distinction, or of the diffe­rence betweene these severall Propositions (Solus Pater est Deus, Pater est solus Deus) The Father onely is God, and the Father is the onely God, &c. by the assistance of this blessed Trinitie wee shall dis­cusse, after wee have proved the Sonne to be truly God, and the holy Ghost likewise to be truly God, in the severall Articles which concerne their per­sons and offices. Now the same Arguments, which proves the Sonne to be truly God, and the holy Ghost likewise to be truly God, will likewise prove the Sonne to be the onely God, the onely Al­mightie. [Page 4] The point next in view, and first to bee handled, is the meaning of this Attribute Almighty, and how it agrees to the Godhead or divine nature as it is presupposed one and the same in the three Persons.

CHAP. 2.
Of Omnipotencie, and of its object: of possibilitie and of impossibilitie.

1 ὈΥκ αδυνατήσει παρα τῷ Θεῶ παν ῥὴμα. Nothing shall be unpossible unto God, saith the Angell to the blessed Virgin, doubting or moving this question, How shall I (instantly) conceive and beare a sonne, seeing I know not a man? That the accomplishing of that, which the Angell had said, was possible to God, the event did prove. But that nothing should be impossible unto God, can neyther be proved by any event, nor will it necessarily follow, at least the necessity of its consequence is not so cleare from the words uttered by the Angel, which admit of some restriction. For, to be God, or to be equall with God, is something, more then meere nothing. Is it then possible for God to make a God euery way equall unto himselfe? The Sonne of God, who was conceived by the holy Ghost, and borne of the blessed Virgin, was equall with God, yet not so made, but so begotten from all eternitie. Hee is more then [...], and is not comprehended under the former Proposition. For being God [Page 5] from all eternitie, it was impossible hee should be made. Must then the Angels speech, or the Arti­cle of Omnipotencie bee restrained to things pos­sible? or is God said to be omnipotent onely in this respect, that hee is able to doe all things, that are possible to be done? In respect of whom then shall they be counted possible? In respect of God himselfe, or in respect of Men or Angells? Or with reference to Angelicall or humane knowledge one­ly? or in respect of knowledge divine? To be able onely to doe all things, that man or Angels can doe, or can conceive may be done, doth not exe­quiate or fill our conceit of power and wisedome truly infinite: it is much lesse than the full extent, or contents of Omnipotencie: which certainly con­taineth power and wisedome much greater than can be comprehended by man or Angell. Againe, to say that God can doe all things, that are possible for him to doe, or may be effected by his infinite po­wer and wisedome, is to say the same thing twise, and yet to leave the true notion of Omnipotencie unexpressed.

Were the question propounded, what things can be seene or heard; What things cannot be seene or heard: a man should be little wiser by this answer, Things visible onely can be seene; Things invisible cannot be seene: Things audible onely can be heard; Things inaudible cannot be heard. For if one which knowes no Latine, nor the derivation of English words from it, should further aske what it is to be visible, what it is to be invisible; or what is the meaning or signification of audible and inaudible? [Page 6] the answer would be, That is visible, which can be seene; that is invisible, which cannot be seene: that is audible, which may be heard; that inaudible, which cannot be heard. So that he which former­ly knew the signification of these words, or their forme in Latine (whence they are derived,) should learne nothing by this answer, which for reall sense is but idem per idem, a diversitie of words, without any difference in the thing signified by them. A­gaine, though these two Propositions be converti­ble, [1. Every object of sight is visible, and what­soever is visible is the object of sight: 2. Every ob­ject of hearing is audible, and whatsoever is audible is the object of hearing;] yet is not visibilitie the true and proper object of sight nor audibilitie of hearing. To be visible, or invisible; to be audible, or inaudible, are termes relative. And euery rela­tion or relative terme supposeth a ground or root, whence it ariseth or results; which in nature hath precedency of it: now it is the root or ground from which the relation results, which is the pro­per object of every facultie whether it be pas­sive as our senses are, or active, as our understan­ding is.

2. This relation or relative terme, to be visible or audible, results from the impression, which the proper object of sight or hearing make upon these two senses, or at least from the aptitude which they have to imprint their proper shape or forme upon these senses. The object of sight, which is colour or light, cannot found the relation of audibi­litie, because neyther light nor colour have any [Page 7] aptitude to imprint their forme upon the eare; nor can the relation of visibilitie result from sounds, which are the proper object of hearing, because sounds have no aptnesse or power to make any sen­sitive impression upon the eye. Sounds then are the proper object of hearing, and the ground or root, whence bodies take the denomination of being au­dible. Light or colour is the proper object of sight, & the ground or root whence bodies in which light or colour is found, receive the relative denomina­tion of being visible. Vnto the question then, [What things may be seene, what things may not bee seene; what things may be heard, or may not bee heard,] the true and onely Philosophicall answer is, Those things onely can be seene, which are en­dowed with colours, or participate of light; those things which have no colour or participation of light cannot be seene. Those bodies onely which are apt to make or give sound, can be heard; those which can yeeld no sound, cannot be heard. If it should further be demanded, why sounds only are audible, when as neyther colours nor other quali­ties can be audible, or become the object of hea­ring? The only way to assoyle this question would be to instruct him that makes it, in the manner how sounds are produced, how they are carryed by the ayre unto the eare, how they are there entertained by the ayre, which the eare or organ of hearing continually harbours within it selfe for their enter­tainment. Hee that should see the fabricke of the eare, and take the use of its severall parts (of the anvile & the hammer especially) into serious consi­deration, [Page 8] would cease to enquire why sounds are audible rather then colours, and begin to admire the inexpressible skill of the Artificer, which fra­med this live-eccho in all more perfect sensitive creatures. No marvell if the eare perceive sounds, seeing the use or exercise of this sense is a continu­all imitation of the production of sounds. And as no creature understands the expressions of our ra­tionall internall notions, save that onely which is endowed with the like internall notions of reasons; so neither could the eare or sense of hearing per­ceive sounds, unlesse it had a continuall internall sound within it selfe. Hee againe that should view the severall humours of the eye, the Chrystalline especially, would never move question, why co­lours should make that impression upon the eye, which they doe not upon the eare.

3 The point questioned in this part of Divini­tie, or concerning the meaning of this Attribute [Omnipotencie] comes to this issue. Whether power infinite & omnipotent have any object wher­unto it is, or may be so immediately terminated, as sight or the visive facultie is unto light or colours, or as the faculty of hearing is to sounds, whence the relation or relative denomination of possibilitie doth so result, as visibilitie doth from the sight or visive facultie, as it respecteth colours. If infinite power presuppose any other object pre-existent to possibilitie, as light and colours are to visibilitie, this object must needs be eyther privative or posi­tive: Something or meere nothing. If wee shall say this object is a positive entitie, eyther it was frō [Page 9] Eternitie without dependence on his Almightie power, & so it should be, as that power is, infinite. Or if we say this supposed object were from him, or by him, or had dependance on his power; then certainly it was possible, and therefore cannot bee precedent to all possibilitie. Whence it may seeme concluded, that Gods infinite power or Omnipo­tencie is the onely foundation of possibilitie, and by consequence cannot possibly have any object, whereto it is or can be terminated, or so fitted, as the visive facultie or sight is to light or colours. Howbeit in truth the former reasons onely con­clude, that the object of Omnipotencie can be no positive entitie, nor the privation or negation of any determinate being. But that the same Omni­potent power may have an object purely negative, or including a totall negation of all things numerable, though their number were potentially infinite, the former reasons or the like cannot enforce us to de­ny. All things are said to be possible unto God, because by his omnipotent power, he can make all things not out of positive possibilities or Entities possible, but of meere nothing, that is, without any positive Entitie pre-existent, to serve either as matter, agent, or instrument. What? shall we say then, that things not possible onely, but impossible, may be done or made by power Omnipotent? Or may wee say that impossibilitie is eyther some­thing, or at least (as some have taught) a degree or part of non esse, or of nothing? But how can that which is not, have any degrees or parts? Or, admit we might conceive things impossible or, impossibili­ties [Page 10] to be degrees or parts of nothing, yet so concei­ved, wee must needs conceive them to have the same negative conditions or properties, which are attributed to non esse, to simple not being, or to no­thing, that is, they might be such objects of infinite power, as non esse, or not being is. Yet he that made all things that are, of nothing and can resolve them into nothing againe, doth never attempt or profer to resolve them into impossibilities, nor did hee make any thing of impossibles. Whether then im­possibilitie or impossibles be something or nothing, how is it possible they should so resist the power Omnipotent, which can doe all things, as that no­thing can be made of them? Lastly, if impossibi­lities can be no objects of Gods power, then things possible or possibilities, must be the onely object of it, and so we shall fall into the former circle, that God can doe those things onely that are possible, and those things onely are possible which God can doe.

4 Here the Schooles acutely distinguish be­tweene possibilitie relative and absolute. Certe non est per ectus & pulcher mundus, nisi omne quod sit palehrū, sit aliqua bo­nitas quae velit; & omne quod scibil [...], sit sapientia quae sciat; & quod pos­sibile, poten­tia quae pos­sit. Na qua aliquid pos­sibile non po­tuit, aut sci­bile ignora­vit, aut pul­chrū nol it, vel invidet, maneum & imperfectum exierit opificium: ipsum verò pulchrum, aut scibile, nemo definit ad bonitatem volentis, aut scientiam scientis. Sed pulchrum est, quod rei cui accidit ad propriam bonitatem obtinendam, perfectionem adijcit; & scibile, quod in sese habet principium, unde sciri pos [...]it: igitur ne (que) possibile, quod simpliciter dicitur & non ad aliquid, definiri debet ad potentiam: sed simpliciter possible, est illud, quo facto & posito, nulla repugnantia fit, aut contradictio. Tune enim res per sese fuerit impossibilis, cum in ipsa est (ut ita dicamus) impossibilitas. Ex­ternum vero quiddam fuerit, si ob idsolum dicatur impossibilis, quod non sit causa quae possit facere. Oportet igitur sit in rebus causa aliqua, quae possit quidquid in sese repugnantiam nul­lam continet. At vero fieri ex nihilo non est simpliciter impossibile, sed impossibile cuidam vir­tuti fin [...]ae, puta naturali; qua virtute esse aliam superiorem, & potentiorem, non est impossi­bile. Vallesius de sacr. Philosoph. pag. 20. Possibilitie relative being the first draught or capacitie of all being or perfection limited, must needs be founded [Page 11] upon Omnipotencie: nothing is relatively possible, but by reference to, or by denomination from this Almighty power. Absolute possibilitie they con­ceive ad modum objecti, as it were an object that doth terminate Omnipotent power, not positively as colours do sight, but privatively as darknesse doth sight; or as an empty sphere without which Om­nipotencie it selfe doth never worke. This absolute possibilitie, or possibilitie meerly Logicall, which is presupposed to relative possibilitie, as light or co­lour is to visibilitie, cannot otherwise be notified or expressed than by this negative, of not implying contradiction. But here the former difficultie con­cerning impossibilities meets with us in another shape. For it will be againe demanded, whether contradiction be any thing or nothing? or how it should come to oppose Gods Almightie power, more then eyther non esse, simple not being, or all things that are possibly can doe? Can it bee lesse then nothing? That is impossible; rather it is, if not so much more, yet so much worse then nothing, as that it cannot possibly beare the true forme or cha­racter of any thing; and for this reason can be no object of power Omnipotent. Vnder that notion which wee have of Omnipotencie or infinite Bee­ing, Truth it selfe, and Vnitie it selfe or Identitie, are as essentially included, as Entitie or Being it selfe. It is no impotency in God, but rather the prerogative of his Omnipotencie, that he cannot weaken his power by division, nor admit any mix­ture of imbecilitie, that he cannot deny or contra­dict himselfe. In that hee is infinitely true, or infi­nite [Page 12] Truth it selfe, the ratification or approbation of contradictions, is more incompatible with his nature or Essence, than falshood is with truth, than weaknesse with power, than malice with goodnes. There is no falshood unlesse it include some de­grees or seeds of contradiction: as all Truth is the offspring of unitie or Identitie. In conclusion, as all things which are or possibly may be, can be no more then participations of his Beeing, who is Bee­ing it selfe: so they must by an eternall Law, when­soever they begin to be, beare a true though an im­perfect resemblance of his unitie, of his Identitie, of his veracitie, as well as of his power which is om­nipotently true, omnipotently just.

5 In answer to the last difficultie proposed, it must be said that impossibilitie is neyther any posi­tive Entitie, nor is it any part or branch of non esse, or of nothing. For in respect of him who is All, more then all things, there can be no absolute non esse. Hee calleth things that are not as if they were, that is, hee can by his sole wrod make all things which yet are not, which yet have not beene, to have true being. Hee can make any thing of no­thing. That then which we call impossibilitie, must not be derived from non esse, nor from falshood, which is finally resolved into contradiction. So that the rule of contradiction is the Test, by which im­possibilities, as well as falshood must be discove­red: and it is more to bee impossible then to bee false. From what fountaine then doth impossibi­litie spring? From absolute and Omnipotent pow­er, or from the infinitie of the Divine nature? But [Page 13] seeing in him all power and being is contained, seeing the very possibilitie of limited being takes its beginning from him, the possibilitie of weake­ning his power, the possibilitie of contradicting or opposing himselfe, must by the eternall Law be excluded from the object of Omnipotencie. As we say, two negatives make an affirmative, so to be unable to dis-enable it selfe, is no imperfection, no impotencie; but the greatest perfection, the high­est degree of power wherof any nature is capable, because the impossibilitie of dis-enabling or weak­ning himselfe is a positive branch of the preroga­tive of Omnipotencie. 2. It is not so true an argu­ment of power in men to be illimited by law, or to be able to doe what they list, as to bee willing to doe nothing, but that which is lawfull and just: unlesse mans will be a law to his power, and good­nesse a law unto his will, how absolute and illimi­ted soever his power may bee in respect of other men, or of any coactive law which they can make to restraine it, it may quickly come to make an end of it selfe. And the end or cessation of power ab­solute is the worst kind of limit that can be set un­to it.

The power of the Persian kings, was sometimes so absolute and so illimited, that Cambyses having no possitive law to curbe his will, fell in love with his owne sister. And yet so naturall is the notion of mans subjection unto some law, even unto men of corrupt mindes, that this lawlesse King consulted his Iudges, whether his desire to enjoy the love of his sister, might be countenanced by law. The [Page 14] effect of these Sages answer, was, that they knew no law in speciall, which might warrant the brother to marry the sister, but they had found a transcen­dent law, by which the Kings of Persia might doe what they list. By the like prerogative of this trans­cendent law; another King, upon her request did delegate his absolute power unto his Queene for a day. And she by delegation of this power, having libertie to doe what she list, did use it to the destru­ction of him that gave it her: for shee cut off his head, before she surrendred it. It is then a branch of the Almighties prerogative, that his omnipo­tent power cannot for a moment be delegated or bequeathed to any other; that as he can doe what­soever he will, so nothing can be done or willed by him, which may derogate from the endlesse exer­cise of his infinite Majestie, power, truth, or goodnesse.

The use of this doctrine concerning the prero­gative of Omnipotencie, and the absolute impossi­bilitie of doing any thing that may derogate from it, is in generall this. As no opinion in the judge­ment of Philosophers can be convinced of absur­dity, untill it be resolved into a contradiction ei­ther unto it selfe, or unto some principle of nature from which it pretends some Originall title of Truth: so the only rule for the discovering impiety of opinions in Divinitie, or for cōvincing their Au­thors of heresie or infidelitie, is by manifesting their repugnancie or contradictiō to some one or o­ther divine Attribute, or to some special promise or asseveration made by the Almightie in Scriptures, [Page 15] and whosoever denies or contradicts any part of Gods word, doth contradict the divine truth or veracitie which no man hath any temptation either to deny or contradict, but from some doubt or de­niall of his Omnipotencie. Of such opinions as either contradict this Article of Omnipotency, or falsely pretend some colourable title of truth from it, wee shall have occasion to speake in the particu­lar Articles, against which these Errors are concei­ved, or whose truth they prejudice. Having hi­therto declared the object and meaning of this Ar­cle, we are in the next place to proove the truth of it against the Atheist.

CHAP. 3.
This visible world did witnesse the invisible power and vnitie of the Godhead unto the Ancient Heathens.

LEst any man should misconceive the1. former title of Almightie to bee but as a faire promising frontispice to an unresponsible worke, we have the fa­bricke of this Vniverse, the whole world it selfe and all things in it, produced as wit­nesses of the Almightie fathers alsufficiencie for ef­fecting whatsoever either this grand Attribute of Omnipotencie, or any other Article of this Creed may promise or intimate unto us. For when wee professe our beliefe, that there is a father Almigh­tie, who made the heaven and earth, wee must be­leeve [Page 16] not onely that hee made both, but that hee which so made them both, is both able and willing to effect all things for us, for which wee have his promise; euen things which neither eye hath seene nor eare hath heard; things which cannot possibly enter into the heart of man, by any bodily sense. To this purpose the Nicene Creed expresseth this article more fully. I beleeve in one God the Father Al­mightie, maker of Heaven & earth, and of all things visible and invisible. Hee that hath already made many things to us invisible, cā prepare those things for us, which neither eye hath seene nor eare hath heard. The inspection of this great visible sphere, did convince the understandings of such as had no other booke, besides this great booke of nature, to instruct them; the understandings of men altoge­ther unacquainted with Moses writings, that the Author of this great Booke, was the onely God, the onely invisible power, which deserved this sove­raigne title. For though it be probable that Plato had read Moses his historie, and his Law; there is no probabilitie, that either Orpheus or Pythagoras, both farre more ancient then Plato, had read or seene them, or could understand the language wherein they were in their times onely extant: Yet Iustin. Martyr one of the most ancient Christian writers,Iustin mar­tyr. De Mo­narchia Dei. produceth the testimonie of Pythagoras, (an heathen Philosopher against the Heathen) as a Second to Orpheus for confirmation of that truth, which we Christians in this Article beleeve.

2. Now albeit neither Orpheus nor Pythagoras were Canonicall writers, though their joynt au­thoritie be not infallible, yet the holy Ghost a tea­er most infallible, hath declared the reasons which they used, to be most infallible by the testimonie of two Canonical writers. The first is that of the Psal­mist, Psal. 96. 4, 5. The Lord is great & greatly to be praised: he is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the Nations are Idols, or gods no-gods: but the Lord made the heavens. The Prophet Ieremy is more expresse and more peremptorie. chap. 10. vers. 10, 11, 12. But the Lord is the true God, he is the living God and an everlasting King: at his wrath the earth shall tremble, and the Nations shall not bee able to abide his indignation. Thus shall yee say unto them, The gods that have not made the heavens, and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth, and from under those heavens. Hee hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdome, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion.

3. The consonancie between the live oracles of God and the dictates of reason in heathen men, af­ford us this Aphorisme, that it is not nature her selfe (which is never otherwise than negatively, or at the most Privatively opposed to the goodnesse of God) but the corruption of nature, which is al­waies contrarie to the good Spirit of God, where­by men are seduced unto Atheisme. And seeing this corruption of nature whereof Atheisme is the symptome, is the onely disease of the soule; the disease [Page 18] and the symptome cannot more kindly be cu­red then by reviving the strength of nature. The receipt for reviving and strengthning nature must be compounded of these two Truths, both evident by light of reason not eclipsed by interposition of corrupt affections or malignant habits, or freed from these by illumination of the spirit. The first truth is, that this visible world did not make it selfe, but had a maker which gave it beginning and conti­nuation of being: The two main prin­ciples con­tained in the Arti­cle of Cre­ation the second, that the making of this visible world doth evince the maker of it to be Omni­potent, and able to effect whatsoever he hath pro­mised. But before the former truth can have its operation upon the humane soule which is misaf­fected; the objections of the Atheists must bee re­moved. All his objections may be reduced to these two, ex nihilo nihil fit; of nothing nothing can bee made: whence seeing we acknowledge Creation, either to be a making of all things of nothing, or (at least) to suppose that some things are made of meere nothing: the truth which we Christians in this Article beleeve, may seeme directly to contra­dict a Philosophicall truth or principle in nature. This first objection is seconded by another. To create or to make something of nothing is to bee active: or thus, Creation supposeth an agent, and eue­ry agent presupposeth a patient. Now if there were any patient, or passive power praeexistēt to the Act of creation, this passive power or patient wherein it lodgeth was not created, but must have a beeing from Eternitie. From the difficultie included in this last objection, some philosophers did conceive [Page 19] an unfashioned or confused masse, coëuall to the Eternitie of divine power, which they acknow­ledged to be the Artificer or framer of this great worke, into that uniformitie or beautie of severall formes which now it beares. The first objection admits a double sense or doubtfull construction, and hath no truth in respect of the Almightie ma­ker, saue onely in the impertinent sense. The se­cond objection universally taken, is false.

CHAP. 4.
The first objection of the Atheist, Of nothing, no­thing can be made. Of the doubtfull sense of this naturall, how far it is true, and how farre it is false.

WHen it is said by the naturalist, that1. nothing can be made of nothing, or that every thing which is made is made of something: this particle ex or of, hath not alwaies the same im­portance: and in the multiplicitie of its significations or importances, the naturalist either hood winks himselfe, or takes opportunitie to hide his errour; or at least makes advantage of the doubtfull phrase against such as seeke to resell him. When we speake of naturall bodies or sublu­nary substances, this particle of, usually denotes the proper and immediate Matter whereof euery such body is made. Thus we say the Elements are mu­tually made one of another, or of the Matter which is common to them all; mixt bodies are made of [Page 20] the Elements wrought or compacted into one Masse; vegetables & living substances indued with sense, are made of mixt bodies, as of their immedi­ate and proper matter. Sometimes the same particle of or that speech (this body is made of that) doth not denote the immediate & proper matter whereof it is made, but yet imports that that part of the bodily substance, w^ch was in the one, becomes an ingrediēt in the other w^ch is made of it. So of water, wine was made by miracle Iohn 2. yet not made of water as of its immediate or proper matter, not so as vapors are made of moysture, ordistilled waters of fume or smoake: for so, that great worke had beene no true miracle, had included no creation, but a generation only. Now it is impossible unto nature to generate wine of water, without the ingredient of any other Element. It cannot be made by generation other­wise then of the juyce or sap of the Vine, which is not a simple Element, but the Expression of a bodie perfectly mixt. Howbeit in this miraculous con­version of water into wine, some part of the cor­poreall substance of water did remaine as an ingre­dient in the wine. There was not an utter annihi­lation of the water, and a new production of wine in the same place, where water had beene, but a true and miraculous Transubstantiation of water in­to wine. AndDe verbo, creare, ego ita censeo, creare du­plex esse, al­terum & praecipuum, ex nihilo fa­cere: alte­rum sine materiae dispositione facere. Nam substantia non videtur aliter fieri posse, quam generatione, aut creatio­ne. Genera­tio vero non est nisi in materia dis­posita: quae igitur sine materiae dis­positione est, creatio vo­cari debet. Qua propter sive ex nihi­lo omnia, si­ve ex nihilo quaedā, quae­dam ex ma­teria non disposita, sed jubendo fe­e [...] omnium est Deus ef­fector & creator. Vallesius. c. 2. p. 22. thus we must grant that Trees and vegetables were on the third day made, not imme­diately of nothing, That fishes and beasts were made, the one of the bodily substance of the earth, the other of the bodily substance of the waters, neither immediately made of nothing, albeit both [Page 21] were made, not by generation, but by creation, that is, not of any bodily matter, naturally disposed to bring forth or receive that forme, which by the creators hand, was instamped upon them. For in true Philosophy, That which Philosophers call the matter of all things generable, was not the first sublunary substance, which was produced; nor was it comproduced or concreated with them, but created in them after they were made. God had gathered the waters into one place, and the drie land into another, before either of them had power to con­ceive or become the common mothers of vege­table and living things. Thus were the heaven, and the earth first made, and the waters divided by the firmament, whereas the earth did not become the Matter or common mother of things vegeta­ble, before the third day,Of this Argument see Erastus in the be­ginning of his first Tome a­gainst Pa­racelsus. wherein God said, Let the earth bring forth grasse, the hearb yeelding seed, and the fruit tree, yeelding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in it selfe, upon the earth; and it was so. Gen. 1. 11. Nor did the waters become the common Mat­ter or mother of fishes, before the fift day, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, &c. Now this production of hearbs or plants out of the earth, of fish and fowle out of the substance of the water, was not a meer conserva­tion or actuation of that power, which the earth & waters had before; but the Creation of a new po­wer in them, the continuation of which power, is part of that, which we call the passive power of the matter. Nor had the fishes or whales, which God created, this passive power in themselves from [Page 22] their first creation, but received it from that bles­sing of God, ver. 22. Be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowle multiply in the earth. Nor did the earth become the Common mother of vegetables, as of hearbs, grasse, trees, &c. and of more perfect livings creatures, at the same time. It received power to bring forth the one upon the third day; not enabled to bring forth the other, untill the fift day; God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattell, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth. So that all these and man himselfe were not immediately made of nothing, though immediately made by God himselfe: for they were made by him of the substance of the earth, which was visible & praeex­istent to their making, though not made of it as of the matter. But when it is said, in the first of Ge­nesis, [God in the beginning made the heaven and earth,] it cannot be supposed or imported, that he made them of any visible or invisible substance praeexistent: and if hee made them or their com­mon masse of no substance praeexistent, here was something made of nothing: but how of nothing? or what doth this particle import? not that nothing should remaine as an ingredient in the first masse, or as if it had the like prece­dency to it, as the earth had to living things: the Al­mightie did not so turne nothing into something, as our Sauiour did water into wine. To say any thing could be made of nothing in this sense, or ac­cording to the former importances of the particle of, doth indeed imply an evident contradiction; for [Page 23] so nothing should be something, and simple not beeing should haue a true being. To make nothing to be something, fals not within the object of pow­er Omnipotent; it can be no part of the Almightie makers worke. As Cyphers cannot bee multiplied into numbers, by any skill in Arithmetique, though supposed infinite; so neither can nothing be conver­ted into something, nor become an ingredient in bo­dies created by any power, though infinite. As the Omnipotent Creator is one vnitie it selfe, so euery thing which he makes must have its unitie or Iden­titie, it cannot consist of contradictories.

2. When then it is said, that all things were made of nothing, or that creation supposeth some things to be immediately made of nothing, this particle of can onely import terminum a quo, the terme onely of the Action, not any matter or sub­ject: and yet the tearme thus imported, can bee no positive Entitie, but a meere negation of any positive Entitie precedent. To make the heauens and earth of nothing, is in reall value no more, then to make them not of any matter or Entitie praeex­istent, whether visible or invisible, on which their Maker did exercise his efficient power or efficacie; but to give them such beeing, as they then first began to have, that is, a corporeall beeing or ex­istence, by the meere efficacie or vertue of his word. As, suppose the Sunne should in a moment be suf­fered to transmit his light into a close vault of stone; we might truely say, this heavenly bodie, did make light of darknesse tanquam ex termino, in that it made light to be there, where was no light [Page 24] at all before, but meere darkenesse. And thus to make light out of darknesse, doth no way argue, that it turned darknesse into light, or that darknesse did remaine as an ingredient in the light made. After this manner, did the Amightie make the heaven and earth of nothing, that is, he made the corporeall masse or substance, out of which all things visible were made, where no limited substance, whether visible or invisible, was before; and by the same efficiencie, by which this masse was made, he made place or spatiousnesse quantitative, which had no beeing at all before; he did not turne indivisibi­litie into spatiousnes, or meere vacuitie into fulnes: fulnes and spatiousnesse were the resultance of that masse which was first made, without any Entitie or ingredient praeexistent. To make something of nothing in this sense, implies no contradiction; there is no impossibilitie, that the heaven and earth should be thus made, but this will not suffice to refute the Atheist or infidell. For many things are possible which are not probable, and many things probable which are not necessary. The next question then is, what necessitie there is in the infal­lible rules of nature and reason, that the Heavens & the earth, should be made of nothing. Against the probabilitie onely of Moses his historie of the first creation, the Atheist will yet oppose this generall induction, That all bodily substances that begin to be what before they were not, that all things which we see made, are alwayes made by some efficient cause, not out of meere nothing, but of some imper­fect being praexistent. To examine then the general [Page 25] rule pretended to amount from this generall indu­ction, s or what truth there is in that philosophicall maxime, ex nihilo nihil fit, is the next point.

CHAP. 5.
By what manner of induction or enumeration of particulars, universall rules or Maximes must bee framed and supported. That no induction can bee brought to proove the Naturalists Maxime, Of nothing, nothing can be made.

1 TO frame a generall rule or principle in any facultie, Art, or science, there is no other meanes possible besides in­duction, or a sufficient enumerati­on of particular experiments to sup­port it. The particulars, from which this suffici­encie must amount, may be in some subjects fewer, in others more. How many soeuer the particular instances or alleaged experiments be; the number of thē will not suffice to support an universall rule, unlesse they erect our understandings to a cleare view of the same reason, not onely in all the parti­culars instanced in, but in all that can be brought of the same kind. Vnlesse there bee a cleare resul­tance of the same reason in all, the induction failes, and the rule which is grounded on it, must needes fall. For this cause, universall rules are easily fra­med in the Mathematiques, or in other Arts, whose subjects are more abstract, or not charged with multiplicitie of considerations or ingredients; [Page 26] from whose least variation, whether by addition or subtraction, whether by further commixture or dissolution, the cause or reason of truth so va­ries, that the rule which constantly holds in a great many like particulars, will not hold in all, because they are not absolutely or every way alike.

Hee which seriously observes the manner, how right angles are framed will without difficultie yeeld his assent unto this universall rule, That all right angles are equall, because hee sees there is one and the same reason of absolute equalitie in al that can be imagined. And this negative rule, will, by the same inspection, win our assent without more adoe, that if any two angles be unequall, the one of them (at least) can be no right angle. The consi­deration likewise of a few particulars, will suffice to make up these universall never-failing rules.

1. First, that the greater any circle is, the grea­ter alwayes will the angle of the semicircle be.

2. The second, that the angle of the least semi­circle which can be imagined, is greater then the most capacious acute-angle that can be made by the concurrence of two right lines. And yet it will as clearly appeare from the inspection of the same particulars, from which the former rules do a­mount, that the angle of the greatest semicircle ima­ginable, cannot possibly be so capacious, as every right angle is. The consideration of the former rules, specially of the first and third, will clearly manifest, that the quantitie contained in these an­gles, how little soever they be, is divisible into in­finite indeterminate parts, or divisible into such [Page 27] parts, without possible end or limitation of divi­sion. But albeit the difference of quantitie between a right angle and the angle of a semicircle, bee po­tentially infinite, or infinitely divisible, according to parts or portions in determinate; yet will it not hence follow, that the one angle is as great againe as the other, according to the scale of any distinct or determinate quantitie, or expressible portions. And this observation in Mathematicall quantitie, would quickly checke or discover the weaknesse of many calculatory Arguments or inductions oft­times used by great Divines in matters morall or civill. As for example, that every sinne deserveth punishment infinite, because every sinne is an of­fence committed against an infinite Being or Ma­jestie. And the greater, or more soveraigne the Majestie is, which wee offend; the greater alwayes will the offence be, and meritorious of greater pu­nishment. Yet all this onely proves, an infinitie of indeterminate degrees in every offence against the divine Majestie, by which it exceedes all offen­ces of the same kinde committed onely against man: it no way inferres an infinite excesse or ods of actuall determinate punishment,See the first part of the Divine Essence & Attributes, chap. 20. pag. 219. 220. or ill deserts. For this reason, wee have derived the just award of everlasting supernaturall paines, unto tempora­rie and transeunt (bodily or naturall) pleasures, from the contempt of Gods infinite goodnesse, which destinates no creatures unto everlasting death, but such as he had made capable of everlast­ing joyes; nor were any of them infallibly destina­ted unto everlasting death, untill they had by vo­luntary [Page 28] transgression, or continuance in despising of the riches of his goodnesse, made themselves un­capable of the blisse to which hee had destinated them.

2 But to returne unto the force or efficacie of induction: that (wee say) is neyther so cleare, nor so facile in matters physicall or morall, as it is in the Mathematiques. Now, the reason, why per­fect inductions are so difficultly made, in matters naturall, is, because the subject of naturall Philoso­phy is not so simple or uncompounded, as Mathema­ticall bodies or figures are: and yet are naturall bo­dies subject to greater varietie of circumstances, more obnoxious to alteration by occurrences ex­ternall, then abstract lines, or motionlesse figures, or bodies are. The cunningest Alchymist (albeit hee could exactly temper his furnace to all the se­verall degrees of heate, that any fewell, of what kinde soever, could afford) cannot by any fire, or by any degree of heate, which issues from it, hatch the most imperfect bird that flyes: yet if he should hence inferre, that no birds could bee hatched by any kinde of heate, daily experience would con­vince his assertion of falshood, and his induction, although it consisted of ten thousand instances or experiments taken from the heate of the forge, or furnace, to be altogether lame. A man mighty try the like conclusion of hatching birds, in all the sands, that this Iland affords, upon the eggs of all the fowles that breed in it, or about it, and finde their barrennesse and unaptnesse for bringing forth any flying Creature, to bee as great, as it is for [Page 29] bringing forth wheate or other corne. And I am perswaded the compost of this our soyle is an unapt to bring forth the former effects, as our sands are. Yet if any man should hence make this generall in­duction, that no sand orSee Ma­crobius in his relati­on of Au­gustus his Apoph­thegmes. compost could performe this midwifery to the conception of any fowles; his errour might bee confuted by the Ostriches, which have beene hatched in the sands of Arabia; and by some compost in Aegypt, which performes that office unto young chickens, which brood-hens doe with us. No man in his time, or since he died, hath beene either more accurate or more industri­ous in observing the externall causes of sicknesse and health, then Hippocrates was. And, no questi­on, but he was as carefull to take his observations or frame his generall rules, from multitude of ex­periences, as any Philosopher or Physitian hath beene. NotwithstandingVide Sep­talium in Hippoc. de aere, aquis & locis. his observation concer­ning the nature and qualities of winds, and the de­pendence of mens health or sicknesse upon them, are farther out of date in France, then an Almanacke made the last yeare for the meridian of London, would be this yeare for the meridian of Mexico. The same winds, which in his Countrey, or in Countries wherein hee made his observations, were most healthfull; are most noysome in some parts of France. The diversitie of the soile, whence windes in severall regions arise or passe through, makes one and the same winde (in respect of the point or quarter of heaven from whence it comes,) to produce quite contrary effects in seve­rall religions, or situations. The East wind may, in [Page 30] some regions, dispose mens bodies to the Iaun­dice, and yet purifie mens blood in other places not farre distant for latitude. So may the South-wind, in some regions, taint mens bodies with consumptions, coughs, or other infirmities, and yet bee healthfull, in other regions not much distant for longitude.

Let then the meere Naturalist tyre himselfe, and his Reader, by long inductions, or with mul­titude of experiments in agents & subjects natural, for supporting his generall rule, ex nihilo nihil fit, [Every thing is made of something] yet his obser­vation, will reach no farther then to Agents or efficients, visible, or limited. Albeit his experi­ments in this kind were infinite; this inference ne­verthelesse [No visible agent can make any thing of nothing, therefore nothing can bee made of no­thing by an invisible or supernaturall Agent] would be more disjoynted then this following; No heate of fire or of the Sunne in what degree soever, can hatch liue-creatures, ergo the heate of the Dam cannot hatch her young ones. The difference be­tweene visible agents, may be much greater, then the difference betweene the heate or warmth of divers bodies. No earthly bodies can produce heate in others, but either by heate inherent in themselves or by motion, yet this will not con­clude, that no celestiall bodie (the Sunne for exam­ple) can produce heat in bodies sublunary, unlesse it selfe be inherently hot, or at least not without motion. It is more then probable, that the Sunne is not formally or inherently hot, and yet although [Page 31] it should stand still, (as once it did) in its sphere above our horizon, it would heat and warme us no lesse then now it doth, whilst it moueth. For cōclu­sion; to make any perfect inductiō sufficient to sup­port an vniversall rule, from earthly bodies, which shall conclude bodies Coelestiall, or from agents sublunarie or uisible, which shall as uniformely hold true in an agent invisible and supercoelestiall, is more difficult then to twist ropes of loose sand. That which the Naturalist should proove, if hee would bee an Atheist or infidell in graine, or op­pose the truth of Scriptures with probabilitie, is, that there is no invisible or spirituall Agent. And this is the point whereat the second obje­ction aymes: there can be no agent without a pa­tient, no exercise of Art, or power, without some matter or subject to worke upon.

CHAP. 6.
The second objection of the Naturalist: [Every agent praesupposeth a patient or passiue subject to worke upon] cannot bee proved by any induction. The contradictorie to this Maxime proved by suf­ficient induction.

1 ACtus agentium sunt in patiente bene disposito. The efficacie of every A­gent (saith the Philosopher) is in the patient fitly disposed to receive it. And else-where hee determines it as a positive truth, that every action is in the patient, [Page 32] not in the Agent. And this his position, may bee ratified by perfect induction or experiments in­pregnable: for every action is an operation, and every operation is so necessarily annexed vnto the effect produced, that where the one is, the other needes must be; and every effect is in the patient, or at least is the patient. The softning of waxe, the hardning of clay, the revivall of vegetables of se­verall kindes, are all actions proceeding from one and the same actuall force, or unvariable influence of the Sunne. The reason, why the active force is but one and the same, and why the actions or ope­rations are many and much different, is, because the active force, is in the Agent, whereas the acti­on or operation is in the patient, and is diversly multiplied according to the diversitie and multi­tude of the patients. We shall not need to question the universall truth of the former Maxime, That every action is in the patient, as some have done. For it holds as true in Divinitie as in Philosophy, & most apparent in the subject whereof we treate. Creation it selfe is an action, a reall action, yet not really in the Creator, but in the Creature onely. For no reall attribute, can be in the Creator, which was not in him from Eternitie; the Creature one­ly gets beginning of Being by Creation, which be­fore it had not. If then there can bee no agencie without an action, and every action be in the pati­ent, the cause is concluded, that every agent though Omnipotent supposeth a patient.

2. But it is one thing to suppose or require, ano­ther to praesuppose or praerequire patiēt; one thing [Page 33] to require or suppose a patient, another to require or suppose a matter or subject to worke upon. We are then to distinguish of Patients, and betwixt the workes wrought or effected by agents. A Patient is usually taken for the matter or subject on which the Agent doth exercise his active force, or out of which it produceth its worke. Euery finite a­gent, aswell naturall as artificiall doth praere­quire and presuppose such a kind of patient, that is, some reall matter or subject, whereon to worke. But this kind of patient is no just compere, no full correlative to an agent universally taken. The rela­latiō betwixt an agent & Patient taken in this sense, is neither so formall or necessary, as it is (inter agens & actum) betweene the Agent, and that which is acted, betweene the efficient and the effect, or be­tweene the worker and his worke. God wee grant could be no actuall agent, much lesse an Omnipo­tent actuall agent, without some Act or worke pro­duced by him. As there could bee no Creature without a Creator, so could there bee no Creator without a Creature. But that which the Naturalist is to prove, is, that the worke of Creation pre­supposeth some matter or subject for the Creator to worke upon. To manifest the impperfection of his inductions to this purpose, and to cleare our contradictorie assertion, wee are to distinguish or explicate the severall workes, which are or can be wrought.

3. Three sorts of workes the meere Naturalist grants. 1. Meerely naturall. 2. Meerely artificiall. 3. Partly naturall, partly artificiall. Workes of [Page 34] the last ranke, (for instance) are Physicall medi­cines, or all such workes as Nature of her owne accord, doth not attempt or undertake, but onely as shee is set a working by Art. Natu [...]e makes no physicall doses, but onely affords the simples, of which they are compounded by the Apothecarie: who notwithstanding cannot compound them without the ministery or operation of Nature. The Physitian may allot the severall quantitie of every ingredient, besides the proportion betwixt them; but the mixture must be immediately effected by heate, or other naturall qualities. So likewise must the extraction or expression of many simples bee wrought by Nature, but at the appointment or direction of the Physitian. Nature doth not at­tempt the making of Bell-metall, much lesse of Bells; and yet she affords all the ingredients to the Bell-founder, who cannot mixe them by any art, or skill, without the heate of the fire, or other ope­rations of Nature, set on worke or directed by him. Workes meerly naturall comprehend all sorts of bodies generable, whether the elements, or bodies mixt. The generation of every such body presup­poseth a mutation or alteration of qualities in the matter, before it become capable of a new forme or nature. Every alteration of qualitie wrought in any sublunary body (whether it be a praeviall dis­position or introduction to a new forme or nature; or whether it be accomplished without generation of any new substance) is the proper effect or worke of the agent, which causeth it. So is every artifici­all worke or forme, the effect or worke of the Arti­ficer. [Page 35] So that Art hath its proper effects as well as Nature, and every artificiall effect or worke suppo­seth an efficiencie or agencie in the Art or Artist: yet doth not the exercise of this active force or ef­ficiencie, eyther presuppose or require any such passive alteration of quality in the matter or subject, whereon it workes, as Nature requires in her pa­tients. Every Statue or Image of wood, is the ef­fect of the Statuarie, or a worke of the Art of Ima­gery; yet doe not these workes, being meerly ar­tificiall, eyther suppose, or necessarily require any alteration of qualitie in stone and wood. The Sta­tuary produceth no naturall effect or qualitie, which was not in the stone before, but onely makes that visible and apparant to the eye, which was former­ly hidden or enveyled in the stone. Every Letter of the Decalogue was in the Tables of stone, before they were ingraven, eyther by the finger of God or by Moses, and became legible onely by their Art or skill of ingraving; yet not made legible by any addition of substance, of quantitie, or qualitie, but by meere abscision of quantitative parts. And this abscision, from which visible characters, or ter­minate figures result, whether in wood or stone, is the proper effect of the Carver or Ingraver. Both these inductions following, universally taken, are false, (though both true in their proper subject:) [1. No Statuary, or Carver, or other like Artifi­cer can produce his proper worke, without some abscision or variation of quantitie in the subject, whereon hee workes: therefore Nature cannot produce her proper effects, without some altera­tion [Page 36] of quantitie in the matter or subject wherein shee workes. 2. Naturall agents or efficients ne­ver produce their proper effects, but by working some alteration or qualitie in the Matter: there­fore no Artificer can produce the proper workes of his Art, without the like alteration of qualitie in the subject whereon hee workes.] Nor will it follow, that because effects meerly artificiall may be wrought without any alteration of qualitie, therefore mixt effects, or workes partly naturall, partly artificiall, as compounded Medicines or Bell-metall, can be so wrought. Least of all can it be inferred, that because Art as well as Nature supposeth a subject praeexistent whereon to worke; therefore the Agent supernaturall, or the Efficient superartificiall, alwayes presupposeth some matter or subject praeexistent, out of which, or in which hee produceth his proper worke. The reason why the former Inductions faile, is because the Agents or Efficients are of a different ranke or kinde. And theVide Arist lib. 1. Poster. Analyt. cap. prohibition holds as true in point of induction as of demonstration, Non licet transcendere a genere ad genus. Hee that will demonstrate any conclu­sion, must not rove from one kinde of subject to another. And the reason why in thus roving he shall certainly faile of his intended conclusion, is, because the principles whence the intended con­clusion must be inferred, cannot be gathered but by induction, and no induction can prove any ge­nerall Maxime, unlesse it consist of particulars of the same kinde. A philosophicall maxime can­not be gathered from Inductions meerly Mathe­maticall, [Page 37] nor mathematicall principles from ex­periments philosophicall. Nor can Artificiall Maximes or conclusions (especially negative) bee gathered from experiments naturall, nor Maximes naturall from observations in subjects meerely Ar­tificiall. Least of all can any theologicall maximes, be ratified from experiments meerely naturall, ar­tificiall, or mathematicall; but onely by inducti­ons, or reasons abstract and metaphysicall, that is, such as hold true in all Arts or sciences whatsoe­ver. The onely certaine rule, which all the former inductions can afford, is this: There can bee no reall effect, whether artificiall, naturall, or superna­turall, without an efficient: Nothing which now is not, or sometimes was not, could possibly bee made without some agent or maker: betweene every naturall Agent and its patient, betweene eve­ry Artificer and his worke, there alwayes results a mutuall relation of efficient and effect. But this rule will not abide the turning: Betweene every effici­ent and its proper effect, there alwayes results a mutuall relation of agent and patient; if by this terme patient wee understand a matter or subject praeexistent to the exercise of the agents effici­encie.

4 The usuall division of Agents into artificiall, naturall, and supernaturall, supposeth a three-fold diversitie in their objects, betwixt which there is this proportion, As nature alwayes affordeth art a compleat naturall subject to worke upon: so the supernaturall agent, or supreme efficient, exhibits that imperfect substance or matter unto nature, [Page 38] which shee brings unto perfection. Nature doth so unto Art, as it is done to her by a benefactor su­pernaturall. Vnto this observation upon the for­mer division, wee can adde no more, nor can any more be required, besides a just proofe that there is an agent supernaturall, which sometimes had no matter at all to worke upon, but made even Nature her selfe, and the passive capacitie or subject where­on shee workes, of no worke or matter praeexistent. The matter it selfe, and nature it selfe, are the im­mediate effects of his active force or efficiencie. Now to beate the Naturalist at his owne weapon, wee are to make proofe of this assertion by full in­duction, and strength of reason grounded upon ex­periments in every subject wherein the Naturalist can instance. First, it is universally true of all the workes as well of Nature, as of Art, which now are perfect, and sometimes were not so, that they did not make themselves, but had (respectively) their severall makers or efficient causes, which brought them unto that perfect estate and condi­tion which now they have. The most perfect works of nature cannot put themselves into a perfect arti­ficiall forme, without the help of some Artificer. Stones doe not naturally grow into Statues, nor trees into the pictures or Images of men or birds: Brasse and Copper, with other metalls conceived in the bowells of the earth, doe not either by them­selves, or by the help of naturall causes which pro­duce them, cast or mould themselves into Guns or Bullets. The Earth and Water doe not worke them­selves into the live-substance of plants or vegeta­bles, [Page 39] but are first wrought, and (as it were) kneaded together by the heate of the Sunne; first altered, & then incorporated into the substance of such trees, by the vegetative faculty, which is actually resident and praeexistent in the trees or plants, which are nourished by them. There is no sublunarie sub­stance which did not take beginning, either entire­ly and together, or piece-meale and successively. The elementall bodies of the ayre and water, were not totally the same a thousand yeares agoe, that now they are: both continue the same they were by equivalencie of succeeding parts, or daily addition by new generation. Now successive generation supposeth an end or destruction of that that was, & a beginning of that which succeedes in its place; and the beginning of every thing, supposeth a be­ginner or cause efficient, to give it being. The race or continuation of more perfect sublunary sub­stances, as of vegetables and moving creatures, re­maines the same, not by equivalency of succeeding parts, but by a totall production of distinct indivi­dualls. And every distinct individuall tree or liuing creature, hath its immediate and proper efficient, as well as its materiall cause, nothing can give it selfe a distinct numericall being.

5 What is the reason then, why the workes of nature, which are perfected in their kinde by their proper efficients (as trees come to full growth) cannot transforme themselves into bodies artifici­all without the worke of the Artificer? What is the reason why the imperfect masse, wherein the seeds of nature are contained, cannot grow up into a [Page 40] perfect or compleate body naturall, without the efficiencie of some other in the same kinde already compleate? Fortes creantur fortibus. Nature makes nothing perfect, but by the help of some Agent formerly made perfect: Doth the perfection of bo­dies artificiall by an indispensable Law of necessitie, require a perfect worke of nature praeexistent to the operation of Art: and doth this perfect worke of nature, bee it brasse, wood, or stone, by a like indispensable Law of necessitie, require an imper­fect masse or matter praeexistent to the naturall A­gents or efficients, which mould or kneade it into its perfect or specificall forme? And shall not this imperfect masse, with all its severall Elements or in­gredients that can be required to the perfection of any naturall body, more necessarily require some precedent efficient cause of its imperfect being or existence? This cannot be conceived; for if these imperfect substances, whereof any naturall body is made, could eyther give beginning of being to themselves, or have it from no cause efficient, they should bee in this respect much more per­fect, than the more perfect workes of nature, in that they eyther make themselves, or have no maker.

Vpon this principle of nature, or from this impos­sibilitie in nature [That any visible work whether naturall or artificiall, should either give it selfe be­ing or have its being from no cause precedent] did See Tully Lib. de na­tura Deo­rum. Tully rightly argue, that as a man comming into an house, wherein were no live creatures saue Rats and Mice, could not conceive that either the house [Page 41] did make it selfe, or had no other maker besides these Rats and Mice, which were found in it: So neither can it be imagined, that this visible spheare wherein the workes of Art and Nature, are daily seene, and doe daily begin to be and expire; could either make it selfe, or have beeing of it selfe, without beginning, without a Maker super-arti­ficiall, or an efficient supernaturall. Every part of this Vniverse considered alone, is a worke of na­ture, but the exquisite harmony betweene them, is a worke more then Artificiall. All that nature can adde to art, or art to nature, is but a shadow of that great Artificers skill, which composed the severall workes of nature into so excellent a forme, and tuneth their discording qualities, in­to such exact harmony. The induction of Tully is more briefly, but more pithily and expressely gathered by our Apostle Heb. 3. ver. 4. Euery house is builded by some man, but hee that built all things is God. But if every house bee built by some man, how is God said to build all things? shall every builder of an house be a God? No: but whatso­ever man doth build, God doth likewise build. For except the Lord doth build the house, they labour in vaine, that are builders of it. Psalm. 127. 1. Better it were to bee idle or to doe nothing, then either to be laborious in building houses, or watchfull in guarding Cities strongly built, unlesse the Lord doe afford not onely his concurrence, but his blessing to the labours of the one, and to the watchfulnesse of the other. But in this argument wee may expa­tiate without impeachment of digression from the [Page 42] matter, or of diversion from our ayme, in the fol­lowing Treatise of divine providence.

6. This present Treatise requires an inducti­on, sufficient to prove that every visible or subluna­rie substance, aswell the common matter whereof all such things are made, as the severall formes, which are produced out of it, have an efficient cause precedent to their making or production. For the seuerall formes, or bodies generable which are constituted by them, the induction is as cleare to every mans sense or understanding, as any ma­thematicall induction can bee. The naturalist is neither able nor disposed to except against the uni­versalitie of it, or to instance in any sublunarie bo­die, which hath not a true efficient cause, or an agent precedent; from whose efficacie its physicall or essentiall forme, was either made, or did result. The question onely remaines about the efficien­cie or production of the prime or common matter. Seeing it is the mother of generation, wee will not vexe the Naturalist by demanding a generative cause efficient of its beeing, but that it must have some cause efficient, wee shall enforce him to grant from a generall Maxime most in request with men of his profession. The Maxime is [That the phi­losophicall progresse from effects to their causes, or from inferiour to superiour causes, is not like Arithmeticall or geometricall progressions; it can­not bee infinite.] Wee must at length come to one supreme cause efficient, which in that it is su­preame, is a cause of causes, but no effect, and being no effect, nor cause subordinate to any other A­gent, [Page 43] it can have no limit of Beeing, it can admit no restraint in working. Whatsoever we can con­ceive as possible to have limited Beeing, or begin­ning of such Beeing, must haue both frō it & by it. Now if the perfect workes of nature, bodies sub­lunarie of what kind soever, suppose a possibilitie physicall included in the prime and common matter, before they have actuall Being; if it imply no contradiction for them to have beginning of Beeing, it will imply no contradiction, that the prime mater it selfe or imperfect masse, whereof they are made, should have a beginning of its im­perfect beeing; That Physicall beeing which it hath, doth presuppose a logicall possibilitie of beeing, as it is; that is, no contradiction, for it sometimes to be, and sometimes not to haue beene. This supreame cause or agent which (as we suppose,) did reduce the logicall possibilitie of the prime matter of sub­lunary bodies into Act, cannot be the heavens, or a­ny part of the hoast of heavē, neither the sun, moon nor stars. For, albeit the Sun be the efficient cause, by which most workes of nature in this sublunarie part of the world, are brought to perfection: yet is it no cause at all of that imperfect masse or part of nature, on which it workes. Vnlesse it had some matter to worke upon, it could produce no reall or solid effect by its influence, light or moti­on, how ever assisted with the influence of other stars or planets. Yet must this prime matter, have some cause; otherwise it should be more perfect than the bodily substances, which are made of it. For they all stand in neede, both of this prime matter, [Page 44] as a cause in it kinde concurrent to their producti­on, and of the efficiencie of the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents to worke or fashion the materi­alls or Ingredients, of which they are made. If either this common matter of sublunary sub­stances, or the Sunne which workes upon it, had no superiour cause to limit their beeing or distin­guish their offices; both of them should bee infinite in Beeing; both infinite in operation. Now if the matter were infinite in beeing: the Sunne or o­ther coelestiall Agents, could have no beeing but in it, or from it. For if the Sunne were infinite in operation, the matter it selfe could bee nothing at all; no part of nature, unlesse it were a worke or effect of the Sunne. Infinitie in beeing excludes all possibilitie of other Beeing save in it and from it. And infinitie in operation, supposeth all things that are limited, whether in beeing or operation, to bee its workes, or resultances of its illimited efficacie.

CHAP. 7.
Shewing by reasons philosophicall, that aswell the phy­sicall matter of bodies sublunary, as the celestiall bo­dies which worke upon it, were of necessitie to have a beginning of their Beeing and Duration.

1 FOr further demonstration, that as well the Sunne, which is the effici­ent generall, as the prime matter which is the common mother of bo­dies sublunary, had a beginning of beeing, there can be no meane eyther more forcible or more plausible, then another Maxime much im­braced and insisted upon by the great Philosopher, to wit, that as well the efficient as the materiall cause derive the necessitie of their causalitie from the end or finall cause, unto which they are destinated. The Sunne doth not runne its daily course from East to West, or make its annuall progresse from North to South, to get it selfe heate, or for the increase of its native force or vigour, by change of Climates; but for the propagation of vegetables, for the continuance of life and health in more per­fect sublunary substances. If then wee can demon­strate, that those vegetables or more perfect sublu­narie bodies, for whose continuall propagation, for the continuance of whose life and well-fare the Sunne becomes so indefatigable in its course, had a true beginning of beeing, that the propagation is not infinitely circular: the cause will be concluded, that as well the common matter, whereof they are [Page 46] made, as the Sunne it selfe which produceth them, had a beginning of beeing and operation from the same supreame cause, which appointed the Sunne thus to dispense its heate and influence, for the re­liefe and comfort of this inferiour world. To prove that these sublunarie more perfect bodies, as vegetables, &c, had a beginning of beeing or propagation; no Argument can be more effectuall to the Naturalist, or others that will take it into serious consideration; than the discussion of that probleme, which Plutarch hath propounded, Whe­ther the Egg were before the Hen, or the Hen before the Egg. The state of the question will be the same in all more perfect vegetables, or living Creatures, which usually grow from an imperfect or weake estate to a more perfect and stronger: [Whether the Acorne were before the Oake, or the Oake before the Acorne. Whether the Lyon had precedencie of nature to the Lyons whelp, or the Lyons whelp unto the Lyon. The induction may be for eyther part most com­pleate, in respect of all times and of all places, if with the Naturalist wee imagine the world to have beene without beginning, or without ending. No Naturalist can ever instance in any more perfect feathered fowle, which was not first covered with a shell, or contained in some more imperfect filme; in any Bull which was not first a Calfe; in any Ly­on, which was not first a whelp; in any Oake, which did not first spring from an Acorne: unlesse he instance in painted Trees, in brazen Bulls, or artificiall Lyons. Of live naturall substances it is universally true, (Omnia ortus habent, sua (que) certa [Page 47] incrementa) All have their beginning, all their cer­taine increase or augmentation. The induction again is for the other partie as compleate and perfect. There never was a true Acorne, which did not presuppose an Oake; nor a Lyons whelp which did not presuppose a Lyon to beget it, and a Ly­onesse to bring it forth. Now every productive cause, every live-substance, which produceth ano­ther by proper causalitie or efficiencie, hath al­wayes precedencie of nature and of time, in respect of that which is produced by it. The Lyon is in order of nature and of time, before his whelp, and yet is every Lyon wherein the Naturalist can in­stance, a whelp before it be a Lyon; so is the Oake, in order of nature and of time, before the Acorne, and yet cannot the Naturalist instance in any Oake, which was not an Acorne or plant before it grew to be an Oake. If then eyther the race of Lyons, or the propagation of Oakes, had no beginning; it would inevitably follow, that Oakes had beene perpetually before Acornes, and Acornes perpe­tually before Oakes; That Lyons whelpes from eternitie had precedency or prioritie of time of Lyons, and Lyons the like precedencie or prioritie of time of their whelps. And if they had bin mutu­ally each before other from eternitie, according to prioritie of time and nature, they must have beene mutually each after other. How the Naturalist will be able to digest this circular revolution of priori­tie and posterioritie, in respect of the same indivi­duall natures, or what hee will say to these follow­ing inconveniences, I cannot tell, but desire to [Page 48] know: Every whole or perfect Fish, which the Naturalist hath heard or read of, had beginning of its individuall Beeing from Spawne. This induction is most compleate and perfect in the Schoole of Nature, most irrefragable by the supposition of the Naturalist with whom wee dispute. Every Fish hath a beginning from Spawne, and that which hath a beginning from Spawne, hath a beginning of its beeing. No Fish or Spawne is or hath beene immortall, or without beginning. Now if it bee universally true, that every particular Fish hath its beginning, it implies an evident contradiction, to say that the race of Fishes, which consist onely of particular Fishes, was without beginning. There must in every race of Fishes be some first Fishes, or first Spawnes, before which there was none of the same kind, frō which this mutual propagation did take its beginning. And though this propagation be without end, yet could it not be without be­ginning, unlesse wee would grant that fishes are not onely of an incorruptible nature, but of a na­ture infinite or eternall. If there were no begin­ning of this mutuall propagation, it would bee de­manded whether the number of fishes or Lyons that shall bee (granting what the Naturalists sup­pose, that this propagation shall be endlesse) can ever be as great, as the number of those Fishes and Lyons that have beene? Or whether the number of those that have beene, may not be conceived to be more infinite, or in another sort infinite, than the number of those that shall be. That the num­ber of Fishes, or Lyons, which, from this time for­ward, [Page 49] may be, (suppose the world were never to end) can be no otherwise infinite then potentially or successively onely, or by addition, because there shall never be any last Lyon, or fish, &c. after which there shall bee no more, the Naturalist will not denie. For those Lyons or fishes, which from this point of time shall be, have as yet no actuall beeing, nor have they before this time had any such bee­ing. Whence it is cleare, that their number can never be actually infinite, but infinite onely by ad­dition, as continuate quantitie is by division.Ego certe hac in re laudo Ari­stotelem, quod cum impossibi­litatem (ut ita dixe­rim) aeter­norum mo­tuum, & corporum, non praevi­derit, maluit ab Eterno esse pulchrā hanc mundi faciem, quam ali­quando ex aeterna de­formitate emersisse. Oportuit vero ipsum aternitatē illam temporis meditari; reperisset siquidem, ut ne (que) in corpore, ne (que) in loco (haec enim ille demonstravit) ita ne (que) in tempore infinitatem esse potuisse: si quidem est etiam tempus quan­tum, ut & corpus, & locus. Si igitur omnia quanta finita, tempus quoque totum finitvm est, & erit. Quare fact us est aliquando [...] ex nihilo. Vallesusde sacra philosoph. pag. 18. But if fishes have beene produced from Spawne, and Spawne from fishes, without any beginning of time, wee must of necessitie grant, that there have beene Fishes, Lyons, Oakes, &c. propagated each from other, for number actually infinite: for every Fish, which could produce Spawn, had actuall bee­ing before it could yeeld Spawne, & every Spawne wherof any fish is made, hath actuall beeing before any Fish can be made of it. Whence if this propa­gation had beene without beginning, their number must needes be actually infinite, so infinite that there could have beene no more than have beene, that there can be no more than now are. That onely is actually infinite, unto which nothing of the same kinde can be added. If this mutuall propagation had beene from eternity, the number of things pro­pagated should have been actually infinite in every [Page 50] point of time imaginable. It is impossible that any thing should be actually infinite from eternitie, and not bee alike actually infinite throughout every part of time; as infinite yesterday as to day, or as it shall be to morrow. It is againe impossible, that any thing should be actually infinite in any part of time, or by any succession of time, which was not infinite from eternitie, and before all times. If wee shall suffer our imaginations of mutuall pro­pagations, to rove backward without an imagina­tion or acknowledgement of some first beginning to stay or limit them, our soules shall finde as little rest (with lesse securitie) as Noahs Dove did, whi­lest the earth was overflowed with water, if she had not returned to the Arke. Vnlesse wee thus pitch upon a first beginning of time and all things tem­porall, we shall not only make shipwracke of faith, but drench our immortall soules in a bottomlesse lake or poole of absurdities, even in nature.

2 The conclusion arising from these premises, is, that albeit naturall reason or discourse could ne­ver have found out that which Moses hath written, concerning the particular manner of the worlds creation; as that it, and all things in it, all the seve­rall originals of propagation, were created in sixe dayes: yet Moses his narrations can onely give sa­tisfaction to such Problemes, as men by light of nature may propose or cast, but can never, without the light of Gods word, be able to assoyle. By so much of this light as Moses in the first Chapter of Genesis holds out unto us, wee may easily free our selves from perpetuall wandring in that inextrica­ble [Page 51] maze of mutuall or circular precedencie, be­tweene things generable, and their generative effici­ents, which the Naturalist can never avoid, untill with us hee grant, that which theAristor. nono ma­taphysico­rum, cap. 8. Manifestū est, quod actus prior potentia est. Dico autem non solum illa potentia determinata quae dicitur principium transmuta­torium in a­lio, prout a­liud est, sed prorsus om­ni motivo, et Statorio principio. Et 12 Me­taphys. cap. 7, Quare vita, & ae­vum conti­nuum, & ae­ternum Deo inest. Hoc e­nim est De­us Quicun­que vero (ut Pythagorici, et Speusippus putant) optimum & pulcherrimum non esse in principio, eo quod plantarum quo (que) ac animali ū principia, causae quidem sunt: bonum vero, & perfectum in ijs esse, quae ex his sunt, non recte putant. Sperma namque ex alijs prioribus perfectis est, neque Sperma primum est, sed quod perfectum est: veluti hominem dicere quispiam possit priorem spermate esse, non illum, qui eo generatur, sed alium, ex quo ipsum Sperma est. Quod itaque est quaedam aeterna, immobi­lis (que) substantia, & à sensibilibus separata, constat ex dictis. Philosopher by the light of Nature did indefinitely teach (Actus prior est potentia,) That which hath perfect beeing, is simply and absolutely before that which proceedeth from it, or is brought to perfection by it. Thus Moses tells us, Gen. 1. vers. 11. That there was an earth, before there was any grasse, that out of this earth was brought forth hearb yeelding seede; and fruit trees yeelding fruit with seed in them, before there was any propagation by seede. So he tels us againe, vers. 21. That God created great Whales, and eve­ry living creature [...]at moveth in the waters after their kinde, before there was any Spawne of fishes or seede of fowles: For so it followes in the 22. ver. That God blessed them, (after hee had made them) saying, Be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the waters and the Seas, and let fowle multiply on the earth. And it was this blessing upon fish and fowle (thus crea­ted at once, that is, made perfect in their kinde, not by growth or succession, but by present operation of his Omnipotent power) which gave first begin­ning to the naturall propagation of Fishes and Fowles by Seede or Spawne. Againe, in as much as the greatest Whales or other creatures most per­fect [Page 52] in their kinde, though produced in a moment, did presuppose a possibilitie of their being, and in their most perfect actual beeing include more than a possibilitie of not beeing, a necessary inclination to returne unto the matter or masse out of which they were made. This beeing which they have, pre­supposeth an infinite and pure act, which every way hath precedencie of them, as having no cause at all of his beeing, but is beeing it selfe, without pos­sibilitie of not beeing. The manner or method which Moses observed in the Creation, was this: Hee made the Heaven and Earth and first masse, of meere nothing, that is, without any masse or sub­ject visible or invisible praeexistent, whereon to worke. That imperfect masse of this great Spheare, now distinguished into its severall parts, and, with­in sixe dayes, adorned and beautified in every part beyond all skill of Art, was the first effect or prime worke in order of time or nature of his all sufficient active power or efficiencie. Out of this masse hee made all things visible in their kind, not by meanes or efficiencie naturall, but by the same supernaturall or Omnipotent power, by which he made the first masse out of nothing. In the prime and Cardinall workes of the sixe dayes, the Almighty did pro­ceede, though by supernaturall efficiencie, in that order or method, which Nature, by his appoint­ment, since hath followed. Man which is the most perfect visible creature, was the last made, & next before him, the beasts of the field, which are next in perfection to him: Next before them, the fowles of the Ayre and fishes of the Sea; and immediately [Page 53] before them, the Sunne, the Moone, and the Stars. But in the severall fountaines or roots of propaga­tion by seede, hee baganne the contrary way. Hee first made man perfect, before hee gave him the power of propagation. So did hee make every li­ving creature actually perfect in his kinde, before he gave them power to increase and multiply by natu­rall seede or inchoation of now being.

3. It is a conceipt groundlesse, either in Philo­sophy or Divinitie, which some late Divines as­well of the Romish as of Reformed Churches, not without faire pretence of Saint Augu­stines Divus Augustinus censet om­nia esse creata simul eodem mo­mento, seu in eodem nunc; illam vero parti­tionem Die­rum, non significare partes temporis, sed distinctionem, & gradus quosdam naturae verum: at (que) factum esse hominem ex terra, non actu praeexistente, sed existente potentia in ipso, velut quivis dicitur nostrum, vere factus ex quatuor Elementis, tametsi nulla terra, aut aqua erat actu id ex quo facti sumus, sed semen & sanguis. Ita (que) ut unico intuitu tota facies, & ejus omnes partes, inspeculo exprimuntur, ita unica Iussione Dei, constitisse totam hanc corpoream molem, & in ea refulsisse illum divinitatis fulgorem, quem vocamus naturam. Caeterum quia non omnes sancti hoc ita intelligunt, alia responsione est opus. Vallefius de sa­cra Philos. cap. 1. pag. 22. Ne (que) vero hoc ullam arguit primae causae debilitatem. Non enim eam causam naturalem ponimus, q [...]ae (que) faciat semper quantum potest, sed liberam & sapien­tissimam, quae facit ut maxime expedit, at (que) omnia pulcherrin [...]a & concinna, in nnmero, pondere, & [...]c [...]sura. Quapropter verba illa capitis 18. Ecclesiastici, Qui vivit in aeter­num creavit omnia simul, ego ita interpretor; Creata esse omnia intra illam hebdomadam, perfectum (que) esse mundum, ita ut nulla ejus pars princeps, quaeque a creatione habitura esset initium, deesset. Nam ut initio capitis secundi dicitur, perfecti sunt caeli & terra, & om­nis ornatus eorum, complevit (que) Deus dic sexta opus suum. Valles cap 1. pag. 45.Authoritie, have taught, that all things were created at once, or in one day, by the Almightie maker: that the mention of Gods six daies worke, is interserted by Moses, onely for distinction sake, or in respect of our incapacitie to conceive di­stinctly of Gods workes. But if all things had beene made in this sense, at once, that is, upon one day: no reason could be given why Gods com­mendation [Page 54] of something which hee made, should bee omitted, and exprest upon the making of o­thers; or why the commendation of his workes, should have beene oftner exprest than once, if the productiō or finishing of al things which he made, had beene momentarie, or in the compasse of one day. Now in the first part of Moses his historie [In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth] we doe not reade, that God saw it was good. What is the reason? because as yet they were not perfected in their kind; but destinated onely unto more perfection. Of the light which was created the first day (saith Moses) God saw that it was good. But so he saith not of the second dayes worke, which was the separation or divisi­on betweene the waters which are above the fir­mament, and the waters beneath it. What doth this omission of the divine approbation intimate unto us? thus much, if no more, That the second dayes worke did not bring the waters to that per­fection and use whereunto they were destinated. But of the third dayes worke, in which the earth was severed from the waters, under the firma­ment, and enabled by his creative power, to bring forth Hearbes and other Vegetables, God (saith Moses) saw that it was good. And so it is likewise said of the fourth dayes worke, in which the Sun and Moone and the Stars were made; and so likewise of the fift, wherein the water was authorized to bring forth fowles and fishes perfect in their kind: and lastly of the sixt day, wherein man was made, it is said, that God saw all that he had made, and it [Page 55] was exceeding good. To explicate every dayes worke in particular, would require a larger Treatise, then we project our intended Commen­taries upon the Apostles Creede, shall bee. Of such Euangelicall mysteries, as the Historie of the sixt dayes worke and the seaventh dayes rest, did by way of Embleme, portend or foreshadow, wee shall have occasion to treate, when wee come un­to the Sonne of Gods consecration unto his ever­lasting Priesthood; or of the Sonne of mans resi­ding three dayes and three nights, in the wombe of the earth: which speech of our Saviour, cannot bee verified either of three naturall dayes, or of three artificiall dayes and nights, but hath a pecu­liar reference to three of those evenings and mor­nings, which Moses mentioneth in the historie of the Creation. The taske for the present under­taken, was to shew theSi facta omnino non sunt (viz. corpora coe­lestia) fit ut sint per sese ab aeterno, et esse proprio existentia. Quapropter nullum illorum ab alio pend [...]at, aut alio posterius sit, sed per sese sint, & ope­rentur ab aeterna (cum operatio procedat à cujus (que) rei natura, & proprio esse:) quare nulla illis prior causa sit, (si enim haec effecta ab alio non sunt, non sit ulla eorum causa) quaprop­ter mundus hic universas, ne (que) unus erit, ne (que) totus, neque perfectus, cum non pendcat totus ab unica virtute & causa, neque causae omnes in unam omnium primam, referantur: sed sint multae mundi partes, à quibus non procedatur ad ullam aliam superiorem, & priorem, hoc vera fieri non potest. Nam ant illae partes habent aliquam naturam sive essentiam communem, aut omnino habent nihil commune. Ex adeo diversis, ut nihil commune dica­tur de illis, nulla ratione potest constari unum: Nam neque ordo esse [...]otest inter omnino diversa. Ordo enim secundum aliquid commune est, dicimus enim inter Petrum & Fran­ciscum ordinem quendam esse. Si concedis partes illas mun [...]i habere aliqu [...] essentiam communem; constat, quandoquidem non sunt omnino cadem, habere as aliquid commune & aliquid diversum. Est autem quod commune unum: quae diversa multa. Illud ergo com­mune prius erit illis omnibus diversis: si quidem ex co constant haec: non ergo [...] par­tes, suo quaeque ordine primae causae, sed pend [...]bant illae omnes ab aliquo [...] causa, à qua daeta erat eis communis illa essentia. Vallesius de sacra Philosophia▪ pag. 16. possibilitie of the Creati­on, or making all things of nothing, and that there is a necessitie in nature, that things generable [Page 56] should have a beginning, that the propagation of living Creatures, could not be from Eternitie, not before all times imaginable. And if sublunarie sub­stances, or vegetables had a beginning: Not the Elements onely whereof they are made, but the Heavens themselves, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, by whose influence they are produced, must have their beginning too; because the end of their beeing, of their operation, of continuance in their course or order, is for the continuall pro­pagation of vegetables, and living bodies. I may conclude this first point, with that acute collecti­on of Iustin Martyr, [...]] If there were no Sunne, there could be no use of the eye, and if there were no eye, there should be no use of the great eye of this world, at least of its light. But in as­much, as the Sunne is necessary for the eye, and the eye for the Sun, there is a necessitie that both of thē should have a beginning of Beeing. For that which hath no beginning of beeing, cannot have its beeing for any other sake, besides it owne. Nor can we truely say, that it is for its owne sake. And this Authors reason for this assertion, is most judiciously acute. [...], praeter causam enim est cujus can­sa non est, so the Latin translator. The Authors full meaning is, That which hath no efficient cause to give its beginning of beeing, can have no finall cause of its beeing, or rather no cause at all, whether finall, formall, or material. But is it selfe the cause of causes, [Page 57] the prime efficient, by which all things are what they are, and the last end or finall cause, for which they are.

CHAP. 8.
Discussing the second generall proposed, Whether the making something of nothing rightly argue a power Omnipotent.

1 THe discussion of the second generall Principle,See Chap­ter 3. § 3. might well have had its admission into Divinity denyed, had not some Schoole Divines, by di­sputing whether there can be any instrumentall cause of Creation, given it a coloura­ble pretence for intruding it selfe. Their meaning may in more civill language be thus exprest; [Whe­ther the power of creating may by omnipotency be de­legated to any agent, not omnipotent.] That Omni­potency it self cannot be delegated, all agree. Now if the production of spirituall grace in the heart of man be, a true and proper effect of creative power; they who teach that the Sacraments of the Gospel do conferre grace ex opere operato, that is, by their proper efficacy; are ingaged to make proofe, that the power of creation may be delegated, by the Almighty Father, either to the consecrated Sacra­mentary Elements, or to the Priest which conse­crates them. But leaving the discussion of this Question (in the explication of whose termes or meaning, the favourers or maintainers of it, do not [Page 58] agree) [...] proper place [...] our present questi­on is, Whether ability to create substances visible or invisible, doth necessarily inferre it to be Omni­potent. Spirituall grace, all grant, is no substance. But here againe, the Schoolemen have troubled themselves and their Readers, with a question, if not more curious, yet as unnecessary as the former; as whether this visible world, or at least some part of it, might not have beene created immediately by Angels, as by Gods instrumets. The Question (perhaps) might be more pertinent and more di­stinct, were it framed thus; [Whether to make any visible or invisible substance of nothing, or without any matter pretedent, which should remaine, as an ingredient in the substance made, do rightly infer the immediate maker to be Omnipotent.] That any cause efficient of substance, which hath beene crea­ted, or hereafter may be created, could be enabled to create or make any other substance, without any entity praexistent, whereof it should be made, is an hypothesis or supposall, which hath no other ground either in Philosophy or Divinity; besides the vncertaine grounds, from which some have attempted to prove, that creation is a prerogative of the one Omnipotent, which cannot be delega­ted to any other. This truth some labour to prove from this Maxime, Inter [...] & non ens infinita distantia est: [Betweene something, betweene any thing which truly is, and meere nothing, there is an infinite distance or disparity.] Now this breach of disparity or distance infinite (which they con­ceive) between something & nothing, cānot be fully [Page 59] made up save only by power truly inf [...]nite, whence it may seeme concluded, that it is impossible for any thing to be made of nothing; save onely by power in it selfe Omnipotent, or absolutely: infi­nite. The conclusion it selfe, or the last propositi­on in the inference, I verily beleeve to be most true; but the meane to inferre it, or manner of infer­ring it, is not so certaine, as the conclusion is sound. The Argument is b [...]t calculatory. And this kind of argument is deceitfull, unlesse the degrees of proportion whether between the disparity o [...] con­g [...]ity of termes compared, bee determinate and certaine. The degrees of disparity, betweene some­thing and nothing, cannot be more in number or more infinite, than are the entitive degrees of any created substance. And these are not actually or absolutely infinite, nor can the disparity betwixt something and nothing, betwixt nothing and the most excellent eventure that is, be so great or so ab­solutely infinite, as is the disparity betwixt the most excellent creature that is or can be, and the one Omnipotent Creator, who alone is absolutely infinite.

2 But be it onely supposed, no way granted, that the power of making some visible substance out of nothing, might be delegated to some Crea­ture; the exercise of this power thus delegated, would not inferre the Exerciser of it, but only the Author, to be Omnipotent. For to be Omnipo­tent, includes as much as to be able to do all things, which imply no contradiction; as much as to make all things that can be conceived as logically possible, [Page 60] out of nothing, because all sorts or kinds of being, numerable or comprehensible, are eminently contai­ned in the incomprehensible Essence; of which the attribute of Omnipotency is a chiefe preroga­tive. It is not then all one, to be enabled to make some thing, suppose a gnat or flye, out of nothing; and to be able to make as many things, as now are extant in the world, or much better than these are, out of meere nothing. It is a maxime evident by light of reason, that no Doner can really give more than he hath to give: suppose he were willing, en­abled and authorized to give himselfe: to give its whole nature with the appurtenances to any other Creature already extant, or in possibility to bee created. It being then supposed, that an Angell by some speciall delegation from the incomprehen­sible Essence or power Omnipotent, might be en­abled to make something of nothing, it were not possible that he should make any nature or essence more excellent than himselfe. Yet it is possible, that there might be some more excellent created substance than this Angell: yea of necessity there should be a possibilitie of his being more excellent in his kind, than now he is. However; for him to give, for him to bestow a more excellent being up­on that which is not, than, for the present he him­selfe hath, is no way possible. Suppose then hee might entirely alienate from himselfe, or bequeath the best being, which for the present he hath, upon some possibility of being, or advance some nume­rable not being to his own estate by his utter anni­hilation; this could not argue him to be Omnipo­tent, [Page 61] because there be many other effects possible, which are not in his power to produce; albeit he could resume that which he had given unto ano­ther, and bestow it againe where he pleased. Last­ly, seeing the prime Essence, who alone is abso­lutely infinite, did not make all things out of no­thing by a necessity of nature, but because it was his will so to make them: no creature by any de­legated power imaginable, could possibly make any one thing, or more things out of nothing, be­sides those which the Omnipotent was willing should be so made; nor these any better either for substance or qualitie, than his will was, they should be. Nor could any creature be enabled by his will out of nothing to make any thing, which was not eminently contained in the nature of that creature, to whom this power of creating, is supposed to be, by his will, delegated. For albeit some efficient or productive causes bring forth effects for sub­stance or qualitie more excellent then themselves: yet this they never doe, this they cannot doe, un­lesse they worke upon some advantage, which the subject or matter whereon they worke doth afford them. But this advantage cannot be supposed in the production of any substance, out of no subject or matter praexistent. All the excellency, which any effect or substance so produced can have, must be intirely derived from its efficient. And that can be no greater excellency or perfection, than the efficient it selfe hath; not altogether so great, be­cause it must be eminently contained in the perfec­tion of its efficient: if so be the efficient have any [Page 62] perfection or being left, after the production of such an effect. So that every efficient cause, which is or can be supposed, as an instrumentall cause of creation, or as enabled to produce something out of nothing, is thus farre limited, that it can produce no effect more excellent that it selfe, and being thus limited in it selfe, and by dependance on an higher cause, as well in its being, as in its operati­on, it cannot be conceived to bee Omnipotent. For that includes as much as to be illimited in ope­ration, or, which is all one, to bee the operative power of the incomprehensible Essence, or of Be­ing infinite.

3 But though to be able to make something out of nothing be not formally aequipollent to the attri­bute of Omnipotency: yet can it not hence be con­cluded, that any agent besides the one Omnipo­tent, is either able or can be enabled to produce the least substance that is, the least portion or mat­ter ingredient to any bodily substance out of meer nothing. To lay the first foundation or beginning of being of any finite substance, is the sole effect of being it selfe, and therefore of that which is truly infinite in operation. Whatsoever is finite or limi­ted, can have no other kind of being, than borrowed or participated. And this kinde of being must bee immediately derived, without intervention of any instrumentall cause, from being not participated or borrowed, but from increated and authentique being. To create, is to give actuall being or existance, without the help or furtherance of any Contribu­ter or Confounder. Now if this power of creating [Page 63] could possibly bee delegated to any created sub­stance, it were possible for that which is created by it, to have its being extra infinitum esse, that is, it should not be immediately and intirely contained in the infinite and incomprehensible Essence or Being. For in this very supposall [That one crea­ted substance might by power delegated from Omnipotency, create another] it is necessarily im­plied, that the substance created should have its being intirely, or part of its being immediately from the other, which, by power delegated, is sup­posed to create it. And having such being, as it hath, either intirely or in part immediately from the other, it could not be immediately and intirely contained in the first cause of all things. And if the least substance possible, could have its Being, not immediately and intirely from the first cause or supreame Efficient, he could not bee actually and absolutely infinite in Being, or Omnipotent in working. For that onely is absolutely infinite, or infinite in Being, in which all things possible are immediately contained; without whose incom­prehensible Being, nothing can have existence; without whose immediate operation nothing can begin to be or exist.

These agitatiōs discussions may notifie unto us the strength & soundness of that treble rule or fun­damentall principle layd by others, and before tou­ched by us. First, it is peculiar unto Art to turne bodies already formed and perfected by nature, in­to another fashion: It is the property of nature, and of naturall and finite Agents, to worke the unfa­shioned [Page 64] or confused matter into some determinate forme or set kinde of being. It is the prerogative of the Omnipotent Maker, to afford naturall Agents the intire matter and stuffe, whereon they worke; and to bestow on them such being as they have, whether that be materiall or immateriall, celestiall or sublunary, spirituall or bodily; and to bestow i [...] intirely, without the helpe of any Co-efficient, with­out the contribution of any stuffe or matter, of any reallitie praeexistent.

CHAP. 9.
Of the perpetuall dependance which all things crea­ted have on the Almighty Creator, both for their beeing and their operations.

1 BVt will it suffice us to beleeve, that as Art hath its proper sub­ject made or fitted by Nature; or as more perfect substances praesuppose an imperfect state in Nature: so this imperfect state of nature, or the subject on which naturall efficients do work, was made of nothing, without any coagency of Nature or Art, by the sole power of the Almighty Father? To beleeve all this, is but the first part of our beleefe of this Article of Creation. For better apprehending the intire object of our beleefe in this point, we are [Page 66] to observe the difference betwixt the dependance, which Art hath on nature, or which workes artifi­ciall have on the Artificer, or which more perfect naturall substances have on the imperfect substan­ces, whereof they are made, or on their naturall efficients; and the dependance which both naturall Agents & Patients, & which efficient causes as wel artificiall as naturall, with their severall matters or subjects, have on the Almighty Creator and Ma­ker of all things. First then nature or causes natu­rall, after they have finished their proper works, and fitted them for Art to worke upon, do not co­operate with the Artificer in fashioning them to his ends or purpose. The Artificer againe, after he hath finished his worke, doth not continually support, preserve or apply it to those uses, unto which it serves; but leaves this unto their care for whose convenience it was made. The Clocke-maker doth not tye himselfe to keep all the Clocks which he makes: nor doth he which undertakes to keepe them, binde himselfe to watch their motions perpetually, or to observe them as curiously as Physitians doe their sicke Patients. Againe, the most perfect works of nature, as vegetables and living things, depend upon their causes, whether materiall or efficient, (for the most part) onely in fieri, not in facto, whilest they are in making or in perfecting, not after they be made and perfected. The Lyonesse doth not perpetually nourish her whelps with her owne substance; nor doth the Raven continually provide for her young ones; or any o­ther creatures more kinde than they, perpetually [Page 67] support or direct their brood in their motions, but leave them to fend for themselves. If the Almigh­tie Creator should doe no better by his most per­fect Creatures, their returne to nothing, would be as speedy, as their production from it. All of them have a perpetuall and undispensable dependance upon his power, not onely whilst they are in ma­king, but as great after they are made. And thus great and perpetuall it is, not in respect of their sub­stances onely, but as truly in respect of their moti­ons or operations. The imperfect masse or matter whereof bodies naturall are made, is not onely his sole worke, or effect of his Omnipotency; but that it is workable or fashionable unto any set forme, this likewise is an effect of his operative power; it could not be perpetually thus fashionable, but by his per­petuall working. That the most perfect naturall Agent, should worke or dispose this matter to any set forme: this likewise is his worke. He doth not onely support both Agent and Patient in that being which he gave them, but doth perpetually coope­rate with them in their motions; doth apply and direct their motions unto those ends and uses, whereto his wisdome hath ordained them.

2 Concerning the manner of that perpetuall dependance, which all finite Agents with their ef­fects, have on the one Omnipotent and supreame illimited efficient, whether in respect of their ex­istence or operation; the disputes in Schooles are intricate, and the questions perplexed. But the best is, the ingenuous Reader may quit them, if he will be but pleased to take unto himselfe, if not [Page 68] an ocular demonstration, yet a visible representation of this truth, in that perpetuall dependance, which light diffused (whether through the celestiall bo­dies, as the moone or starres, or through the ayre or other inferiour elementary bodies capable of en­lightning) hath on the Fountaine of Light, to wit, the body of the Sunne: or which the light in rooms, otherwise dark, hath on the light of Fire or candles by night. So perpetuall, so essentiall is this depen­dance which light, in bodies inlightned by others, hath on the bodies which enlighten them; that someVide Za­barel. de Lumine. good Philosophers, from observation of this dependance, have concluded, that [Lumen. non est inhaesive in corpore illuminato, sed in cor­pore lucente▪] The lightsomnesse which appeares in these inferiour bodies, or in bodies not lucent in themselves, is not inherently or subjectively, in the borrowers, or bodies enlightned, but in the bodies which enlightens them. To prove this conclusion, they use this Antecedent, that light borrowed or participated, doth follow the motion of the body which bestowes or lends it; and this Antecedent they thinke sufficiently proved by sense. For if we hold a looking-glasse to a candle by night, the light which for the present appeares either in the whole glasse or in some part of it, will alter its place or seat according to the motion of the candle. If you move the candle higher or lower than it was, the light in the glasse will remove with it, from the highest place to the lowest, and from the lowest to the highest, as it shall please the mover to alter the aspect betwixt them, so will the light move from [Page 69] one part of the roome to another, as the candle is re­moved. And if you take the candle quite out of the roome, the light will follow it, and leave no­thing but darknesse behind. The same observa­tion holds as true in a Dyall, in which the light or shadow constantly followes the motion of the Sun. But to hold this conclusion, [That light borrowed from the Sunne or a Candle, should be inherently or subjectively in the Sunne or Candle] is more than true Philosophy will warrant; more than the unquestionable truth of the former experiment can logically inferre. For though light in bodies not lucent in themselves, bee not their owne, but borrowed; yet in that it is borrowed, it must bee truly in the borrower, not in the body which lends it. For every one which lends, is presumed to transfer the use of what hee lends unto him that borrowes: the borrower must have the posses­sion of what is lent him, during the time of the loane. As for the former experiments, they may be retorted upon such as use their helpe for infer­ring this pretended conclusion, [Vide An­ton. Scar­milion. de coloribus. That light diffu­sed is not inherently in the body enlightned, but in the body lucent, or enlightning.] For the muta­tion of the seat of borrowed light, whether in a look­ing-glasse held to a candle, or in a Sun-dyall, will be the very same, albeit the Candle or Dyall stand still in the same place; if so we move the Looking-glasse the same way from the Candle, or the Dyall the same way from the Sunne, by which the Sun did move from the Dyall, or the Candle was mo­ved from the Looking-glasse. This conclusion is [Page 70] most certaine, [That the motion of light, accor­ding to the motion of the body which diffuseth it, doth no way inferre the light not to be inherently, (according to the inherency which it hath) in the body, through which it is diffused; but rather that this light, however inherent in the body enlight­ned, hath a perpetuall indispensable dependance upon the light of the body which produceth it; a dependance on it, not onely in fieri, that is, whilest it is in production, which is in an instant; but a de­pendance in facto, so long as it continues in the bo­dy enlightned. And we cannot better conceive the manner, how a line should be made by the con­tinued fluxe of a point, or a surface by the continued motion of a line; or how time should receive its continuation from the continued fluxe of an in­stant, than by observing the manner how light being produced in an instant in the body, which borrowes it (the extremity of it being terminated to a mathematicall point or line) doth vary its place of residence in the same body, moving continually from one part to another, according to the degrees of motion, either of the body which gives the light, or of the body which is enlightned, one from the other. If either body could move or bee moved from the aspect of the other, in an instant, the light would remove from the body enlightned in the same instant. But moving as it doth, the motion of the light from one part of the same body or roome into another, is perpetuall; there is no in­terruption in the motion so much as momentary, no interposition of darknesse so long as the motion [Page 71] lasts. And yet it is not the same numericall light, which thus moveth in the bodie or roome enlight­ned. There is a continuall production of light fully answerable to the continuall succession of the mo­tion. The light, whilest in motion, continues no longer the same than the aspect betweene the bodie enlightning and enlightned continues the same. And it may be questioned, whether there be not a perpetuall production of new light, even whilest neyther the body enlightning nor enlightned re­move one from the other, whilest both stand or rest upon their severall centers.

3 But what ever Philosophers may dispute one way or other concerning the proper subject of light diffused or participated, or concerning the identifie or multiplication of it in bodies not lucent in them­selves, but enlightned: the dependance of borrowed or participated light upon the fountaine of light, whence it is borrowed, is the most perfect Em­bleme, which the eye of man can behold, of that dependance which all things numerable that are, or can be, have on the incomprehensible Essence, or in­exhaustible fountaine of Beeing. Whether light participated or diffused, have any true inherence or no in bodies enlightned, or whether it be present with them or in them, (ad modum spiritalium) af­ter such a manner as spirits are in sublunary bodies, or with them; this is certaine, that light participa­ted, is not deduced or drawne out of any matter praeexistent, or out of any positive qualitie inhe­rent; it is produced out of darknes or want of light. And herein it is the true Embleme of created Enti­ties, [Page 72] w^ch were not made of any entities praeexistent, but of nothing. As light participated or diffused, hath no permanent root in bodies enlightned: So things created have not their root of beeing in any maetter praeexistent, nor hath the prime matter, of which things generated are made, any root prece­dent out of which it groweth. Such being as it hath, it hath intirely by its perpetuall dependance upon beeing it selfe. The most excellent numerable bee­ing that can be imagined, is more truely participa­ted or borrowed from beeing it selfe, than the light of the Moone or Sarres, than the light in the ayre, water, or yce, is from the body of the Sunne. And albeit the formes or perfect bodies, which, by ope­ration of efficients naturall, respectively result or are produced out of the matter, have a being di­stinct from the matter, out of which they are made or produced: yet even these have the same imme­diate dependency upon the incomprehensible Es­sence or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing, which the prime matter hath. As the resplendencie or ir­radiation of coloured glasses, be they yellow, greene or azure, have the same immediate dependance upon the light of the Sunne, which the light diffu­sed throughout the heavens, water, ayre, or pure glasses, hath; unlesse the Sun send forth his beames upon them, these colours have no resplendencie, they cannot affect the sense of sight. Nor can any created Agent (albeit endowed with qualities ope­rative, more forcible and permanent, than any co­loured glasses can bee) produce any reall effect, without the cooperation or coagencie of the in­comprehensible [Page 73] Essence, or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing. As impossible it is, that any agent should move, or be moved, otherwise than by the vertue of his Almighty power, as that it should have beeing or existence (extra infinitum esse) without his infi­nite Beeing or immensitie, or that the continuance of it in such being, should not be comprehended in his infinite and interminable duration, which wee call Eternitie. Againe, as light borrowed or diffu­sed throughout this inferiour world, hath a beeing in its kinde distinct from that light, which is per­manently seated in the fountaine of light, on which, notwithstanding, all borrowed light abso­lutely depends as being eminently contained in it: so every numerable beeing, or part of this world, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, the Elements, mixt bodies, vegetables, man, and beast, have their proper kinde of Beeing distinct each from other, and distinct againe from the incomprehensible fountaine of beeing; on which notwithstanding all of them have more immediate, more essentiall de­pendance, than either the lights, or different shapes in a glasse, have on the Sunne which gives the light, or on the bodies which they represent. And in this incomprehensible fountaine of beeing, all things not onely which are, but which possibly may bee, are more eminently contained, than the least-spar­kles or portions of borrowed light, which appeare in broken glasses, are in the body of the Sunne.

4 In this point onely, or in this especially, is the production of light in this inferiour world by the Sunne, unlike the Creation of all things by the Al­mighty [Page 74] Father of lights, in that the Sunne produ­ceth light or resplendency, without any free choice or intelligence, but by a necessitie of nature, that is, it so produceth light, as it hath no power not to produce it. So doth not the Almighty Father ey­ther create the things that are, or preserve them in their estate of beeing, or cooperate with them in the production of such effects, as they in their seve­rall kindes and rankes are truly said to produce. For albeit the Almighty Father, bee more immutable than the Sunne, yet is hee immutably free. For freedome of will, by which creatures rationall ex­ceede all creatures meerly naturall, or capable of no better endowment then sense, being a true and reall branch of beeing, a perfection of the most per­fect creatures, must be as truely and really, though in an eminent manner, contained in the Maker of all things, as any other branch of numerable beeing is. Now the object of this freedome of will in the Omnipotent Maker, is not onely the Creation or not creation of things that are or may bee; not the preservation or destruction of things created, or of the severall endowments or qualifications: but part of this object of divine freedome is the ena­bling or inhibiting of all his creatures, to exercise those qualities or faculties which are to them most naturall, and in their kinde most powerfull. Albeit Nebuchadnezzar had power to make the flames of intēded persecution, much hotter than any ordina­ry fire; though other Tyrants might have power to make the like againe, much hotter than hee did, or to environ Gods Saints with the fire of Hell; yet [Page 75] if the Almighty Creator withdraw the influence of his power from such fire or flames, they can have no more power to burne or scorch his Ser­vants, than they have to coole them; although we suppose their nature and qualities to be preserved still entire, by the same power, by which they were created. For as (but now) was said, the inhibition or enabling of naturall qualities or faculties to ex­ercise their native force, is as truely the object of divine freedome, as the preservation or destruction of the Agents themselves, with their qualities or endowments is. For the same reason, the Sunne was no way wounded in his substance, nor hurt, nor tainted in its influence or other qualitie, when, by the divine power, which is immutably and perpe­tually free, it was inhibited in its course or mo­tion.

5 That the Almightie Creator neyther in our time, nor in the times long before us, hath laid any such restraint upon the Sunne, that it should not move, or upon the fire, that it should not burne, is not from any restraint which hee hath laid upon his power by his eternall decree; but from his immuta­ble and eternall freedome. Wee may not say, that he cannot, for the times present or which are to come, lay the like inhibition upon the Sunne, upon the fire, or upon other celestiall or sublunarie bodies, for exercising the functions most naturall to them. That hee will not, at any time, lay the like restraint upon them, wee are not bound to beleeve, untill thus much be by his word revealed unto us. That God cannot at this time bring such a generall In­undation [Page 76] upon the earth as hee did in the dayes of Noah, we may not say or thinke: but that hee will not destroy the world by water, wee must beleeve, because wee have his solemne promise to this pur­pose sealed unto us, by the signe of the Bow in the Cloud. But when the iniquitie of this present world shall come unto the same height and mea­sure, which the old world had made up, wee be­leeve hee will destroy it by fire. For other mutati­ons in the course of nature, the condition or exi­gence of times ensuing, may be such, as that they may be as strange and miraculous, as at any time heretofore they have beene. The not interposing of miracles in these our dayes, proceedes not from any Act passed by the Almightie to the contrary, nor from the unchangeablenesse of his eternall will; but from the condition or course, which his crea­tures hold de facto, whose condition or estate is in it selfe, and by his Almighty will so to have it, so changeable and so improveable to different pur­poses, that many events, which to our observation would be most strange, might upon speciall occa­sions be produced, without any change or altera­tion in his power, whose exercise ad extra, that is, in respect of effects producible in the creature, is im­mutably free, untill hee promise to inhibit them, as hee hath done the generall Inundation. And al­though hee be most immutable in all his promises or inhibitions: yet doth not every promise or in­hibition which hee makes, induce an absolute im­mutabilitie or necessitie of the things promised or inhibited. Their immutabilitie or necessitie is the [Page 77] proper effect of his more solemne or peculiar pro­mises. Nor are such inhibitions as he hath set un­to the water absolutely necessary from Eternity, but grow necessary in revolution of time, by the changeable condition of the Creature. And albeit we can neither prescribe limits to his will, nor con­ceive any reason of the mutations which fall out in the Creatures by his inhibition, by his permission, or by his positive enabling them to exercise their native functions; yet of the least mutation, that can fall out in the world, he knowes a cause or reason, nor doth he suffer any thing to be done, for which his immutable freedome in governing the world, hath not an eternall rule or reason infinitely more perfect, than the wisest man living can give any for his best Acts or undertakings. But suppose the Sun to have that freedome of power in the emission or not emission of his beames, which men have over their breath, or that dexterity in tempering or mo­derating its light or influence, which skilfull Mu­sitians have in modulating their voices: and the former representation of that power which God hath over all his creatures, and of their dependance on him in their beings and operations by the de­pendance which light hath on the Sunne, would be more lively and full.

6 But the Psalmist hath made choice of that free power, which man hath over his animall fa­culties, as over his breath or operation of his senses; as the fairest picture of Gods free power creative and providence over his Creatures. These wait all upon thee, that thou mightest give them their meat in [Page 78] due seasons. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they dye, and returne to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth. The glory of the Lord shall endure for ever: the Lord shall rejoyce in his workes. He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth: he toucheth the hils and they smoake. Psal. 104. vers. 27. &c. Yet even in these and the like emblemati­call expressions of the Creators free power over his Creatures, or in the choisest that can bee taken or gathered out of the Propheticall descriptions, from the exercise of mens free and purest thoughts, there will still remaine this disparity: We cannot alter the objects of our intellectuall or abstract con­templations, without some alteration or change of Acts. It is then the prerogative of the Almighty, freely to will things most contrary and different, without any diversity in his will. And this his free will not onely worketh greater varietie or change in the Creature, than the wits of all men in the world can conceive, but withall irresistibly deter­mines the issue of every possible change, without any shadow of change or alteration in his thoughts or resolutions; which in him are not many, but more truly one infinity, than any one thought in us is one. This disparity betweene the Identity of his Eternall knowledge, and of his immutable freedome, and the manner of our understanding or intellectu­all choice, I cannot yet better represent than by the See the first part of the Divine Essence & Attributes, chap. 21. pag. 229, 230. &c.former disparity, betweene the circle and many [Page 79] sided figures. Mans purest intellectuall thoughts or actuall choices, are in the contemplative part of the soule, as angles are in many sided figures, all as different each from other, as one angle is from a­nother in a quadrangle, and every one is as distinct from the substance of the soule wherein they are, as angles in a quadrangle are from the sides or surface of it. But those which wee terme, or conceive as severall Acts or exercises of the Divine power, as the Act of creation, the act of preservation, the act of conseruation, the production of miracles, &c. are in the Almighty, not so much distinct one from another, or from his incomprehensible essence, as the Angles in a circle are from the sides or from the circumference, which notwithstanding is a to­tangle, in which there is no sensible distinction be­tweene sides and Angles, albeit both of them bee truly contained in the circumference, as all power and freedome of power is contained in the immu­table, infinite and incomprehensible Essence.

CHAP. 10.
The usuall and daily operations of naturall causes with their severall events or successes, are as immediate­ly ascribed to the Creator by the Prophets, as the first Creation of all things, with the reasons why they are so ascribed.

1 FRom the forementioned hun­dred and fourth Psalme, which is no other than a sweet para­phrase upon the sixe dayes work of Creation, and from the like propheticall emblazoning of Gods glory, which amounts from consideration of his workes; the intelligent Reader will informe himselfe, that the continuall rising and setting of the Sunne and Moone, their incessant diffusion of light through this visible World, the perpetuall ascent of springing waters into the hills, their con­tinuall decursion from them into the Sea, the limi­tation of the Seas ebbing and flowing, the daily growth of plants and vegetables, the motion of li­ving things on the earth and in the waters, are as immediately and as intirely ascribed unto the ope­rative power of the Creator, as their first Creation out of nothing was. Yet the reason of their ascri­bing all this unto the immediate and sole power of God, will no way warrant the truth of their cri­ticisme, who teach that neither the fire doth truly heat or burne, or the water really coole or moisten, or that no visible creature hath any reall operation [Page 81] upon another, but that our assigning of their moti­ons or operations, as true causes (in their kind) of the effects which we see daily produced, is but a solaecisme of vaine Philosophy, or of sciences fals­ly so called; whereas the right resolution of this solaecisme into distinct and Christian phrase, is but this, God doth produce heat, cold, moisture, vegeta­bles, and other living things, (ad praesentiam crea­turarum) the Fire, Water, Sunne, Earth, &c. being but bare witnesses of the Creators power, which is ma­nifested in them, or of its operation in their pre­sence, by which operation alone, all those effects are produced, which the Philosophers ascribe un­to the Creatures. And most true it is, that the Creator doth daily worke all those effects, which we attribute to naturall agents: yet doth hee not worke such effects onely in them, or where they are present, but he truly worketh by them and with them. And if the Omnipotent power be truly said to worke by and with natural meanes or causes, they must truly worke with him, in their kinde. When the Apostle saith, in him wee live and move, and have our beeing, this necessarily implies, that wee have a life in its kinde distinct from his life, a mo­tive power different in its kinde from his power, a kinde of beeing likewise distinct from his infinite Essence, or from being-it-selfe. But in as much as the life of all things living, the motions of every thing that moveth, the being of every numerable thing, that is, hath such an absolute dependance as hath been declared upon his creative power; hence it is that the Prophets and Divine Philosophers, [Page 82] ascribe all the visible effects or events, which time presents or place accompanieth, no lesse intirely to the Creator, than the first production of their vi­sible and naturall causes. As for the former Cri­tickes, in whose language, God onely worketh in his creatures, or (his creatures being present) they might with as good reason, affirme that the Sunne did not really move, but that God did move, the Sun being present; yet could he not move or create motion ad praesentiam Solis, unlesse the Sunne did truly move. The truth is, the Sunne doth move, or is moved by Gods presence in it, but he doth not move with it or by it. But with the Sunne or other Creatures, he truly worketh, as they truly worke with him. And, by this concession of some true power and property of working unto naturall A­gents, more is ascribed to the Creator of all things, than can bee ascribed by the contrary opinion, which utterly denies al power or property of wor­king to the Creatures. For he that denyes any ef­fects to be truly wrought by them, cannot ascribe their abilities or operative force (which, in his o­pinion, is none) unto their Creator. ButWho fed thee in the wilderness with Man­na, which thy fathers [...] not, that hee might humble thee, and that he might prove thee, to doe thee good at thy latter end: Lest thou say in thine heart, My power and the might of my hand hath [...] is wealth. But thou shalt remember the Lord thy God, for it is Hee [...] power to get wealth, that he may establish his covenant, which hee [...], as it is this day. DEVT. 8. vers. 16, 17, 18. Mo­ses taugh the Israelites, that it was God which gave them power to gather substance. Nor were they more bound to praise God for the substance which they gathered, or for the Manna which by miracle [Page 83] hee sent unto them, than for the [...] which he gave them to gather the one or other.

2 Ye [...] is not this absolute and immediate de­pendance, which every creature, as well or its be­ing, as for its power or exercise of it, hath o [...] the Almighty Creator, the intire ground or reason, why the effects which are (in their kinde) produ­ced by the Creatures, are by the Prophets wholly ascribed unto power Almighty. For this depen­dance, or the reason of ascribing all things to God which is grounded on it, being for the present [...] ­questred; he hath a peculiar title to all the works or effects, (especially to all of greater and more pub­lique consequence) which the Creatures produce, from his skill or wisedome in contriving the com­bination of second causes, with their severall ope­rations, for the assequution of their last or utmost end. Nor was the entitative goodnesse of every creature in his kinde, albeit considered in that per­fection wherein God made it, the ground or rea­son of that approbation which hee bestowed upon them, as they severally began to bee, or after hee had accomplished them all. God (saith Moses) saw all that he had made, and loe it was exceeding good. What goodnesse then was this, which hee thus commends? the goodnesse of order or of har­mony betwixt them, as they were parts of this V­niverse. This harmony, was the accomplishment of his severall workes, the ground of his praises, and the complete object of our beleefe of this Ar­ticle of Creation. Hence saith the Apostle, Heb. 11 By faith we beleeve; What? Secula facta esse, nay [Page 84] more then so [...], that the worlds were harmonically made. It was a double over-sight in some good Divines, from one or both of these two principles, (Omne ens qu [...]ens, est bonum,) What soever hath being is good, whatsoever is, was made by God, and all things which God made were good; to infer, that sinne or morall evill could have no positive entitie. For the greater the entitative goodnesse of any creature is, the greater measure of morall evill it alwayes includes, unlesse its entita­tive goodnesse hold such harmony or correspon­dency with the rest, as may helpe to make up or support that goodnesse of order, that is, that good­nesse of coordination amongst themselves, or of that joint subordination unto their Creator, which he first framed and placed in this Vniverse, as it was his worke. Vnlesse sinne or morall evill had some positive entitie, or some positive degrees or mea­sure, all sinnes should be equall, there could bee no different kinds of sinne, no numericall difference or degrees betwixt particular sinnes of the same kind. But of the nature of sinne or morall evill, and how compatible this evill is with goodnes entitative, more at large, by Gods assistance, in the Treatise of Ori­ginall sinne, or the estate or condition of the sons of wrath, which estate every child of Adam by par­ticipation of this first sinne doth inherit. The pe­culiar title which the Almighty Creator by right of Creation, or by the combination or contri­vance of naturall and intellectuall agents, hath to all the praises, which either the Souldier orVide Sal­vi [...]num lib. 7. num. 227. States­man, the Landlord, the Husbandman, or such as [Page 85] live by Merchandizing daily rob him of, will come more fitly to be declared in some following Trea­tises of Divine speciall providence.

3 If the Reader desire a briefe abstract or summe of what hath beene said of Gods power in crea­ting the world, or of the reservation of this free power unto himselfe to alter, to innovate or a­mend the estate wherein he hath hitherto preser­ved it; I cannot exhibite this generall view more clearly or more succinctly than Iustin Martyr hath done in his answer to the fourth question of the Grecians. The question was thus proposed, [An Deus faciat, feceritve, facturusve sit: Et si facit, suaptene voluntare, an praeter voluntatem?] Whe­ther God do make the things that are, whether hee hath made the things that have beene, whether hee will make other things which yet are not, or the things which are, after a better manner than as yet they have beene made: or if he be or hath beene a maker, or con­tinue to make things better, whether he do all this out of his owne free will, or besides his will. His full an­swer to this question is, Fecit Deus, & facit, & facturus est, suapte sponte & voluntate: nam creatu­ram ipse condidit, quae antehac non fuerat, volens. Eam providentia sua in eo ut sit, conservat: quod quidem est, facit. Quam etiam instauraturus est, & in statum meliorem redacturus per restitutionem sive renovationem: quod est facturus est: ut repurget cam ab absurditate omni, ex rationalium ignavia contracta. Non quod per judicii considerationem & deliberationem posterius id quod melius sit, invenerit; sed quod longe antea & prius quam mundum condi­dit, [Page 86] constitutum habuerit ut faceret. Neque enim possibile est ut vel ad notionem vel ad potentiam, Deo posterius quidquam accedat, quod prius non habuerit. Volentem autem Deum mundum creasse, illud est do­cumento, quod cum Deus potuerit plures efficere soles, non plures, sed unum duntaxat effecerit. Nam qui plures non potest condere soles, neque unum condere potest: & qui unum solem creare potuit, necessario quoque plures creare potuit. Quomodo igitur quos facere potuit plures soles, Deus non fecit, nisi certe quod plures soles facere noluit? Sin quos non fecit soles, voluntate non fecit: perspicuam utique fuerit, cum etiam quem fecit, voluntate fecisse. Et veluti sol, ita & reliquae creaturae partes omnes, quae vel ob­noxiae vel non obnoxiae sunt corruptibilitati, ex vo­luntate Dei & id quod sint, & id quod hujusmodi sint, habent.

CHAP. 11.
Containing the summe of what wee are to beleeve in this Article of Creation, and of the duties where­to it binds us: with an introduction to the Article of His providence.

TO beleeve that God is the maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible, in­cludes in it an acknowledge­ment not onely of the six dayes worke, but that he still makes all things that are, and shal make all things which here­after shall be. So long as any thing which hath beene continues in beeing, so long as any thing which now is not, shall beginne or not cease to be, so long the Almighty continues a Maker. And in as much as some things which are made, or which hereafter shall be made, shall have no end, he con­tinues an everlasting Maker. This title of Maker is none of his Eternall Attributes, but a denomina­tion ascribed unto him from his workes which all had their beginning in time, or rather with time, or with duration finite or numerable. It is an ever­lasting Attribute, for that properly is everlasting, which though it have beginning yet it hath no end. But albeit the acts or exercises of his will or power had a beginning with the world, (for they are al­wayes in the creature or effect) yet his will and pur­pose to make the world are eternall: So is the po­wer by which he made it, so is the combination [Page 88] of all these, to wit, his providence, by which hee orders and governes all things, coeternall to his es­sence. All moderne controversies to my knowledge account it an heathenish solecism to say, God only did make or hath made the world and all things in it, he doth not now make them. For this were to deny the necessity of his everlasting worke in pre­serving, supporting, and continuing all things in their proper being. And to deny this, would bee more than a solecisme of speech, a reall branch of infidelity. Is it then a lesse solecisme of speech to say, or a smaller portion of infidelity to thinke, that God only hath decreed before all times what shall fall out in time, but doth not now decree nor shall any thing hereafter be decreed by him? Question­lesse, if his decree be coeternall to his power, the same with his will or purpose, if hee cease not to worke or will, he ceaseth not to worke or decree. He did decree to worke when he did not worke, or produce any effect ad extra, but hee never produ­ced any effect or worke when hee did not decree. For he worketh all things by the Counsell of his will, not by the Counsell of his will as past and en­ded, but by the Counsell of his will, which was, which is, and which is to come. And he decreeth all things for the times present after the selfe same manner that he decreed them from eternity, other­wise his decree were not eternall, could have no re­semblance of eternity. To infer that Gods decree is an act past, or that God doth not now decree, because he hath decreed al things before all worlds, is a solecisme or ignorance, to say no worse, of the [Page 89] same nature, quality & scantling, as if you shold say, God was before the world was, therefore God is not since the world was, nor shall be after the end of this world. For the world could neither begin, continue, nor cease to be, but by his eternall and ir­resistible decree, which neither hath beginning nor end, nor can admit any interposition of change. It is true, that if we consider the Deity in himselfe or his decree as it is in him, or the same with him, there is neither praeteritum nor futurum, no such difference in them as wee character or notifie by these termes past or to come: yet if wee consider God or his eternall Decree, as they include a refe­rence of precedency to things temporall, past, or to come, or as times current have coexistence with him, wee may not deny that God was before all times, and did decree things to come, that he is in all times current, and doth decree the issue of times present or ensuing. Thus in all times, and in all places, the Almighty Father is present with us, pre­sent in us, as our maker and preserver, present by his eternall providence to order and governe us. And the government of the world, specially of Men and Angels, is in true Divinity, the proper object of the Eternall Decree. And if God be thus with us, nothing can goe amisse with us, save only by our ignorance, by our misbeleefe or weake be­leefe of this first Article.

2 The true, that is, the firme and sound beleefe of every morall or sacred truth, specially of such fundamental truths as are contained in this Article, alwayes include a correspondency in the beleever [Page 90] unto the thing beleeved. And this corresponden­cie must have its place, not in the braine or appre­hensive faculty onely, but in the affection. The sympathy of affection unto the thing beleeved, re­sults from the impression which the speculative forme or representation in the braine makes upon the heart, which is the seat of the affection. The meanes subordinate to the Spirit of God for ma­king this impression, are two: A right explication or branching of the article or object to be belee­ved: & a serious and frequent meditation upon the object rightly branched, or a taking not of the truth onely, but the consequences of it into deepe and setled consideration; or as we say, a laying of both to heart. The maine branches of this Article are three: First, that God is the maker of all men that are, not of Adam onely. Secondly, that he is the preserver of all. Thirdly, that he perpetually or­dereth and governeth all things, even the thoughts of men, by the irresistible uncessant working of his Omnipotent decree or will. In our beleefe of the two first branches (bee it lesse or more, weake or strong) so it be uniforme, it is essentially included, that God is good to all, in that he hath given life and being unto all. Of this his goodnesse no man can want store of witnesses, so long as either he in­joyes himselfe or the necessary supplyes of life. One speciall duty, whereunto the beleefe of this Article doth immediately bind all men, is expresly commended to us by our Saviour, Matth. 6. The generall neglect whereof is more than sufficient to condemne not the Heathens or Infidels onely, but [Page 91] the greatest part of such as professe the Christian Faith, of infidelity: Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eate, or what ye shall drinke, nor yet for your body what you shall put on. Is not the life more than meat? and the body than rayment? It is a sin for him which beleeves that God hath given him that life and being which he hath, not to beleeve that God did give him both for his greater good, or that he will not increase his blessings upon him, so he doe not distrust his fatherly care and provi­dence: A greater sinne it is to suspect or question, whether God have not a more fatherly care over all men, than he hath over other creatures. So our Saviour addes, Behold the fowles of the ayre: For they sow not, neither doe they reape, nor gather into barnes, yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better then they? In that God hath gi­ven man a better kind of life and being than the fowles of the ayre; this is an undoubted pledge unto all, that he hath prepared far better food for them than for birds and beasts, an everlasting food; so they do not distrust his providence. And as hee provideth better food for man than for beast, so hath he better rayment for them in store, than he hath for vegetables; so they will seeke it from him, and not be their owne carvers. Which of you by ta­king thought can add one cubit unto his stature? And why take ye thought for rayment? Consider the Lillies of the field, how they grow; they toyle not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you that even Salomon in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these: wher­fore if God so cloath the grasse of the field, which to [Page 92] day is and to morrow is cast into the Oven; shall hee not much more cloath you, O ye of little faith. That to distrust Gods providence or doubt of his love, of such love as is ready to bestow better rayment upon them than Salomon in all his royalty had, is a point of infidelity, is included in our Saviours infe­rence or conclusion: Therefore take no thought, say­ing, What shall we eate? or what shall we drinke? or wherewithall shall we be cloathed? For after all these things do the Gentiles seeke. For your heavenly Fa­ther knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Is it then unlawfull to make any thing which the Gen­tiles sought after, any part of our care? No, the Gentiles after their fashion, sought after God, who (as the Apostle saith) giveth to all life and breath and all things, even to the Gentiles, that they should seeke the Lord: if happely they might feele after him and finde him. Acts 17. 25, 27. The onely reason why they did not find him, was because they sought him amisse. And the reason why they sought him amiss was their ignorance of this truth which our Saviour and S. Paul hath taught, to wit, that God did give the very Gentiles themselves food and rayment, with other necessaries of life, even life it selfe, with all its contentments, to the end that they might seeke him and taste his good­nesse. But they ran counter, and sought only after those things which were good not in themselves, but as they were pledges of his goodnesse. And the more eagerly they thus sought after these tem­porall good things, the further they ran from the Fountaine of goodness, which alone must sweeten [Page 93] the best things we can desire, and season our soules for the right entertainment or fruition of them.

3 Our speculative assent unto this Article, or approbation of this truth, whereof these Gentiles were ignorant, will rather aggravate than mitigate our Saviours censure of them; if we be as greedy seekers after the necessities of life, or as solicitous hunters after superfluities, as the Gentiles were. The distinctions or divisions of care, with annota­tions what kinde of care, is by our Saviour forbid­den, what allowed of, are easie to be found almost in every Writer, especially in the Expositors of that 6. chapter of Matthew. But whether through the default of hearers or of teachers, or respective­ly of both: too much liberty is every where taken for employing the greatest part of mens times and indeavours in providing things of this life. Not­withstanding all the prohibitions which have been given by our Saviour to the contrary: Covetous­nesse and ambition, the two grand enemies of be­leefe in God and his loving providence, have no where in any age thriven better, than amongst zea­lous Christian professors in these later times. And which is most to be lamented, Scripture is secretly opposed to Scripture for justifying or countenan­cing unchristian care of wordly matters. The war­rant, which many take to themselves from the mistaken sense of one place in S.1 Tim. 5▪ 8 Paul, He that pro­videth not for his family is worse then an Infidell, is used as a countermand to our Saviours prohibition. For the right limitation whereof, the onely caveat which I have to commend unto the Reader, is this, [Page 94] As S. Paul, how mightily soever he debase workes, not ceremoniall onely, but morall, doth never de­nie their use or necessity either for attaining to justification, or for making our Election sure, but onely seeks to strengthen our relyance upon Gods mercies in Christ by denyall of our selves, and of the best works w^ch we can do, whether before rege­neration or after: so our Saviour, albeit he seeme universally to forbid all care of minding temporall contentments, yet in deed and reall meaning, for­bids us onely to place any part of our hopes or con­fidence in our owne endeavours. He doth not sim­ply forbid all care of things temporall, but so farre onely as it is an hindrance to our care and watch­fulnesse for trying and tasting the goodnesse of God, or as it weakens our relyance upon his father­ly providence. If we be watchfull in prayer, and frequent in meditations upon Gods goodnesse al­ready experienced, our care of heavenly things and estimate of Gods goodnesse will better teach every one of us in his severall calling, the right limitation of his domestique cares, than any generall rule which can be gathered from the nature, quality, or quantity of cares. For conclusion, he which for­bids us to take care for the morrow, commands us to pray this day for to morrowes bread, that is, to pray every day for the good successe or blessings of the dayes following, with all attention and watchfulnesse.

4 Another fundamentall duty, and one of the most formall effects of faith, as it respects this Ar­ticle, is that of the Preacher, Ecclesiastes the 12. [Page 95] vers. 1. Remember now thy Creator in the dayes of thy youth. But why is this duty in particular prest upon youth? Because the prints of Gods creative power are then most fresh in our nature, and might transmit a fairer copy or truer estimate of the Crea­tors goodnesse unto old age, than old age can take any: so young men by often reflecting upon the present comforts of health and strength, upon the activity of body, the quicknesse of sense and spirit, would ingrosse them deeply in their memories. Youth then is the fittest season for estimating the benefits of Creation, and old age the choicest time for surveying our unthankfulnesse to our Creator. If the former contentments of youth, with the comforts which accompany our best thoughts and actions, were truly calculated in our fresh and choicest daies, and rightly waighed upon their pro­per center, our thankfulnesse would reciprocate upon the Fountaine from which they flow, and be returned to their doner in a measure equiponde­rant to their waight upon our soules. And nothing but want of thankfulnesse in such as have tasted the ordinary benefits of Creation, can hinder the de­scent of Gods choice of blessings in great abun­dance. Would we but sequester that delight which we take in health and strength from our selves, and surrender it wholly into his hands that gave it, he is still ready to renew and better our present and former estate. Did we empty our hearts of pride, of selfe-delight, or complacency, by powring forth such joyfull thanks giving as the Psalmist doth, It is he that hath made us, and not wee our [Page 96] selves: [...]t is he that gives us all those good things wherein we joy, we did not receive them from our friends or parents, wee cannot take them to our selves: the same Lord, as the Psalmist elsewhere avoucheth, would give us our hearts desire, even fill our hearts with joy and gladnesse which shall never saile or decrease. This is his sole and proper gift, for though we could take unto our selves all the temporary contentments of transitory plea­sures, which either our hearts could wish, or our inventions calculate, yet should wee not have our hearts desire, so long as we fixe our delight either in the things enjoyed, or in the enjoying of them, and not in the Lord which gave them unto us, and us power to enjoy them.

From thus delighting in the Lord, or from ren­dring according to the benefits bestowed upon us, the generall withdrawments are but two. First, an over prizing of such externalls as procure or in­crease our contentments. Secondly, an ouervalu­ing the feare or dread of mens persons, or other externalls which seeme to menace disgrace, vexa­tion, or torment unto us, if we should doe as in our calmest thoughts we often desire to doe. The sini­ster sway of both temptations or withdrawments from the duties commended unto us, cannot be otherwise counterpoized than by taking the last branch of this Article into deepe and serious con­sideration. The last branch was, that God doth nor onely make and preserve us, but doth withall perpetually order, direct, and governe both us and all the externalls which we love or feare, by his all-seeing, [Page 97] ever-working Decree or Counsell. If our soules or senses have for once or twice beene over­joyed with the possession of any externalls or in­strumentall causes of contentment, let us call to minde, that as the Almighty Creator gives both us and them their being, so hee likewise stints and limits as well their operations, as our capacities to receive their impressions at his pleasure. The same externalls which formerly wrought our comfort or contentments, may procure our griefe and mi­sery by too much or unseasonable familiarity with them, or fruition of them. If in feare or dread of evill menaced by man, or represented to us by fire, by sword, or other unruly instruments of wrath or vengeance, wee cannot hope that the Almighty Creator will by miracle abate their strength, or in­hibit the exercise of their native qualities or dispo­sitions, as he did in Daniel and the three childrens cases; yet unlesse our faith in the last branch of this Article faile, it will confirme us in this resolution, that he can and will so contrive the concurrence of hurtfull agents, as they shall become instruments of greater good to such as love him, and in tempta­tions adhere unto him. The rule or Maxime is uni­versally true: No agent or instrument, whether of temporall harme or comfort, whether of joy or griefe, can worke any other wayes or any further than he by his Eternall Decree or Providence hath appointed it for the present to worke. And in that promise made unto us by our Apostle, That hee will not suffer us to bee tempted above our strength; it is included that he will so restraine or abate the [Page 98] force and efficacy of all second causes, as they shall not conquer our patience or quell the comfort of our unwounded conscience.

CHAP. 12.
Though nothing can fall out otherwise then God hath decreed: yet God hath decreed that many things may fall out otherwise than they doe.

1 MEn, otherwise of light and vaine behaviour, gaine oftentimes respect amongst the multitude by pretended descent from worthy Families, with whom their names have some alliance: so doe inconsiderate positions or conclusions dangerously erronious, many times get more esteeme among the Learned, than ordi­nary truths doe, as being mistaken for the true and naturall off-springs of undoubted Maximes. There is no Christian, but thinkes himselfe bound upon his allegiance to submit his assent unto the former Principle, [It is impossible, that any thing should be, which God hath decreed not to be; or any thing which is, should otherwise bee, than God hath decreed it should be.] And many which make a conscience as well of their words as of their wayes, (herein per­haps especially faulty, that they are too zealously [Page 99] sollicitous not to speake amisse,) make no scruple of entertaining these and the like inferences follow­ing, as naturally descending from the former Ma­xime: [It is impossible ought should fall out other­wise than it doth: all things in respect of God and his Omnipotent Decree, are necessary: Contingencie is but a solecisme of secular language, or if any thing may without offence be termed contingent, it must be reputed such, onely with reference to second causes.]

2 Howbeit such good men as doe thus write and speake, will give us leave (I know) to take it in the first place as granted, that God is wiser than we are, and knowes the nature of all things and their differences better than they or we doe. This being granted, we will in the second place suppose that Contingency is not a meere fictitious name of that which is not, as Tragelaphus; nor altogether Syno­nymall to Necessity. The question about Contin­gency, and of its difference from necessity, is not such as one in merriment once proposed in schools; An chimera calcitrans in vacuo terat calceos: The very names of Contingency and Necessity to ordi­nary Latinists differ more than Ensis and Gladius, than Vestis and Indumentum, betwixt which per­haps the ancient Latine Artificers or Nomencla­tors knew some difference. Yet was it impossible for them to know any thing which God knew not, who out of all controversie knowes the true diffe­rence betweene Contingency and Necessity, much better then we can doe. For both of them are En­tities of his making, and serve as different Lawes to the diversity of his creatures, or their different [Page 100] actions. All the reasons that can be drawne from the immutability of Gods Decree to the contrary, may with greater facility and strength of the same Decree be retorted than brought against us. For God immutably decrees mutability. Now who will say that things mutable, are in respect of Gods decree or knowledge immutable? The Heavens and other bodies moveable according to locall mo­tion, are truly moveable in themselves, absolutely moveable, not immoveable in respect of Gods de­cree or knowledge: for he knowes them to bee moveable, because he decreed them so to be; hee doth not know them to be immoveable because he decreed them not to be such, unlesse for a time by interposition of miracle. It implies lesse contra­diction, to say, Deus immutabiliter decernit muta­bilia, than to say (which hath beene accounted an ancient orthodoxall Maxime,) Stabilis dat cuncta movere. For Mobility is a branch of Mutability.

3 Every thing in respect of Gods decree or knowledge is altogether such as God hath decreed it should be.In what good sense all things may be said necessary in respect of Gods decree. If then God hath decreed there should be contingency, as well as necessity; it is altogether as necessary that some events should be contingent as others necessary: and as truly contingent as the other is necessary in respect of Gods decree.See chap. 22. parag. 2. Albeit to speake properly, the natures of contingency and necessity consist not in meere relation or respect. For in as much as both are immediate and re­all effects of Divine Omnipotency; both must have absolute being, the being of neither is meerly re­lative. Now if Contingency have a true and ab­solute [Page 101] being, it is neither constituted in the nature of contingency by any respect or relation to se­cond causes, nor can any respect or relation to the first cause deprive it of that absolute nature, which the Omnipotent efficacy of the cause of cau­ses hath irrevocably bestowed upon it. Briefly, if Contingency be any thing, it is that which it is by the Omnipotent Decree; and being such, it is alto­gether as impossible that some effects should not be absolutely contingent, as that such effects as the Divine Decree hath appointed to bee necessary, should not be at all. Or if we would make impar­tiall inquiry into the originall of all things, nothing without the precincts of the most glorious and ever blessed Trinity, is absolutely necessary.

4 By Contingency (lest haply we might be mis­taken) we understand the possible meane betweene necessity of being and necessity of not being, or of being such, or of not being such; or betweene ne­cessity of doing, and necessity of not doing, or ne­cessity of being done, or necessity of being left un­done. This meane betweene necessity of doing, and necessity of not doing, is that which in agents intellectuall, as in men and Angells wee call free­dome of will or choice. Vnto which freedome, necessity is as contradictory, as irrationability is to the nature of man, and contingency as necessarily presupposed as life and sense are to reason. Adde reason to contingency, and we have the compleat definition of Free-will. In those cases wherein the Creator hath exempted man from restraint of ne­cessity, his will is free. The divine will it selfe is [Page 102] not free in those operations which are essentiall, though most delectable. God the Father is more delighted in the eternall generation of his Sonne: so is God the Father and the Sonne in the eternall procession of the Holy Ghost; than in the creati­on, production, or preservation of all the creatures. Yet are not these or other internall operations of the blessed Trinity so free in respect of the divine nature, as is the production of the world. What­soever God decrees he decrees it freely, that is, so as he might not decree it. Whatsoever he makes he makes it freely, that is, he so makes it, as that it was not necessary for him to make it.

CHAP. 13.
Contingency is absolutely possible, and part of the ob­ject of Omnipotency, as formall a part as neces­sity is.

1 IT is an unquestionable rule in the Art of Arts, that propositions, for their forme not incompatible, may from the necessity of their matter or sub­ject, become equivalent to proposi­tions directly contradictory; whose indispensable law or rule it is, that if the one be true, the other must needs be false, they admit of no meane be­twixt them. Now there is no matter or subject in the world, which is so absolutely necessary, as the existence of the Divine Nature, or the internall operations of the Trinity. Whence it is, that be­tweene [Page 103] these two propositions [The generation of the Sonne, is necessary, the not generation of the Son is necessary.] there is no possible meane which can be capable of truth. The first is so absolutely ne­cessary, and so necessarily true, that the latter is e­ternally false. But such is not the case or conditi­on of these two propositions following: [The Creation or Existence of the World is necessary: The not Creation or non existence of the World is necessa­rie.] These are not contradictories for their form, nor equivalent to contradictories for their matter or subject, and therefore may admit a meane be­tweene them. To say the creation or existence of the world was absolutely necessary, hath no truth in it: for it had a beginning of existence and being, and may have an end: and the other extreame or contrary [The not creation or non existence of the world is absolutely necessary,] hath lesse appearance of truth in it. It remaines then, that the two con­tradictorie propositions to these false ones, must be true. The contradictory to the former is this: [The creation or existence of the world is not abso­lutely necessarie.] The contradictory to the lat­ter is this▪ [The not creation or non existence of the World is not absolutely necessary.] Now seeing the world is created, and yet it was not necessary that it should be created: both these propositions fol­lowing (seeing either of them is a true meane be­tweene the two former extreames or false ones,) are most true: [1 The creation of the world was possible, 2 The not creation of the world was possible.] And if as well the not creation, as the creation of [Page 104] the world, was possible; wee may not deny that God did freely create it: seeing freedome pro­perly taken, includes or is a possibility of doing or not doing. It was likewise free for the Almighty, to create or not to create Man or Angell. But his free purpose to create them after his owne Image be­ing supposed: it was not meerly possible, but al­together necessary that they should bee created good. In as much as he is goodnesse it selfe, it is not possible that evill should bee created by him, that he should be the Author of it. As is his being, so is his goodnesse, perpetually absolute, eternally necessary. But though Men and Angels were ne­cessarily created good, yet their goodnesse in the beginning was mutable, not perpetually necessa­rie. The question is, whether continuance in that goodnesse, wherein God created them, were tru­ly possible in respect of Gods decree, unto such as have not so continued, or their non continuance necessary: Or whether, neither their continuance or non continuance were necessary, or both alike possible. To say that Adams continuance in good­nesse was, in respect of Gods decree, necessary, is [...]vidently convinced of falshood by his fall. So that the other part onely remaines questionable, whe­ther Adams non continuance in the state of good­nesse, were so absolutely decreed by God, that it was not possible for him to continue. For resolu­tion of this point, we are to inquire, First, whe­ther in respect of Gods power it were possible. Secondly, whether in respect of his goodnesse it were necessary or most congruent, to ordaine or [Page 105] decree neither a necessitie of continuance, nor a necessitie of non continuance in goodnesse; but the meane betweene them, that is, an absolute possibilitie of continuance, and an absolute pos­sibilitie of non continuance. That it was pos­sible to decree such a mutuall possibilitie, may thus be proved.

2. Whatsoever implies no contradiction, is ab­solutely possible, and fals within the object of om­nipotencie. But this mixt possibilitie of continu­ing or not continuing, being a meane betwixt the necessitie of Adams continuance, and the necessi­tie of not continuance in the state of integritie, im­plies no contradiction: Ergo, it was possible for God to decree it. That it implies no contradicti­on in respect of the forme, is a point so cleare from the first principles of argumentation▪ that hee which vnderstands not this, is neither fit to dis­pute, nor to be disputed with. But the same forme (notwithstanding) of contrarietie applied to the divine nature, the persons in Trinitie, or their in­ternall operations, admits no meane. What is the reason? The nature and attributes of the Deitie are absolutely necessary and precedent to all divine decrees or effects of Gods power. And it im­plies a contradiction, that any thing which is ab­solutely necessarie, should admit any mixture of contingency, or of possibilitie of the contrary. But the nature, state, condition, or existence of man, are not proper obiects of the divine decree, yet proper effects of his power, and being such, they are not absolutely necessary; and not being neces­sary [Page 106] in themselves, they cannot incomber or involve propositions, for their forme, not necessarie with absolute necessitie. Whatsoever had a true possi­bilitie of beeing before it was, may bee actually such as it was absolutely possible for it to be, or such as it might please the Almightie Creator (who is free in all his actions ad extra) to make it. It was possible for him to make mans goodnesse or his continuance in it, not to be necessary, but contin­gent. He that made man of nothing, had nothing to resist or hinder him from squaring or framing his nature, to that abstract forme of truth which was in its selfe, or (as we say) objectively possible. For absolute Omnipotencie includes an abilitie to in­grosse or fill meere logicall possibilities, with true and Physicall substances or qualities, as truely an­swerable unto them, as naturall bodies are to bo­dies mathematicall. But concerning Gods power to decree an absolute contingencie in the state, Condition, or Actions of men, there can bee no question amongst such as grant his Omnipotencie to be out of question. What could necessitate his will to lay a necessitie of sinning upon Adam, whose fall or first sinne, if it were necessary in re­spect of Gods decree, the necessitie must needs proceed from Gods Omnipotent decree, without which nothing can haue any reall possibilitie or true title of beeing, much lesse a necessitie of bee­ing. For Divine Omnipotencie is the first and sole Foundation of all Beeing, otherwise then by it; and from it nothing can come to passe either necessa­rily or contingently.

[Page 107] 3. Whatsoeuer is and hath not beene, must of necessitie have some cause of now beeing. And as is the event or effect, such must the causalty bee. If the one be necessarie or inevitable, it is impossi­ble the other should bee contingent or meerely possible. Both, or neither, must bee necessarie. Man we suppose did once stand upright, his first sinne or fall, That action what soever it were, which brought him downe, the evils which thence en­sued, are not meere nothing: Evill it selfe got some kinde of beeing by his negligence, which from the beginning it had not. Of all, or any of these, the question still revolves, whether they were necessary or not necessarie, but Contingent. If Contingent, we have no more to say, but Gods peace be on them, which so speake and thinke: If any reply, that they were necessarie, he must assigne a necessary cause of their beeing. For without some cause they could not be, and without a ne­cessitating cause, there was no necessitie that they should bee. Was this supposed necessitie then from man or from God? from any second cause, or from the first cause of all things? if from man onely or from other second causes; then were they necessary not in respect of the first cause, but in respect of the second: that is, some second cause did make them necessarie, when as the first cause had left them free, or meerely possible; which to affirme is contrary to their positions, with whom we dispute, and in it selfe unconceiveable. For who can make that necessarie, which God hath made contingent or subject to change? What can [Page 108] be said then? that God did make mans fall, his first sinne or appetite of the forbidden fruite, to bee ne­cessarie, or necessitate his will in his sinister choy­ces? This were all one, as to say, that God were the immediate and necessarie cause of sinne, of death, of all the evills that have befallen mankinde since Adam. For he is the sole immediate and ne­cessarie cause of all things which hee so decrees as they cannot possibly fall out otherwise. For him to erre in decreeing, or for the execution of his decree to bee defeated, is impossible. In respect of his proper and adaequate object, and peremptorily intended effect, his will is a more irresistible, more powerfully necessitating cause, than any other cause whatsoever. Now if Gods will had beene, to leave no possibility for Adams perserverance, his fall had beene the compleat object of Gods decree con­cerning our first estate, and by consequence Gods decree, or will had beene the first cause of sinnes first entrance into the world.

CHAP. 14.
The former conclusion proved by the consent of all the Ancients, whether Christians or Heathens which did dislike the errour of the Stoikes.

THE incommodious or inconsiderate speeches, which some of better note and antiquitie, have let fall, were (as I perswade my selfe) but symptomes of their provoked zeale, or eager de­sire to salve those grosse absurdities, which they had rightly espied in others. But it is alwaies more easie to expugne an errour or salve a particular in­convenience, then to provide, that no more shall follow upon the cure or medicine. Had those fa­mous lamps of Gods Church, by whose light many grosse opinions have beene discried and re­formed, seene the inconveniences, which follow upon their owne positions, as clearely, as many of their friends since have done: it would bee a foule slander in us to suspect, that they would not wil-willingly have altered their dialect, or taken advise for expressing their good meaning in tearmes more safe, more proper, and scholastique. If o­therwise we abstract their speeches from that respect and reverence, which we owe unto their memorie, or that good opinion which best men have had of their sinceritie: I cannot see wherein the neces­cesarie consequences of their opinions, as they are usually expressed, comes short of the Manichees [Page 110] errors, or wherein they differ at all from the Stoicks. The Manichees held all evill, and mischiefe in the world to fall out by inevitable necessity: but this necessitie they derived from an evill Author, from a prime cause or Creator of evill onely, not of any thing that was good. And better it is (for it is more consonant to our Saviours advise) to ac­knowledge the tree for evill, where the fruite is evill, then to justifie it for good, when the fruite is apparently and of necessitie naught. The perti­nacie or stiffenesse in this common error, [Evils and mischiefe, or wicked actions fall out by necessi­tie] being presupposed aequall; they adde lesse sinne or errour to it, which hence acknowledge a prime cause of evill, or a cause evill by fatall neces­sitie; then those which hold evill to be necessary in respect of his Omnipotent decree, who is infinite­ly good. In fine, the Manichees were grosse hae­retiques in holding evill and mischiefe to fall out by inevitable necessitie; but this heresie once ad­mitted, it was rather a consonancy of error, then a­ny addition of new heresie, to admit two prime causes or Creators, the one of good, the other of evill. They durst not slander goodnesse with any crime, or for being the Author of any thing that was not good: nor were they disposed to flatter greatnesse, as if evill were no evill, because it pro­ceeded from it.

2. That which the Ancients reprooved in the Stoicks opinion, as most injurious to God and all good men, was, that they held all things (and e­vill things amongst the rest) to fall out by fate or [Page 111] unavoydable necessitie. This foundation being once laied, the rootes of vertue must utterly perish, and that which we call vice should bee a meere name, or matter of nothing: there is no place left for just reward or punishment. Whether by fate the Stoicks meant the influence of starres, the course of nature, or the decree of GOD (who to them was all one with Nature;) all was one in re­spect of the former inconveniences, which neces­sarily followed from admission of an inevitable necessitie in humane actions, whence soever that be derived. To say, it comes from the first cause, or from the second, is meerly accidentall to the er­ror or inconvenience so sharply & justly reproved by the primitive Church. In respect of a Trades­mans commoditie, it is all one, whether he be pro­hibited for setting up or trafiquing, by the compa­nie of his own profession, or by some higher pow­ers, so the prohibition or restraint be as large & pe­remptorie, without hope of release: or if he bee restrained upon his allegiance by the Prince or privy counsell, his hopes of thriving will be much lesse, then if he were tied onely by the locall sta­tutes of some pettie Corporation. Thus if the Stoick derived the necessitie of all things from the revolution of the Heavens, or from other second causes, as their supposed guides: the impossibili­tie of doing otherwise then we doe, was, in every Christians conceipt, evidently much lesse, then if we derive this necessitie from the Omnipotent de­cree. Now the danger or incenvenience of their opinion, did formally consist, in nursing a conceipt [Page 112] in men, that it was impossible for them to doe o­therwise then they doe, or to avoyd the evills and mischiefes into which they fall. And these dan­gers or inconveniences, are so much greater in Christians then they were in the Stoicks; as the God which wee acknowledge is more Omnipo­tent, then nature or the Stoicks god. For the more Omnipotent he is, the more impossible is it for a­ny creature to avoid the necessitie which by his decree is layed upon him.

3. In respect of the former inconveniences, or of the opinion it selfe, it is meerely accidentall, whether this necessity bee layed upon us by coa­ction, or willingly and cheerefully entertained by us; whether it proceed from Gods power or im­pulsion, or from his wisdome: so our actions and their issues, bee, in respect of his Omnipotent power or will, alike unavoidable. If birds and fishes could speake, I suppose the one would as much complaine of those that in hard frost or snow, allure them with baites to come within the fall of the trappe, as the other would doe of Fish­ers for driving them violently into their nets. If the birds once taken be used as hardly; their expo­stulations would be so much more just, as their usage before their taking, was more kinde. To make a man willing to undoe himselfe, upon faire promises made, not with purpose to doe him good, but to circumvent him; is greater cruelty then can accompany open violence. Hee that wit­tingly ministers poyson instead of Physick, is in all mens judgement, as true a Murderer, as hee that [Page 113] kils with the sword, albeit the partie to whom it is ministred, having no reason to suspect any dan­ger, doe willingly drinke it. And the lesse suspiti­ous or more charitably affected hee is to his professed Physitian, the greater wrong he hath in being thus uncharitably dealt with. It would lit­tle boote the malefactor in this kinde, to plead; Albeit I gave it him, hee might have chosen whe­ther he would have drunke it, because I did not in­force him with a drawen Dagger or other wea­pon to be his owne executioner. In many cases, one may be the true cause of anothers death, and deserve death himselfe, although he be not any ne­cessarie cause of his death, or plot his destruction without possibilitie of avoidance. But if our wil­ling choyse of those waies which lead to death, be necessarie in respect of the Almighties decree, so that there be no possibilitie left, to escape it; hee is a more necessarie and more immediate cause of all their deaths that thus perish, then any man can be of his death whom he poisons. And if the case stood thus with any, their miserie were greater, by how much they did lesse suspect his goodnesse: However, most miserable, because most desperate. Reason and knowledge (the two ornaments of the humane nature) should be to them a curse. He that neither knowes nor doth his Masters will, shall be beaten; because it was possible for him to have known it: but w^th fewer stripes, because not know­ing it, there was no possibility left for him to doe it. But he that knowes it, and doth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes, because the knowledge of his [Page 114] will to punish sinners, and reward the righteous, did include a possibilitie to avoyd death, and to be made partaker of life. If otherwise, there bee no possibilitie left for him, that knowes Gods displea­sure against sinne, to avoid the wayes of sinne (those are death;) his case before and after death, is much more miserable than his, whom God in just judge­ment, hath deprived of knowledge. And the Prae­server of men should be accounted much more fa­vourable to stocks and truncks, than unto many men upon whom hee besto [...]es his best gifts in great plentie; if these be bestowed upon the Con­ditions now mentioned, or be charged with re­medilesse miserie.

4 But admitting their miserie to be fatall and inevitable by divine decree; is it not possible to acquit this decree, or the Author of it from being the Author of evill? did the Stoick condemne all Iudges of injustice that sentenced malefactors un­to violent death, whereto by their opinion, all that suffered it, were inevitably destinated? Per­haps the feare of censure in publique Courts, did make them silent in this point: But was not this care to keepe themselves harmelesse, or feare not to offend Magistrates, altogether fatall? Galen ( [...] my remembrance) in his Stoicall discourse, quòd mores animi sequuntur temperamentum corporis, hath framed this answer to the question proposed: We doe not offend in killing Snakes or Toades or other like venemous creatures; albeit their natu­rall temper or disposition be unaltrably harmefull unto men. And if nature or temper of bodie make [Page 115] some of our owne stamp and ranke more noysome than these creatures are, unto their neighbours; to fit the one sort with the same measure of punish­ment, which is due unto the other, is no injustice, no inequality. AndIn Dialo­gistam. Lipsius, a man not too much abhorrent from any opiniō, that was fashionable to his new stile, or might serve to set forth the point, which for the present he much affected; gives this briefe placet, in favour of the Stoicks opinion: (Fa­tali culpae fatalis paena,) punishment is fatall to fa­tall crimes. But this is principium petere, to take that for granted which is questioned. For, if the harmes which malefactors do and suffer, be truly fatall; the one is no true crime, the other is no just punish­ment. To Galen I answer, that if we could by any skill in physick or complexions discerne some men to bee as naturally disposed to mischiefe all that come in their way, or by chance offend them; as are the Snake, the Sloworm, or other serpent, it would be the wisest way for such as love their lives, to rid the world of these fatally mischievous reasonable creatures, as fast as they met with them▪ or to ap­point some certaine daies for hunting them, as wee do noysome beasts. But to examine their suspitious intentions, to question their actions, to arraign their persons, or put them upon a formall or legall tryall of their life, would be as ridiculous, as to produce witnesses against a Snake, to empannell a Iury upon a mad Dog, or to take bale for a Wolfes appearance, before a Butcher, in an assembly of Mastives.

5 The common notions of good and evill, & the ingraffed opinion of contingency in humane acti­ons, [Page 116] have taught the Lawgivers of every nation, to put notorious malefactors unto more exquisite tor­tures, than we do harmfull creatures; either to en­force them to utter, what no destiny nor complexi­on makes them voluntarily confesse, or else to de­terre others (that are as naturally disposed to evill, as they were) from doing the like. Scarce any male­factor (unless he be poysoned with this opinion of absolute necessity) but will acknowledge that it was possible for him to have done otherwise thē he hath done; possible for him to have avoided the doome, which is passed upon him by man: which to have a­voided had been absolutely impossible, if it were to be awarded upon him by Gods eternall decree, or (which is all one) if in respect of this decree, it had been necessary. As ignorance of the true God, and his saving truth, makes the former error more ex­cusable in the Stoicks, than in such Christians as shal maintain it: so might impotency exempt that God which the Stoicks worshipped, (whether Nature, Fate, or some other distinct celestiall power) from those imputatiōs, unto which omnipotency makes the God of Christians lyable, if all things were by vertue of his decree absolutely necessary. It was a received opinion among many Heathens, that the gods themselves were subject unto Fate, & for this reason, when any thing fell out in their judgement amiss; Fates commonly did either intirely bear the blame, or the greatest part of it. And their gods (in­deed) had deserved pity rather than blame, if they could do no better than they did, as being over­mastered by Fates. But for a Christian to inveigh a­gainst [Page 117] Fates, is to accuse or deny his God. If Fates be nothing, hee hath no reason to complaine of them: if any thing they bee, they are of the true Gods making, who made all things, who cannot possibly be subject to any thing that he hath made. Nor can it stand with our allegiance to say when any disasters befall us, that our God could no other­wise choose, that our mischances were the abso­lutely necessary effects of his Omnipotent decree. One speciall cause of this error, and of some mens adherence to it, is a jealousie or zealous needlesse feare, lest they should grant God to be impotent, or not so omnipotent but that some things might take possession of beeing without his leave or no­tice. The originall of this feare, is, want of di­stinction, betweene chance or casualty, and such contingency as hath beene expressed.

6 Many reasons might be alledged sufficient to demonstrate the inevitable absurdities of this sup­posed absolute necessity. But it is one labour to convince an error before indifferent hearers; ano­ther to make men forsake the errours which have long possessed them: a third to win them unto a liking of the contrary truth. For effecting the two latter, no meanes can be so effectuall in respect of their disposition with whom we have to deale, as a plaine declaration, how ill this opinion of absolute necessity, how well this doctrine of mixt possibility or contingency consorts: first with their owne re­solution of other difficulties in this very argu­ment whereof wee treate: secondly, with the perpetuall voice of Gods Spirit, and his Mes­sengers, [Page 118] specially when they seeke ex professo, to perswade to good, and to disswade from evill.

CHAP. 15.
The principall conclusions, which are held by the fa­vourers of absolute necessity, may be more clearly justified, and acquitted from all inconveniences, by admitting a mixt possibility or contingency in hu­mane actions.

1 THe most I have met withall, are afraid in plaine termes to main­taine; That God did as immedi­ately and as necessarily decree Adams fall or state of sinne, as his originall justice or state of in­tegrity. For this were to make him as true, as pro­per, and necessary a cause of sinne, and of all evill, as he is of goodnesse. To allay the harshnesse of some speeches, heretofore used, by those men whom they favour, they will grant no more then this: that God did decree to permit his fall. But the speech is improper and very ambiguous▪ and in what sense soever it may be taken, it must plead its warrant or right use, from our opinion; theirs can afford it none. Permission, to speake properly, is a vertuall part of the Decree it selfe; not the object whereto the decree is terminated. But to let this passe; we will take [Gods decree to per [...]it] to be all one, as if they had said Gods permissive decree. Did God then by his decree, permit Adam to sinne? if [Page 119] he did, this decree was either just or unjust. What­soever is by just decree permitted, is by the same decree sufficiently warranted. At least the punish­ment, otherwise due unto it, is dispensed with. Such divorces as were unlawfull from the first in­stitution of Matrimony in Paradise, were permitted to the Israelites for the hardnesse of their hearts by Moses, and for this reason, they were not pu­nished by the judiciall Law. If it should please our Soveraigne to permit sickly Students to eate flesh in Lent, we would take his professed permission, for a sufficient dispensation with the penall Statutes in this case provided. God questionlesse would ne­ver have punished Adam for eating an Apple, if by his eternall decrece he hadQuàm lon [...]è quaeso est à juben­te [...]ermit­tens? Qui en [...]m, [...] nos ista [...]ma­la) perferre, et prohibere potest ne perferamus, probat abs (que) [...] [...]ebe­ [...] [...]ferre, & quaecun­q [...] pati­ [...]ur. susti­n [...]e Salvi­ [...]n. lib. 8. in initio pa. 260. permitted him to have eaten it. But their meaning haply is not, that God did allow or approve his eating of it, seeing he threatned it with death. But if, by his decree, he did not allow it, he did permit it onely in such a sense, as we may say the Lawes of our land, per­mit men to be hanged because they keepe not men close prisoners, nor so tye their hands that they cannot steale, rob or kill, before they bee suspected or convicted of felonie, robbery, or murder. But▪ no tyrant did ever before hand forbid such a fact, under paine of death, without a supposed naturall possibility to avoid it. And just Lawes afford or­dinary or civill meanes for satisfying nature in ne­cessities, lest these (as they know no l [...]w) enforce men to use their naturall possibilities or faculties amisse. The lawes of this Land and others, which make theft matter of death, permit men the free [Page 120] imployment of bodily faculties, to earne their bread, or (if they be impotent) to crave or accept the benevolence of others, lest they should perish for hunger, or be enforced to steale. If our lawes or Lawgivers, not permitting any of these meanes or the like, should punish the taking of a loafe of bread or cup of drinke, with death; they might be more truly said to enjoyne, then permit theft; to be more delighted with the bloud of the needy, than with preservation of publike peace; albeit they did not set other mens meat before thē, when they are hungred, nor lead their hands to take it. In like manner, he that saith, God did permit Adam to eate the forbidden fruit, and by eating to in­curre death, doth necessarily imply, that God per­mitted him the free use of his externall and inter­nall faculties to satisfie his appetite, with some o­ther meate. Now the free use of any faculty in­cludes the concourse or cooperation of God, with­out which it is impossible any creature should move. And this concourse was a part of his decree or will as it concerned this act. More plainly: He that permitted Adam to sinne, did more than per­mit him to abstaine from sinne, or to persevere in obedience. If then God in permitting him onely to sinne, did afford meanes necessary for reducing this possibility of sinning into a sinfull act not al­lowed; his more than permission of him to abstaine from sinne, his commandement to persevere in obedi­ence, did not onely suppose a true possibility for him to abstaine and persevere, but include withall better meanes for reducing this possibility into act, [Page 121] then were afforded for enabling him actually to sinne. These two contrary possibilities, and the se­verall meanes for accomplishing them, must beare a proportion answerable to a meere permission without approbation, or to a prohibition, and to a peremptorie command of civill authoritie. Now every just Lawgiver affords better meanes and in­couragement for accomplishing his commands or requests, then he doth for breaking or negle­cting them.

2▪ For conclusion, when they say God, by his aeternall deree, did permit Adams fall, their mea­ning rightly expressed, is no more then this; God did not decree that his perseverance should bee ne­cessarie. For necessitie of perseverance excludes all possibility of falling. But if his fall had beene necessarie in respect of the aeternall decree, it had not onely beene permitted, but allowed and requi­red. It remaines then that both were possible, neither necessary in respect of the divine decree. Or to untwist the knot a little further; God by his decree did permit and allow him a possibility to fall; but he did not allow the reduction of this possibility into act, that is, he gave it him, not to the end that he should fal, but that his perseverance might be more beneficiall. He did not onely per­mit or allow him a possibitie of perseverance, but did command and require the reduction of this possibilitie into act.

3 This forme of wholsome doctrine admitted, will clearely enlighten the truth of another distin­ction or resolution much used, but mightily ob­scured, [Page 122] or rather quite stifeled, by such as hold all things necessary in respect of the aeternall decree. The distinction is: God is the cause of every action, but he is not the cause of the obliquitie which accom­panies sinfull actions, nor of sinne as it is sinne. This is their last Apologie for avoyding that imputati­on of making God the author of sinne. Herein wee both agree; The coexistence of the all-wor­king decree (or divine cooperation) is necessarily required to every action or effect. Every action includes a motion, and in him wee move, wee live, and have our beeing. But hee that will grant this cooperation or actuall coexistence of the all-wor­king decree to be the necessarie cause of every acti­on, unto which it is most necessarily required; must, upon the same tearmes, grant, God to bee not the necessarie onely, but the onely cause of all and every obliquitie, of all and every sinne, of all that hath beene, is, or can be blame-worthy in men or devills, from their creation to euerlasting. The demonstration of this inconvenience or absurdi­ty, wherewith we charge the adverse opinion (but no maintainer of it) must be referred unto the dis­cussions of the state of Innocency and the manner of sinnes entring into the world: we are now en­gaged to extract a better meaning out of their other words, than they themselves expresse, or can truely be contained in them, untill they aban­don the opinion of absolute necessity in humane actions, as they have reference to the aeternall decree.

Seeing it is agreed vpon, that God and man are [Page 123] joynt agents in every sinfull action, or in effects essentially evill (such questionlesse was mans desire to be like God, or his lusting after the forbiden fruite:) The Probleme remaines, why both should not be aequall sharers in the sinne: or how it is possible justly to condemne men of iniquitie, without some imputation unto God, who is the principall agent in all actions. Shall wee bee partiall for him or seeke to excuse him by his greatnesse? Shall wee say hee cannot doe amisse, because he is su­preame Lord over all, and may doe with his creatures what hee list? To such as count the donative of robbers a true boone or reall curtesie; to such as can magnifie their owne integrity, whereof they give no proofe, save onely as he did by negatives, (non hominem occidi,) I am no murtherer. The Poet hath shaped an answere, as fit as pertinent, (non pasces in cruce corvos,) Thou shalt not feede Ravens upon a Gibbet. To say God is the Au­thor of sinne were hideous blasphemie: yet to say he is no tempter, no seducer of mankind to evill, is not to offer praise unto him. Let my spirit va­nish with my breath, and my immortall soule re­turne to nothing, rather then suffer her selfe to be overtaken with such a dead slumber, as can rest contented to set forth His Glory by bare negatives, or by not being the Author of sinne, who is most highly to be praised in all his works, whose good­nesse is infinitely greater in concurring to sinfull actions, then the goodnesse of his best creatures in the accomplishment of their most syncere intentions.

[Page 124] 4 The truth of this conclusion is necessarily grounded upon these assertions hereafter to bee discussed: That mans possibilitie or hopes of attai­ning everlasting happinesse, was of necessitie to bee tempered with a possibilitie of sinning, or falling into miserie. To permit or allow man this possibility of sinning, & to bestow upon him the contrary possi­bility of not sinning and hope of happines was one & the same branch of divine goodnesse. One & the selfe same branch of Gods goodnesse it was, to allow this possibilitie of sinning, and to afford his concourse for reducing of it into Act. For unlesse he had decreed to afford his concourse thereto, it had beene impossible for man actually to have sin­ned. And if for man to sinne had beene made im­possible by Gods decree: it had been alike impos­sible for him to have done well or ill, or to become truly happy. Briefly, God in that hee decreed a mixture of contrary possibilities, decreed withall a concourse or cooperation sutable unto, and suf­ficient for the actuall accomplishment of both. To the probleme propounded, the answere from these grounds, is easie: Albeit God and man bee joynt agents in every action or effect essentially evill, yet the whole sinne is wholy mans: because the nature of sinne consists either in mans using the possibility of sinne allowed of God for his good, to accomplish such acts, as God disallowes, or in not using the contrary possibilitie unto such acts, as he not onely alloweth and approveth, but re­quireth and commandeth, such as he most boun­tifully rewardeth, and unto whose accomplish­ment, [Page 125] hee affordeth, not his ordinarie concourse onely, but his speciall furtherance and assistance. In every sin of commission, we approve and make choice of those acts which his infinite goodnesse disalloweth. In every sinne of omission, we do not approve those acts, which he approveth: although perhaps it may be questioned, whether there can be any sinne of pure omission, or not mixt with commission; that is, any sinne wherein we doe not either like what God dislikes, or reject and con­temne what he likes & cōmends unto us for good.

5 From these resolutions we may finde some truth in an usuall position; which, without this truth presupposed, is palpably false. Every action or effect, as it is an effect or action, or as it proceeds from God, is good. The best meaning whereof it is capable, must be this; Gods goodnesse is seene in every action, even in those which are most sinfull. To vouchsafe his cooperation to them, is a branch of his goodnesse, because man could not be happy without a possibility of deserving to be miserable. But humane actions or effects in their owne na­ture, indefinitely considered, or in the abstract as they are actions, are neither morally good, nor mo­rally bad. When it is said that every action, as an action, is good, this must be understood of transcen­dentall goodnes only, of w^ch kind of goodnes mo­ral evill or sin it selfe is partaker. If every action, as it is an actiō were morally good, it were impossible any action shold be morally evill. If we consider hu­mane actions not indefinitely, or with this redupli­cation, as they are actions, but descending unto par­ticulars, [Page 126] some are good, some are bad, and some (per­haps) positively indifferent, but of this hereafter.

CHAP. 16.
The former contingency in humane actions or mu­tuall possibility of obtaining reward or incurring punishment, proved by the infallible rule of faith, & by the tenour of Gods covenant with his people.

1 THough manifest deductiōs of ill sounding Consequences from their positiōs, which we refute, and more commodious explana­tions of other tenents common to both, may somewhat move the Favourers of universall necessity to a dislike of their owne opinions, & in part incline them to the opposit truth: yet is it positive proofe of Scriptures that must strike the maine stroak, & fasten their as­sents unto it. And God forbid they should bee so uncharitable, as to think, that we or any sonnes of the true Church, would be unwilling to put our selves upon this tryall. Scripture wee grant (and are ready upon as high and hard termes as they, to maintaine,) is the onely infallible rule of rectitude or obliquitie in opinions concerning God, or mans salvation. Yet are we not hereby bound to reject reason, and infallible rule of Art, as incompetent Iudges, what propositions in Scripture are equi­pollent, which opposite, which subordinate: or what collections from undoubted sacred Maximes, are necessary or probable, or what conclusions are [Page 127] altogether false and sophisticall. Nor ought they to suspect reason in others to bee unsanctified; be­cause it is accompanied with rules of prophane sciences. For even these are the gifts of God, and are sanctified in every Christian, by the rule of faith. And in as much as both of us admit Scripture to be the onely rule of faith in it selfe most infal­lible: both of us are tyed by infallible consequents of truth from this rule derived, to admit of this Maxime following;Vid. Suf­frag. Britan­norum in Concil. Dordr. the­si 3. de An­tecedaneis ad Conver­sionem. Vide etiam D. Wardum Concione de Gratia di­scriminante pag. 5, 6, 7. editionis 2. Gods threats and promises, his exhortations, admonitions, or protestations, whether immediately made by himselfe or by his Prophets, containe in them greater truth and syncerity then is in our admonitions, exhortations, and promises. His truth and syncerity in all his wayes are the rule or patterne, which we are to imitate, but which wee cannot hope to equalize.

2 Put the case then a religious, wise, and graci­ous Prince, should exhort a young gentleman (that in rigour of Law had deserved death for some aemulous quarrell in the Court) to behave himselfe better hereafter, and he should be sure to find grea­ter favour at his hands than any of his adversaries: no man would suspect any determination in the Prince, to take away his life for this offence, or any purpose to intrap him in some other. A minister of publique iustice in our memory told a Butcher, (whom he then sentenced to death for manslaugh­ter,) that he might kill Calves, Oxen and Sheepe, but mankinde was no butchery ware; hee might not kill his honest neighbours. The solecisme was so uncouth, and so ill beseeming the seat of gravity [Page 128] and of justice, that it moved laughter (though in a case to be lamented) throughout the assembly; and a young Student standing neare the barre, ad­vised the poore condemned man to entreat a Li­cence to kill Calves and Sheepe that Lent. The wisest of men may sometimes erre, sometimes place good words amisse, or give wholsome coun­sell (such as this was, had it beene uttered in due time and place) out of season. But to spend good words of comfort and encouragement, upon such as thou hast certainly appointed to dye; to floute the children of destruction with faire promises of preeminence;Gen. 18. 15▪ That be farre from thee O Lord. Shall not the Iudge of all the earth doe that which is right and just: a thing welbeseeming the best and wisest Princes of the earth to imitate? Was then the sen­tence of condenmation for Cains exile or utter de­struction without possibility of revocation, when thou entreatedst him as a most loving Father;Gen. 4▪ 6, 7, 8. Why art thou worth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doe well, shalt not thou bee accepted? and if thou doest not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him? Did that, which the Text saith, afterward came to passe, come to passe by inevitable necessity? And Cain talked with Abel his brother: and it came to passe when they were in the field, that Cain rose up a­gainst Abel his brother and slue him. My adversaries (for I am not theirs) must be entreated to pardon me, if I be as resolute and peremptory for my opi­nion hitherto delivered, as they are for any other. For reason and conscience ruled by Scripture per­swades [Page 129] me, it is possible for the Iudge of quick & dead to be unjust in his sentences, or unsyncere in his incouragement, as that Cains destruction should be in respect of his decree, altogether ne­cessarie or impossible to have beene avoyded. When the Lord tooke first notice of his aemu­lation and envie at his yonger brother; God would not banish him from his brothers presence, nor so tie his hands that he could not strike: But he used all the meanes that aequitie (in like case) re­quires to move his heart, that way which it was very possible for it to bee moved. And unto this motion Cain had both Gods assistance and incou­ragement, as readie as his generall conc [...]urse to conceave anger in his heart, or to lift up his hand against his brother.

3 The very tenor of Gods grand covenant with the sonnes of Abraham includes this twofold pos­sibilitie, one of attaining his extraordinary graci­ous favour by doing well, another of incurring miserable calamities by doing ill. If yee walke in my statutes, and keepe my commandements, and doe them; then will I give you raine in due season, and the land shall yeeld her increase, and the trees of the field shall yeeld their fruit. And your threshing shall reach to the vintage, and the vintage shall reach un­to the sowing time: and yee shall eate your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely &c. I am the Lord your God, which brought you forth out of the Land of Aegypt, that yee should not bee their bond­men, and I have broken the bands of your yoke, and made you goe upright. Levit. 26. ver. 3. ad 14. But [Page 130] if yee will not hearken unto mee, and will not doe all these commandements; And if yee shall despise my statutes, or if your soule abhorre my judgements, so that ye will not doe all my commandements, but that ye breake my covenant: I also will doe this un­to you, I will even appoint over you terrour, consump­tion and the burning ague, &c. Levit. 26. ver. 14, 15, 16, &c.

This tenor or condition was to continue one and the same throughout all generations. But some generations, as the event hath proved, were de facto partakers of the blessings promised; others have had their portion in the curses. Shall wee hence inferre, that prosperitie, was in respect of GODS decree or good pleasure altogether necessarie unto such as prospered, not so much as possible unto those that perished, or that their calamity was absolutely necessary? I would say ra­ther, & I have Gods word, yea his heartie wishes, for my warrant, that the most prosperous times, which any of Abrahams or Davids posteritie en­joyed, did come farre short of that measure of pro­speritie, which by Gods aeternall decree, was pos­sible to all, even to the whole stocke of Iacob throughout all their generations. O that my peo­ple had hearkned unto me: and Israel had walked in my wayes! I should soone have subdued their ene­mies, and turned my hand against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted them­selves unto him: but their time should have endu­red for ever. Psal. 81. verse 13, 14, 15. But in what estate? fed with the finest of the wheate, and satified [Page 131] with hony out of the Rocke. verse 16. Were these meere wishes of winde which vanished with the avouchers breath? did the Pslmist utter them out of tender affection to his people and country, without commission from his Maker? or was He lesse affected towards his people then this his mes­senger, that his message wants the waight of ever­lasting truth? To these and the like demands, of many bad answers, this is the best and most com­mon: God would undoubtedly have made his pro­mise good, and done aswell by Israell as here hee wish­eth, if Israell could have turned to him or done what he requires. But that, say the same men, was in re­pect of Gods decree or secret will, impossible. Whēce, seeing the condition neither was nor could be performed by Israel, God was not bound to be­stow these blessings upon them, but free to reserve his store unto himselfe, or for some other people; which was profered (but upon conditions impos­sible to bee performed) unto Israell. Might not churlish Naball have promised abundance of bread, of wine and flesh to Davids servants, upon like tearmes? May not cutthroate Vsurers assure bags of Gold to bedridden or decrepit limbs, up­on condition they will fetch them from the toppe of high towers or sleep mountains? But what kind­nesse, what synceritie could there be in such lavish profers, specially if the impotent wretches were by covenant excluded from al use of crutches? Yet is it more possible for a creeple to goe without his crutches, then for Israell to walke in the waies of God, without his aide or assistance. Necessitie [Page 132] therefore constraines us to confesse the one of these two, Either that there was no more synceritie in the Almighties protestations, then in Nabals or the Vsurers supposed bountie, which they never meant to use, but upon performance of impossibi­lities: Or else his promises, if they had any syncerity in them, did include his furtherance and assistance unto Israell for performing the condition requi­red. Now unto whatsoever effect or event the furtherance or speciall assistance of Omnipotent power is, upon the truth and synceritie of divine promise, alwaies ready and assured, the same effect cannot truly be deemed impossible in respect of the aeternall decree. And whatsoever is not in respect of this decree impossible, the non existence of it, or the existence of the contrary effect, cannot, in re­spect of the same decree, be necessarie. So then nei­ther was Israels well-doing and prosperitie, nor their ill-doing and calamitie at any time absolute­ly necessarie, in respect of Gods decree; both were possible, both contingent.

4 The truth of these collections from Gods word (or rather of these infallible consequences of his essentiall goodnesse, sincerity and truth) though necessarie and evident unto Artists, may from o­ther positive authorities of the same word be rati­fied à fortior to common sense. If Neither these good things which God sincerely purposeth and expressely promiseth, nor that evill which he seri­ously and expressely threatens, bee necessary in re­spect of his decree: much lesse can that good which is neither particularly promised or avouch­ed; [Page 133] or that evil which is not expressely threatned or foretold by his infallible messengers, be held neces­sary in respect of his decree. Now, that the prospe­rity which he expresly promiseth by such messen­gers, is not so necessary, as to exclude all possibili­tie of cōtrary Evill; nor the evill which he solemn­ly denounceth so necessarie, as not to leave a true possibilitie for a contrary blessing: his Prophet hath given such a generall and evident assurance, not to Israell onely out to all the Nations of the earth; as we cānot deny, but that it was devised of purpose, by the Lord himselfe, as a post statute to prevent this strange misconstruction, which his people had then made, & which he then foresaw would after­wards be enforced upon his decrees or lawes, by this praejud [...]cate opinion of absolute necessitie. At what instant I shall speake concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdome, to pluck up and to pull downe, and to destroy it; if that nation against whom I have pronounced, turne from their evill, I will repent of the evill that I thought to doe unto them. And at what in­stant I shall speake concerning a nation, and concer­ning a kingdome to build and to plant it; If it doe evill in my sight, that it obey not my voyce, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would be­nefite them. Ier. 18. ver. 7, 8, 9, 10. And, if wee may gesse at the nature of the disease, by the medicine, and the manner of applying it; the house of Israell, was at this time almost desperately sicke of this errour which we refute. Or what need we frame conjectures from the qualitie of the medicine, when as the working of it hath made the Crisis [Page 134] palpable and apparent. The pestilence is best knowne by the botch, or outbursting. What then was the issue of that Cordiall which the Prophet ministred unto them, being but the extraction of the former generalls? Thus saith the Lord; Be­hold, I frame evill against you, and devise a device against you; returne yee now every one from his evill way, and make your wayes and your doings good. We have seene the application of the medicine, what was the operation? And they said, there is no hope, but wee will walke after our owne devises, and wee will every one doe the imagination of his evill heart. Ier. 18. ver. 11, 12. But did the Prophet take their answere verbatim, as they uttered it? No, God did not appoint him to keepe a Register of their words, but to make a comment upon the secret language of their hearts. They are suffici­ently convicted to have said, wee will every one doe the imagination of his evill heart, in that the imaginations of their heart were evill, and they had resolved to retaine their wonted principles, and not to hearken unto the Prophets doctrine. The true and literall paraphrase of their replye, no interpreter extant hath so fully expressed, as the usuall language of some in our times briefly doth; What shall bee, will be: there is no hope the world will amend: if it bee Gods will to prosper the courses which are taken, all will be well: if not, his will however must be done. Thus we delude and put off our Maker with Ifs, and Ands: when as his will re­vealed, aswell for private as publike good, so wee would addresse our selves to doe it, is plaine and [Page 135] absolute. And it is impossible we should addresse our selves to doe it, vnlesse wee would hearken [...] to such as teach it. To expect any other fruite, or use of this doctrine of absolute necessitie, then carnall securitie in time of peace and pro­speritie, and than desperate wilfulnesse in distresse and adversitie, were a madnesse. And seeing this frenzie did still grow greater and greater, in the Iew, as the destruction of Ierusalem (whereof it was both times the principall cause and most fearefull prognostique) grew neerer: the Lord authorized another Prophet (after Ieremie) to in­terpose his oath for the cure of it. They thought that death and destruction, when they approached, were armed with absolute necessitie, (derived from Gods decree) to punish them for their fathers sinnes: and in this conceipt many yeelded unto them, when they might easily haue conquered them. To discover the vanitie of this skale and to acquit his omnipotent decree from the suspected imposition of necessitie. As I live (saith the Lord God) yee shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverbe in Israel: The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge. Be­hold, all soules are mine, as the soule of the father, so also the soule of the son is mine: the soule that sinneth, it shall die. Ezek. 18. ver. 2, 3, 4. Have I any plasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord God? And not that he should returne from his wayes and live? ver. 23. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby yee have transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit: for why will yee dye, O [Page 136] house of Israel? For, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turne your selves and live ye. vers. 31, 32. If the returning of this people, wherein God tooke pleasure, were not necessary, as the event hath proved (for, the most part of them did not returne) it must needs argue a spice of their frenzy, to think their death, wherein he tooke no pleasure, should be necessary. The onely orthodoxall resolution of this point then, must be this, [It was Gods good will and plea­sure,] (the formall dictate, and absolute injunction of his eternall and irresistible decree,) that neither the life or death of such as perished should be ne­cessary; but that both should be possible: albeit the choise of life had beene more pleasant to God, who had complained with griefe, Perditio tua ex te O Israel.

CHAP. 17.
That Gods will is alwayes done, albeit many particu­lars which God willeth, bee not done, and many done which he willeth should not be done.

1 AVt erit aut non erit, is a Prophe­cie which will never bee out of date, impossible ever to bee im­peached of falshood: an answer as universally true to all, as un­sufficient to any question con­cerning things to come. The truth of every dis­junctive proposition, as Logicians teach, is fully salved, if any one member, though of never so ma­ny, be true. Or if the disjunction or division be ar­tificially formall, the actuall existence of one part or member, excludes the actuall existence of the other: so doth the absolute necessity of the one exclude all possibility of the others reduction into act. If I should wage any summe that it would ei­ther raine all day to morrow, or be faire all day to morrow; no man of understanding would put me to prove, that it did both raine all the day, and hold up all the day. The proofe of either part, would be sufficient to evince the truth of my disjunctive assertion; that both should be actually true is im­possible. Or if my adversary could substantially prove, either any intermission of raine or interrup­tion of faire weather: His advantage against mee would bee as evident; because the proposition, which he was to make good against me, was but [Page 138] disjunctive: so that of any two minutes in the whole day, if the one were rainy, and the other faire, my universall disjunctive must needs be false, and his apparantly true, because directly contradictory un­to mine. That it should at one and the same time raine and not raine, is impossible, and comes not within the compasse of any contradictory conte­station, it can be no object of lay or wager.

2 When wee say that God in many humane actions decrees a mixture or multiplicity of possibi­lities; our meaning is, that the tenour of Gods e­ternall & omnipotent word, from which all things derive as well the law and ma [...] of their being; as their being it selfe: is in respect of the severall possible events decreed, not conjunctive or catego­ricall, but disjunctive. And we hold it a sinne to thinke or say, that the onely wise Almighty Crea­tor is not able to conceive or make propositions as truly disjunctive, as any of our making are, or not able to make as formall and contradictory oppositi­on betweene their severall parts, as any humane wit can conceive. Thus much being granted, our intended inference is an everlasting truth. Gods decree or determinate proposition, concerning the supposed multiplicity of possibilities or manifold events, all alike possible; is alwaies exactly fulfil­led, when any one of the events, whose possibilities are decreed, goes actuall existence. To reduce more of them then one into act at one and the same time, is, in many cases altogether impossible, and falls not within the object of Omnipotency. If the reducti­on of any one of them, into actuall possession of its [Page 139] owne being, were in respect of his decree, or by any other meanes, altogether necessary; his decree should necessarily; be broken, and his omnipotency might be overborne. For the necessity of ones be­ing, takes away all possibilitie of being from the con­tradictorie, which omnipotency (as is supposed) had bestowed upon it. Finally, Gods decree in re­spect of all and every part of its proper object, is alike Omnipotent: and therefore it is as impossible for any necessity (by vertue or respect of what cause soever,) to incroach upon those events, the Law or manner of whose production God hath de­creed to be contingent; as for Contingency to hin­der the production of those events, the law or manner of whose production or existence, he hath decreed to be necessary. As impossible for neces­sity to mingle with absolute contingency, from which God hath separated it; as for contingencie to be wedded to absolute necessity, whose mariage God hath forbidden by an everlasting decree.

3 The onely difficulty,Objection wherewith these con­clusions can (as I conceive) with probability bee charged, may be conceived thus: Admitting Gods decree concerning the house of Israels life or death, were (as evidently it was) disjunctive, and did es­sentially include a possibility of life, and a possibi­lity of death, in respect of all or most of their per­sons, or of their publike state; Yet no man will de­nie but that amongst the severall or opposite mem­bers of this or the like decree, God wills one, more than another. For so he saith, That hee willed not the death, but the life of him that dyed. Now if that [Page 140] which God willeth not, may come to passe; and that which he willeth may not come to passe; or if, of two possible events, that whose actuall being he willeth tenne thousand times more ardently, never get actuall being or existence (as being prevented by the actuall accomplishment of the contradicto­rie or incompatible event which he lesse willeth,) How can his will, in this case bee fulfilled? and if his will be not fulfilled, his decree must needs bee broken; and if his decree may be broken, how is his will said to be irresistible? how do we beleeve him to be Omnipotent? Some perhaps would hence conclude, that if of two objects, which we suppose to bee alike truly possible, there bee no necessity, that that should come to passe, which GOD willeth most, or any probabilitie for that to come to passe, which he lesse willeth, or willeth not at all, but rather the contrary: Then there is a possi­bilitie or rather a necessitie, that his will should not be alwaies fulfilled, that he might sometimes sit downe with a kinde of losse, and say with im­potent man,Answer. I have failed of my purpose. The best preparation for fit and peaceable entertainment of the Orthodoxall solution to these difficulties, will be to declare the evident and necessary truth of that assertion, which they object unto us, as a dan­gerous inconvenience able in their judgement to infer the last conclusion.

Truth fully and evidently declared will justifie it selfe against all gainsaiers. The assertion which we grant will necessarily follow from our former discursions, and comes now to justifie it selfe is [Page 141] this; That such things as God no way willeth, oft­times come to passe, when as their contradictories, which he wils most ardently, come not to passe.] The principall instance for justifying this truth, is the repentance and life of a sinner, which God hath sworne that he willeth; so doth hee not his death, if we will beleeve his oath. If any mans verdict shall scatter from mine, or others, which main­taine this doctrine, I must call God and his consci­ence to witnesse, whether he hath not left that un­done, w^ch God wold have had him to do, & some­times done, that which God would have had him not to doe? Let him that will answere negatively to this Interrogative, indite that confession which we daily make in our Liturgy of falshood or slaun­der. Let him call for Iacobs Ladder downe from heaven, and require a guard of Angels to conduct him safely into Gods presence. For if hee have as truely and continually done Gods will here on Earth, as the Angels doe it in heaven; hee may justly challenge speedie admission into their socie­tie. But if he can with safe conscience communi­cate with us sinnefull men, in that confession; his exceptions against our assertion are but needlesse scrupulosities, altogether against reason? what­soever they bee in respect of his conscience, yet to his exceptions wee are to frame a further ans­were.

4 There is an absolute necessity, that Gods will should alwayes be fulfilled: but there is no such necessitie, that it should alwayes bee fulfilled by the parties to whom it is revealed or directed. [Page 142] They are tyed indeed by necessitie of praecept, and at their perill, alwayes to doe it; but the Al­mightie God, doth not referre the fulfilling or evacuation of it, to their fidelitie, choice or resolu­tion: for so the certaintie or infallibilitie of execu­ting his decree, should bee but commensurable to the fragility of our Nature; and that which some object unto us would fall directly upon themselves, to wit, That Gods will should depend upon mans will. As hee alwayes grants the re­quests of the faithfull, or, as the Psalmist speakes, gives such as delight in him, their hearts desire, al­beit he alwaies gives them not the particulars or materialls which they request or heartily de­sire: so he knows how to fulfill his own will, or do his pleasure, albeit those particulars or materials, which he ardently wils and takes most pleasure in, be not alwayes done by us. And this answer might suffice unto a Reader not scrupulously curious. But sophisticall and captious objections require artifi­ciall and formall solutions. The former objection may perhaps be framed more captiously thus. Of more particulars proposed to the choise of men, if that bee not alwayes done, which God willeth most, his will is not done at all. For as a lesser good whilest it stands in competition with a greater, is rather evill than good: so, that which is lesse wil­led or desired, cannot be said to bee willed or de­sired at all, in respect of that which is more desired, specially in the language of Gods Spirit, which expressely saith, that God will have mercy, and not sacrifice. Whence it will follow, that when sacri­fice [Page 143] was offered, without performance of duties of mercy, or obedience; Gods will was not done, but broken. It is Gods will likewise, that we should goe unto the house of mourning, rather then unto the house of mirth. The duties to be performed in the house of mourning are many: To mourne, to fast, to pray, with other branches of humiliation; all which God truly willeth, in different measure ac­cording to the diversity of their nature, or the more or lesse intensive manner of their performance. The transgressions likewise usuall and frequent in the house of unhallowed mirth, are many and much different as well in quality as degree; all de­tested of God as contrary to his most holy will, but more or less detested according to their nature, quality or degree, or other circumstance. Suppose a man, to whom choise of going into the house of mirth or mourning is solemnly proposed; the in­conveniences of the one, and gracious acceptance of the other in Gods fight, seriously prest by Gods Minister; do vtterly reject the Preachers counsell, and adventure upon the most desperate evill that is practised in the house of mirth: shall wee say Gods will is in this case fulfilled? Yes, though the evils which he willeth not, were tenne thousand, and man did desperately resolve to doe the very worst and most contrary to his will; yet that which he willeth most, shall still be done: for it is his ab­solute and peremptory will, that all the particu­lars offered to mans choice, as well those which his Holinesse most abhorreth, as those which hee wil­leth most, should bee truly possible for a man to [Page 144] choose without impediment, that none should bee necessary. Now this liberty being left to man which way soever his will inclineth, Gods will shall be most infallibly fulfilled, in the selfe same mea­sure, as if the very best had beene chosen by man; seeing it is his absolute will to grant him freedome (at his perill) to choose the very worst and refuse the best. And the perill is, that Gods will shall be done upon him according to the measure it was neglected by him. As this proposition [The Sun will either shine or not shine this day at twelve of the clocke] will be as true if the Sunne shine not, as if it shine: so Gods will being (as is supposed in this case) disjunctive, shall bee as truly fulfilled, albeit man doth that which he willeth not, as if he did that which he willed most. For his will (as was now said) may (according to the same measure) be fulfilled two wayes, either by us, or upon us; whe­ther it be this way or that way fulfilled, it is all one to God, but much better for us to doe it, then to have it done upon us. And though it be possible for us not to doe it, yet not doing it there is no possi­bility left, that it shall not be done upon us. In as much then as Gods will must of necessity be done, and no man can doe it by doing evill, (seeing it is set onely on that which is truly good;) the punish­ment of such as continue to doe evill, is absolutely necessary, that is altogether as unavoydable, as if they had beene appointed to it from all eternities, or created to no other end, then that they might be punished. For the punishment of evill is good, and is for this reason a part of Gods will, or rather a [Page 145] part of the object of his irresistible will or inviolable decree; yet may we not say that GodEt vere clamor & grandis cla­mor est, quando pie­tas Dei, pec­catorum clamoribus vincitur, ut peccantes punire coga­tur. Osten­dit ergo Do­minꝰ, quam invitus pu­niat etiam gravissimos peccatores, dicens, quod clamor Se­domorum ad se ascen­derit. hoc est dicere: Miseritor­dia quidem mea mihi suadet ut parcam, sed tamen peccatorum clamor cogit ut puniam. Salvianus lib. 1. simply wil­leth evill, or delighteth in punitive justice, which he never willeth, but upon supposall of evill deserts in the Creature. As for the evill it selfe, which de­serveth punishment, that, God is not said (in true Divinity) to will at all, either voluntate signi, or be­neplaciti, either by his secret or revealed, or by his antecedent or consequent will. For nothing is evill, but that which swarveth from, or is contrary to the rule of goodnesse, and other rule of goodnes there is none, besides Gods goodnesse; nor doth he wil any thing that is not consonant to his good­nesse; so is not any thing that is truly evill. They which otherwise teach, that God in any sort can will that which is morally evill, have mightily for­got the rules of Logick: For if nothing be evill, but that which God would not have done, then nothing which God would have done, can be evill.

CHAP. 18.
Of the distinction of Gods will into Antecedent and Consequent. Of the explication and use of it.

1 GOds will being, as all confesse, in­divisible, some there bee which hold all distinctions concerning it, no lesse unfitting, then the di­vision of Christs seamlesse coate. Others mislike that distinction of his antecedent and consequent will, and yet are content to distinguish his will into revealed and se­cret, or into voluntatem signi & beneplaciti. The use notwithstanding of the first distinction [of his antecedent and consequent will] is most ancient; warranted by the authority of Chrysostom, and well exemplified by Damascene. And of this distincti­on I have made choise in other meditations, as most commodious (to my apprehension) for re­solving many problemes arising out of Propheti­call and Euangelicall passages, concerning the ful­filling of Gods will in his threats or promises. The ingenuous Reader will not bee so uncharitable or injurious towards Chrysostom or Damascene, as to suspect, that either of them imagined two wills in God; unto which imputation, they are more just­ly liable, which affect the distinction of Gods secret and revealed will, or of voluntatis signi & benepla­citi. For every distinction of Gods will, must bee framed ex parte volitorum, non ex parte volentis, in [Page 147] respect of the things willed, not in respect of him that willeth them. We must in charity and good manners permit Chrysostom and Damascene that li­berty of speech which we take our selves. Now it is usuall with all of us, to attribute that verbo tenus unto the cause, w^ch really and properly belongs on­ly unto the effect, or to denominate the intellectual faculty from the qualitie of the object to which it hath reference; as when we say the Sunne is hot, the understanding is practique, &c. The meaning of those two good Authors, whom we follow in the use of the distinction of Gods antecedent or conse­quent will, was this, or the like: That God by one and the same indivisible will, might differently af­fect or approve divers objects, according to the nature quality or degrees of goodnes contained in them. And certaine it is, that the immensity or greatnesse of our God, doth not make his power or will to bee unweildy. Though he be in power truly infinite, yet he alwayes worketh not according to the infinity of his power, but oft-times more gently and pla­cidly, then the weakest or softest spirited of his rea­sonable creatures can doe. Though his will like­wise be alwayes irresistible, yet is it not alwayes so peremptorily set on this or that particular object willed by him, as mans will, for the most part, is. The variety of particular objects which hee truely willeth in different measure, is much greater than the wit of man can comprehend So is the liberty or variety of choise, which hee alloweth unto his creature, much greater then we can without grud­ging, afford to such as have dependance on us. [Page 148] Some things he willeth in the first place and di­rectly; though not so peremptorily, but that things lesse willed by him, or contrary evills, which hee willeth not, may get the start or take place of them in humane choise. Other things he willeth in the second place, or by consequence, as in case, that which in the first place he willed, be (by abuse of mans free will) rejected. The former he is said to will by his antecedent will, because the object wil­led by him, hath antecedence or preeminence in re­spect of his beneplacitum or acceptance: the latter he is said to will by his consequent will, that is not in the first place or directly, but by consequent, as supposing those objects, which he better approved, to be neglected. Whatsoever is good in it selfe, and good withal for a reasonable creature to make choise of, that, God is said to will by his antece­dent will, as the repentance of a sinner, and the joy­full fruits which the sinner shall reape by his peni­tencie. Whatsoever in it selfe is not evill, or con­trary to the rule of goodnesse, but evill to the rea­sonable creature, which must suffer it, as sicknesse, death, all kinde of torture or calamity, that God willeth onely by his consequent will. We may not deny but that he truly willeth the death of obsti­nate sinners, yet this he willeth by his consequent will. Their obstinacy in sinne he willeth not at all, for if he did, he would not punish it: for punish­ment is the necessary consequent of his will neg­lected. Both these branches of one and the same will (which from the reference onely which they have unto their different objects, wee conceive to [Page 149] bee two or divers) are subordinate to his abso­lute and peremptorie will, which is, that man should have a libertie of doing, and not doing those things which in the first place he willed or liked better. But is not this libertie of man an im­perfection?

2 An issue though a blemish to youth and live­lihood, is ofttimes a good meane or principall cause of health to an unsound and crasie bodie. So possibility of declining to evill, albeit in it selfe an imperfection, and not possibly incident to aeter­nall and immutable goodnesse, is no way contra­ry to the participated actuall goodnesse of the rea­sonable creature; whereof it is an essentiall or con­stitutive part, at the least a necessarie ingredient or condition precedent to the constitution of it. And imperfection with reference to this end, may be the object of Gods antecedent will, or part of that which in the first place he willeth and princi­pally intends. But inasmuch as actuall evill is for­mally dissonant to actuall goodnesse; hee which is actually and infinitely good, cannot but hate or dislik actuall evill in whomsoever it is found, as much as he loveth the contrary good. Now pu­nishment or malum poenae, being as necessarie a con­sequent of Gods hate or dislike of sinne, as re­ward or happinesse is of his loue to vertue and pietie: the reasonable creature by declining from vertue to vice, from good to bad, doth ipso facto and inevitably bring evill [malum poenae & damni] tribulation and anguish upon it selfe. By reward and punishment in this place, wee understand not [Page 150] onely life and death everlasting (of whose refe­rence to Gods aeternall decree, we shall in parti­cular dispute hereafter, if Superiours shall so think fit:) but every temporall blessing or crosse, all prosperity or calamitie, specially publike & remar­kable. Prosperitie we alwayes take to be a pledge of Gods love (though not alwaies of the Person, on whom it is bestowed, yet of some good quality in him or in some of his, serving for publique use or private imitation;) and is alwayes (in the begin­ning at least) an effect of Gods antecedent will. Calamitie we take alwayes for a token of Gods dislike, though not alwaies of the person afflicted, yet either of somewhat in him to bee amended, or of somewhat formerly done by him, to bee by o­thers avoided; and is an effect of Gods consequent will. For hee wils no evill at all, not malum poenae, but as it is either a punishment or correction for evill done, or good neglected, or as it is a mede­cine to prevent the doing of evill, or neglect of goodnesse.

3 From the infinite varietie of possibilities au­thorized by the aeternall decree, and their corre­spondent consequences, which one time or other actually follow upon their reductions into Act, by the irresistible award of the same decree; wee may resolve many difficulties, and abandon sundry in­conveniences, wherewith the Heathen in their vaine speculations, and many Christians in more grievous temptations, charge, either the truth or goodnesse of Gods Providence. The varietie of such possibilities, amounts, partly from the speci­ficall [Page 151] nature of the objects, made possible by the divine decree: partly from the severall degrees of good or evill contained in such objects, or in mens actions concerning them. The whole lati­tude (if I may so speake) of Gods providence, as it concernes kingdomes, states or persons, consists in moderating and ordering the possible devoluti­ons or alternations of the resonable creature from his antecedent will to his consequent. The alterna­tions or devolutions themselves, may be number­lesse, save onely to God; so may the degrees bee of mans dissonancie or consonancie to Gods ante­cedent will, throughout the course of his life.

CHAP. 19.
Of the divers acceptions or importances of Fate, especially among the Heathen writers.

1 THE very name of Fate, will be I know, to many very offensive, unto whom I am unwilling to give the least offence. The use of it (I must confesse) is in some cases prohibited by S^t. Au­stin, a man too modest, to vsurpe greater authori­tie then he had; and oecumenicall authoritie in this point hee had none, or none so great as might impose silence upon all posteritie. Would to God such as are most forward to presse us with this Re­verend fathers interlocutorie sentence once or twice perhaps vttered for not vsing the name; [Page 152] could be perswaded to stand to his definitive sen­tence often pronounced against the nature of the Errour, which the Heathens, against whom hee disputes, covered under this name. Vpon conditi­on they would be pleased not to revive the nature of the errour, or bury their opinions that way ten­ding; my heart and mouth should never give breath unto the name. The opinion which some rigid Stoicks had of Fate, is an haeresie not to bee named among the Heathen; so deepely tainted with the very dregs of heathenisme, that it is a wonder any Christian writer should come neere it; that any at least should take infection from it: especially seeing the Reverend and learned Fa­thers of the primitive church, had provided so ma­ny excellent preservatives against it. But albeit Fate, according to that sense or meaning, where in some heathens tooke it, was become a wicked Idol: yet seeing the word or name, whether in the ordinary use of Greeke or Latine writers, hath greater va­rietie of significations or importances, then al­most any other word in the world besides▪ to a­bandon all, for one ill sense, or importance, seemes to me as rude and uncivill a part, as to roote out a whole clan or surname, because one of the same name and stocke had beene at deadly sohood with our family or had otherwise deserved death. Vpon diligent perusall of the best Philosophers, histori­ans or Poets amongst the Heathens, of some hi­storians and Moralists of best note amongst Chri­stians; we may finde realities, or solid matter an­swering to this word Fate, which cannot bee so [Page 153] well expressed by any other terme or name, by any paraphrase more briefe than the true and proper definition of the matter or reality signified by it. Now if the matter defined, prove to bee no Idoll; the name certainly is indifferent, and of the defini­tion there may be a good morall or historicall use. For finding out the true and proper definition or description of it, we are to explicate the divers ac­ceptions or importances of the name.

2 Fatum à fando dictum, and sometimes imports no more then the dictate of nature, or the certaine course appointed to things naturall. Thus natu­rall death, is by some accounted fatall. And Dido according to this importance, did not die by Fate, because shee prevented Lachesis by cutting the thred of her owne life, before this great Arbitresse of mortality had passed sentence upon her;

And according to this importance it is used by the Prince of Romane Historians in the sixt booke of his Annals; Per idem tempus Lucius Piso Pontifex (rarum in tanta claritudine) fato obijt. About the same time L. Piso High Priest died a naturall death (being 80. yeares of age;) a matter rare in those times, in a man of so great birth and place. Some­times againe Death it selfe, howsoever it come up­on men, is termed Fate or Destiny; perhaps be­cause the comming of it is by course of nature cer­taine, albeit the time and manner of it, be unknown or incomprehensible. So another Roman Poet [Page 154] saith, The parthians poysoned arrowes carryed Fates upon their points, able to let in Death at the least breach of skin, Fatum (que) in sanguine summo est. It may be Virgil held naturall death to be fatall, be­cause it cannot be avoided, being otherwise of our opinion, that Dido might have lived longer, or that it was not absolutely necessary from the houre of her birth, that she should live so many yeares and noSee Cha. 23. §. 2. more. For so some of the wisest amongst the Heathens held death to be fatall, that is, simply necessary unto all; albeit to dye at this or that set houre, were in their opinion contingent, or at least supposed a Contingency before it became necessary. Of this opinion wasThat Death it selfe is fatall, Pythago­ras supposeth in those verses; Iura colas non ore tenus; sed rebus & ipsis: Nec pravis mentem suescas rationibus uti: Sed mortem fato subituros noveris omnes: Divitias quando (que) dari; quando (que) perire. That disasterous or untimely death was not fatall but preventable, he supposeth in the verses following, for he calleth all Ca­lamities Divina Infortunia. See Hierocles upon both places. See his Annotations upon the latter. Chap. 21. of this Booke. Parag. 2. Pythagoras and his followers. And so it seemes wasQuaest. 32. Si Deus mortalem naturam nostram fecit, cur Deum mortem non fecisse dicis? Explicatio. Non si quid est mortale naturâ, id omnino mori necesse est. Argumente sunt Enoch & Elias, qui cum naturâ mortales sint, in immortalitate etiam manent superiores excelsiores (que) effecti quàm ad quos elogium illud pertineat, Terra es, & in terram revertêris. Verum est igitur, naturam nostram à Deo factam esse mortalem, mortémque invectam esse in mundum hominis inobedientiâ. Si enim Deus ut naturam fecit mortalem, sic etiam mortem fecis­set, non inobedientia mortem induxisset: ac si Deus inobedientiam non fecit, ne mor­tem quidem fecit. Iu­stine Martyr. But Lucan, we know, was somewhat al­lyed unto the Stoicks, and out of his private conceit that the set time or manner of every mans death, was no lesse necessary then death it selfe, he might, not inconse­quently terme violent or sudden death, Fatall. And [Page 155] Tacitus, who seemes to be doubtfull, whether all things fell out by Fate or Necessity or no, ascribes violent and undeserved death, as well as naturall, unto Fate. For, speaking of Agricola his untime­ly death, (as we would terme it) he saith, Constans & libens fatum accepit: He constantly and willing­ly entertained his Fate. Martials conceit con­cerning Death and Fates, is not much different from Lucans, or this last cited place of Tacitus, though not altogether the same.

And as Death, in his opinion, could not bee re­pelled where Fates had granted his admission; so neither could it be obtruded, or admitted, without the leave or approbation of Fates, if the authority of the Father of Poets be authentique.

Virgil was somewhat of a better minde in this point than Homer was, or they are, which can thus liberally dispose of their friends bodies or bones.

3 That no man can dye before his Day come, is an opinion in whose truth some are so confi­dent, as they will not stick to bequeath the bones of their dearest friends unto the divell, if they should dye otherwise. And it is certaine, all things have their appointed time, yet may wee not hence collect that no man can live longer or dye sooner than he doth, or that the number of his dayes can­not possibly bee diminished or encreased: But [Page 157] of this argument seeQuaestio. 33. Si ho­minum na­tura ut mortalis, proprium ac suum finem agnoscit, tempus au­tem unus­cujus (que) non est certi cujusdam termini; quod qui­dem fotum vocant ij qui à religi­one nostra abhorrent: quomodo Ezechiae addita sunt tempora? Quod enim additum est, in praefinito determina­to (que) numero certè sumi­tur. Vnde igitur in merientibus incertum interminatum (que) tempus docetur? Explicatio. Non esse uniuscujusque tempus certum ac definitum, [...] divi [...] scripturae verbis docetur, Si in campo invenerit homo puellam desponsatam, eique vi [...]llata dormierit: vitum quidem interficite, puellam autem ne interficite. Mores e [...]m corrupit homo proximi sui, eum (que) puls [...]ns non crat qui juvaret, atque ita haecres [...]. Et puella clamavit, nec suit qui ei auxilium [...]ret. Non autem divina scriptura violatum therum coactae morti comparasset, simor [...] certa desi­nita (que) fuisset. Quod enim apud Deum definitum est, id nec viola [...]i, nec transiri potest. Quod si ita est, profecto definitae Ezechiae vitae tempora vitae non sunt addita, sed annis ejus qui indefinite occupaverant, quorum sinis morbo lethali eveniebat, nisi Deus morbam ejus cu­rasset, eumque ad vitam revocavisset. Iustin. Martyr. explicat. pag. 29. Iustin Martyr, or the Author of the questions and explications, which have for a long time gone under his name. In all these or the like acceptions of Fate, and the very common conceipt which this name suggests, there is an im­portance of necessitie. And according to the se­verall degrees of necessitie, Fates good or bad (for so they divided them for their qualitie) were sub­divided into (majora & minora) into lesser and greater fates. (Fata minora) lesser fates, were held alterable by enchantment or other curious pra­ctises, taught by Sathan, as imitations of those sa­cred rites or solemnities, which God had orday­ned for averting imminent plagues. (Fata majo­ra) chiefe or supreame fates were so unalterable, so in­flexible, that their great god Iupiter could not com­mand them, but was to doe whatsoever was de­signed by them [...] done. Whence as Lactan­tius wittily [...] they could not rightly en­style him Maxi [...] because hee was lesse then this kinde of Fate [...] in this heathenish division not­withstanding, there was a true glimpse of a Christian truth, hereafter [...] [...]sewere to be discussed. Subordinate to this division of Fates, were the [Page 158] opinions of the Caldean and Aegyptian Astrolo­gers concerning the power or efficacie of the hea­vens, over sublunary bodies. TheVide Bel­lantium. Caldeans were impious not in practise only but in opinion, in that they held the operation of the heavens to be unal­terable and unpreventable by the wit, industry or skill of man: all which such as follow Ptolomie the Aegyptian, expressely deny, & bring good reasons for their deniall. If their practises to foretell things to come, bee no worse than their opinions concerning the manner how they come to passe; it would bee no great sinne to be their Schollers.

4 There is no Christian but will grant his God to be greater then Heathenish Fate, and his Law to be above all controll of any other Law or pow­er whatsoever. And yet by the doctrine of many Divines, the Almighty Lawgiver is made aeternal­ly subject to his owne decrees. Their meaning is taken by many to be in effect this: That albeit God be Omnipotent, yet it is true of him,

That he had past his Omnipotent word, concer­ning the ordering and managing of all things to come, before it could be taken or accepted by a­ny creature: and that by his word thus past once for all for ever, such irrevocable doome had passed upon some of his best creatures before their nonage, (in their non existence;) as they would not have accepted life or being it selfe, when they first entred vpon possession of it, if they had knowne up­on [Page 159] what hard conditions it had beene tendred. Or, were it yet left free for them to disclaime those covenants or conditions of life and beeing, where­unto they never gave their consent; The greatest part of divine goodnesse which they could hope to be partakers of, were to be released from the right of creatures, and to returne againe to nothing. Briefly, by making God supreame Lord of such hard weirds or sinister Fates, as are by these men inevitably awarded to absolute reprobates; they doe not adde so much unto his greatnesse, as they derogate from his goodnesse, in respect of the hea­then gods. For, unto such of the heathens, as gran­ted Fates a negative voice in some cases against the good purposes of their gods; it was some comfort to thinke, that their gods wished them well, and did entreate them, as great personages or cour­teous gentlemen do their sutors, whom for the pre­sent they cannot pleasure, as being overborn by the opposite faction. But alas, what can it boot poor im­potent man, to beleeve his Maker was not from ae­ternitie subject to Fates, or any other law; if by his owne Lawes, or decrees, he hath bound them be­fore the world had beginning, (without all hope or possibility of release) to harder conditions of Life, then the heathens imagined could bee injoyned by Fates. For it is probable, that such of the heathen as were most peremptorie for the absolute neces­sitie of fatall events, did thinke bad Fates had spit their poyson, when this life was ended. They did not suspect the miseries inflicted by them, to be for time so everlasting, or for their qualitie so [Page 160] unsufferable, as wee Christians beleeve the tor­ments of the life to come shall bee to all that are ordained for the day of wrath. But bee the tor­ments for their qualitie more exquisite than the Heathens could conceive any; was it absolutely necessary for the Almightie from aeternitie to ap­point them? If so it were, there was a fatall neces­sitie praecedent to the Almightie decree. But if his decree hath brought this absolute necessitie upon men; the execution of this decree by in­strumentall or second causes, differs nothing save onely in excesse of rigour and severitie, from the most rigid stoicall Fate.

CHAP. 20.
Of the affinitie or allyance which Fates had to ne­cessitie, to Fortune or chance in the opinion of Hea­then writers.

BVT that we may finde out, which wee most desire, some mittigati­on or tolerable reconciliation of the most harsh opinions, whe­ther maintained by heathens or Christians in this argument: it is a common notion received by all, that every fatall event is necessarie; but very few of the heathen, were of opinion, that all ne­cessarie events were fatall. Albeit by way of such a Poeticall licence in substituting the speciall for the generall, as he used that said, [Page 161] ‘Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem.’

Fate is sometimes taken for necessity without restriction. It was not usuall with ancient Hea­thens, nor is it with such as to this day use to ascribe many events to Fates, to terme the rising, or set­ting of the Sunne, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, or other like effects of hourely observation (necessary by the common course of nature) fatall. In the literall construction of many good Writers, Fate and Fortune, are, if not Synonimall in their for­mall, At vos, O superi, & divum tu maxime rector Iuppiter, Arcadij quaeso miserescite regis: [...]t patrias audite preces, si n [...]mina vestra Incolumem Pallanta mihi, si fata reservant: Si visurus eam vivo, & venturus in unum, Vitam oro: patior quemvis durare laborem. Sin aliquē infandū casum Fortuna minaris, Nunc, ô nunc, liceat crudelem abrumpere vitā. Virgil. Aeneid. lib. 8. prime, or direct signifi­cations, yet coincident in their importances or conno­tations. Their titles, to the selfe same events or effects, were ofttimes undistinguish­able, by such as ascribe too much to the one or to the o­ther. Ausonius, but for verse sake, might as well have said, Dum vult fortuna, as,

[Page 162] Others held Fortune to be a branch of Fate, or an instrument for executing what was by Fates designed.

The resultance of this long Oration, is no more than this: Fortune was but the messenger to bring all those welcome, or unwelcome presents to the Romane State, which Fate did bestow upon it. Of this argument see more in the 27. Chapter of this Booke, parag. 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

2 In Tacitus his language Fate and Fortune have sometimes the same reference or importance. Occulta lege fati, & ostentis ac responsis destinatum Vespasiano liberis (que) ejus imperium post fortunam cre­didimus: After his good fortune we surely beleeved, that the Empire was by the secret course of fate, by signes and Oracles destinated to Vespasian and his sonne. Tacit. 1. histor. cap. 10. Yet is not this dif­ference [Page 163] betwixt Fate and Fortune constantly ob­served by these two Writers themselves, much less observed at all by others: with Cominaeus, Ma­chiavel, and other later Historians or Politicians, Fortune and Fate, are used promiscuously. The properties or attributes of Fate, are, in ordinary con­struction the same, or equivalent to those of For­tune. The titles of Fate were anciently these, or the like, unavoydable, insuperable, inflexible, ineluc­table. And it is a conceit or prenotion, that to this day runnes in many Christians mindes, that no­thing can be against a chance: Where Fortune failes, nothing prevailes. This difference notwithstan­ding betwixt them, might bee observed in many Writers (or in their language, which have cause, in their owne apprehensions to like well or com­plaine of them.) That the ordinary successe of others labours or consultations, are for the most part ascri­bed by envy or aemulation unto Fortune: whereas Fates are usually charged with the calamities or disasters, which befall themselves or such as rely upon their counsells. Most men are by nature prone to excuse themselves in their worst actions, si non à toto, yet à tanto, by accusing Fortune; and can be well content to exonerate their galled con­sciences, of inward griefe, by venting bitter com­plaints, or receiving plausible informations from others, against Fates. Attonitis etiam victoribus, qui vocem preces (que) adhibere non ausi, lacrymis ac si­lentio veniam poscebant, donec Cerealis mulceret ani­mos, fato acta dictitans, quae militum ducum (que) dis­cordia, vel fraude hostium evenissent. Tacitus lib. 4. [Page 164] [...] [Page 165] [...] [Page 166] [...] [Page 167] [...] [Page 164] Histor. num. 72. Even the Conquerors were asto­nished at the sight, who not daring to speake, begged their pardon with silence and teares, till such time as Cerealis with comfortable words revived their spi­rits; affirming that those things, which indeed came to passe through the mutinousnesse of the souldiers, or the dissention of the Leaders, or the malice of the Ene­mies, were but fatall mischances which could not bee escaped.

3 Some againe derive Fate and Fortune from one and the same fountaine, and distinguish them onely by excesse of strength, as the same streame in Winter differs from it selfe in drouth of Sum­mer.Caelius Ro­digin. lecti­on, antiq. lib. 10. c. 20. Advertendum vero illud, quandocunque illa coelestium causarum ratio ita digeritur, ut artem ex­culcatam exsuperet, dici à platonicis fatum: ubi ve­ro sic, ut vincere inertem desidiosum (que) evaleat rur­sum à solerti strenuo (que) vinci, Fortunam. Vtrobi (que) vero divinam statuunt providentiam, quae ad finem agat sibi soli notum quae universa modis contemperet occultioribus. Lection. Antiquar. lib. 10. cap. 20 The Platonicks, which derive most humane events or successe from the order or disposition of cele­stiall causes, call this disposition, Fate; when it is so strong, that no endeavours or skill of man can prevaile against it: but when the strength of it is of such a middle size, as may prevaile against sloath­full and carelesse men, but may bee vanquished by the vigilant and industrious, they call the same disposition Fortune. In both cases they admit a Divine Providence, which worketh to ends knowne onely to it selfe.

[Page 165] 4 For this affinity betweene Fortune, Chance and Fate in best Writers, it will bee expedient to touch at the seat of Chance or Fortune in our way, and to declare what is meant by these termes; and whether such events as we say fall out by Fortune or Chance, have any alliance with necessity. In this discussion, I hope wee shall arive at that point, whereat the favourers of absolute necessity, and the favourers of other opinions concerning Fate and Fortune, more fluctuant, will bee content to cast anchor. Fortune (saithCasus au­tem latius patet quam Fortuna: quando & eam com­plectitur, & multa alia quae alias aliter accidere suapte na­turâ pos­sunt. Ipsum nomen hoc indicat. Est enim [...] Grae­cis quod ultrò & à se fit: intelligitur (que) casus, quum quod alterius causa sierisolet, [...] propter illam caus [...]m, quale frigus sub caniculae ortum esse videtur non enim frustra, ne (que) denique sicut quod est in nostra potestate, pars est contingentis: sic fortuna pars est casus. Vtque casus contingenti, ita i [...]s quae in nostra sunt potestate, fortuna accidit: non omni­bus tamen, sed in quibus consilium delectus (que) adhibentur, uti diximus. Proinde casus com­munis est animatorum & animae expertium: fortuna hominis est propria, ejus qui jam a­gere possit. Idque hinc constat, quòd fortunatum esse & foelicem esse pro eodem habentur, & foelicitas est quaedam agendi dexteritas: haec autem solius est perfecti hominis. Quae ergo fato comprehenduntur, haec sunt▪ contingen [...], possibile, delectus, in nostra situm potesta­te, fortuna casus, iis (que), adjuncta, de quibus est etiam [...] fortassis, & perinde: quae omnia conti­nentur quidem fato, nullum autem eorum fatale est. Plutarch. de fato. pag. 418, 419. Faium iamen sub provi [...]e [...]lia comprebendit. Plutarch) is a part of Chance, as free-will or choise is of contingency. Every casuall event is contingent, but every con­tingent effect is not casuall or a chance: [...], quasi [...]. The very name of Chance in Greek (saith Aristotle) implies as much as to be to no end or purpose: yet this etymology (under correction) was no part of the Ancients meaning, which gave the Greek name [...], to such events as we terme casuall, unlesse [ [...] frustra] be referred onely (as perhaps Aristotle intended) to the efficient cause. After a manner of speech not much unlike to this, [Page 166] the Schoolemen say that is gratis dictum (as wee would say freely spoken) not for which a man takes no fee, but for which he hath no just ground or rea­son. And that in phrase of Scripture is said to bee done gratis or frustra, which is done without just motives or provocation, not that which is done or attempted to no end or purpose. Oderunt me fru­stra, and Oderunt me gratis, They hated me without a cause, or They hated me vainly, are in some trans­lations equivalent. The word in the originall an­swers to both. In analogy to this kinde of speech, those events were said to fall out by chance, or to be [...], which in the opinion of such as gave this name, had no efficient cause, or at least none discernable, but were supposed to move themselves or to take possession of such short beeing as they had, without the assignement of any superiour po­wer, or of any constant or setled cause; intruding themselves into the course of nature, like unbid­den guests, sometimes as unwelcome as frost in summer, sometimes as welcome as warme weather to such as want fire in winter.

5 Fortune hath her authority placed onely in reasonable actions orPlato for­tunam cau­sam in pro­positis con­stitutis (que) per accidentiam & consequutionem. Aristoteles, causam per accidens in ijs quae ex animi appetentia propter quid fiunt, obscuram illam quidem & instabilem. Diff [...]rre autem à fortuna spontaneum temer arium (que) casum. Quod enim à fortuna, idem à temeritate quoque fieri: hoc (que) geren­dis in rebus esse. Quod autem temerarium spontaneum (que) sit, non continu [...] idem à fortuna fieri, id (que) citra omnem rerum administrationem usu venire. Porò fortunam rationalium esse; spontis autem casum, tum rationalium, tum rationis expertium animantium, tum inanimatorum corporum. Epicurus, causam non sibi constantem, personis, temporibus, mo­dis: Anaxagoxas & Stoici, indeprehensam humano captui causam. Siquidem evento­rum quaedam è necessitate, quaedam è fato, quaedam ex libero & constituto, quaedam è for­tuna, nonnulla è suae spontis casu. Plutarch. de placitis & decretis Philosoph. lib. 1. p. 213. deliberations, yet not in [Page 167] all these, but onely in such events as fall out ei­ther so farre beyond or contrary to mens intenti­ons, that they may be rather wondred at, then ex­pected. If husbandmen should digge their Vine­yards with purpose to finde Gold, the fruitefull vintage thereon following (though no part of their intentions) could not so properly b [...]e ascribed to Fortune, as if a husbandman, intending onely to dig his Vineyard in hope of a plentifull vintage, should finde store of Gold.

6 The meaning of Plato, of Aristotle and Plu­tarch may bee better perceived by fit instance, then by large scholastique commentaries upon their severall definitions of Fortune. Valerius Maximus (and to my remembrance, Plutarch) hath a memorable storie of one Iason Phereus, that was cured of an impostume in a fray or Duell. The blow of an enemy was the cause of this mans health, but by a rare and unusuall accident, quite contrary to his intention that gave it; and altoge­ther beyond his expectation that received it. His purpose was only to maintaine his reputation or revenge his wrongs, either to wound or to be wounded, without any hope or thought of curing his disease, the danger wherof was not fully disco­vered, til it was past. But a more perfect Idaea or ex­emplarie forme of fortune good or bad, then any historian relates, the greeke Epigrammatist hath pictured for our contemplation. The matter of the Epigram was in English thus: A silly poore wretch, being deprived of all meanes to live, re­solves to deprive himselfe of breath; but, whilest [Page 168] he sought a place convenient for acting this despe­rate purpose, finding store of gold which another had hid; he returned home againe leaving his hal­ter in the place, which was worse taken by him that hid the gold, then meant by him that left it: for he hanged himselfe in it for griefe of his losse.

To finde Gold was no part of that poore mans hopes, whom despaire of like meanes to live by, had made desirous of death: the other had as lit­tle minde to dispatch himselfe, when he came to visit the supposed stay and comfort of his life where­in his soule had solaced her selfe with the foole in the Gospell.

CHAP. 21.
Of the proper subject and nature of Fate.

1 THE most usefull issue which these or the like cases afford is this, whe­ther the event specified in them bee meerely casuall, contingent, or (in some sort) necessarie. One and the same determination, will as well befit the like quaestion, concerning such events as are properly tearmed Fatall, whose proper subject, nature and definition, we are more particularly to inquire after. The first quaere, which few meddle withall, would bee this: Whether fatall events participate more of contingencie, then of necessitie. But setting aside all comparison, it sufficeth us that they truely participate of both; but in diffe­rent degrees or measures according to the diversi­tie of times. Contingencie is alwayes as neces­sarily praesupposed to the production of events fa­tall, as necessitie is included in them. And as the proper forme or essence of Fates consists not in e­very sort of necessitie, but in some peculiar branch thereof; so neither is every Contingent subject a fit matter for receiving that forme or branch of necessitie, wherein the nature of Fate consists, and which giues denomination and be­ing to events fatall. I have heard many unthrifts, upon the loosing of a faire game at Tables, curse the Dice or cry vengeance upon ill luck; but I ne­ver heard any Gamester frame such inditements [Page 170] either in verse or prose, against Fates, as were usuall amongst the heathens, whose language in other cases, is with our unthrifts most familiar. Such pettie adventures as Cardes and Dice, are as met all too base to be instampt with the inscription of Fate: whose proper subject in publike affaires, is matter either of tragedie or of triumph: in pri­vate matter either of extraordinarie and unusuall prosperitie or of calamitie.

Most of Gods creatures are the subject of con­tingency; mankind onely or humane societie, is the the proper sphaere, without whose circumference, neither fortune or fatall events doe wander. Yet is not every part of man subject to fate, though man according to every part bee subject to that contingencie, which is praesupposed to Fates. Si fato fi­eret, ut esset aut impro­bus, aut bo­nus; profe­ctò contra­ria in cum cadere nun­quam possent, nec sae­pissime mu­taretu [...]; quin nec alii quidem pro­bi essent, a­lii malitalio­qui fatum causam ma­lorum esse, contraria (que) sibi facere sentiremus, aut illud quod ante dictum est, videri verum esse, nihil esse virtutem nec vitium sed opi­nione solum bona, & mala judicari: quae, ut vera ratio docet, maxima est & impieta [...] & injusti [...]ia. Verum fatum hoc immutabile esse dicimus, iis qui praeclaras bonas (que) res cligunt, ac sibi proponunt, digna praemia, item (que) iis qui contraria, digna praemia constituens. Non enim ut alia, veluti a [...]bores & quadr [...]pedia, quae nihil voluntate & judicio facere possunt, sic hominem Deus condidit. Ne (que) enim praemio ac laude dignus esset, si per se, & à se, bo­num non deligeret, sed bonus [...]actus esset: nec si malus esset, jure supplicio afficeretur, cum non à se talis esset, sed aliud nihil esse posset, nisi quod factus fuisset. Iustin. Martyr. Apo­log 2 pro Christ pag. 32. Itaque Deus non est sic mundum deletu [...]us & eversurus ut nulli sint jam futari improbi angeli, daemones, & homines, propter Christianorum semen & genus quod ipsum causam rerum esse intelligit. Nam nisi hoc esset, ne vobis quidem haec jam à malis geniis fieri ullo modo possent, sed ignis judicij delapsus omnia dissiparet & in­cenderet, quemadmodum etiam cl [...]vies superioribus seculis nemini pepercit, nisi uni illi qui à nobis Nochus appellatur, à vobis Deucalion, ejus (que) familiae, ex quo rursus tam multi nati sunt quorum partim improbi, partim boni fuerunt. Sic enim conflagrationem fore cens [...]mus, non, ut Stoicis placet, omnium rerum inter ipsas mutatione, quod turpissimum videtur: nec fato homines facere aut pati quicquam co [...]ū quae fiunt & evenium, judic [...]mus, sed voluntate ac judicie unumquen (que) bene agere aut peccare: malorū (que) geniorū operā bonos, veluti Socratē ejus (que) similes exagitari & in vincula conjici: Sar [...]anapatū aut [...] ̄, Epicurū ac fimiles in rerū abundantia & gloria beatae vitae compotes videri: quod cum non intellexissent Stoici, fati necessitate fieri omnia censuerunt. Iustin Mart. Apol. 1. pro Christ. pag. 8. Iustin Martyr; though a professed enemy to Stoi­call [Page 171] Fates, and a most valiant champion, a chiefe leader to all the rest which have defended the Christian truth against that sect, being most potent in the infancie of Christianitie; was not so nice, as either to deny us the right use of the name Fate, or the nature of the thing thereby signified. This, saith he is immutable Fate, that such as doe well, shall be rewarded, and such as doe ill shall bee punished. Quid aliud est fatum, saith Minucius Feli [...] quàm quod de unoquoque nostrum Deus fatus est, qui cum possit praescire materiam▪ pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum, etiam fata determinavit. Both of them follow their Master S^t. Paul, that God will render to every man according to his workes: unto them that are contentious, and disobey the truth, and obey un­righteousnesse, shall bee indignation and wrath. Tri­bulation and anguish shall bee upon the soule of every man, that doth evill, of the Iew first, and also of the Graecian. But to every man that doth good, shall bee glorie, and honour, and peace, to the Iew first, and also to the Graecian. For there is no respect of persons with God. Rom. 2. verse 8, 9, 10, 11. It is a point cleare from the authoritie of Minucius Felix and Iustin Martyr, and from the grounds of Christi­anitie it selfe, that the reasonable soule is not subject to Fate, Rodigi­nus lecti­on. Anti­quar. lib. 10 cap. 20. Caeterum quo planius fati ratio pernosca­tur, ita om­nino colli­gendum, si­cuti animi rationalis summus creator est Deus, at (que) idem guber­nator, ita et corporis ge­niter est mundus, ac moderator, vnde con­sequitur il­lud, uti ani­mus velut Dei filius ab Deo, tanquam à patre, providentiae legibus clementer agatur, & suaviter. Corpus verò ut mundi membrum à mundano corpore fati viribus, velut particula quaedam ab mole tota impetu quodam [...]ra [...]atur violento: unde fit, uti in mentem nulla pror sum sati vis queat assultare, nisi quatenus corpori ipsa se fatalibus obnoxio legibus, ad­dixerit. propterca semper ferè divinus Plato ab corporis amore, ac externorum cura ad ani­mi & Dei cultum praecipit defugiendum, quando non alia ratione declinari mala queunt. taken (in the Stoicall sense) for [Page 172] absolute necessitie, whencesoever such necessitie be derived. For as Iustin Martyr strongly con­cludes, if the soule of man were by the necessitie of the Divine decree, either violently driven or placidly drawne to good or evill, there could bee no vice or vertue, or God should bee as truely the onely author of all vice, sinne, and wickednesse, as he is of vertue and godlinesse; or as S^t. Austin infe [...], hee could not justly punish any besides himselfe, who is altogether incapable of punish­ment, but more uncapable of deserving it, or of doing evill. That freedome of choyse or Contin­gencie, which these good Writers, with all the auncients suppose as granted, by the divine decree, to the humane soule, is the proper subject or im­mediate matter whereto Fate is limited. The na­ture or essence of Fate, in their doctrine consists in the infallible doome or sentence, past by the Divine providence upon mens actions according to their nature or qualitie. The actions or choyses them­selves are truely and properly contingent, not Fa­tall, the events or issues of them are Fatall, not contingent. And in this sense did most of theNe (que) enim si non esset providētia, ordo ille in mundo exi­steret, quod fatum possit aliquis ap­pellare: nec si ista dees­sent, ulla esset mulcta ullum (que) adversus sceleratos judicium: immo nec bonorum praemium, nec cōmen­datio. At vero, Provi­dentiā at (que) ordine ex­istentibus, omnes opor­tebat qui jam nascun­tur eadem bona Sor­tiri; si nihil à seipsis ad inaequalitatem contulissent. Hierocles in Carm. Pythag. pag. 127. And again pag. 136. Tot tanta (que) adeo ex versibus istis possumus baurire prae [...]epta quae ad virtut [...] institutionem primam conferunt. Videntur enim & Providentia, & Fati, liberatis (que) animi verissimimas rationes complecti; quibus molestiam illam, quae in eorum, quae c [...]rnuntur, dissimilitudine versatur, oratio examinavit; inque omnibus malorum caussam Deum nequaquam existere demonstravit. That Fates may stand with freedome of Election in man, Tacitus ob­serves out of the ancient Heathens. Sed mihi haec, ac [...]alia audienti, in incerto judicium est, fatone res mortalium & necessitate immutabili, an forte voluantur. quippe sapientis­simos veterum, qui (que) sectam eorum aemulantur, diversos reperies: ac multis insitam opinio­nem, non initia nostri, non finem, non denique homines diis (que) curae. Ideo creberrima & [...]ri­stia in bo­nos, laeta a­pud deterio­res esse; contra alii, fatum quidem congruere rebus putant sed non è vagis stellis, verum apud principia & nexus naturalium causarum, ac tamen electionem vitae nobis relinquunt: quam ubi elegeris, certum imminentium ordinem. ne (que) mala vel bona, quae vulgus putet: multos qui conflictari adversis videantur, beatos: ac pleros (que) quamquam magnas per [...], miserrimos: si illi gravem fortunam constanter tollerent, hi prospera inc [...]nsulte utantur. Caeterum plurimis mortalium non eximi, quo primo cujusque ortu ventura destinentur: sed quaedam secus quàm dicta sint ca­dere, fallacijs ignara dicentium, ita corrumpi fidem artis, cujus clara documenta, & antiqua aetas & nostra tulerit. Quippe à filio [...]jusdem Trasulli, praedictum Neronis imperium in tempore memorabitur, ne nunc incepto longiù [...] abierim. Cornel. Tacit. lib. 6. Annal. num. 22. hea­thens, in their sober moodes use the name of [Page 173] Fates. So Virgil ascribes the want of anAeneid. 7. Filius huic, fato divum, prolésque vir [...]lis Nulla fuit; primá (que) oriens erepta juventa est. heire male by the untimely death of the first borne and the illVirgil. Aeneid. 7. Vndique collecti coeunt, Mattémque fatigant. Illicet infandum cuncti contra omnia bellum, Contra fata Deum, perverso numine poscunt. Certatim regis circunstant tecta Latini. Ille, velut pelagi rupes immota, resistit. Vt pelagi rupes, magno veniente fragore, Quae sese, multis circum lat [...]antibus undis, Mole tenet; scopuli ne quicquā, & spumea circū Saxa fremunt, later ique ill [...]a refunditur alga. successe of warre unseasonably undertaken, or begun (as a man would say) in an ill time, unto the Fates, or Weirds allot­ted by the gods. The fained cō ­plaint or speech which hee puts in Latinus his mouth disswa­ding Verū ubi nulla datur caecū exuperare potestas Consilium, & saevae nutu Iunonis eunt res: Multa deos aurásque pater testatus inanes, Frāgin [...]ur heu fatis, in quit, fer [...]múr (que) procell [...]. Ipsi has sacrilego pendetis sanguine poenas, O miseri, te Turne nefas, te triste manebit Suppliciam: votisque Deos venerabere seris. Turnus & his people from going to war, is a true picture of Moses his expostulation with the Israe­lites, which had gone out to warre contra [...]y to Gods Com­mandement, and found that successe by experience, which Latinus fore-warnes Turnus of: Yee answered, and said un­to mee, we have sinned against the Lord, wee will goe up and fight, according to all that the Lord our God com­manded us. And when yee had girded on every man his weapons of war, ye were readie to go up every man into the Hill. And the Lord said unto me, say unto them, Goe not up, neither fight, for I am not among you: lest yee be smitten before your enemies. [Page 174] So I spake unto you, and you would not heare, but re­belled against the Commandement of the Lord your God, and went presumptuously up into the Hill. And the Amorites which dwelt in that mountaine, came out against you, and chased you as Bees doe, and de­stroyed you in Seir, even unto Hormah. And yee re­turned and wept before the Lord; but the Lord would not hearken unto your voyce, nor give eare unto you. Deuter. 1. vers. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45.

Plagues or punishments are properly then ter­med fatall, when GOD will not repent or change the Doome threatned; when his eyes are shut un­to mens teares, and his eares unto their prayers. But of all the heathens which I have read, this point is most divinely discussed bySi quidem per se alteri quidem di­vitias; alte­ri autem pauperta­tem, divi­num judi­cium tribu­it: Divinam voluntatem nominari istud opor­tuit, non in­fortunium. Sin autem nih [...]l hujusmodi nominibus imperat; sed fortuito & temere accidit, ut felix iste sit, sicuti dicunt; ille autem infelix: Infortunium vocare tantummodo istud oportuit; non Divinum Infortunium. Sin porro Deus arbiter unicuique tribuit, quod meritis con­venit; neque in caussa est, ut tales ipsi simus; sed eo fine tantum justitiam possidet, ut ex praescripto ipsius, gestis paria referat: non immerito conjunctis nominibus judicij decreta Divina Infortunia nuncupat: sive, (quia Divinum sit judicium, atque intelligens) praepo­nendum putarit quod Divinitatem atque scientiam demonstret: sive etiam (quod sponte malitiam idipsum amplectatur, de quo agitur, unde etiam calamitatibus istis dignum est) Infortuniorum nomen adjecerit, tanquam non ex professo certum hominem vel supplicio, vel praemio afficere Deus statuat; sed eum semper, qui i [...]o se, atque illo modo gesserit; cujus rei caussa non sit extra nos investiganda. Itaque voluntatis nostrae, divini (que) judicij nexum Infortunium parere; nihil (que) aliud totum hoc Divinum existere Infortunium, quam Dei adversus peccata calculum. Hieroc in aurea Pythag. carmina pag. 111. Hierocles in his commentary upon Pythagoras golden verses. If Calamitie (saith he) be the award of divine power, Pythagoras might better have called it Divine will, than Divine misfortune. If it bee not the award of Divine power, it had beene enough to have called it misfortune; a Divine misfortune it cannot bee. Out of these straights he winds himselfe with this [Page 175] acute distinction, Inasmuch as Calamitie or ven­geance is the award of Divine power, it is in this re­spect rightly called Divine. But with reference to this or that particular man, it is a misfortune. His meaning (as he elsewhere illustrates himselfe) is this: The Divine power (as every just iudge) doth onely intend to punish evill, suppose Adulterie, Mur­der, Incest, &c. But that this or that man should commit these or the like evils, which necessarily draw calamitie upon themselves, this is contingent. Now the necessarie award of a contingent evill, is by the Pythagoreans, sometimes termed Fate, sometimes Divine misfortune.

2. Not to interpose ought one way or other praejudiciall to the different opinions concer­ning freewill, as it hath reference to merit, election or predestination (for all which points wee have allotted a peculiar place in this long worke:) we hold it for the present as a part of our Creede or fundamentall point of Christianitie; That man in in respect of some objects, hath a true freedome of choyse or Contingencie, and is enabled by his Creator to make varietie of antecedents in thought, word or deede. But theSee chap. 28. §. 1. antecedents being once made by man, though not without divine coope­ration; God alone allots the consequents, without any concurrence or suffrage in man. To repaire to Gods house or loyter at home, or in worse pla­ces on the Lords day, is left free unto us by the di­vine decree: but what good or evill, spirituall or temporall, shall befall us upon our better or worse choise, is intirely and meerely in the hands of God. [Page 176] wee have no power or freedome to resist the doome or sentence which God hath appointed to our resolutions, be they good or bad. As unto evill or goodnesse indefinitely taken, some measure of reward or punishment is, in the language of Iustin Martyr and other of the Auncients, truely fatall: so everyNos ita ju­dicandū hu­manū gen [...]à Christo dici­m [...], ut tamē etiā nūc om­nia Deum, prout ratio­nabileputat, regere ac di­spensare cre­damus: & i­ta in futuro judicio ju­dicaturum affirmemus, ut tamen semper eti­am in hoc seculo judi­cesse docea­mus. Dum enim semper gubernat Deus, & semper judi­cat: quia gubernatio ipsa est ju­dicium. Sal­vian. lib. 1. And again: [...]deo etiam sanctos ho­mines casti­gatos quōdā judicio Dei legimus, ut judicandos nos, Deo judice, etiam presenti seculo nosceremus; quia sicut Deus est semper, sic justitia Dei semper: sicut omnipotentia Domini indeficiens, sic censura indemutabilis: sicut Deus jure perpetuus, sic justitia perseverans. Salvian. lib. 2. possible degree of good or evill, whe­ther meerly moral, or spirituall, hath successe from aeternitie fitted to it quoad pondus, in measure more exact then the cunningest Arithmetician can de­vise. Gods Iustice holds one scale, his mercy and bountie the other; their severall awards are most exact, most infallible and irresistible; yet alternant. Punishment or chastisement for offences past is necessarie, yet not absolutely necessarie to any mans person in this or that degree; because the aeternall decree hath left him a possibilitie not to offend in this or that kinde, or not to offend in such a degree; or in case hee so offended, to seeke for pardon. Nor shall wee, by this assertion bee enforced to imagine any new act or determinati­on in God, either for daily awarding different successe, or the same successe in different measure, according to the diversitie or contingency of hu­mane choise, which may varie, every moment. For the infinite, incomprehensible and all comprising essence, as isIn the Treatise of the Divine Essence. Part. 1. before observed, is fitnesse it selfe, an vnchangeable rule aeternally fitting every altera­tion possible to the creature, without any altera­tion [Page 177] in it selfe. A rule it is, which needes no ap­plication to the event, the event by getting exi­stence or actuall beeing is actually applied unto it. The just measure and qualitie of that successe, which is by the Idea of equitie, bountie, or mercie al­lotted to every event, is no lesse essentially contai­ned in goodnesse it selfe, then the event it selfe or its beeing, is in infinite essence, or in Essence it selfe.

3 The immediate and proper subject of Fate, is Freedome of choise or contingencie in humane actions; the genus proximum, is the certaintie of Divine retribution according to the nature and qualitie of the choyse wee make. Yet are not re­wards or retributions, but retributions extraordi­nary and remarkeable, aswell for their manner of execution as for their matter or qualitie, properly termed Fatall. Of sinister Fates, there is no con­tingent subject, which can exhibit a more exact picture or modell, for the manner how they come to passe, then a game at Chesse or Tables. Many games at both, which at the beginning, or untill the middle of time spent, in them, are very faire and more then tenne to one; after some few over­sights, or ill dice, become desperate and irrecove­rable, by any skill that can be vsed: so events pro­perly fatall, become at length unpreventable, irre­sistible; but such they were not from the begin­ning of time, or from their infancie or first at­tempts, on whom they fall. Such disasterous or dismall events, for which the Heathens usually in­dited Fates, were commonly remarkable checks given, they know not by whom, to humane poli­cies [Page 178] or cunning contrivances. They were, as the unexpected winning of an after-game, upon some great stake or wager. Good or dexterous Fates, were the unexpected issues of mens contrivances, for their owne or associates good Fortunes. The manner of accomplishing such fates or Fortunes, is like a game wonne by a bungler, against a skilfull player, by extraordinarie dice, or by the suggesti­on of some by-stander, more skilfull then both. This kinde of Fate or strange Fortune, of which most of the Heathen knew not well what to make, wee may define, To be the incomprehensible dispo­sition, or irresistible combination of second causes, conspiring for the infallible execution of Gods will, maugre all plots or conspiracies of men to defeate the events, which hee had purposed. Sinister or disasterous Fates were the infallible execution of his consequent will. Good fates or fortune, were the infallible effects of his antecedent will; both were sometimes strangely & remarkeably accom­plished against cunning and potent oppositions, not so much for the parties sakes whom they be­fell, as for others. Many disasters have befallen some men, though deservedly for their owne sins, yet withall for the admonishing of others, to pre­vent the like. Hence it is that the Heathen Poets observation [Multi committunt eadem diverso eri­mina Fato] though in many cases most true, is no way prejudiciall to the unchangeable rules of the All-seeing Providence, which is alwayes full of equitie, whose justice is still allayed with mercy.

CHAP. 22.
The opposite opinions of the Stoicks and Epicures. In what sense it is true, that all things are necessarie in respect of Gods decree.

1 THE Stoicks did well in contra­dicting the Epicures, which held fortune and Chance to rule all things, or at least to bee in themselves somethings, not meere denominations of such events as had no certaine or constant cause, appre­hensible by man. The Originall of their Errour, was, their desire to be extreamely contrary to the Epicureans in a matter contingent, or rather in contingencie it selfe: for that is the common sub­ject of Fortune, chance or fate. Fortune and chance they deny to be any thing, with no other purpose, it seemes, then that they may make Fate to bee all things. They were Orthodoxall in acknowledg­ing an infallible unerring providence, but they [...]r­red againe as much in not acknowledging this in­fallible providence, oft-times to hold the meane betweene Chance or Fortune, and absolute ne­cessitie; or not to order and moderate contingen­cie it selfe. From the same originall, some have thought it to be the most safe and compendious course for rooting out errour and superstition, to overthrow the a [...]tecedent, when their commissi­on directs them onely to deny or refute the conse­quence. As not a few, no lesse affraid (and the feare [Page 180] it selfe is just) to grant merit of workes, then the Stoicks were to admit of Chance, have taken away all contingency in humane actions, save onely with reference to second causes. Wherein they seeme to invert that rule of Tyrannicall policie: He is a foole that kills the Father, and leaves his braits behind to revenge his blood. These take away the harmelesse Parents for the faultie issues sake, seeking to destroy true and Orthodoxall an­tecedents for the incommodious consequences which others have falsely fathered upon them. The reclaiming of men from this one Errour is my present and scope.

2 For the better effecting whereof, we will sub­scribe at length unto their general Maxime, [That all things are necessary in respect of Gods decree,] up­on condition they wil not extend it beyond its na­turall and proper subject, or not take decree in the Stoicall, but in a civill sense. Now hee that saith [All things are necessary in respect of Gods de­cree,] cannot in civill construction bee conceived to meane any more then thus; All things which God hath decreed are necessary. The question then is, whether every thing that is, may truly bee said to be the object, or part of the object of Gods decree. To which question our answer must be ne­gative. For those things onely are properly said to be decreed, which are enacted and appointed for better ordering and moderating such things as either by nature, custome, or ill example, are apt to grow worse, or may be amended by good educa­tion, wholesome advice or discipline. Every de­cree [Page 181] of man supposeth the subject or party whom it immediately concernes, to be capable of perswa­sion to good or evill, to be alterable in his inclina­tions, through feare of punishment, or hope of re­ward. Magistrates or Corporations take order that mad men or dogs should doe no harme; yet are not these creatures the proper subject of their de­crees or sanctions. They do not tie Mastives by penall laws not to bite, they do not bind mad men to good behaviour: but they i [...]joyn men of reason and understanding to muzzle M [...]stives lest they bite; to keepe mad men or franticks, close, lest they should doe mischiefe by going abroad. Now the Divine decree concerning the ordering of man, is the rule or patterne of all humane decrees, and therefore supposeth somewhat in man, which makes him more capable of the divine sanction, than reasonlesse or inanimate creatures are. This capacity of the reasonable creature or man, consists in freedome of choise or contingency, in his acti­ons or resolutions. The donation of this freedome upon man, is an act of Gods free bounty, and is pre­supposed as the proper subject to the divine decree, or to all acts or awards of divine justice or mercy. The proper and formall object of the same decree, is, the moderation of this contingency or freedome of man, by awarding the issues or consequences, in mercy, justice, or bounty, exactly proportioned to the nature and manner of his choise and resolu­tion. For illustrating the truth of our intended con­clusion, let us take the EpigrammatistsSee Cha. 20. relation, or that idaea of Chance or Fortune, which hee hath [Page 182] pictured, for a true story. It was not necessary in respect of the divine decree, that the one should be so extreame poore, or the other so miserably rich, as to come within the compasse of that snare, wher­in the latter was taken. The meanes by which the one came to that depth of poverty or melancholly passions, wherewith hee had almost beene stifled, and the other to that height of covetousnesse, from which he fell headlong into despaire, were contin­gent. Neither were driven into such excesse of passion or distemper by irresistible necessity. But taking them as now they have made themselves; that the one should be led unto temptation, the o­ther into it; fell not out by chance, but by the espe­ciall disposition of the Divine providence. The great Tempter intended mischiefe to the one, but failed, God having yet a blessing in store for him. To the other, perhaps he intended not this parti­cular harme, untill opportunity did offer it. So that the inriching of the one by a chance rare and unusuall, in respect of man, was necessary in respect of Gods decree of mercy and fatherly providence; the delivering of the other unto Sathan, was like­wise necessary, in respect of Gods justice.

3 Now if such events, as to the apprehension of meere naturall men come by chance, be necessary in respect of the divine decree: disasters by common consent reputed fatall, must by efficacy of the same decree be divorced from contingency, with which formerly they had connexion. For though For­tune, as well as Fate, be a branch or particle of the proper object of the divine decree; yet as they have [Page 183] reference to man, this difference may in the last place be observed betwixt then: Those things fall out by meere chance or fortune, whose procurati­on or prevention hath not beene thought of at all by man, or but sleightly, before they happen: Those by fate, which have beene often and seri­ously thought of, but either farre exceed all expec­tation, or frustrate sollicitous care or forecast. Oft­times the unexpected accomplishment of one mans expectation defeates the industrious hopes or anxious contrivance of another, and such events are in a twofold sense termed fatall.

4 All events properly fatall include a kinde of canvas betweene man and man, nation and nation, or betweene divine providence and humane poli­cie, or betwixt the soule of man and wicked spirits licensed by divine providence to sollicite, tempt, or assault her.

CHAP. 23.
Of the degrees of necessity, and of the originall of in­evitable or absolute necessity.

1 VVEre the maine question hitherto disputed, thus proposed, Whe­ther all things were only so farre necessary, so farre contingent, as it pleased the Omnipotent to ap­point: or whether the successe or issue of humane intentions or contrivances, were so far avoydable or unavoydable, as he hath made them by his decree: I should have Infidels only for mine adversaries: Christians, I am perswaded, will move no questions about his power or ability, but only about his will or pleasure, for determining all things. And who can deny that Gods Law or co­venant for effecting some things, is more strict and peremptory, then for effecting others. The Pro­phet supposed his covenant for day and night to bee more certaine and invariable, than his cove­nant for the former and latter raine. And yet the Law which he hath appointed for the most glori­ous creatures in the Firmament, is not like the law of the Medes and Persians. It was dispensed with­all all at Iosuahs suit, and may againe be dispensed with at his pleasure. The motion of the Sun and Moone, is not perpetually necessary in respect of his de­cree. The seasons of seed time, harvest, and the disposition of these lower Regions (in which For­tune [Page 185] may seeme to have placed her wheele, and Chance erected his tottering throane) may become certaine and constant to such as constantly observe his holy Covenants: If you walke in my statutes, then will I give you rain in due season. Levit. 26. 4. &c Such was the wisedome of the Lawes given unto this people, that by observing them, they might have changed the disposition of the Ayre, altered the influence of the Heavens, and have had domi­nion over the Starres.

2 Constancy of assent or adherēce unto these fun­damental truths of religion, wold fasten our minds unto a point of inestimable use (as wel forreforming or curing maladies of State▪ as of private life) of­ten in this Treatise intimated, but not fully decla­red. The point is this; maine events which at this instant are meerely contingent, and may easily bee prevented by diversity of practices, not onely pos­sible but acceptable by the divine appointment, may in succession or revolution of time, become more necessary, and at length truly fatall, alto­gether unavoydable. Absolutely necessary from all eternities, nothing can truly be reputed, besides the Deity, and the internall operations of the ever blessed Trinity. Many things which from the be­ginning of time had but the first degrees of possibi­lity, (their contraries or incompatible opposi [...]es being in the highest degree of probability,) have by the continued sinister sway of mans thoughts and practices, beene drawne from meere possibili­ties to be more then probable, and unto the first de­gree of necessity: yet at the first not absolutely or [Page 186] irresistibly necessary. Some meanes there may be, though but a few left of many, and those not easie to be put in practice, for preventing them. The e­vents of greater consequences which stood thus, were with the Heathens accounted Fata minora: For Fates (as we said before) admit the selfe same division or degrees that necessity doth. The same events by omission of practices appointed by the divine decree for their prevention, become altoge­ther irresistible and absolutely necessary in respect of any meanes possible for averting them: yet not absolutely necessary from eternitie, but absolutely necessary only from that point of time, wherein the eternall decree or providence did cut off all contrary possibilities, which before were concur­rent with the possibility of their being. And events thus utterly bestript of all contingency, or al possi­bility of being recalled or avoyded, were by the Heathens ascribed [Fato majori] to greater Fates. The symptomes or characters of events becomming thus irresistibly & absolutely necessary, comeIn the Treatise of Prodigies & of their usefull ob­servation. else­where (by Gods assistance) to be deciphered. Here it sufficeth to advertise the Reader, that as divers things besides, so necessitie may be enstyled abso­lute many waies, but two especially. Some things are said to be absolutely necessarie, that is, altoge­ther inevitable, albeit this necessitie or inevitable­nesse did accrue from some occasions or set points of time lately past. As many diseases, in their na­ture curable, and easie to have beene cured by ordi­narie medicines (if they had beene administred in time,) do, by some few daies ill diet, by carelesse [Page 187] attendance, or casuall relapse, become altogether incurable, by any after-care or helpe of physick. Other events there be, which were absolutely ne­cessarie in respect of all times: their exhibition or production could not by any policie of man have beene prevented. So our Saviours death was abso­lutely necessary from the beginning of the World, but whether absolutely necessary from eternity, or absolutely necessary, without supposall of Adams fall (which was not necessary) shall not here be di­sputed. Certaine it is, that nothing decreed by God, can be so absolutely necessary as the Divine Nature, or blessed Trinity is. Many errors have found opportunity to mingle themselves with di­vine truth for want of a commodious distinction or explication of this indistinct and confused terme Absolute: the anatomy of it were worth the paines of the Learned. Evident it is, that some things which are not to day, may to morrow be, in their kind, absolute.

3 We truly say, that the summe of mony wher­in one man stands bound unto another, is absolute­ly due from the time of the forfaiture, or non-per­formance of the condition: that is, there is no plea left in Law, no course or meanes of Iustice to a­voyd the payment of it. Yet was not the same sum absolutely due from the first date of the bond; the performance of the Condition in due time had prevented the losse, which negligence or breach of promise hath now made necessary and irrecoverable. Moneys lent upon no other consideration, but up­on meere good will, to be repayd whensoever the [Page 188] party lending shall demand them; are absolutely due, from the date of the recognizance, and for that which is absolutely due, there is a necessitie of payment or satisfaction.

4. Some disasterous events become, by divine providence, irresistibly necessarie long before they be actually accomplished, or inflicted: such was the destruction of Pharaoh, of Senacherib, the deso­lation of Iudah and Ierusalem by Titus. Others be­come fatally irresistible within some few dayes or houres before they happen, other not till the very moment wherein they are awarded either for some grievous sinne then committed, or for some remar­kable document of Gods justice. Some againe are for a long time totally irresistible and unpreventa­ble; others resistible quoad See Cha. 24. parag. 9. & 10. tantum, though not quoad totum, that is, part of the evils might be pre­vented, though not the whole. All that we have said concerning the alteration of possibilities, or contingencies, or change of events contingent in­to necessary, may easily be conceived, without any surmise of alteration in the Omnipotent, or in his everlasting decree. The least degree of possibility or contingency, is as necessarily derived fromNos cala­mitatum nostrarum authores s [...] ­mus. Deus enim pius est & miseri­cors, & qui, ut scriptum est, neminem velit perire vel laedere. Nos [...] ergo adversum nos omnia facimus. Nihil itaque, nihil est in nobis crudelius nobis. Nos inquam, nos etiam Deo nolente cruciamus. Sed videlicet adversum meips [...]im dicere arbitror, qui cum superius dixerim, ob peccata nostra nos puniri à Deo, nunc dicam nos puntri à nobis ipsis. Vtrum (que) verum est; Deo quippe punimur, sed ipsi facimus ut punia­mur. Cum autem punire nos ipsi facimus, cui dubium est quin ipsi nos nostris criminibus puniomus: quia quicunque dat causam qua puniatur, ipsese punit, secundum illud; Funi­bus peccatorum suorum unusquisque constrin gitur. Salvianus lib. 8. his absolute irresistible will, as necessity it selfe in the highest degree. It is impossible for possibility to [Page 189] have any right to actuall being without his speciall appointment. To think that Fate, Chance, or For­tune, should nestle in some certaine periods of time, or be brought forth by revolutiōs of the heavens, is altogether heathenish. But neither doth Scripture insinuate, nor can reason justly suspect any danger in avouching, that the Almighty suffers that con­tingency or multiplicity of possibilities betweene good and evill, or the severall degrees of evill, wherewith hee hath endued the reasonable crea­ture, to explicate or contract it selfe in every mo­ment of time. And according to the nature of the free motions of man, the irresistible decree brings [...] such events or issues, as were truly possible from eternity, but become necessary by revolutions, not of the heavens, but of mans hart and thoughts; publike plague or calamities become necessary, or inevitable by these meanes onely. We must ever remember that God hath not so decreed all things before they come, or the manner how they shall come, as that he doth not yet decree them. For he continually decrees as well necessity as contingency, and brings forth effects as well contingent as neces­sary, from this present houre; both being some­times meerly possible. The truth of this our last assertion, may be demonstrated from our former principle: If one part of a disjunctive proposition be denied or faile, the other may be necessarily inferred, though neither bee absolutely and determinately necessary, but become such by consequence, or up­on supposition of the others failing. Many things which in respect of our present purpose or resolu­tion [Page 190] are free or contingent, may within a short while after become altogether necessary and una­voydable, without any alteration or change in us. Suppose a Iudge should be tied by oath to execute justice upon a malefactor within eight dayes; there is no necessity that he should performe his vow the first, second, third or fourth day. The execution or not execution of Iustice, is during the first seven daies, free and contingent, without any breach or violation of oath: but omitting the opportunities, which the first seven dayes have offered, the exe­cution of Iustice upon the eighth day, is as necessa­rie, as his honesty or fidelity; as necessary, as if hee had beene tied by oath to execute it upon that day alone. The parts of indefinite time, or of the mat­ter promised or threatned by man, may be farre more than this instance implies. So that the per­formance of those duties or promises, which for a long time was free and arbitrarie, and might have beene performed in different measure, becomes at length absolutely necessary, and necessary to such a determinate degree. The parts of Gods disjun­ctive decree, and the degrees as well of every mat­ter decreed by him, as of the time allotted for the execution of it, may be numberlesse in respect of us. And man by not entertaining the opportuni­ties, which by severall times have beene allotted him, for reducing his possibilities of doing Gods antecedent will into act, may forfeit the very pos­sibilities themselves for ever, or for a long time. And by continuance of such neglect of many parts or kindes of successe, all truly possible, in respect of [Page 191] the eternal decree; that only shall in the end be­come necessary, which he least desires, which his soule shall most de [...]est. In respect of some future events not as yet become necessary, the eternall de­cree leaves fewer branches of contrary contingen­cies or possibilities, in respect of others more. Their multitude may expire or revive every mo­ment, according to the diversity of mens waies, on which Gods will is alwaies done by means infinite, at least to man incomprehensible.

4 The incarnation of our blessed Saviour, was in the opinion of some of the Ancients, absolutely necessary before the creation of mankind, & should in time infallibly have been accomplished for con­firming or augmenting that happy estate wherein Adam was created; if so he had continued sted­fast in it untill the time appointed by God for his change or translation. But however the Schooles may determine or wave this question (I must con­fesse, neither very usefull nor in this place much ne­cessary) there was no necessity questionlesse, that the second Adam should become a bloudy sacrifice for our sinnes, unlesse the first Adam had sinned: but after he, by his actuall transgression, had utter­ly cut off that possibility of perseverance, which the eternall decree had bestowed upon him, the humi­liation and bitter passion of the Sonne of God, be­came as necessary in respect of Gods mercy and bounty towards man, and of his infinite justice which (notwithstanding his infinite mercy) was to be fully satisfied, as his incarnation. After Cain had despised Gods [...] and had slaine his bro­ther [Page 192] Abel, it was necessary the Messias should proceed from Seth; yet not then so necessary, that he should be the sonne of Abraham, as the Son of Seth. Others lineally descended from Seth, might have forfeited their reall possibilities, or ordinary hopes of attaining unto this glorie. At the least, when God first made his promise to the Woman and her seed, the birth of Abraham was not in re­spect of the eternall decree so necessary, as Christs birth was. It was possible to have written Terah as childlesse as Iechoniah, after his mariage with A­brahams mother. But after the same God had pas­sed that promise unto Abraham and confirmed it by solemne oath, In thy seed shall al [...] the nations of the earth be blessed: It was thenceforth altogether as necessary, that our Redeemer should be the seed of Abraham, as of the Woman: Yet not then so ne­cessary, that he should bee the sonne of Iudah, or that Iudah should have a sonne called Iesse, or that Iesse should have a son called David, a man after Gods owne heart. That glory, which long after Gods oath to Abraham, befell the Tribe of Iudah, was (for ought we know or can object unto the contrary) a part of that dignity; whose possibility was once really possessed by Reuben, though utter­ly forfeited by his misdemeanour. But after Iacob had prophesied, that the Scepter should not depart from Iudah, till Shilo come, or rather after the Lord had sworne not to faile David in bestowing the prerogative promised to Iudah upon his seed, the necessity becomes as great, that our High Priest, after the Order of Melchisedeck, should bee the [Page 193] sonne of David as the son of Man, or seed of A­braham. Now if we can perswade our selves, that God either speakes or sweares as he truly intends, or that mortall man may certainly know where to have him, or what to trust to: wee must beleeve and acknowledge those events concerning which he hath sworne not to repent, to be farre more ne­cessary in respect of the irresistible decree, from the first interposition of such oath; then those ordi­nary blessings or cursings, which hee seriously threat [...]eth or promiseth, but disjunctively, & with expresse reservation of their repentance whom he threatneth, or of their defection whom he incoura­geth by his promises: yet such was his covenant of life and death with his people, such was his de­cree concerning the prosperity or calamity of Da­vids temporall Kingdome; as theIer 18. [...]. &c. Prophets com­ments upon the promise made to2 Sam. 7. 12. &c. See the next chap­ter of this Book pa­rag. 2. David expresly testifie. By these and the like oracles fully exem­plified in the alternation of Ierusalem and Iudahs contrary fates, or successe; we may discerne the course of that eternall providence, by whose irre­sistible unerring disposition, all other States or Kingdomes have the certaine periods of their pro­sperity or calamity assigned, and by which Princes and greatest statesmen stand or fall.

CHAP. 24.
Of the contrary Fates or Awards whereof Davids temporall kingdome was capable: and of its de­volution from Gods antecedent to his consequent Will.

1 HOMER was not so blinded with the heathenish misconceit of Fate, as not-to-see more wayes to death than one. In Achilles he described two courses of life, the one shorter but decked with glory; the other longer, but bare and naked of [...]ame: both alike possible by Fates.

Now as one poyson sometimes expels another: so this opinion of double Fate, (if men be disposed to use this terme) takes away the malignity of that error, which holds all events to be fatall; albeit of such twofolded fates or successe, the one part or the other must by absolute necessity be fulfilled, ac­cording to the parties choise, unto whom they are awarded. The body of that which Homer shadowed in Achilles, is evidently contained in Gods fore­mentioned covenant with Israell, and sealed unto us by manifest experience in Davids line. For of Gods speciall providence over the seed of Abra­ham or the Iewish nation in generall, we have trea­ted at large in the first Booke of the Comments upon the Apostles Creed. The contrary Fates of Davids kingdome in succeeding ages, seeme to wrastle & strive, as Iacob and Esau did in the womb, or to countersway each other, like two opposite scales unequally ballanced, by turnes. That thus it fared with Davids Kingdome, doth not argue Gods decree concerning it to have beene mutable, but rather immutably to have elevated & depressed [Page 196] both Prince and People, according to the degrees of their mutability in turning to him or from him.

2 Salomon had the largest talent of wealth, and the greatest measure of wit to use it, that any earth­ly King either before or after him had. His possi­bilities to increase his kingdome, and propagate greatnesse to his posterity, were much greater than any earthly Monarch since him might expect. Ma­ny parts of Gods glorious promises made to Da­vid, were literally meant of him, which were never literally fulfilled in him, or in his naturall linage; because they did not performe the conditions, which God required, that they might bee more capable of his extraordinary undeserved favours. The Covenant with David is expressed Psal. 89. I have found David my servant: with my holy oyle have I anointed him. With whom my hand shall bee established: mine arme also shall strengthen him. The enemy also shall not exact upon him: nor the sonne of wickednesse afflict him. And I will beat downe his foes before his face: and plague them that hate him. This promise pertaines to David and to his suc­cessors: but however the promise was on Gods part unalterable, yet the prerogative promised was subject unto change on contingency. For so a little after the Psalmist distinguisheth betwixt Davids seed and Davids sonnes. His seed will I make to en­dure for ever, and his throne as the dayes of Heaven. This he speakes not of many, but of one, to wit, of Christ, to whom onely the Kingdome of David was predestinated. Of such as were ordained to this Kingdome, he speakes in the plurall, not abso­lutely [Page 197] but conditionally: If his children forsake my Law, and walke not in my judgements; if they breake my Statutes, and keepe not my Commandements: Then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes. The tenour then of Gods Covenant with David as it concerned Christ was absolute, but as it concernes Davids other sonnes, it was disjunctive, or conditionall. If any shall question why God for many generations did deale no better with Davids successors, than with the successors of other Kings, the answer from the te­nour of the Covenant is plaine, They forsooke his Lawes, and would not walke in his Iudgements. Psal. 89. vers. 32. and thus breaking his Statutes, their visitation was altogether unevitable, not on a sud­den, but by degrees. The Lords arme even in Sa­lomons time was stretched out, ready to fetch the blow, which after his death fell upon his son Reho­boam, as heire to his chastisements. The blow was sudden and smart; for of twelve Tribes, ten were rent from his Kingdome by Ieroboam. The wounds Inflicted by the Egyptian upon Iudah and Benja­min, and upon Ierusalem her selfe, were grievous, though as yet not uncurable. So grievous as might give that people plainly to understand, that the prosperity of Davids earthly Kingdome was not like the dayes of heaven, nor the glory of Salomons throne like the Sunne in the Firmament, altogether priviledged from change, or mutability. But al­beit the motion of the creature, appointed to exe­cute Gods wrath, were sudden, yet the waight of Ierusalems burthen was not permanent, because [Page 198] shee was not as yet frozen in sinne.

3 Of Rehoboams successors some were good, and these by their penitency and heroicall reforma­tion, set back the Diall of such dismall Fates, as still did threaten them: many were bad, and did draw Gods plagues upon themselves and their people. And whilest the blow of Gods stretched out arme, is diverted and borne off by the fervent prayers of godly Princes; the waight of the whole Nations burthen, is much increased by the iniquity of the people. Either the number of the supplicants was not equall to the number of the delinquents; or the fervency of their prayer and repentance, not so constant, as the others delight in sin and wicked­nesse. The waight of their sinister Fates, by this meanes secretly and insensibly increasing (even whilest their motion was restrained or abated) in­creased the swiftnesse or violence of the motion, when by permission of the Divine Decree, they had liberty to take their wonted course. Ioas and Achas pulled them on so fast, that Micha threat­ned judgement, not against the King and Nobles onely, but against City and Temple, in such a thun­dring voice, as if desolation had even then besieged the City round about, and utter destruction was ready to enter in at the breach: Therefore shall Sion for your sake be plowed as a Field, and Ierusalem shall become heapes, and the mountaine of the house, as the high places of the Forest. Micha 3. ver. 12. Spake he this of his owne times, or of some others follow­ing? was it in respect of the Eternall Decree, alto­gether impossible for this dreadfull sentence to have [Page 199] beene forthwith put in execution? Indeed many of their Magistrates and Politicians, most of their Priests and Prophets, untill this very instant had said to the like purpose: Is not the Lord among us, none evill can come upon us. vers. 11. This vaine confidence presumptuously and falsly grounded upon the immutability of Gods promises, made the doome menaced by Micha more necessary and fatall at this time, than otherwise it would have beene; though to such as understood the tenour of Gods Covenant with his people, neither at this time nor many yeares after, altogether un­evitable.

4 The good King Hezekiah knew the Lord did not threaten in jest, and for this reason his feare was hearty, and his prayers earnest: Did he not feare the Lord, and besought the face of the Lord? Ier. 26. ver. 19. But did this his feare or hearty prayes im­paire the present possibility or necessity of the plagues threatned? Yes, The Lord repented him. Of what? that he had denounced all this evill against Ierusalem, or intreated Hezekiah so roughly by his Prophet Micha? no: But the Lord repented him of the evill which he had denounced against him and meant to execute. For who repents himselfe of that which he did not so much as truly intend? Is God then as man that he should repent? It is impossible that there should be any change of purpose in God, & herein he is most unlike to man, or the son of mā, whose repentance alwayes includes some internall alteratiō of wil or purpose, not of the matter purpo­sed only. Our best intentions of good to others, of­ten [Page 200] expire upon particular respects, and cannot be revived againe, albeit we neither had just occasion to take dislike, nor the same reasons to continue it, which we had to take it. Through the inconstan­cie of our nature we loath to morrow what we like to day: our affections alter without any change in the matter affected by us. Far otherwise it is with God, whose will or purpose is still immutable; and yet exactly fitteth every change or mutation in the creature. To have punished Ierusalem continuing her wonted course (but sixe moneths longer after the Prophet had thus warned her) with such mise­ries as Senacherib had menaced, was one part of the eternall and unchangeable decree: another part of the same decree (no lesse immutable) was to avert these plagues from Ierusalem truly repen­ting upon their denunciation. No former wicked­nesse could alienate his love from her, or make him recall the blessings promised to David, so long as this people was so affected, as in that covenant was required.

5 The possibility of the desolation menaced by Micha, was, for the present, as great, as the As­syrian was potent. It might truly have beene said of this City, in respect of his army, what one saith of Navigators:

That extraordinary power wherewith the Lord had armed this Tyrant to take vengeance upon his neighbour nations, might well make the present [Page 201] avoydance of the plagues menaced by Micha, seeme almost impossible. But good Hezekiah, by turning with all his heart, and all his soule unto the Lord, unto whom all things are possible, did not only remove destruction threatned from the City and Temple, but caused it to turne upon the de­stroyer. Ierusalem and Iudah, by the unfained pe­nitence of Prince and People, became the object of Gods antecedent will, and fell under the former part of Gods Covenant with David: The enemy shall not exact upon him, nor the sonne of wickednesse afflict him. And I will beat downe his foes before his face, and plague them that hate him. Psal 89. vers. 22, 23. The Assyrian by going beyond his com­mission, in daring not Hezekiah only, but the Lord of Hosts, unto whose protection Hezekiah had fled, becomes the object of Gods consequent will, which by divine appointment, he was at that time to execute upon Ierusalem; but upon Ierusalem fallen away by disobedience, not upon Ierusalem returning in heart unto her God.

6 That this people might have some time of breathing and respite to gather themselves for the better accomplishing of so great a worke, as Heze­kiah had begun; the Lord in his wisdome so dis­posed that Tirhakah King of Cush should make for­ward to entertaine Senacherib with battaile at that very instant, wherein he had purposed to give the on set upon Ierusalem. This unexpected removall of present terror, was (no doubt) a sure pledge un­to the people for strengthning their relyance on Gods promise, for setling their hearts and continu­ing [Page 202] their constancy in fervent prayers, during the time of the enemies absence. And seeing the force of Egypt and Cush were not sufficient to dissipate Senacheribs mighty army, perhaps not able to hold him play any longer; the Lord sends Hezekiah and his people deliverance from heaven: Then the Angell of the Lord went forth, and smote in the Camp of the Assyrians, a hundreth fourescore and five thou­sand: and when they arose, early in the morning, be­hold they were all dead corpses. Isaiah, 37. vers. 36. The noise of this great overthrow was as the joy­full sound of a Iubile unto Ierusalem, and did por­tend another more admirable and victorious Iu­bile to bee accomplished in the same place; of whichIn the Treatise of Christs an­swer to Iohn. elsewhere. This for the present might witnesse to Hezekiah and the people, that rather then one tittle of Gods Covenant with David should fal to the ground, the host of heaven should leave their station, and keepe garrison on earth. A little after this miraculous deliverance, the Sun is compelled to goe fifteene degrees backwards, for setting forward the course of Hezekiah his life, whom Death and Fate had now, in the worlds sight, arrested. God hereby testified unto Prince and People, that if they would continue such in health, as they were in sicknesse, so well-minded in peace and prosperity, as they had beene in strait siege, or other distresse of war: Ierusalems good dayes might become as certaine and constant, as the dayes of heaven; seeing that great light, which was appointed from the beginning to rule the day, did now give place to Hezekiahs prayers. But most [Page 203] of this people were most unlike their Prince, albeit even he, after he had received those two miracu­lous pledges of Gods loue, did not render according to the reward bestowed upon him. 2 Chron. 32. v. 25. For his heart was lifted up, therefore there was wrath upon him, and upon Iudah and Ierusalem. Notwith­standing, Hezekiah humbled himselfe for the pride of his heart (both he and the inhabitants of Ierusalem:) so that the wrath of the Lord came not upon them in the dayes of Hezekiah.

7 After the yoake of Ashur was taken from off this peoples neck, many of them became wanton, others secure, as not suspecting that a Cockatrice should spring out of this Serpents root, that his fruit should be a fiery flying Serpent. Isai. 14. v. 29. Vnto Hezekiah himselfe, though a most wise and prudent King, the Babylonian tyranny, being now in his in­fancy, did seeme by nature mor [...] mild and gentle, than the Assyrian had beene. And not content to entertaine the King of Babylons Ambassadors with curtesies sutable to their congratulations, he shew­ed them his treasury and all the good things wher­with the Lord had blessed him: willing (perhaps) to give their master and the world to wit, that not­withstanding the former wars and exactions, hee was no begger; but a fit confederate for neighbour Princes, to curbe the insolency of the Assyrian, whose strength though much abated by the ter­rible blow, which the Angell of the Lord had gi­ven Senacheribs host, was not quite broken till ma­ny yeares after. But the Prophet knew this fawn­ing whelpe to be of wolvish kinde, and discovered [Page 204] those implanted seeds of cruelty in him, which when they came to be ripe, would be more noy­some to the Kings and Princes of Iudah, than his predecessor the Assyrian had beene. Isaiah said un­to Hezekiah, Heare the word of the Lord: Behold, the dayes come, that all that is in thy house, and that which thy fathers have laid up in store unto this day, shall be caried unto Babylon: nothing shall bee left, saith the Lord. And of thy sonnes that shall issue from thee, which thou shalt beget, shall they take a­way, and they shall bee Eunuches in the palace of the King of Babylon. 2 King. Chapter 20. vers. 17, 18.

8 Any Heathen which had held Esaias for an undoubted Sooth-sayer, would instantly have con­cluded hence, that the captivity of Hezekiahs suc­cessors, and all the miseries which the Babylonian afterwards brought upon Iudah and Ierusalem, were absolutely fatall, altogether impossible to be avoided. And many good Christians (perhaps) will question, whether the plagues here threatned, were not from this point of time, necessary in re­spect of the Divine Decree. To answer this que­stion by interrogation: Why should not the spirit of the Prophet Esay be as truly subject to the for­mer propheticall rule, as Micahs was? Now God, according to that rule, was ready to repent him of all the evill, which he had threatned, whensoever the people should repent them of whatsoever they had done. The Lord had given Hezekiah and his successors a farre larger and longer time, for pre­venting the evill which Esay threatned, than they [Page 205] had for avoiding the doome denounced by Mi­cah. The very tenour of the denunciation made by Esay, shewes them a ready meanes for preven­ting the woe denounced; so they would have laid it to their hearts, or followed the advise of succeed­ing Prophets. But mortality must needs be rife, where variety of diseases and multitudes of unskil­full Empyricks do meer. The common transgres­sions of the people, are the epidemicall diseases of States: and such projects as Princes or Statesmen, without the prescript of Gods Word, or sugge­stion of his Providence, use for their recovery, are like unseasonable ministration of Empyricall or old wives medicines, to crased bodies. They usually invite or entertaine the destruction or ruine of king­domes, otherwise ready to depart. Not the best amongst the Kings of Iudah, but were smatterers in empyricall or secular policy. Some were more, some lesse, all too much given to put confidence in multitude of men and store of treasure. And for increasing this supposed sinew of Warre and nutri­ment of Peace, they used meanes, neither warran­table by Gods written Law, nor by the rule of cha­ritie. To prevent this mischiefe which is the root of all evill, what perswasion could be more fit or pertinent, than this prediction of the Prophet: That the wealth which Hezekiah and his fathers had heaped together, which his successors would be too carefull to increase, would in succeeding ages steale their children, for whom it was provided, from them, and make them miserable captives in a for­raigne Land. To heape up riches we know not for [Page 206] whom, is a vanity; to heape them up with care and toile to the destruction of our best private friends, and advancement of the publike enemy, is the ex­tremity of folly mixt with misery. Had Hezekiah his successors beene as ready to aske counsell of Gods Prophets as of Politicians; these could have instructed them, that the miseries foretold by Esay, were fatall unto covetousnesse and unconscionable care for posterity; yet not simply necessary after co­vetousnesse was much increased in Hezekiahs suc­cessors. For long after the going out of this decree, whensoever the Princes of Iudah repented for their owne oppression, and the oppression of their fathers, the Lord repented him of the plagues de­nounced, and shewed himselfe ready to remove the oppressor from them. And though in peniten­cy in other sinnes, did in part concur; yet continu­ance in violence and oppression, was the principall string and fatall cord, by which the Princes of Iu­dah did draw captivity upon themselves and their children, and desolation upon the City.

9 To passe over the various alternation of Iu­dahs and Ierusalems different fates, in the dayes of Manasses Ammon, and Iosias, and come to Iehoikim, Iosias sonne, in whose dayes the inveterate disease of Iudah came to a Crisis: Did not thy Father (saith the Prophet Ieremy to this untoward and Prince) eate and drinke, and doe judgement and justice, and then it was well with him? He judged the cause of the poore and needy, then it was well with him: was not this to know me (saith the Lord?) But thine eyes and thy heart are not, but for thy covetousnesse, and for to [Page 207] shed innocent blood, and for oppression, and for vio­lence to doe it. Therefore thus saith the Lord con­cerning See Iose­phus in the history of Iehoiakim. Et Seder Olam.Iehoiakim the son of Iosiah King of Iudah, They shall not lament for him, saying, Ah my bro­ther, or ah sister: they shall not lament for him, say­ing, Ah Lord, or ah his glory. He shall bee buried with the buriall of an Asse, drawne and cast forth be­yond the gates of Ierusalem. Ier. 22. vers. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.

Shortly after the execution of this sentence up­on Iehoiakim in full measure, Ieconiah his son, with other of the royall seed, according to Esaias for­mer prophesie, were caried captives unto Babell, and all or some of them made Eunuches. How­beit the execution of the same decree upon Zede­kiah and such as were yet left behinde, was not as yet unavoydable, or meerly fatall; but such not­withstanding they made it at last by continuance of like covetousnesse and oppression.

When the City was more narrowly besieged by the Chaldean, than it had beene by the Assyri­an: the Lord of hosts calls for the Aegyptian, as he had done for the King of Cush, to remove the siege. The libertie and respiration which Zedekiah and his besieged people in the meane time got, be­ing much greater then Hezekiah had for two years space together; was a true pledge of Gods antece­dent will, which in part they had fulfilled, and which should undoubtedly have beene fulfilled in greater measure for their good, so they had used this liberty to Gods glory; or gone on so well in this time of breathing, as in their distresse they had [Page 208] begun. Ye were now turned, and had done right in my sight, in proclaiming liberty every man to his neighbour, and ye had made a covenant before me in the house which is called by my name. But ye returned and polluted my name, and caused every man his ser­vant, and every man his hand-maid, whom hee had set at liberty at their pleasure, to returne; and brought them into subjection, to be unto you for servants and for hand-maids. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Yee have not hearkned unto me, in proclaiming libertie every one to his brother, and every man to his neigh­bour: behold I proclaime a liberty for you, saith the Lord, to the Sword, to the Pestilence, and to the Fa­mine: and I will make you to be removed into all the Kingdomes of the Earth, &c. Ier. 34. v. 15, 16, 17. And Zedekiah King of Iudah and his Princes will I give into the hands of their enemies, and into the hand of them that seeke their life, and into the hand of the King of Babylons army which are gone up from you. Behold, I will command, saith the Lord, and cause them to returne to this City, and they shall fight against it, and take it, and burne it with fire, and I will make the Cities of Iudah a desolation without an inhabitant. ver. 21, 22.

10 Too much skill in secular policy made them put too great confidence in the strength of Ae­gypt: and this confidence in the helpe of man, made them secure, whilest they were conscious of breaking the Covenant which their Fathers had made, and they lately renewed with their God. The probabilities of the Aegyptians success against the Chaldean, were (in all politique esteeme) very [Page 209] great: and likely it is that the Chaldeans were brought back againe with speed unto Ierusalem by the speciall hand of the Almighty, that they might execute his judgements upon this rebellious peo­ple. How necessary, how fatall and unevitable the execution of his consequent will alwayes becomes, where his antecedent will hath beene thus openly and wilfully neglected, may best be gathered from the same Prophets reiterated threats unto this peo­ple, resuming (as it seemes) their former vaine confidence of the Chaldeans finall departure, after his forementioned prophecy to the contrary. Ier. 37. ver. 9, 10. Thus saith the Lord, deceive not your selves, saying, The Chaldeans shall surely depart from us: for they shall not depart. For though ye had smit­ten the whole army of the Chaldeans that fight against you, and there remained but wounded men among them; yet should they rise every man in his tent, and burne this Citie with fire. To extinguish this flame, or prevent the extinction of Zedekiahs royall race and Iudahs earthly glory, there was no possibility left, so long as they wrestled with Fates, and made policie their strength: yet was there after this time, a possibility, as true, as Gods promise can make any, for escaping à tanto, though not à toto; a pos­sibility for Zedekiah to have kept himselfe and his family in a better estate, then they afterwards en­joyed; a possibility to have left the City and Temple standing, after death had disposed of them; so he would at the time appointed by God, have submitted himselfe unto the King of Babell, unto whom he had sworne allegiance. Then said Iere­miah [Page 210] unto Zedekiah, Thus saith the Lord the God of Hostes, the God of Israel; If thou wils assuredly goe forth unto the King of Babylons Princes, then thy soule shall live, and this Citie shall not bee burnt with fire, and thou shalt live and thy house. But if thou wilt not goe forth to the King of Babylons Princes, then shall this City bee given into the hands of the Chaldeans, and they shall burne it with fire, and thou shalt not escape out of their hand. Ier. 38. ver. 17, 18

And Zedekiah the King said unto Ieremiah; I am afraid of the Iewes that are fallen to the Chalde­ans, lest they deliver mee into their hand, and they mocke me. But Ieremiah sayd, They shall not deliver thee: obey, I beseech thee, the voice of the Lord, which I spake unto thee: so it shall bee well unto thee, and thy soule shall live. But if thou refuse to go forth, this is the word which the Lord hath shewed me. And behold, all the women that are left in the King of Iu­dahs house, shall bee brought forth unto the King of Babylons Princes, and those women shall say; Thy friends have set thee on, and have prevailed against thee: thy feet are sunke in the mire, and they are tur­ned away back. So they shall bring out all thy wives, and thy children to the Chaldeans, and thou shalt not escape out of their hand, but shalt be taken by the hand of the King of Babylon: and thou shalt cause this Ci­tie to bee burnt with fire. &c. vers. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

11 This last neglect of Gods antecedent will, so often revealed for his good, procured the speedy execution of his consequent will without all possibi­lity to avoid it. Not a title of Ieremies or Ezekiels [Page 211] prophesie, which hisSee Jose­phus in the Historie of Zedekiah. Politicians sought to set at variance, but is exactly fulfilled upon him, and so is Micahs prophesie upon this Citie. The manner how Ieremies and Ezekiels prophesie, which seeme to contradict each other, were both fulfilled, is ad­mirable, and might well move a man, not well ac­quainted with the nature of prophecies and Gods speciall providence, to think the Fates had plotted his ruine. But this particular argument is prosecu­ted elsewhere more at large.

12 To recapitulate the summe of many argu­ments to like purposes vnto every possible choise or resolution made by man, whether concerning matters private or publique, there is a distinct cor­respondent successe allotted by the omnipotent and immutable Decree. Every actuall choise or resolution, is as the drawing of a new lott, whose just price or recompence, be it good or bad, is in­stampt upon it from eternity. And for the awar­ding or payment of it in due time, the whole host of Gods creatures stand bound by the very tenour of their beeing or dependancy upon their Maker. Seeing all of them were made by his word, and are continued by his meere will and pleasure; sooner shall they forfeit their very beeing, and be resolved into nothing, than the least tittle of Gods will, con­cerning any creature, should not be fulfilled; or, that successe, be it good or bad, should not be awar­ded to private men or publike States in that exact degree and measure, which God from eternity hath appointed.

From ignorance of this essentiall subordination, [Page 212] which fate or conspiracy of second causes, have unto Gods irresistible providence, who by his in­finite creative power, can at all times dissolve their combination, or compose them anew, by wayes to man for number incomprehensible, as pleaseth him; the wisest amongst State wizards have erred and do erre more grossely in assigning the causes of Kingdomes ruines or erections, or in prognostica­ting the successe of politick skill, than a vulgar A­stronomer should do, which would take upon him to foretell the peculiar disposition of the Ayre or weather in every place throughout this Iland, for every houre of the yeare following. The observa­tion which many of them gather from the inspec­tion of times present or past, are of as little use for future ages, as an Almanack of this yeare, is for the yeares following. Sooner may moderne Scholars prove extraordinary Husbandmen, by observing Virgils Calender of the rising and setting of Stars, or other rules of that ancient husbandry, which he describes; than pragmaticall wits become wise Statesmen by reading Tacitus, Livy, or others, bet­ter acquainted with the mysteries of State, or Princely secrets, than with Gods providence or with the Almighties Decree concerning the suc­cesse of their projects. Though that decree bee as He is most immutable, yet the variety of mens dis­positions, especially in sundry ages, is greater than any alterations in the heavens; the divers conjun­ctions or oppositions of mens wils to his, are more then can be found amongst the Starres. Now it is his immutable will to render unto every people and [Page 213] nation, according to the degrees of that conformity or dissonancy, which they hold; with his mercy, bounty, or justice, or with his most holy will.

CHAP. 25.
Of the sudden and strange erection of the Macedonian Empire, and the manifestation of Gods speciall providence in Alexanders expedition and suc­cesse.

1 ARISTOTLE [...]. Arist. l. 7. cap. 7. polit. being born when Greece did flourish, and living when the Halcyon dayes of Ma­cedon beganne to dawne, would gladly tie the light of GODS countenance, which in his full age was inclining to the Meridian of Greece, unto the situation of his Country, and disposition of his Countrimen, whose politick vertues, in his Phi­losophicall vanity, were intailed to the peculiar temper of that clime. The people (saith hee) that live in cold countries, and in Europe (as distinct from Greece) are stout and hardy, but not so wise and politick; more free then civill, much apter to be their owne men then their neighbours masters. The Asi­atickes (that want no wit) are destitute of courage: therefore they remaine in servitude and subjection [Page 214] unto others. The Grecians as they enjoy the middle place for situation, so they participate with the Asi­aticks for wit, and colder countries for courage, in such proportion, as enapts them to preserve their libertie, and to beare rule and soveraignty over others. Many Comets at their first appearance, are usually mis­taken for fixed Starres, reputed next in glory unto the Moone; untill their parallax bewray their place, and their sudden end discover their orginall to bee corruption. Thus the brightnesse of the Grecian Monarchy, whilest it was in rising or com­ming unto its height, misperswaded their hearts whose eyes it dazeled, that it was to endure like the daies of heaven; whereas it proved but like the gli­string bubbles of the morning dew, which dissolve with the strength of those beames, that gave them lustre. This is the onely difference: the period of their splendor falls in the compasse of an houre, and Comets usually continue not many months. Wher­as the rise and fall of Kingdomes commonly out­reach any one mans age or observation, and such as follow marke the occurrences of their owne times more then their connexion with former. Whence it is, that secular politicians are alwayes learning, and never attaine unto the knowledge of what they seeke. Howbeit, Aristotle lived long enough to have seene his error, for Alexander (I take it) did dye before him, and with Alexanders life the light of Macedon was extinguished, and the glory of Greece much eclipsed and abated. And though neither Greece nor Macedon have changed their clime or site, yet Aristotles [...], Keene [Page 215] Cocks of the game, have proved as arrant Cravens since, as the Asiaticks in his time were; as any Eu­rope ever hatched: infamous for effeminatenesse under the Romanes, so deeply infected with the Asi-aticke luxury, that their very nature seemed to be tainted with servility, and to sollicite that bar­barous yoake, which for a long time hath been laid upon them. But their present estate stands in more need of our prayers, then their fore-elders did of our censure. To returne unto their best times.

2 Never had any Monarchy on Earth save one (if happily that may be called a Monarchy) either so speedy an erection or so sudden a dissolution, as the Macedonian had. The true reason of its sud­den dissolution, as aPa [...]san. Writer in this case unparti­ally tells us, was, because the Foundation of it was laid by perjury. The true cause of its swift erecti­on, was partly the execution of Gods justice upon the Persian, and other Nations communicants with him in his present luxury, partly the accom­plishing of Gods antecedent will for the good of his Church, as isIn the fulfilling of that pro­phesie, Zac. 9. v. 9. elsewhere specified. In Aristotles time, Alexander was, as Nebuchadnezzar had beene Gods scourge or hammer to bruise all Ea­sterne Nations.

3 The incredible successe of Alexanders furious attempts were such, as no Heathen which outlived him, could ascribe unto policy, wealth, or strength, or whatsoever meanes meerly humane. Amongst others, the heroicall Romane Poet so describes his beginnings and proceedings, as if the Fates had u­sed his restlesse instinct to purchase same, but as a [Page 216] spur to make him runne the race, and his sudden death as a curb to check his fury, lest he should transgresse the bounds that they had set him.

4▪ Some passages in this Poet may serve as a Motto to Apelles his devise, who painted Alexan­der with a thunderbolt in his hand; as if hee had beene appointed for a sudden terrour to Nations farre and near, astonishing more places with dread of his swift approach, then felt his stroke. But what­soever the Poet or Painter could expresse, was more excellently represented by Gods Prophet, many yeares before Alexander or Darius was born. And as I was considering, behold, an hee Goat came from the West on the face of the whole earth, and tou­ched not the ground: and the Goat had a notable horn betweene his eyes. And hee came to the Ramme that had two hornes, which I had seene standing before the river, and ranne unto him in the fury of his po­wer. And I saw him come close unto the Ramme, and he was moved with choler against him, and smote the Ramme, and brake his two hornes, and there was no power in the Ramme to stand before him, but hee cast him downe to the ground, and stamped upon him; and there was none that could deliver the Ramme out of [Page 218] his hand. Therefore the hee Goat waxed very great, and when he was strong, the great horne was broken: and for it came up foure notable ones, towards the foure windes of heaven. Dan. 8. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. What should move the Prophet to compare the King­dome of the Medes and Persians to aThe Per­sian Rams, as some re­late, are of an extraor­dinary greatnesse, and might serve as an Embleme of Darius his exces­sive power in respect of Alexan­ders, if it were to be measured by visible cōjecture. Ramme, or what the comparison did in particular portend, is not so usefull for me at this time to know, nor so easie to finde, as the mysticall portendment of his resembling the Macedonian Kingdome to a Goat. The Macedonians in Daniels time, and untill Phi­lip of Macedons time (who asNon sum facturus verba, Ma­cedones, ut vos abista domum re­deundi cu­piditale de­moveam (siquidem per me integrum vobis est quò libuerit abire) sed ut intelligatis, quid ego vobis praestiterim, & qualē vos mihi vicē rependentes discedatis. Ac primum à Philippo patre (ut par est) ordi­ar. Philippus enim vos incertis sedibus errantes atque inopes, & pleres (que) sub Pellibus degen­tes, exiguos (que) ovium greges in montibus pascentes, ac pro ijs parum feliciter adversùs Illyrios, Triballos, & finitimos Thracas bellum gerentes; pro Pellibus Chlamydes gestendas dedit, ex montibus in planitiem deduxit, pares (que) hostibus ad pugnandum effecit, ut non tam in Locerū munitione deinceps, quā in vestra virtute sal [...]tē collocaretis urbes vobi [...] habitādas dedit, op­timis (que) legibus at (que) institutis ornavit. Idem vobis in eos ipsos barbaros qui vos assiduis popula­tionibus lacessebant, imperium acquisivit, & dominos èservis effecit: magnam Thraciae par­tem Macedoniae adjecit oppidis (que) ad marit [...]mam oram peroppor tunis in potestatem suam re­dactis, commerciorum sacultatem aperuit, & tutas metallorum fodinas suppeditavit. Thes­salos praeterea, quorum metu olim exanimati eratis, vestro imperio subjecit: Gente Phocen­sium afflicta, aditum in Graeciam amplum & expeditum pro angusto & difficili vobis pate­fecit. Arrian▪ de expedit. Alex. lib. 7. p. 151. Alexander in his choler, upbraided them, first made them Gentle­men) were poore shepheards or goath [...]ards scarce able to defend their owne mountaines; no way likely to assault the Persian in his owne Land. Now as the swiftnesse of Alexanders expedi [...]ion, and the fiercenesse of his onset upon Darius, is lively re­sembled by a Goat running to push; so his tender yeares are excellently characterized in the He­brew, which is verbatim hircus caprarum, which properly signifies rather a Kid, then a Goat come [Page 219] to full growth; or a male kid that followeth the Damme. For, Alexander, when hee undertooke this expedition against Darius had more of his mo­thers countenance, then of his fathers. But the yonger he was, the more ready he was to conceive hope of victory against all hope in the forecast of man. His too much haste had procured worse speed, unlesse he which had raised up his spirit to this attempt, had a while arrested him with sicknesse at Tharsis. His abode there and at Solis to sacrifice for his re­covery, made Darius presume that hee had runne himselfe out of breath, and durst not looke upon his puissant host, much lesse abide his push. And in this errour, into which his owne and others pre­sumptuous confidence, in the multitude and mag­nificence of his army, had led him, he makes haste to follow after Alexander, who, before either knew of others removall, was gotten beyond him. The circumstances of their mutuall errour and of their conflict, are so consonant, to the Prophets predictions, that I must beleeve the same God, which decreed Absalons fal by overthrowing Achi­tophels counsell, had now fully decreed to ruinate the Persian Monarchy, by suffering Darius to listen more unto his flattering braggards, then unto the mature advice of Amyntas. This wiseDarius in­terea cum exercitu ca­stris locum delegerat, Assyriae cā ­pum planū omni (que) ex parte aper­tum, qui & magnitudi­ni exercitus maxime commodus esset, & ad ducen­dum equi­tatum per­opportunus visus fuerat. A quo qui­dem loco ne recederet, Amyntas Antiochi fi­lius, ab A­lexandr [...] transfuga, su [...]serat. Loci enim amplitudi­nem, & multitudini Persarum & impedimentis percommodam esse. Et mansit quidem eo Loci Darius. Caeterū quum Alexander longiorem moram Tarsi ob aegritudinem sa [...]ret, ne (que) minorem Solis, ubi & sacrificarat & Ludos fecerat; mullum etiam temp [...]ris in expeditione adversùs Cilicas montanos posuisset: Darium à sententia sua abduxit, ne (que) invitus adid quod maxime cordi erat credendum, protractus est. Siquidem ab ijs qui ad voluptatem tantam loquuntur (ma­xim [...] semper regibus, cum quibus versantur, damno futuri) impulsus, Alexandrum ulteri­us progredi [...] sibi [...] adventûs perculsum. Arrian. de expedit. Alex. lib. 2. pag. 35. Captaine, [Page 220] by birth a Macedonian, well knowing Alexander to be of such a forward spirit, as would scorne ei­ther not to seeke his adversary any where, or not to incounter him wheresoever he found him; counsel­led Darius to expect him in the plaine of Assyria, whither he assured him that hee would shortly come, though to the great disadvantage of the Grecians: But that advantage which Alexander scorned to seeke, the Lord mighty in battaile, vouchsafed to give him, as Alexander himselfe free­ly acknowledged, after he knew where Darius his army was encamped. Although hee could hardly be brought to beleeve that Darius had left his stati­on and marched toward Cilicia, untill his Scouts brought him certaine word that he had his adver­sary in his hands, so it would but please him to put them forth whilest time served to take him.

But the Historians censure of Darius his fatall miscariage, will give the ingenuous Reader better satisfaction, then any discourse can be made upon it. To excuse his folly in not hearkning to Amyn­tas, which had beene too grosse if it had been meer­ly naturall, he saith, [...], &c. which the Translator misinterprets, when he saith, Ac fortasse Deus illum eo loci adduxit. The Authors words import thus much in English: Assuredly some divine misfortune led him into that place, in which his horsemen, his chiefest trust, would doe him no Hoc etiā modo ejus animum commove­rant, quòd Darij E­quitatum facile uni­versas Ma­cedonum copias pro­culcatu­rum dice­bant: quan­tumvis A­myntas A­lexandrum, ubicun (que) is Darium esse audi [...] et, venturum affirmasset: ibi (que) eum opperiri suasisset. Caeterum deterior sententia, quod primo accessu gra­tior auribus accideret, vicit. Ac fortasse De­us illum eo Loci addu­xit, ubi nec equitatus magno usui esse posset, ut nec infinita hominum pariter & jaculorū ac telorum multitudo; sed nec ipsam quidem excercitus magni ficentiam ostendere poterat: sed Alexandro facilem omnino victori­am praebebat. Oportebat enim Asiae imperiū Persis à Macedonibus adi [...]i, quemadmodum Per­sa Medis ac prius Medi Assyriis ademerant. Arrian, ibid. service, wherein nor multitude of men, nor store [Page 221] of munition, could advantage him, being so straitned that he could not make any true representation of the gaudinesse or goodlinesse of his army. It was a place so fit as Alexanders Counsell of Warre, could not have made choise of a fitter for delivering vp the Scepter of Persia into his hands.

5 Alexanders sollicitous, though superstitious care to render thankes or supplications for good successe unto the reputed Gods of every place where he touched in this expedition, is to me a suf­ficient testimony or assured signe, that he had ta­ken certaine notice of some peculiar divine instinct impelling him to undertake it. And not knowing from what speciall God this instinct or impulsion came, he tendred his service unto all he knew. Postquam nam (que) è longinque vidit can­didatum po­pulum, & Sacerdotes ante agmen in amictu byssino, Pon­tificem (que) in stola hyacin­thina auro distincta, tiaram in capite ge­stantem, prae fix [...] aureâ lami­na Dei no­mine in­script [...], vix mentis com­pos, solus accedens ad Pontificem [...]lexander, comiter sa­lutans nomen Dei adoravit, quem se in Macedonia vidisse memoravit, dum deliberaret quo pa [...]to Asiam posset subigere, ejusque [...]ortatu expeditionem suscepisse. Quare & Deo immolavit▪ salvis vitibus in templum ascendens, gavisus admodum o [...]enso sibi libro D [...]e­lis, in qu [...] Graecum quendum Pers [...] debellaturum significabatur. Lib. antiq. 11. cap. 8. Io­sephus his narration of his devotion at Ierusalem, and great respect of Gods High Priest there, sutes well with his usuall demeanour towards other Gods, related by this Heathen Writer, and is not improbable from his princely kindnesse unto the Iewes, to whom he allotted free habitation in the City called by his owne name. Vide Dion.

6 Many particulars not impertinent to this dis­course, I leave to the ingenuous Readers observati­on, that shall be pleased to peruse Diodorus Siculus, Arianus, or Quintus Curtius. These present right­ly applyed, may asswage that declamatory humour of some pedantick politicks, which would have A­lexanders [Page 222] strange successe to be the naturall issue of Macedonian valour, and Asiatick effeminatenesse. Such collections might bee tollerated in a young Student appointed to make a theame or declama­tion in praise of masculine or frugall spirits, or in dispraise of feminine luxury. Howbeit these po­litick conjectures, are rather imperfect, than alto­gether untrue: whether the Authors of them did apprehend so much or no, I know not, but certaine it is, their opinion supposeth a Divine truth, which they expresse not. It is not improbable in true Divinity, that the Persians were plagued as for ma­ny other sinnes, so in speciall for their riot & luxu­ry, and that God to give them notice hereof, did make speciall choise of the Macedonian to bee his scourge; a people remarkable in those dayes for austerity of life and masculine behaviour. For so it is usuall with the just Lord to upbraid those whom he severely punisheth for some predomiant vice, with some contrary vertue in them, by whom he punisheth, as elsewhere is exemplified more at large out ofDuplici­ter in illa Hispanorū captivitate Deus osten­dere veluit, quantum & [...]disset acrius libi­dinem, & diligeret [...]stitatem, cum et Van­dalos ob so­lam maximè pudicitiam illis superponeret, & Hispanos ob solam vel maxime impudiciti­am subjugaret. Quid enim? Nanquid non erant in omni orbe terrarum b [...]rberi fortiares, quibus Hispaniae traderentur? multi abs (que) dubio, imo ni fall [...]r, omnes. Sed id [...]o ille infir­missimi [...] hostibus cuncta tradidit, ut ostenderet scilicet, non vires valere, sed causam; ne (que) no [...] tunc ignavissimorum qu [...]rundam hostium fortitudine obrui, sed sola [...] nostrorum impuritate superari. De gubern. Dei. lib. 7. Salvianus. But unlesse the Lord had otherwayes disposed of time and place, the Per­sian horses were not so effeminate or cowardly, but they might easily have put the Macedonian pikes to flight, or trampled the footmen under their feet, as Darius Courtiers proudly bragged [Page 223] before their encounter. But pride goes before de­struction, and God for this [...]on brought them into those straits, wherein they might perceive and see the truth of what his Prophet had said, An horse is but a vaine thing, neither shall hee deliver an [...] by his great strength. Psal. 33. 17. And againe: Woe to them that goe downe to Aegypt for helpe, and stay on horses, and trust in charets, because they are many, and in horsemen, because they are very strong: but they looke not unto the holy One of Israel, neither seeke the Lord▪ Isaiah 31. ver. 1. I should think my selfe infideli deteriorem, worse then the Heathen Writer, if I did not derive Alexanders victory over Darius, from the divine decree: The time appoin­ted (to use hisParag. 4. words) was now come, that the Ma­cedonian should take the Empire of Asia from the Per­sians, as the Persians had taken it from the Medes, and the Medes from the Assyrians. Now who is it that can appoint the times, but hee which sitteth above the circles of the heavens, and moveth all things, being himselfe immovable?

CHAP. 26.
Of the erection of the Chaldean Empire, and of the sudden destruction of it by the Persian, with the re­markable documents of Gods speciall providence in raysing up the Persian by the ruine of the Chalde­an Monarchy.

1 THe weapons of war woūd more or lesse, according to their skill or strength that weild thē. So is the whole strength of warre it selfe; so is the might and poli­cie of every Kingdome more or lesse successefull to friends, or hurtfull to foes, ac­cording to the proportion which it holds, with his will or purpose, who is enstyled the Lord of hosts, the Lord mighty in battaile. Behold, they shall surely ga­ther toge­ther, but not by me: whosoever shal gather together against thee, shall fall for thy sake. Be­hold I have created the Smith that bloweth the coales in the fire, and that bringeth forth an instrument for his worke, and I have created the waster to destroy. No weapon that is framed against thee, shall prosper, and every tongue that shall rise against thee in judgement, thou shalt condemne. This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord, and their righteousnesse is of me, saith the Lord. Isaiah 54. vers. 15, 16, 17. Vnlesse the Grecians had beene generally lyable to the Aegyptians cen­sure [ [...], The Grecians are alwayes chil­dren] in true antiquity, Aristotle might have in­formed himselfe and his followers, that the Assy­rians, and other inhabitants of the southerne coasts of Asia, had sometimes beene a people so fierce and terrible in war, that Alexander attended with the whole strength of Macedon, would have beene but as a flock of Sheepe or an herd of Goats to an host of Wolves or Lyons. Whilest Tiglath Pele­zer, [Page 225] Senacherib, and other Kings of Assyria, were Hammers in the hand of God, who could resist them? The strength of these Assyrians was so great, that the Prophet foresaw the sudden advancement of the Chaldeans to the like or greater height or strength, would hardly be beleeved by neighbour Nations, Iew or Gentiles, untill they felt it to their smart.Hab. 1. v. 5. to 10. Behold ye among the Heathen, and regard, and wonder marvellously: for I will worke a worke in your dayes which ye will not beleeve, though it be told you. For loe, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty nation, which shall march through the bredth of the Land, to possesse the dwelling places that are not theirs. They are terrible and dreadfull: their judgement and their dignity shall proceed of themselves. Their horses also are swifter then the Leopards, & are more fierce then the evening Wolves, and their horsemen shall come from far, they shall flye as the Eagle that hasteth to eate. They shall come all for violence: their faces shall sup up as the East winde, and they shall gather the captivity as the sand. And they shall scoffe at the Kings, and the Princes shall bee a scorne unto them: they shall deride every strong hold, for they shall heape dust and take it.

The true and finall reason, as well of the Assy­rians as the Chaldeans sudden greatnesse and suc­cesse in battaile, was the accomplishment of Gods consequent will upon Israel and other neighbour Countries, growne, by speedy increase of their iniquitie, slaughter-ripe. Howbeit, the power it selfe or successe of these two Monarchies was a sure pledge of Gods antecedentVide S. Hieron. in cap. Isai. 45 v. 2. & 3. will for their [Page 226] owne greater good; so they had gratefully ac­knowledged his goodnes in making them so great. But when these Battaile-Axes began to lift up themselves against him, which hewed the Nations with them; he abated their edge and softned their temper. Of Nebuchadnezzar, whose excessive pride had made him prouder then the rest, that O­racle was verified in an exquisite sense:Psal. 49, 20. Man be­ing in honour had no understanding, but became like the beast that perisheth. And that other remnant of the last forecited prophecie, was literally fulfil­led in him, of whom it was meant; Then shall his minde change, and he shall passe over, and offend, im­puting this his power unto his God. Habak. 1. v. 11. And Balshashar his sonne not taking warning by his humiliation, nor by the hand writing upon the wall, was surprized with sudden destruction, ei­ther the selfe same night wherein the hand was seene writing, or (which is more probable) the same night of some yeare following. He had filled the measure of his fathers sinnes, as full with ini­quity, as the boules wherein he caroused were with wine; and that being full, to drinke the cup of Gods wrath was to him at that time, necessary.

2 Now according to the Chaldeans growth in former iniquity, the prosperity of the Medes and Persians did daily increase, and their successe in warre, become every day more assured, than for­merly it had beene, and at length (in such a sense as hath beene observed) altogether fatall. The fru­gality of their private life, and publique discipline, specially in warre, were qualifications without [Page 227] which (perhaps) the Lord would not so highly have advanced them, or used them as his instru­ments in this service. But even these, and all other morall vertues, unto which the Politician ascribes their good successe, were proper effects of Gods consequent will, now absolutely set to plague the Chaldeans, and of his antecedent will for Israels re­demption; sure tokens withall, of his love unto these Conquerors.

The Historicall syncerity of Xenophons intenti­ons, or literall truth of his ingenuous relations, have not beene so much disparaged by any other pretences what soever, (if by any other at all) as by the heroicall sweet exemplary disposition of his admired Cyrus, by his dexterity in consultations, and the extraordinary speedy successe of what hee put in execution. Whatsoever Xenophon hath said concerning his successe, it doth not so farre exceed the unsuspected stories of Alexanders swift growth in fame and greatnesse, as that did the greatest in­crease or excesse, which any one Generall, (though much longer live'd than Alexander was) or which any one age did ever bring into the Romane State. TheFama est [Caesarem] quū alio tē ­pore in Hi­spania, lege­ret per oti­um Alexan­dri historia, diu eum se­cum cogita­bundum se­disse, inde lachrymas profudisse, Mirantibus causam amicis dixisse; Annon videtur vobis gemen­dum, quum hae aetate, Alexander tot jam regna subegerit, me nihildum gessisse prae­clari? Vt ergo Hispaniam attigit, mox accinxit se operi, atque intra paucos dies cobortes decem ad priores viginti conscripsit. Plutarch. in vita Iul. Caesaris. best spirits which Rome had bred, whilest they lookt on Alexanders picture, and the Map of his conquest, were ashamed of their owne dulnesse and slow progresse of their victories. The Parthi­an though not so masculine and valorous as in A­lexanders [Page 228] time he had beene, was able, in Pompeys. judgement, to have given Caesar the check, after his Pharsalian victory. And in this perswasion Pom­pey had sought [...] from him, had not Ca [...]es indignation at the motion deterred him:

3 The ods of antiquity betweene Cyrus, Alex­ander, Caesar and Pompey, and other circumstances of severall times, being rightly allowed (according to the rate ofSee the first Booke upon the Creed. pag. 59. &c. former discussions to this purpose,) will make the credit of Xenophon in his institution of Cyrus, of Arianus, and Quintus Curtius, in their Histories of Alexander, and of the best Romane Writers from Livie downewards, to any unparti­all Examiner, much what eaven. Or what if Cy­rus, as he is set forth by Xenophon, did in his infan­cie, youth, or maturity, (all odds and allowances of antiquity rightly made) farre excell Alexander, Pompey, Caesar, or any other whosoever that lived after him, as well in dexterity of wit, as in exem­plary disposition of life, military or civill: all this may, without any just suspition of Poeticall ficti­on, without the least transgression of a faithfull Historians bounds, bee referred unto a more inti­mate, more placid, and more loving touch of that Spirit, wherewith, all that much excelled others in any age, have beene in some measure or other inspired, and incited to those exploits which have beene performed by them. I cannot blame the lat­ter Romane Heathen for mistrusting Xenophons [Page 229] relations in the forementioned booke; but surely, that Christian which will not acknowledge some extraordinaryIt is me­morable which Xe­nophon re­lates in his fourth book, at the time when Cyrus did prose­cute the victory, which he had gotten over the Babylo­nians in the first conflict, where­in their King was slaine. Quum au­tem progre­derentur, & nox a [...] ­petiisset; proditum est; Cyro & exercitui Lucem clae­rissimam caelitus ab­latam fu­isse: quo factum ut in animis [...]mnium quidam horror erga numen divinum, & in hostes confidentia existeret. Xeno­pon. Lib. 4. fruits of Gods peculiar calling, of his professed fatherly institution, instruction, and protection of Cyrus, shall much forget himselfe.

Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue Nations before him: and I will loose the loynes of Kings to o­pen before him the two leaved gates, and the gates shall not be shut. I will goe before thee, and make the crooked places straight; I will breake in pieces the gates of brasse, and cut in sunder the barres of iron. And I will give thee the treasures of darknesse, and hidden riches of secret places, that thou maist know, that I the Lord which call thee by thy name, am the God of Israel. For Iacob my servants sake, and Israel mine elect; I have even called thee by thy name: I have surnamed thee, though thou hast not knowne me. I am the Lord and there is none else, there is no God besides me: I girded thee, though thou hast not knowne me. That they may know from the rising of the Sunne, and from the West, that there is none be­sides me; I am the Lord, and there is none else. Isai. 45. ver. 1. usque ad 7.

The Spirit of God (so farre as my remembrance or observation serves mee) doth not elsewhere vouchsafe to grace any Heathen Prince with such honourable titles, or affable speeches as these here mentioned are. Of Gods owne people, but few were called by their names, before these were im­posed [Page 230] by men. This is the prerogative of such as were types of the true Emanuel. The veryEgo vero sic [...]io, mi Rex, inquit. Nam regem natura ni­ [...]ilo te mi­nil [...] ortum arbitror: quam ille rex est, qui dux apum in alveo nascitur. Illi enim semper apes ultro parēt, ac quocun (que) loco ma [...]se­rit, ab eo nulla earum discedit. Quod si aliquò pro­dierit, nul­la ipsum de­serit. lam mirisicus eis amor er­ga princi­pem hunc suum innascitur. Itidem erga te mihi quodam modo videntur hi homines ad­fecti esse. Xenophon. lib. 5. p. 118. cha­racters, which the Heathen have made of Cyrus his amiable cariage towards men, his devotion, and vigilant care to testifie his thankfulnesse to­wards the Gods for his good speed, are evident tokens of this his speciall calling to the present ser­vice, and of his seeking to expresse himselfe in out­wardCyrus autem domum reversus, precatus (que) vestam patriam, & Iovem patrium, & Deos caeteros in militiam domo profectus est, quum quidem & pater eum una prosequeretur. Ac postquam domo egressi essent, fulgura tonitrua (que) dextraei oblata fuisse perhibentur. Quae quum adparuissent, alio praeterca nullo captato augurio perrexere; quod maximi Dei signa nemini obscura esse possent. Xenophon lib. 1. p. 25. Hee knew by experience that he was set on worke by some divine instinct, and this made him seeke to please all which he tooks for Gods or Divine Powers. So Xenophon relates in his third book: Bonis avibus hostile solum invasit; ut vero primum fiaes transierat, Tellurem libationibus prepitiam sibi reddidit, & Deos atque Heroas regionem Assyriorum incolentes sacrificiis placa [...]t. Quibus peractis rursum Iovi patrio rem divinam fe [...]it, nec si quis alius se Deorum [...], ullum neglexit. The watchword which he gave unto his Souldiers in that battell wherein the King of Babylon was slaine, was, Iupiter auxiliaris & Dux. Xe­nophon. lib. 3. performances: albeit young Samuel-like, he could not distinguish the callers voice, wanting an Ely to instruct him; yet can no Atheist bee so impudent as to surmis [...] that Esay, leremy, and Xeno­phon, should conspire like partners to make a faire game by seeing one anothers hands. For what common stake could they hope to gaine by this practice? but to omit generalities for justifying Xenophon and Herodotus in relating such rare docu­ments of Cyrus his infancy (albeit these being com­pared with the former prophecie and sacred relati­ons concerning Salomon, or others whom God hath called by name, are in themselves capable e­nough of credit:) we will descend to such particu­lars [Page 231] in Heathen Writers, as are consonant to the sacred passages, concerning the Babylonian warre, and may serve to set forth the wisedome and pro­vidence of God in effecting his good purpose to­wards the captive seed of Abraham. for (accor­ding to the intent and purport of the former Pro­phecy) the Reader is alwayes to beare in minde, that the true and finall cause of Gods extraordina­rie blessings upon Cyrus, and of his conquest of the Babylonians, was the appointed deliverance of his chosen people, and the manifestation of his power and wisdome to the ends of the world.

4 A man of moderne experience in treatise of Leagues, and but of speculative acquaintance with the difficulties which interpose to hinder the asso­ciation of lesser Segniories against mighty neigh­bour Monarcks, would happely deeme that Xeno­phon had framed his relations of Cyrus his successe, in linking bordering Nations to the Medes and Persians, by the modell of some Academicall can­vas, or suit for some annuall office amongst fellow Citizens. The Armenians, the Hyrcanians, the Cedrosians, with many other naturall subjects to the Babylonian, all unacquainted with the project at the beginning, come over unto Cyrus with as great facility and speed, as if there had beene no greater danger in undertaking this doubtfull and (in common experience) most desperate war, than in giving a free voice to one competitor before a­nother in a free and popular State.

But Xenophon was not so meane a contempla­tive Scholar, as to commit so foule a solaecisme as [Page 232] this had beene; albeit his pupose had beene to poe­tize in these narrations. Poeticall fictions must beare a true resemblance of probability. Truths themselves must bee set forth in their native co­lours, although they appeare to ordinary experience, most incredible. Such was the successe of Cyrus in the former businesse; if it were to bee de­riued onely from his owne witt or contriuance. But Xenophon might have good historicall reasons not to suspect the Persian annalls or Persians re­ports of Cyrus, as we haue sacred authoritie to be­leeue the matters reported by them. He that cal­led Cyrus by his name before hee was borne, and had now set him vp as Competitor with the Baby­lonian, for the Asiaticke Monarchie, had layd the plot, and made the canvas for him before hee set forth: and (which is principally to bee obserued) had giuen publick warning to those Nations, which Xenophon mentions (more then threescore yeares before) to bee ready with others in armes against Babell: Ier. 51. 27, 28, 29. Set up a standard (saith Ieremie) in the land, blow the Trumpet among the nations: prepare the nations against her: call together against her the kingdomes ofThe first occasion of Cyrus his expedition was to re­gaine the revolting Armenians unto his uncle Cyaxarez, King of the Medes. And these hee won to their allegiance, partly by love, partly by sleight, having [...]ur prized some parts of their country (under pretence of hunting) before they were aware. See Xenophon, book 2. and 3. how Cyrus won the Chaldeans which bordered upon the Armenians to his side. And his 4. book, how the Hircanians, after the King of Babylon was slaine in battaile, revolted to him, and of the good service which they did him. And after them the Sacae and the Ca­dusii, with Gobrias and Godatas two great Princes. Ararat, Minni, and Ash­chenash: appoint a Captaine against her: cause her horses to come up as the rough Caterpillers. Prepare against her the nations with the Kings of the Medes, [Page 233] the Captaines thereof, and all the Rulers thereof, and all the land of his Dominion. And the land shall tremble and sorrow: for every purpose of the Lord shall be performed against Babylon, to make the Land of Babylon a desolation without an Inhabitant. It is intimated by another Hab. 2. v. 2, 3, &c. Prophet, that the Lord would have these prophesies concerning Babylon so remarkeably fulfilled, that all the world might take notice of them: The Lord answered mee and said; Write the vision, and make it plaine upon ta­bles, that he may runne that readeth it. For the vi­sion is yet for an appointed time, but at the end it shall speake, and not lye: though it tarry, waite for it, be­cause it will surely come, it will not tarry. Behold his soule which is lifted up, is not upright in him; but the just shall live by his faith. Yea also, because he transgresseth by wine, hee is a proud man, neither keepeth at home, who inlargeth his desire as Hell, and is as death and cannot be satisfied, but gathereth un­to him all nations, and unto him all people. Shall not these take up a parable against him, and a tanting proverbe against him and say; woe to him that increa­seth that which is not his: how long? and to him that ladeth himselfe with thick clay? Shall they not rise up suddenly that shall bite thee? and awake, that shall vex thee? and thou shalt be for booties unto thē? Because thou hast spoyled many nations, all the remnāt of the people shall spoyle thee: because of mens blood and for the violence of the land, of the Citie, and of all that dwell therein.

Cyrus in the beginning of this expedition was but Cyaxarez his agent, to regaine the revolted [Page 234] Armeneans. The warre was managed in the King of Media his name, albeit God (according to Esai­as Prophesie) did prosper Cyrus under him, as hee did David under Saul. The same did goe of Cy­rus amongst the Medes and Persians, as it had of Dauid through the host of Israell, Cyaxarez hath slaine his thousand, and Cyrus his tenne thousand. The Monarchy was to be setled on the Persian; Cy­axarez was feoffee in trust for Cyrus, as Saul was, by Gods appointment, for Dauid.

5 TheirPr [...]ceden­te vero tem­pore mori­tur apud Medos A­styages, & Cyaxares Astyagis fi­lius, matris­que Cyri frater, Me­dorum im­perio poti­tur. Rex autem As­syriorum quum Cyros universos, non exigu­am sane na­tionem, sub­egisset, A­rabum re­gem impe­rio suo sub­jecisset, Hyrcani [...]s subditos ha­beret, Bactrios appug [...]aret; futurum existimabat, ut si Medorum vires d [...]bilitasset, facile finitimis omnibus imperaret. Xenophon. lib. 1 p. 22. taking of armes was just, and in their owne defense. Their first resolutions did reach no further, then to the safeguard of their borders, much trespassed upon by the Caldeans, untill un­expected successe & hopefull opportunities of bet­ter, daily presenting themselves without seeking, did invite them to come neerer. After they had gotten secret intelligence of the enemies estate, many new associates, and qui [...] possession of so much of his dominions, as would suffice to main­taine their doubled armie; they had no hope to conquer, no purpose to besiege the Metropolies of the kingdome. That, which after a doubtfull consultation, did chiefly sway them in the height of all their strength to continue their war, was the complaint of their trustyThe Medes themselves were unwilling to follow the warres after the King of Babylon was slaine, untill the Hyrcanians did perswade them; and Cyrus himselfe was doubtfull what to doe, untill he saw in what desperate estate he should leave Gobryas, if his army were dissolved. See Xenophon in the 5. book. confederates, justly fea­ring [Page 235] lest they should become a prey to the insolent Tyrant, (much exasperated by their revolt) as rea­dy, as able to take revenge upon them, if once their armie should be dissolued. The overthrow of Crae­sus, following upon their resolution to continue the warre, brought great accesse of new associ­ates and fresh supplies unto their armie. Had Cyrus or his confederates understood the tenour of the Commission which the Lord of hoasts had sealed them before they undertooke this warre; they had no question giuen the onset upon Baby­lon before the overthrow of Craesus, at that time when they marched by it. Their written warrant, if they could have read it, was very expresse, and their invitation to attempt, full of hope: Remove out of the midst of Babylon, and goe forth out of the Land of the Caldeans, and be as the hee goates before the flocks. For loe, I will raise and cause to come up against Babylon, an assembly of great nations from the North countrey, and they shall set themselves in array against her, from thence she shall be taken: their arrowes shall be as of a mightie expert man: none shall returne in vaine. And Caldea shall be aspoile: all that spoile her shall bee satisfied saith the Lord. Ier. 50. vers. 8, 9, 10. But such is the infinite wisedome of the Lord, that ignorance or concealement of his purpose from men whom hee imploies in his service, is oft-times the best meane to have it spe­dily executed by them. In this assembly of great Nations from the North, foretold byEsa. 48. 20. Esaiah; be­sides the Armenians and Hyrcanians, the Lydi­ans and the Cappadocians, with others menti­oned [Page 236] by Xenophon, were included, without whose presence and assistance the enterprise had beene in vaine. The opportunitie which Cyrus after his conquest of Craesus tooke, was the definite time, appointed by God, but concealed from men, perhaps from the Prophet himselfe, which pe [...]ned the Commission. The entire presence of these nations now assembled, and skilfully set in array, before the Citie (as God had commanded, for representing their terrour and strength) was yet nothing so terrible to the besieged spectators as the fame of their absence had beene, when they were [...]ewer. TheQui au­tem in mu­re stabant, obsidionem hanc irri­debant, quòd ei [...] commeatus esset copio­sior, quam in annos vi­ginti. Quae Cyrus quum audiisset, in partes duodecim exercitum divisit, ut pars quaeli­bet unum anni men­sem in ex­cubiis esset. Quibus iterum auditis, multo etiam Babylonii magis irridebant, qui cogitarent secum, Phryges ac Lycios & Arabes, & Cappadoces futur [...]s c [...]ntra se in excubiis; quos omnes arbi­trabantur animia erga se magis esse benevolus, quam erga Pers [...]. Ac Fossae quidem jam actae erant. Cyrus vero quum audiisset, celebrari Babylone festum, quendam ejusmodi diem quo Babylonii omnes nocte tota potarent & comessarentur: quamprimum eo die tenebrae accessis­sent, magna mortaliam multitudine adhibita, Fossarum ostia versus amnem aperuit. Hoc quum factum esset, aqua noctu in Fossa [...] manabat, & alueus fluvii per urbem tendens homi­nibus permeabilis esse cepit. &c. Xenoph. de instir. Cyri Histor. lib. 7. pag. 190. magnificence of Babylons wals, did seeme to outface them in the height of their bravery, & made them contemptible in her proud childrens eyes. Cyrus himselfe despaired of doing any good by violent assault; his chiefe hopes, were, not in the multitude of his souldiers, but in the multitude of his enemies, more easie to bee van­quished by famine, then if they had beene fewer. But this his project seemed to them ridiculous, be­ing stored with provision for twenty yeares; with­in which space, some of those companies which hee had set by course to keepe quarter before the City, would forsake him, others they hoped would [Page 237] become their friends, as they anciently had beene: and in this confidence, they rest secure, as if they had thought to have out-laughed their sudden de­struction.

6 The doome which our Saviour gave upon the Foole in the Gospell, doth so well befit the King of Babylon, his wisest Counsellors and Fol­lowers, as if it had beene framed of purpose for them. Each of them had said unto his soule, Soule thou hast store of provision layd up for many yeares, take thine ease, eate, drinke, and be merry: but the Lord had said unto them all, by his Prophet Da­niel, Yee Fooles, in this night of your merriment and solemnity of your God, shall your soules bee taken from you, and whose then shall those things be, that you have provided? The hand which wrote that dreadfull sentence upon the wall, Mene, Mene, Tekel, Vpharsin; was not more visible to Belshazzar himselfe, then the finger of God in all this businesse, is, or may be to such, as will con­ferre Xenophons Historicall Narrations, with Pro­pheticall Predictions.

7 FirstAc pri­mum qui­dem turres propter flu­men exstru­ [...]bat palmis [...]undatas, quarum non minor erat, quam jugeri longitudo. Nam hac majorem etiam in longitudi­nem excrescunt. Has autem pa [...]mas operi propterea subjiciebat, ut quam maxime videre­tur id facere quod solent, qui ad urbem obsidendam sese comparant, ut tametsi flumen in fossem dilaberetur, ipsas turres non everteret. Etiam multas, alias supra terram ege­stam excitabat, ut quam plurima essent excubiarum loca. Xenophon. de instit. Cyri lib. 7. Histor. pag. 190. Cyrus casts his trenches neere the Ri­ver, whether w^th purpose to interrupt or divide its course, or only for more commodious defence of his army, or annoyance of his enemy, Xenophon ex­presseth [Page 238] Yet it seemes by Cyrus his answer to Chrysantas, that he had no hope to finde any entrance into the citie, other­wise then by famish­ing the be­sieged. Vbi jam in Ca­stris essent Cyrus ijs, quos opor­teret, con­vocatis, di­xit: urbem socij undi (que) contemplati fuimus: at (que) equidem, quo pact [...] quis adeò firmos & excelsos muros oppugnando capere possit, videre mihi non videor. Quanto autem plures homines in urbe sunt, quando ad pugnandum non exeunt, tanto citi [...]s fieri arbitror ut fame in potestatem redigantur. Nisi igitur aliquem alium modum habetis, quem nobis ostendatis, hoc ipso nobis istos expugnandos esse autumo. Et Chrysantas inquit: Hic [...]ine fluvius per ur­bem mediam labitur, cujus latitudo [...]adia duo superat? Ita profecto, ait Gobryas, ac tan­ta quoque prefunditas ejus est, ut ne duo quidem viri, alter alteri insistentes, supra aquam exstare possint. Quo fit, ut fluvio sit urbs etiam munitior, quam moenibus. Et Cyrus: Missa faciamus haec, ait mi Chrysanta, quae viribus nostris potiora sunt. Xenophon. de instit. Cyri lib. 7. pag. 190. The reason why Cyrus did cast his trenches so wide and deepe, was in his first intention, as it seemes, onely for the more commodious de­fence of his Souldiers against the sallies of their enemies. Adibita vero mensura quam­primum fossa latissima profunditissima (que) vobis erit agenda, pro parte cui (que) [...]ua; quo paucis­simis custodibus vobis sit opus. Xenophon. ibid.not; Herodotus is of opinion, that this op­portunity was rather taken when it offered it selfe, then sought by Cyrus, when he first began to cast his trenches. However, the trenches being made, were ready, when opportunity served, to rob the City of the deepe streame, whose naturall course was through the midst of it; and the streame di­verted from its wonted chanell, left an easie en­trance for Cyrus and his army, under the wals and [...]loodgate through which it passed. His stratagem to make this entrance into the City now drowned with wine, opens to us the literall meaning of di­vers aenigmaticall prophecies: A drought is upon her waters, and they shall be dryed up: for it is the Land of graven Images, and they are madde upon their Idols. Ier. 50. v. 38. Whatsoever Cyrus might intend, it was Ierusalems and Syons curse upon Babylon, which gave successe unto his stratagem. The violence done to me, and to my flesh, be upon Ba­bylon, shall the inhabitants of Zion say; and my blood upon the inhabitants of Chaldea, shall Ierusalem say. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Behold I will plead thy [Page 239] cause, and take vengeance for thee, and I will dry up her sea, and make her springs dry. Ier. 51. ver. 35, 36. All these plagues here threatned, are exactly fitted to the patternes of cruelty which Nebuchadnezzar had exhibited in the destruction of the holy City, and the derision of her and other captivated Prin­ces. Ierusalem in the present sense and fresh me­mory of her griefe had thus complained: Nebu­chadnezzar the King of Babylon hath devoured me, he hath crushed me, he hath made mee an empty ves­sell: (therefore must Babylon bee drawne dry of water) he hath swallowed mee up like a Dragon; hee hath filled his belly with my delicates, he hath cast me cut. Ier. 51. vers. 34. Therefore must Babylon become as heapes, a dwelling place for Dragons, an astonishment, and an hissing without an Inhabitant. vers. 37. It is significantly foretold by Habakkuk that Nebuchadnezzar had consulted shame to his house. Habak. 2. And it is the opinion of good in­terpreters, that the woe following should be parti­culatly directed unto him and to his family: Woe unto him that giveth his neighbour drinke; that put­test thy bottle to him, and makest him drunke also; that thou maist looke on their nakednesse. Thou art filled with shame for glorie; drinke thou also, and let thy foreskinne bee uncovered: the cup of the Lords right hand shall be turned unto thee, and shamefull spewing shall be on thy glorie. Habak. 2. vers. 15, 16. Divers Authors of good note have left written, whether upon any better authoritie then tradition of the Hebrews, I know not (though that I know in many cases worthy of respect and credence) that [Page 240] Nebuchadnezzar did use to make himselfe sport, by making his captive Princes drunke. This and the like insolencies the Lord avengeth upon his sonne and people: In their heate I will make their feasts, and I will make them drunken, that they may rejoyce, and sleepe a perpetuall sleepe, and not awake, saith the Lord. Ier. 51. vers. 39. and when the time appointed was come (whether that were the first or second yeare after the hand writing upon the wall) the Lord gave Cyrus notice of the Babylonians intended aniversary revellings, whom hee had now more infatuated, then they at other times used to infatuate themselves. Cyrus his stra­tagem to drie up the water, either first conceived or put in execution upon this notice of their drunken festivall, and whatsoever purposes of his that tooke effects, are all directed to the accom­plishing of Gods revealed purpose or consequent will upon Babylon, as it were so many arrowes to their marke. The Lord of hoasts was the Ar­cher, and Cyrus his bow, whose intentions a­gainst Babylon must therefore prosper, because, The Lord of hoasts hath sworne by himselfe, saying, Surely I will fill thee with men, as with caterpillers; and they shall lift up a shout against [...]hee. Ier. 51. vers. 14. There is not one clause of Cyrus his ad­vise or exhortation to his followers, after they had found the river to bee passable, or of his pro­clamation after their entrance through the water­gate which Xenophon relates, but is parallell to some part or other of Ieremies Prophesies. Wee may boldly say all that Cyrus commanded, was [Page 241] faithfully executed, that the scripture might bee fulfilled.

8 That At si hoc in mente [...] alicui venit quod fertur esse formi­dabile ur­bem intran­tibus; ne tectis illi conscensis hinc inde tela in nos conjiciant: id ipsum maxime vo­bis animos addat. Nam si qui con­scendent aedes, opitu­lator nobis est deus Vulcanus. Et sunt eo­rum vesti­bula crema­tu facilia. Nam januae palmarum è materìa fabricatae sunt, quae ingens in­cendium ci­tò parient; & copia pici [...] ac stuppae, quae citè magnam flammam eliciunt. Quo fiet, ut vel celeriter ne­cesse sit hos ab [...]dibus aufugere, vel celeriter exuri. Verum agite, arma capite, Diis equi­dem juvantibus praeibo. Xenophon. de instit. Cyri Histor. lib. 7. p. 191. which in reason might most daunt or deterre his souldiers from raunging the streets of Babylon, was opportunitie of annoyance from the tops of their flat-roofed houses. But this incon­venience Cyrus by his good foresight turnes to his advantage. If any (sath hee) clime up to the tops of their houses (as it is likely many of them would) we have God Vulcan our confederate: for their porches are very apt to take fire, their gates being made of palmetrees, & asphaltites inunctae, which will serve as oyle to cause them to take fire, and wee have store enough of torches pitch and straw to inlarge the flame after the fire be once kindled. By this meanes either we may enforce them to forsake their houses or burne both together. The execution of this stratagem would quickly amate men already affrighted with the sudden surprisall of the Citie. To this purpose, the Lord had spoken long before: The mightie men of Babylon have forborne to fight:Cyrus autem co [...]ortes equitum per vias passim dimittebat, edicens, ut si quos extra do­mos invenirent, [...]cciderent: at illis, qui adhuc in aedibus essent, per Syriacae linguae peritos [...] jussit, ut intus manerent. Quod si quis foris deprehenderetur, enus morte mult a [...]dum. Et [...]i quidem haec exs [...]quebantur. Xenophon. ibidem. pag. 192. they have remained in their holds: their might hath failed, they became as women: they have burnt their dwelling places: her barres are broken. Ier. 51. vers. 30. One post shall runne to meete another, and one messenger to meet another, and shew the King of Babylon that [Page 242] his citie is taken at one end. And that the passages are stopped, and the reedes they have burnt with fire, and the men of warre are affrighted. verse 31, 32. Xenophon tels us, that after Cyrus had given Gobri­as and Gadatas in charge to conduct the Armie with all speede to the Kings Palace: Si qui occurre­bant, of such as Atqui, aiebant illi, qui erant cum Go­brya, Demō ­strate nobis i [...]inera quū vob [...]s ea cognitasint. Vrbs enim tota, hac nocte comes­sationi est intenta. Sed in excubias tamen ante regiae portas incidemus, quod cae semper i [...]tic coll [...]centur. Non negli­genda res est, ait Cy­rus, sed eun­dum, ut quam maxi­me impara­tos offend i­mus. Quae quum essent dicta, perge­bant. Si qui eis obviam venirent, partim caesi peribant, partim retrò vicissim fugiebant, partim clamorem edebant. Cum his & Gobrya [...]i clamores edebant [...]osdem, velut ipsi quo (que) comessationum socii. Simul pergentes, quà celerrime progredi poterant, ad regiam perve­niunt. Et hi quidem Gobryae Gadatae (que) adjuncti portas regiae clausa [...] invoniunt: qui verò adversus Regiae custodes ire jussi f [...]erant, irr [...]unt in eos in ignem luculentum potantes, sta­tim (que) hostili cum eis more agunt. Xenophon ibidem. came in their way, some were slaine, others retired againe into the citie, others cryed out. That which made the noyse more con­fused and the danger lesse apprehended, was, that Gobrias and his souldiers being Babylonians by birth, did counterfaite the roaring of that unru­ly night. Whatsoever occasion of distast or impla­cable discontent the proud King had given to these two captaines, (whether those which Xenophon re­ports or others) the finall cause of that successe, which their bloody intentions against their native King did finde, was the accomplishment of Gods will reuealed against him for his Grandfathers cru­eltie against Ierusalem, whereof being gently war­ned by Gods Prophet, he no way repented, but ad­ded gall to wormwood, and thirst to drunkennes, O thou King, the most high God gave Nebuchadnez­zar thySo Grandfathers are usually called Fathers in Scriptures, specially in respect of such as inherit after them. It is evident from Ier. 52. vers. 51. that Evil-Merodach did immediately succeed Nabuchadnezzar. This Evil-Merodach was that King of As [...]yria which was slain in the battaile betwixt Cyrus and the Babylonians related by Xenophon in his 4. book. A King much better beloved of his subjects than his son Belshazzar. father a kingdome, and majestie, and glorie, [Page 243] and honor. And for the Majestie that he gave him; all people, nations, and languages trembled and feared before him: whom he would, he slew; and whom hee would, he kept alive; and whom hee would, hee set up; and whom hee would, hee put downe. But when his heart was lifted, and his minde hardened in pride: he was deposed from his Kingly throne, and they took his glorie from him. And hee was driven from the sonnes of men, and his heart was made like the Beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild Asses: they fed him with grasse like Oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till hee knew that the most high God ruled in the kingdome of men, and that hee ap­pointeth over it whomsoeuer he will. And thou his sonne O Belshazzar, hast not humbled thine heart, though thou knewest all this: but hast lifted up thy selfe against the Lord of heaven, and they have brought the vessels of his house before thee, and thou and thy Lords, thy wives and thy Concubines have drunke wine in them, and thou hast praysed the gods of silver, and gold, of brasse, yron, wood and stone, which see not, nor heare, nor know: and the GOD in whose hand thy breath is, and whose are all thy wayes, hast thou not glorified. Then was the part of the hand sent from him, and this writing was written. And this is the writing that was written, MENE, MENE, TEKEL, VPHARSIN. This is the interpretation of the thing, MENE, God hath num­bred thy kingdome, and finished it. TEKEL, thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting. PERES, thy kingdome is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians. Dan. 5. vers. 18. to 29.

[Page 244] 9 Thus wold Daniel have cured Babel, but she was not cured by him; howbeit Belshazzar was more kinde to Daniel then to himselfe, then most great Princes are to Gods best Prophets that reprove them: For he commanded and they cloathed Daniel with scarlet, and put a chain of gold about his neck, & made a proclamation concerning him, that he should be the third Ruler in the kingdome. In that night was Belshazzar the King of the Caldeans s [...]aine. And Darius the Median tooke the kingdome being about threescore and two yeere old. Dan. 5. vers. 29, 30, 31. For it is not the bestowing of a Scarlet robe, of Court holy water, or of reall honour in greatest measure upon Gods servants, that can couer a scarlet sinne in Princes. The staine of blood can never be washed off, nor the crie of the oppressed blowne away (though the whole element of wa­ter, winde, & ayre were at their commands) with­out the teares and sighs of the oppressors, whose hearts cannot be cleansed without repentant pray­ers. Ierusalems sighs and teares in her sorrow had sunke too deepe into the Almighties eares, to be expiated without the sacrifice of many sorrow­full hearts and contrite spirits throughout Babel: Israel is a scattered sheepe, the Lyons have driuen him away: first the king of Assyria hath devoured him, and last this Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon hath broken his bones. Therefore thus saith the Lord of hosts the God of Israel, behold I will punish the King of Babylon and his Land, as I have punished the king of Assyria. And I will bring Israel againe to his ha­bitation. &c. Ier. 50. vers. 17, 18, 19. Thus Israel [Page 245] is revolved from Gods consequent wil to his antece­dent, & Babylon from his antecedent to his conse­quent will. And for the speedy execution of both parts of this his will, for Israels good, and Baby­lons hurt, the Persian Monarchy is with such speed erected.

10 But some happily will here demand, where­in the similitude mentioned by Ieremie, betweene the King of Assyria and the King of Babylons pu­nishments, did consist? Senacharib is the onely Assyrian King, whose disastrous end is regi­stred in sacred story: and Belshazzer is the onely King of Babylon, that did parallell him in his plagues. Senacharib was slaine by his owne sons, Belshazzar by his naturall subjects, sometimes his dearest friends, but made his enemyes by his un­naturall He had slaine Go­brias his sonne, be­cause hee was a bet­ter Archer than him­selfe: and gelded Gadatas being jea­lous lest he should prove his corriuall▪cruelty. Senacharib for blaspheming the God of Israel was murthered whilest he offered sa­crifice in the house of Nisroch his god: this was one remarkable branch or issue of Hezekiah his praiers against him in the Temple, to wit, That the Lord would declare himselfe to bee a God above all the gods of the nations. Beshazzar is slaine in his royall pal­lace, whilest he solemnizeth the feast of his great God Bell; Part of whose ceremonies were to praise the gods of silver and gold, of brasse, wood, yron, and stone, and to sawce this Idolatrous luxu­ry, with such sacriledge and blasphemie, asDan. 5. 21. Da­niel had forewarned them to avoyd. Senacharib had a large time of repentance allotted, from the sudden destruction of his armie untill his death. Belshazzars disaster and dissolution of his empire, [Page 246] fell out both in one houre;both (it may be) were more sudden, because his warning to desist from oppression, sacriledg and Idolatry, were more ex­presse and solemn. The justice of God, though ex­ecuted upon the Assyrian hoast, by the more immediate hand of his power, upon Babylon by his wisedome; in managing the opportunities and moments of warre, was in both alike remarka­ble; in that both had their fatall sudden blow in that very night, wherein they had lifted up them­selves against the God of heaven, and blasphemed the holy one of Israel: It came to passe that night (not imediately after Ezekias had received Zennache­ribs blasphemous message, but in the same night some two yeares after) that the Angell of the Lord went out, and smote in the campe of the Assyrians, an hundred fourescore and five thousand, &c. See Abu­lensis and [...] in their Com­ments up­on this place. 2 King. 19. 35. And in that night (saith Daniel) was Bel­shazzar the King of the Caldeans slaine, to wit, in that night, which was solemnly consecrated unto the Caldeans God, and solemnized by aniversarie custome; but whether in that night tweluemonth, wherein the handwriting was sent from God, or more yeares after, is not certaine: that it should be the selfe same night, is from many sacred circum­stances, most improbable, if not impossible.

11 In what night soever it was; the sudden sur­prizall of Belshazzers court and kingdome, though to moderne politicians it may seeme strange; yet no circumstance related by any sacred writer is in it selfe so incredible, as that which Aristotle in his second booke of his politicks reports, as credited [Page 247] by him; to wit, that some parts of this great Citie did not perceive the deadly blow, which the principall parts of it had felt, till three dayes after it was given. It is a very inconsiderate note which Ramus, or he that set forth his translation of Ari­stotles politiques, hath left in the margine of this text: Hic locus indicat post Alexandri victorias hos libros scriptos esse, & tamen permirum sit in his Al­exandri nullam mentionē fieri. A judicious Criticke would rather have conjectured that these bookes had been written before Alexander tooke Babylon from Darius; in that, there is no mention in all these bookes of Alexanders projects or successe; fit matters (specially being fresh) for politick discourse or instance. At the least, he which had read and re­membred the Prophesies of Ieremie or Daniel con­cerning. Babylons destruction, stood bound in Christian charitie to have demurred upon the point (before he had giuen sentence) whether this place were not to bee understood rather of Babylons surprizall by Cyrus thē of Alexanders ta­king of it; though it had beene out of question that Alexander had taken it before Aristotle wrote his politicks. Aristotle might haue more good Authors then one, for this report. Herodotus, wee know, (whom Aristotle had read) relates the like; whose entire narration concerning the taking of Babylon by Cyrus I have transcribed, that the Reader may compare his historicall relations with the prophe­cies before rehearsed, or hereafter to be cited.

[Page 248] [Cyrus quum Gyndem mulctasset in trecentos & sexaginta rivos diductum, & alterum ver illuxisset, ita porro ire Babylonem pergit, Babyloniis eum pro­ducto exercitu praestolantibus. Qui, ubi propiùs ur­bem ille promovit, cum eo conflixerunt, praelio (que) fu­gati, in oppidum compulsi fuerunt. Ii tamen, quia Cyrum jampridem animadverterant inquietum esse, viderant (que) omnes pariter gentes aggredientem, com­portaverant permultorum annorum commeatus: ideo (que) tunc obsidionem nihili faciebant. Et Cyrus, quum jam longo tempore nihil admodum res ipsius proficerent, inops consilij erat. Tandem sive alius ei anxio suggessit, sive ipsi in mentem venit quid in rem esset, sic statuit faciendum: Instructis universis co­piis, partim quà fluvius urbem ingreditur, partim à tergo quà egreditur, praecipit ut, quum cernerent al­veum posse transiri, illac urbem invaderent. Ita in­structis atque admonitis suis, cum inutiliori exerci­tus parte abijt ad paludem. Eò ubi pervenit, quae Ba­byloniorum Regina fecerat circa flu [...]en & circa pa­ludem, eadem & ipse fecit. Nam revocato flumine, alveum ejus pristinum vado transibilem reddidit. Quod quum ita factum esset, Persae qui ad hoc ipsum instructi erant, per alveum unde fluvius Euphrates abscesserat mediorum ferè femorū tenus fortiter Baby­lonem introierunt. Quos Babylonij, si factum Cyri priùs aut audissent, aut sensissent, haud dubiè con­tempto eorum ingressu, pessimo exitio affecissent. Nam obseratis omnibus quae ad flumen ferunt portulis, con­scensis (que) septis, ipsi pro ripis stantes illos progressos ve­luti in cavea excepisset. Nunc ex inopinato eis Persae [...]stiterunt: & quum capti essent qui media urbis in­colebant [Page 249] Babylonij, propter ejus tamen magnitudi­nem non sentiebatur (ut fertur) ab iis qui circa extre­ma habitabant. Sed quòd fortè dies festus eis esset, exercendis choreis atque oblectationibus operam da­bant, donec planè hoc resciverunt. Atque ita pri­mò capta est Babylon. Herodotus Lib. 1.]

One materiall circumstance there is in Herodo­tus, which is not so much as intimated by Xeno­phon; and it is this: Albeit the Babylonians could neither have prevented Cyrus in diverting the course of the River, nor withstood his entrance by its chanell; yet might they with ease have stopped his passage along the chanell, or his entrance into any street of the Citie, had they beene mindfull to shut those gates, which at the end of everie street did open upon the river. But that night being con­secrated to revelling, the passage by water from one part of the City to another was freely permit­ted. They had a solemne custome of leaving those gates open that night, which on other nights were to be shut. And by this meanes, destruction found a more easie entrance into that great City.

12 Some modern Politicians have discoursed in folio, against the vastnesse of Cities as most incom­modious for defence, taking occasion from Ari­stotles exceptions against Babylon, which in his censure was a Region; no more a Citie then Pelo­ponesus should be, if it were walled about. But it was not Babylons vastnesse which bred this insen­sibility when the day of destruction was come, that some members of her should not so much as feele any paine when others were utterly cut off. Should [Page 250] any Prince now living, in confidence of this ex­periment, attempt the like upon Quinzie, Moscho, or if any other greater Cities there be in the world, he might finde their Citizens better prepared up­pon few houres warning then Babylon was in three dayes, unlesse perhaps he made his assault up­on Moscho upon some great Festivall, wherein her citizens enjoy the liberty of Lacedemonian slaves, to be beastly drunke without censure. Cities farre lesse then Babylon, onely her matches in impiety, have beene surprised with Babylonish stupidity, when the ful measure of their iniquity had brought forth the day of visitation. Carthage was farre greater and fuller stuft with all sorts of people when Scipio razed it, then when the Vandals tooke it. And yet no member of it, in the former cala­mity, was so senselesse of their fellow-members, or of their common mothers griefe, as the whole body was, when most of its naturall members were cut off by the Vandall.

[Fragor ut ita dixerim, extra muros & intra mu­ros praeliorum & ludicrorum confundebatur; vox mo­rientium vox (que) Bacchantium: ac vix discerni forsi­tan poterat, plebis ejulatio, quae cadebat in bello, & so­nus populi qui clamabat in circo. Et cum haec omnia fierent, quid aliud talis populus agebat, nisi ut, cum eum Deus perdere adhuc fortasse nollet, tamen ipse ex­igeret ut periret. Salvianus Lib. 6.] The noise of bat­taile without the wals, and the noise of sporting with­in the walls; the voice of dying men, and the voice of riotous or drunken men, were so mingled and confoun­ded, that a man could hardly have distinguished the [Page 251] outcries of such as fell in battaile from the noise or cry of the multitude in the game-court. And by such do­ings, what did this people else, but solicite their owne destruction at Gods hands, who otherwise would not (haply) have destroyed them; or not at this time. With the like stupidity was Treers taken, none of the greatest Cities then in Europe, though one of wealthiest amongst the Gaules, after she had beene thrice lanced. The very Babylonish madnesse did possesse another Citie not farre from Treers: such a lethargie had over-spred the whole Corporati­on, Vt Principes illius urbis, ne tunc quidem de con­vivijs surgerent, cum urbem hostis intraret: Ideo enim Deus ipsis evidenter, uti credo, manifestare vo­luit cur perirent, cum per quam rem ad perditionem ultimam venerant, eam ipsam agerent cum perirent. Salvi [...]nus ibidem. Her Governours did not breake off their feasting and banqueting, when the enemie did enter the City. God (as I conjecture) did purpose­ly manifest the reason why they perished, in that they were doing that very thing when they perished, which had brought them to utter destruction.

13 But of the causes, symptomes, or signes of divine infatuation, elsewhere. Thus much I thought expedient in this place for the young Readers in­formation; that albeit Babylon had beene much greater in compasse, then she was, so that the mea­sure of her iniquity had beene lesse; the date of her prosperity might have beene much longer. Chal­dea might have sate as Queene of Nations, in de­spight of all politicke prognostications, which have beene framed since her overthrow. The best [Page 252] service which this kinde of Critick usually per­formes to States or Kingdomes, is to fixe their bol [...]s upon the gates of great Cities, after they have beene ransacked by the enemy. But Baby­lons iniquity being grown unto that setled height, at which it stood in Ieremies and Daniels times; although her strength, her wealth, provision, and policie, had beene farre greater then they were, and contracted into a narrower roome, than the compasse of her walls; the date of her soueraignty would have beene as short; the device of the Lord would have beene performed against her by other meanes, as sure, and speedy, as Cyrus used, if his stratagem had beene defeated. ForSee Sec­tion 1. cha. 9 parag. 3. & chap 10. parag. 2. strength of body, or strength of wit, skill in armes, or skill in policie; all of them are but the gifts of God, hee can either deny them when he pleaseth, or inhibit the use of them where they most abound. He that commanded the fire not to touch his Saints in the furnace, can as easily prohibite the strong to use his strength, the swift his flight, and intoxicate the politicians braine that shall displease him. This is the word of the Lord which came to Ieremiah the Pro­phet, against the Gentiles, against Aegypt, against the armie of Pharaoh Necho King of Aegypt, which was by the River Euphrates in Carchemish, which Nebuchadrezzar King of Babylon smote in the fourth yeare of Iehoiakim the sonne of Iosiah King of Iudah. Order yee the buckler and shield, and draw neere to battaile. Harnesse the horses, and get up yee horsemen, and stand forth with your helmets, furbish the speares, and put on the brigandines. Wherefore [Page 253] have I seene them dismaid, and turned away backe? and their mighty ones are beaten down, and fled apace, and looke not back: for feare was round about, saith the Lord. Let not the swift flee away, nor the mighty man escape, they shall stumble and fall towards the North by the River Euphrates. Ier. 46. vers. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Goe up into Gilead, and take balme, O Virgin, the daughter of Egypt: in vaine shalt thou use many medicines: for thou shalt not be cured. The Nations have heard of thy shame, and thy cry hath filled the Land: for the mightie man hath stumbled against the mightie, and they are fallen both toge­ther. vers. 11, 12. If a few shall chase a multitude, we know the reason, the one was either lesse vali­ant, or lesse skilfull then the other; But why the valiant should turne their backs in the day of bat­tell, it is Gods Prophet, not the Politician must resolve us: They could not stand because the Lord did drive them. vers. 15.

14 The Lord had given Moab wit and strength and wealth abundance: Hee had beene at ease from his youth, and he had setled on his lees, and had not beene emptied from vessell to vessell, neither had hee gone into captivity: therefore his tast remained in him, & his sent is not changed. Ier. 48. 11. But when he begun to ascribe his prosperitie to his strength or policie, to trust in wealth, and deride his poore neighbour Israel now going into captivitie, the Lord who is debtor to none; bereft him of all: Therefore behold, the dayes come, saith the Lord, that I will send unto him wanderers that shall cause him to wander, and shall emptie his vessels, and breake [Page 254] their bottles. And Moab shall bee ashamed of Che­mosh, at the house of Israel was ashamed of Bethel their confidence. How say yee, we are mightie and strong men for the warre? Moab is spoyled and gone up out of her cities, and his chosen young men are gone downe to the slaughter, saith the King, whose name is the Lord of hoasts. The calamitie of Moab is neere to come, and his affliction hasteth fast. Ier. 48. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, &c. The horne of Moab is cut off, and his arme is broken, saith the Lord. Make yee him drunken: for he magnified himselfe against the Lord. Moab also shall wallow in his vomit, and he also shall be in derision. For was not Israel a deri­sion unto thee? was he found among theeves? for since thou spakest of him, thou skippedst for joy. ver. 25, 26, 27. They shall howle, saying; How is it bro­ken downe? how hath Moab turned the backe with shame? so shall Moab be a derision, and a dismaying to al them about him. For thus saith the Lord, Behold he shall flee as an Eagle, & shall spread his wings over Moab. Kerioth is takē, & the strōg holds are surprised & the mightie mens hearts in Moab at that day shall be as the heart of a woman in her pangs. v. 39. 40, 41

As for Babylon, if she were stupid and blinde, without all foresight, feare or apprehension of that hideous stormes approach, wherein shee peri­shed: the wonder is lesse to any Christian, then their stupiditie; who thinke her destruction might by rules of policy have bin prevēted. For,Orto au­tem clamore ac strepitu, quum ij, qui erant in [...]us, tumultum sentirent, & inspici rex juberet quid illud esset rei; a­pertis aliqui portis, so­ras procur­runt. Eas quum pate­factas Ga­datai con­spicerent, iruunt & illos rursus fugientes intro sequu­ti, ac feri­entes, ad regem accedunt: eum (que) jam er [...]ctum cum acinac [...], quē strictum tenebat, inveniunt. Hunc Gadataei & Gobriani numer [...] plures opprimunt, interfectis etiam jis, qui regi aderāt ac partim aliquid objiciebant, partim fugiebant, partim se quacunque re peterant, tueban­tur. Xenophon. l. 7. pag. 192. though [Page 255] her defendants had beene more in num­ber then her proud wals could containe, though every one had beene more stout then Hector, ar­med with more hands then Briarius had; though every one of her sta [...]gazing statesmen had had more politick eyes then Argos had, all had beene one, totidem (que) occulos nox occupatuna. A messen­ger from the Lord of hoasts, had called for a dim­nesse of sight upon her Seers, and sung a lullaby to her souldiers everlasting sleepe: I will make drunke her Pinces and her Wisemen, her Captains and her Rulers, and her mightie men: and they shall sleepe a perpetuall sleepe, and not awake saith the King, whose name is the Lord of hoasts. Ier. 51, vers. 57. So in­fallibly doth divine Iustice observe the rule of re­taliation, whereof I shall hereafter speake: Though Babylon should mount up to heaven, and though shee should fortifie the height of her strengh, yet from me shall spoylers [...] unto her; saith the Lord. Ier. 51. ver. 53. For, seeing her people hath entred into the sanctuary of the Lords house, the Lord wil doe judge­ment upon her grauen Images. vers. 52.

15 To conclude, The reason of Babels stupi­ditie, and whatsoever oversights the Politician can discover in her (related by Xenophon or Herodotus) was, that the fulfilling of Ieremies Prophesies against her, might become more manifest to succee­ding ages: How is the hammer of the whole earth cut asunder and broken? how is Babylon become a desola­tion among the nations? I have layd a snare for thee, and thou art also taken, O Babylon, and thou wast not aware: thou are founde and also caught, because [Page 256] thou hast striven against the Lord. The Lord hath o­pened his armorie, & hath brought forth the weapons of his indignation; for this is the worke of the Lord God of hoasts, in the land of the Caldeans. Come a­gainst her from the utmost border, open her storehou­ses, cast her up as heapes, and destroy her utterly, let nothing of her bee left. Ier. 50. vers. 23, 24, 25, 26. For she had carried away all that was in Ezekias house, all that his father had laid up in store, no­thing was left, as Esaiah had foretold. c. 59. v. 36. the exact fulfilling of whose Prophecie is registred by the sacred Historian. 2 Chron. 6. verse 18. The sudden surprizall of the Citie and Court of Baby­lon made the finding of the treasure of Darkenesse and the riches of secret places, which the Lord by his Prophet had promised to Cyrus, more easie, then if his entrance at that time had beene suspe­cted or feared: for so the besieged might have had leisure to have hid their treasure where the enemy should hardly have found it.

16 But what speciall comfort is this to Sion, that Cyrus had done to Babylon, as Babylon had done to her. This might satiate or somewhat al­lay the boyling heat of a revengefull minde. But is the miserie of an enemy of like use unto Gods people, as was the Brazen serpent? Can the sight of it cure their griefe, or beget true happinesse in such as looke on it? It is very probable that Babylons spoiles did helpe to reedifie Ierusalem. And albeit, the God of Sion, had other meanes in store (more by many, then man can number or conceive) for reducing his people into their owne [Page 257] Land; we may, notwithstanding, without censure of curiositie, safely conjecture, that the disgraces w^ch Nebuchadnezzar & his successors has done unto the royall seed of Iudah, were the first seedes of their speciall favour and grace with Cyrus. Of the plagues threatned by Esaiah unto Ezekiah for shewing his treasures unto the Babylonians, it was one part that of his sonnes some should bee Eu­nuches in the Palace of the King of Babylon. Is. 39. 7. Now it is unlikely that Cyrus would eyther make the Persians Eunuches, or trust the Caldeans about his bodie. Daniel and other his fellowes of the royall seed of Iudah, being made such unto his hand, were men as fit for his purpose as hee could seeke. And it was his purpose upon consultation (asQuum (que) in mentem ei veniret, quid in se nego [...]ij sus­e episset, qui multis mor­talibus im­perare ni­teretur, & habere do­micilium in urbe inter illustres am­plissima in­stitueret, quam sic adfecta in eum esset, ut urbs ali­cui maxime infesta: quum haec inquam ex­penderet, corporis sibi custodia opus esse ex­istimavit. Quod item sciret, ho­mines opprimi faciliùs non posse, quam inter vescendum, bibendum, lavandum in cubili & somno: circumspiciebat, quos [...]am in his sibi maxime sidos habere posset. Arbitrabatur au­tem, non posse fidum hominem unquam esse, qui magis amaret al um, quam illum, qui ejus custodia indigeret. Quamobrem [...]lios, quibus essent liberi, vel conjuges genio congruentes, vel amores alij, naturae quadam coactione judicabat ad eos maxime diligendos impelli. At Eunuchos omnibus his carere cernens maximi facturos putabat illos, à quibus locupletari plurimum possent, & opem habere, si injuriis adficerentur, atque etiam honoribus ornari. A quo autem beneficiis in hos conferendis ipse superari posset, neminem fore censebat. Xe­nophon. lib. 7. pag. 192. Xenophon tels us) to have Eunuches next a­bout him, as men most likely to be trusty. Daniel or others of good note amongst this people, being admitted to favour, for to be of Cyrus bedcham­ber; would not bee defective in procuring their countries good. And easie it was for him, that cau­seth darkenesse to bring forth light, that tur­neth the shadow of death into the morning, to raise vp a blessing unto his people out of their ex­piring curse. But whether by this meanes or [Page 258] others, certaine it is, that such of Iudah as escaped Nebuchadnezzars sword, were detained captives to him and his sonnes untill the erection of the Persian monarchy. 2 Chron. cap. 36. vers. 20. Now in the first yeare of Cyrus King of Persia (that the word of the Lord spoken by the mouth of Ieremiah, might bee accomplished) the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus King of Persia, that he made a proclamation through­out all his kingdome, and put it also in writing, say­ing; Thus saith Cyrus King of Persia, All the king­domes of the earth hath the Lord God of heaven gi­ven mee, and he hath charged mee to build him an house in Ierusalem, which is in Iudah, who is there among you of all his people? the Lord his God be with him, and let him goe up. vers. 22, 23. This last pas­sage compared with the forecited Prophecie, E­saiah 45. vers. 4, 5, 6. may acquit Iosephus his report of Daniels conference with Cyrus, from all suspition of fiction or uncertainty of tradition.

Blessed be the name of God for ever and ever: for wisdome and might are his: and hee changeth the times and the seasons, he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings. Dan 2. vers. 20, 21. He hath yet a fourth hammer in his hand, to bruize and crush these Westerne Nations, as the three first had done the Easterne, and yet appointed to take fuller venge­ance upon these Iewes (whom he had now redee­med by Cyrus) then the Chaldean had done; after the second measure of their iniquity, became more full then the former had beene.

CHAP. 27.
Of Gods speciall providence in raising and ruinating the Roman Empire.

1 THe lingring growth of the Ro­mane Monarchy hath made the print of Gods speciall hand in erecting it, lesse discernable, then it had beene in the sudden advancement of the three for­mer. Nor was it come to any competent height before Prophecie did cease in Iewry. So that we are (for the most part) destitute of such Comments, as God had furnished us with, upon the histories of other Monarchies. But whatsoever the registers of Romes successe have ascribed to Fortune, wee may recover it, by the former ruled cases, as entire­ly due unto Gods providence. Now the ancient Romans were not of their later Satyricall Poets minde: Nullum Numen abest, si sit prudentia. Not Felicity her selfe, whom they tooke for a Goddesse, much lesse was Prudence, or any other supposed patronesse of inferiour vertues, so much honoured by them as Lady Fortune; the multitude of whose Temples testified they tooke her for their sove­raigne Mistris. From this reall testimony of the ancient Romans, (who best knew by what meanes their state was raised, or at least perceived it to bee often held up and inlarged by meanes in particular unknowne to them;) Livie and Plutarch give [Page 260] Fortune Existima­runt multi, & inter cae­teros Plu­tarchus gravissimus autor, popu­lum Roma­num in ac­quirendo tanto impe­rio majore fortune prosperitate, quàm vir­tute usum esse; idque vel ipsius­met populi Romani au­toritate con­stare. Neque enim fortu­nae tot Tem­pla dedicas­set, nisi ei victorias suas accep­tas tulisset. Nam Romae nulli Deo­rum, Dea­rumve tot erant posita templa, uti Fortunae. Eidem huic sentiae videtur Livius quoque suffragari, eò quòd in recitandis orationibus Imperatorum, nunquam solius virtutis mentionem facit, sed fortunae auxilium adjungit. Ego vero contrarinm sentio, neque Plutarchi hanc opini­onem defendi posse contendo. Nam si nulla extitit Respublica quae tantum Imperium, uti Roma acquisivit: cur id fortunae potiùs, quam bonis ipsius legibus & institutis tribuamus? virtus exercituum, & Imperatorum singularis industria Imperium Romanum peperêre: res autem p [...]rtas conservarunt bona rei [...]: institutio, recta (que) gubernandi ratio à primo Legisla­tore constituta: uti deinceps copiosiùs disseremus. Disput. Nic. Machiavel. Lib. 2. Cap. 1. in initio. precedence of vertue (civil or martiall) in the Roman territories, as being a more speciall Be­nefactresse or principall Foundresse of their Em­pire. Machiavel is of a contrary minde, perswa­ded thereto, by such a reason, as argues he had not God or his providence in his thoughts; that his thoughts were not his owne, when he conceived it: so dissonant it is to truth and his owne politick principles. His words are these; If no other State did ever compasse such a mighty Empire as Rome did, why should this be attributed to Fortune, rather then to good lawes and discipline?

2 With Plutarch and Machiavel it fares just so in this controversie, as it usually doth with other controversors; each of them hath the truth under his levell, whiles he oppugnes the adverse opinion; both of them overshoot it whilst they deliver their owne. Plutarch rightly denies the morall or civill goodnesse, whether of Romane lawes or lives, to have brought forth their greatnesse. Hee erreth as much in adjudging all that to Roman fortune, whereto Roman vertue had no just title. Notwith­standing if by Fortune hee meant any certaine la­tent cause more then humane, which did convay success to the current of Roman policies, by secret [Page 261] and hidden passages; his meaning is better then his manner of expressing it. To thinke thus charita­bly of this ingenuous Philosopher, wee have rea­son, as knowing him to be a perfect enemy, aswell to Epicurean chance, as to Stoycall Fate: and therefore no adversary of Divine Providence. In favour of Machiavels opinion, who deserves no favour himselfe, thus much on the other side might be said; If the auncient Romans had beene as vaine as the Graecians, as luxurious as the Asi­aticks, as perfidious as the Carthagineans, as un­civill and barbarours as many nations, which they conquered: they should not have beene so con­stantly fortunate in their enterprises at home, and abroad, as Livie and Plutarch had observed them to bee. That is, in our language, Divine Provi­dence would not have destined them unto that greatnesse, unto which at length they grew, if they had beene alwayes, or for the most part, as bad, as in the period of their prosperitie, they pro­ved. For albeit God be debtor unto none; yet the abandant riches of his bountie, will no suffer him to leave morall vertues or constant execution of Lawes comparativly good, vnrewarded with blessings temporall. All this, notwithstanding will not inferre, what Machiavell undertooke to prove that the Romans did raise themselves, more by vertue, then they were raised by Fortune; if wee take Fortune (as in all probabilitie Plutarch did) for an hidden fountaine, secretly feeding those courses which the Romans tooke for their good, with successe and speed farre above their expecta­tion. [Page 262] Vnder this indefinite latitude of unknowne causes, the Divine Providence or coelestic fortuna (as the Pythagorians terme it) may bee compre­hended, and this divine providence or celestiall Fortune it was, which raised the Romans: they did not raise themselves by their vertues. For wee do not use to say that Princes favorites do advance themselves, albeit Princes would not advāce them to such great dignities as they enjoy, unless they were in some measure qualified unto their liking.

3 Some nations have beene, others might have beene more observant of better Lawes then the Romans knew, and have used the same discipline of peace and warre, even all their policies, with greater sinceritie of good intentions then they did; & yet not have propagated their soveraignty ouer others, halfe so farre, as the Romane Empire was (by Gods speciall Providence) propagated. For vertues morall, and ciuill discipline, or refor­mation of misdemeanors, (though all more exact, then the practise of any nation could hitherto pat­ternize) are no such meritorious causes of tempo­rall prosperitie or Dominion, as may binde God in justice, to dispense the one in greatest plentie, where the other most aboundeth. Without these qualifications the Romans had not beene capable of such prosperitie, as God in bountie bestowed upon them; but the true positive cause of their extraordinary greatnesse, was the speciall service, whereto his wisedome had appointed them. The rule of his liberalitie in disposing kingdomes, is the correspondency or proportion, which tem­porall [Page 263] greatnesse holds with the execution of his will, whether for punishing those which have made up the measure of their Iniquitie, or for the propagating or preservation of his Church alrea­dy planted, or for preparing or ploughing up the hearts of wilde and unnurtured Nations, for better receiving the seed of his Gospell.

4 When the measure of that prosperitie, which GOD for these and like purposes had allotted Rome heathen, and her iniquitie became full; shee and her Provinces became a swifter prey to Bar­barous Nations, some scarce so much as heard of before, then any neighbour countries had beene to her. The incredible successe of the Goaths and Vandals, of the Franks and Almaines &c, but specially of the Hunnes, (whose furious progresse was like to the Vultures flight, & seem'd to presage the slaughter which they made) will justifie the probability either of Xenophons stories concerning Cyrus, or of Curtius, Arianus, or other writers of Alexanders conquests. Was it then naturall po­licy or skill in warre, which did seate all, or most of these barbarous Nations in these westerne coun­tries? Vertues they had not many amongst them, yet each of them some one or other commendable qualitie, which did manifest the contrary predo­minant vice or outcrying sin in the Christian peo­ple, which God had appointed them to plague, asDe provi­dentia. lib. 7 Salvianus hath excellently observed. How­beit this great power was not given them altoge­ther to destroy others, but withall to edifie them­selves in the faith, and to bee made partakers of [Page 264] Gods Vineyard which hee had now in a manner taken from these vngratefull husbandmen, whom they conquered. The Francks became Christians through feare of theVide An­nonium lib. 1. cap. 15. See the Treatise containing the Origi [...]nall of Vn­beliefe, &c. cap. 18. §. 1 Almaines; dread of the Hunnes did drive the Burgundi [...]ns to seeke san­ctuary in the same profession And no question, but such of the ancient Christian Inhabitants, as outlived th [...]se stormes, did beleeve God and his servants better afterward, then they had done be­fore. Never were there any times more apt or more powerfull to kindle devotion in such as were not altogether frozen in unbeliefe, or be­nummed with the custome of sinning, then these times were. Rome, which had beene the watch tower of politicke wisdome, became more stupid then Babylon had beene, when the day of her vi­sitation did come upon her. Her Citizens, (were a meere politician to be their judge) deserved to be buried in their Cities ruines, for not awaking up­on such and so many dreadfull warnings as shee had. Extraordinary Prophets the Christian world at that time had none, because it needed none: the Prophecies of ancient times did so well befit them, as if they had beene made of purpose onely for them. Nor Senacherib, nor Nebuchad­nezzar in the prime of their strength and power could better have brooked that title (though gi­ven them in expresse termes by GOD) which Attilas (as it seemes from certaineOther Barbarians had the like appre­hension of their cal­ling to the like service as Salvia­nus witnes­seth. Po­tuerant (Wandal [...]) ergo ille de­gere, nec ti­mebant: sed illa uti­que coelestis manus, quae eos ad puni­euda Hispa norum fla­gitia illuc traxerat, etiam ad vastandam Africam transire co­gebat. Ipsi denique fatebantur, non suum esse quod facerent. Agi enim se divino jussu at perurgeri. Ex quo intelligi potest quanta sint mala nostra, ad quos vastandos atque cruciandos ire bar­ba [...]i compelluntur invi [...]i, secundùm illud quod vastator terrae Israeliticae Rex Assyriorum ait. Esa. 35. & Ier. 25. Salv. lib. 7. de Gubern. Dei. apprehension [Page 265] of his extraordinary calling to doe the like ser­vice,) had inserted into his royall titles,Chronica Hungaro­rum. Malleūs Orbis & Flagellum Dei; The Hammer of the World and Scourge of God. The fame of Alexanders first victories, was nothing so terrible to Asia, as the noise of this Scythian Thunderbolt was to the ut­most parts of Europe, and would have beene to Africa and Asia, unlesse the Lord had put his hook into his jawes, when he begunne to swallow these and other Nations in his greedie hopes. But when the time of his commission drew neare to an end, this Sampson had a Dalilah to abate his strength. H [...] that had made himselfe sport with others mi­serie, and counted it his greatest glorie to shed much blood, was choaked with hisVide Chro­nica Hun­garorum. Et Bonfin. lib. 7. dec. 1. owne, in his mariage bed: these were the first fruits of his luxu­rious nuptiall feasts; what the after crop was, wee leave to God.

5 The knowne successe of these Hunnes, throughout Hungary and other parts of Europe, may serve as a leading case to determine the que­stion proposed betweene Plutarch and Machiavel; Their valour or strength of warre was not so much as knowne by fame to Europeans, until they felt it. The passages into Europe, out of these places of Scythia, which they inhabited, was unknowne un­to themselves, much lesse did they dream of inva­ding the Roman Empire, untill he that had decreed to make them a scourge to Europe, did lay a traine to teach them the ready way unto it.Bonfin. lib. 2. dec. 1. The man­ner of their introduction was in the Philosophers language by as meere a chance or fortune, as if a [Page 266] Sexton should finde a casket of Gold, whilest hee digs a grave. They had no other intention, that very morning wherein they first became acquain­ted with the confines of Europe, then to chase the Hart, and the Hart no other desire, than which was meerly naturall, to save his life. That this reason­lesse creature by seeking thus to satisfie his naturall de [...]ire, should shew these Hunnes a safe passage through the Fens of Maeotis, into Europe; was meere Chance in respect of them or their shallow forecast, but providence in respect of him, who hath the product or issue of every attempt possible, in nu­merato, as we say, in ready coyne: who can so tem­per all occurrences at his pleasure, as that the selfe same ingredients may be an wholesome potion un­to some, and deadly poison unto others; and so combine the carelesse intentions of men, and the desire of brute Beasts, as they shall become more faithfull cofederates for accomplishing his will, then men can bee (albeit they purposely conspire together, and binde themselves by solemne oath or Sacrament) for effecting their owne designes.

6 The report which these roving Hunters had made to their Countrimen of that pleasant Land, into whose confines the chased Hart had led them, did invite the chiefe heads of their Clans, with their severall rascalities, to flock into Europe like beg­gers dismist out of a prison, invited to a solemne banquet. And their hunger-starved appetites, be­ing once fed with variety of uncouth pleasures, did whet their wits and arme their spirits, to attempt greater matters then they could conceive before. [Page 267] Artis magister ingenii (que) larg [...]torventer. Their bel­lies taught them new Arts, and practice of inven­tions unsuspected unto Christians. The mixt In­habitants of that Country, which from them was after termed Hungary, having sufficient warning of their intended invasion, had prepared a compe­tent army, whose Leaders presumed, they were more safely guarded against the sudden assault of their barbarous enemies for one night, by the Ri­ver of Danow which ranne betweene them; then they could be by any wall or trench. And in this presumption they rested as secure for that night, of the Hunnes, as the Babylonians were of Cyrus. It is very likely, that Detricus Generall for the Ro­mance, and Matrinus, alias Martinus, (or Ma­crinus) chiefe Commander for the Pavonians, one or both had read how Cyrus had divided the River Gyndis, and so turned the course of Euphrates in one night, that the usuall Chanell of it became passable to his foot Souldiers before the morning. But that the like should be attempted uponSee chap­ter 26. pa­rag. 11. Da­now was not credible; to be effected by their ene­mies, they knew it impossible. And what other passage there was possible for these Hunnes to find, being utterly destitute of Ship or Boat, they could not suspect. But they bought the knowledge of their new invention a great deale too deare; with the losse of the better part of their armie, which encamping in the open fields, were pittifully slaughtred like wandring sheepe by theBonfini­us. lib. 3. dec. 1. Hunnes, who with the helpe of bladders had swum over to the number of an hundred thousand, in the deadest [Page 268] time of the night. This sudden disaster, which be­ing now past, might in some moderne politicians judgement easily have beene prevented, did so les­sen the Roman forces, that albeit they became cōquerors in the next conflict, yet purchased they victorie with the losse of so many souldiers, that they were not able to stand before the multitude of their furious enemies in the third encounter: And to try them the fourth time, they had no cou­rage. The stumpe of that arrow, which Detricus carried in his forehead to Rome, in witnesse that he had confronted his enemies, and was not wounded in the backe, did pierce the hearts of some and daunt the spirits of other Romans. And the fresh bleeding experiments of these Hunnes incredible fury, might well occasion, that genera­tion and their children, to flatter their cowardly fancies, with forged tales, as if it were no dispa­ragement to the Romans (though as yet in highest esteeme for valour amongst the sonnes of men) to bee outdared by an inchanted generation of infer­nall monsters, borne of witches and begot by De­vils. For such legends of these Hunnes originall, have gone for currant amongstAëtius postquam audivit At­tilam exer­citum infi­nitae multi­tudinis du­ctare in Gallias, ob­viandum maturè pu­tavit: &, ut ipse dice­re solebat, enitendum, ut Ala [...]to­res, seu mali genii procul ferro exter­minarentur: alludens ad naturam umbrarum & Daemo­num, qui gladium e­ductum ti­ment & minus, ut Psellius ait; ac praeterea scite allu­dens ad originem decantatam Hunnorum ad Daemones referendam. Nam cum Filimer Rex Gothorum post egressum Scanziae insulae terram Scythicam ingressus, reperisset mulieres quasdam magas maleficâ arte populum vexare, longè fugatas adegit in solitudinem, ubi spurci ac vagi spiritus in complexum suumeas illexere, humanae, figurae, sed in humanae pror­sus mentis & impietatis supremae edituri sobolem, nempe Hu [...]nos, rapto & venatu ali con­suetos. Forcatulus. lib 5. pag. 72 [...]. ex Iornande in lib. rerum Getic. Fabulosum pu­tarem, nisi D. Augustinus Sylvanos & Faunos, agrestia veterum numina, improbos exti­tisse mulieribus, appetisse & peregisse concubitum retulisset: & Daemones quosdam, quos inquit, Dusios Galli nuncupant, eadem cupidine inquinatos pr [...] comperto haber [...]tur. Ibid. ex Augustino. lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 23. good writers, [Page 269] and are not altogether out of date in some places unto this present day. But the Romanes did want a Marius, Sylla, or Camillus, to be their Dictator in these times; Detricus was no Iulius or Germani­cus: what the best of these could haue done, or durst haue attempted, had they been living then, is more then the spirit of any now living can divine; hee that had made these in their times valo­rous, had now decreed the beggerly Hunnes should bee victorious, and there is neither counsell nor might against the Lord.

7 Or if this bee not canonicall scripture with politician, let us examine whether the evidence of truth manifested in the historicall narrations, whereon Machiavel comments, have not extor­ted as much from him in a manner against his will, and contrary to his purposed conclusions, as the author of truth in this point hath taught vs. Hee, Disput. lib. 2. cap. 29. Quod si quis igi­tur animo comprehen­dat res à populo Ro­mano, prius tam praecla­rè, longo an­norum nu­mero, ge­stas: iis (que) has conferat, quas adversùs Gallos gessere: tam diversat esse comperiet, ut non ab uno eodem (que) sed diversis populis, g [...]estae esse videantur. Vsque ad [...]o scilicet, occaecat fortuna ani­mos hominum, ait Livius: cum vim suam ingru [...]entem ref [...]ngi non vult. Quo [...]it, ut qui in perpetuis pericul [...] versantur, min [...]s vit [...]perari debeant; & min [...]s laudari qui continuâ foeli [...]itate fruuntur: cum & illos & hosfata tr [...]ere videantur [...] ne (que) consilium illorum ad resistendum malis; neque horum virtus ad comparandam foelicitatem multum facere queat. &c. saith Machiavel, that wil compare the Romans wise carriage of state-businesses for many yeares together, with their ill managing of matters, whē they were in­vaded by the Gauls, shal find them so different, as that the latter grosse error may seem to haue bin commit­ted by another people, not by the same. So stangely doth Fortune (so he now accords in termes with Livie, whom herein he contradicted before) blind the [Page 270] judgements of men, when it is her pleasure not to have her power controuled, whose authority is so great, that neither they which are commonly exposed to danger deserve much blame, nor they much praise, which en­joy perpetuall felicity. Fates may so strongly draw both parties this way or that way, as the policie of the one shall not be able to prevent the evils which happen, nor the others vertue be sufficient to bring forth good successe. In fine, taking Fortune and Fates for terms equivalent, throughout his whole Discourse, hee He con­cludes; Cum urbi Romae tanta Imperii magnitudo fatalis esset; opprimi, ac vehementis­sime affligi [...]am opor­tuit, ut de­inceps cau­tior, pru­dentior (que) fieret, ac tantam im­perij molem acquiren­dam: dele­re tamen planè non debuit. Ita (que) ut omnia h [...]ec ita suc­cederent, Fata Ca­millum in exilium misêre, non necaverunt, urbem à Gallis permisêre occupari non Capito­lium: ut (que) commodiùs occupari urbs posset, efficêre, ut major exercitus pars, ex praelio non Romam, sed Veios fugeret. Et (ut omnia uno quasi fasce comprehendam) effecerunt, ut ad avertendum à Republica tantam malorum molem, nihil à pepulo Romano prudenter sapien­ter (que) fieret: ad defendendum Capitolium & recuperandam urbem jam captam omnia com­modissima instructa essent. Disput. Nic. Machiavel. lib. 2. cap. 29. concludes for Plutarch; That the greatnesse of the Romane Empire was decreed by Fate; and with refe­rence to this end, as Rome could not in her growing age be overthrowne, so it was expedient that she should often be oppressed and afflicted, that her Statesmen might become more wary and wise, for procuring that greatnesse which Fates had decreed to accomplish by them. Wherefore, that all these might take place: the Fates (which as he grants, use meanes conveni­ent for effecting their purpose) had put Camillus to exile, not to death; suffered the City to bee taken by the Gaules, but not the Capitoll: and that the Citie might be taken with lesse adoe, they had likewise or­dained that the greatest part of the Romane army, be­ing discomfited by the Gaules, should not retire to Rome, but flye to Veios. To knit up all (as he speakes) [Page 271] in a bundell, it was the ordinance of Fates, that the Romanes should for this turne use neither their won­ted wit, nor discretion, for averting the evills which befell them, and yet have all things made ready to their hands, for defending the Capitoll and recove­ring of the City. By the forecast of Fates, not of the Romanes, it was, that exiled Camillus, who was no way guilty of the wrongs which the Senate had done unto the Gaules, no way obnoxious unto them, but free from all obligements, should bee at Ardea with one army, and expected at Veios by another, that they might with joynt forces assault the Gaules, when they least expected, and so recover the City.

8 Had Machiavel told us what hee meant by Fates or Fortune, wee might either quickly agree with him, or easily confute him, as disagreeing most from himselfe: whatsoever hee meant by them, it had beene a point of honesty in him, to have craved pardon of Plutarch for contradicting him in the former discourse; seeing hee borrow­eth Plutarchs owne language in this Comment of Romes surprizall by the Gauls. If Machiavel by Fate or Fortune, understand some branch of Gods decree or providence, mentem teneat, lin­guam corrigat. For though he comment upon a Heathen writer, it would no way misbeseeme him sometime so to speak, as men might suspect him to be a Christian. But not to question in what sig­nification he used the words Fates or Fortune; the reall attributes which he gives to Fate or Fortune, cannot belong to any power in heaven or earth, save onely to the onely wise invisible GOD, for [Page 272] who can blinde the mindes of men, of such politicke wise [...]men as the Romanes were, save onely hee who made our soules, and giveth wisdome to whom he plea­seth, who can make choise of excellent spirits, for ma­naging humane affaires present, or entertaine occasi­ons offered for great atchievances? who againe can deprive such men (men so qualified as Machiavel would have them) of life, depose them from their dig­nities, or so abate their strength; as they shall not bee able to make resistance when evills are determined? That power onely can doe all these, which know­eth all things, worketh all things, determines all things, ruleth all things. Yet all these attributes here specified hath Machiavel, bestowed on Fate. Either was this man stricken with heathe­nish blindnesse for detaining the truth in unrighte­ousnesse, or else in seeing thus farre into events, in his judgement, Fatall, hee might have seene Gods providence ruling in them, and disposing of all hu­mane affaires whatsoever. The like contemplation of fatall or fortunate events, led Commineus, a man aswell seen in matters of state, as Machiavel was, un­to a distinct view of Divine Prouidence, as shall be shewedSee cha. 29. parag. 1. heareafter. Whatsoever effect these ob­servations wrought in Machiavel; the perusall of them will lift up the Christian Readers heart to sing with Daniel: Blessed bee the name of God for ever and ever, for wisedome and might are his. Hee changeth the times and seasons, he giveth wisdome unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know un­derstanding.

9 But though wee could make this or the like [Page 273] orthodoxall construction of Machiavels meaning, in this discourse, though fate and fortune in his language were the same that Gods providence is in ours; Yet the use which hee makes of this his doctrine, would neither be consonant to his owne principles elsewhere delivered, not to the eternall truth: Hoc unum pronunciabo de fortunae viribus & fati necessitate, quod historias omnis generis per­currenti facile apparebit, homines fati necessitatem evitare non posse: sed faciliorem eventum ijs, quae ab eo impendent, efficere, eum (que) promovere; adeo (que) parcarum [...]elas texere, non retexere, aut rumpere. Quod etsi ita se habeat, non decet tamen, ut animum abjiciamus, nos (que) plane committamus fato; sed, qua­cun (que) fortunâ aspirante, bene speremus, diligenter prudenter (que) rebus nostris provideamus: quòd fatorum viae & rationes producendorum effectuum, obscurio­res sint, quam ut a nobis intelligi qu [...]ant. Machiavil. in fine lib. 2. What great matter is this, which is so plainely witten in histories of every kinde, as he [...] that runnes may reade it? His resolution is this, that men cannot avoid the necessitie of fate, but rather fa­cilitate the events by it decreed: So vnable are they to undoe the contrivances or contextures of destinie, that by how much the more they struggle with them, they weave and knit them faster. But shall state-pi­lots for this reason strike saile to Fortune, and suf­fer the world to floate, whether fates doe drive it? No, rather beare out against all blasts of chance, be­cause the wayes of fate, and manner how it brings its matter about, are so obscure, that no wit of man can discerne them. But what bootes it us to know the [Page 274] wayes of Fates to be so obscure, that they cannot be knowne, if neither knowne nor unknowne, they can bee avoided▪ It would inspire our indea­vours with greater alacrity, and our indeavours would be blessed with better successe, were wee taught (as the truth is) that such events as Politici­ans terme fatall, are in their nature, alterable, though not by us, or by any humane skill or poli­cie, yet by him whose almighty ayd, is alwayes ready for us, so we seeke it with due humilitie. But Machiavel (if I mistake him not) was once of opi­nion, that Fates and Fortune interpose their autho­rity only in some more principall humane affaires; he acknowledgeth no generall providence over all. The generall Maxime whence hee falsely de­rives his fruitlesse inference, is, That Gods Decree (whereof Fates good or bad, are necessary bran­ches) is altogether immutable. The most necessary, immediate, and most usefull consequent of which truth, is this, As long as the parties against whom he decrees evill, continue the same; the evill de­creed, is as immutable as his decree, and men by seeking to avoid it by their wit or strength, doe draw it more speedily, or more heavily upon them. For, it is impossible, that humane power should not bee foiled, whilest it opposeth it selfe against Omnipotency; or the devices of humane wisedome not be defeated, whilest they counterplot Wisdome infinite. But though in the Almighty, or in his decree, there be no shadow of change; yet as Da­niel speakes, he changeth times and seasons; and in that his mercy is immutable, he is alwayes ready to [Page 275] repent him of the evills forethreatned, when men repent them of the evill, for which hee threatneth them. Or, in termes (perhaps) more proper, it is one essentiall part of his immutable decree to alter the events decreed, or foresignified, (bee they good or bad) according as men alter their mindes for better or worse. But how Fates are invited or may be avoyded, wee are to speake more particularly hereafter.

10 The very instance whence Machiavel fra­med his forementioned Aphorisme, will bee a fit example for illustrating our present rule. The Romanes (as he observes) were usually most reli­gious observers of the Law of nations, and whilest they continued thus, Gods blessings did rest upon their policies: But at the time when the Gaules inuaded Italy; the Fahii, being sent Embassadours in a Treaty of peace, unaduisedly put on the girdle of warre, and slew a standard-bearer of the Gaules in defence & quarrell of the Clusini, betwixt whō they should have been indiferent arbitrators. And in stead of just punishment (which by the Law of nations was, to have beene delivered up unto the Enemies whom they had wronged,) the Romans did grace them with the office of Tribunes, at their returne, and appointed them chiefe managers of that warre with the Gaules, whichImprimis igitur ha­benda ratio est earum rerum, quae fato ipso, seu astro­rum in­fluxu, eve­nire viden­tur, & qui­bus ut resi­stamus, for­tuna non permittit. Quarum exemplum luculentissimum est id, quod, populus Romanus, in clade Gal­lica accepit. Nam cum fatis urgentibus, tanta moles mali instaret: primam occasionem, ad illam accelerandam dederunt tres Fabij Legati, qui cum agere debuissent de pace, inter Clu­sinos & Gallos; contra jus gentium, pro Clusinis, adversùs Gallos praelio decertarunt: at (que) ita Gallorum iram, adversùs populum Romanum provocarunt. Machiavel. lib. 2. cap. 29. their inso­lencie [Page 276] had provoked. The successe whereof was such, as the Israelites had, before Achans sacri­ledge was punished by Iosuah. Romes present ca­lamitie had spred much farther, if the whole State had beene as deepely infected with this foule crime, as the whole Senate and people,Magnus ille nostrorū temporum Medicus Vindicia­nus, consul­tus à quo­dam; dolori ejus adhibe­ri jussit, quod in tempore congruere videbatur: adhibitum sanitas con­secuta est. Deinde, post annos ali­quot eádem cursus cor­poris causâ commotus, hoc idem ille putavit adhibendū: adhibitum vertit in pejus. Mira­ [...]us, curr [...]t ad Medicū, indicat fa­ctum: at ille, ut erat acer­rimus, ita respondit; Ide [...] [...]a [...]è acceptus e [...], quia ego non jus [...]: ut omnes qui audîssent, parum (que) hominem nossent, non eum arte medicinali fidere, sed nesci [...] qua illicitâ potentiâ putarent. Vnde, quum esset à quibusdam postea stupentibus interrogatus, aperuit quod non intellexerant, videlicet illi atati jam non hoc se fuisse jussu­rum. August. Epist. 5. ad Marcellinum. then resident at Rome were: Sed Veios habitante Ca­millo, illic Roma fuit: In as much, as the life and soule of the Roman estate did then reside in the exi­led Camillus and his company, (who had suffered much wrong from the Romanes, but had done none unto the Gaules;) it pleased the Lord to raise up his spirit, to rescue the Citie from their tyranny, who would have revenged the offence committed, with greater severitie, then this aeternall aequitie had appointed for this time, wherein Romes iniquitie was not fully ripe for utter de­struction.

11 To doe justice, though to a publick enemy, is a fundamentall rule of Propheticall and Christi­an policy, whereto Machiavel hath one, and Plu­tarch another discourse very pertinent. Thus to doe, is good and acceptable in the sight of God, without whose speciall direction and benediction, the practise of most approved rules of policy, prove more fruitlesse, if not more dangerous to great Estates, then choisest receipts doe to illiterate or ordinarie patients, being administred without the Physitians advise or prescript.Magnus ille nostrorū temporum Medicus Vindicia­nus, consul­tus à quo­dam; dolori ejus adhibe­ri jussit, quod in tempore congruere videbatur: adhibitum sanitas con­secuta est. Deinde, post annos ali­quot eádem cursus cor­poris causâ commotus, hoc idem ille putavit adhibendū: adhibitum vertit in pejus. Mira­ [...]us, curr [...]t ad Medicū, indicat fa­ctum: at ille, ut erat acer­rimus, ita respondit; Ide [...] [...]a [...]è acceptus e [...], quia ego non jus [...]: ut omnes qui audîssent, parum (que) hominem nossent, non eum arte medicinali fidere, sed nesci [...] qua illicitâ potentiâ putarent. Vnde, quum esset à quibusdam postea stupentibus interrogatus, aperuit quod non intellexerant, videlicet illi atati jam non hoc se fuisse jussu­rum. August. Epist. 5. ad Marcellinum. To a Patient [Page 277] demanding why the same medicine, which had once done him much good, did at the second time doe him harme; Vindicianus a learned Physitian in S. Augustines time answered, because at the first time, I gave it you; you tooke it the second time your selfe, being of that age, in which I would not have given it. Now as diversitie of times, alte­ration of humors, or constitution of mens bodies, may cause the selfe same medicine, which at some times brought health, at another time to bring forth Death or dangerous sicknesse to one and the selfe same body: so may Kingdomes, whether for forme or government the same, or different, be speedily overthrowne, by following that method of reformation, or the selfe same rules of policy, by which most States formerly have beene preserved. Hee that changeth times and seasons, disposeth the concurrents, or dissolveth the com­bination of occurrent circumstances or opportu­nities; must give his approbation or allowance, be­fore any contrivance of man can be effectuall. He is the supreame Physitian of mens soules, the pre­server of States and Kingdomes. The greatest statesmen are at the best, but his Chyrurgions, or his Apothecaries, and if they adventure upon any difficult cure without consulting him; the same hand which healed this yeare, may wound the next; the same receipt which gave life to day, may kill to morrow. From these Collections, Machiavel, so hee would bee constant unto him­selfe, cannot vary.

12 The diversitie of Fortune much furthering [Page 278] some, and crossing others,Dum sa­pe multum (que) ipse mecum cogito de fortunae di­versitate quae aliis secundam, aliis adver­sam se in eorum acti­onibus, in­stitutis (que) exhibet: hanc ejus causam in­venisse mihi videor, quòd ut di­versi sunt agendi mo­di, aliis at (que) aliis homi­nibus con­sueti ac na­turales: ita aliae atque aliae sunt temporum rationes, oc­casiones (que) ▪ Quidam in rebus ge­rendis, ad­ministran­dis (que) ferocia quadam u­tuntur, & omnia cum impetu a­gunt. &c. Mac [...]iavel. lib. 3. cap. 9 in initio. he derives from these originalls: As there be divers kindes of proceedings in managing the affaires of peace or warre, with whose diversities the dispositions of men, by nature or cu­stome much different, suit, some with one, some with another: so have different times their seasons and op­portunities. Some times require quick dispatch, others delay of businesse; some businesses speedy execution, others maturity of consultation and long forecast. Now seeing no one man is fitted for all kindes of proceedings, nor no one kinde of proceeding can befit all or most times, but all have their limits, which without errour or danger they cannot trans­gresse. Hence it is that those men least erre, and become most fortunate in their atchievements, which have the hap to be imployed in such times and seasons, as best agree with their naturall and accustomed manner of projecting. Statefortune then by Machiavels conclusion, is no bastard brood, no fatherlesse bratt, but the true and legi­timate ofspring of Time, fitly matched with the peculiar disposition of experienced practickes. On the contrary, publique misfortune or ill successe, is the naturall issue of mens endeavours, when they are undertaken in an unfit time. The onely questi­on then remaining, is, whether there bee any, or if any, who is the chiefe author of all fit matches or disagreements betweene the severall dispositions of men, and the opportunities of times? It is a point unquestionable, that the prime author of such matches, is the first author of all successe, be it good or bad, in humane affaires. The greatest amongst [Page 279] the sonnes of men cannot command what op­portunities they please, but must bee content with such as time affords them: nor are the wisest of men alwaies able to make choyse of the best which time presents. Time likewise, though thus affording opportunities, cannot appoint the men, that are most fit to entertain them. So that neither is time the fountaine or author, nor can men bee their owne Carvers of good successe. Doth this office then belong to Goddesse Fortune? If shee could see this, she might see all things; and were no longer to bee reputed Fortune: wisdome and prouidence should be her titles. It is That wisdome by which all things were made, which disposeth their operations. It is that Providence, which was before all times, that dispenseth the times and op­portunities, that are. These sit supreame scrutators in consultations of state, and have more casting voyces, then the world takes notice off. They se­cretly sway every election: other suffragants may freely declare their opinions, and vent their breath; which these tune and moderate as they please.

13 That we may descend to Machiavels in­stance; The Romanes appointed no generall with­out publick consultation. Whether Fabius Maxi­mus were chosen generall by unanimous consent of the Senate, or with difficultie and contradicti­on, we have not observed, or doe not remember. Even such as were most forward, or factious for him, did little thinke how well his peculiar tem­per did sute with the opportunitie of those times, wherein he was appointed to cope with Hannibal. [Page 280] The common rumors, which run of him through­out Rome, argue a generall dislike of his procee­dings; if lingring, might in their censures be called proceedings rather then cowardly delay or detre­ctation. The best proofe he gave for a long time of his courage, was his constant contempt of others censures.Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem. But after, the event did as farre sur­passe their hopes of his slow proceedings, as these had come short of their first expectations; their note was changed. Fabius was now the Vnus home nobis cunctande restituit r [...]m. Ennius.onely man, and (as some of them make him) more then a man; in—Sed mens humana major; nec t [...]la nec enses Nec fortes spectabat equos, tot millia contra Poenorum invictum (que) ducem, tot in agm [...]ne, solus Ibat, & in sese cuncta arma viros (que) gerebat. Sillius Italicus. lib. 7. common esteeme the onely Author of their Cities preserva­tion. Howbeit, to such as can resolve effects into their prime and native causes, children might more justly be fathered up­on the woman that beares them, then this joyfull issue, which was brought forth by his lingring, can be upon his forecast or wisedome. For this cunctation, of which the peculiar opportunities of these times begat good successe; was to Fabius (Ne (que) Fa­bius sua cūctatione, [...]llâ cōmo­diori tēporū occasione uti potuit, quam illâ ipsâ: cum tamen na­turalis esset in Fabio illa cunctatio, non ex praesenti temporum statu su [...]pta. Id enim vel eo ipso satis declaravit, quòd cum Scipio in Africam postea ad conficiendū bellum trajicere vel­let: Fabius ei vehementer resistebat, & omnibus modis impedire conabatur: ut qui naturâ suâ magis ad cunctandum, arcenda (que) praesentia pericula ferretur, quàm ad alia majorasub­eunda. Ita (que) per Fab [...]um non stetit, quò minus Punicum bellum absolvi fini [...]i (que) non posset, quòd is non animadverteret alia jam tempora esse, & aliam belli gerendi rationem commo­dam existere. Quod si solus rerum potitus fuisset, victoriam de Carthaginensibus obtinere ne­quivisset, quod belli gerendi rationes temporum diversitati nescivisset accommodare. Se [...] [...]um in ea republica totessent insignes Imperatores, ac rei militaris peritissimi homines, voluit fortuna, ut sicuti difficilibus illis temporibus Fabius bellum sustinere, ac pericula arcere; ita postea, commodiori rerū statu, Scipio id conficere, & victoriā obtinere pot [...]erit. Ma [...]h [...]. 3 c. 9. as [Page 281] Machiavel well observes) a disposition naturall: he could not have changed with the times, nor fa­shioned himselfe to new occasions. Hee had held the same byas still, though on another much diffe­rent ground: and so might he well have lost his late purchased fame, and Rome her prize; unlesse there had beene more skill used in playing the game, than the supposed Roman Gamesters pra­ctised. As suppose Fabius had beene sent to have bid Hannibal play in Africk, and Scipio appointed to keepe the goale in Italie: Rome and Carthage, by the misplacing of these two men, might have changed Fates and Fortunes. Rome, in all likeli­hood, had beene taken, when Fabius saved it; and Carthage inriched with Romane spoiles, at the time when Scipio ransacked it. Rome could not have found a surer buckler to beare off Hannibals blowes in Italy, then lingring Fabius: nor a fitter sword to beat him in his native soile, then forward Scipio. And yet was Fabius the most forward man to oppose Scipio his expedition into Africk: and it may be some of Scipio his friends had bandied as earnestly against Fabius. Either of them liked his owne course best: if haply either liked any other besides. Neither of them knew, what temper was fittest for every season; nor is it possible for the wisedome of man to match these alwayes aright, because albeit the temper or dispositions of men did never alter, ye [...] the occasions or opportunities of times are more changeable than the Moone.

14 The Aphorisme which Machiavel gathers from the former discussions is not so false, as im­perfit, [Page 282] and it is this: Seeing different times require different manners of proceedings, and state-agents cannot easily change their manner, whereto they have beene most accustomed; it were most expe­dient for States to change their agents, that their severall dispositions might more exactly sute with the alterations of times and opportunities. The facilitie of observing or practising this rule in Aristocratis, is in his judgement, one speciall cause why, that kinde of government is more du­rable then Monarchicall. For Princes will hold their wonted wayes, they will not change their resolutions, much lesse will they give place to o­thers, that are better fitted for entertaining the opportunities or change of times.Petrus So­derinus, cu­jus alias eti­am mentio­nē fecimus, naturâ hu­manus erat, et patientiâ suâ multas injurias fe­rebat, quae res salutaris fuit Reip. si­mul at (que) ipsi quandiu tē ­pora clemē ­tiora fuere. Sed cum tē ­porū muta­tione ferrea quaedā aetas adesset, quae severitatem postulabat: at (que) ille à cō ­sueta sua pa­tiētia & bo­nitate disce­dere nesci­ret, semet­ipsum simul, atque patri­am perdi­dit. Machi­avel. lib. 3. cap. 9. Petrus Sode­rinus, a man for his moderation and wisedome fit to have governed an Empire, did (as hee thinkes) overthrow himselfe and the Florentine estate, by continuing his authoritie, being unable to put off his wonted lenitie and patience, in times requiring austere imperious reformation. Whereas Pope Iu­lius the second, plaied the Lyon all his time with the Foxes luck: the more he was cursed for his im­petuous insolency, the stronger hee grew: no thankes to him or his witt, but to the times, which had they changed, he must have fallen. But was not Septimius Afer, for his native severitie, aswell fitted to the impetuous disposition of the Roman Empire when he undertook it, as any medicine can be to the malady, for which it is by art prepared? And yet his practise (though exactly answering [...]o Machiavels rules of reformation (here and else­where [Page 283] set downe) found but the Mountebankes successe; hee cured some present mischiefes, but procured more grievous, secret, and more perma­nent inconveniences. The barbarous nations which longed most for Romes destruction, lear­ned the use and art of making the Romans wea­pons and artillerie, from the discontented Exiles, which his severitie thrust upon them. Nor did Constantine the great (though Leunclavius be wil­ling to preferre the unsanctified Zozimus his bill against him, to Christian Princes) halfe so much weaken the Empire, by his largesse towards the Christians, as Septimius did wound it, by seeking to restore or rather to intend the rigour of ancient discipline amongst moderne dissolute Romans. Many like practises, in the issue became meanes of the Empires more speedy dissolution; though all, (as farre as the eye of policy could see,) most con­venient for the present season, but it is not for po­liticians to know the exact temper of times & sea­sons, which the father hath put in his owne power, as cases reserved for infinite Wisdome.

15 Had Rome in the dayes of Arcadius and Honorius stood at the same point of liking with God, as she sometimes had done: these oversights (as it pleaseth posteritie now to censure them) of Constantine and Septimius with infinite other parti­culars of like nature, falling out before and after them, should have added much to the measure of her wonted prosperitie. But being now decli­ned from Gods favour to the aspect of his Iustice, all conspire against her: and her best supporters [Page 284] become stumbling-blocks, to cause her to fall. And, although it had beene possible for the severall suc­cessions of her ancient and choisest Senators, to have beene assembled together in counsell for her good; yet what possibilitie was there left to pre­vent the combination of second causes secretly con­spiring her destruction, when as the unavoidable mischances of Nations, which they knew not, e­ven the disasters of her enemies became confede­rates with domestick miscariages to worke her mischiefe. If we consider onely the visible causes, or meanes observable, by which this mightie Em­pire came to miserable ruine: not all the over­sights committed by any one, though the very worst of al her Governours or Counsellors; not all the devises of any one natiō or cōmon enemy, did sow the seedes of so much evill and mishap, as be­fel her from one example of severitie, unseasonably practised by theBonfin. lib. 2 dec. 1. King of Goathes, upon a wicked woman, that sought to cover her adultery, by her abused husbands blood. The fact indeed deser­ved the height of Princely indignation, and more then an ordinary death, but to pull her in peeces with horses (as Hermanarichus commanded) was so indignely taken by her brethren, that in re­venge they killed this grave and auncient King; by whose wisedome and authoritie the Goathes had beene able so well to have matched the Huns, as the Romanes might have stood as arbitrators to moderate the quarrell as they saw fit, or to have devided the prey. But the Goathes, being sud­denly deprived of their▪ Governour in the very [Page 285] nicke▪ when the warre was begun, left their habita­tion to the Hunnes, and (upon protestations of more then ordinary fidelitie and good service) got to be admitted as naturall subjects within the Em­pire, which by this meanes became exposed to a double mischiefe. It hath the Hunnes as neare, but more insolent and noisome neighbours, then the Goathes had beene: and through the folly and greedinesse of the Imperiall officers, the Goath in short time of a former open enemy, became a treacherous friend. The Romans nurst this young snake in their bosome, after such an unpleasant and untowardly fashion, as they might bee sure, hee would be ready to use his sting, when God should send him one. And albeit the Goath and Hun, did naturally worse agree, then the Toade & Spider: yet in relation to the execution of Gods justice up­on the Roman Empire, they hold this exact sub­ordination, that wheresoever the one had broken skinne, the other was ready to infuse his poyson; the one alwaies ready to inlarge the wounds, which the other had made, before they closed. Howbeit, when both these enemies had done the worst to Rome that they intended, (for both of them had power in respect of any help that man could make, to do her as much harm, as they listed) yet the Pro­phets speech concerning Israel, was remarkably true of her, Perditio tua ex te O Roma, Romes de­struction was from her selfe. Her very enemies would have healed her, but Babylon-like shee would not be healed. Alaricus the Goath had taken the Citie, but made conscience of defacing [Page 286] it: he spared the suppliants for the Temples sake. Attilas was kindly intreated by Pope Leo not to visit it; the rather thereto perswaded, because God had visited Alaricus for polluting it. It was the crie of the noble Aetius his blood treacherous­ly shed, not by the Enemy, but by the Emperour Valentinian, at the instigation of Maximus, which did solicite Gensericus King of Vandals to come out of Afrique to visit Rome, now sunke so lowe by Aetius his fall, that she could never bee raised againe.

16 The concatenation of sinister Fates, that is, (in better language) the combination of second causes designed by God for the execution of his consequent Will upon the Roman Empire, is in this case so pregnant: that I cannot make a fitter close of this discourse, then by relating the histori­call Circumstances, occasion and consequence of Aetius his death. Maximus a Roman Senator, and principall Favorite of Valentinian the Emperour, Vide Pr [...] ­cop. l. 3. de bell [...] Van­dalico.sporting with him on a time in his Palace, chan­ced to leave his ring behind. The Emperour, by this token invites Maximus his Lady to come and visit his Empresse Eudoxia, his intention be­ing to visit her in such a manner, as was no way pleasing to her, but most displeasing to her Hus­band, unto whō she disclosed their joynt wrong & her speciall griefe. The indignity of the Fact (be­ing done by so deare a friend as he supposed Valen­tinian was) made so deepe impression in his heart, that an ordinary revenge could not suffice. The Emperors life seemed too small a recōpence, with­out [Page 287] hopes of succeding him: & his hopes of succes­sion (he saw) were but vain if Aetius should survive Valentinian: Maximus therefore, smoothly dissem­bling his discontent for the present, perswades the Emperour that Aetius was too potent in the opini­on of the State, and become more popular than before, by the happy successe of his late employ­ment against Attilas the common enemie and ter­rour of Christendome.Paulus Dia­conus. lib. 15 The Emperours weakness is easily wrought to put Aetius to death, which (as one observes) was in effect to cut off his owne right hand with his left, and to expose himselfe to publike hatred and danger, without a Defendant. Thrasilas, a Centurion to Aetius, knowing his Ge­neralls loyalty and innocency, in [...]venge of his un­deserved death, kills Valentinian▪ And Maximus not content to usurpe the Empire, unlesse he might have the Empresse Eudoxia in to the bragaine, abu­seth her as Valentinian had done his Lady. Eu­doxia more impatient than Maximus his wife had beene,Vide Bonfi­nium lib. V. dec. 1. & Niceph. l. 15 hist. Eccles. cap. 11. sollicites Gensericus King of the Vandalls to revenge her husbands death, and her wrongs. In the execution of Gods will or wrath upon Maxi­mus, the Roman [...] prevent him, for they stone him to death; but [...]ould not prevent the ransacking of the City by him, and the finall overthrow of the Romane Empire. As for those imperiall titles which some afterwards tooke upon them, these were but as ominous formalities for the more le­gall resigning up of the Romane Soveraignty into the hands of strangers, as Momillus surnamed Au­gustulus (the last of Italian blood which bare rule [Page 288] in Rome) did it into the hands of the Hunnes, the reliques of Attilas his race, their inveterate ene­mies; whose rage and cruelty when it was at the height of its strength, had beene broken by Aetius his valour. As the Romane Rulers and Senate had done to him: so hath the Lord now done to them.

CHAP. 28.
Why God is called the Lord of Hosts, or the Lord mighty in Battaile. Of his speciall providence in managing Warres.

1 ALBEIT the sole authority of Scripture without the assigne­ment of any reason, be a warrant alsufficient for us to enstyle our God the Lord of Hosts: yet why he is so often in Scripture thus enstyled, as by a most speciall and peculiar at­tribute, these reasons may without offence bee gi­ven. His peculiar hand is not in any subject of hu­mane contemplation more conspicuous, then in the managing of Warres. Why it should bee more conspicuous in this then in other busi­nesses, wherein men are much imployed, the reason is plaine: for Contingences are no where more ticklish than in Warre, not is their number in any other subject so incomprehensible to the wit of man. It is hard to use wit and valour both at once; hard to spie an errour upon the first [Page 289] commission of it, harder to redeeme the time, or regaine opportunities lost. It is a grosse errour which hath insinuated it selfe into some Politicians thoughts, if wee may judge of their thoughts by their writings; that the chances which may fall out contrary to Warriours expectations, are not so many but that they may be forecast or numbred. It is the Politicians errour likewise, (though would to God it were his alone) to think all occurrences which are casuall in respect of man, to be from the first occasions of warre begun, so determined by him, which gives successe in battaile, as that victo­ry must in deed and truth (though to men she seeme not so) incline to one party more than to the other. These casualties of War, or doubtfull inclinations of victorie, are in succession infinite. Their possibi­lities one way or other, may every moment in­crease from misdemeanours either of them which fight the battailes, or of the parties for whom they fight. The fairest probabilitie of good successe may be abated from every good act or reformati­on of the adversarie. Gods eternall freedome ei­ther in determining new occurrences, or altering the combinations of others already extant, cannot be prejudiced by any Act past. He hath not so be­fore all time decreed them, that hee doth not still decree them, at his pleasure, as well during all the time of warre and fight, as before. Ita accidit Lazius. sae­penumero, ut fortuna ad utrum (que) victoriam transfe­rat, quò Bellum extrahatur, animos (que) nunc horum, nunc illorum accendat. So it oftentimes falls out, that Fortune makes faire profer of victory to both sides, [Page 290] and one while incourageth this partie, another while that, by which meanes warres are usually prolonged. Now whatsoever in these cases befals men either beyond their expectation, or contrary to their fore­cast, is counted fortunate, if it be for their good; or fatall, if it be for their harme. Hence men not on­ly of most accurate booke-learning amongst the Romanes, but of best experience in matters of war, have given more to Fortune, then by-standers or Historicall Relators usually acknowledge to bee her due.

Had Caesar upon a diligent and accurate survey of the meanes, by which he got his victories, allot­ted Fortune her just part in severall, or told us truly how much fell out beyond or above his expectati­on, how much just according to his reckoning: the world (I think) would have beene of the same minde with Machiavel in hisCha. 27. §. 7. forementioned contemplations of Romes surprisal by the Gaules, which was, That the most victorious do not deserve much glory either for wit or valour, nor the con­quered much dispraise for the contrarie imperfec­tions; seeing Fate or Fortune have alwayes the chiefest stroke as well in the exaltation of the one, as in the dejection of the other. Notwithstanding it is no part of mine, whatsoever it was of Machia­vels meaning, to have any man deprived of that commendation which is due to him in respect of other men. And it is not the least title unto true praise, to be in favour with the supreame disposer of Martiall successe. In respect of him the victorious have no cause to boast, but rather to condemne [Page 291] their sloath and negligence in that the fruites of their successe, was no better then usually it proves, they having so good assistance, and sure pledges of divine favour.

2 Wheresoever Cicero, Caesar, Vegetius, or o­ther heathens, could suspect or descrie the secret assistance of fate or fortune, specially in matters more remarkeable, as are the usuall consequents of warre; there we may without solecisme say, the finger of the Lord of hoasts did worke. For if the least wound that is given or taken in fight, doe not make it selfe, but is made by the vigilant and working hand of man; shall not the chiefe stroke or sway of battaile, which usually falls without War­riers comprehension, lead us to a direct, a certaine and positive cause? Now if this cause were other­waies unknown, by what name could we more pro­perly call it, then by the Lord of hoasts, or great Moderator of warre.

If wee may guesse at Gods working in all, by the manifestation of his speciall hand in some: I am perswaded there was never any great battaile fought since the world began, much lesse any fa­mous warre accomplished with such facilitie or speed, but that if it had pleased the Historians to expresse all circumstances of speciall moments, or could the reader survey such as they expresse, with as diligent and curious eyes, as one Artificer will anothers worke: the consultations of their chiefe managers, & the executions w^ch seem to have most dependance on them; would beare no better pro­portion w^th their entire successe, then the day labo­rers [Page 292] work doth with a curious edifice, or then the Pioners paines doth w^th the defence or expugnation of strōg forts or Castles. And yet even in the matu­rest deliberations or most exact consultations of warre; related by ordinary historians, the finall de­termination, may for the most part be resolved in­to some speciall Divine instinct: the execution of that which men by such instinct determine and re­solve upon, essentially depends upon the dispositi­on of Gods peculiar providence, who hath an au­thentique negative in the use of every meanes, which men make choice of; albeit in using them he admit men, as his coworkers, but not as sha­rers in production of the principall effect or end. He alone bestoweth victorie where hee pleaseth, by what meanes or whose agency hee pleaseth, but not alwayes with victorie and successe, unlesse such as be his agents or instruments in the execu­tion of his consequent will upon others, be ready to doe his antecedent will or pleasure themselves.

3 This is a subject whose fuller explication would require a larger volume, then this whole Treatise in my intendment shall be. I will there­fore instance especially in one battaile, and another warre, of the greatest consequences, that the histo­ries of these three hundred yeares past present un­to us. The first shall be in that fierce and violent conflict at Grūwald betweene Iagello or Vladislaus King of Poland and Lituania, and the Crucigeri or Knights of Prussia, about the yeare one thou­sand foure hundred. Should a Politician or Souldier, that will beleeve no more, then hee sees [Page 293] grounds for out of his owne Art, have seene, the mighty preparation and couragious resolution of both parties, hee would haply have demanded a signe of Gods providence, and said in his heart, Let us see either of these two Armies take flight upon a conceipted noise of Chariots or Horsemen, or an imagination of an Army not really existent: or what Gedeon is hee now alive, that dare ad­venture on the weaker of them, with three hun­dred men, although hee had thrice three hun­dred Trumpeters to encourage them. We will not therefore presse any with beleefe of Mi­racles in these later times, but rather perswade them with us to acknowledge, that those extraor­dinary manifestations of power more then naturall, in battailes fought for Israell and Iudah by Gedeon or Sampson, by the Angels, by the Hoast of Hea­ven, or by inferiour Elements, were not more pre­gnant documents of Gods immediate hand in ma­naging warres, nor better proofes of his just title to be the Lord of Hosts; than the contrivances of ordinary causes and occurrences in martiall affaires of moderne times, doth or might afford to all such as rightly survey them. To make a mighty armie fall by the free and unimpeached exercise of their owne valour and strength, can be no lesse wonder­full to unpartiall eyes, than to scatter them by fire and lightning, than to beat them downe by mighty hailestones from heaven. To cause the stronger and more skilfull in warre to faint, without dimi­nishing of their courage and strength, is no lesse the Lords doing, than if their hearts had beene [Page 294] surprised with a panick terrour, or their armes sud­denly deprived of life and motion, as Ieroboams was. Yet this was the case of the Prussian Knights of the Crosse, and the Germane Forces which as­sisted them against Iagello.

4 The conduct of the right wing of Iagelloes Army, which did consist of Lituanians, was com­mended to his brother Vitoudus, not out of any foresight of advantage, but in honour of his per­son, or of that Nation; which was perhaps an o­versight in point of warre. However, this wing was fiercely assaulted by the opposite wing of the Germane Armie, which was a great deale the stronger, especially for horsemen. God by his se­cret Vide Var­sevicii pa­ral. in vita Iagell.providence did so dispose that this advantage should redound unto their greater overthrow. For the Lituanians being the farre weaker part of Ia­gello his Army, both for want of skill and of Ar­mour, after a furious encounter fled the faster: and the Germane wing, which had put them to flight, not suspecting but that their other wing had beene as able to match the Polonian, as they had beene to defeat the Lituanian; pursued the victorie so long and so farre, that they were neither able ful­ly to succour the other wing being scattered and broken by the Polonians, before their returne, nor to flye from their enemies with that speed they de­sired; as being over wearied with the former chase. Of the Germans, by this oversight and pre­sumption, fiftie thousand were slaine, and (as some relate) almost as many taken prisoners. They had put their confidence in the valour, skill and mul­titude [Page 295] of their Armie, which did consist of an hundred and fortie thousand choice souldiers. The good King Iagello his trust was in his praiers to God; and in the presumption of his Enemy, which had beene so triumphant before the victo­ry, so certaine of victorie before the joyning of the battaile; that they would not give Iagello leave to say his prayers, or doe his wonted service unto God, but sent him two swords in mockerie, one for himselfe, and another for his brother Vitou­dus, as if they had wanted weapons to defend themselves; profering him withall, that if the place wherein hee then was, were too strait for ordering his men they would goe back, as in con­tempt and scorne they did, and make him roome. This insolent message was by the religious King embraced, as a welcome prognostique that they should give him place against their wils. And so it fell out, that they were not able to defend them­selves within their trenches; their Tents and cari­ages became a prey to Polonians, being so well fraught with all manner of provision, not for ne­cessitie onely, but for pleasure, that Iagello caused a great number of Wine-vessels to bee burst in pieces, lest his souldiers should be overcome with plenty of wine, after they had overcome their po­tent enemies, or at lest be hindred from further pursuite of victorie. There a man might have seen a strange spectacle, a flood or stream not of blood or wine, but as if it had bin of gore by the mixture of the wine and the blood alike violently shed in the Germane Camp. The gaudinesse of their Ar­mour [Page 296] would not suffer such as escaped by flight, toly hid in the fennes or reeds into which they ranne. This was the issue of their unhallowed confidence, which had in their Tents abundance of Torches and of chaines; the one provided [...]or leading the Nobles of Poland Captives, the o­ther for firing their Cities.