A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part — Commentaries upon the Apostles Creed. Book 6

A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part — Commentaries upon the Apostles Creed. Book 6

Table of contents

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Title page

TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE AND TRVLY noble WILLIAM Earle of Penbrooke, Lord high Steward of his Majesties Houshold, Knight of the most noble Order of the Ga•ter, and Chancellor of the Vniversity of Oxon; The blessings of this life, and of the life to come be multiplied.

THE CONTENTS OF THE SEVERALL Chapters in this ensuing TREATISE.

SECTION I. Of the one absolutely infinite, and incomprehensible Essence in generall.

CHAP. I. How far we may seeke to expresse what by light of Nature, or otherwayes, may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence, or his Attributes.

CHAP. 2. Containing two philosophicall Maximes which lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite and incompre•ensible Essence.

CHAP. 1. Of infinity in Beeing, or of absolute infinitie: and the right definition of it by the ancient Philosophers.

CHAP. 4. There is no plurality of perfections in the infinite Essence, albeit the perfection of all things be in Him. Of the absolute identity of the Divine Essence and Attributes.

SECTION II. Of the severall branches of absolute infinitie; or of the infinitie of the Divine Attributes, as they are severally apprehended by us.

CHAP. 5. Of Divine Immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof infinity in magnitude, or space imaginary is the shadow.

CHAP. 6. Of Eternity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof successive duration or the imaginary infinity of time, is the modell.

CHAP. 7. Of the infinity of Divine Power.

CHAP. 8. Of the infinity of Divine Wisedome. That it is as impossible for any thing to fall out without Gods knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence.

CHAP. 9. Of Divine Immutability.

CHAP. 10. Of the eternall and immutable Decree.

CHAP. 11. Of transcendentall goodnesse: and of the infinity of it in the Divine nature.

CHAP. 12. Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodness communicative, or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature.

CHAP. 13. In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse.

CHAP. 14. Of God infinite love to mankinde.

CHAP. 15. What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love: of the distinction of singula generum, and genera singulorum: of the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti.

SECTION III. That Gods good will and pleasure is never frustrated, albeit his unspeakeable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfeignedly tendered.

CHAP. 16. In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his Vineyard, or for such as perish.

CHAP. 17. The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as perish, testified by our Saviour, and by S. Paul.

CHAP. 18. Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods unfeigned love to such as perish, a principall meanes or occasion why so many perish.

CHAP. 19. How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge.

CHAP. 20. Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge, their is no change or alteration at all in God, but onely in men and in their actions. Gods will is alwayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall, with tormens everlasting.

CHAP. 21. How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy, or other affections are in the Divine Nature.

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Title page

THE CONTENTS OF THE SEVERALL Chapters in this ensuing TREATISE.

SECTION I. Of the Attribute of Omnipotency, and creative power.

CHAP. 1. The Title of Almighty is not personall to the Father, but essentiall to the Godhead.

CHAP. 2. Of Omnipotencie, and of its object: of possibilitie and of impossibilitie.

CHAP. 3. This visible world did witnesse the invisible power and vnitie of the Godhead unto the Ancient Heathens.

CHAP. 4. The first objection of the Atheist, Of nothing, nothing can be made. Of the doubtfull sense of this naturall, how far it is true, and how farre it is false.

CHAP. 5. By what manner of induction or enumeration of particulars, universall rules or Maximes must bee framed and supported. That no induction can bee brought to proove the Naturalists Maxime, Of nothing, nothing can be made.

CHAP. 6. The second objection of the Naturalist: [Every agent praesupposeth a patient or passiue subject to worke upon] cannot bee proved by any induction. The contradictorie to this Maxime proved by sufficient induction.

CHAP. 7. Shewing by reasons philosophicall, that aswell the physicall matter of bodies sublunary, as the celestiall bodies which worke upon it, were of necessitie to have a beginning of their Beeing and Duration.

CHAP. 8. Discussing the second generall proposed, Whether the making something of nothing rightly argue a power Omnipotent.

SECTION II. Of Divine Providence in generall: and how contingency, and necessity in things created are subject unto it.

CHAP. 9. Of the perpetuall dependance which all things created have on the Almighty Creator, both for their beeing and their operations.

CHAP. 10. The usuall and daily operations of naturall causes with their severall events or successes, are as immediately ascribed to the Creator by the Prophets, as the first Creation of all things, with the reasons why they are so ascribed.

CHAP. 11. Containing the summe of what wee are to beleeve in this Article of Creation, and of the duties whereto it binds us: with an introduction to the Article of His providence.

CHAP. 12. Though nothing can fall out otherwise then God hath decreed: yet God hath decreed that many things may fall out otherwise than they doe.

CHAP. 13. Contingency is absolutely possible, and part of the object of Omnipotency, as formall a part as necessity is.

CHAP. 14. The former conclusion proved by the consent of all the Ancients, whether Christians or Heathens which did dislike the errour of the Stoikes.

CHAP. 15. The principall conclusions, which are held by the favourers of absolute necessity, may be more clearly justified, and acquitted from all inconveniences, by admitting a mixt possibility or contingency in humane actions.

CHAP. 16. The former contingency in humane actions or mutuall possibility of obtaining reward or incurring punishment, proved by the infallible rule of faith, & by the tenour of Gods covenant with his people.

CHAP. 17. That Gods will is alwayes done, albeit many particulars which God willeth, bee not done, and many done which he willeth should not be done.

CHAP. 18. Of the distinction of Gods will into Antecedent and Consequent. Of the explication and use of it.

CHAP. 19. Of the divers acceptions or importances of Fate, especially among the Heathen writers.

CHAP. 20. Of the affinitie or allyance which Fates had to necessitie, to Fortune or chance in the opinion of Heathen writers.

CHAP. 21. Of the proper subject and nature of Fate.

CHAP. 22. The opposite opinions of the Stoicks and Epicures. In what sense it is true, that all things are necessarie in respect of Gods decree.

CHAP. 23. Of the degrees of necessity, and of the originall of inevitable or absolute necessity.

SECTION III. Of the manifestation of Divine Providence in the remarkable erection, declination, and periods of Kingdomes: in overruling policy, and disposing the successe of humane undertakings.

CHAP. 24. Of the contrary Fates or Awards whereof Davids temporall kingdome was capable: and of its devolution from Gods antecedent to his consequent Will.

CHAP. 25. Of the sudden and strange erection of the Macedonian Empire, and the manifestation of Gods speciall providence in Alexanders expedition and successe.

CHAP. 26. Of the erection of the Chaldean Empire, and of the sudden destruction of it by the Persian, with the remarkable documents of Gods speciall providence in raysing up the Persian by the ruine of the Chaldean Monarchy.

CHAP. 27. Of Gods speciall providence in raising and ruinating the Roman Empire.

CHAP. 28. Why God is called the Lord of Hosts, or the Lord mighty in Battaile. Of his speciall providence in managing Warres.

CHAP. 29. Of Gods speciall providence in making unexpected peace, and raising unexpected warre.

CHAP. 30. Of Gods speciall providence in defeating cunning plots and conspiracies, and in accomplishing extraordinary matters by meanes ordinary.

SECTION IV. Of Gods speciall Providence in suiting punishments unto the nature and qualitie of offences committed by men.

CHAP. 31. Of the rule of retaliation or counterpassion. And how forcible punishments inflicted by this rule without any purpose of man, are to quicken the ingraffed notion of the Deitie, and to bring forth an acknowledgement of Divine Providence and Iustice.

CHAP. 32. Of the Geometricall proportion or forme of distributive justice; which the supreame Iudge sometimes observes in doing to great Princes as they have done to others.

CHAP. 33. How the former law of retaliation hath been executed upon Princes, according to Arithmeticall proportion, or according to the rule of commutative justice.

CHAP. 34. The sinnes of parents visited upon their children, according to the rule of retaliation.

CHAP. 35. Grosser sinnes visited upon Gods Saints according to the former Rule of Counterpassion.

CHAP. 36. Of sinnes visited or punished according to the circumstance of time or place wherein they were committed.

CHAP. 37. What manner of sinnes they be, which usually provoke Gods judgements according to the rule of Counterpassion. And of the frequency of this kinde of punishment foresignified by Gods Prophets.

CAP. 38. The conclusion of this Treatise, with the relation of Gods remarkable judgements manifested in Hungary.

A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

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A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

BY THOMAS IACKSON Doctor in Divinitie, Chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and Vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the Towne of Newcastle upon Tyne.

The first part.

LONDON, Printed by M. F. for Iohn Clarke, and are to be sold at his shop under St. Peters Church in Cornhill. 1628.

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TO THE RIGHT HONOVRABLE AND TRVLY noble WILLIAM Earle of Penbrooke, Lord high Steward of his Majesties Houshold, Knight of the most noble Order of the Ga [...]ter, and Chancellor of the Vniversity of Oxon; The blessings of this life, and of the life to come be multiplied.

HAd the consciousnesse of my weaknesse left any place for expectation that my poore Labours should have found such benigne acceptāce with men of higher place and judgement, as by the report of Honourable personages, and mine owne late experience of your noble favours, some of them I now perceive have found with your Honour, [Page] these present papers had come to crave your patronage in a better dresse than now they doe. Besides the consciousnesse of my inabilities to please the acurate judgements of this age, want of opportunities for these many yeares to give my selfe that contentment, which I was once bold to promise unto my selfe, had almost deterred me from publishing any part of my former labours, which were not popular, and for the Pulpit, of which ranke this present Treatise is not. The subject or matter of it is Academicall, and was conceived in that famous Nurserie of all good literature, which for these many yeares hath flourished, and many more may it flourish under your Honorable patronage. If either these, or other of my Labours of the like argument, which tooke their first being from the benignity of that soile, may finde acceptance with your Lordship, I shall need no other Apologie for publishing them beside my unfaigned desire to leave the Christian world a testimonie of that high esteeme which I have ever made of your Honourable favours to [Page] that renowned Vniversity, and of my thankfulnesse for my particular interest in your generall goodnesse. If this manifestation of my weaknesse may occasion other Academickes to shew their strength in this and like Arguments, it shall be a great part of my joy and comfort to see better fruits of your Lordships favour brought forth by others, than I can present unto you. But if these may finde that acceptance which I most desire, your Lordship will haply bee deemed by some, to patronize not my weaknesse onely, but mine errors. It is not so unusuall, nor so much for mee to be censured for an Arminian, as it will be for your Lordship to be thought to patronize Arminianisme. To give your Lordship that satisfaction therefore in this point, which I am not bound to give unto others; If the man which most mislikes the Arminian or Lutheran doctrine in the points most controverted through reformed Churches, will but agree with me in these two, That the Almighty Creator hath a true freedome in doing good; and Adams off-spring a true freedome of [Page] doing evill; I shall not dissent from him in any other points controverted, unlesse it be in this one, that there needs to be no other controversie at all betweene the Arminians and their opposites in point of Gods Providence and Predestination. In all other particulars, save onely so farre as they are reducible to these two, I have not yet the learning or understanding to conceive, what contradiction there is or can bee, betweene men not willing to contend about words. But if any in opposition to Arminius, will maintaine that all things were so decreed by God before the Creation of the world; that nothing since the Creation could have fallen out otherwise than it hath done, or that nothing can bee amended what is amisse, I must crave pardon of every good Christian to oppugne his opinion, not as an errour onely in Divinity, but as an ignorance which involveth enmity to the sweet disposition of the All-seeing and unerring Providence; as a forerunner of ruine to most flourishing States and Kingdomes where it growes common, or comes to full [Page] height. For supplanting or preventing the growth of such opinions, I make bold to crave your Lordships patronage. Thus with my continuall praiers for your Lordships health, with all increase of honor and happinesse, I humbly take my leave.

From my Study in Newcastle upon Tine. November 20. 1627.

Your Lordships in all duty and observance, THOMAS IACKSON.

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THE CONTENTS OF THE SEVERALL Chapters in this ensuing TREATISE.

SECTION I. OF the one absolutely infinite, and incomprehensible Essence in generall.

Chapter. Folio.

1 How farre wee may seeke to expresse what by light of nature or other wayes may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence, or his Attributes. 3

2 Containing two philosophicall Maximes which lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite and incomprehensible Essence. 9

3 Of infinity in Beeing, or of absolute infinitie: and the right definition of it by the ancient Philosophers. 20

4 There is no plurality of perfections in the infinite [Page] Essence, albeit the perfection of all things be in him. Of the absolute identity of the Divine Essence and Attributes. 31

SECTION II. OF the severall branches of absolute infinitie; or of the infinitie of the Divine Attributes, as they are severally apprehended by us.

Chapter. Folio.

5 Of Divine Immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof infinity in magnitude, or space imaginary is the shadow. 42

6 Of Eternity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof successive duration or the imaginary infinity of time, is the modell. 62

7 Of the infinity of Divine Power. 83

8 Of the infinity of Divine Wisedome. That it is as impossible for any thing to fall out without Gods knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence. 90

9 Of Divine Immutability. 115

10 Of the eternall and immutable Decree. 120

11 Of transcendentall goodnesse: and of the infinity of it in the Divine nature. 128

12 Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodnesse communicative, or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature. 132

[Page]13 In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse. 147

14 Of Gods infinite love to Mankinde. 157

15 What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love: of the distinction of singula generum, and genera singulorum: of the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti. 166

SECTION III. THat Gods good will and pleasure is never frustrated, albeit his unspeakeable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfeignedly tendered.

Chapter. Folio.

16 In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his Vineyard, or for such as perish. 182

17 The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as perish, testified by our Saviour, and by S. Paul. 195

18 Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods unfeigned love to such as perish, a principall meanes or occasion why so many perish. 200

19 How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge. 207

20 Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge, there is no change or alteration at all in God, but onely in men and in their actions. Gods [Page] will is alwayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall, with torments everlasting. 213

21 How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy, or other affections are in the Divine Nature. 226

[Page]A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

SECTION I.
Of the one absolutely infinite, and incomprehensible Essence in generall.

THe originall of Atheisme, of errours, or misperswasions, concerning the Beeing, or Attributes of the Divine Nature, being in a former Treatise at large discussed; the next enquiries, which exact Method would in this Argument make, are, First, how this truth of Gods being, most certainly known, by internall experience unto some, may by force of speculative Argument bee made manifest unto [Page] others. Secondly, how his nature and attributes may be fitliest resembled.

My first resolution professed in the beginning of the discussing of the originall of Atheisme, as yet restraines me for adventuring too farre in the former. For whilest I view the progresse which I have purposed; to debate this point, upon my first entry into that Paradise of contemplation, (within whose territories I now encampe) by syllogisticall force of argument, seemeth to me as great an oversight, as to entertaine an enemy, more desperate then potent, with a pitched battaile, when as all his forts might, by constant prosequution of advantages gotten, be orderly taken, each after other, without possibility of any great losse, or apparent danger. Now the Atheists chiefe strength lying in a preconceived impossibility of a Creation and Resurrection, the conquest of the whole truth will easily bee compassed, after those weake holds bee (as in due time they shall be) utterly demolished. Or in case, after their overthrow, he be of force to bid us battaile, we shall be most willing to try our intended quarrell with him by dint of argument, in the Article of the last Iudgement. In the meane time, wee may, without danger of his checke, proceed upon those advantages, which the grounds of nature give us.

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CHAP. I.
How far we may seeke to expresse what by light of Nature, or otherwayes, may be conceived concerning the incomprehensible Essence, or his Attributes.

FIrst, if every particular man, or bodie generable, have precedent causes of their beings; their whole generations must of necessity have some cause: otherwise all should not be of one kinde or nature. Now this progresse from effects unto their causes, or betwixt causes subordinate, cannot be infinite: but as all progressive motion supposeth some rest or stay, whence it proceedeth, so must this progresse, whereof I speake, take beginning from some cause, which hath no cause of its being. And this is that incomprehensible Essence, which wee seeke.

2 But whereunto shall wee liken him? Things compared alwayes agree in some one kind, or have (at least) a common measure. Is then this cause of causes contained in any predicamentall ranck of being? Or can our conceipt of any thing therein contained, be truly fitted unto him? Or may his infinite and incomprehensible nature be rightly moulded within the circumference of mans shallow braine? One thing it is to represent the infinite Essence, another to illustrate this truth, that he cannot be represented. Though nothing can exactly resemble him, yet some things there be which better notifie how farre he is beyond all resemblance or [Page] comparison, then others can doe. By variety of such resemblances as his works afford, may our admiration of his incomprehensiblenesse bee raised higher and higher, and with our admiration thus raised, will our longing after his presence still be enlarged. The nature of things finite and limited, no Philosopher can so exactly expresse, as Painters may their outward lineaments. But as some sensible objects, besides their proper shape or character, imprint a kinde of dislike or pleasance in creatures sensitive: so have our purest and most exact conceipts intellectuall certaine symptomaticall impressions annexed, which inwardly affect us; though we cannot outwardly so expresse them, as they may imprint the like affection in others. Hence it is that the more right resemblances we make to our selves of any thing, the greater will be the symptomaticall impression of the latent truth; some part or shadow whereof appeareth in every thing, whereto it can truly be compared. And though we cannot in this life come to a cleare view of that nature, which we most desire to see; yet is it a worke worthy our paines, to erect our thoughts, by varietie of resemblances (made with due observance of decorum) unto an horizon more ample then ordinary; in whose skirts or edges, wee may behold some scattered rayes of that glorious light, which is utterly set unto men, whose thoughts soare not without the circumference of this visible world; for all we see with ou [...] bodily eyes, is but an hemisphere of midnight darknesse, to the habitation of Saints, and seat o [...] blisse.

[Page] 3 The rule of decorum in all resemblances of things amiable or glorious is, that as well the simple termes of comparison be sightly and handsome, as the proportion betweene them exact. Supposing the ods of valorous strength betweene Aiax and ordinary Trojanes, to have beene as great, as Homer would have us beleeve it was; the manner of this Champions retreat, being overcharged with the multitude of his Enemies, could not more exquisitely be resembled, than by a company of children, driving an hungry hard-skinned Asse with bats or staves out of a corne-field or meadow. The Asse cannot, by such weaklings, be driven so hard, but he will feed as he goes; nor could Aiax be charged so fiercely by his impotent foes, but that he fought still as he fled. The proportion is approved, as most exact, by a

Nec dictis erit ullus bonos, si cum actus ab urbe

Daunius hostili Teucris urgentibus heros,

Vix pugna absistit, simili [...] dicetur Asello,

Qu [...]m pueri laeto pascentem pinguia in agro

Ordea stipitibus duris detrudere tendunt,

Instantes, quatiunt (que) sudes per terga, per armos.

Ille autem campo vix cedere, & inter eundum

Saepe hic atque illic avidis insistere malis:

Omnia conveniunt, rerum (que), simillima imago est.

Credo equidem, sed turpe pecus, nec Turnus Asellum,

Turnus avia atavis (que) pote [...]s dignabitur heros.

Aptius hanc speciem referat Leo, quem neque tergae

Ira dare, aut virtus patitur, neque sufficit unus

Tendere tot contra, telis (que) obstare sequentum.

Hieron. Vida Poet. lib. 2.

teacher of Poetry that was his Arts Master, who notwithstanding, with the same breath disallows the invention, as no way applyable unto Turnus, at least in the courtly censure of those times wherein Virgil wrote. Be the congruity betweene the termes never so exquisite or pleasant; the Asse notwithstanding is no amiable creature, nor can wisedome or valour, for his many base properties willingly brook comparison with him in any. More [Page] fitly (as this Author thinketh) might Turnus his heroicall spirit have beene paralleld by a Lion, which though unable to sustaine the fierce pursuit of many hunters, yet cannot be enforced to any other march, then Passant gardant.

4 But wee must allow the Poet (whose chiefe art is to please his Readers appetite with pleasant sauces, more then with solid meates,) to bee more dainty and curious in this kinde, than it is requisite the School-divine or Philosopher should be: albeit neither of them need much to feare, lest their discourses be too comely, so solidity of truth bee the ground of their comelinesse. No courtly Poet is more observant of the former rule of decorum in their comparisons, than the holy Prophets are. Thus hath the Lord spoken unto mee (saith Esaias, cap. 31. vers. 4.) Like as the Lion, and the young Lion roring on his prey, when a multitude of shepheards is called forth against him, hee will not bee afraid of their voice, nor abase himselfe for the noise of them: so shall the Lord of hosts come downe to fight for mount Sion, and for the hill thereof. SaintEt hic quidem omnium morbus est trium generum quae proposui: & eorum scilicet qui secundum corpus de Deo sapiunt, & eorum qui secundum spiritualem creaturam sicuti est anima; & eorum qui ne (que) secundum corpus, ne (que) secundū spiritualē creaturā, et tamen de Deo falsa existimant: eo remotiores à vero, quo id quod sapiunt, nec in corpore reperitur, nec in facto & condito spiritu, nec in ipso creatore. Qui enim opinatur Deum (verbi gratia) candidum vel rutilum, fallitur; sed tamen haec inventantur in corpore. Rursum, qui opinatur Deum nunc obliviscentem, nunc recordantē, vel si quid hujusmodi est; nihilominus in errore est: sed tamen haec inveniuntur in animo. Qui autem putant ejus esse potentiae Deum, ut seipsum ipse genuerit: eo plus errant, quòd non solum Deus ita non est, sed nec spiritualis nec corporalis creatura. Nulla enim res omnino est, quae seipsum gignat ut sit. Aug. de Trinit. lib. 1. cap. 1. Austin hath noted three sorts of errors in setting forth the divine nature: of which, two go upon false grounds, the other is altogether groundlesse. Some (saith he) there be that seeke to measure things spirituall by the best knowledge which they have gotten (by [Page] sence or art) of things bodily. Others doe fit the Deity with the nature and properties of the humane soule, and from this false ground frame many deceiptfull and crooked rules, whilest they endeavour to draw the picture or image of the immutable Essence. A third sort there be, which by too much straining to transcend every mutable creature, patch up such conceipts, as cannot possibly hang together, either upon created or increated natures, and these rove further from the truth then doe the former. As (to use his instance) He which thinkes God to be bright or yellow, is much deceived; yet his errour wants not a cloke, in as much as these colours have some being (from God) in bodies. His errour againe is as great, that thinkes God sometimes forgets, and sometimes cals things forgotten to minde; yet this vicissitude of memorie and oblivion, hath place in the humane soule, which in many things is like the Creator. But hee which makes the Divine nature so powerfull, as to produce or beget it selfe, quite misseth not the marke onely, but the Butt, and shoots (as it were) out of the field: for nothing possible can possibly give it selfe being or existence.

5 But though in no wise wee may avouch such grosse impossibilities of him, to whom nothing is impossible; yet must we often use fictions or suppositions of things scarce possible, to last so long till we have moulded conceipts of the Essence and Attributes incomprehensible, more lively and semblable, then can be taken either from the humane soule alone, or from bodies naturall. To maintaine [Page] it as a Philosophical truth, that God is the soule of this universe, is an impious errourIn the 5. Book, Section 3. before condemned, as a grand seminary of Idolatry. Yet by imagining the humane soule to be as really existent in every place, whereto the cogitations of it can reach, as it is in our bodies, or rather to exercise the same motive power over the greatest bodily substance in this world, that it doth over our fingers, able to weild the Heavens or Elements with as great facility and speed, as we doe our thoughts or breath: We may, by this fiction, gaine a more true modell or shadow of Gods infinite efficacy, then any one created substance can furnish us withall. But whilest we thus, by imagination, transfuse our conceipts of the best life and motion, which we know, into this great Sphere, which we see, or (which sute better to the immutable and infinite essence) into bodies abstract or mathematicall: we must make such a compound as Tacitus would have made of two noble Romanes: Demptis utriusque vitiis solae virtutes misceantur: The imperfections of both being sifted from them, their perfections onely must be ingredients in this compound. Yet may we not thinke, that the divine nature, which we seeke to expresse by them, consists of perfections infinite, so united or compounded. We must yet use a further extraction of our conceits, ere wee apply them to his incomprehensible nature.

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CHAP. 2.
Containing two philosophicall Maximes which lead us to the acknowledgement of one infinite and incompre [...]ensible Essence.

VNto every Student that with observance ordinary will survey any Philosophicall tract of causes,1 two maine springs or fountaines doe in a manner discover themselves: which were they as well opened and drawne, as some others of lesse consequence are, wee might baptize most Atheists in the one, and confirme good Christians in the other. The naturall current of the one directly caries us to an independant cause; from whose illimited essence and nature, the later affords us an ocular or visible derivation of those generall attributes, whereof faith infused giveth us the true taste and relish. The former wee may draw to this head, [Whatsoever hath limits or bounds of being, hath some distinct cause or author of being.] As impossible it is, any thing should take limits of being, as beginning of being from it selfe. For beginning of being is one especiall limit of being.

2 This Maxime is simply convertible, [Whatsoever hath cause of being hath also limits of being.] because it hath beginning of being: for [Omnis causa est principium, & omne causatum est principiatum,] Every cause is the active beginning or beginner of being, and an active beginning essentially includes [Page] a beginning passive, as fashionable to it, as the marke or impression is to the stampe. Or in plainer English, thus; Where there is a beginning or beginner, there is somewhat begunne. Where the cause is prae [...]xistent in time, the distinction or limits of things caused or begun, are as easily seene as the divers surfaces of bodies severed in place. But where the cause hath onely precedence of nature and not of time, (as it falleth out in things caused by concomitance or resultance,) the limits or confines of their being seeme confounded, or as hardly distinguishable as the divers surfaces of two bodies glued together. Yet as wee rightly gather that if the bodies be of severall kindes, each hath its proper surface, though the point of distinction bee invisible to our eyes: so whatsoever we conceive to have dependance upon another, wee necessarily conceive it to have proper limits of being, or at least a distinct beginning of being from the other, though as it were ingrafted in it. But whether we conceive effects and causes distinctly as they are in nature, or in grosse, so long as wee acknowledge them (this or that way conceived) to be finite and limited, wee must acknowledge some cause of their limitation, which (as we suppose) cannot be distinct from the cause of their being.

3 Why men in these dayes are not Gyants, why Gyants, in former, were but men, are two Problems which the meere naturalist could easily assoyle by this reason, for substance one and the same. The vigour of causes productive or conservative of vegetables, of man especially, from which [Page] he receiveth nutrition and augmentation, is lesse now then it hath beene at least before the Flood; though but finite and limited, when it was greatest. Why vegetables of greatest vigour, ingrosse not the properties of others lesse vigorous, but rest contented with a greater numericall measure of their owne specificall vertues; is, by the former reason as plaine. For in that they have not their being from themselves, they can take no more then is given; nor can the natures whence they are propagated, convey them a better title of being, then themselves have. This as the seale communicates his fashion to the waxe, so doth the limited force or vertue of causes, alwayes imprint bounds and limits upon their effects. If further it be demanded, why the Elements having the opportunity of mutuall vicinity, to wreake their naturall enmities or hostilities, doe not each trespasse more grievously upon other; as why the restlesse or raging water swallowes not up the dull earth, which cannot flye from any wrong or violence offered; or why the Heavens, having so great a prerogative by height of place, largenesse of compasse, and indefatigable motion, do not dispossesse the higher Elements of their seat? The naturalist would plead the warrant of Natures Charter, which had set them their distinct bounds and limits by an everlasting undispensable law. Yet is nature in his language alwaies an internall or essentiall part of some bodies, within which it is necessarily confined. As the nature of the Heavens hath not so much as liberty of egresse into neighbour Elements, nor the proper formes [Page] of these, (upon what exigence or assaults soever made against them in their territories,) so much as right of removall or flitting into lower Elements. Or, in case it be pretended that these particular natures, have a nature more generall for their president; yet this, whether one above the rest, or an aggregation onely of all the rest, is still confined to this visible world, and both so hidebound with the utmost sphere, that they cannot grow greater or enlarge their strength. So that nature taken in what sense the Naturalist lists, cannot be said so properly to set bounds or limits to bodies naturall, as to bee bounded or limited in them. Or to speake more properly, Nature her selfe did not make, but is that very domestique law, by which they are bounded, and therefore, in no case, can dispense with it. And in that she is a law, (for the most part, but not absolutely indispensable) shee necessarily supposeth a Lawgiver; who, if he have no Law set him by any superiour (as we must of necessity come in fine to some one in this kinde supreame) hee can have no such limits or bounds, as he hath set to nature, and things naturall. He neither is any part of this visible frame, which we see, nor can he be inclosed within the utmost sphere. And thus by following the issue of the former fountaine, we are arived in the latter, which fully discovered, opens it selfe into a boundlesse Ocean. Whatsoever hath no cause of being can have no limits or bounds of being.

4 And Being, may bee limited or illimited two wayes: Either for number of kindes and natures contained in it, or for quantity and intensive perfection [Page] of every severall kinde. Of things visible, we see the most perfect are but perfect in some one kinde, they possesse not the entire perfection of others; and that perfection, whereof they have the just propriety, is not actually infinite, [...] finite and limited. Whatsoever thus is, it was as possible for it not to have beene, and is as possible for it not to be, as to be but of this or that kinde, not all that is, or hath being. Even those substances which we call immortall, as the heaven of heavens, with all their inhabitants, be they Angels or Archangels, Principalities or Thrones, enjoy the perpetuall tenour of their actuall existence, not from their essence, but from the decree of their Maker. Manent cuncta non quia aeterna sunt, sed quia defenduntur curâ regentis. Immortalia tutore non egent, haec conservat artifex, fragilitatem materiae vi sua vincens. Seneca Epist. 58. All things continue in being, not because they are eternall, but because they are defended by the providence of their Governour. Things immortall need no guardian or protector. But the maker of all things preserveth these things (which we see continue in being) overmatching the frailty of the matter by his power. In this mans philosophy nothing which is made, can be by nature immortall, though many things be perpetually preserved from perishing. Nothing which is immortall, can bee made. He grossely erred, if hee were of the same opinion with some others of theMittamus animum ad illa quae aeterna sunt. Miremur in sublimi volitantes rerum on niū formas▪ Deum (que) inter illa versantem, & providentem, quemadmodum quae immortalia facere non potuit, quia materia prohibebat, defendat à morte, ac ratione vitium corporis vincat. Senec. ib. Whether for thus saying hee fall under the censure of Muretus in his annotations upon this place, I refer it to the judicious Reader. Impie stulta veterum opinio, Deum voluisse quidem à primo omnia immortalia facere, sed non potuisse, propter materiae vitium. Quasi non, ut caetera omnia, ita materiam condiderit, ac procrearit Deus. Recte Lacta [...]tius, Idem materiae fictor est, q [...]i & rerum materia constantium. Ancient, that God had a [Page] desire to make things immortall, but could not by reason of the frailty or untowardlinesse of the matter. But that things made out of the matter, or made at all, could be immortall by nature, he rightly affirmed. For to be immortall in his language, is to be without beginning, without dependance. And what so is, hath an eternall necessity of existence. Absolute necessity of existence, or impossibility of non-existence, or of not being alwayes what it is, and as it is, implies an absolute necessity of being or of existence infinite; which cannot reside save only in the totality or absolute fulnesse of all being possible. The greatest fulnesse of finite existence conceiveable, cannot reach beyond al possibility of non-existence, nor can possibility of non-existence, and perpetuall actuall existence, be indissolubly wedded in any finite nature, save only by his infinite power, who essentially is, or whose essence is to exist, or to be the inexhaustible fountaine of all being. The necessary supposall, or acknowledgement of such an infinite or essentially existent power, cannot more strongly or more perspicuously be inferred, than by the reduction of known effects unto their causes, & of these causative entities (whose number and ranks are finite) into one prime essence, whence al of them are derived; it self being underivable frō any cause, or essence conceivable. In that this prime essence hath no cause of being, it can have no beginning of being. And yet is beginning of being, the first & prime limit of being, without whose precedence, other bounds or limits of being, cannot follow.

5 If that which Philosophers suppose to be the [Page] root of incorruption in the heavens, can brooke no limits of duration, but must bee imagined without end or beginning; why should it content it selfe with limits of extension? seeing duration is but a kinde of extension, seeing motion, magnitude, and time, by their rules in other cases, hold exact proportion. Things caused (as induction manifesteth) are alwayes limited and moulded in their proper causes. Nor are there two causes (much lesse two causalities,) one of their being, another of their limitation or restraint to this or that set kinde of being. For whatsoever gives being to any thing, gives it the beginning of being. As Sophroniscus was the true cause why Socrates was in that age wherein he lived, not before or after; why he was a man not a beast, an Athenian, not a Barbarian. Quicquid dat formam, dat omnia consequentia formam: whatsoever gives forme of being to any thing, gives all the appurtenances to the forme: is a Physicall Maxime which supposeth another Metaphysicall, Quicquid dat esse, dat proprietates esse: That which gives being unto any thing, gives likewise the properties of such being as it hath. Now limits of being, are essentiall properties of that essence or being, wherin they are found. And distinct bounds or limits are included in the distinct forme of being, which every thing hath from its cause. Actuall essence or existence it selfe, is distributed to every thing that hath cause of being, as it were sealed up in its proper forme or kind of being. It is as possible to put a new fashion upon nothing, as for any thing that is, to take limits or set forme of being from nothing. [Page] That which hath nothing to give it being, can have nothing to give it limits or bounds of being. And as no entity can take its being, or beginning of being from it selfe; so neither can it take bounds or limits from it selfe, but must have them from some other. The prime essence or first cause of all things that are, as it hath no precedent cause of existence, nor can it be cause of existence to it self; so neither can it have any cause of limits without it selfe, nor can it be any cause of limits to it selfe. It remaines then, that it must bee an essence illimited, and thus to be without bounds or limits, is the formall effect or consequence of being it selfe, or of that which truly is, without any cause precedent to give it being, or make it what it is.

6 So essentially is the conceipt of being without bounds or limits, included in our conceipt of being without cause precedent, that if we should, by way of supposition, give any imaginary entity leave to take beginning or possession of being from it selfe, without the warrant of any cause precedent to appoint or measure it out some distinct portion or forme of being: thus much being once by imagination granted, wee could not (by any imagination possible) debarre this entity from absolute necessity of being for ever after whatsoever it listed to be, or from being all things, rather than any one thing.

Of the Heathens, many did hold an uncreated Chaos praeexistent to the frame of this Vniverse: and Philosophers, to this day, maintaine an ingenerable matter, which actually is not any body, but indifferent to be made every body. Let us but suppose; [Page] First the one, or other of them to be as Homogeneall in it selfe, as the ayre or water: Secondly, to be able to actuate, or Proteus-like to transforme it selfe into a better state than now it hath, without the helpe of any agent or efficient; and then, as it could have no cause, so can there bee no reason given, to restraine it from taking all bodily perfection possible to it selfe. And if it bee true, which some teach, that this prime matter hath neither proper quantity nor quality, what should hinder it to take both without measure, supposing it might bee its one carver of those endowments? Or imagine there were such a vacuity, where the world now is, as we Christians beleeve there was before it was made, and onely one of Democritus casuall Atoms, or some meere possibility or appetite of the matter, left free, venire in vacuum, to give it selfe full and perfect act without curbe or restraint of any superiour power or sharer to cry halfe mine with it, or make claime to the nature of any actuall entity lost; it being supposed to be able to take any one nature upon it, what should either hinder or further it, to assume the nature of earth, rather than of water, or of these two, rather than of any other Element, or of any simple bodies, rather than of mixt or compounded substances, or of bodily substances, rather than spirituall, or of all these, rather than of their metaphysicall eminences, and perfections? Or whilst we imagine it, without cause of existence or beginning, no reason imaginable could confine it to any set place of residence or extension: no cause could bee alledged why it should take possession of the [Page] center, rather than of the circumference of this Vniverse, as now it stands, or of both these rather than of the whole sphere, or of the whole sphere rather than of all extensive space imaginable. Only the very supposition of taking beginning though without cause, doth put a limit to its duration; because this kinde of beginning, being but imaginary, depends upon our imagination, as upon its true cause. And yet even thus considered, me thinks it should extend its existence both waies, and draw a circular duration to the instant where it beginnes. Or (not imagining the beginning) let us imagine it only to have true present being without any cause precedent to push it forward, or superiour guide to appoint it a set course; and it is not within the compasse of imagination, why the duration of it should not reach as farre the one way as the other. as farre beyond all imagination of time past, as of time to come, why it should not comprehend all duration imaginable by way of present possession, or supereminent permanency, without admission of any deflux, division, or succession, for continuation of its existence.

7 If it bee objected, that any thing may follow from supposition or imagination of impossibilities, the reply is easie. The objection is either false, or true in a sense, which no way impeacheth, but rather approves that kinde of arguing. True it is, there is almost nothing in nature so impossible, as it may not be the possible consequent of some impossibility supposed or granted: but of every particular impossibility supposed or imagined, the possible [Page] Qui scholas regūt, ia id nobis exploratū reliquerūt: tale esse conditionalis propositionis naturam sive conditionem, ut existente falso quod antecedit, & etiam quod subsequitur, possit remanere vera conditionalis. Pasq. c. 1. ad Rō. fol. 65 Though it were impossible for an Angell from heaven to preach any other Gospell than Paul had preached, and impossible likewise for any Angell of heaven to be accursed, yet S. Pauls conditionall proposition was true; If an Angell from heaven should preach any other Gospell, he should be accursed. In like manner this supposition or conditionall [If any thing could take beginning from it selfe, it should be infinite] is true: although both these positions be false; First, that any thing can take beginning from it self: Secondly, that any thing which hath beginning can be infinite. And this only is absolutely true, That which truly is without all beginning, is absolutely infinite.consequences are not infinite; neither such nor so many as we list to make them; they are determinate by nature. Now we cannot conceive it to be in nature more impossible for a meere logical possibility, really and truely to take beginning of actuall being onely from it selfe, then it is for that which is supposed & imagined thus to take beginning, to be restrained either to any determinat kind or part of being, or to bee confined to any set place or residence. Or if any mislike these imaginarie models, let him (now he hath givē us leave to make them, and vouchsafed to looke upon them) utterly cancell or deface them. The everlasting edifice to whose erection they are destinated, is this; ‘Such as we cannot cōceive that not to be, which we conceive to take beginning of being from it selfe without any cause precedent; such of necessity must we conceive and beleeve him to bee indeed, who neither tooke beginning from himselfe, nor had it given by any, but is the beginning of being, the sole maker of all things that bee, being himselfe without beginning, without dependance o [...] any cause, without subordination to any guide, to appoint his kinde, to limit his place, or prescribe his time of being.’ He is in all these, and whatsoever branch or portion of being imaginable, truely and really infinite, the quintessence or excellency [Page] of all perfections (whether numericall or specifical) incident to al sorts or degrees of Beings numerable.

CHAP. 1.
Of infinity in Beeing, or of absolute infinitie: and the right definition of it by the ancient Philosophers.

1 WEre the question proposed in formall termes [An inter nihil & aliquid detur medium,] Whether something or nothing may admit a meane or middle nature: few answerers in the Schools would make choice of the affirmative: If any did, hee might easily be thus opposed: Every meane betwixt two is either by participation of both extreames, (as lukewarme is neither hot nor cold, but a mixture of both;) or a meane by abnegation, as being capable of neither. So a stone, though in it be not blinde, yet cannot see; and is therefore such a meane as we now speake of, (i) medium abnegationis, betwixt sight and blindnesse. That which is not (so is nothing) can communicate no kinde of being (for it hath none,) unto any thing; therefore it is impossible there should bee any meane of participation betwixt nothing and something. And to finde a meane betwixt them, by abnegation, that is, any thing which is neither something nor nothing, is as hard, as to assigne a space or vacancy betweene a line and the point that terminates it. What name [Page] soever we propose, unlesse it have some degree or portion of entity answering to it, we may justly say, it is just nothing. These reasons notwithstanding though they firmely hold in secular disputes of predicamentall or numerable Entities, yet the infinite Essence comes not within the lists of this division. Is he then a meane between something and nothing, rather an excellency too transcendent, to be comprehended under the name of something, or of any thing; for this were to make him aIdem absolutum, quod et Deum dicimꝰ, non cadit in numero cum omni alio, ut quod Deus & coelum, sint plura, aut duo, aut alia, & diversa; sicut nec coelum est idem absolutum, ut coelum quod est aliud à terra. Et quia idem absolutum est actu omnis formae formabilis forma, non potest forma esse extra idem. Quo enim res est eadem sibiipsi, forma agit, quòd autem est allerialias est, quia non est idem absolutum, hoc est omnis formae forma. Est igitur idem absolutum, principium, medium, & finis, omnis formae, & actus absolutus omnis potentiae. Cusan. de Genes. dialog. pag. 128. numerable part of being. On the other side, we should avouch as much under our hand, as the foole said in his heart, if we did cōprehend him under the other extream. To say there is no God, or that God is nothing, are speeches altogether equivolent, both equally false, and alike blasphemous. Fully contradictory to their falshood, and in direct opposition to their blasphemie, we may more safely say and think, that God is one, yet no one thing. And if we avouch him to be all, our meaning is, he is a great deale more than all things. The Latine ens, which universally taken, directly answers to our English every thing, or any thing; (asLib. de ente & uno. Mirandula well observes) faciem concreti habet, it beares the face or image of a concrete. And every concrete takes its name from that nature, whereof it participates; which nature, notwithstanding by reason of its simple, pure, and perfect essence, cannot brooke the same name which it bestowes on others. Nothing is truly tearmed hot, or white, but [Page] from participation of heat or whitenesse; yet to say heat is hot, or whitenesse white, is a speech as improper and unnaturall, as it would bee to style the Kings Majesty, Lord President, chiefe Iustice of some Court, or with some other inferiour title, meerely dependent on supreame Majesty. Heat then is that from which things are called, as by participation of it, they truly are, hot; Whitenesse, that, from whose particiration, things are termed white. This shall we speake of God, so we speake of him as best befits his supreame Majesty, that hee is no one thing, but rather one, from whose most pure & perfect being, all things are said to bee, what they are. That man is one thing, and the earth another, that any thing is sayd to be, what it is, includes a participation of his being, whose proper name isEx. 3. 14. I am: whose essence is the very quintessence, the incomprehensible and indiminishable fulnesse of that, without which, wee can neither affirme or deny ought of that which is [...] the onely foundation of every thing, that can bee named alone, the onely bond of all things that can bee combined or linckt together. SayCum primum ingressus Academiam sueris, occurret tibi Parmenides, qui unicum demonstrabit Deum essererum omnium ideas, id est, exemplaria rationes (que) eminentissimè continentem vel producentem. Occurret Melissus et Zeno, qui solum Deum revera esse demonstrent, caetera verò videri. Marcil. Ficin. Epist. 8. pag. 866. we then not onely, that He is one, but that he onely is: And that in him the eminent totality or perfection of every thing, to whom this title, Is, can be imparted, is contained. Angels and immortall spirits are, but they are not Being it selfe, that is, they are what they are, by participation of his Essence, who onely is, who alone comprehends all things.

2 Of the greatest Angell which he hath created, or of the most noble intelligent Spirit which the [Page] Philosophers imagined, were he present, or did we know the place of his residence, we might without wrong say, This Angell, or yonder Intelligence; or speake of either, as of a numerable part, though a principall one of this Vniverse. For though his nature be much more perfect then ours is, and hee according to the perfection of his nature, much more excellent then his fellow Angels are: his perfections neverthelesse have their bounds and limits, not uncapable of these demonstrative signes, This, Here, or Yonder, &c. He neither containes the specificall perfection of our nature, nor the numericall of his Fellowes, within the measure of his perfection. In his kind then he is most perfect, yet is he not that perfection which he hath in him, but the receptacle of it; And if he have perfection onely in him, without being himselfe perfection, Quid habet quod non accepit? All he hath must bee participated or borrowed from perfection it selfe. And of his borrowed perfections, one neither properly is another, nor are all or any of them, what he is. His power is not the same that his wisedome is; his wisedome is not his goodness, nor his goodnesse his life. Sathan and his Angels have life, though they have lost their goodnesse; and their power to practise, is lesse than their wit to plot mischiefe and villany. The best, the wisest, or mightiest of those immortall Spirits, which kept their stations, is not able, either by his meere power to give being to things that are not, or life to livelesse creatures; his wisedome cannot inspire wisedome into creatures indued with life; his goodnesse is no fountaine whence grace may [Page] be derived into the heart of man. But when we say God is one, or God onely is, in this indivisible unity, we include all multiplicity. Nor can wee say more of him in fewer words than Seneca hath done; Est totum quod vides, & totum quod non vides: Hee is the absolute totality of all and every part of being or perfection, which we see in things visible, or conceive in substances invisible.

3 By the same analogy of speech that wee say a statue, or picture, though made after life, is, no true man; we are bound to say, and thinke, that no creature (the best of which is but the image of God; his being, at the best, but participated) truly is. It is their chiefe grace to be true shadows of true being. O [...] as it is usuall with Divines to enstyle Christ, the true Samuel, David himselfe, the right Salomon, the onely Sampson: not that they thinke the stories of those mens lives, were onely faigned legends for good example, (or that no such persons had ever truly beene,) but because they did foreshadow one far more excellent, than themselves, in whom that was really and fully exhibited, which was only prefigured in them. So we say God alone Is, because the totality and fulnesse of that being is in him, whose representation is in his creatures. Thus much is included in all those sacred passages, wherin he saith of himselfe, I am He, I am God, and there is none besides. Thus much many comments yet extant in the Ancient Philosophy of the Heathens, being compared with these texts, would fully informe us.

4 The Stoicks appropriate the name of essence unto [Page] God, & unto the matter, which they foolishly conceive to be coeternall with him,Vide Senecam Ep. 58. & Muretū in annot. able to overmatch the benignity of his active power, by its passive untowardlinesse. How ever, they held nothing worthy the title of Essence, which was not [...] independently everlastingly. Plotines Philosophy was more divine, unlesse perhaps he gave too much to his Demoniacall or Angelicall spirits, as many others, not conceiving any creation but out of the matter praeexistent, seeme to allot a kinde of independent Being to immateriall substances. An error easie to have beene checkt, had the favourers of it beene put in mind, that these their demi-gods by necessary consequence of this opinion, must have beene acknowledged infinite in Being. Whereas the true notion of such infinitie, by the apparent grounds of true Philosophy, is onely proper, onely possible unto One; because it entirely includeth all that can be; and, All, absolutely excludes all plurality. From this principle rightly sounded, did Plato deny things sensible truly to be, or (as Seneca paraphrases upon his Text) they make a shew only, or put on a countenance of being for a time, being uncapable of the stability or solidity of true being. So far was this divine Philosopher from their herefie, which acknowledged an independent being in immateriall substances, that (to the Aristotelicall Christian his shame)Dijs à se factis promisit Deus non factus immortalitatem; quod impossible est, se dixit esse facturum. Sic enim eum locutum narrat Plato, &c. vide Aug. lib. 22. de civ. Dei cap. 26. Et Solum in 4. senten. distin. 43. q. 1. art. 2. Et Platoriem ipsum in Times. p. 41 hee derives their immortality, not from the immaterialitie or excellency of their nature, but from the speciall grant or Charter of their Maker; as if dissolution or finall expiration were due to them as they are creatures; albeit the [Page] execution of it were everlastingly differed from their first creation. These termes of being, is, or are, &c. which are so common to al things, that without them, we can neither make enquiry after any thing, nor distinguish it from nothing, are attributed by the same Philosopher to this eternall Maker of all things, after such an eminent and soveraigne manner, as may not be communicated to any other. So the name of Poet (to useSecundum ex his quae sunt, ponit Plato, quod eminet et exuperat omnia. Hoc ait per excellentiam esse, ut Poeta cōmuniter dicitur: omnibus enim versus facientibus hoc nomen est: Sed iam apud Graecos in unius notam cessit. Homerū intelligas cum audieris Poetam. Quid ergo hoc est? Deus scilicet maior ac, potentior cunctis. Seneca ep. 58. Quid per Ideas intelligat. Plato, vide ibid. et apud Muretum in annotat. Seneca his comment upon Plato his dialect) absolutely or demonstratively taken, was Homers peculiar title throughout Greece, albeit the name of Poet was common in that time to all versifiers. The Poet Homer was a tautology amongst the Graecians, but Poet Aeschylus, or Poet Euripides none. A greater tautology or solaecisme it had beene in Platoes Divinity, to have said of God, as we doe of our selves or of Angels, he is something, every thing, or the most excellent thing. Enough it was to have said he is One, or. He is All, although he should have hit his or the Anoient Philosophers meaning best, that had said, he is, [...], He that is. Or as the Apostle comments upon Gods name revealed to Moses, He which was, is, and which is to come, [...].

5 Parmenides much more ancient then Plato, did not deny (unlesse Simplicius one of Aristotles followers double with us) all distinction, either numericall or specificall, or more generall, betweene the visible or intelligible parts of this Vniverse. Any member of which division, being granted, multitude and division would necessarily follow. [...]] This is the chiefest name of the eternall and most blessed God, so called of his Essence, being, or existence, which is, simply one, Deut 6. 4. The force of this, name, the holy Ghost openeth He that is, that was, and that will bee, or is to come, Rev. 1. 48. & 4. 8. & 11. 17. & 16. 5. And the forme of the Hebrew name implyeth so much, Je being a signe of the time to come, Ieheveh, he will be, H [...], of the time present, Hoveh, he that is; and Vah of the time past, Havah, he was. It importeth that God is, and hath his being of himselfe from before all worlds: [Isa. 44. 6.] that he giveth being or existence unto all things, and in him all are and doe consist, [Acts 17. 25] That he giveth being unto his word, effecting whatsoever hee hath spoken, whether promises, [Exod. 6. 3. Esay 45. 2, 3.] or threatnings, [Ezek. 5. 17. and 7. 27] It is in effect the same that Ehieh, I will be, or I am, as God calleth himselfe, Exod. 3. 14. Of this the Gentiles named the greatest God Iove and Iupiter, that is, Iah-Father, of the shorter name Iah, mentioned Psal. 68. 5. And Varro the learnest of the Romanes, thought Iove to bee the God of the Iewes. August. lib. 1. de consen. Euan. cap. 22. Hereof also in Greeke writers hee is called Iao Diodor. Sicul lib. 2. cap. 5. Clem. Alexand. Strom. lib. 5. Macrob. lib. 1. Saturnal. cap. 18. But in the Greeke tongue the name Iehovah cannot rightly bee pronounced, and for it the Greeke Bibles have Lord, which the new Testament followeth, as Marke 12. 29. from Deut. 6. 4. and elsewhere usually; and the Hebrew Text sometime putteth Adonai Lord, or Elobim God, for Ievovah, as Psalme 57. 10. compared with Psalme 108. 4. 2. Chron. 25. 24. with 2 Kings 14. 14. Ainsworth upon Psal. 83. 19. But how many or great soever, the parts of multitude were, in [Page] his opiniō, they truly were not, in respect of that unitie, whence they had their originall. That speech of this sage Philosopher, Omnia unum sunt, which Aristotle, in the first entry into his new Philosophy, stumbles at as a Paradoxe, was an orthodoxall principle of true Divintie. Parmenides meant the same that Plato did, (perhaps better) although he exprest his meaning in a poeticall manner, more apt to bee mistaken, though rightly taken, more magnificent and much apter to occasion admiration. The speech it selfe will naturally beare this construction, Multitude of things visible, is but the multiplyed shadow of invisible independent unitie: things sensible, or by imagination numerable, are but so many severall representations of his incomprehensible being, who is one; not as one is part of multitude, [Page] yet most truly One, because indivisible and unmultipliable, as wanting nothing, as most entirely possessing all that can accrue by multiplication: most truly One, because He onely is, and unto his being nought can be added, nought detracted from it, by the increase or diminution of other beings. Or in Parmenides meaning, He so is, that if al things numerable should lose that being which they have, or be annihilated, all might be found againe in him, and be restored with Iobs restitution, to their wonted estate, without diminution of his soveraigne being. For whatsoever now is, heretofore hath bin, or can be extant, besides Him; hath a more excellent manner of being, treasured up in his eternall and infinite Essence, than may with safety be committed to its owne charge or custody.

6 Happy had it beene for Aristotle himselfe, and not amisse for us, if he had imployed his extraordinary talent of wit, in setting forth that infinite treasure of wisdome, whence he received it; or spent his daies in contēplation of that unity, whēce al things whereof he wrote, had their beginning, rather thā in decyphering their severall natures and perfections, altogether omitting the essentiall references, or dependencies, which they had from him; unlesse this mirror of nature, had bin of their number, who infatuated (as the Apostle speakes) by divine wisedome, became vaine in their imaginatiōs; he might have perceived his owne definition of such infinity as he imagined in the divisibility of Magnitude or succession of time, to have beene (as Plato speakes of Time it selfe) but a moveable image of that true [Page] and solid infinity, whose definition, being well assigned by others, was censoriously rejected by him; or such a floating shadow of it swimming in his braine, as the Sun or Starres imprint in a swift running streame. A perfect definition should bee so fitted to the entire nature of the thing defined, or to the thing it selfe absolutely considered, as the barke is to the tree, or other visible surfaces to the bodies which they environ: To expresse some particular properties or branches, much lesse some references or considerations of it, is not enough. The question then being absolutely proposed Quid est infinitum? What is infinity? or what is it to be infinite? The definitive and satisfactory answer must bee such, as shall expresse not the nature of infinity in succession onely or in division, not in this or that respect only, or according to some particular abstraction or consideration; but the nature of infinity simply and absolutely considered. That only is absolutely and properly infinite, which is infinite not according to one conceipt or kinde of infinity, but that which is infinite in Being. This was that infinity which the Ancients well defined, when they said, Infinitum est extra quod nihil est: Infinity is that without which nothing is, or can be. For as infinity in longitude, includes all length conceiveable, and infinity in solid magnitudes, all dimensions imaginable; so must infinite being include all Being possible; and it is impossible for any thing to be without or besides that, wherein all being possible is contained. Thus did these ancient Heathens feele after and seeke, and in a manner find, that Lord [Page] under the notion of unum and infinitum, in whom, as S. Paul saith, (Act. 17. 28.) we live, and move, and have our being. His words will beare or rather presuppose that improvement, which is necessarily included in the Ancients definition of absolute infinitie, It is impossible that any thing living should have life, that any thing moveable should move, that life or motion should have the least degree of being, save only in Him, who onely is. For as the same Apostle there saith, vers. 25. He giveth to all, life and breath, and all things. The very first beginnings, the first and last degrees of such being as they have. Aristotle then came farre short of the truth in saying, Infinitum est extra quod semper aliquid est, That is infinite, which never hath so much, but it is alwaies getting more. The truth is, Aristotle did not, could not deny the definition assigned by the Ancients, to be a true and perfect definition of absolute infinity, or of infinity in being. Wherein then, or upon what grounds did he dissent from them? Either in that he did not acknowledge any such absolute infinity or infinite being, as the Ancients beleeved; or else did suppose, that they held this visible world or some bodily magnitude to be so actually and absolutely infinite, as the former definition doth import. Concerning this latter sort of infinity, whatsoever the ancient Philosophers did, we Christians doe not dissent from Aristotle: for we deny any bodily magnitude actually infinite. But that there is an absolute infinity, or an Essence actually and absolutely infinite, may be necessarily inferred from those branches of that infinity which consists not [Page] in act, but in possibility, or succession, which Aristotle rightly acknowledged, and well defined. For, whence should al the parts of this visible world possibly get any new portion of time, any succession or addition to their present being or duration, which now they have not; save onely from his infinite and inexhaustible store, who, before all times, had so much of being in every kind, as he could not possibly either get any more, or lose a dramme of what he had; albeit through every moment of duration divisible, he furnished all things, that are (as hee could doe more) with as much perfection, as they are capable of, that is, all of them with perfection or being in it selfe finite, but in some of them without limit of duration. But are all things in him? or such only as include perfection? or shall wee say perfections are in him, rather than in the things themselves? And if so, whether shall we say hee is one perfection, or all perfections?

CHAP. 4.
There is no plurality of perfections in the infinite Essence, albeit the perfection of all things be in Him. Of the absolute identity of the Divine Essence and Attributes.

1 HEE argued like himselfe that said, We must either allow the Gods to have bodies, or deny them sense; because sense is never found without a body. What was it then in [Page] his Philosophy, which framed the organs of bodily sense? a body already organized and indued with sense? or a spirit (virtus formatrix) which rather is in the body, than is a body it selfe? And if this spirit frame the organs by its owne skill, Epicurus should in reason have afforded it both sense and reason in greater measure than hee had himselfe; who, out of the same matter, could not make so much as one haire white or blacke; much lesse the most exquisit instruments of sense. But if this spirit, by which, in Philosophers opinions, our bodies are produced, work not by art, but is only set on work by the supreame Artificer; seeing he can make it to do more without sense & reason, thā Epicurus could doe, by all his art or philosophicall skill: wee must needs grant sense (& reason) to be in Him, yet such, or in such a sort, as befits his Majesty, not such as Vide Lactant. lib. 1. de ira Dei. Et Betuleum in com. Epicurus took delight in. Our argument is grounded on the Psalmists Philosophy. Vnderstand yee bruitish among the people, and yee fooles when will yee be wise? He that planted the eare shall he not heare? He that formed the eyes, shall hee not see? Hee that chastiseth the Heathen, shall not he correct? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know? Psal. 94. 8, 9, 10. Yet as wee say that He onely is, and all things numerable are but meere shadowes of His being; so wee must hold, that hearing, sight, and reason are in him, according to their idaeall patterns or perfections, not according to those imperfect pictures, which communicated to men and beasts, distinguish them from vegetables or livelesse creatures; whose perfections likewise are in him. But [Page] some things perhaps there be, which have no portion of perfection, as the prime matter, or some like dead or dull masse. For how shall that, which is but a body, be in him that hath no body? That Maxime, Idem est non esse, & non apparere, is not so true in matters of civill proofe or allegation, as the other stemme of the same root, Idem est non esse & non operari, is in nature. To be without efficacie or operation, or to serve unto no use, is all one, as not to be at all. Or, rather, so to be, hath the same proportion to simple non-being, as nihil agere, to otiosum esse. To be without use or operation is more remote from true being, and worse in nature, than simply not to be. If any such things there be, how should we say they are in God, in whom is nothing but perfection? Yet of things without proper use or operation, there might be some peculiar end best knowne to their Maker; if it were but to commend the perfection which other creatures borrow from him, and to stirre up our thankfulnesse, that we neither are such dull masses our selves, nor are troubled with harbouring or supporting them. But even these, if any such there were, could not be existent or extra causas, unlesse they truely were in Him. What is it then for all things that are, or their perfections to be in Him?

2 For all things to be in Him, is no more then that He alone can produce them without seed or matter precedent. All things, not extant onely, but possible, are in his wisedome, as the Edifice is in the Artificers head: all things againe are in his power, as strength or force to move our limbes, is [Page] in our sinewes or motive faculty. The perfections of all things are truly said to be in Him, in as much as whatsoever is, or can bee done by their efficacy or vertue, Hee alone can doe without them. Hee could feed all the beasts of the field without grasse, heale every disease, without herbe, mettall, or other matter of medicine, by his sole word, not uttered by breathing, or any other kinde of motion; not distinct from his life or essence. Hee is life it selfe; yet is not his life supported by any corporeall masse, or praeexistent nature, nor clothed with such sense as ours is: for sense, in as much as it cannot be without a corporeall organ, is an imperfect kind of knowledge. Paine hee cannot feele as we doe, because that tendeth to destruction, which is the period of imperfection: yet what soever paine any sensible or materiall object can inflict upon us, He alone can inflict the same in an higher degree. The measure of paine, likewise, which we feele by sense, He knows much better without sense or feeling of it. But when wee say all things are in Him, after a more excellent manner, than they are or can bee in themselves: Wee must not conceipt a multitude or diversity of excellencies in his Essence, answering to the severall natures of things created: We must not imagine one excellencie sutable to elementary bodies, another to mixt, a third to vegetables, a fourth to sense, &c. one to the humane nature, another to the Angelicall. And ifTertium genus est eorū quae propriè sunt: innumerabilia haec sunt, sed extra nostrum posita conspectū. Qua sunt, interrogas? Propria Platonis suppellex est. Ideas vo [...]at, ex quibus quaecun (que) videmus, omnia fiunt, & ad quas cuncta formantur. Hae immortales, immutabiles, inviolabiles sunt. Quid sit Idea, id est, quid Platoni esse videatur, audi. Idea est eorū quae naturâ fiūt exemplar ae [...]ernum. Sword [...]. ep. [...]8. Plato in Timaeo ait Ideas nunquam fieri, semper esse: corporea autem omnia nunquam esse, semper fieri. Vide Cusan. Dialog. de Genesi, quomodo idem, identificando, pluralitatem producit. Plato meant there [Page] were as many severall Idaea's eternally extant, whether in the first cause of things, or without Him, as there were substances specifically distinct one from another; his opinion may neither be followed, nor approved by any Christian. In all these, Divine Excellency, as one face in many glasses of different frame, is diversly represented, being in it selfe more truly one than any other entity, that is termed one, or then any bond of union betweene things united. Of natures extant, some, to our capacity, represent Him better, some worse; not the meanest or basest, but is in some sort like Him; not the most excellent creature that is, not all the excellencies of all, can so fully represent his nature, as an Apes shadow doth a Mans body. But what in other cases would seeme most strange, infinite variety best sets forth the admirable excellency of his indivisible unity.

3 Touching the question proposed, Whether he were one excellency or all excellencies? whether he were one perfection, or all perfections, Respondent ultima primis. The answer is in a manner given in the beginning of this Discourse. Though hee that saith God is all perfections, excepts none, yet hee includes onely perfections numerable and participated: And to say He were onely one perfection, implyes onely perfection limited, and therefore perfection borrowed, not independent. Or admitting there be a meane betweene all, or some perfections, and one perfection, which may fitly be expressed by all perfection: yet he that should thus say [God is the universall unity or totality of perfection] had need [Page] to distinguish acurately of universality and totality, and define Vniversale ante rem▪ more exquisitely than the Platonickes doe; that he may acquit his meaning, from suspition of such totality, or universality, as ariseth not onely by aggregation of parts, but whose extent is no more than equall to all its parts. For every other universall or whole, is fully equalized by all the parts taken together; whereas the Divine Nature infinitely exceeds all particular natures or perfections possible, though in number they could be infinite. It is then (if any man list so to speake) such a totality or universality, as cannot bee augmented, much lesse made up by multiplication of any other perfection, though prosecuted in infinitum; neither diminishable or exhaustible by multiplicity or division of particulars derived from it. But whether wee consider this His infinite Essence in it selfe, or, as it eminently containes all things possible; the incomprehensibility of it is in both respects more fully intimated (exprest it cannot be) by indefinite formes of speech; than by addition of any definite termes, whether of singularity, universality, or totality. Hee speakes more fully and more safely, that saith, God is being it selfe, or perfection it selfe; than he that saith, he is the onely being, or all being, the onely perfection, or all perfection, the totality of being and of perfection. So all plurality be excluded, we expresse his being and perfection best, by leaving them, as they truly are, without all quantity.

4 That all plurality, not onely of Idaeall perfections answering to the natures of things numerable [Page] or created, but of internall perfections, whose different titles necessarily breed plurality of conceits in us; must be excluded from the true, orthodoxall intellectuall apprehension of the illimited Essence, may from the former maine principle be thus evinced. In that Hee is without beginning, without end, without all cause of being, without dependence; we cannot imagine, or at least our understanding must correct our imaginations, if they shall suggest, his power to bee as the stemme, wisedome, goodnesse, and other like atributes, as branches growing from his being or essence, as from the Root. For if his Being or Essence be absolutely independent, it is absolutely illimited; and being such, what could limit or restraine it from being life, from being power, from being wisedome, from being goodnesse, from being infinitely, whatsoever any thing that hath being is?Deus verò multipliciter dicitur, magnus, bonus, sapiens, [...]eatus, verus, & quicquid aliud non indignè Dei videtur. Sed eadem magnitudo ejus est, quae sapientia: non enim mole magnus est, sed virtute. Et eadem bonitas quae sapientia, & magnitudo, & eadem veritas, quae illa omnia. Et non est ibi aliud beatum esse, & aliud magnum, aut sapientem, aut verum, aut bonum esse, aut omnino ipsum esse. Nec quoniam Trinitas est, ideo triplex putandus est: al [...]oqui minor erit, Pater solus, aut Filius s [...]lus, quam simul Pater & Filius▪ August. de Trinitate lib. 6. cap. 7. He that affirmes any of these attributes to bee what another is not, or divine Essence not to bee identically what all those are, must grant as well the Attributes, as the Essence to be finite and limited. If power in God have a being distinct from wisedome, and wisedome another being distinct from goodnesse, one must needs want so much of infinite being, as another hath of proper being distinct from it, and, at the best, they can bee but infinite secundùm quid, or in their ranke. Againe if any of them be, what Essence [Page] identically is not; Essence cannot bee infinite, because wisedome, power and being have their severall beings distinct from it. And the nearer these come (whether severally or joyntly considered) to the nature of true infinity, the more naked and impotent they leave their mother-Essence, if we once grant Essence and them to bee distinct, as Parents and children, or as root and branch, or to what use should powerlesse Essence serve? to support these branches of infinity? this it could not doe without infinite power. And those branches, if they need a root or supportance, their being must needs bee dependent, and therefore limited.

5 From the former definition of absolute infinity, [Infinitum est extra quod nihil est] We may conclude, that unlesse all power, unlesse all wisedome, unlesse all goodnesse, unlesse all that truly is, or can possibly be supposed to have true being, bee identically contained in Gods Essence; He could not be absolutely infinite or illimited in being. Whatsoever is uncapable of limit, is uncapable of division or numericall difference: For wheresoever it can be truly said, This is one, and that another, or This is, and is not That, each hath distinct limits. But seeing our imagination or phantasie is divisible, and our purest intellectuall conceipts of infinity, but finite; we cannot thinke of God as infinite in power, infinite in wisedome and in Essence; but wee must frame a conceit of power distinct from our conceit of Essence, and a conceit of wisedome distinct from both. And this plurality of conceipts in us, usually brings forth a conceit of plurality betwixt his [Page] Essence, and his Attributes; unlesse our understandings be vigilant and attentive to correct our phantasies, by this following, and the like knowne Philosophicall truth. As we cannot contemplate incorporeal substances without imagination of some corporeall forme, and yet the understanding constantly denyes them to bee like their pictures presented to it by the phantasie, or to have any such corporeall forme as it doth paint them in: so in this case, notwithstanding the plurality of our imperfect conceipts, or multiplicity of perfections imagined by us, in our contemplations of the Godhead; we must stedfastly beleeve, and acknowledge, that He infinitely is, what all these severall representations intimate: not by composition, or mixture of perfections severally infinite, but by indivisible unity of independent and illimited Being. And as it is a maxime most infallible in naturall philosophie [Vis unita fortior] Force, otherwise the same, is alwaies greater united, than being scattered or diffused: so is the metaphysicall extract of it, more eminently true in Divinity. The indivisible unity of illimited being or perfection, is, in every respect imaginable, more excellent and soveraigne than all infinite perfections, by imagination possibly could be, so they were, though never so strictly, but united. From this fundamentall truth of Gods absolute infinity by indivisible unity, wee may inferre, He is powerfull above all conceit of infinite power, rooted in the same Essence with infinite wisedome, and partaker of all her fruits, but not identically the same with her. Wise He is, beyond all conceit of infinite [Page] wisedome, though sworne confederate with infinite power, or linked with it, or with other perfectiōs, in any other bond, but not in absolute identitie. Good likewise He is above all possible conceit of infinite goodnesse, though indissol [...]bly matched with all other perfections that can bee conceived, unlesse they be conceived (as we must beleeve in Him they are) different onely in name or mans conceit, but indivisibly agreeing with it in the internall unity and identity of nature and Essence. Lastly, the immensity of his Majesty, and infinity of duration, common to his Essence and all his Attributes, infinitely exceed all conceit of infinite succession or extension, whose parts cannot be actually and indivisibly the same, one with another, or with the whole.

This is the bottomlesse and boundlesse Ocean of admiration, wherein contemplative wits may bathe themselves with great delight, but whereinto they cannot dive, without great danger; That the totality of every conceiveable excellency and perfection, should be contained, after a manner farre more excellent in unity indivisible, then if their natures, which they hold thus in common, were laid out in severall, without any bounds prescribed, besides infinities proper to each kinde.

6 But seeing our imaginations have a more sensible apprehension of greatnesse, exprest under the notion of totality or divisible infinity, then under the conceipt of indivisible unity; and seeing every whole, seemes much greater, when it is resolved into parts, (as a mile by land, whose severall quarters [Page] or lesse portions, are distinctly represented to our eyes, seemes much longer than two miles by water, whose levell surface affords no distinct representation of parts, or diversity of aspect) it will bee very behoovefull to unfold some principall branches of being or perfection, whose infinitie or totality is eminently contained in the unity of infinite Being. For being thus sorted by imagination into their severall ranks, like so many numbers in a table ready for addition, the understanding may with admiration guesse at the product, like an Arithmetician, which had gone so far in Geometricall progression, that he could not number the last and compleat summe; yet acknowledgeth that the progresse in nature, can admit no end or limit. Or though we could thus proceed by addition or multiplication of perfections in infinitum, we were still to allow the understanding to use the improovement of the former rule, Vis unita fortior: Or to admit the Platonickes conceipt, concerning the masculine force of unity in respect of pluralities effeminate weaknesse, to bee in this point more Orthodoxall than in any.

[Page]

SECTION II.
Of the severall branches of absolute infinitie; or of the infinitie of the Divine Attributes, as they are severally apprehended by us.

CHAP. 5.
Of Divine Immensity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof infinity in magnitude, or space imaginary is the shadow.

ORder of nature leads us first to explicate two branches of perfection infinite, 1 that answer unto a kind of infinitie, so frequent and obvious to our thoughts, that our imaginations will hardly suffer it to be severed from those subjects, which our understandings by light of reason may, and by the eye of faith, must confesse to bee finite, to wit, time and place. The cause of this difficultie in abstraction, was signifiedIn the 5. Booke. Section 2. before to be this. No event there is observed by sense, but is husked in the circumstance of place and time, whence it is, that these two accompany many Phantasmes, after they [Page] bee winnowed from all the rest, into the closet of the understāding. The conceit of mathematicall or metaphysicall space, is so naturally annexed to our imagination of time and place physicall; that albeit reason, aswell as Scripture demonstrate the world to be, for Physicall magnitude, finite; yet our phantasies cannot be curbed from running into imaginary locall distance, beyond the utmost surface of this goodly visible worke of God, yea beyond the heaven of heavens. The Philosopher, which thought all place or locall distance to bee contained within the utmost sphere, it beeing contained in nothing else (for extra coelum nihil est, was his saying) might in congruity have granted, a like termination, or circumscription of succession or time; unto which notwithstanding our imaginations will not easily subscribe. For though our understanding oft refute their errour, which deny the beginning of Time; yet our senses still nurse an imaginary successive duration much longer before the creation of this visible world, than the continuation of it hath beene. And (which is much to bee admired) some Schoole-braines have beene so puzled in passing this unsoundable gulfe, as to suspect that God, which is now in every place of the world created by Him, was as truly in these imaginary distances of place and time, before the creation was attempted. Thus have they made place commensurable to his immensitie, and succession, or time coequall to his eternitie. But what could they answere us, if we should demand, whether this duration, or locall distance, wherein they imagine God to have beene [Page] before the Creation, were created by Him, or not? whether they were truly something, or meerly nothing? If they held them to be meerly nothing, they should have told us, that they had a reall imagination of an infinite space, which really was not: and therefore could not bee truely tearmed imaginary space before the world was created. For it is one thing to imagine an infinite space, and another to avouch there was an infinite imaginarie space before they could have any imagination of it. Hee that made the world and all that is in it, is not much beholding to those men, for building him an infinite Castle, not in the Ayre (which had no being before the Creation) but in that which neither thē was, nor since hath had any being, save onely in the vanishing imaginations of men which have perished. For if this imaginary space were any more thā a meere imagination, it was surely created by God. Had then this imaginary space another space or distance-locall, or this imaginary time or successive duration, another duration, wherin to be produced? or doe they make this imaginary time or place fully commensurable to eternity or immensity? If God from eternity had been in any other infinity besides himselfe, hee could not be said to be incomprehensible. By this imaginary space no realty can bee truely meant besides God himselfe, whom the Axioma hic proponit R. David. Tu reples omnem locum, & comprehendis, & nullo loco comprehenderis, nec ullus te locus complecti, & contineri potest. Hinc Haebraei etiā Deum indigitant vocabulo [...] locum, quum dicunt, Benedictus locus [...] Cujus appellationis R. Elias in Tisbite adfert auplicē rationem. Quia Deus instar loci omnia com plectitur, ip se autem à nullo comprehenditur. Qui autē hodie contendant Deū esse corpus coelo inclusum, minus rectè sentiunt, quam Iudaeorum Rabbini. Dolendum est ista contraria errata hodie defendi. Quidā disputant et asserunt corpus Christi esse uti (que): et tamen negant esse spiritum praesertim immensum & infinitum. Alij negantes Deum esse spiritum simplicem, faciunt corporeum, & loco circumser [...]nt▪ C [...]ppen in Psal 139. ver. 7 [...] Quo ibo à spiritu tuo.Hebrews enstyle by the name of place; to wit, infinite.

[Page] 2 But what shall we answer unto these or the like captious demands of the Atheist: If the world, if time, if place, which now are, had not been from everlasting? where was your God when these were not, some where, or no where? If no where, Hee and Nothing might be fellow residents. In respect of eternity or immensity, no creature, no positive essence, no numerable part of this Vniverse is so like unto Him, as this negation of all things, which we describe by the name of Nothing. It hath no beginning or end of dayes. Nothing or the negation of all things, as it is the object of our positive conceit, is more like unto Him than any one thing, in that no distinct or proper place of residence can bee assigned to nothing, or to the negation of all things: Yet most unlike him, in that it is truly and absolutely no where, not in it selfe. Non entis, non est actio, non est qualitas, non conditio, That which is not can have no capacity to accept any condition of being, it can have no right or title to bee termed it selfe. We may truly say some objective conceipts are nothing: but we cannot rightly conceive, that nothing should have any degree or kinde of being; and want of being is the worst kinde of barrennesse that can be imagined. We cannot imagine it should bring forth any degree or ranke of being. It cannot be mother to that which possibly may bee; it cannot be nurse to that which is. But of God wee cannot absolutely say, He was no where, before the world was made; we must use this limitation [Hee was no where save in Himselfe:] But such and so in Himselfe, that He was more than all things, longer [Page] than time, greater than place, more infinite than capacity it selfe, uncapable of circumscription or commensurability, able to limit time and place, (or whatsoever we conceive to be by succession or addition infinite,) by his essentiall presence, or coexistence more than penetrative; being so in both, in all things that are, as nothing possibly could have beginning, or continuance of being, unlesse He were in them, as the center of their supportance; yet so as they cannot environ or encompasse him. The absolute infinity of his being includes an absolute impossibility of his being onely in things, that are, or may be, though by his power those may be in number, by succession, infinite.

3 Had the evaporations of proud phantasticke melancholy, eclipsed the lustre of his glorious presence, in that late prodigious Questionists braine, which would bring us out of the sunne-shine of the Gospell into old Aegyptian darknesse: For as some well conjecture, this error of inclosing God in the heavens, and excluding his essentiall presence from this inferiour world, was first brought forth in Aegypt, but so ill taken, as it could not be propagated to many nations; entertained by few Philosophers of better sort, Aristotle or the Author of the Booke de mundo ad Alexandrum, excepted; from whose opinion Verstius did herein dissent, that hee held God to be everywhere by his power, and immediate providence: His error notwithstanding, is exceeding grosse and unsufferable, in that hee makes his infinite power, wisedome, and goodnesse, in whose sweet harmony Divine Providence especially consists, [Page] but as Agents or Ambassadors to his infinite Majesty: as if his infinite Majesty onely were full compere to his Essence, unfitting to bee imployed abroad, or to keep residence any where, save in the Court of Heaven. Or if his power and wisedome be joynt assessors with his Essence in the heavens, and yet reach withall unto the earth, unto every thing within this Canopy, which is spred betwixt us and his glorious presence: His power, his wisedome, &c. may in some sort be held more infinite than his Essence, as being in many places where it is not. But for God to be everywhere here on earth, or in the region under the earth, by his wisedome, by his power, or by his goodnesse, is perhaps in his language no more, than that the effects of these Attributes are every where, that all things as well in earth as in heaven, are essentially subject to that eternall Law, which he hath appointed them; that every creature doth as constantly fulfill his will, and obey his power, in his absence, as if it were penetrated by his presence; that the eye of his knowledge pierceth every corner of the world, and seeth the secrets of mens hearts, as clearly, as if it were resident in their centers. And in part, unto this purpose, some great Schoolemen distinguish the manner of Gods being in all things, by his essence, by his power, by his presence. Let us take it as possible to supposition or imagination, (what by the habit of Christian faith, we are fully perswaded to bee in it selfe impossible) what by light of reason might be demonstrated to imply a manifest contradiction to any well-setled understanding, viz. [That infinite [Page]Essence or Being it selfe should not be every-where essentially present, or that infinite power should not bee able to reach every possible effect:] yet should al things that are, be present to him, whose name, whose best description is [I am.] Nothing could be done or said without his presence, that is, without his perfect notice. And in this sense perhaps it hath beene rightly avouched by some good Authors, whose meaning hath beene much mistaken, or wilfully perverted by others, That all things as well future as past, are alike present to Him, who was every where (before there was any distinction of times;) because nothing can bee said or done, without his perfect knowledge or just notice. Nothing can be begun, continued, or finished, without his expresse warrant or intuitive permission. He hath a vigilant eye over all things that are, or possibly can be. Or taking it againe as not impossible to imagination, that divine knowledge were not so truly infinite as wee beleeve it is; yet admitting his power to bee truly infinite, nothing could be done, said, or intended, without its concourse, operation, or assistance. So that he might be everywhere by his infinite power, albeit his knowledge were not infinite; or everywhere by his infinite knowledge, albeit his power were but finite. But by the infallible consequence of these indemonstrable principles, it will necessarily follow, That his Essence, being as was shewed before, truly infinite, nor world, nor time, nor place, nor power, nor wisedome, nor any thing possible can be where it is not, it must needs be, where any thing is, or possibly may be. He is in every center [Page] of bodily or materiall substances, in every point imaginable of this visible Vniverse, as an essentiall root, whence all and every part of what is besides him spring, without waste or diffusion of his substance, without nutriment or sustentation from any other root or element. The conservation of immaterial or illocall substances, is from the benefit of his essentiall presence. Materialls are daily made and renewed by the transient efficacy of his creative power.

4 Doe we make these collections only, or doth not the Scripture teach this Philosophy also? Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God farre off? Ier. 23. 23. Nothing is, nothing can be without the reach of his power, his omnipotency cannot be confined within the places that are: for his hand hath made them all, not as Prisons to inclose his Essence, not as manicles to hinder the exercise of his mightie arme. Can any hide himselfe in secret places, that I shall not see him? saith the Lord, Ibid. vers. 24. This is a formall demand of our assent unto the infinitie of his knowledge. These are two speciall, but not the onely wayes of his being every where, which the Scripture teacheth: for there followes a third, which after the manner of our understanding, is the root or foundation of al the rest; that indeed, from which the two former branches are most necessarily inferred, Doe not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord. Doth He fill heaven and earth by his power, or by his knowledge onely? Nay, but most properly and in the first place by his essentiall presence. For his Essence is infinitely powerfull, [Page] infinitely wise.

His filling the earth as well as heaven, by his essentiall presence, cannot be denyed but from one of these two reasons following.

Either, That his Essence is altogether uncapable of intimate coexistence, with such grosse and base creatures, as the parts of this inferiour world:

Or else, Because it is his will, to abstract or withhold his essentiall presence from them.

To affirme the former part, to wit, That his nature is uncapable of intimate coexistence with any nature created by Him, is to deny his omnipotency; as all, by necessary consequence, doe, which grant not the immensity of his Essence. For what can withstand or withdraw his Essence from piercing the earth, as well as heaven? Not the hardnesse of it, not the loathsomnesse of the vile bodies contained in it. If either of these qualitites, or ought besides, could deny the admission of his essentiall presence, he were not omnipotent, because not able to place his Essence in that locall space, in which, were it filled with more subtill or more glorious bodies, it might as well reside, as in the heavens. Suppose he should (as no doubt hee is able) annihilate the earth, and create a new heaven in the space wherein it now is, or demolish his present heavenly seat, or turne it into a baser masse then this earth is; were it not possible for him to bee in this new heaven by his essentiall presence, or should he be neither in it, nor in the new earth? If hee could not be here, he were in this respect more impotent than the Angels, who can change their mansions when they mislike them.

[Page] 5 Shall wee then take the latter part of the former division, and say, It is his will and pleasure to withdraw his Essence from this lower roome of his own Edifice, whiles it remaines so ill garnished, as now it is? If hee have made heaven his habitation by choice, not by necessity of his immensity, with which all places, as we contend, must necessarily be filled; hee might relinquish it by the like free choice of some other mansion, which he could make for himselfe as pleasant and beautifull: yea, Hee might by the like freedome of will, come and dwell with us here on earth. So that in conclusion, he which admitteth Gods wil to be free, but denies the absolute immensity of his Essence, makes him capable of locall motion or migration from place to place. And such motion necessarily includeth mutability, which is altogether incompatible with infinity. Reason grounded on Scripture, will warrant us to conclude from the former principle, that hee which hath no cause of being, can have no limits of being, no bounds beyond which it cannot be. Essence or being illimited cannot possibly bee distinguished by severalties of internall perfections, though united: much lesse can it be distinguished or limited by any place, whether reall or imaginarie. In that he is the authorlesse Author of all being, it is altogether as impossible for Him not to bee in every thing that is, as it is for any thing to be without Him. The indivisible unity of his infinite Essence is the center and supporter of all things, the conservation of place, and that which holdeth things divisible from resolving into nothing.

[Page] 6 Dominus ipse est Deus in coelo sursum & in terra deorsum: The Lord (saith Moses) hee is God in heaven above, and in the earth below, Deut. 4. 39. yet saith Salomon, 1 King. 8. 27. Behold the heavens, and the heavens of heavens are not able to containe thee. May we say then, Hee is as truely without the heavens, as he is in them? or that he is where nothing is with Him? surely, hee was when nothing was, and then hee was where nothing was besides himselfe. Or peradventure before the creation of all things numerable, there neither was whē nor where, but only an incomprehensible perfection of indivisible immensity and eternity; which would still be the same, though neither heaven nor earth, nor any thing in them should any more be. We may not so place him without the heavens, as to cloath him with any imaginary space, or give the checke to his immensity by any parallel distance locall. But hee is said to be without the heavens, in as much as his infinite Essence cannot bee contained in them, but necessarily containes them. Hee is so without them, or if you will, beyond them, that albeit a thousand more Worlds were stowed by His powerfull hand each above other, and all above this; Hee should by vertue of His infinite Essence, not by free choyce of will, or mutation of place, bee as intimately coexistent to every part of them, as Hee now is to any part of this Heaven and Earth which wee see. This attribute of Divine immensitie was acknowledged, and excellently expressed by many of the Ancient Philosophers, but most pithily [Page] by some of the Ancient Fathers. Before all things, saithAnte omnia enim Deus erat solus, ipse sibi & mundus & locus, & omnia. Solus autem, quia nihil aliud extrinsecus praeter illum. Caeterum ne tunc quidem solus: habebat enim secum quam habebat in semetipso, rationem suā scilicet. Tertul. adversus Praxean. cap. 5. Tertullian, God was alone, and hee was to himselfe, world, place, and all things. The manner of his coexistence with the world, De confusione linguarum. Philo the Iew well expressed: God filleth all things, yet is contained in none, containing all. The vicinity of His Essence preserveth their Essences more truly than the symbolizing qualities of their naturall places doe. And even this efficacy of symbolizing or preserving qualities, flowes as immediately from his essentiall presence, as the passive aptitude of bodies preserved by them, doth. The more the places are through which bodies naturall swiftly move, the lesse properly they are in them. In analogy to this condition of naturall bodies, the more capable man is of all knowledge, the more lyable his capacity is to distraction, as consisting rather in united perfections, than in firme and indivisible unity of perfection. And therefore it is often said of most pregnant wits, qui ubi (que) est, nusquam est, He that is every where, is no where. Or he that ingageth himselfe to all courses of life, goeth through with none. But of God, who is perfection it selfe, not by aggregation, but by absolute unity of Essence; that of Saint Bernard is most admirably verified, Nusquam est, & [...]bi (que) est, Hee is no where, because no place whether reall or imaginary can comprehend or containe him: He is every where, because no body, no space, or spirituall substance can exclude his presence, or avoid the penetration of his Essence. But Saint Gregories Character of Gods ubiquitary presence and immensity, is more [Page] lively and full. Deus est intra omnia non inclusus, extra omnia non exclusus, supra omnia non elatus; God is within all things, yet not shut up, or inclosed in them; he is without all things, yet not excluded from them; hee is above all things, yet not elevated or exalted by them; hee is below all things, yet not burdened or depressed by them. Greg. in Psal. 139.

7 Anselmus notwithstanding (had not long custome or generall consent prescribed too strōgly against him) would have reformed this kinde of speech, Deus est in omni loco, God is in every place, by changing one particle, Deus est cum omni loco, God is with every place. This Criticisme of his, though well approved by some good writers; whilest they dispute against such as say God was every where, before any place was, yet (in my opinion) the use of it, were it as common as the other, which he sought by this to correct, would cōceale much matter of admiration, (which the description of immensity used by Saint Bernard and others promptly suggests) if not occasion or suggest an erroneous imagination of coextension in the Divine Essence. The bodies which are contained in places, are truly said to be with the places which containe them, and the places with them; and wee may distributively averre, that every body is with every place, and every bodily substance is with its mathematicall dimen [...]ions, in the same place with it. But so to be in every place, in every least part of every body, as not to bee contained in any or all of them, though we should multiply them in infinitū, [Page] doth exclude all conceipt or coextension with thē, and much better notifie the indivisible unitie of Gods immensity, & the incōprehensiblenes of his essentiall presence, than if wee should say he were with every place. But as no Characters of the incomprehensible Essences ubiquitary presence doe so well befit it, as these that intimate more to our cogitations than we can in words expresse: So of this kinde I have found none, from which I have received so full instruction, or reaped the like fruits of admiration, as from that of Trismegist, Deus est sphaera, cujus Centrum est ubi (que), cujus peripheria nusquam, God is a sphere, whose Center is everywhere, whose circumference is no where. Not the least particle of this universall Globe or sphere, but is supported by the indivisible unity of his Essence, as by an internall Center. And yet neither the utmost circumference of this visible world, nor any circumference conceiveable, can so circumscribe or comprehend his essentiall presence, that it might bee said, thus farre it reacheth and no further. For albeit hee would crowne the convexity of these Heavens with others, so much higher and more spacious, than these Heavens, as these are than the Earth, and continue this course unto the worlds end: yet all should bee comprehended in his Essence; it could not be comprehended in any. Their circumference should still be somewhere, whereas his Essence, though still inlarging (by this supposed daily exercise of his power) the bounds of its actuall coexistence with these new creatures, is in it selfe altogether boundlesse. Omnipotency it selfe, [Page] cannot pitch a circumference to it, because nothing can be, but it must be in it, which onely truly is, and cannot bee contained in any thing imaginable. In that all things are contained in him, he is rightly resembled by a sphere, which is of al figures the most capacious. In that all things cannot comprehend him, He is rightly resembled by a sphere whose circumference is no where.

8 Two points notwithstanding in the former resemblance seeme difficult to mens conceipts; but more difficult it is fully to expresse what may rightly be conceived concerning them. The former difficulty is, how a Center should be conceived to be every where: The second, how the indivisibility of Gods presence in every place, should bee compared unto a Center. To the former it may be sayd, That as the divine Essence by reason of its absolute infinity, hath an absolute necessity of coexistence with space or magnitude infinite: so were it possible there should bee (as some Divines hold it possible there may be) a magnitude or materiall sphere actually infinite; this magnitude could have no set point for its Center, but of every point designable in it, wee might avouch this is the Center as well as that. Every point should have the negative properties of a sphericall Center; there could be no inequality betweene the distances of severall points from the circumference of that which is infinite, and hath no bounds of magnitude. To the second difficulty it may bee said, The manner of divine presence or coexistence to every place or parcell of bodies visible, is rightly compared unto a [Page] Center, in that it hath no diversity of parts, but is indivisibly present to all and every part of things divisible. His presence againe is herein like to magnitude actually infinite, in that it can have no circumference. But whether the divine Essence may have as perfect actuall coexistence to every point or Center, as it hath to every least portion of magnitudes divisible, cannot so cleerely bee inferred from the indivisibility of divine immensity, because the indivisibility of Centers or points, and of spirituall substances are Heterogeneall, and Heterogenealls are oft-times assymmetrall, that is, not exactly commensurable. Hence the most subtill Schoole-men or metaphysicall Divines, as well ancient as moderne, resolve it as a point irresoluble by humane wit, whether a mathematicall point or Center can be the compleat and definitive place of an Angell, albeit they hold the Angelicall natures to bee as truely indivisible, as points or Centers are. But it is one thing for an immateriall or spirituall Essence to have true coexistence with every Center, another to be confined to a Center, or to have a definitive place or coexistence in it. And whatsoever may bee thought of Angells; of the Divine Essence we may say, that he is as properly in every Center as in every place, seting wee acknowledge Him to bee alike incomprehensibly and indivisibly in both. The manner of his indivisibility we conceive by his coexistence to a Center. His incomprehensiblenesse, by his coexistence to all spaces or places imaginable, without coextension to any, without comprehension in all. We may in no case [Page] imagine, that there is more of God, or that God is more fully in a great space than in a little; in the whole world, than in a man or little world. For this once granted, an Asses head should participate the essentiall presence of the Deity in greater measure than a mans heart doth. But in what respects God is said to bee more specially present in one place than in another, or to be present with some, and absent from others: hereafter.

9 The absolute perfection of this Attribute, in whose right apprehension or conceipt many other divine perfections, according to our manner of conceiving them, are as it were couched or lodged, may best bee gathered by opposition to the imperfections of bodies or materiall magnitudes. A body though of Homogeneall nature, suppose a Pole or stone fixed in the earth, invironed above with water and the ayre, can have no coexistence with these divers bodies, otherwise than according to the diversity of its owne parts: that part of it which hath coexistence with the ayre, can have no coexistence with the earth or water. Farre otherwise it is in God, whose absolute infinity in that it is not composed of parts, but consists in perfect unity, cannot bee coexistent to any place after any other manner than He is coexistent to all, that is, by indivisible unity or identity, Wheresoever He is (and Hee is every where,) He is unity it selfe, infinity it selfe, immensity it selfe, perfection it selfe, power it selfe. All these branches of quantity, in which we seek to ingrasse so many sorts of infinities, thereby to expresse or resemble His incomprehensible nature, [Page] do flow from participation of his infinite presence. Vnlesse He were infinitie or immensity it selfe, there could be no magnitude, no measure quantitative, by whose multiplication wee could in any sort gather or guesse what immensitie or infinitie meant. That imaginary infinitie which wee conceive by succession or composition of parts (for their severall extensions finite, though in number infinite) is but a transient raye or beame of that actuall and stable infinitenesse, which Hee possesseth in perfect unitie, without any imaginary diversity of parts united. Had his immensity any diversity of parts, there should be more power in many parts, than in one, or few: unto the full exercise of his whole power or force, there should bee a concurrence of all parts required: & this concurrence of parts in number infinite, would perhaps be impossible. Infinitum transire non potest. At the least, were divine power so lodged in divine immensitie, as strēgth or power is in our bodily faculties, it could not bee so omnipotent, as we beleeve it is. Our strength or force is alwaies increased by unition or cōtraction of severall parts; His power can receive no increase seeing his immensity excludes al division, & doth not so properly include, but rather properly is, Vnity it selfe.

10 The Prophets and other holy men in their patheticall expressions sometime speake of God as farre absent, because his powerfull presence is not manifested in such sort as they could wish. Oh that thou wouldest rend the Heavens (saith the Prophet Esa. c. 64. 1.) that thou wouldest come downe, that the mountaines might flow down at thy presence: As when [Page] the melting fire burneth, the fire causeth the waters to boile: to make thy name knowne to thine adversaries, that the Nations may tremble at thy presence. When thou diddest terrible things which wee looked not for, thou camest downe, the mountaines flowed downe at thy presence. But to indoctrinate us, that this description of his powerfull presence did include no dogmaticall assertion of his locall descent, no denyall of his being everywhere, or filling every place by his essentiall presence: the same Prophet elsewhere pictures out his immensity to us under the shape of a Gyant able to squeze the whole Globe of Heaven, Earth & waters; Who hath measured the waters in the hollow of his hand? & meted out heaven with his span, and comprehended the dust of the earth in his three fingers (after such a manner as men take up dust or sand) and weighed the mountaines in scales, and the hills in a ballance? Esay 40. 12. Behold the Nations are as a drop of a Bucket, and are counted as the small dust of the Ballance. Behold, he taketh up the Isles as a very little thing. All Nations before him are as nothing, and they are accounted to him lesse than nothing and vanity, vers. 15. 17. Thus hee linketh his essentiall presence with his power and knowledge. Why sayest thou O Iacob, and speakest O Israel; My way is hid from the Lord, and my Iudgement is passed over from my God? Hast thou not knowne? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, the Lord, the Creator of the ends of the Earth fainteth not, neither is wearie? there is no searching of his understanding. vers. 27, 28. Yet Iob in his anguish had almost said as Iacob did; O that [Page] I knew where I might finde him! that I might come even to his seat! I would know the words which he would answer me & understand what he would say unto me. Behold, I go forward but he is not there, and backward but I cannot perceive him: On the left hand where he doth worke, but I cannot behold him: he hideth himselfe on the right hand, that I cannot see him. Iob 23. 3, 5, 8, 9. But though he might hide himselfe from Iob, yet could not Iob hide himselfe or his wayes from him: for so he confesseth in the next words, He knoweth the way which I take, vers. 10. Whither shall I goe (saith the Psalmist) from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flye from thy presence? If I ascend up into Heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in Hell, behold thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost parts of the Sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me, &c. Psal. 139. vers. 7, 8, 9, 10. Thou hast possest my reines; thou hast covered me in my mothers wombe. These and the like straines of other godly men, argue a sympathy of Gods essentiall presence, not onely invironing their bodies, but penetrating their soules, and diffused through their hearts. His coexistence with all, his essentiall presence or inhabitation in all, is the same, although the worldly minded take no notice of it. And when it is sayd, that he beholdeth or knoweth the ungodly afarre off, this language fitly expresseth their conceit of him, and of his essence. They consider not, that hee is alwayes neere unto them, alwayes about them, alwayes within them, but in heaven onely, whither their thoughts seldome ascend. And according to[Page]their misconceit of him, so it happens to them, they imagine him to be farre distant from them, and his helpe and succour in their distresse comes slowly to them, as if it had too farre to goe.

CHAP. 6.
Of Eternity, or of that branch of absolute infinity, whereof successive duration or the imaginary infinity of time, is the modell.

1 WHatsoever hath beene, or rightly may be conceived of divine immensity, will in proportion as well suit unto eternity. And unto this Divine Attribute is that of Tertullian as applyable: [Ante omnia Deus erat solus, & erat sibi tempus, mundus, & omnia:] Before all things were, God was, and he was unto himselfe time, the world, and all things else. We cannot properly say, He was in time before he made the world. For as Saint Augustine acutely collects, if he which alwayes is, and was, and is to come, had alwayes beene in time; hee could not have beene before all times, nor could he be, as we beleeve he is, as truly before all times future, as before all times past. His eternity then, is the inexhaustible fountain or infinite Ocean, from which time or duration successive (in what finite substances soever they bee seated,) with all their severall branches or appurtenances, doe perpetually flow; and unto eternity, they have if not the same proportion, [Page] yet the same references, the same dependances on it, which finite and created magnitudes have to Divine immensity.Vide Tertul. in Apologet. cap. 48▪ As there was from all eternity a possibility for us to bee before wee were; so our actuall being or existence, whilest it lasteth, is composed of a capacity to be what we are, and of the actuation or filling of this capacity. Life (sensitive especially) is but the motion or progresse of this capacity towards that which fills it, or as it were a continuall sucking in of present existence, or continuation of actuall being, from somewhat praeexistent. Vnlesse the vegetables, by which our life is continued, had existence before they become our nutriment, they could not possibly nourish us, or continue us in that estate of being which we have. Nor could these Vegetables themselves exist, unlesse they did draw their existence or continuation of their being, from that which did every way exist before them; and unto which they doe by motion or continuation of their being approch. So that future times, and all things contained in time it selfe, presuppose a fountaine of life, as truly praeexistent to their future terminations or motions, as it was to their beginnings. That description of time [tempus edax rerum,] as if it were the devourer of all things which are subject to alteration, did rellish more of poeticall wit, than of any metaphysicall truth. For if time did devoure al things which are brought forth in time, what is it that could possibly nourish them, or continue their being from their beginning to their end? whilest the time appointed for them lasts, they cannot possibly be consumed [Page] or perish. Nothing there is that doth or can desire its owne destruction, nor long after the presence or fruition of that, which doth devoure or destroy it. All things naturally desire the continuation of such being, as they have; which notwithstanding things temporall cannot have, but from the continuation or fruition of time. Time then it is not, but their owne motions or endeavors to injoy or entertaine time approching, which doth waste or consume things temporall. We naturally seeke to catch time, and it is the nature of time, though continually caught, not to be held by us. This nimblenesse of time, is so like unto the swift progresse of motion, that some acknowledge no difference at all betweene them. Whereas in true Philosophy, the length of time passing by us, is onely notified by motion. Motion in true observation goes one way, and drives time another, as the streame which runnes Eastward, turnes the Wheele Westward. Our actuall being or existence slides from us with time, and our capacity of being, continuing still the same, runnes on still, being alwayes internally moved with desire of actuation or replenishment. And this replenishment cannot otherwise bee gotten, than by gaining a new coexistence with time approaching, whose office, designed by Eternity, it is to repaire the ruines which motions present or past have wrought in our corruptible substances. The best of our life, the very being of things generable (asA rebus generalibus si abstuleris ipsum erit; cum in perpetuâ acquisitione versentur, subitò non esse contingit. Rebus autem, quae non sunt tale, si ipsum erit adjunxeris, accidit à se [...]e ipsius esse labi. Manifestum enim ex hoc fuerit, ipsum esse non esse illis innatum, si fiat ex eo quod futurum sit, & factum fuerit, & sit in posterum faciendum. Videtur enim in rebus generabi libus id potissimum eisentia esse, scilicet tractus quidam ab ipso esse ex generationis initio, quousque ad temporis extrema perveniat, quando non sit ulterius, idque ipsum quod dicitur, est in eis existete, ac si quis quicquā ex hoc ductu circumcidat, vita comminui. Qua propter & esse diminui, & universo quidē esse eiusmodi oportet, quous (que) sic erit. Quam [...]rem ad ipsum esse futurum natura festinat, ne (que) vult qui [...]scere, quippe cum esse sibi hauriat dum ali [...]d quiddam at (que) aliud agit, movetur (que) in orbem quodam essentia desiderio. Plot. Emead. 3. pag. 328. Plotinus excellently observes) is but as a continuall draught or receipt of beeing from the inexhaustible fountaine of life. Nature, saith he, (meaning [Page] the nature of things generable) hastens unto that being which is to come, nor can it rest, seeing it drawes or suckes in that being which it hath by doing now this and now that, being moved as it were in a circle with desire of Essence or of Being what it is. Nor are we men, or any creatures (specially generable) permitted to draw or sucke so much of our proper being from the fountaine of Eternity, at once, or in any one point of time, as we list. We have our portions of life or selfe-fruition distributed piece-meale and sparingly unto us, lest too much put into our hands at once, might make us prodigall of the whole stock. As may yonglings by their parents too much bounty towards them, whilest their experience is small, overthrow themselves and their posterity. And nimblest wits, for the most part, runne through largest fortunes in least time; usually shortning their dayes by taking up pleasures (due in their season) beforehand, seeking as it were to enjoy the fruits of many yeres duration all at once. Whereas fruition of delights and pleasures should be measured by the capacity of our estate or condition; as wise men fit their expences according to the tenour of their revennues.

2 Albeit the constant motion of the Sunne and Moone be appointed by the Creator as a common standard for the measuring of all times: yet every thing temporall, or endowed with duration measurable [Page] by the motion of the heavens, hath its proper time, which in all of them is no other than a participation of eternity. And hee should define the severall branches of time most exactly, that could number or decipher the severall actuatiōs, draughts or replenishments, which are derived from the infinite fountaine of life & being, to fill the capacities, or satiate the internall desires of things temporall. And albeit the motion of the heavens bee constant and uniforme; yet the duration of things temporall or sublunary (though measured by their constant motion) is capable of internall contraction and dilatation. Some things have a kind of a double duration, and runne a course of time as it were indented. Life, albeit in it selfe most sweet, yet in us is often charged with soSee Ecclesiasticus 41. 2. great a measure of sowre occurrences, that were it at all or most times, as some whiles it is, the fruition of it could not quite the paines we are put to in preserving it. And the worse our estate is, the longer it seemeth to bee such, because vitall existence or duration, through distraction of mind, or vehement motion, seemeth divided into more parts, then without such impulsions it could take notice of. In griefe or paine wee strive to thrust time present apace from us, that some other may come better attended. In delight or pleasure wee seeke to arrest it, and wish to have our joyfull moments fixed, or to have them still to returne and goe, so that wee might prolong our daies by living the same times over and over again, as men often walke longer in pleasant gardens, then in vast fields, by often resuming the same short [Page] walkes. Were it possible for us to stay those gratefull parcels of time, till new ones come with like supply; the current of pleasure, thus damnd vp, would swell; and our fruition of such imperfect existence as we have, would be much more perfect and entire. But seeing the pleasure of borrowed life, is to the identity of being, but as water to the pipe, through which it runnes; all the remedy wee have against welcome times departing from us, is to regain the like, and make up the unity of our existence of selfe-fruition by equivalency. The gluts or gushes of pleasure, may at one time bee much greater than at another, yet still transient, never consistent. The fruition of them cannot possibly be entire: begotten and dying in every moment; they are, and they are not in a manner, both at once; so that we lose them as we gaine them.

3 The Angelicall natures, albeit they account not the continuation of their duration, nor number the portions of their participation of eternity, by the motion of the heavens, as being not fed with expectance of that time or successiō, whose opportunites wee watchfully attend: yet their desires (more fervent by much then we have any) to continue what they are, witness they have not all that in present possession, wch is allotted to their compleat duration. Nothing, being the foundation as well of angelical excellēcies, as of our mediocrities, makes them uncapable of that entire selfe-fruition, which is essentiall to him which made thē of nothing, being made of none. He, as he is of himselfe without beginning, so is he entirely in himselfe, and can acquire [Page] nothing by succession. He desires not his own duration, wch none can give him, nor needs he to desire it, because it is alway entirely & indivisibly present, without possility of addition. For how should Essence it selfe, or infinity of being, get ought to morrow, which to day it hath not; or lose ought to day which yesterday it had. The first branch of impossibility wch we can conceive as incident to him, that is thus truly infinite, is, not all times to containe within himselfe all fulnesse of joy, however possible. He is life it selfe, & therfore life truly infinite. And infinite life, being infinitely sweet, containeth joy truly infinite; altogether uncapable of any addition or diminution. As in a body infinite (could any such be) there could be no middle or extreams; so neither can infinite life admit any parts, as being indivisible into duration subsequent & precedent. Natures, capable of these differences, have alwayes the one accomplished by the other. Time comming (as we said before) repaires the losses of time going, and perfects or supports things naturall by successive continuance of present being. But perfection it selfe can no more bee perfected, than whitenesse can be dyed white. Life, or Essence infinite, excludes vacuity, or capacity of resumed acts to fill up the measure of actuall existence, or fruition of being. In that he is [...], All-sufficient, he can want nothing; and to him that can want nothing, all must be present. We must then conceive of the Divine Essence, as infinite, not onely in life, but in the degrees or acts of life: which in the eternall cannot be many, but onely take the denomination [Page] of plurality, from things decreed. As Hee is said Everlasting with reference to the perpetuity of succession, which still supposeth his interminate existence, as present to the whole and every part of it. Consider him in himselfe, and He is every way indivisibly infinite, and interminable; not onely because Hee had no beginning, nor shall have ending: For so might time or motion be held interminable, could the Heavens have beene created from Everlasting; whose revolutions neverthelesse or successive parts of motion, should have beene truly numerable, and therefore terminable; whence whatsoever had beene contained within their circuit, should still have gotten somewhat which before it had not, either addition of duration, or (which is all one) continuance of their first existence, or some new Acts of life, of sense, or reason. But unto Essence infinite, none of these can accrue. If they could, as yet he should not be, nor ever could Hee bee actually eternall, but everlastingly onely by succession. For Eternity, as Boetius hath well defined it, is the entire or totall possession of interminable life, all at once or together. Howbeit these termes of totall fruition or possession, may seeme to include some parts, though not in the life possessed, yet in the possession of it; which (I take it) was farre from this good Authors meaning. What meant he then to use such tearmes? onely to exclude succession, which hath a totality of Being, but not altogether, or all at once. As the next houre, and whatsoever shall have successive duration in it, shall bee wholly and fully existent; but so as one part shall [Page] goe before, another come after. So is not that duration which is interminable. But in what sense totality is attributed to essence or duration infinite, will better appeare in the issue of these explications. This definition of Boetius, though conceived in such termes as might minister occasion of wrangling in subtile disputes; doth notwithstanding imprint a more lively character or notion of the Everliving God his infinite happinesse, than Aquinas definition doth, though very artificial: [Aeternitas est duratio manens, uniformis, sine principio, & fine, mensurâ carens,] Eternity, is a duration uniforme, and permanent, without beginning or end, uncapable of measure.

4 ButAc si quis aeternitatem ita descripserit, scilicet vitam jam infinitam ex eo quod sit universa; nihil (que) amittat, cum nihil vel praeterierit, vel sit futurum; alioquin jam tota nō esset: is profecto proximè ad definitionem ejus accedet. Quod enim deinceps subditur, scilicet totā esse, nihil (que) amittere, expositio quaedam est ejus quod dicebatur, scilicet (vita jam infinita) Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4. p. 329. Plotin (in mine opinion) gives a more deepe and full apprehension of it in fewer tearmes; [Aeternitas est vita infinita] Eternity is infinitie of life. And such we gather it to be, because it is the university or totality of life, and can lose nothing, in that nothing of it is past, nothing to come. He addes withall, that these termes of Being, All, whole, or losing nothing, are added onely for explication of that, which is sufficiently contained in these words, Infinite life. In the same Treatise he excellently observes, when we say, That is Eternal, which alwayes is: (as the Greeke [...] verbatim signifies) thisNon aliud quiddam est ens, aliud vero semperens, sicut ne (que) aliud est Philosophus, aliud vero Philosophus verus. Verumtamen quia nonnulli Philosophiam simulant adjunction est Philosophus verus. Sic & enti ipsum semper & ipsi semper adjungitur Ens, adeò ut dicatur [...] .i. semper ens, unde dicitur [...] .i. aevum. Qua propter sic accipiendum est ipsum semper cum ente, ut vere ens nobis significet. Plotin. Emead. 3. lib. 7. cap. 4 p. 329. alway, is added for declaration sake, and yet being assumed to expresse the uncorruptiblenesse, [Page] or indeficiency of that which is Eternall; it breeds a wandring imagination of plurality or indivisibility of duration. The best medicine, by his prescription, for purging our brains of this erroneous fancy, were to enstyle Eternity onely with the name of Entity or Being. But as being is a name sufficient to expresse Essence, and Essence it selfe, or essence independent a full expression of Eternity: yet because some Philosophers comprise generation, or the being of things generable under the name of Essence, it was behooveful for our better instruction, to say, that is Eternall, which alwaies is, & cannot cease to be. Whereas in true Philosophicall contemplation, it is not one thing, truly to bee, and alwayes to Be. There is no greater difference betwixt these two, than to be a Philosopher, and to be a true Philosopher. Now there can be no truth in saying, he is a Philosopher, who is no true Philosopher, for [ens & verum convertuntur] The Entity of every thing necessarily includes the truth of every thing. Notwithstanding because some doe counterfeit Philosophy, or falsly usurpe the name of Philosophers; we give the title with an addition to such as wel deserve it, and enstyle them, by way of difference from the others, true Philosophers. And in like manner, when we say, That is eternall, which alwayes is; wee seeke to notifie no more by this universall note, Alwaies, then that it hath a true and no counterfeit, no second-hand or dependent Being.

Another secondary and subordinate use of the universall signe, alwayes, added to entity, is, to intimate the interminable, indistinguishable & indivivisible[Page]power, which needeth nothing besides that which it actually and for the present hath. Now it hath All, that is or can bee, in that it truly Is: for true entity is absolute totality, and unto totalitie, nothing is wanting. But that which is in time comprehended, how perfect or totall soever it may bee in its kinde, besides other wants, alway needs somewhat to come, never fully besped of time. On the contrary, that which so is, as it needs no after being, and cannot be brought within the lists of time, either determinate, or in succession infinite, but now hath whatsoever is expedient to bee had: this is that, which our notion of Eternity hunteth after. That which thus is, hath not its Essence or Being delivered unto it enwrapt in quantity, but is precedent to all quantity or mensuration. Farre otherwise have things generable their being, as it were spun out from divisibility. The very first being which they have supposeth quantity, and as much as is cut off from the draught or extension of their duration, so much they lose of their being or perfection.

5 Ignorance of this Plotinicall Philosophie hath much perplext some Logi [...]ians, questioning whether Socrates in the instant of his dissolution or corruption, be a man, or corps, or both. To be both implyes a contradiction; these two negative propositions being simply convertible, No corps can be a man, no man can bee a corps. And yet there is as much reason, that he should in this instant bee both as either. For true resolution we are to say, He was a man, and shall be a corps, or he ceaseth to bee [Page] the one, and begins to be the other. But the Being or existence of both being mensurable by time, must needs bee divisible, and for this reason, not comprehensible by an instant which is indivisible. But Plotins conclusion is, whilest wee seeke to fit that which truly is, with any portion of measure or degree of quantity, the life of it being thus divided by us, loseth its indivisible nature; We must then leave it (as it is) indivisible, as well in life or operation, as in Essence, and yet infinite in both.

Of time, no part truly is, but the present, which is never the same: and as one questioned (in that age wherein the Art of Navigation was imperfect) whether Navigators were to be reckoned amongst the dead or the living: So it is more doubtfull then determinable, whether time participate more of being, or of not being; yet as is time, such is the nature of things brought forth in time. But Eternity (being the duration of Him who onely Is, being made of none, but Maker of all things, and the dispenser of Time it selfe into its portions) asAd 7. Plotin. lib. Ennead. 3. Ficinus describes it, is as a fixed instant or permanent Center, which needs no succession for supply; all sufficient to support it selfe, and all things else. The same Writer not unfitly compares Eternity to a Center in a Circle; and time to the points or extremities of the lines in the Circumference, alwayes so moving about the Center, that were it an eye, it might view them all at once. Yet must we not hold Eternity to be indivisible, after the same manner that points or Centers are. These are indivisible, because they want the perfection of that [Page] quantity, whose parts they couple. Eternity is indivisible by positive infinite, as containing all the parts or perfections possible of succession in a more eminent manner, then they can be contained in time it selfe, which (as Plato wittily observes) is a moveable image of Eternity. This difference betwixt the indivisibility of an instant or moment, and Eternity, may perhaps make the solution of that seeming contradiction lesse difficult then it is to some great Schoolemens apprehensions: [Petrus in aeternitate agrotat, Et, Petrus in aeternitate nō aegrotat.] Peter is sick in eternity, Peter is not sicke in eternity. This affirmation & deniall, in one and the same indivisible instant or limited portion of time, would inferrean indivisible contradiction, which in eternity they doe not. And yet is Eternity more indivisible than an instant, but indivisible after another manner.

6 But I know not how it comes to passe, that the true shadow of perfection it selfe, is oft-times more apparant in things most imperfect. Natures more perfect (by a borrowed perfection) hold the meane betweene them; Out of both we may spell more than we can put together, for right expressing the nature of perfectiō it selfe. The prime matter, though of things created most imperfect, is of creatures sublunary, most like unto the Creator, in being ingenerable and incorruptible; in that it is the Alpha whence all things generable spring, and the Omega into which they are resolved: Yet is the prime matter most contrary to its Maker, in that wherein it doth resemble Him. It is in a sort or [Page] manner, all things generable, but perfectly nothing, as wanting the true unity of Entity, or determinate Being. The Creator or Essence it selfe, is the incomprehensible perfection of all things, without participation of their imperfections. The Earth againe is like the Eternall Founder in permanency and immobility, but this it hath from its naturall dulnesse; whereas the perfection of this shadow is in Him from the infinite vigour of his vitality. The swift motions of the Heavens, or motion as swift as we may imagine, is as a middle terme of proportion between the Earths immobility, and the supermotion, or more then infinite mobility of the Deitie, which we tearme the infinite vigour of his vitality. Instants in this are most like Eternity, in that an infinite number of them added together, yeelds no increase of quantity: Nor doth Eternity receive addition from succession infinite, which most unlike it in being divisible, doth yet better expresse the positive infinity of it, than instants can doe. Eternity againe, is like a fixed Center, because indivisibly immutable; yet withall most like a circle. And Trismegists description of the Deity, commutatis commutandis, as well exemplifies the Eternity, as the immensity of his nature. Eternity is a circular duration, whose instants are, alwayes, whose terminations or extremities never were, never shall be: It is coexistent to every parcell of time, but not circumscriptible by any: succession infinite cannot be coequall to it. For albeit the motion of the Heavens, or other notifications of duration divisible, should continue the same, without interruption or End: [Page] yet every period and draught of time, we can imagine, shall still fall within Eternity, now totally existent; and which hath beene, is, and ever will be unto every minute or scrupe of time, that hath beene, is, or shall be, alike everlastingly coexistent, not by acquisition of any new successive parts, but by indivisible and interminable unity.

7 We cannot perhaps properly say, that God shall be after all times or durations to come; for duration must flow from His Everlasting Being without end. And what can be after that which hath no end? And here we suppose, that albeit time or duration successive had their actuall beginning with the creatures: yet there shal be, or may be, if not a time, yet some duration successively infinite. And that onely is after this manner, infinite, unto which somewhat of the same kinde may still bee added. Thus, as in the continued and divisible quantities, [non datur minimum.] There is no fraction so little, but may be lesse; and as in numbers [non datur maximum] There is no number so great, but it may be made greater by addition: so in successive duration [non datur ultimum.] It may be truly said to last for ever, because it can have no last portion. But howsoever we cannot properly, or without exposing our speech to captious exceptions, say, that eternity shal be after all time or duration successive; (seeing this may seeme to import, that duration or succession shall finally cease:) yet that eternity (being duration, actually, interminably and indivisibly, not successively, infinite) now is, and ever was, as infinitely praeexistent or precedent to all ages, or [Page] successions comming towards us, one way; as it is and was to the worlds nativity, or the first out-going of time, the other way. This is a point which we must beleeve, if we rightly beleeve God to bee Eternall, or know what Eternity is. A point, which would to God they had seriously and in heart considered, which have had Gods eternall decree and the awards of it, most frequently in their mouthes and pens. And he is no Christian that would deny whatsoever is by God decreed, was so decreed before all worlds: So is he no Christian Philosopher, much lesse a true Christian Divine, that shall refer or retract the tenor of this speech [Before all worlds] to that only which is past, before the world began. Whatsoever can be more properly said or conceived to be past, then to be yet to come, or to bee in every moment of time designable, can have no property of Eternity. For that onely is Eternall, which alwayes is, and so alwaies is, that it hath precedence or praeexistence infinite to all successions, which way soever wee looke upon them, or take their beginning, whether backwards or forwards. It was a great oversight (or rather want of insight into the nature of this great Sphere or visible world) in Lactantius, (otherwise a learned Christian) not onely to deny there were any Antipodes, but to censure the Philosophers (which had gone before him) of grosse ignorance or infatuation, for avouching this truth, now manifested to meaner Scholars, or more illiterate Christians, than any which Lactantius taught. A greater ignorance it would be in us which acknowledge this truth, to [Page] say these Antipodes were under the earth, and the inhabitants of Europe and Africa onely above it; or that the Heavens were as farre under our Antipodes, as they are above us. For whosoever walkes on the earth, whether in this Region or that, whether at the halfe or full Antipodes, is above the earth. And every part of the Heavens unto which the lookes of men are erected, as well the Nadir as the Zenith, as well the South pole as the North-pole is above the earth. And as the Heavens are every way above the Earth, so is Eternity every way before all worlds, before all times. As we beleeve this visible world and all things in it, had a beginning; so we expect it shall have an end: Now the eye of Eternall Providence lookes through the world, through all the severall ages, successions, or durations in the world; as well from the last end to their first beginning, as from their first beginning to their last end. There is no period of time to us imaginable, which is not so invironed by Eternity, as the Earth or Center is with the Heavens; save onely that the Heavens are finite, and Eternity infinite. So that the Heavens though far every way, are no way infinitely above the Earth; whereas Eternity or Gods eternall decree, are every way infinitely before all worlds, before all times. In this sense, were it possible, the world might have beene created, or motions continued from everlasting; the Eternall, notwithstanding, should have been everlastingly before them. For that period of motion which must terminate the next million of yeares, shall have coexistence with Eternity now existent; [Page] whose infinity doth not grow with succession, nor extend it selfe with motion; but stands immovable with times present, being eternally before times future, as wel in respect of any set draught or point, whence we imagine time future to come towards us, as in respect of the first revolution of the Heavens, whence time tooke beginning. Or, to speake as we thinke, it is impossible to conceive any duration to be without beginning and ending; without conceiving it circular, and altogether void of succession. Notwithstanding, if any list to imagine time both wayes everlasting; the continuity of it may be best conceived by the uninterrupted fluxe of an instant; and the stability of eternity, by the retraction of such a perpetuall fluxe into one durable o [...] permanent instant.

8 O [...], not to suffer the remembrance of childish sports altogether to passe without any use or observation, if not for composing some greatest controversies amongst learned men, yet for facilitating contemplation in one of the greatest difficulties, that Philosophy, whether sacred or humane, affords to the conceit of the most curious. The difficulty is, how eternity being permanent and indivisible, should have coexistence with succession or motion. We have seene a Top turne so swiftly upon the same center, in a manner, that it seemed rather to sleepe or rest, than to move. And whilest it thus swiftly moved, any bright marke or conspicuous spot, how little soever, seemed to be turned into an entire and permanent circle. Seeing motion thus swift, may be procured by a weake arme, it will be [Page] no hard supposal to conceit that a mover of strength and vigour infinite, should be able to move a body in a moment. Admit then the highest visible sphere should be moved about in a moment; all the several parts of successive motion, which now it hath, would be contracted into perfect unity: which whether it should be called a cessation from motion, or a vigorous rest, or a supermotion, actually containing in it parts of motion successively infinit, were not so easie to determine. If thus it were moved about in an instant, the nature of it supposed to be incorruptible, and the mover immortall, remaining still in the same strength and minde; he would not move it more slowly this day or yeare, than he did the former. This supposition admitted, there should bee not onely parts successively infinite of one revolution, but revolutions successiuely infinit in one and the same instant. Or to speake more properly; As these revolutions should not properly be termed motion, but rather the product of motions infinitely swift, united or made up into a vigorous permanency: so should not the duration of one or of all these revolutions bee accounted as an instant or portion of time, but a kinde of eternity or duration indivisibly permanent. The motion of the eight sphere supposed to be such as hath beene said, that is motion infinitely swift, or not divisible by succession; the Sunne moving successively as now it doth, should have locall coexistence to everie starre in the eight Sphere, to every point of the Eclipticke circle wherein it moves, at one and the selfe same instant, or in every least parcell of time. [Page] Every Star in the eighth sphere, every point should be converted into a permanent circle; and so in one circle there should be circles for number infinite, as many circles as there bee points or divisibilities in the Ecliptique circle. Thus in Him that is eternall, are Beings infinite, and in Eternity are actually contained durations in succession infinite. The former supposition admitted, we could not say that the inferiour Orbes, moving as now they doe, did move after the eighth Sphere, but that the times of their motion were eminently contained in it. For the eighth Sphere being moved in an instant, should lose the divisibility of time, and the nature of motion, with all the properties that accompany them, not by defect, (as if it no way comprised them,) but by swallowing up time or division successively or potentially infinite, into an actuall permanency. By this supposition of passive motion made infinitely swift, by the strength of the mover, and improved into a kinde of actuall indivisible permanency, we may conceive of the first Movers Eternity, as Mathematicians conceive the true nature of a Sphere, by imagining it to be produced by the motion of a semicircle upon the Axis. For let the Eternall be but thus imagined to bee an intellectuall sphere, capable of momentary motion or revolution throughout this world; and the indivisible coexistence of his infinity, to every part of time and place, will be very conceivable. Yet as Mathematicians perswade not themselves, their figures are produced by motion, but rightly conceive their nature to be such without any production, as if they [Page] were so produced: so let eternall duration bee esteemed more indivisible, than the unity of motion conceived as infinitely swift, yet not made indivisible by such swiftnesse of motion, but indivisible onely of it selfe, and by the infinite vigour of his vitall essence, wherein all the perfection of motion or rest, are (if I may so speake) indivisibly tempered, or (lest I should bee mistaken) eminently contained. The same proportion which motion contracted into stability hath unto succession, hath divine Essence to all other Essences, eminently containing all, no one kinde formally. This divine Essence, whose essentiall property we conceive Eternity to be, is truly the totality of being;De hac duplice totalitate, vide Marsil. Ficinum ad 7. Plotin. lib. Enneadis. 3. a totality not aggregated of parts, but rather (as Plotine intimates) producing all other parts or kindes of being. Eternity likewise is a totality of duration, not aggregated of parts, nor capable of accesse or addition; but rather a totality from which all durations or successions flow, without resolution or diminution of its infinite integrity. As if a body should cast many shadowes of divers shapes in a running streame, the shadowes vanish and are repayred in every moment, without any diminution of the bodie.

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CHAP. 7.
Of the infinity of Divine Power.

1 THe circumstances of time and place are presupposed, the one as spectator, the other as stage to all things, which wanting place or time, or being it self, present themselves anew in their proper shape and forme. But of things so presented, operation or power in their kinde is the native and immediate property. Nothing that hath any proper seat or existence numerable in this spacious Amphitheatre, but is fitted for acting some part or other usefull for the maintenance of the whole. Now all operation or power, which (according to the variety of things created) is manifold and diverse, doth give but such a shadow of that infinite power, which is eminently contained in the union of infinite Essence, as time and place did of his immensity and eternity. The force and vertue of some things may perhaps more properly be termed strength or power passive, then operation. Howbeit even in the earth and earthly bodies, by nature most dull, there is a power or strength to sustaine waights laid upon them; a power to resist contrary impulsions, which perhaps essentially includes an active force or operation; a power of swaying to the center, which is no more passive than active, but a [Page] meane betwixt both. Even in the dullest body that is, there is a secret force or slow activity to assimilate other things to themselves, or to preserve symbolizing natures. In bodies lesse grosse and more unapt to resist violence offered, as in the windes, vapours, or exhalations, or in the spirits or influences which guide our bodies, we may perceive an active force or power motive fully answerable to the greatest passive strength or resistance. Other Elements or mixt bodies, are indued with an operative power of producing the like, or destroying contraries. Celestiall bodies, the Sunne especially, have a productive force to bring forth plants out of their roots, to nourish and continue life in al things. It is perhaps impossible, for any thing, that hath not being of it selfe, to receive infinity of being in any kind from another, though infinite. Impossible for the fire, because the substance of it is finite, to be infinitely hot; but were it such, it would be infinite in operation.

2 As the Author or first setter forth of all things operative, who alone truly is, surpasseth all conceit of any distinct or numerable branch of being: so is his power more eminently infinite in every kinde, than all the united powers of severall natures, each supposed infinitely operative in its owne kinde, and for number likewise infinite, can bee conceived to be. Now what was generally observed before, that things by nature most imperfect, doe oftentimes best shadow divine perfections, hath place againe in this particular. Gods infinite power is clearliest manifested in creatures which seem least powerful. [Page] Where wast thou (said God toCap. 38. vers. 4, 5, 6. Iob) when I laid the foundations of the Earth? declare if thou hast understanding. Who hath laid the measures thereof, if thou knowest? Or who hath stretched the line upon it? Whereupon are the foundations thereof fastened? or who laid the corner stone thereof? The excellent majesty of this speech, sufficiently testifies it was uttered by God himselfe, though taken from his mouth, by the pen of man. But setting aside the majesticke phrase or resemblance, farre surmounting all resemblance all observance of poeticall decorum; What cleerer fountaine of deeper admiration, can the eye of mans understanding looke into, then this, that not onely every corner stone in the world with its full burthen, but all the mighty buildings or erections, which are seene upon the whole surface of the earth; yea the whole earth it selfe, with all the mountaines and rockes upon it, with all the metalls or massie substance that are within it, should be borne up by that which is lesse than any corner stone, by that which indeed is no body or substance, not so much as a meere angle or corner. Yet so it hath pleased Him, by whose wisedome the foundations of the earth were layd; to make that little point or indivisible Center; which is farthest removed from our sight, the most conspicuous place and seate of that indivisible power which is infinite. Let Mathematicians imagine what rules or reasons of equipendence they list, their last resolution of all supportance into the Center, must suppose the same truth which the Aegyptian Magicians confessed, [Hic digitus [Page]Dei est] The finger of God is here. Impossible it were for that, which in it selfe is matter of nothing, impregnably to support all things supportable; unlesse it were supported by the finger of God. And yet if we conceive of Him, as Isaias describes Him, all the strength and power that is manifested in the supportance of the whole earth, and all therein, is not the strength of his little finger. Yea though wee should imagine, that as the waight of solids amounts according to their masse or quantity: so the sustentative force, which is chambered up in the Center, should be multiplyed according to the severall portions or divisibilities of magnitude successively immensurable: yet this imagination of force so multiplyed, it being divisible, could not equalize that true and reall conceipt of force divine, which ariseth from consideration, that it is indivisibly seated, throughout immensity. To uphold earths innumerable much weightier and massier than this is, which borne by him, beareth all things; would be no burthen to his power sustentative: (so from the effects, his power, though in it selfe one, must receive from us plurality of denominations.) And yet fully commensurable to this power sustentative, is his active strength or power motive. He that spans the Heavens with his fist, could tosse this Vniverse with greater ease, than a Gyant doth a Tennis Ball, throughout the boundlesse Courts of immensity. Rocks of Adamant would sooner dissolve with the least fillep of his finger, than bubbles of water with the breath of Canons.

3 Our admiration of this his active power, [Page] which we conceive as incomprehensible, and altogether uncapable of increase, may bee raised by calculating the imaginary degrees of active powers increase in creatures divisible, as well in quantity, as operation. Though Powder converted into smoake, be the common mother of all force, which issueth from the terrible mouth of the Gunne: yet the Canon sends forth his bullet (though more apt to resist externall motion) with greater violence than the Sachar: and every Ordinance exceeds other in force of battery, according to the quantity of the charge or length of barrell. But were it possible for the same quantity of steele or iron, to bee as speedily converted into such a fiery vapour, as gunpowder is; the blow would be ten times more irresistible then any, that Gunpowder out of the same close concavity, can make. The reason is plaine; the more solid or massie the substance to be dissolved, is, the greater quantity would it yeeld of fire, or other rarer substance, into which it were dissolved. And the greater the quantity, the more violent is the contraction of it into the same narrow roome: and the more violent the contraction is, the more vehement is the eruption, and the ejaculation swifter. Thus from vapours rarified or generated in greater quantity, than the concavities of the earth, wherein they are imprisoned without vent, is naturally capable of; doe Earthquakes become so terrible: These and the like experiments bring forth this generall rule, The active strength of bodies multiplieth, according to the manner of contraction or close unition of parts concurring to the impulsion[Page]or eruption: So doth the active force or vigour of motion, alwayes increase, according to the degrees of celerity which it accumulates. Now though the most active and powerfull essence cannot be encompassed with walls of brass, nor chambred up in vaults of steele, albeit much wider than the heavens; yet doth it every where more strictly gird it selfe with strength then the least or weakest body can be girt. For what bonds can we prescribe so strict, so close or firme, as is the bond of indivisible unity, which cannot possibly burst or admit eruption, wherein notwithstanding infinite power doth as intirely and totally encampe it selfe, as in immensity. How incomparably then doth His active strength exceed all conceipt or comparison? The vehemency of his motive power, whose infinite Essence swallowes up the infinite degrees of succession in a fixed instant, and of motion in vigorous rest; cannot bee exprest by motion so swift and strong, as would beare levell from the Sunne setting in the West, to the Moon rising in the East. To cast the fixed Starres downe to the Center, or hoyse the Earth up to the Heavens, within the twinkling of an eye, or to send both in a moment beyond the extremities of this visible world, into the wombe of vacuity whence they issued, would not straine his power motive. For, all this we suppose to be lesse then to bring nothing unto something, or something to such perfection, as some of his creatures enjoy. Howbeit even such as take the fullest measure of perfection from his immensity, must derive their pedigree by the mothers [Page] side, from meere nothing or vacuity. Homo, saith S. Austine, terrae filius, nihili nepos; Man is the son of the earth, and the grandchilde of nothing. And when he shall come unto the height of his glory, he cannot forget, he must remember, that the worme was his sister, and the creeping thing the sonne of his mother. To produce as many worlds out of nothing, as the Sunne each yeare doth Herbes or Plants out of the moistned Earth, would breed no cumbrance to his power or force productive. To maintaine, repaire, or continue all these in the same state, whilest he makes as many moe, would neither exhaust nor hinder his conservative vertue. Multiplicity or variety greater than wee can imagine of workes most wonderfull, all managed at one and the same time, could worke no distraction in his thoughts, no defatigation in his Essence. From the unity of these and the like branches of power, all in him most eminently infinite, doth the attribute of Omnipotency take its denomination, whose contents, so farre as they concerne the strengthning of our faith, shall hereafter be unfoulded.

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CHAP. 8.
Of the infinity of Divine Wisedome. That it is as impossible for any thing to fall out without Gods knowledge, as to have existence without his power or essentiall presence.

1 BVt power in every kinde thus eminently infinite, could not be so omnipotent, as we must beleeve it; did it not in this absolute unity of all variety possesse other branches of being, according to the like eminency or infinity of perfection. Strength or power, if meerely naturall or destitute of correspondent wisedome, to comprehend, manage, and direct it, might bring forth effects in their kinde truly infinite, whose ill forecast or untowardly combinations, neverthelesse, would in the issue argue lamentable impotency, rather then omnipotency. And hard it would be to give instance almost in any subject, wherein a double portion of wit matched with halfe the strength, would not effect more, or more to the purpose, then a triple portion of strength, with halfe so much wit. Archimedes did not come so farre short of Polyphemus in strength or bulk of body, as the wonderfull works wrought by his Mathematicall skill, did exceed any that the Gyant could attempt.

2 Every choice is better or worse accordingly as it more or lesse participates of true wisedome: [Page] And most unwise should that choice justly be esteemed, which would not give wisedome preheminence to power. Knowledge then, might wise men choose their owne endowments, would be desired in greater measure then strength. Wisedome, saith the Wiseman, is the beginning of the wayes of God. And shall not that branch of being, by which all things were made, by which every created essence hath its bounds and limits, be possest by Him, (who gave them being and set them bounds,) without all bounds or limits! above all measure? Yes, whatsoever branch of being wee could rightly desire or make choice of before others: the inexhaustible fountaine of being hath not chosen, but is naturally possest of, as the better. And therefore if we may so speake, though both be absolutely infinite; his wisedome is greater then his power, to which it serves as guide or guardian. And as the excellency of the Artificers skill often recompences the defect of stuffe or matter: so the infinity of wisedome or knowledge seemes, in a manner, to evacuate the necessity of power or force distinct from it. Howbeit I will not in this place, or in our native dialect, enter that nice dispute, which some Schoolemen have done; Whether Gods Essence and Knowledge be formally his Power. But whilest we conceive Power and Wisedome as two attributes formally distinct, (at least, to ordinary conceipts,) we may conceive Wisedome to be the father, and Power the mother of all his workes of wonder. As for Philo and other Platonicks that make Knowledge the mother of all Gods workes, it is probable they dreamed of a created [Page] Knowledge, or perhaps under these termes, they cover some transformed Notion of the second person in Trinity, who is the Wisedome of the Father, by whom also he created all things: who as he is the onely begotten Sonne from eternity, so is hee likewise a joint Parent of all things created in time by the Father; as Eve was in some sort Adams daughter, and yet a true mother of all that call him father. But here we speake not of that wisedome of God, which is personall; but of the wisedome of the Godhead, as it is essentially and indivisibly infinite in the whole Trinity.

3 Wisedome, as all agree, is the excellency of knowledge, from which it differs not, save only in the dignity or usefulnesse of matters knowne, or in the more perfect maner of knowing them. Though no man be wise without much knowledge, yet a man may know many things, and not be very wise. But if we speake of Knowledge divine, not as restrained in our conceipt to this or that particular, but simply, as it comprehends all things, the name of Wisedome in every respect best befits it: for though many things knowne by him, whilest compared with others more notable, seeme base and contemptible; yet not the meanest, but may be an object of divine contemplation to a Christian, that considers not the meere matter or forme, or physicall properties, but the Creators power, or skill manifested in it. How much more may the vilest creatures, whilest he lookes upon his owne worke in it, and the use whereto he appointed it, be rightly reputed excellent? He knowes as much of every [Page] Creature, as can be knowne of it, and much more than man possibly can know: and thus he knoweth not onely all things that are, but all that possibly may bee. This argues wisedome truly infinite; whose right conceit must be framed by those broken conceipts which we have of the modell of it.

4 Of wisedome then or usefull knowledge, the parts or offices are two: The one stedfastly to propose a right end: The other, to make and prosequute a right choice of meanes for effecting it. Humane wisedome is oft-times blinde in both, and usually lame in the latter. Neither can we clearly discerne true good from apparent; nor doe our consultions alwayes carry eaven, to the mistaken markes whereat we ayme; but be the end proposed good or bad, so it be much affected, the lesse choice of meanes is lest, the more eagerly wee apply our selves unto their use, and strive as it were, to straine out successe by close embracing them. And for this reason, ignorance or want of reason to forecast variety of meanes for bringing about our much desired ends, is the mother of selfe-will and impatience. For what is selfe-will, if a man should define it, but a stiffe adherence to some one or few particular meanes, neither onely nor chiefly necessary to the maine point? And wits conscious of their owne weakness, for conquering what they eagerly desire, presently call in power, wrath, or violence, as partiall or mercenary seconds to assist them. Whereas hee that out of fertility of invention, can furnish himselfe beforehand with store of likely meanes for accomplishing his purpose, cannot much esteeme [Page] the losse or miscariage of some one or two. Howbeit, as mans wit in this case is but finite, so his patience cannot be compleat. Even the wisest will be moved to wrath or violence, or other foule play, if the game whereat he shoots be faire and good, and most of his strings already broken. Nor can he be absolutely secure of good successe, so long as the issue is subject to contingency, and may fall without the Horizon of his foresight and contrivance. But wisedome infinite doth compleatly arme the Omnipotent Majesty (if I may so speake) with infinite patience and long-suffering, towards such as every minute of their lives violently thwart and crosse some or other particular meanes, which he had ordained for his glory and their good. Hee is light, saith the Apostle, and in him is no darknesse. He distinguisheth the fruits of light from fruits of darknesse, before they are, even before he gave them possibility of being. As impossible it is for his will to decline from that which he discernes to be truly good, as for his infinite Essence to shrinke in being. Many things may (as every thing that is evill doth) fall out against his will, but nothing without his knowledge, or besides his expectation. That which in its owne nature (as being made such by his unalterable decree) is absolutely contingent, is not casuall in respect of his providence or eternall wisedome. In that he fully comprehends the number of all meanes possible, and can mixe the severall possibilities of their miscariage, in what degree or proportion he list: he may, and oft-times doth, inevitably forecast the full accomplishment of his [Page] proposed ends, by multiplicity of meanes, in themselves not inevitable, but contingent. So that, successe is onely necessary to the last, yet not absolutely necessary unto it. All the necessity it hath is ofttimes gotten by casuall miscariage of the possibilities bestowed upon the former: as if he ordained the apprehension of a Traytor, or of a Malefactor, by an hundred meanes, all by the immutable decree alike possible, and equally probable; if ninety and nine doe misse, the hundreth and last, by the rules of Eternall Wisedome, must of necessity take. But in that it was possible for the former to have taken, successe falls to this last, not by absolute necessity, but as it were by lott; for it might have beene prevented by the former, by supposall onely of whose miscariage it is now necessary. And yet successe it selfe, or the accomplishment of the end proposed by infinite wisedome, was absolutely necessary and immutable.

5 There is a fallacy, though the simplest one that ever was set to catch any wise man, wherein many excellent wits of these latter ages, with some of the former, have beene pitifully intangled. The snare, wherein it were not possible for any besides themselves to catch them, they thus frame or set, Whatsoever God hath decreed, must of necessity come to passe: But God hath decreed every thing that is: Therefore every thing that is, comes to passe of necessity. All things are necessary at least in respect of Gods decree. The extract or corrallary whereof, in briefe, is this: It is impossible for ought, that is not, to bee: for ought that hath beene, not to have beene, for ought [Page]that is, not to be; impossible for ought to be hereafter, that shall not be. But if it be (as here I suppose) very consonant to infinite wisedome; altogether necessary to infinite goodnesse; and no way impossible for infinite power, to decree contingency as well as necessity; or that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; a conclusion quite contradictory to that late inferred, wil be the onely lawfull issue of the former Maxime, or major proposition matched with a minor of our choosing. Let the major proposition stand as it did before, [Whatsoever God hath decreed must of necessity come to passe] with this additionall, Nothing can come to passe otherwise than God hath decreed it shall or may come to passe. The minor proposition, which (if our choice may stand) shall be consort to the major, is this, But God hath decreed contingency as well as necessity, or, that some effects should bee as truly contingent, as others are necessary; Therefore of necessity there must bee contingency, or effects contingent. The immediate consequence whereof is this, There is an absolute necessity, that some things which have not beene, might have beene; That some things which have beene, might not have beene. That some things which are not, might be; That some things which are, might not be: That some things which shall not be hereafter, might bee; That some things which shall be hereafter, might not be. But as ill weeds grow apace, so the late mentioned errour once conceived, was quickly delivered of a second, which derived the infallible certainty of Gods foreknowing things future, from an infallible necessity (as [Page] they conceived it) laid upon them (before they had being) by his immutable decree. But every wise decree presupposeth wisedome, and wisedome essentially includeth knowledge: shall we then grant that Gods Knowledge is antecedent, and his foreknowledge consequent to his decrees? or shall we say he did inevitably decree the obliquity of Iewish blasphemy against his Sonne, because he did most certainly foreknow it, or, that hee did therefore certainly foreknow it, because hee had irresistibly decreed it? Most certaine it is, that he did as perfectly foresee or foreknow all the obliquities of their malice & blasphemy against Christ, as he did their very acts or doings: if those could be distinguished from their acts or doings. Briefly, to admit the former conclusion; That the Eternall foreknowes all things, because he decrees them; or, that they are absolutely necessary in respect of his decree; were to imprison his infinite wisedome, in his selfe-fettered power; to restraine the Eternall Majestie from using such liberty in his everlasting decrees, as some earthly Monarchs usurpe in causes temporall or civill: For, Papae nunquam ligat sibi manus; The Pope (as they say) never tyeth his owne hands, by any Grant or Patents: which is a fault in him; onely because he is otherwise very faulty, and unsufficient to support or weild so high a prerogative with upright constancy. But, in that Holy and mighty One, the reservation of such liberty (as anon we intimate) is a point of high perfection.

6 That to be able to decree an absolute contingency as well as necessity, is an essentiall branch of [Page] Omnipotency or power infinite, shall (by the assistance of this Power) be clearly demonstrated in the Article of Creation. That God did omnipotently decree a contingency in humane actions, that the execution of this decree is a necessary consequent of his communicative goodnesse, (a consequent so necessary, that unlesse this be granted, we cannot acknowledge him to be truly good, much lesse infinitely good,) shall (by the favour of this his Goodness) be fully declared in the Treatise of mans fall, and of sinnes entrance into the World by it. That which in this place wee take as granted, is, ‘That Gods wisedome is no lesse infinite than his power; that he perfectly foreknowes, whatsoever by his omnipotency can be done; that his power and wisedome are fully commensurable to his immensity and eternity; that all these rules following, are exactly parallell in true Divinity.’

‘Gods Presence is not circumscriptible by the coexistence of his creatures; He is in every one of them as a Center, and all of them are in Him as in a circumference capable not of them only but of all that possibly can bee; onely uncapable of Circumscription or Equality.’

‘His Eternity is more than commensurable to time or any duration of created Entities: It is in every duration as a permanent instant; and all durations are contained in it, as a fluent instant in a set time, or as noonetide in the whole day.’

‘His Power likewise may not be confined to effects that are, have beene, or shall bee: the production of every thing out of nothing, argues it [Page] to be truly infinite; and yet the production of all, is to the infinity of it, not so much as a beame of light which is strained through a needles eye, is to the body of the Sunne, or to all the light diffused throughout the world.’

Least of all may his infinite wisedome be comprehended within those effects which by his power have been produced, or which it now doth or hereafter shall produce. But looke how farre his immensity exceeds all reall or compleat space, or his Eternity succession, or the duration of things created, or his Power all things already reduced from possibility to actuall existence; so farre doth his infinite Wisedome surmount the most exact knowledge that can bee imagined of all things already ereated and their actions. Nothing that is, could have borne any part in the world, without the light or direction of his Knowledge: and yet that measure of his Knowledge which can bee gathered from the full harmony of this Vniverse, is lesse in respect of it absolutely considered, then skill to number digits, is to the entire or exact knowledge of all proportions or other arithmeticall rules or affections, that can arise from their multiplications or divisions. The causes, properties, & hidden vertues of each thing created, are better knowne to Him, than so much of them as we see or perceive by any other sense, is to us: and yet He knowes whatsoever by infinite power possibly might have beene, but now is not, whatsoever hereafter may be, though it never shall be; as perfectly as he doth the things which at this instant are, heretofore have beene, or hereafter must be.

[Page] 7 The subject wherein this his incomprehensible wisedome exhibits the most liuely and surest apprehensions, for drawing our hearts after it in admiration; is the harmony or mixture of contingency with necessity. And this, most conspicuous in moderating the free thoughts of Men or Angells, and ordaining them to the certaine and necessary accomplishment of his glory. The contingent means which by his permission and donation, these creatures may use for attaining their severall ends, or private good, may be successively infinite. And yet, albeit the utmost possibilities of their varieties and incōstancies, were reduced to act, the ends notwithstanding, which his infinite wisedome hath forecast in their creation, should by any course of many thousands, which they may take, be as inevitably brought to passe, as if no choice or freedome had beene left them; or as if every succeeding thought had been drawne on by the former, and al linked to that which hee first inspired, or by his irresistible power produced, with indissoluble chains of Adamantine Fate. We would esteeme it great wisdome or cunning (to use S. Austines illustratiō) in a Fowler to be able to catch againe all the Birds, wch he had formerly caught, after he had permitted every one of them to take wings and flye which way they listed. God hath nets every where spred, for catching such as his wisedome suffers to flye farthest from him, or most to decline the wayes which in his goodnesse he had appointed for thē: and (which is most of all to be admired) the very freedome or variety of mens thoughts, so they be [Page] permitted to imploy them according to their owne liking, becomes their most inevitable, and most inextricable snare. For all their thoughts are actually numbred in his infinite wisedome, and the award of every thought determinately measured, or defined by his Eternall Decree. So farre is freedome of choice or contingency from being incompatible with the immutability of Gods will, that without this infinite variety of choice or freedome of thought in man and Angels, wee cannot rightly conceive him to be as infinitely wise, as his decree is immutable.

8 Free it was for mee to have thought or done somewhat in every minute of the last yeare, whereby the whole frame of my cogitations or actions for this yeare following might have beene altered: and yet should God have beene as true and principall a cause of this alteration, and of every thought and deed thus altered; as he is of those that de facto are past, or of that which I now thinke or doe. Nor should his will or pleasure (as some object) depend on mine, but mine though contingently free, necessarily subject unto his. For unto every cogitation possible to man or Angell, he hath everlastingly decreed a proportionate end: to every antecedent possible, a correspondent consequent; which needs no other cause or meanes to produce it, but onely the reducing of possibility (granted by his decree) into Act. For what way soever (of many equally possible) mans will doth encline, Gods decree is a like necessary cause of all the good or evill that befalls him for it. Did we that which we [Page] doe not, but might doe; many things would inevitably follow, which now doe not. Nor doe the things, which at this instant befall me, come to passe, because he absolutely decreed them, and none but them (as we say) in the first place; But because hee decreed them as the inevitable consequents of some things, which hee knew I would doe, which notwithstanding hee both knew and had decreed, that I might not have done. For whatsoever I should have done and have let undone, there was a reall possibility to have done it; though not inhaerent in me, yet intituled unto mee in particular by Gods Decree; untill some demerit of mine or my forefathers, did cut off the entaile, and interrupt the successefull influence. For here I will not dispute, how farre the sinnes of Parents may prejudice their Children; but these termes should, or might, being referred to matters of duty; are as infallible signes in Divinity, as in Grammar, of a potentiall, what we should have done or might have done, was possible for us to have done, by that decree whence all power and possibility, not meerely logicall, is derived. So then, both that which might befall me if I did otherwise, and that which now befals mee doing as I doe, flow alike immediately from the absolute necessity of his eternall decree: whose incomprehensible wisedome herein appeares most admirable; that though the variety in this kinde were infinite, yet should it comprehend all; not one thing could fall without the actuall circumference of it.

9 The generall reason, why most Christian [Page] writers are more able and apt both to conceive right, and to speake more consequently to what they rightly conceive, concerning other branches of divine absolute infinitenesse, than concerning his infinite knowledge, is, because all creatures without exception, are true participants of Gods other Attributes, besides his wisedome or knowledge. For even the meanest creature, the worme or gnat, hath a portion of that being, of that power, of that duration, which in him are infinite: and that portion of these attributes which they have, or that quantity of being which they have, is a participation of his immensity. But of his knowledge or wisedome, men and Angels (the manner of whose knowledge is to men for the most part unknowne) are of all his creatures the onely participants. And (as hath been observed before) those rules are alwayes the most cleare and certaine, and most easily gathered; which are gathered from an uniforme identity of particulars, in variety of subjects. Those universall rules (on the contrary) are hardly gathered, or (without accurate observation) are lesse certaine, which can be experienced onely in some one or fewer subjects. Another speciall reason why we doe not conceive so magnificently or so orthodoxally of Gods knowledge, as were fitting; is, because we want fit tearmes to expresse them in. For seeing words are taken as the proper vesture of our thoughts & conceipts; and seeing most men are apt to conceive or judge rather according to the vesture or outward appearance of things, than according to the inward truth: it is almost impossible for us not to transforme [Page] the manner of Gods knowledge or decrees, into the similitude of our owne conceipts, conjectures, or resolutions; so long as we put no other vesture or expressions upon Gods decree or knowledge, than were fitted for our owne. To salve this inconvenience, or to prevent the occasion of this errour,Quomodo est praescius, dum nulla nisi quae futura sunt, praesciātur? Et scimus quia Deo futurum nihil est, ante cujus oculos praeterita nulla sunt, praesentia non transeunt, futura non veniunt: quippe quia omne quod nobis fuit & erit, in ejus prospectu praesto est, & omne quod praesens est, scire potest potius quam praescire. Greg. lib. 20. in Iob. cap. 24. Et paulo post, In illo, nec praeterita, nec futura reperiri quaeunt, sed cuncta mutabilia immutabiliter durant; & quae in seipsis simul existere non possunt, illi simul omnia assistunt, nihil (que) in illo praeterit quod transit: quia in aeternitate ejus modo quodam incomprehensibili, cuncta volumina saeculorum transeuntia manent, currentia stant. Vide Petrum Damianum in ep. 4. de omnipotentia, & Ludovicum Ballaster Hierologiae, cap. 3. Saint Gregory moves this doubt: How we can say there is any praescience or foreknowledge in God, seeing onely those things can be properly said to be foreknowne, which are to come: whereas we know, that nothing is future unto God, before whose eye, no things are past; things present doe not passe by Him, things future doe not come, upon Him. Whatsoever hath beene to us, is yet in his view; and whatsoever is present, may rather be said to be knowne than foreknowne. To the same purpose Saint Austine would have Gods knowledge of things which are to come, to bee tearmed rather science than praescience or foresight; seeing all things are present to God. But these two great lights of the Latine Church, with some others that follow these for their guides, have not in this argument exprest themselves so clearly or so accurately as that their expressions can passe without question or exception in the Schooles. We may not say (nor did Saint Austine or Saint Gregory, as I presume, thinke) that God doth not see or know a distinction betweene times past, present, or to come, more [Page] cleerely than we doe. If then he distinguish times present from times past or future, how is it said by St. Gregory; that nothing to him is future, nothing past? If these differences of time or of succession be reall; the Eternall knowes these differences much better than we doe. And if he know a difference between things present, past, and to come; to be present, past, or to come, is not all one in respect of his Eternall knowledge. If God, as all grant, be before all worlds; his knowledge being coeternall to his being, must needs be before all worlds. And Saint Austine himselfe grants a scientia a science or knowledge in God most infallible, of all things that have beene, are, or shall be; before they are, were, or could be; for they could not be coeternall to him, who is before all worlds, the beginning of the world it selfe, and of all things in it. Now all knowledge of things not yet present, but to come, is foreknowledge: to determine or decree things future, is to predetermine or foredecree them. And seeing God from Eternity hath both knowne and decreed the things that then were not; he is said to have foreknowne and foredecreed them. So then God foreknowes, and man foreknowes; God hath decreed, and man hath decreed. But the difference between the manner of their foreknowing and decreeing, being not oft-times wel expressed by learned writers or teachers, and seldome duely considered by their Readers or hearers; the identity of words wherewith we expresse our own foreknowledge & Gods foreknowledge, begets a similitude of conceipt, or will hardly suffer us rightly to conceive [Page] the true difference betweene the nature and manner of humane wisedome, and wisedome divine. And this hath beene the fertile nursery of many errours in this Argument, which now and hereafter we shall endeavour to displant: imitating the Heralds, who are often enforced to give the same Coat to divers parties; but alwayes with some difference, remarkeable to such as are conversant in the mysteries of their Art.

10 Our knowledge of things to come is many wayes imperfect; (and foreknowledge onely) because the duration neither of our knowledge, nor of our selves, as yet can reach unto that point of time, wherein things so knowne, get first existence. We looke on them as on things afarre off, which we expected to meet; for as things past resemble moueables going from us, so things future seem to come upon us. And whiles they get being, which before they had not; we get continuance of being, and of knowledge, which before we had not; that is, we gaine a reall coexistence with them: For if the daies, or thred of our life should be cut off before the things foreknowne by us come to passe, or get actuall being; wee could not possibly haue coexistence with them. Such being or duration as they have, is too short the one way, & our existence too short the other way, to make up this knot or bond of mutuall relation, which wee call coexistence: There must be on our part, a continuatiō or lengthning of that existence which we have; and on their part, a growth into that actuall being, which whilest they are meerely future, they have not; before [Page] wee and they can bee truely said to exist together. Now if we shall mold the manner of Gods foreknowledge of things future in our owne conceipt or foreknowledge of them, we shall erroneously collect; that, seeing wee cannot infallibly foreknow future Contingents, so neither could they be infallibly fore-knowne by God; if to him or in respect of his decree, they were contingents, and not necessarily predetermined.

And some there be, which push our pronenesse to this errour forward, by another; not distinguishing betweene contingency and uncertainty, they argue thus;

That which is in it selfe uncertaine, cannot certainly be knowne:

Every future contingent is in it selfe uncertaine: Ergo, it is not possible, that a future contingent should certainly be knowne.

But they consider not that there is a twofold uncertainty: one formally relative: another onely denominative or fundamentall. That which is relatively uncertaine, cannot be certainly knowne; for so it should bee certaine to him, to whom it is uncertaine. But a future contingent, as it is contingent, doth not necessarily or formally include this relative uncertainty; although it usually be in part the foundatiō or Cofounder of it. For relative uncertainty, or that uncertainty which is so termed with relation unto knowledge, results partly from the nature of the object, suppose a future Contingent or Event mutable; partly and more principally, from the imperfection of the knowledge, in respect [Page] of which it is said uncertaine. But the same effect or event, which is in part the foundation of uncertaintie, with respect to finite or unperfect knowledge, may bee the distinct and proper object of knowledge in it selfe infallible, or of knowledge infinite. Now if we grant, that there is any knowledge in it selfe infallible, we cannot imagine that any thing possible (yet is every future Contingent, though we consider it as contingently future, possible) should bee uncertaine unto such knowledge. We should againe consider, that the Eternall Providence, doth neither know or foreknow Contingents future, by interposed or expiring Acts; but by interminable and Eternall Knowledge, in which there is no succession, nothing future, nothing past. And without the interposition of some determining or expiring Acts, there can bee no errour in men; no man erres while hee is in the search of truth, or whilest he suspends his Iudgement. Take then away the imperfection of our knowledge or iudgement, whilest it is in suspense; which is ignorance, rather than errour; and it better resembles divine knowledge, than our actuall resolutions or determinations doe.

11 The best knowledge which we can have of things contingent, is but conjecturall: and of things meerly casuall, we cannot have so much as a true conjecturall knowledge; for, those things we tearme casuall, wch are without the reach or sphere of our forecast or conjecture. And hence it is, that the actuall exhibition of any event, whether casuall or contingent, doth alwaies actuate, increase, or perfect [Page] our knowledge. The true reason why we cannot certainly foreknow events contingent, is because our Essence & Knowledge are but finite: so that things contingent are not so contained in us, that if we could perfectly know our selves, wee might perfectly know them. But in the Divine Essence all reall effects, all events possible, whether necessary, casuall, or contingent, are eminently contained, the perfect knowledge of his owne Essence, necessarily includes the perfect knowledge not onely of all things that have beene, are, or shall bee, but of all things that might have beene, or possibly may be. For as Gods Essence is present in every place, as it were an ubiquitary center; so is his Eternity or infinite duration indivisibly coexistent to every part of succession; and yet withall is round about it. Hee it is, that drives things future upon us, being from Eternity as well beyond them, as on this side of them. Though hee should create other creatures without the circumference of this world, they should be all within his presence, without which, it is impossible ought besides him, should have any existence: yet should he not properly gaine any new existence in them, but onely take a denomination of coexistence with them; because they have existence in Him, which before they had not. Thus, admitting the branches of Contingency or indifferent possibilities never reduced to act, to be in our apprehension numberlesse; yet whensoever any thing comes to passe, which might not have beene, it cannot fall without the sphere of Gods actuall knowledge, [Page] which is fully commensurable to Eternity and Immensity; and therefore is not onely coexistent to every successive act, but doth environ whole succession. And whether of such things as possibly may be, more or fewer bee reduced to act; nothing accrewes to Eternall Knowledge, no new act can bee produced in it, by the casuall event; but only that which was eternally knowne, having now gotten actuall coexistence with Eternity, bestowes this extrinsecall denomination upon the Eternall Creator, It was foreknowne from eternity; that is, in plaine language, knowne, when it was not, by Him that more properly alwayes indivisibly, is, then was before it. And being such, his knowledge of things, which, in respect of us are onely future and foreknowne, doth as truly resemble, or rather containe our knowledge of things past or presēt, as of things to come. Now for us to apprehend a thing past, under the nature of a thing contingent, is not impossible. And though we certainly know it to bee already past, yet this certainty of our knowledge, doth not perswade us, that it came to passe certainly, or inevitably; but is very compatible with our conceipt of its contingency or casuall production, whilest it was present. Our knowledge of such things past or present, is necessary; but the event it selfe is not therefore necessary, nor to bee termed necessary in respect of our knowledge. Much lesse may we say, either that contingent effects are necessary, or that no effects are not necessary, in respect of Gods decree or foreknowledge of them. For if we beleeve that Gods foreknowledge of all events [Page] to come, be they of what kinde they possibly may bee, is more cleare and more infallible than our best knowledge of things past or present; the necessary infallibility of his knowledge, can neither adde any degree of necessity to the nature of the events foreknowne, nor take one jo [...] of contingency from them. God should not be absolutely infinite either in Essence or in Knowledge, if the absolute infallibility of his foreknowledge, or the impossibility of his not erring in his predictions, were in it selfe grounded upon, or to be inferred by us, from the absolute necessity of the event, rather than from the absolute infinity of his wisedome. For those effects which being otherwise in their nature contingent, it is in our power (by Gods permission, by circumspection and forecast) to alter by laying a necessity upon them, which before they had not; we are able (after this necessity laid upon them by our selves) infallibly to foreknow and foretell, albeit our knowledge still remaine but finite. Now, that some events, which are to day, in themselves and by Gods decree, truly contingent, may by our industry and circumspection, become to morrow truly necessary, no intelligent Christian Divine will (I hope) deny; or if any doe deny it, we shall be able (by Gods assistance) positively to demonstrate the truth of this our assertion, and withall demonstrate the dangerous inconveniences of the contradictory opinion, in the Treatise of Divine providence. In the meane time, to finish this principall stemme of Divine providence, to wit, his infinite Wisedome; and the dependance which things [Page] temporall have upon his eternall knowledge: Succession we imagine as a scrole containing severall columnes of contingency or indifferent possibilities; of which onely so many, or so much of any, as in revolution of time, take inke, and are unfoulded, become visible to Men and Angels. But the Almighty looketh on all things, as well from that end of time which is to come, as from that which is past: his infinite and eternall wisedome, doth not onely encompasse all things that come to passe, as the Circumference doth the Center; but penetrates the whole scrole of succession from end to end and from corner to corner, more clearly then the Suns brightnesse doth the perspicuous or purified Ayre. Those Columnes of meere possibilities never actuated, which his finger from Eternity hath drawne in Characters secret and invisible to his Creatures, are alike distinct and legible to his glorious eye, as those others whose first draught, being as secretly and invisibly fashioned by him, man or other second causes by his concourse, fill with actuall or sensible existence; as the Embroyderer doth the Drawers obscure patterne, with conspicuous branches of silke, gold, or silver.

12 But lest we may be thought to reade the Ancients with no greater reverence, than we do some moderne Writers from whom wee freely dissent, without any impulsion of envy or vainglory, let us for conclusion of this long discourse, a little reflect upon the testimonies before avouched out of S. Austine, and out of S. Gregory. The truth then at which these two learned Fathers aimed, & which, [Page] in the charitable construction of such as read them with reverence, they did not misse, may bee fully comprised in these observations following, which are but necessary extracts of what hath hitherto beene delivered. Whereas S. Gregory saith, Vnto God nothing is past, nothing to come; the true construction of his meaning is, that in Gods knowledge of things past, present, or to come, there is nihil futurum, nihil praeteritum, no such difference of time or duration, as we expresse by these words, future or past: for it alwayes is, and so perfectly alwayes is, that nothing can be added to it by succession or variety of events, be they necessary, casuall, or contingent. But as his Eternal knowledge of all things, doth not make all things, which he knowes, to be eternall (no not in respect of his Eternall Decree or Knowledge, for he eternally decrees and knowes things temporall and mutable:) so neither doth the immutable or absolute certainty of his knowledge, make all things so known by him, to be immutable or absolutely necessary, either in themselves or in respect of his Eternall Knowledge. Onely this we are bound to beleeve, and this is all that we may in this argument safely say: [Gods Knowledge of things mutable & unnecessary, is absolutely necessary, because absolutely infinite.] Againe, it is most true which S. Gregory saith; that things future doe not come upon God as they doe upon us; that things present do not passe him, or from him, as they do from us. Whilest things present passe from us, we likewise passe from them: for we continually lose that portion of duration or coexistence which [Page] wee had with them; alwayes gaining, whilest our glasse is in running, a new [...]rit or link of coexistēce with that which is next to come. Nothing, in this sense, can passe by God or from God, because He alwayes is, and the manner of his duration is indivisible: He cannot lose any existence by antiquity, nor gaine any new portion of duration, by everlasting continuance. Times passing exonerate themselves into the Ocean of his infinite duration, without inlarging it; times comming incessantly flow from it, without diminution of it. Times future againe, are said to come upon us, or to meet us; because our duration or existence cannot reach to future things, whilest they are future: the very Angels are not of so long standing or duration to day, as they shall bee to morrow: unlesse things future did come towards them, and as it were meet them, they should have no coexistence with them. In this sense, times future cannot be said to come upon God, because he alwayes is, and exists every way before them. His duration is yesterday, to day, to morrow, the same for ever; and every way the same without addition of quantity, without alteration of nature or quality: and in it are all things that are. So much of being as things future can bee said to have, they have it in him and from him: so much of being as there remaines of things past, remaineth in Him, and things present, even presence it selfe, cannot for a moment subsist, without Him.

[Page]

CHAP. 9.
Of Divine Immutability.

1 WIth these stemmes of Divine perfection hitherto exprest, another presents it selfe to our contemplation, which some Schoole-men have moulded in the same conceipt with Eternity; of which, others conceive it to bee the off-spring. Vs it sufficeth, that the true explication of the former, confirmes the truth of this attribute, whose briefe explication we now seeke. And perhaps, if I should speake properly, the Knowledge of it, is the Off-spring of our right knowledge of the former. The attribute it selfe, whose truth in former disputes hath beene supposed, is Divine Immutability; which may be thus demonstrated.

2 All mutation supposeth a defect or imperfection, either in respect of the terme, whence, or into which, the change is made; and therefore can have no place in absolute or abstract perfection, or in Essence infinite. More particularly, all mutation or change, is either in essence, in quantity, in place, or in quality; under which we comprehend all vitall endeavors, all acts of the Will or Vnderstanding. In essence or nature, it is impossible the totality and fountaine of Essence should admit any change, as impossible for him which hath no author of being, [Page] not to bee alwayes what hee is; as for that which now is not, to take his being to it selfe: unto infinit perfection (for such he is) what can accrew? On the other side, nothing can fall from it, but must fall into him; seeing, He is in being infinite. And in that he filleth every place by his essentiall presence, it is impossible hee should move from place to place, or be carryed by any circular motion, being indivisibly and totally in every space that can be imagined. And as his Immensitie could not be entended or contracted by extension of new magnitudes, or by diminution or annihilation of the old; so neither can his Eternity, bee shortned or lenghtned by continuation of succession, or expiration of time or motion. Power, in like sort, truly infinite, can admit no intension or remission, in endeavors; but moveth all things without motion, and worketh all things without labour or toyle inherent: For all things are made, and brought to nothing, by his sole will or word. Nor speakes hee ought, which from Eternity hee hath not spoken; albeit succeding ages have still new messengers of his eternall will and Word, All flesh is as grasse, and all the glory of man as the power of the grasse; the grass withereth, and the flower thereof falleth away. But the word of the Lord endureth for ever. And yet this was that word of the Gospell, which seemed then first to be preached unto them.

3 All the difficulty wherewith flesh and blood in this article are usually assaulted, or seeme to themselves to be beset, is, how his will or counsaile should be eternally immutable, and yet everlastingly free: [Page] but supposing, what we often promise, and once for all (by his assistance) shall undoubtedly prove; that absolute contingency or possibilities aequipendent betwixt many effects, may as truly be the object of his Eternall decree, as necessity in other workes of nature: I see not what appearance of difficulty can present it selfe, to such, as beare the two former principles before mentioned levell in their mindes and thoughts; the one, that God is absolute infinite in Being: the other, that Hee is absolutely perfect, according to all the branches of Beeing or perfection by us conceiveable; or, more than all these, Perfection it selfe. Now in things that have any better portion of Being, wherein they can truly delight; it is, to our apprehension, a degree or portion of perfection to have an immutable state of such Being; an imperfection, to be subject to alteration or change. But, whether their estate bee mutable or immutable, it is a greater perfection to be free in their operations, than to be restrained to some one or few particulars, without any choice or variety of subjects, wherein they may exercise their operative faculties. Bruitish, or meerly sensitive creatures have a delectable kinde of Being, whose continuance they desire; but without all variety of choice, or desire of any better being, although the best being they have be subject to alteration or change. Men are free in their operations; but mutable and subject to alteration, as well in their nature, as in their operations, or in the objects of their freedome; and yet are more excellent than the visible Heavens, which are not obnoxious [Page] to alteration or corruption. So that, if the Heavens, or other incorruptible substances, had their freedome of choice, which men have; they would bee more perfect and excellent creatures than man is: Or, if man were as immortall as they are, he would be incomparably more perfect than they can bee, without the freedome of choyce or will, which (as we now suppose) is the inseparable consequent, or companion of reason or intellectuall knowledge. But, though freedome be in it selfe a great perfection; yet to be free to do evil, is a branch of imperfection, which springs from the mutability of the creatures freedome. And this their mutability, though in it selfe an imperfection, yet is an imperfection necessarily praerequired, or praesupposed to the perfection of the creature. For no creature can bee truly perfect by nature, but by the will and pleasure of the Creator. And it is his will and pleasure, to make them mutable, before they be immutably happy. But the Creator of all things, in that He is absolutely perfect, even Perfection it selfe, is essentially immutable, essentially free, and immutably happy; because infinitely good. Yet if we compare these attributes amongst themselves, immutability is the ground or supporter, not the Crowne or perfection of freedome, but freedome rather the perfection of immutabilitie. Yet were freedome in it selfe, how perfect and complete soever it were, no absolute perfection, unlesse it were immutably wedded unto goodnesse. Absolute immutability and absolute freedome, may very well stand together, even in our conceipts; so they be rightly joyned, or sorted. To [Page] be freely immutable, implyes a contradiction; if not unto the nature of immutability, yet unto the nature of absolute perfection, or to our true conceipt of infinite Being. To be freely immutable, is a branch of imperfection or impotency; which might put al those perfections, which are contained in that nature which is no otherwise than freely immutable, upon the hazard. If the divine Essence were freely immutable, or free in respect of his immutability, whether of nature or goodnesse; it were possible for him to put off these two attributes, and to eloath himselfe with mutability, which is alwayes charged with possibility of doing amisse. But to be immutably free, is no point of imperfection; but rather the period of perfection; and necessarily inferres this perfection (which wee call freedome) to be as unchangeable as the Attributes of power, of wisedome, of eternity, or goodnesse are. The excellency of his nature and Essence necessarily includes an Eternall liberty or freedome in the exercise of his omnipotent power, and in the influence or communication of his goodnesse; Free it is for him, from Everlasting to Everlasting, omnipotently to decree as well a mutability in the actions of some things created, as a necessity or immutability in the course or operation of nature inanimate: That the course of mans life, or the finall doome awarded to every man (though that must be awarded unto all according to the diversity of their courses,) should be immutable; because they are foreset by an immutable omnipotent Decree; hath no more colour of truth, than to say the Omnipotent [Page] Creator, must needs be blacke because he made the Crowes and Ebony blacke; or white, because he made the Snow and Swannes white; or greene and yellow, because hee made the Gold yellow, and the Popinjayes greene: Or that hee should be of all colours, because the Rainbow is his creature. Let us beleeve then, that He is everlastingly and immutably free, to make creatures of what kinde it pleaseth Him, that he hath printed a resemblance of his freedome in the mutability of this inferiour world, and hath left a modell of his immutability in the celestiall and immortall substances. But the more immutable Hee is, the more irresistible we conceive his power to bee: or the greater his wisedome is, the lesse preventable the contrivances of it are: the worse it would be with such as have to deale with Him, were not his goodnesse (which is the rule of his Eternall Decree) immutably as great, as He himselfe, or his other Attributes are.

CHAP. 10.
Of the eternall and immutable Decree.

1 FRom all, or most of the former speculations, concerning the severall branches of the divine Attributes or perfections, somwhat may be gathered, not unusefull for rectifying or bettering our apprehensions of Gods absolute and omnipotent decree. [Page] A point, though in all ages most difficult, yet in this age become so common, and so farre extended, that no Divine can adventure upon any other service profitable for the present estate of Christs Militant Church, but he shall be enforced either to make his passage through it, or come so nigh unto it, that hee must, in good manners, doe homage unto it. That this Decree is for its tenour, immutable, (if wee take it in the abstract, or as it is in God) is cleare from the attribute last handled; that the same Decree, is irresistible in its executions, or that the things decreed are inevitable, is evident from the attribute of Gods infinite Power or Omnipotency. That this immutable irresistible Decree, is Eternall, or before all Times, no man questions. Yet is it not agreed upon by all, either what a Decree is, or what it is to be Eternall. All least the most part doe not perfectly beare in minde, the true importances of an Eternall Decree. To this purpose have the former speculations concerning Eternity, and Gods infinite wisedome beene praemised; Lest, by the incogitant use of these and the like Scripture Phrases, [God foreknowes or hath decreed all things from Eternity;] that slumber might creepe upon the unvigilant or unattentive Reader; with whose dreames many deceived, have thought and spoken of Gods Decree or predetermination of things to come, as of Acts already irrevocably finished and accomplished; And by a consequent errour, resolve that it is as impossible, for any thing to be otherwise than it is, will be, or hath beene; as it is to recall that againe, which is already past. In [Page] which conceipt, though they doe not expressely speake or thinke it, they necessarily involve thus much [That God by his Eternall and powerfull Decree, did set the course of nature a going with an irresistable and unretractible swingde; and since onely lookes upon it, with an awfull eye, as Masters sometimes watch their servants, whether they goe the way they are commanded.] But it is a rule in Divinity, not contradicted, (for ought I know) by any Christian, that there is altogether as great need and use of power and wisedome infinite, to manage the world, as there was at first to make it, Pater meus operatur adhuc (saith theIoh. 5. 17. Wisedome of God) et ego operor. My Father worketh hitherto, and I worke. And as hee ceaseth not to worke, so doth he never cease to decree. Omnia Ephes. 1. 11. operatur secundum consilium voluntatis suae. Hee worketh all things according to the counsell of his Will. So that albeit the Counsell of his Will, by which hee worketh, be Eternall; yet all things are not yet wrought by it. Shall we say then, he hath not decreed whatsoever doth or shall befall us? Yes, in this sense we may, [He doth not now first begin to decree thē:] but in as much as his Decrees have no end, wee should remember withall, that hee now decrees them. And it were much safer for every man in particular to looke on Gods Decree concerning himselfe, as present or coexistent to his whole course of life; rather than on it, as it was before the world, or in Adam: for so we shall thinke of it, as of an Act past and finished, which hath denounced sentence upon us, more irrevocable [Page] than the Lawes of the Medes and Persians. Howbeit even these lawes, whiles they were in making, suppose that Liberty in their Makers, which they utterly tooke from them being once enacted.

2 Gods Decrees are like theirs, in that they are in themselves unalterable: but not in that they make some evills, which befall others, inevitable; or some casuall inconveniences, unamendable. No wisedome, but that which is infinite, and an Eternall Law in it selfe, foreseeing all things that possibly can bee, hath just warrant to make Decrees for men everlastingly immutable. Too strict obligement unto Lawes positive, or Decrees unalterable, deprives both Lawgivers and others of their native Liberty and opportunity of doing good. Were the Popes wisedome and integrity parallell to that supereminent dignity, which he challengeth; it were not amisse for the body whereof hee is the lawfull head, if he exercised the same power over his Grants or Acts, that hee doth over his breath: alwayes reserving a liberty to send them forth, or call them in, to enlarge, contract, or invert them, according to exigences or occasions present. To alter his opinion of men, as they doe theirs in points of usefull doctrine, or their demeanours in matters of life; curbing him this yeare, whom hee priviledged the last yeare; now punishing where he lately rewarded; and, shortly after, rewarding where now hee punisheth; would argue no mutability of mind, or unsetled fickle disposition, but rather immoveable constancy; if so in all these changes he truly observed the rule of Iustice, which [Page] because it is alwayes one and the same, and never varies, must needs afford different measures to different deserts, and fit contrary dispositions with contrary recompences. But seeing Princes and Governours, are made of the same corrupted mold with those, whom they governe; oft-times exposed by height of place to greater blasts of mutabilitie, and inconstancy, than their inferiours; Publicke Lawes have beene sought out by most Nations, to runne like a straight line, betwixt two distorted and crooked ones; and to bee as a firme, or barre, betweene the tumultuous and raging passions of Princes and subjects, which every foot (as we say) would fall foule were they not thus fended off, one from the other. Vpon this consideration many Conquerours have beene content to sheathe up a great part of their illimited power (retayning some competent prerogatives to themselves and their successors) in publicke Edicts or Lawes, not altogether so unalterable as the Lawes of the Medes and Persians: yet lesse subject to change, then Lords purposes, or Princes pleasures: and every Act wherto they passe their consent, restraines them of some former liberty, and abates somewhat of their present greatnesse; to whose length or continnance (as Theopompus observed) much by this meanes, is added; and it were better to live an hundred yeares, (as hee said) with ingenuous health and strength, then to swagger it for twenty, with gyantly force, or Athleticall constitution. And albeit the Law (which is a common looking glasse to direct the Prince in commanding, and the subject in obeying) [Page] may sometimes lay out authority, and sometimes obedience, or inflict punishment one while, and dispense rewards another while, in measure greater or lesse, than a wise & just Arbitrator, chosen for these particular purposes, would allow of; yet hath it beene thought fittest for all parts, rather to brooke these interposed mischiefes, then to be perpetually subject to the former inconveniences of the Papacie; if the Popes (such as they are) or other Princes should practise according to the Canonists rule, Papa nunquam ligat sibi manus, The Pope never tyes his owne hands.

3 But the unerrable rule of everlasting Iustice, who from eternity decrees, whatsoever may bee, and foresees whatsoever will be, (because Heaven and Earth may sooner passe than his words or acts) passeth no act to the prejudice of his absolute and eternall power of Iurisdiction. What grant or promise soever he make, cannot binde the exercise of his everlasting libertie, for a moment of time: they last no longer than durante beneplacito: seeing gracious Equity, and onely it, is his everlasting pleasure. He ever was, ever is, and ever shall be, alike indifferent and free to recompence every man according to his present wayes. And in that, hee alwaies searcheth the very hart and secret thoughts, and never ceaseth to decree; his one and indivisibly everlasting decree, without any variety or shadow of change in it selfe; fits all the changes, severall dispositions, and contingent actions of Men and Angels, as exactly, as if he did conceive, and shape a new Law, for every one of them; and they are [Page] conceived and brought forth, as wel befitting them as the skin doth the body, which nature hath enwrapped in it. No man living (I take it) will avouch any absolute necessity from all Eternity, that God should inevitably decree the deposition of Elies line from the Priesthood, or his two sonnes destructions by the Philistims: For this were to bereave him of his absolute and eternall liberty. I demand then, whether within the compass of time, or in eternity, as praeexistent to Elies dayes, he past any act that could restraine his eternall liberty of honouring Elies families, as well as any others in their time? To say, He did, were impiety; because it chargeth the Almighty with impotent immutability. What shall we say then? The deposition of his race, the sudden death and destruction of his sonnes, were not at all absolutely necessary, but necessary onely upon supposed miscariage of the possible meanes and opportunities, which hee had given them for honouring him. And that eternall decree, [They that dishonour mee, them will I dishonour,] as coexistent to the full measure of this their transgression, by it shapes their punishment.

4 To thinke of Gods eternall decree with admiration void of danger; we must conceive it, as the immediate Axis or Center, upon which every successive or contingent act revolves: and yet withall, that, wherein the whole frame of succession or contingency is fully comprehended, as an unconstant movable Sphere in a farre greater quiescent, or rather in such a one (as in the description of Eternity was imagined) which hath drawne all the successive [Page] parts of motion, into an indivisible unity of duration permanent. Every part of the larger Sphere (this, swallowing up motion, in vigorous rest) should have coexistence locall with all and every part of the next moveable Sphere under it, move it as slowly and swiftly, as the latitude of successive motion can admit. Whilest we thus conceive of Gods eternall decree, and of his foreknowledge, (included in our conceipt of it) according to the Analogy of what we must beleeve, concerning the manner of his ubiquitary presence or immensity: we shall have no occasion to suspect, that his necessary foreknowledge of what we doe, should lay a necessity upon our actions, or take away all possibility of doing otherwise. Rather, we may by this supposall, beleeve that as probable, and perceive in part the manner how it is so, which shall by Gods assistance be demonstrated to be de facto most true. As, first, that the Omnipotent doth eternally decree an absolute contingency in most humane acts: Secondly, that this eternall act or decree (which we thus conceive to be throughout the whole succession of time, in every place indivisibly coexistent to each humane thought or action) doth not only perpetually support our faculties, but withall uncessantly inspire them with contingency in their choice: that is, it so moves them, as they may without lett or incumbrance, move themselves more wayes then one: And yet, even whilest it so moves them, it withall inevitably effects the proportioned consequents, which from everlasting were foreordained to the choices, which we make, be they [Page] good or bad; or according to the severall degrees of good or evill done by us, or of our affections or desires to doe them.

CHAP. 11.
Of transcendentall goodnesse: and of the infinity of it in the Divine nature.

1 IF in assigning reasons of Maximes or proverbiall speeches, wee might not bee thought to fetch light beyond the Sunne; we should say, Life unto things living is therefore sweet, because it is a principall stemme of being, as sweetnesse likewise is of goodnesse. However, we may resolve this Physicall Axiome, into a Metaphysicall: Omne ens qua ens est bonum; Vnto every thing, its owne proper being is good. Poyson, though noysome to man, to the Aspe is pleasant, so is venome to the Toad, and the Adder delighteth in his sting. In things inanimate, there should be no reluctance of contrary or hostile qualities, unlesse each had a kinde of gratefull right or interest in their owne being, and were taught by nature to fight for it, as men doe for their lives or goods. This is that goodnesse which we call entitative or transcendentall. A goodnesse equally, alike truly communicated to al things that are, from his goodnesse who onely is; but not participated equally, or according to equality, by all. For as the [Page] least vessell that is filled to the brimme, is as full as the greatest that can be, and yet the quantity of liquor contained in them equally full, is most unequall: So, albeit the entitative being of the Flye, Ant, or Worme, be unto them as good as mans being is to man: (For even the Ant or Flye being vext, or Wormes trod upon, will bewray their spleene, and labour as it were to right themselves for the losse or prejudice which they suffer in their Entitative goodnesse, by doing harmes to their tormentors) yet is mans being simply much better than the being of Ants or Wormes. And much worse were that Man, than any Beast, that with Gryllus in the Poet, would like to change his humane nature, for a bruitish. This excesse of entitative goodnesse, by which one creature excelleth another, accreweth partly from the excellency of the specificall Nature of Entity which it accompanieth; as there is more Entitative goodnesse is being a Man than in being a Lyon; and more in being a Lyon, than in being some inferiour ignoble Beast: it partly accreweth according to the greater or lesser measure, wherein severall creatures enjoy their specificall Nature. Men though by nature equall, are not equally happy, either in body or minde. Bodily life in it selfe is sweet, and is so apprehended by most; yet is lothsome to some; who (as we say) doe not enjoy themselves, as none of us fully doe. Sensitive appetites may be in some measure satisfied by course, not all at once. The compleat fruition of goodnesse incident to one, defeats another (though capable of greater pleasure) for [Page] the time, of what it most desires. Venter non habet aures, The Belly pinched with hunger must be satisfied with meat, so must the thirsty throat bee with drinke, before the eares can sucke in the pleasant sound of musicke, or the eye feed it selfe with fresh colours or proportions. Too much pampering bodily senses, starves the minde; and deepe contemplation feedes the mind, but pines the body Of making many Bookes (saithEccles. 12 12. Salomon) there is no end; and much study is a wearinesse of the flesh The more Knowledge we get, the greater capacity wee leave unsatisfied; so that we can never seize upon the intire possession of our owne selves: and contemplation (as the wise King speaketh) were vanity, did we use the pleasures of it any otherwise, thā as pledges or earnest of a better life to come. And albeit man, in this life, could possesse himselfe as intirely as the Angels doe their Angelicall Natures, yet could not his entitative goodnesse or felicity, be so great as theirs is; because the proper patrimony which he possesseth, is neither so ample nor so fruitfull. God alone is infinite, in being infinitely perfect; and he alone, infinitely enjoyes his intire being, or perfection. The tenure of his infinite joy or happinesse, is infinitely firme, infinitely secured of being alway what it is; never wanting so much as a moment of time, to inlarge or perfect it by continuance, uncapable of any inlargement or increase for the present. But this entitative or transcendentall goodnesse, is not that which wee now seeke; whereto notwithstanding it may lead us. For even amongst visible creatures, the better every one is [Page] in its kind, or according to its entitative perfection, the more good it doth to others. The truest measure of their internall or proper excellencies, is their beneficial use or service in this great Vniverse, whereof they are parts. What Creature is there almost in this whole visible Sphere, but specially in this inferiour part, which is not beholden to the Sunne; from whose comfortable heat, Nothing (as thePsa. 19. 9. Psalmist speakes) can bee hid? It is, at least of livelesse or meere bodies, in it selfe, the best and fairest; and farre the best to others. And God (as it seemes) for this purpose, sends forth this his most conspicuous and goodly messenger, every morning like a bridegroome bedeckt with light and comelinesse, to invite our eyes to looke up unto the Hils whence commeth our Helpe: upon whose tops he hath pitched his glorious Throne, at whose right hand is fulnesse of pleasures everlasting. And from the boundlesse Ocean of his internall or transcendent joy and happinesse, sweet streames of perpetuall joy and comfort, more uncessantly issue, than light from the Sunne, to refresh this vale of misery. That of men the chiefe inhabitants of this great Vale, many are not so happy as they might be, the chiefe causes are; that, either they doe not firmely beleeve the internall happinesse of their Creator, to be absolutely infinite, as his other attributes are; or else consider not in their harts, that the absolute infinitie of this his internall happinesse, is an essentiall cause of goodnesse (in it kinde, infinite) unto all others, so farre as they are capable of it; and capable of it all reasonable creatures, by creation, are: none [Page] but themselves can make them uncapable of happinesse, at least, in succession or duration, infinite. Goodnesse is the nature of God; and it is the nature of goodnesse to communicate it selfe unto others, unto all that are not over growne with evill: of which goodnesse it selfe can be no cause or author.

CHAP. 12.
Of the infinitie and immutability of Divine goodness communicative, or as it is the patterne of morall goodnesse in the creature.

1 THe father of Epicures, wil have more than his sonnes, to consent with him, that imbecility and indigence, are the usuall parents of Pitie, Bountie, Kindnesse, or other like branches of communicative humane goodness. Whilest we ned not others helpe, we little think in what need they stand of ours. The Prince in his jollity, can hardly compassionate the beggers misery: nor knowes the Begger how to bemone decayed Nobles: whose condition is more miserable than his owne, though so it seemes not unto him; who would thinke he had fully conquered want, were hee but furnished with such supplies of meat, drinke, and clothing, as these have alwayes ready at hand. That sympathy, which in livelesse or reasonlesse creatures, naturally flowes from similitude of internal qualities, seldome breaks [Page] forth in men; but either from experimentall remembrance of what lately hath, or from apprehension of what shortly may befall themselves: sight of the like afflictions in others, as wee have lately felt, revives the phantasmes or affections which were companions of our mourning; and by so pitying of our owne former plight, we pity them.

2 But albeit Epicurus observation may seeme in a manner universall, whilest applyed to its proper subject, Man in his corrupt state; yet when he transcends à genere ad genus, from our corruptible nature to the divine nature, which is immortall; his inference is of the same stampe with those fooles inductions, that concluded in their hearts, There was no God. The divine nature (saith he) is not penetrable by mercy or pity: Why so? Will you heare a bruit make Enthymems? Because these finde no entrance into the hearts of men, but through some breach of defect or indigence. It is well this slowbellyed evill beast, could grant mans nature not to bee altogether so bad or cruell, as want might not tame it, and make it gentle and kinde. But would not bruit qeasts, so they might speake, disclaime his conclusion; that true felicity, or fulnesse of all contentment possible, should make the divine nature worse, than want and misery doth the humane? Surely, there is somewhat else amisse in that, which is made better by defect. Nor could wealth and honour make the mighty unmindefull of others, but by making them first forget themselves. The externalls whereon our desires fasten, so captivate the humane soule, that she cannot doe as she would, or [Page] as nature teacheth her; but these strings being cut, she followes her native sway. And in a good sense it was most true, which a Master of a better sect, than Epicurus founded, hath taught; Nemo sponte malus.

3 Lust in old Age, Pride in Beggars, and shifting in men overflowing with wealth, seeme to transcend the nature of sinnes, and are monsters in corrupted nature; because, not begotten by temptations, they in a manner beget themselves: yet scarce shall we finde an old man so prone to Lust, a rich man so delighted in shuffling, an Epicure so addicted to his pleasure, or any at all so ill affected either in himselfe or towards other; that being askt, wold not professe his desire to deserve well of others, to be liberall, to be upright, compassionate, just and bountifull. For though continuāce in bad custome, induce in a sort, another nature; yet can it not transport any man so farre beyond himselfe, or miscarry his thoughts so much, but he shall feele some secret impulsions unto goodnesse, and some retractions from evill. But as Quod pleros (que) in emendabiles facit, omnium aliarum artium peccata, artificibus pudori sunt offendunt (que): errantem in vita peccata delectant. Non gaudet navigio Gubernator everso, non gaudet egro Medicus elato, non gaudet Orator, si patroniculpareus cecidit. At contra, omnibus crimen suum voluptati est. Laetatur ille Adulterio, in quod irritatus est ipsa difficultate: laetatur ille circumscriptione furt [...] (que) nec ante illi culpa, quam culpae fortuna displicuit. Id prava consuetudine evenit. Alioqui ut scias, subesse animis, etiam in pessima abductis, boni sensum, nec ignorari turpe, sed negligi, omnes peccata dissimulant, & quamvis feliciter cesserint, fructu illorum utuntur, ipsa subducunt. At bona conscientia prodire vult, & conspici. Ipsa nequitia tenebras timet. Eleganter itáque ab Epicuro dictum pute, Potest nocenti contingere ut lateat, latendi fides non potest. Aut si hoc modo melius hunc explicari posse juditas sensum: Ideo non prodest latere peccantibus, quia latendi etiam si facultatem habent, fiduciam non habent. Ita est, tuta scelera esse possent: secura non possunt, Seneca Epist. 97. Seneca well observes, It is no [Page] marvaile that we do not amend what we know to be amisse in ourselves; seeing errors in every other mystery or profession, make the professor ashamed: Onely such as erre in matter of life & manners are delighted with their errours. The Mariner takes no delight to see his vessell overturned, nor the Physitian in sending his Patient before his time unto his grave. The Oratour rejoyceth not when his Clyent is through his errour overthrowne. Contrariwise, every criminous person is delighted with his crime. One solaceth himselfe in Adultery, and taketh courage to prosecute his desires from the very difficulty of accomplishing thē. Another delights in over-reaching others, and in theft; never displeased with his faultinesse, untill it prove unfortunate. All are apt to dissemble their faults, being content when they fall out fortunately, to reape the fruit of them, whilest they subduct the faults of them; but, a good conscience delighteth to set it selfe forth and to have notice taken of it, whereas naughtinesse is afraid of darknesse it selfe. And as Epicurus elegantly saith, A malefactor may have the hap, but not the assurance to be undiscovered. But (as this Author replyes) what availes it him not to have his naughtinesse discovered, without hope or assurance that it shall not be discovered. His conclusion is, Naughtines may be safe, but it can never be secure.

4 The reason why their naughtinesse an never be warranted with security, is; because conscience in men most vicious, still beares evidence against them, that they live not as shee would have them. For (as Seneca in the same place well observes) though bad custome may worke a delight in naughtinesse,[Page]yet even in minds drencht in the very dreggs of filthinesse, there still remaines a sense of goodnesse: nor is it so much our want of knowledge, as of our right estimate of what we know to be nought, which maketh naughtinesse to be so little abhorred. The minde of man, in that it is indued with reason, hath the rules of Equity imprinted in it; which it alwaies seekes to instampe upon the inferior faculties of the soule. But this divine light of reason, hath as small force to kindle the love of vertue in hearts overgrowne with sensuall desires, as the Sunne in a mist, hath to set moist stuffe on fire. The unsetled affections of youth, somtimes admit the impression of these ideall characters, in actuall retired speculations; so will the water take the same shape from the seale, which the waxe doth, but hold it no longer than the seale is held upon it. The heart, which maturity of years hath hardened with vast desires, will as hardly bee wrought into a new forme, as the stone, which cannot take any other shape, but only by losing some of its masse or substance; yet if those vast desires be cut off, or their hopes of supplyes from externalls interecepted; the soule, thus freed, becomes more fashionable unto reason. Affability, which is as the superficiall draught of reason indeavouring to stampe the heart with reall and solid kindnesse; is as naturall [...] Epicure, as to another man, so long as the exercise of it is not prejudiciall to his belly. And the less his desires were to satisfie it, the larger would the extension of his bowels of compassion be towards his brethren, or poore neighbours; some drops of kindnesse may distill from him in the overflow [Page] of plentie or store sufficient to feed both eye and appetite. But in the daies of scarcity, he suckes in cruelty as wine, and feedes upon the needy as upon delicates: Were there no more sweet morsels in the market then would serve one man; not one of this crew, but would cut them out of his Fathers throat, rather than suffer his owne weasand to bee defeated of its intemperate expectations. Indigence then, though Epicurus could not see so much, is, upon different occasions, the mother as well of cruelty and oppression, as of bounty or pitty.

2 From doing to all, as we would be done unto by any, nothing doth hinder us so much (if ought befides doe hinder us at all) as our conceipted or opinative want of somewhat, which either for the present we doe, or hereafter may stand in need off, for satisfying the variety or unconstant longings of our unknowne desires. How well soever they may speake or protest, experience schooles us; not to trust any that fixe their expectations upon great matters, or have one eye alwayes upon their private ends, but with this limitation; if the premisses they now make shal not crosse their opportunities, when matters come to tryall. But if wee know a man of meanes, more than competent for maintaining that estate wherein his constant resolution hath pitcht content, one otherwise of temperate desires, and composed affections, able to discerne what is fitting betwixt man and man; we thinke him a fit rule for directing others, a patterne whereto would all conforme themselves, nothing [Page] should goe amisse in Church or Common weale. No man that conceives his owne cause to bee just and good, but would commend it to his arbi [...]rement before anothers. For▪ internall moderation mixt with outward competency, is the onely supporter of true constancy. Yet cannot this mixture, in any created Essence bee so firme or permanent, but possibilities or opportunities of satisfying some internall latent capacities, by externall proffers, may dissolve it. For finite existence hath possibility of nonexistence to controll it, and possibility of nonexistence includes possibility of being otherwise than it is. And therefore it is never impossible to finite being either to lose it selfe, or change his properties. A more particular root of this contingency, or unconstancy in reasonable creatures or intelligent, is the infinite capacity of their conceits or desires; within whose compasse their finite motions may become excentricke and irregular, as it were a starre fixed in too wide a sphere. The desires of collapsed Angells, were once tuned by their Creator in as perfect harmony as any creatures could be: They had all cōpetency that could be desired, whether of internall faculties, or of objects to cōtent thē. Howbeit, whilst the chiefe Ringleader of this rebellious Rout, sought to satisfie this infinitie of his desire; not by participation of his joyfull presence, who was infinitely good; but by affecting that greatnesse and Majesty infinite, which he was enabled to conceive, but whereof his nature was more uncaple than a whirry of an Argoes-eyes saile; his capacities did overcope. And his intemperate [Page] longings, while he was in travell of this prodigious birth, hath imprinted that vgly shape upon him, which now he beares. Hee is become the monstrous brood of his owne monstrous and deformed desires; his mouth opening too wide to swallow that which is incomprehensible, could never since be shut; his ravenous appetite cannot bee satisfied. Like the grave he feedes on rottennesse, and by continuall gnawing and devouring that which cannot satiate, he continually encreaseth his unquenchable hunger. His will is wedded unto mischiefe, and affecteth nothing but that which is by nature evill; & amongst evills that most greedily and uncessantly, which is most contrary to infinite goodness. The first man by this monsters impulsion, reaching too high for that which hee could not compasse, did put himselfe from off the appointed Center of his rest and revolutions; and since continueth irregular and unconstant in all his motions, thoughts, and actions. In him, in our selves, in the whole nature (besides that part which hath firme union with the infinite Essence) wee finde the Maxime infallibly verified, Mota facilius moventur. By our first Parents needlesse yeelding to one temptation, wee are not able to resist any; Our resolutions to follow that which wee acknowledge to bee good, or our adhaerence unto that infinite goodness, from which he divorced his will; can neuer in this life bee so firme and strong, but the allurements to contrary evills, may bee so great or so cunningly proposed by the great Tempter, that, without especiall grace [Page] we cannot resist their attractions. Since our internall harmonie betwixt soule and body; and mutuall correspondency of each faculty with other, was dissolved, no externalls can consort with us. Iust competency seemes too little, all of us being as easily led by abundance, as driven by want, to doe evill. And, which is worst of all, our earnest attempts to doe that which is good and right, drawes iniquity after them; and whiles wee take too hastie, or unweildy ayme at our owne welfare, others harmes fall under our levell.

6 That which most improoveth the force of temptations, whether suggested by want or indigence, or by other occasions or opportunities; is the inequalitie, partly of our naturall propensions, partly of meanes which minister their severall contentments or annoyances. Wealth, in some men, gets the start of Wit, and overswayes them (otherwise not much mis-inclined) unto such vanities, as usually are neither bredd nor nursed, but by abundance. Others wits over-reach their revenues; and imboldens them to stretch their projects or inventions beyond the rules of right and equity. Some mens bodies overgrow their soules; and these are easily impelled to act any boysterous mischiefe: Others being impotent of bodie, strive so much the more to furnish their mindes with subtill inventions or commodious experience: and by making too much use of the common Proverbe, [Hee that is weake had need to bee wilie,] are easily tempted to practise unlawfull [Page] policie, with delight; as the onely preservative against contempt, or as an instrument of revenge upon such as they hate or feare. And it would goe much against the course of common experience, if that wilinesse which hath weaknesse for its foundation, should not be often enforced to cover or shelter it selfe with craft and fraud. To love our owne wills, is an impotency naturall unto all. And wee love them the better, at least more strongly, when we perceive them set on that which in it selfe is good. Whence it is that our desires of doing many things which are good and commendable, often draw us to use meanes not so commendable, for their accomplishment. Many, out of an extraordinarie good will unto the poore, thinke it no robbery to cozen the rich; or to dispense with publike Lawes, for gratifying some private friend, whose welfare in conscience they are bound to tender. Vnto these, and many like enormities, the infinite Capacity of finite Existence gave first possibility of being, and the inequality of our internall propensions, which can never fitly match or hold just proportion with externall occurrences, gives life and improvement.

7 But in the incomprehensible Sphere, which hath Vbiquity for its Center, and Omnipotency for its Axis; whose numberlesse lines are all possible perfections, measurelesse; there is no place for exorbitancie. One branch of Being, cannot mis-sway or over-toppe another; all being so great and firme, as none can bee greater or [Page] firmer; being not united, but possessed in such perfect unity, as prevents all possibility of distraction or division. Shall wee say then, hee possesseth all things that possibly he can desire to have? Or rather, he alwayes infinitely is, without all possibility of not being, whatsoever possibly can be. And though being infinite, he can doe all things; yet can he not desire to perfect himselfe, or to be greater or better than he is. In that he neither can feare the impayrement, nor wish the inlargement of his own estate; all outward imployments of his power are for the good of his creatures. His will to have them when they were not, was but the influence or working of his essentiall goodnesse; which is so abundantly sufficient to his infinite being, that the overflowing of it is the fountaine of all things besides, which are good. Nothing besides him could possibly have beene, unlesse he were in power and in being, infinite. And unlesse his infinite being had beene infinitely good, nothing besides him, should actually have beene, or beene indowed with such being, as all things that actually are, have from him. The proper being of every thing, which actually is, or at least the continuance or amendment of such being, is infinitely desired by all, as being the stamp or impression of his infinite goodnesse, which is alike truly, though not equally, or in the same measure communicated to all things that are. The Entity of every thing is good to it selfe, and most desired.

8 And though these first assurances of his goodnesse and loving kindnesse, be usually requited on [Page] mans part with unkindnesse and despight: yet the greatnesse of his Majesty, never swayes him to sudden revenge. Quite contrary to the corrupt nature of man, (whose goodnesse usually is ill-thriven by his over-growing greatnes:) the unresistible strength of his Almighty power, is the unmovable pillar of moderation and mercifull forbearance. The greatest potency of man being but finite, the higher it growes, the apter it is to be overtopt with jealous impotency. The greatest Monarch that is, may be prevented by others, (of whose power he is jealous) in the exercise of his power or authority over him; unlesse he carefully watch his time, and fit seasons, or take opportunity when it is offered, for accomplishing his projects. But of God, saith the Wiseman, Wisd. 12. 18. Thou mustring thy power judgest with equity, and orderest, or governest us with great favour; for thou maist use power when thou wilt. And his will is to use it, when men will not beleeve that he is of full power to doe what hee will; as the same Wiseman expresseth, vers. 17. But more full unto our present purpose, are the sayings of the same Wiseman, vers. 15, 16. For so much then as thou art righteous thy selfe, thou orderest all things righteously; thinking it not agreeable with thy power to condemne him that hath not deserved to be punished. For thy power is the beginning of righteousnesse, and because thou art the Lord of all, it maketh thee to be gracious to all. Though this Author be not, yet this passage in him, is canonicall, and fully consonant to Gods owne words to Ionah, Chap. 4. 10, 11. Then said the Lord, thou hast had pitie on the Gourd, for the which [Page]thou hast not labored, neither madest it to grow, which came up in a night, and perished in a night: And should not I spare Nineveh that great City, wherein are more than sixscore thousand persons, that cannot discerne between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle? Amongst great men▪ many oppresse their tenants: but what Lord would spoile his proper inheritance, whereto no other can be intituled; or eate out the heart of that ground which hee cannot alienate or demise? What Architect would deface his owne worke, unlesse the image of his unskilfulnesse (whereof the Creator cannot bee impeached) be so apparant in it, as he cannot but blush to behold it? Or who would leave a goodly foundation bare or naked, unlesse he be unable to reare it up without injustice? Now seeing the Entitative Good of proper being, is the foundation of that true happinesse which flowes from more speciall participation of Gods presence; wheresoever he hath laid the one, it is to all that rightly consider his Wisedome, Truth, and Goodnesse, an assured pledge of his will and pleasure to finish it with the other. As his nature is immutable, so are his gifts without repentance. The current of his joyfull beneficence, can admit no intermission, much lesse admixture of any evill. Sorrow, woe, and misery, must seeke some other Originall; they have no hidden vent, or secret issue from the Ocean of Ioy and Happinesse.

9 As the fountaine of bodily light cannot send forth darknesse, but uniformly diffuseth light; and light onely throughout this visible Sphere: so cannot [Page] the infinite Ocean of true felicity, send forth any influence, but such as is apt to cherish the seeds of joy and happinesse; wherewith every creature capable of them, was sowne in its first creation. And, as it is the property of light propagated or diffused from the Sunne, to make such bodies as are capable of its penetration (as Glasses, Chrystall, Pearle, &c.) secondary fountains of light to others: so doth the influence of divine goodnesse, inspire all that are conformable to his will, with desire of doing to others as he hath done to them; that is, of being secondary authors or instruments of good to all. But such as wilfully strive against the streame of his over-flowing goodnesse, or boysterously counterblast the sweet and placide spirations of celestiall influence, become creators of their owne woe, and raise unto themselves those stormes wherein they perish. Yet so essentiall it is unto this infinite Fountaine of goodnesse, however provoked, to send forth onely streames of life; and such is the vertue of the streames which issue from him, that as well the evill and miseries which miscreants procure unto themselves, as their mischievous intentions towards others, infallibly occasion increase of joy and happinesse unto all that give free passage unto their current. And this current of life, which issueth from this infinite Ocean, never dryes up, is never wasted by diffusion: The more it is dammed or quarved by opposition of the sonnes of darkenesse, the more plentifully it overflowes the sonnes of light. All the good which one refuseth or putteth from thē, returnes in full measure to the other.

[Page] But if the miseries which wicked spirits, or their conforts, either suffer themselves, or intend to others, worke good to those that receive the influence of infinite goodnesse; might he not without prejudice, or imputation, inspire these castawayes with such mischievous thoughts, or at least intend their woe and misery, as these are occasions or meanes of others happinesse, or of his glory? Wee are indeed forbid to doe evill that good may ensue; but if it bee his will to have reprobates doe or suffer evill for the good of his chosen, shall not both bee good, as willed by him, whose will (in that hee hath absolute dominion over all his creatures) is the rule of goodnesse?

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CHAP. 13.
In what sense, or how Gods infinite will is said to be the rule of goodnesse.

1 BAd was the doctrine, and worse the application or use,Sunt qui scribunt, Anaxarchum sophis [...]am consolandi ejus causa accersi [...]um, ad eum venisse, quumque cubantem atque suspirantem offendisset, arridentem dixisse, ignorare ipsum cur veteres sapientes Iustitiam Iovi assidentem fecerint: nimirum quia quicquid à Iove decernitur, id juste factum esse censeri debent. Opportere igitur, quae à magno Rege fierent, justa existimari; primum quidem ab ipso Rege, deinde à caeteris mortalibus. Atque hoc quidem dicto non nihil solatii Alexandro attulisse. Ego vero majoris errati quam prioris autorem Alexandro Anaxarchum fuisse censeo, si illam viri sapientis sententiam esse statuit. Arrian. de expedit. Alex. lib. 4. which Anaxarchus would have gathered from some Hieroglyphicall devices of Antiquity; wherein Iustice was painted as Iupiters assistant in his Regiment. Hereby, saith this Sophister unto Alexander, (then bitterly lamenting the death of his dearest Friend Clytus, whom he had newly slaine in his temelent rage) your Majesty is given to understād, that the decrees of great Monarchs, who are a kinde of Gods on earth, must bee reputed Oracles of Iustice, and their practices may not bee reputed unjust either by themselves, or by others. But this sophisticall inversion of these Ancients meaning, was too palpable to please either the wiser or honester sort of Heathen, though living in those corrupt times. For albeit many of them conceived of Iupiter, as of a great King, subject to rage and passion, yet all of them held Iustice for an upright, milde and vertuous Lady; ready alwayes to mitigate, never [Page] to ratifie his rigorous decrees; alwayes tempering his wrath with equity. The true Iehovah, as he needes no sweet-tongued consort to moderate his anger, as Abigail did Davids; so hath he no use of such Sophisters as Anaxarchus, to justifie the equity of his decrees, by his Omnipotent Soveraignty or absolute dominion over all his creatures.

2 To derogate ought from his power, who is able to destroy both soule and body in hell fire, I know is dangerous; & to compare the prerogatives of most absolute earthly Princes with his, would be more odious. Yet this comparison I may safely make:Quanto superior est Deus homine, tam mea malitia est [...]nferior bonitate eius, ut qualitate ita etiam quantitate. Anselm. in meditat. cap. 8. He doth not more infinitely exceed the most impotent wretch on earth in power and greatnesse, than he doth the greatest Monarch the world hath, or ever had, in Mercy, Iustice, and Loving-kindnesse; nor is his will the rule of Goodnesse, because the designes thereof are backt by infinite power; but because holines doth so rule his power, and moderate his will, that the one cannot enjoyne, or the other exact any thing not most consonant to the eternall or abstract patternes of equity. His will revealed doth sufficiently warrant all our actions, because we know, that he wils nothing but what is just and good; but this no way hindereth, but rather supposeth Iustice and Goodnesse to be more essentiall objects of his will, than they are of ours. And therefore when it is said [Things are good because God wils them] this illative infers only the cause of our knowledge, not of the goodness wch we know: and the logicall resolution of this vulgar Dialect, would be this, We know this or that to be good, because [Page]Gods will revealed commends it for such. But his will revealed commends it for such, because it was in it nature good; for unlesse such it had bin, he had not willed it. These principles though unquestionable to such as fetch their Divinity from the Fountaine, will perhaps in the judgement of others that never taste it but in trenches, be liable to these exceptiōs.

3 If the goodnesse of every thing presuppose its being, & nothing can be without Gods wil, what cā be good (we speake in order of nature, not of time) before God wills it? Of being or goodnesse actually existent in any creature, it is most true, neither can be without some precedent Act of Gods will. But as there is a logicall possibility presupposed to the working of the Almighty power: so is there a goodnesse objective precedent in order of nature, to the Act or exercise of his will. And unto some things considered as logically possible; this goodnesse objective is so essentially annexed; that if it bee his will to give them actuall being, they must of necessity be actually good; nor can hee that can doe all things, will their contraries. Hee might, had it pleased him, have taken life and existence from all mankind, when he preserved Noah and his Familie. But to reserve them men, and no reasonable creatures, was no object of power omnipotent; much lesse doth his omnipotency enable him to worke ought contradictory to his owne nature or essentiall goodnesse. As is the man, so is his strength, and as is the nature of the willer, such are the objects of his will. Simile gaudet simili. To long after such meats as feed diseasefull humors, is naturall to every [Page] disease. And our nature being corrupted, whets our appetites to such things as are agreeable to the praedominant corruption wherewith it is tainted, not to the purity wherein it was created. To will onely that which is consonant to his nature, is so much more essentiall to God, than unto us, by how much his nature is more simple than ours is. And seeing it is essentiall purity, altogether uncapable of corruption, his will cannot pitch but on that which is pure and holy. Whence the prime rule of all goodnesse, without himselfe, is consonancy to his essentiall purity and Iustice. For as much as thou art righteous thy selfe thou orderest all things righteously, thinking it not agreeable to thy power to condemne him that hath not deserved to bee punished. Wisedome 12. 15. He loveth truth and sincere dealing, because he himselfe is true and just. That veracity which is coeternall to his Essence, includes an everlasting enmity unto treachery, fraud, and perjury; his immortally spotlesse and unchangeable purity, cannot approve of lust and intemperancy, or condemne chastity in any person, at any time. Nor could he have given a Law, as some lawlesse Lawgivers have done, for the authorizing of promiscuous or preposterous lust. To legitimate violence, or entitle oppression unto the inheritance bequeath [...]d to conscionable and upright dealing, is without the prerogative of omnipotency; it cannot be ratified by any Parliament of the Trinitie blest for ever. The practise, or countenance of these and the like, are evill; not in us onely, to whom they are forbidden; but so evill in themselves, that [Page] the Almighty could not but forbid and condemne thē, as profest enemies to his most sacred Majesty.

4 To square great mens actions to the dictates of reason or nature, given in their good dayes, or to bring their wills within compasse of any constant Law; seemes greater violence, than if we should seeke to fashion their bodies by handsome well proportioned garments, but much too strait. And yet we see by daily experience, that such as are most impatient of regulation or restraint, are most importunate to have their owne unruly wills, the rules of their inferiours minds and consciences. To doe otherwise than they would have them, though they alleage the dictates both of reason and Gods word, will admit no appeale from the censure of peevishnesse or perversenesse. But for them to set constant patternes of that morality or good behaviour, whose defects in inferiours they either punish or make advantage of; is reputed a kinde of Pedantisme, or Mechanicall servitude. To request such performances, seemes as harsh, as if we should intreat them to set us copies, or songs, or take pains in teaching us some honest trade. And seeing inferiours are secretly blinded with this pride of heart; which breakes forth more violently in superiours; most of both rankes, measure Gods will by their owne. But if wee will condemne this impatience of restraint, as a fault in our selves, we must of necessity acquit the Almighty from the like. The infinite greatnesse of his Majesty, cannot wrest his most holy will from strict observance of such rules of Righteousnesse as he sets us to follow. That integrity [Page] wherewith our first nature was cloathed, was but the Image of his Holinesse. And hee that requires us to be holy, as He is holy, or perfect as our Heavenly Father is perfect; exacts not of us, that wee should be as holy and perfect as Hee is, in any point of his imitable perfections. Every part of that holinesse which becommeth Saints, is in the best of them, but as the materiall forme in an house built of untowardly stuffe, by unskilfull hands: but in Him, according to the exactest Mathematicall or Idaeall forme, that the cunningest Architect hath in his head. The best examples of goodnesse, we can conceive, are but as dead pictures of those everliving ones, which He expresseth in his workes. All his decrees concerning man, are not in themselves onely, but to mans eyes that looke not on them a squint, so straight and just, that hee will referre the tryall unto the deliberate and sober thoughts of his Enemies. Is not my way equall? Are not your waies unequall? Ezek. 18. 25.

5 This may instruct us, that those patternes of Holinesse or perfections which wee are bound to imitate in Him, are not to be taken from his bare Commandement, or revelation of his will, but from the objects of his will revealed, or from the eternall practices which hee hath exhibited; as so many expresse or manifest proofes, that his will is alwayes Holy and Iust: albeit wee cannot alwaies so expressely discerne the manner how it is just and holy in some particular Commandements; but must implicitely beleeve it to bee such in them, because it is so eminently and apparantly holy and [Page] just in those perfections, whereof our generall duties are the imperfect representations. Of all his morall commandements, not one there is, whose sincere practise doth not in part make vs truely like him; & we are bound to be conformable to his will revealed, that we may be cōformable to his nature; without conformity wherevnto, we cannot participate of his happinesse; For, Happinesse is the immediate consequent of his nature. The antecedent of Lactantius Argument. [Qui nos irasci jubet, is uti (que) irascitur,] .i. He that biddeth us be angry, is certainly angry himselfe,] is not so certaine or authentique, and the inference is somewhat doubtfull. But out of all question, he that bids us unfaignedly blesse our persecutors, doth unfaignedly tender his blessings to such as persecute Him in his members. He that seriously exhorts us to bee mercifull and kind to all, sheweth kindnesse to the most unkinde. That charity which hee hath injoyned every man towards all (his greatest enemies not excepted) though we consider it in the most charitably minded Martyrs, in whose death it seemed to shine, were but as weake sparkles, or vanishing smoak, of those infinite and eternall flames of love, which burst out in him toward such, as have deserved worse at his hands, than any Tyrant of his tormented servants. That truth and fidelity, which he exacts of us, the faithfulnesse of Abraham himselfe; is but a little mappe, or narrow surface of that infinite soliditie of truth, whereon his promises are founded. Betweene the chastity and temperance of purest virgins, and his eternall purity, there is the like true correspondency; [Page] but not so great, as there is betwixt the dross and corpulency, and the refined or sublimated spirits of the same bodies. Or could that rule which is the fulfilling of the whole Law & the Prophets, Doe unto every man as we would be done unto; be exactly fulfilled by us; it would be but a slender, though a true modell or representation of his eternall equity. He that honoureth me, him will I honor. For in this, and the like, he expects no more than the inward affection of mortall hearts, or prayses of man whose breath is in his nostrils, being ready out of his goodnesse, to recompence these silly services, with glory, love and happiness everlasting. But doth he intend thus well to all, or destruction unto some, as it is a meanes of blisse to those whom he loves? If so he did, we might be exempt from that negative precept, of not doing evill that good might ensue. For the only reason why we are boūd not to doe so, is because in so doing we should become unlike our heavenly Father, and not be perfect as he is perfect. But as he turnes the voluntary evils of some, to the good of others; so may wee, and ought to consecrate such forfeitures, as legally fall into our hands to pious uses; or better the states of such as tender publike welfare, by others deserved harmes.

6 Be it then granted, (which is the root of all objections against these resolutions) that Gods glory must as well appeare in the punishment of the Reprobate, as in the beatifying of the Elect; the consequence will bee quite contrary to that which their objections would hence inferre; For, if the [Page] foundation of Gods glory, bee as sure in the one case, as in the other; the manner of his dealing with both must be alike perfect, and alike behovefull for us to follow. Sine bonitate (saith Seneca) nulla majestas, Goodnesse is the foundation of glory. Now, were it true, that he did intend evill to some, before they had committed any (though not as evill to them, but as a meanes of others good) or absolutely ordained them to eternall inevitable misery, for the advancement of his owne glory; wee should not sinne, but rather imitate the perfection of our heavenly Father, in robbing Iudas to pay Peter, or in feeding the hungry, such especially as be of the houshold of Faith, with the spoiles of ungodly rich men, or unbeleevers. More warrantable it were to guesse at the perfection of his Iustice towards the wicked, and of his bounty towards the godly, by the commendable shadow or imitatiō of it in earthly gods. To procure the common good without intention of harme to any, and with admission of as few private mischiefes as may be, is the chiefe praise of great States-men. And it is the glory of Princes, to encourage all men unto vertuous courses by good example, gratious exhortations, and unpartiall distribution of publike honors or commodities: and yet withall to inflict disgrace upon haughty contemners of those gracious allurements; and to bee sterne in execution of Iustice (without fauour) upon notorious transgressors of wholesome Lawes. Yet not to use severity without sorrow, nor draw blood but by way of medicine; for preserving of their [Page] Crownes and dignities, for maintenance of publike peace, or for preventing the like diseases in other particular members of the same body. Magistrates that would mind these matters, more than raysing themselves, their friends, or posterity, more than life it selfe, which they owe unto their Countrey; should exhibite us a true model, though (God wot) but a slender one of our heavenly Fathers wisdome and loving kindnesse: first in drawing men to repentance, by gratious promises, and unfaigned proposalls of inestimable rewards for their service: Secondly, in making the wicked and obstinate despisers of his infinite goodnesse, serve to the manifestation of his endlesse glory, and confirmation of those that love him in the immortal state of happinesse. These prints of his Fatherly care and Iustice, are yet fresh to bee seene in his proceedings with ungratious Cain. And the Lord said unto Cain, why art thou wroth? and why is thy countenance fallen? if thou doe well, shalt thou not be accepted? and if thou dost not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: And unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him, Gen. 4. ver. 6, 7. Severe punishment for doing evill, without precedent loving instructions, or good encouragement to doe well, is the naturall off-spring of unnaturalnesse. It beares no shadow of that justice or equity, whose glorious patterne shines most brightly in our heavenly Father.

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CHAP. 14.
Of God infinite love to mankinde.

1 IF the Apostles authority could not perswade us to beleeve, his reasons would inforce us to grant, that the issues of blessing and cursing from one and the same mouth, are contrary to the course of nature, and argue the nature of man, (in whom alone this discord is found) to be much out of tune. Out of the same mouth proceedeth blessing and cursing, my brethren, these things ought not so to be. Iam. 3. 10. For nature in other things gives you a better example. Doth a fountaine send forth at the same place, sweet water and bitter? Can the Figtree, my brethren, beare Olive berries? either a Vine figs? &c. These and the like fountaines of naturall truth, are as open to us, as they were to him, and wee should much wrong both this Ambassador of Christ, and Gods image in our selves, if we did beleeve them only for his authority, and not for their owne native perspicuity. The best use of Apostolique [...]authority, in these allegations, is to warrant our use of the like, though in matters divine: not one of his instances but holds as truly in God, as in man; not one but receiveth a necessary increase of strength, from the indivisible unity of the divine Essence. For a Fig-tree to beare Olive berries, is lesse impossible, than for the tree of life to bring forth death. To cause [Page] the Vine bring forth Figs, were not so hard a point of husbandry, as to derive cursednesse or misery from the fountaine of blisse. For a Spring to send forth water sweet and bitter, fresh and salt, at one and the same place, is more compatible with any reasonable conceipt, than for hate or harmefull intentions to have any issue from pure love. But God is love: yea, love is his Essence as Creator. In that he is the Author of being, hee is the Author of goodnesse to all things that are, (Being, unto every thing in its owne proper being, is good) and goodnesse in an intelligent Don [...]r, is alwayes the fruit of Love. Hence saith the Wiseman, of him that is wisest of all, of him that can neither deceive nor be deceived: He hateth nothing that he hath made. For even their being, and that goodnesse which accompanies it, is an undoubted pledge of his love. If to blesse God the maker, and to curse men which are made after his similitude, argue (in the Apostles supposall) a dissolution of that internall harmony, which should be in the humane nature: to hate some, and love others of his best creatures, all being made after his owne image; would necessarily infer a greater distraction in the indivisible Essence, besides the contradiction which it implyes to infinite goodnes. To love the workes of his owne hands, is more essentiall to him, that made all things out of meere love, than it is unto the fire to burn matter combustible: and if his love be, as he is, truly infinite, it must extend to all, seeing all are lesse than infinite.

2 Love, were it perfect in us, would perfectly fulfill Gods Law, and make up a compleate body [Page] or System of morall goodnes. Now the most absolute perfection of that love, whereof the humane nature (though uncorrupted) could bee capable, would be but an imperfect shadow of our heavenly Fathers most perfect love; which hath the same proportion to his goodnesse, that love in us (were it as perfect as it possibly might bee) should have to our morall goodnesse. That is, it is his compleat communicative goodnes. And though these two in him bee rather different names, than divers attributes, yet wee love his goodnes better, whiles it is attired with the name of Love. For, of men that doe us equall good turnes, we love them best, whom we conceive to love us most: and loving kindnesse seemes good and lovely, even in the eyes of such as reape no profit from it, besides the sight of it. The very exercise of it in others, excites our weake inclinations to the like: and our inclinations moved, stir up a speculative assent or secret verdict of conscience, to approve that truth which wee cannot follow in the practice: Beatius est dare, quam accipere: It is a more blessed thing to give, than to receive. No man measureth that which wee call a good nature (as of men some are better natured than others) either by the means it hath to benefit, or by the benefits bestowed; but by the fervency of unfaigned good will, and hearty desires of doing good to all. This is that wherein (especially when it is holpen by grace) we most resemble the divine nature, which is infinitely better than the humane nature (though takē at the best) not only in respect of his ability to do good, but of his good wil to do the best that may be. [Page] And this his good will exceeds ours, not intensively only, but extensively. For we are bound to imitate him as well in the extension of our unfaigned good will towards all, as in the fervency of our desires to do the best good we can to some, because his loving kindnes to man is both waies infinitly perfect, Thus saith the Lord, Let not the wise man glory in his wisedome, nor the strong man glory in his strength, neither the rich man glory in his riches: But let him that glorieth, glory in this, that he understandeth, and knoweth me; that I am the Lord which exercise loving kindnes, judgement, and righteousnesse in the earth: for in these things I delight, saith the Lord. Ier. 9. 23, 24. The first then & most native issue of infinite goodnesse, is the exercise of bounty or loving kindnesse, which floweth from it, without matter or motive to incite it. This is that which gave being, and with being, some portion of goodnesse unto all things that are; it alters the name, but not the nature in the current. To prevent others with good turnes before they can expect or deserve them, is the highest point of bounty, whereto the ability of man can reach. But God gave vs that we most desire, proper being, with the appurtenances, before we could desire it; for it is the foundation of all desire. From Bounty or loving kindnesse, or from that Goodnesse whence they spring, Mercy and Compassion differ only in the extrinsecall denomination taken from different objects. Compassion is good will towards others, provoked from notice of their miserie: and Mercy is but an excesse of Bounty, not estranged from ill deservers, in distresse; so long as [Page] the exercise of it breedes no harme to such as are more capable of bountifull love and favour. This incompossibility betweene the exercise of Mercy and bounty towards particulars ill deserving, and the preservation of common good, occasioneth the interposition of Iustice punitive; whose exercise is in a sort, unnaturall to the Father of mercy. For he doth not afflict willingly, nor grieve the children of men. Lamen. 3. 33. Nothing in good men can provoke it towards offenders, but the good of others deserving either better or not so ill, which might grow worse by evill doers impunity. To take pleasure in the paine or torture of notorious malefactors, is a note of inhumanity: their just punishment is onely so farre justly pleasant, as it procures either our owne, or others welfare; or avoydance of those grievances, which they more justly suffer, than wee or others of the same societie, should doe. The more kind and loving men by nature are, the more unwilling they are to punish, unlesse it be for these respects. How greatly then doth it goe against his nature, who is loving kindnesse it selfe, to punish the workes of his owne hands; Man especially, who is more deare unto him, than any child can be unto his Father, for hee is the Father of all mankind? For it is he that made us, and not we our selves; not those whom we call Fathers of our flesh, for even they likewise were made by Him. Hence he saith, Call no mā Father on earth, for one is your Father wch is in Heaven, Mat. 23. ver. 9. Is the title his peculiar, more than the realty answering to it? Is he more willing to bee called the onely Father of all [Page] the sonnes of men, than to doe the kinde office of a Father to them? No, like as a Father pittieth his owne children, so the Lord pitieth them that feare him, For he knoweth our frame, he remembreth we are but dust. Psal. 103. 13, 14. It seemes this Psalmist either was or had a most kinde and loving Father, and hence illustrates the kindnesse of his Heauenly Father, by the best modell of kindnesse which hee knew. But if God truly be a father of all mankind, he certainly exceeds all other fathers as farre in fatherly kindnesse, as hee doth men in any branch of goodnesse or perfection. This is the first foundation of our Faith, layd by his onely Sonne: Ad multiplicandum quippe sanctorum sapientiam proficit, quod postulata tardè percipiunt, ut ex dilatione crescat desiderium, ex desiderio intellectus augeatur. Intellectus verò cum intenditur, ejus in Deum ardentior affectus aperitur. Affectus autem ad promeranda coelestia tanto fit capax, quanto fuerit expectando longanimis. Greg. lib. 20. moral. in Iob ca. 24. Aske and it shall be given unto you, seeke and ye shall finde, knocke and it shall be opened unto you. For every one that asketh, receiveth, and he that seeketh, findeth, and to him that knocketh it shall be opened. Or what man is there of you, whom if his sonne aske bread, will he give him a stone? Or if he aske a fish, will hee give him a serpent, Math. 7 [...] vers. 7, 8, 9, 10. Every Father that heard Him, would have beene ready to have answered no; yet none so ready or carefull as they should be, to give or provide best things for their children, because all besides him are evill Fathers. If ye then being evill know how to give good gifts to your children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things to them that aske him, ver. 11. Hee is then so much more willing to give good things to his children, as he is better or greater than other Parents. His love to all men, seeing all are his sonnes, by a more peculiar reference than Abraham was Adams, or Isaac [Page]Abrahams, is infinitely greater than any Parents beare to the fruits of their bodies. Mortall fathers love children when they have them; but love to themselves, or want of means to immortalize their owne persons, makes them desire to have children. The onely wise immortall God (who is all-sufficient to all, most to himselfe, unacquainted with want of whatsoever can bee desired) out of the abundance of his free bounty and meere loving kindnesse, did first desire our being; and having given it us, doth much more love us, after we are instamped with his Image. For he sowes not wheate, to reape tares; nor did he inspire man with the breath of life, that he might bring forth death.

3 The Heathens conceived this title of Father, as too narrow for fully comprehending all references of loving kindnesse betwixt their great Iupiter and other Demigods or men.

Iupiter omnipotens regum rex ipse▪ Deus (que)

Progenitor, genitrix (que) Deum, Deus unus, & omnis.

And another PoetOrpheus. Vide Apul. in lib. de mundo. [...] Forcatulli lib. 5. p. 703.,

Iupiter & mas est & nescia faemina mortis.

And because the affection of mothers, especially to their young and tender Ones, is most tender: the true Almighty hath deigned to exemplifie his tender mercy and compassion towards Israel, as David did Ionathans love towards him; far surpassing the love of women, yea of mothers to their children. Sion had said, the Lord hath forsaken me, and [Page]my God hath forgotten mee. But her Lord replyes, Can a woman forget her sucking child, that she should not have compassion on the sonne of her wombe? yea, they may forget, yet will I not forget thee, Esay 49. ver. 15. And if his love could sufficiently bee expressed by these dearest references amongst men, whose naturall affection towards their tender brood (in respect of meaner creatures) is much abated by wrong use of reason (as many mothers by greatnesse of place, or curiosity of education, are lesse compassionate towards their children, then other silly women are) he hath chosen the most affectionate female amongst reasonlesse creatures, to blazon his tender care and loving protection over ill-deserving children: How often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a Hen gathereth her chickens under her wings! Math. 23. ver. 37. Finally, as he gives much more to our being, than our earthly Parents, whom we suppose to give us being; so all the sweet fruits or comforts of love, whether of fathers and mothers towards their children, of husbands towards their wives, or of brethren to brethren, sisters to sisters, or one friend to another (their sinfulnesse onely excepted) are but distillations or infusions of his infinite love to our nature. To witnesse this truth unto us, the son of God was made both father, and brother and husband to our nature, &c. Every reference or kinde office, whereof reasonable creatures are mutually capable, every other creature (though voyd of reason, so not voyd of love and naturall affection) may expresse some part of our heavenly Fathers loving [Page] kindnesse: but the love of all, though infinitely increased in every particular, and afterwards made up in one, could no way equalize his love towards every particular soule created by him. Feare of death or other danger, hath such joynt interest with love, (as well in the heart of man, as in other creatures) that, albeit they would doe more for their yong ones than they doe, if they could, yet they doe not usually so much as they might: not so much for their model of wit or strength, as God for his part though infinite in wisedome & power doth for the sonnes of men. He that feareth none, but is feared of al, he that needs no Counsellor, but hath the heart of Prince and Counsellor in his hand, makes protestation in his serious griefe, that he hath done all for his unfruitfull vineyard that he could, as much as possibly could be done for it. Or, if his serious protestations cannot deserve credit with deceitfull man, his solemne oath is witnesse of greater love than hath beene mentioned, of greater than the heart of man is able to conceive, even towards such as all their life time have hated Him. As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyes.

If besides the authority of these and infinite more sacred texts most perspicuous in themselves, the interpretation of the Church, be required for establishing of the doctrine delivered; the whole ancient Church some peeces of Saint Austine onely excepted, which may bee counterpoyzed with other parts of the same Fathers writings, is ready to give joynt verdict for us. And whether the restrictions [Page] which some reformed Churches have endeavoured to lay upon Gods promises, be compatible with the doctrine of the English Church, comes in the next place to be examined.

CHAP. 15.
What the Church of England doth teach concerning the extent of Gods love: of the distinction of singula generum, and genera singulorum: of the distinction of voluntas signi, and voluntas beneplaciti.

1WHat middle course soever the Church of England doth hold, or may take for compromising contentions betweene some other reformed Churches in points of Election and Reprobation, of free wil or mans ability, before the state of regeneratiō: She doth not in her publike and authorized doctrine come short of any Church this day extant, in the extent of Gods unspeakable love to mankind. No nationall Councell, though assembled for that purpose, could fit their doctrine more expresly to meet with all the late restrictions of Gods love, than the Church our mother, even from the beginning of reformation, hath done; as if she had then foreseene a necessity of declaring her judgement in this point, for preventing schismes or distraction in opinions amongst her sonnes. First, she injoynes us to beseech God to have mercy upon all men. This was the practice of the Ancient Church, which in her opinion, needed no reformation. A practice injoyned [Page] by1 Tim. 2. 1 S. Paul, I exhort or desire first of all, that supplications, prayers, intercessions, and giving thankes be made for all men. If any man shall seeke to lay that restraint upon this place, which S. Austine somewhere doth, as if the word [all men] did import only genera singulorum [all sorts of men,] not, singula generum, [every particular man:] the scanning of the words following, the sifting of the matter contained in both, with the reason of the exhortation, and other reall circumstances, will shake off this or other like restriction, with greater ease than it can be laid upon it. Wee are commanded to pray for no more▪ than them, whose salvation we are unfainedly to desire, otherwise our prayers were hypocriticall. Are we then to desire the salvation of some men onely, as they are dispersed here and there, throughout all nations, sorts, or conditions of men, or for every man of what condition soever, of what sort or nation soever he be? The Apostle exhorts us to pray for Kings (not excepting the most malignant enemies which the Christians then had) and for all that be in authority. And if we must pray for all that are in authority, with fervency of desire, that they may come unto the knowledge of the truth; then questionlesse, wee are to desire, wee are to pray for the salvation of all and every one, which are under authority. God is no accepter of persons; nor will the Omnipotent permit us so to respect the persons of the mighty in our prayers, as that we should pray that all and every one of them might become Peeres of the heavenly Ierusalem, and but some choice or selected ones of the meaner [Page] sort might bee admitted into the same society. Wee must pray then for high and low, rich and poore, without excepting any, either in particular or indefinitely. The reason why our prayers for all men must be universall, is, because wee are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men; not as they fall under our indefinite, but under our uniuersall consideration. The reason againe, why wee are bound to desire the spirituall good of all men universally considered, is, because wee must be perfect as our heavenly Father is perfect. Vnto this universall desire, wee must adde our best endeavours that saving truth may be imparted unto all; because it is our heavenly Fathers will, his unfaigned will, that all should come to the knowledge of truth.

2 Both parts of this inference [as first, that it is our duty to pray for all sorts of men, and for every man of what sort soever: And secondly, that we are therefore to pray thus universally, because it is Gods will, not onely that we should thus pray, but that all without exception shold come unto the truth and be saved] are expressely included in the prayers appointed by the Church of England to bee used upon the most solemne day of devotions. The Collects or Praiers are in number three. The first, Almighty God we beseech thee graciously to behold this thy family for the which our Lord Iesus Christ was contented to be betrayed, and given up into the hands of wicked men, and to suffer death upon the Crosse, &c. The tenour of this petition, if we respect onely the forme, is indefinite not universall: but every Logician knows, and every Divine should consider, that the necessity [Page] of the matter, whether in prayers or propositions, will stretch the indefinite forme wherewith it is instamped, as farre as an absolute universall. That the forme of this petition is in the intention of the Church of England, to be as farre extended as we have said (that is) [to all and every one of the congregation present] the prayer following puts out of question. For in that wee are taught to pray for the whole Church, and for every member of it. Almighty and everlasting God, by whose spirit the whole body of the Church is governed and sanctified: receive our supplications and prayers, which we offer before thee for all estates of men in thy holy Congregation; that every member of the same, in his vocation and ministery, may truly and godly serve thee. &c. If here it be excepted, that albeit this prayer be conceived in termes formally universall, yet is the universall forme of it to be no further extended, than its proper matter or subject; and that (as will be alleaged) is the mysticall live-body of Christ, whose extent, or the number of whose members, is to us unknowne: the third and last prayer will clearely quit this exception, and free both the former petitions, from these or the like restrictions. For in the last prayer wee are taught to pray for all and every one which are out of the Church, that they may bee brought into the Church, and bee made partakers with us of Gods mercy, and the common salvation. Mercifull God, who hast made all men, and hatest nothing that thou hast made, nor wouldest the death of a sinner, but rather that he should be converted and live: have mercy upon all Iewes, Turkes, Infidells,[Page]and heretiques, and take from them all ignorance, hardnesse of heart; and contempt of thy Word▪ And so fetch them home, blessed Lord, to thy flocke, that they may bee saved among the remnant of the true Israelites, and be made one fold, under one shepheard Iesus Christ our Lord. If God therefore will not the death of any Iew, Turke or Infidell, because of nothing hee made them men: wee may safely conclude that he willeth not the death of any, but the life of all, whom of men or infidells, hee hath made Christians; to whom he hath vouchsafed the ordinary meanes of salvation, and daily invites, by his messengers, to imbrace them. Hee which made all things without invitation, out of meere love, made nothing hatefull; nor is it possible that the unerring fountaine of truth and love, should cast his dislike, much lesse fix his hatred upon any thing that was not first in it nature odious. Nothing can make the creature hatefull or odious to the Creator, besides its hatred or enmity of that love, by which it was created, and by which he sought the restauration of it when it was lost. Nor is it every degree of mans hatred or enmity unto God, but a full measure of it, which utterly exempts man from his love; as that reverendHooper in his Preface to the ten Commandements. See Parag. 8 of this chapter. Bishop and glorious Martyr, one of the first Reformers of the Religion profest in this Land, observes.

3 If with these authorized devotions we compare the doctrine of our Church in the publike catechisme, what can bee more cleare, then that as God the Father doth love all mankind, without exception; so the Sonne of God did redeeme not [Page] some onely of all sorts, but all mankind universally taken: First wee are taught to beleve in God the Father who made us and all the world. Now, if the Church our mother have in the former prayers truly taught us, that God hateth nothing which he hath made; this will bring forth another truth: viz. That either there be some men which are not of Gods making; or else that hee hateth no man (not Esau) as he is a man, but as a sinner, but as an enemy or contemner of his goodnesse. And consequently to this branch or corollary of this former truth, wee are in the same Catechisme, in the very next place taught to beleeve in God the Son who hath redeemed us and all mankind. And if all mankind were redeemed by him, than all of this kind were unfeignedly loved; none were hated by him. And though in the same place, wee are taught to beleeve in the holy Ghost as in the sanctifier of all that are sanctified, yet this wee are taught with this caveat, that he doth sanctifie al the elect people of God, not all mankind. All then are not sanctified by God the holy Ghost, which are redeemed by God the Sonne, nor doth God the Father bestow all his spirituall blessings upon all whom hee doth unfeignedly love, or on whom hee hath bestowed the blessing of Baptisme as the seale or pledge of their redemption. All these inferences are so cleere, that the consideration of them makes us doubt, whether such amongst us, as teach the contrary to any of these, have at any time subscribed unto the booke of Common prayers, or whether they had read it before they did subscribe unto [Page] it or contradict it. That this universall extent of Gods love, and of the redemption wrought by Christ, is a fundamentall principle, whereon many serious and fruitfull exhortations in the booke of Homilies are immediately grounded, shall (by Gods assistance) appeare in the Article concerning Christ. For a concludent proofe that God doth unfeignedly will, not genera singulorum, all sorts of men onely; but singula generum, every one of all sorts to be saved; take it briefely thus: All they which are saved, and all they which are not saved, make up both parts of the former distinction or division to the full. But God will have all to bee saved which are saved; he likewise willeth the salvation of all such, as are not saved, that is, of such as dye: therefore he willeth the salvation of every one of all sorts. That God doth will the salvation of all that are saved, no man ever questioned; that God did will not the life, but death of such as dyed, the Iewes (Gods owne people) did sometimes more then question: and to prevent the like querulous murmurings of misbeliefe in others, he once for all interposed his solemne oath; As I live saith the Lord, I will not the death of him that dyeth, but rather that he should repent and live. None then can be saved whom God would not have saved; many are not saved, whom God would have saved.

4 But how, or by what Will doth he will that they should be saved that are not saved? Doth he will their salvatiō by his revealed, not by his secret will? Doth he give signification onely of his good will towards them, whereas his good will and pleasure, [Page] is not finally to doe them any reall good? This I take to be the meaning of voluntas signi, and beneplaciti. But, it being granted, that God doth will the salvation of all men, by his revealed will, or voluntate signi; This alone will sufficiently inferre our intended conclusion [That he truly wils the salvation of all, without the exemption of any.] Vpon such as contradict this doctrine, it lyes upon them to prove not the negative onely, that God doth not will the salvation of all by his secret will; but this positive particular, that God doth nill or unwill the salvation of some by his secret will, whose salvation he willeth by his revealed will. Now if it be answered, that he doth by his secret will or good pleasure, unwill or nill the salvation of the same parties to whom he willeth salvation by his will revealed or signified; they must (without remedy) acknowledge the one or the other member of this division: as, either [that there be two wils in God of as different inclinations ad extra, as the reasonable and sensitive appetite are in man:] or [that there is a manifest contradiction in the object of one and the same Divine Will.] That, All men should be saved, and that some men should not be saved, implyeth as formall a contradiction, as to say, [All men are living creatures, some men are no living creatures.] Now that all men should bee living creatures, and that some men should not be living creatures, falls not within the object of Omnipotency. And if the will of God, be at truly undivided in it selfe, as the omnipotent power is: it is no lesse impossible that the salvation of all, and the non-salvation of some [Page] should be the object, or true parts of the object of one and the same divine will undivided in it selfe, than that the actuall salvation of all, and the actuall and finall condemnation of some, or the non-salvation of all, should be really effected by the omnipotent power. Whether this divine will be clearly revealed, or in part revealed, and in part reserved or secret in respect of us, all is one; so this will in it selfe and in its nature, bee but one, and undivided. The manifestation or reservation of it, or whatsoever other references it may have to us, can neither increase nor abate the former contradiction in the object. Or if voluntas signi, bee not essentially the same with voluntas beneplaciti, there is a manifest contradiction or contrariety betwixt them: If the salvation of all bee the object of the one, and the non-salvation or reprobation of others, be the object of the other.

5 Yet doe we not (like rigorous Critiques) so much intend the utter banishment of this distinction out of the confines of Divinity, as the confinement of it to its proper seat and place. Rightly confined or limited, it may beare faith and allegiance to the truth, and open some passages for clearing some branches of it: But permitted to use that extent of liberty which hath beene given to it by some, it wil make way for canonization [...] [...]esuiticall perjuries, for deification of mentall evasions or reservations. Let us compare Iesuiticall practices with that patterne, which is the necessary resultance of some mens interpretation of Gods oath in this case. Were this interrogatory put to any Iesuiticall Assassinat, [Page] imagine a powder-plotter; [Doe you will or intend the ruine of the King or State, or doe you know of any such project or intendment?] there is none of this crue so mischievously minded, but would be ready to sweare unto this negative [As the Lord liveth, and as I hope for life and salvation by him, I neither intend the ruine of King or State, nor doe I know of any conspiracy against him.] And yet in case the event should evidently discover his protestation to be most false; yet would he rest perswaded, that this or the like mentall evasion or reservation [I neither intended the ruine of King or State, so they would become Romane Catholiques; nor did I know of any conspiracy against them, with minde or purpose to reveale it unto them,] may be a preservative more than sufficient, a soveraigne Antidote against the sinne of perjury, which hee had swallowed or harboured in his brest; specially if the concealement of his treason, make for the good of the Church. To put the like interrogatory unto the Almighty Iudge, concerning the ruine or welfare of men, no Magistrate, no authority of earth hath any power. Yet hee, to free himselfe from that foule aspersion, which the Iewes had cast upon him (as if such as perished in their sinnes, had therefore perished, because it was his will and pleasure they should not live but dye,) hath interposed his often mentioned voluntary oath; As I live, I will not the death of him that dyes, but rather that he should live. Shall it here bee enough to make answer for him, interpretando, by interpreting his meaning to be this? I doe not will the death of [Page] him that dyes, so he will repent, which I know he cannot doe: nor doe I will his non-repentance, with purpose to make this part of my will knowne to him; however, according to my secret and reserved will, I have resolved never to grant him the meanes, without which he cannot possibly repent; whereas without repentance hee cannot live but must dye. But, did Gods oath give men no better assurance than this interpretation of it doth, I see no reason (yet heartily wish, that others might see more) why any man should so much blame the Iesuites, for secret evasions or mentall reservations in matter of oath. For the performance of our oaths in the best manner that wee are capable of, is but an observance of a particular branch of that generall precept, Be ye perfect as your heavenly Father is perfect. Who then can justly challenge the Iesuite of imperfection or falshood, much lesse of perjury, for secret evasions or mentall reservations, when his life is called in question; if once it bee granted, that the God of truth, in matter of oath concerning the eternall life or death of more men than the Iesuites have to deale with, doth use the like?

6 In matters then determined by Divine Oath, the distinction of voluntas signi and beneplaciti, can have no place; specially in their doctrine who make the bare entity or personall being of men, the immediate object of the immutable decree concerning life and death everlasting. For the entity or personall being of man, is so indivisible, that an universall negation, and a particular affirmation of the [Page] same thing, [to wit, Salvation] falling upon man, as man, or upon the personall being of men, drawes to the strictest point of contradiction. Farre ever be it from us to thinke, that God should sweare unto this universall negative, ‘I will not the death of the man that dyeth; and yet beleeve withall, that he wils the death of some men that dye, as they are men, or as they are the sonnes of Adam: that hee should by his secret or reserved will, recall any part of his will declared by oath; that hee should proclaime an universall pardon to all the sonnes of Adam under the seale of his oath, and yet exempt many from all possibility of receiving any benefit by it.’

7 Shall we then conclude that the former distinction hath no use at all in Divinity? Or if this conclusion be too rigorous, let us see in what cases it may have place, or to what particulars it may bee confined. First, it hath place in matters of threatning, or of plagues not denounced by oath. Thus God, by his Prophet Ionas, did signifie his will to have Nineveh destroyed at forty dayes end; this was voluntas signi; and he truly intended what hee signified: yet was it his voluntas beneplaciti, his good will and pleasure at the very same time, that the Ninevites should repent and live. And by their repentance, his good will and pleasure was fulfilled in their safety. But in this case there was no contrariety betweene Gods will declared or signified .i. [voluntas signi] and his good will and pleasure, .i. [voluntas beneplaciti]; no contradiction in the object of his will however considered, for that was [Page] not one and the same, but much different, in respect of Gods will signified by Ionas; and of his good will and pleasure, which, not signified by him, was fulfilled. One and the same immutable will or decree of God did from eternity award two doomes, much different, unto Ninevch; taking it as it stood affected when Ionas threatned destruction unto it, or as it should continue so affected; and taking it as it proved, upon the judgement threatned. All the alteration was in Nineveh, none in Gods will or decree: and Nineveh being altered to the better, the selfe same rule of Iustice, doth not deale with it after the selfe same manner. The doome or sentence could not bee the same without some alteration in the Iudge, who is unalterable. And in that hee is unalterably Iust and Good, his doome or award, was of necessity to alter, as the object of it altered. Deus saepe mutat sententiam, nunquam consilium. Gods unchangeable will or counsell doth often change his doome or sentence. The same rule holds thus farre true in matter of blessing or promise not confirmed by oath: upon the parties alteration unto worse, unto whom the promise is made, the blessing promised may be revoked, without any alteration of Gods will or counsell. Yet may we not say, that the death or destruction of any to whom God promiseth life, is so truely the object of his good will and pleasure, as the life and salvation of them is, unto whom he threatneth destruction. The same distinctiō is of good use in some extraordinarie cases, or as applyed to men after they have made up the full measure of their iniquity, and are [Page] cut off from all possibility of repentance. Thus God willed Pharaoh to let his people goe out of Egypt, and signified this his will unto him by Moses and Aaron, in mighty signes and wonders. This was voluntas signi, onely, not voluntas beneplaciti. For though it were his good will and pleasure, that his people should depart out of Egypt; yet was it no branch of this his good will and pleasure, that Pharaoh should now repent or bee willing to let them goe. Rather it was his good will and pleasure (specially after the seventh plague) to have the heart of Pharaoh hardned. And yet after his heart was so hardned, that it could not repent, God so punished him, as if it had beene free and possible for him to repent, and grant a friendly passe unto his people. But Pharaohs case was extraordinary; his punishment so exemplary, as not to be drawne into example. For as our Apostle intimates, it was an argument of Gods great mercy and long suffering, to permit Pharaoh to live any longer on earth, after he was become a vessell of wrath destinated to everlasting punishment in hell. The reason why God thus plagued Pharaoh, for not doing that which now he could not doe (all possibility of amendment being taken from him) was to teach all generations following, by his fearefull end, to beware of his desperate beginnings, of struggling with God, or of persecuting them, whose patronage hee had in peculiar manner undertaken. And here again, there is no contradiction betweene these two proposition [God from all eternity did will the death of Pharaoh; God from all eternity did not will the death, but[Page]rather the life of Pharaoh. For albeit Pharaoh continued one and the same man, from his birth unto his death, yet did he not all this time continue one and the same object of Gods immutable will and eternall decree. This object did alter as Pharaohs dispositions or affections towards God or his neighbours altered. There is no contrariety, much lesse any contradiction, betweene these [God unfaignedly loveth all men; God doth not love, but hate the Reprobate, although they be men, yea the greatest part of men.] For here the object of his love and hate is not the same; he loves all men unfaignedly as they are men, or as men which have not made up the full measure of iniquity: but having made up that, or having their soules betroathed unto wickednesse, he hates them. His hate of them as Reprobates; is no lesse necessary or usuall, than his love of them as men. But though he necessarily bates them being once become Reprobates, or having made up the full measure of iniquity: yet was there no necessity layd upon them by his eternall decree, to make up such a measure of iniquity.

8 How these deductions will consort with some moderne Catechismes I doe not know: sure I am they are consonant to the opinion of that learned Bishop and blessed Martyr in his Preface to his expositions of the ten Commandements; a fit Catechisme for a Bishop to make. Every man is called in the Scripture, wicked, and the enemy of God; for the privation and lacke of faith and love, that he oweth to God. Et impii vocantur, qui non omnino sunt pii; that is, They are called wicked that in all [Page] things honour not God, beleeve not in God, and observe not his Commandements as they should doe; which we cannot do by reason of this naturall infirmity, or hatred of the flesh, as Paul calleth it, against God. In this sense taketh Paul this word, wicked. So must we interpret St. Paul and take his words; or else no man should be damned. Now we know that Paul himselfe, St. Iohn, and Christ damneth the contemners of God, or such as willingly continue in sinne, and will not repent. Those the Scripture excludeth from the generall promise of grace. Thou seest by the places afore rehearsed, that though wee cannot beleeve in God as undoubtedly as is required, by reason of this our naturall sicknesse and disease, yet for Christs sake in the judgement of God wee are accounted as faithfull beleevers, for whose sake this naturall disease and sicknesse is pardoned, by what name soever S. Paul calleth the naturall infirmity, or originall sinne in man. And this imperfection or naturall sicknesse taken of Adam, excludeth not the person from the promise of God in Christ, except wee transgresse the limits and bounds of this originall sinne by our owne folly and malice; and either of a contempt or hate of Gods word, we fall into sinne, and transforme our selves into the image of the devill. Then wee exclude by this meanes our selves from the promises and merits of Christ, who only received our infirmities, and originall disease, and not the contempt of him, and his Law.

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SECTION III. That Gods good will and pleasure is never frustrated, albeit his unspeakeable love take no effect in many to whom it is unfeignedly tendered.

CHAP. 16.
In what sense God may be said to have done all that he could for his Vineyard, or for such as perish.

1 TO found both parts of a contradiction in truth, fals not within the Sphere of omnipotency, and we may with consent of al Divines, maintaine it to be impossible. The true originall aswell of our aptnesse to conceive difficulties in the points proposed, as our ignorance in assoyling them, is because we extend not this Maxime so far as it naturally would reach; and the reason why we [Page] extend it not so farre, is our pronenesse to extend our owne power to the utmost, and, for the most part farther then justice or true goodnesse can accompany it. It is our nature to be humorous, and the nature of humor to be unconstant. Fortunes character may be every sonne of Adams Motto: Tantum constans in levitate, Onely constant in unconstancy. And being such, nothing can imply any constant contradiction to our nature; nothing that is truly and constantly the same, but will one time or other contradict our changeable and inconstant humors. And these enraged with contradiction, doe, (Tyrant-like) arme power, without just tryall or examination, without either respect or reverence, against whatsoever contradicts them. The right use of power in creatures meerely sensitive, is to satiate their appetites of sense: for nothing hath power to move it selfe, but what is sensitive: and, all power, whether of body or minde, was bestowed on man for the execution of his will, or accomplishing his desire of good: but, since his will, by his fall, became irregular, and his desires corrupt; his power is become like a common officer, or undercommander to all his unruly appetites, domineering by turne or succession; all other inclinations being under the command of it. So the wise man hath charactered the resolution of voluptuous men, cap. 1. 6. Come on therefore, let us enjoy the good things that are present, and let us speedily use the creatures like as in youth. And ver. 11. Let our strength be the Law of justice; for that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth. Even in such as are by [Page] most esteemed good men and sober, those notions of truth and equity which are naturall and implanted, are so weake and ill taken; that, rather than upstart carnall appetites or desires which custome countenanceth, should be enraged through their reluctance, they presently yeeld their consents to such proposalls, as (were they resolute, firme and constant) would as offensively contradict them, as punishment or paine doth our sense of pleasure. Vnto such proposalls we often yeeld, as are impossible to be approved by Equity; to whom we usually professe our dearest love and allegiance, with promises to frame our lives by her rules. But love in us (whether one simple and indivisible quality, or an aggregation or cluster of divers inclinations, all rooted in one Center,) is not alike set on divers objects. Hence, when it comes to opposition betweene sense and reason, betweene our selves, our private friends, and common equity, it divides it selfe unequally. The particular inconveniences whereto we are daily exposed, by the inordinate love of the world, and the flesh, are infinite; all may be reduced to these two originalls: First, it blindes our judgements, and makes our intentions seeme upright and just to our partiall desires, or at least not incompatible with the rules of equity; when as, to impartiall judgements, they are palpably unjust. Secondly, having blinded our judgements, it forthwith abuseth our power or authority; to effect whatsoever is not, for the present, apprehended for a grosse and evident wrong. So that nothing whereon our love or liking is for the present [Page] mainly set, seemes any way impossible unto us; unlesse it bee altogether without the compasse of our power: And, through the variousnesse of our humerous disposition, that, which we cannot like or admit to day, will be allowed of to morrow. But though there bee none that doth good, no not one, yet some there be doe lesse evill than others. And seeing those amongst us, whose love to equity is more strong and constant than their neighbours, are alwayes drawne with greater difficulty to dispense with truth or approve unjustice; the consequence necessarily amounting from this experimented truth, is, That ‘[if any mans judgement in matters of equity and justice were infallible, and his love to justice and knowne equity altogether constant and invincible, it would bee impossible for him to transgresse in judgement.]’ Thus as well the strength of unconstant humorous desires, as the faintnesse of love or equity (both which most men may experience in themselves) as the contrary vertues, which they may observe in some few joyntly conspire to rectifie our conceit of God, in whom the Ideall perfection, of the ones integrity and constancy, is without all mixture of the others vice or humorous impotency.

2 The first rule for right extending the former Maxime [To make both parts of a contradiction true, is no part of the object of power omnipotent] would be this; Many effects which are very possible to power alone considered, or as it hath the mastery over weake inclinations unto equity, necessarily imply a direct and manifest contradiction unto [Page] some Divine Attributes, no lesse infinite or immutable than Almighty power. Hence it followes, that many effects or designes, which seeme possible to the humane nature, may bee impossible or most incongruous to the Divine. It is more shamefull then impossible for rich men to lye & cozen, or for Magistrates to oppresse and wrong their inferiors; albeit the ones riches or others power, were infinitely increased, without internall increase of their fidelity. But to him that is eternally true and just, yea eternall truth and justice, it is as impossible to speak an untruth, or doe wrong, as for truth to be a lye, or justice to be unjust. Many things then are possible to meere power, which are impossible to it, as linkt with truth or love; and many things againe possible to it, as linkt with these, which yet directly contradict the eternall patterne of justice or goodnesse; and are by consequent impossible to the Almighty, who is no lesse just and good, then powerfull. Many Pyrats by Sea, or Robbers by Land, might they injoy but halfe the power & authority for a Month, whereof ordinary Princes by inheritance are possest; would doe their companions and friends more good, and worke their enemies greater spoyle in this short space, than any Monarch can doe in his whole raigne, which holds it a point of Majestie to moderate his actions by that Princely rule; Princeps id potest quod jure potest, Princes can do no more than they can doe justly. In this sense, I think we may truly say, all before Christ were theeves & robbers, or in respect of him very unjust; not Abraham, David, Ezekiah, Iosias, not one of the Prophets, [Page] might they have but halfe that power and authority cōmitted to them over Angels for a night, which the Son of God from everlasting had, without robbery; but would have thought it very possible to have removed the Romane Army with as great terror, losse and disgrace, as the Angell of the Lord sometimes had done the Assyrians, from Ierusalems-siege; whose fatall destruction, God incarnate cleerly foreseeing, bewailed with teares, but would not, but could not prevent. For to the King of everlasting righteousnesse, that onely was possible, which was justly possible. And though he were a Father to Israel, and the Prince of peace, yet he approves a most bloody and mercilesse warre, before an unjust peace, and disgracefull to Eternall Majestie; for so the Prophet had said in his name, before, There is no peace unto the wicked; to such as stubbornely abandon the wayes of peace, and wilfully neglect saving health, so often and lovingly tendred unto them; Hos salus ipsa servare non potuit, and shall infinite power save them, whom infinite salvation cannot save?

3 To have smitten the men of Sodom with blindnesse, before lust had entred in at their eyes; had beene a worke as easie to Almighty power, as blinding them in the attempt or prosecution of lust conceived. But that contradiction which the prevention of this sinne, did not imply unto Gods power, it did (all circumstances considered) necessarily imply unto his Iustice; by whose immutable and eternall rules, they were left unguarded against these foule temptions, for wilfull contempt of [Page] his goodnesse, for abusing his long suffering and loving kindnesse. But did it imply any contradictiō to his goodnesse or loving kindnesse, to have prevented the Sodomites former contempt or abuse of them? Out of question it did, unto his eternall equity; for all his waies are mercy and truth. And these Sodomites wilfulnesse presupposed, the eternall rule of his goodnesse and loving kindnesse, had appointed justice to debarre them, as now they are, from reaping those fruits, whereof his goodnesse, as they were men, had made them capable. The principle whence the just proofe of these seeming paradoxes, as also the right explication of all difficulties in this argument, must be derived, is a Schoole Maxime borrowed from orthodoxall antiquity, now not much used, but of much use in true Divinity, and for this reason to bee more fully insisted upon, in the Treatise of mans first estate. The Maxime it self is briefly thus; It is impossible for mā or other created substance, to be absolutely impeccable from his creation. Onely He that is infinite in being, is infinitely good; and infinite goodnesse onely implyes an absolute impossibility of being bad. As God onely essentially is, so hee onely is essentially and immutably good; all things besides him are or sometimes were subject to mutability, aswell in Essence as in their state and condition. Power omnipotent could not from the first Creation, have pared off all mutabilitie from mans morall goodnesse, without perishing the onely possible root of his eternall and immutable happinesse. To decline to evill, implyes no contradiction to Being simply, [Page] but onely to omnipotent being: it is so possible to all Creatures, that without this possibility, it were (as we shall afterwards prove) impossible for them to be truly like their Creator, for a moment in that attribute, whose participation is the only assurance of their eternall weale. If God either by his omnipotent power, or infinite wisedome, had necessarily (though without any violence) restrained this possibility in man, of declining from good to evill, man had forthwith ceased to have beene truly and inherently good, and ceasing to be such, had utterly lost all possibilities of that estate, whose pledge or earnest he received in his creation. Gods goodnesse is his happinesse. And his participative goodnesse is the foundation of mans happinesse. So that not Gods justice onely, but that loving kindnesse whereby hee created man, and appointed him as heyre apparent of life eternall, did remove all necessity from his will, because the imposition of necessity (whether laid upon him by power or wisdome infinite) had utterly extinguished that goodnesse wherein it was onely possible for the creature to expresse the Creators goodnesse manifested in his creation. Now that was not Gods essentiall or immutable goodnesse, for that is incommunicable. All the goodnesse man is capable of, doth but expresse Gods goodnesse communicative. It is the stampe of it communicated. As God then did communicate his goodnesse to his creatures, not by necessity but freely, so could not the creature be truly good (that is like his God) by necessity but freely. Nor was it possible for him to have beene either [Page] confirmed in such goodnesse as he had, or translated to everlasting happinesse; but by continuing freely good for some space, or lesse evill, than by the liberty which God by his immutable law had given him in his creation, hee possibly might have beene. Continuing good, though but for a while, without necessity, the riches of Gods free bounty, had beene continually increased towards him, and had finally established him in everlasting blisse by confirmation of him in true goodnesse, or by investing him with immortality. Since his fall wee are not usually capable of mercy or of the increase of his bounty; much lesse of these everlasting fruits whereof blessings temporall are the pledges; but by free abstinence from some evills, unto whose practices, the possibility of our corrupted nature might be improved. And albeit we doe not alway that which is in its nature evill, yet we can doe nothing well, but even the good which we do we doe it naughtily: yet unlesse we doe both lesse evill, and the good which we do lesse naughtily than we possibly might doe, God still diminisheth the riches of his bounty towards us; and by inhibiting the sweet influence of his gracious providence, suffers us to fall from one wickednesse to another, being prone to runne headlong into all, if once the reines of our unruly appetites, bee given into our unweildie hands. Farre bee it from any sonne of Adam to thinke hee is able without Gods love and favour to withdraw himselfe from the extremities of mischiefe, much lesse to doe such good as may make him capable of well-doing. [Page] So strong is our love to sinfull pleasures, since our first parents gave the reines unto our appetite, that none can recall themselves or repent, without the attractions of infinite love. And yet many whom this infinite love doth daily imbrace, because they apprehend not it, are never brought by the attractions of it to true repentance. Despisest thou the riches of his goodnesse, saith the Apostle, Rom. 2. 4. his forbearance and long suffering, not knowing that the goodnesse of God leadeth thee to repentance? Of whom speakes he thus? of such onely as truly repent, and by patient continuance in wel-doing, seeke for glory, honour, and immortality? nay, but, of them who for hardnesse of heart, cannot repent; but treasure up wrath against the day of wrath, and the revelation of the righteous judgment of God.

4 Were the riches of his bounty therefore fained, or did hee onely profer, but not purpose to draw them unto repentance, which repented not? this is no part of our heavenly Fathers perfection, no fruit of that wisedome which is from above, but a point of earthly policy devoid of honesty; a meere tricke of wordly wit, to whose practice nothing but weaknesse and impotence to accomplish great desires, can mis-incline mans corrupted nature. But doth it not argue the like impotency, though no such want of integrity in God, not to effect what he wils more ardently and more unfainedly, than man can doe the increase or continuance of his welfare, or avoidance of endlesse misery? No; it being supposed (as we have said) that man is not capable of [Page] endlesse joyes, unlesse he will be wrought by meere love, without the impulsions of unresistible power, unfaignedly to love him that hath prepared them for him; the same infinite love which continually drawes him unto repentance, was in congruity to leave him a possibility not to be drawne by it. For coactive penitency, would have frustrated the end to which repentance is but a meane subordinate. The imployment or exercise of Gods almighty power to make men repent against their wils, or before they were wrought to a willingnesse by the sweet attractions of his infinite love, or by threatnings of judgements not infinite or irresistible, would be like the indeavors of a loving Father, more strong than circumspect, who out of pity to his sonne, whom he sees ready to be choked with water, should strangle him by violent haling him to the shore. Most men by ascribing that unto Gods power which is the peculiar and essentiall effect of his love, doe finally misse of that good, which both infallibly conspire to poure, without measure, upon all such as take right and orderly hold of them. How shall wee then fasten our faith to them aright? we are to beleeve, that Gods infinite power shall effect without controule or checke of any thing in heaven or earth, all things possible for their endlesse good, that truly love him; but constraines no mans will to love him, being alwaies armed against wilfull neglectors of his unfaigned love. No man would argue his love to be lesse than infinite, because not able to produce the effects of infinite power: and as little reason wee have to [Page] thinke, that power, though infinite, should bee the true immediate parent of love, which never springs in any reasonable creature, but from the seedes of love or lovelines sown in the humane soule, though they doe not alwayes prosper. Constraint, because it is the proper and immediate effect of power, is a companion fit for lust; whose satisfaction breedes rather a loathing of the parties constrained, than any good wil or purpose to reward them for being unwilling, unloving, or impatient passives; nothing but true unforced love, can yeeld contentment unto love. Needy man, to whom benevolences though wrested are ever gratefull, cannot bee induced to love the parties from whom they are wrested. For, Non tantum ingratum sed invisum est beneficium superbè datum: Good offices whilest they are presented by pride, are not onely ungratefull but odious. But God who giveth to all men liberally, and upbraideth no man; as he esteemes no gifts (howsoever given) so he alwayes detests the niggardly backwardnesse, and loves the cheerfulnesse of the giver.

5 From these discussions the truth of the former rule, with the right solution of the maine probleme proposed, may bee illustrated, by examples of divers kinds in subjects knowne and familiar. Be the charge never so great, so the exonerations be well nigh equal, the incoms are lesse than if their charge were little, and their exonerations none. Or, be a mans revenues never so large, so his necessary expences be no lesse, hee shall not bee able to doe as much for his friend in some reall kindnesse, as hee [Page] whose estate is not halfe so great, if so his annuall expences be tenne times lesse. In like case, though mans love to his dearest friend, be (in respect of Gods love to us) but faint, and his power but small; yet because his love to justice is much lesse, or rather his partiality greater, hee oft-times effects that for his temporall good, which God though infinite in power, doth not effect for those whom hee infinitely loves. For the bequests or grants made unto man by his infinite love, must undergoe the examination of justice and equitie. What are alike infinite, before they passe the irrevocable seale of infinite power, one of these cannot attempt, much lesse absolutely bring ought to passe, without the others consent. Infinite love cannot oversway, either Gods incomprehensible wisedome to devise, or his omnipotency to practise meanes for mans salvation, which contradict the unchangeable rules of infinite equity. His love is as truly indivisible, as infinite; and is for this reason more indissolubly linkt unto the unchangeable rules of his owne justice or equity, than unto mankinde, whose goodnesse in his best estate, was but mutable; nor are any of Adams posterity so capable of that infinite mercie, wherewith God embraceth them, as Gods Iustice and Majestie are of his infinite Love. These being as He is absolutely immutable, are throughout eternity immutably loved of him, who indivisibly is Majestie, Iustice, Love, immutable.

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CHAP. 17.
The truth and ardency of Gods love unto such as perish, testified by our Saviour, and by S. Paul.

1 THese are no Paradoxes, but plaine truth; without whose acknowledgement, wee shall hardly finde any true sense or good meaning in Gods protestations of sorrow for his peoples plagues, or in his expostulations of their unthankfulnesse, or in his kind invitations of them to repentance, which never repent, or in his tender profers of salvation to those which perish. I have spred out my hands all the day long unto a rebellious people, which walketh in a way that was not good, after their owne thoughts, &c. Isay 65. 2. His infinite power expects their conversion, as the Mariner doth the turning of the Tyde; but may not transport them into the land of Promise, untill his Loving-kindnesse have converted them. The unremovable rules of eternall equity, will not suffer him to stretch out his hands any farther than he doth, towards the sonnes of men; and when the measure of their iniquity is accomplished, his infinite Iustice will not suffer him to stretch them out so farre any longer. Albeit hee cannot then without unfaigned sorrow, withdraw them from those to whom in love unfaigned hee hath stretcht them out. Thus Ierusalems iniquity come to the full [Page] did fill our Redeemers heart with woe, and his eyes with teares. If thou hadst knowne, even thou, at least in this thy day, the things which belong unto thy peace; but now they are hid from thine eyes: Luke 19. 42. Did he speake this as man, or doth not the Spirit say the same? Hee that spake this, spake nothing but words of spirit and life, nothing but the words of God, if we may beleeve that he meant as he hath spoken. I have not spoken (saithIoh. 12. 49, 50. Hee) of my selfe, but the Father which sent me, hee gave me a commandement, what I should say, and what I should speake: whatsoever I speake therefore, even as the Father said unto me so I speake. His bowels of compassion were freely extended towards thē, from that exact conformity which his spotlesse and blessed soule held with Gods infinite love; and yet restrained againe by that conformity, which it as exactly held with the eternall rules of Gods infinite justice or equity: and from these different motions or distractions, thus occasioned from that indissoluble uniō of his divisible soule, with these two different attributes of the indivisible nature, were his teares squeezed out. He wept then as man, not as God; and yet in this humane passion, did visibly act that part which God before his incarnation had penned, as a sensible memoriall of his unconceivable love. O that my people had hearkned unto me: and Israel had walked in my wayes; I should soone have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted themselves unto him but their time should have endured for ever. He should have fed them also with the[Page]finest wheat, and with honey out of the Rocke should I have satisfied thee. Psalm. 81. vers. 13, 14, 15, 16. Wheat and Honey, here promised, were Emblemes of better blessings purposed towards them. And thus avouching this his purpose, under no character of courtly complement, but in the forme of legall assurance; his words are undoubted tokens of unfeigned love and desire unquenchable of their welfare, that did not prosper. Israel might have said, as Ierusalem afterwards did of her sorrow; Was there ever any love like unto this love wherewith the Lord imbraced mee in the dayes of my youth. Notwithstanding this excessive fervency of His loving kindnesse (whose will is infinite) laid no necessity upon their wils to whom hee wished all this good. They had a liberty left them by eternall equity, to refuse it. Hee out of the wishes of his bounty as he protesteth, was ready to poure out his best blessings according to the immensity of his loving kindnesse, so Israel would open his mouth wide to receive them. But my people (saith he) would not hearken unto my voice; and Israel would none of mee; so I gave them up unto their owne hearts lust; and they walked in their owne counsells. Psal. 81. vers. 11, 12.

2 Lord, who had sinned, the heathen people or their forefathers in like manner as Israel did, that in times past thou sufferedst them all to walke in their owne wayes? Acts 14. 16. They that observe lying vanities forsake their owne mercy, saith the Prophet Ionah. 2. 8. Never hadst thou given them up to their owne hearts lust, to treasure up wrath against [Page] the day of wrath, had they not despised the riches of thy bounty; whose current, neverthelesse was not altogether diverted from their posterity. To them thou leftest not thy selfe without a witnesse, in that thou didst good, and gavest them raine from heaven in fruitfull seasons, filling their hearts with food and gladnesse. To all nations even in the time of darknesse, when they were strangers from thee; these and the like temporall and sensible blessings, were unquestionable earnests of thy everlasting love, since more fully manifested; For thou so lovedst the world (not Israel onely) that thou gavest thine onely begotten son, to the end that who so beleeved in him, should not perish but have everlasting life. What further argumēt of Gods infinite love, could flesh & blood desire; thā the Son of Gods voluntary suffring that, in our flesh, by his Fathers appointment, wch, unto flesh and blood seemes most distastfull? That this love was unfaignedly tendered to all, at least, that have heard or hereafter may heare of it, without exception; what demonstration from the effect, can be more certaine, what consequence more infallible, thā the inference of this truth is frō a sacred truth received by all good Christians, viz. [Al such as have heard Gods love in Christ proclaimed and not beleeved in it, shall in the day of Iudgement appeare guilty of greater sinnes, than their forefathers could be endited of; and undergoe more bitter death, than any corruption drawne from Adam, if Christ had never suffered, could have bred.] I shall no way wrong the Apostle in unfolding his exhortations to the Athenians thus farre; but they rather offer the [Page] spirit by which hee spake, some kinde of violence, that would contract his meaning shorter. The times of this ignorance (before Christs death) God winked at, but now commandeth all men every where to repent; Because hee hath appointed a day, in the which he will judge the world in righteousnesse, by that man whom hee hath ordained, whereof he hath given assurance unto all men, in that hee hath raised him from the dead, Acts 17. 30, 31.

3 Why all men in the world have not heard of Gods infinite love thus manifested, many causes may hereafter bee assigned, all grounded upon Gods infinite Iustice or Mercy. Of Christs death many which heard not might have heard; many which are not, might have bin partakers; save only for their free and voluntary progresse from evill to worse, or wilfull refusall of Gods loving kindnesse daily profered to them in such pledges, as they were well content to swallow; foolishly esteeming these good in themselves, being good onely as they plight the truth of Gods love to them, which he manifested in the death of his Sonne. With this manifestation of his love, many againe out of meere mercy have not beene acquainted; lest the sight of the medicine might have caused their discase to rage, and make their case more lamentably desperate.

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CHAP. 18.
Want of consideration, or ignorance of Gods unfeigned love to such as perish, a principall meanes or occasion why so many perish.

1 BVt if the most part of men, as we cannot deny, doe finally perish, what shall it availe to revive this doctrine of Gods infinite love to all; by whose fruitlesse issue, he rather is made an infinit looser, than men any gainers? As for God, he hath frō eternity infallibly forecast the entire redemption, of his infinite love, which unto us may seeme utterly cast away. And of men, if many dye, whom he would have live (for his will is, that all should bee saved, and come to the knowledge of the truth) the fault is their owne, or their instructers; that seeke not the prevention of their miscariage; by acquainting them with this coelestiall fountaine of saving truth; whose taste we labor to exhibite unto all, because the want of it, in observation of the heathen, is the first spring of humane miseryHeu primae scelerum causae mortalibus agris Naturam nescire De [...]m. Silius Italicus. lib. 4. de be [...]o pun [...].. Or, in language more plaine, or pertinent to the argument proposed, most men reape no benefit from Gods unspeakeable love; because not considering it to be his nature, they doe not beleeve it to be as he is, truly infinite, unfeignedly extended to all that call him Maker. But had the doctrines, which those divine Oracles [God is love, and would have all men to bee saued] naturally [Page] afford, beene for these forty yeeres last past, as generally taught, and their right use continually prest, with as great zeale and fervency, as the doctrine and uses of Gods absolute decree, for electing some, and reprobating most, in that space have beene, the plentifull increase of Gods glory, and his peoples comfort throughout this land, might have wrought such astonishment to our adversaries, as would have put their malicious mouths to silence. Who would not be willing to be saved, if hee were fully perswaded, that God did will his salvation in particular; because hee protests hee wills not the death of any, but the repentance of all, that all might live? Or were the particulars of this doctrine, unto whose generality, every loyall member of the Church of England hath subscribed, generally taught & beleeved; all would unfeignedly endeavour with fervent alacrity to be truely happy, because none could suspect himselfe to bee excluded from his unfeigned and fervent love, who is true happinesse. Whose love and goodnesse is so great, that hee cannot passe any act, whereby any of his creatures should bee debarred either from being like him in love and goodnesse; or being such, from being like him in true happinesse: But alas, while the world is borne in hand, that the Creator oft-times dispenseth the blessings of this life, not as undoubted pledges of a better, but deales with most men, as man doth with beasts, feeding them fattest which are appointed first to bee slaine: the magnificent praises of his bounty secretly nurseth such a misperswasion in most men of his [Page] goodnesse; (at least towards them) as the Epigramm [...]tist had of a professed Benefactor, that shewed him (as he thought) little kindnesse in great Benevolence.

Munera magna quidem misit, sed misit in hamo,

Et Piscatorem piscis amare potest?

Great gifts he sent, but under his gifts,

there covered lay an hooke,

And by the fish to be belov'd,

can th'cunning Fisher looke.

2 The frequency of sinister respects in dispensing of secular dignities or benevolences, makes such as are truly kind, to be either unregarded, or mistrusted by such as stand in neede of their kindnesse. And as fishes in beaten waters, will nibble at the bait, although they suspect the hooke: so the world hath learned the wit to take good turnes, and not to be taken by them; as suspecting them to bee profered in cunning rather than in true kindnesse: and cunning, where it is discovered or suspected, is usually requited with craft; love onely hath just title unto love. The most part indeed are so worldly wise, that none but fooles will easily trust them; howbeit our naturall mistrust of others, makes all of us a great deale worse than we would be. And as if we thought it a sinne or point of uncharitablenesse, to prove other mens conjectures, that measure our dispositions by their owne, altogether false; wee fit our demeanours to their misdeemings of us, and resolve rather to do amisse; than they should thinke amisse. Howbeit even in [Page] this perfidious and faithlesse age, the old saying is, not quite out of date: Ipsa fides habita obligat fidē. Many would be more trusty than they are; and do much better by us than they doe, would we wholly commit our selves to their trust and kindnesse. Now, though by mans goodnesse or badness, God can neither become worse nor better in himselfe; yet the riches of his bounty, or communication of his goodnesse, are still multiplyed towards those that stedfastly beleeve him to bee such as hee is: One, whom all are bound to love; because hee is so kind and loving; one whom all may safely trust, because his loving kindnesse is so utterly void of partiality, being armed with power and justice infinite. Thy righteousnesse is like the great mountaines, thy judgements are like the great deepe; O Lord thou preservest man and beast. How excellent is thy louing kindnesse, O God! therefore the children of men put their trust under the shadow of thy wings. Psal. 36. ver. 6, 7. This especially should move all to admire his loving kindnesse, that he loved all without any other motive than his owne meere goodnesse or loving kindnesse, either to incline his will or stirre up his power to give them a being like his owne: We love him (saith Saint Iohn) because he loved us first. Doe all then whom hee unfeignedly loves, love him vnfeignedly? Would God they did: for so (as his will is) all should bee saved. Did then the Apostle meane that his love to us, is no true cause of our love to him? yes; yet not simply as it is in him, but as being unfeignedly in him it is truly apprehended by us. Ingenuous [Page] love is never lawfully begotten, or fully conceived but from an apprehension of true lovelinesse in the object; and nothing can bee more lovely then love it selfe, when it is firmely apprehended or undoubtedly knowne.

3 Though secret consciousnesse of our owne unlovelinesse, in the state of nature, makes us oft-times too mistrustfull of others love: Yet unto our nature unregenerate and overgrowne with corruption, it is almost impossible, not to love them whose love to us we assuredly know to be unfaigned; unlesse their behaviour be very loathsome. Howbeit even so we love their persons, though not their presence, wherewith againe we willingly dispense, if it may gratifie us in other things, which we much desire. That which makes the worlds condemnation so just, that infinite mercy may not dispence with it, is mens dull backwardnesse to love him, of whose glorious beauty, the most glorious, most admired creatures are but fleeting shadowes, no true pictures. Him of whose infinite love and unfeigned preventions in unrecompensable benefits, all the pleasures wee take in health, the joy of strength, the sweetnesse of life it selfe; and whatsoever in it is good and lovely, are infallible pledges, and yet his intention in free bestowing them is to bind himselfe (more strictly than man is bound by receiving the just price of what he bargaines for) to instate us in the incomprehensible joyes of endlesse life.

Hee requires nothing at our hand, but that wee may be more capable of his loving kindnesse, by [Page] drawing still nearer and nearer to him, with all our hearts, with all our soules, and with all our strength; of whose least portion he is sole maker and preserver; of all whose motions hee is sole author and guide. From participation of his favour or presence, whatsoever is good in them, is undoubtedly capable of increase. The services wherein the eternall King requires demonstration of this our love, are not so hard, as those which wee willingly performe to corruptible men, not invested with any shadow of his lovelinesse, nor seasoned with any tincture of his loving kindnesse; to men, that cannot be so beneficiall as loving to their friends, nor halfe so loving as they are lovely, though their lovelinesse come farre short of their greatnesse. Far otherwise it is with him, whose Greatnesse and Majesty are truly infinite: hee is as glorious and lovely as great, as loving as lovely, and yet withall no lesse beneficiall than loving to those which love him, and doe his will.

4 This unfaigned love of him, raised from beleefe of his loving kindnes toward us, is as the first conception or plantation of true happines, to which once truly planted, whatsoever in this life can befal us,Rom. 8. 28. serves as nutriment. Diligentibus Deum omnia operantur in bonum. Wee know that all things worke together for good, to them that love God, to them who are called according to his purpose.

As this Article of his goodnesse and love is to be prest before any other, so the first and most naturall deduction, that can be made from this or any other sacred principle; and that which every one [Page] when hee first comes to enjoy the use of reason, should be taught to make by heart, is this: He that gave mee life indued with sense, and beautified my sense with reason, before I could desire one or other of them, or know what being meant; hath doubtlesse a purpose to give me with them, whatsoever good things my heart, my sense or reason can desire; even life or being as farre surpassing all goodnesse, flesh and blood can conceive or desire, as this present life, I now enjoy, doth my former not being, or my desirelesse want of being what now I am. These are principles, which elsewhere (by Gods assistance) shall bee more at large extended: yet would I have the Reader ever to remēber, that the infinite love, wherewith God sought us when we were not, by which he found out a beginning for mankind, fitted as a foundation for endlesse life, can never be indissolubly betrothed unto the bare beeing which hee bestowed upon us. The finall contract betwixt him and us, necessarily presupposeth a bond or linke of mutuall love. There is no meanes possible for us to be made better or happier than we are, but by unfaigned loving him, which out of love hath made us what we are. Nor are we what we are, because he is, or from his Essence onely, but because he was loving to us. And after our love to him enclasped with his unspeakable and unchangeable love to us, whose apprehension must beget it; the faith by which it is begotten in us, assures our soules of all the good meanes the infinitie of goodnesse may vouchsafe to grant, the infinity of wisedome can contrive, or power omnipotent is able to practise; for attaining the [Page] end whereto his infinite love from all Eternities doth ordaine us. And who could desire better encouragement or assurance more strong then this, for the recompence of all his labours? or if all this cannot suffice to allure us, hee hath set feare behind us to impell us unto goodnesse; or rather before us, to turne us backe from evill.

CHAP. 19.
How God of a most loving Father becomes a severe inexorable Iudge.

1 BVt if God as wee have said bee love, shall not his love be like his nature, altogether unchangeable? How then shall hee punish his beloved Creatures, or have anger, hate, or jealousie, any place or seat in the Omnipotent Majestie? Can these consort with infinite mercie? Many Philosophers have freed God from anger, making him Author onely of grace, and favour towards men. And I could wish their heresies had beene better refuted than they are, or at least, that men would bee better perswaded of such refutation, as Lactantius hath bestowed upon them, albeit I will not bind my selfe to stand to his decision of this point, but rather illustrate by instance or experiment, how extreame severity may stand with the fervency of fatherly unfaigned love.

2 Few mens hearts would have served them [Page] to have dealt with their owne bowels as Torquatus did with his. Howbeit in all that mighty people amongst whom he lived, I am perswaded but a few had taken the like care and paines to traine up their children in the most commendable qualities of that age. Not one would have adventured his owne person further, to have rescued his sonne from the enemy, or justified him in any honourable quarrell. In these and the like points, he had, and, upon just occasion,Meroveo certe auget probitatis famam at (que) justitiae necatus filius, justissimas uti (que) ob causas, ne quis ipsi diritatem in alienos falso exprobet liberos, vel in suos inauditam saevitiam nullis fultam rationibus: quales nec Posthumius Tiburtus, nec T. Manlius Torquatus olim habuere. Foreatulus de Gallorum Imperio & Philosophia. lib. 5. Et Paulo post. Posthumus Dictator, quia Aulus filius injustus praesidiis egressus hostes fuderat, victorem audacem caedi securi jussit: at Torquatus itidem Latino bello, Cos. filium à Metio Tusculanorum Duce provocatum, & forte detractandae pugnae pudore incensum, ac spolia referentem, mactari à lictore mandavit: jure forsitan, cum, teste Paulo Iurisconsulto, parentibus Romanis antiquior esset disciplina militaris charitate liberorum. At qui Gelaor Merovei filius in patrem contumax, in cives procax, in omnes superbus & injurius, pudicis matronis vim intulerat, p [...]tres & maritos terrnerat, ceciderat foederatos ac amicos Franci nominis lacessierat. Cum (que) ex amicissimis aulicis quispiam objecisset Meroveo Lucium Gellium Censorem Romanum, qui filio novercam solicitanti, & praeter [...] parricidium meditanti, ac propemodum convicto, ignovisset, & in reatu constitutum absolvi diligentissime curasset: Ille, inquit, boni patru functus est officio, ego boni Ducis: qui debellare hostes didici, & socios honorificè tractare, eorum (que) ulcisci injurias. would further have manifested, as much unfained love, as any father could unto his sonne; more than the imbecility of sex would suffer a tender hearted mother, to make proofe of. Doth then the adjudging of this his owne son to death, rightly argue he loved him lesse than other parents did their children, whose worse deserts they would not have sentenced so severely? No: it rather proves love and care of martiall discipline, and hate to partiality in administration of civill Iustice, to have beene much greater in him, than in other parents of his time. The more just and equall the law hee transgressed was, or might have beene (as for illustration [Page] sake we will suppose it to have been a law most equall and just) the more it commends his impartiall severity, that would not suffer the violation of it goe unpunished in his dearest sonne; whom the more desirous hee was to make like himselfe in religious observance of Martiall Discipline, and practice of Iustice towards the enemy; the readier he was to doe justice upon him for doing the contrary. That excessive love, which he bare unto his person, whilest his hopefull beginnings did seeme to promise an accomplishment of those martiall vertues, whose first draught hee himselfe had well expressed; turnes into extreame severity and indignation, after he proves transgressor of those fundamentall rules, by which he had taken his direction; and unto whose observance his desire of posterity was destinated. So it falls out by the unalterable course of nature, or rather by a Law more transcendent and immutable than nature it selfe, that a lesse love being chained (by references of subordination betweene the objects loved) with a greater, cannot dislinke it selfe without some deeper touch of displeasure, than if the bond or reference had beene none. The neerer the reference, or the stricter the bond; the more violent will the rupture be, and the dissociation more unpleasant: As there is no enmity to the enmity of brethren, if the knot of brotherly kindnesse once fully untie: The reason is, because our love to our brethren, is neerest united with the love of our selves, unto which all other love is in some sort subordinate. True affection is alwayes most displeased, where it is most defeated; [Page] where most is deservedly expected and least performed. Now as partiality towards our selves, and indulgence to our inordinate desires, oft-times begets desire of revenge upon unnaturall or unkinde brethren: so doth the constant and unpartiall love of equity and wholesome Lawes, naturally bring forth just severity towards presumptuous neglecters of them whose persons wee love no lesse, than they do that would plead with teares for their impunity. Towards them, unto whom wee would give reall proofe of more tender and true affection, than their partiall abetters doe, could wee winne them, by these or other warrantable means, to link their love with ours, or to love that best which most deserveth loue. As Seleucus loved his son (for saving the one of whose eyes, (both being forfait by the law) he was cōtented to lose one of his own) more dearely than most princely mothers do their children, for he loved him as himselfe, yet could not dispence either with himselfe, or his sonne, because he loved the publike law, and common good, that might accrue by this singular example of Iustice; better than either, better than both.

3 For every man to love himselfe best, is in our judgement no breach, but rather a foundation of charitie. Alaw to whose performance every man is bound in matters of necessity concerning this life, or in whatsoever may concerne the life to come; though not in cases of secular honour or preferment, wherein Proximus quis (que) sibi, must (by the law of conscience, and fundamentall rule of Christianitie) give place to Detur digniori. But [Page] nothing can be so worthy of love or honour as God; who will we, nill we, doth and must enjoy this liberty or priviledge of loving himselfe best. And if he love himselfe better than he doth any creature, he must love equity and justice better than he doth any man; for he himselfe is equity it selfe, the eternall patterne as well of Iustice as of Mercy; he cannot be unjustly mercifull towards those men, whom he loves more dearely than any man doth himselfe. And in as much as goodnesse it selfe is the essentiall object of his will, he loves nothing absolutely and irrevocably, but that which is absolutely & immutably good. So was not man in his first creation, much less is he such in his collapsed estate; and yet Gods love (so super infinite is it) extends it selfe unto our nature so collapsed and polluted with corruption, which he infinitely hates. This his love, which knowes no limit in it selfe, is limited in its effects towards men, by the correspondency which they hold or lose with that absolute goodnesse, or with those eternall rules of equity, justice, or mercy, in which his will is to haue man made like him. Such as have beene either in re or spe, though not as they should bee, yet such as either infinite loving kindnesse can vouchsafe to accept, to cherish, or encourage to goe forward as they haue begunne; or infinite mercy to tollerate in expectation of their repentance, or aversion from their wonted courses: these, if once they finally dissolve the correspondency, which they held with Mercie, or burst the linke which they had in Gods love, (with reference to that goodnesse, wherto the [Page] riches of his bounty daily inviteth them) his displeasure towards them kindles according to the measure of his former mercies or loving kindnesse. If being illuminated by his Spirit, they finally associate themselves to the sonnes of darknesse, or having put on Christ in baptisme, they resume their swinish habit, and make a sport of wallowing in the mire; the sweet fountaines of joy and comfort, which were opened to them as they were Gods creatures, not uncapable of his infinite mercy, prove floods of wo & misery to them as they are sworne servants of sinne and corruption: For, hate to filthinesse and uncleanness, is essentially and formally included in Gods love of absolute goodnesse, righteousnesse and true holinesse. And the displeasure or indignation which he beares to these, must needes seize on their persons that have covered thēselves with them, as with a garment; and to whose soules they sticke more closely than their skinnes doe to their bodies, or their flesh unto their bones.

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CHAP. 20.
Whilest God of a loving Father becomes a severe Iudge, their is no change or alteration at all in God, but onely in men and in their actions. Gods will is alwayes exactly fulfilled even in such as goe most against it. How it may stand with the Iustice of God to punish transgressions temporall, with tormens everlasting.

1THe summe of all is this; love was the Mother of all his workes, and (if I may so speake) the fertility of his power and Essence. And seeing it is his nature as Creator, and cannot change: no part of our nature (seeing every part was created by him) can bee utterly excluded from all fruits of his love; untill the sinister use of that contingencie wherewith hee indued it, or the improvement of inclinations naturally bent unto evill, come to that height as to imply a contradiction for infinite justice or equity to vouchsafe them any favour. Whether naturall inclinations unto evill, may bee thus farre improved in the children by their forefathers or no, is disputable; but in another place. Concerning Infants (save onely) so farre as neglect of duties to be performed to them, may concerne their Elders, seeing the Scripture in this point is silent, I have no minde here or elsewhere to dispute. If faith they have, or [Page] such holinesse as becommeth Saints; neither are begotten by our writing or preaching, nor is the written word the rule of theirs as of all others faith that are of yeares. And unto them onely that can heare or reade, or have the use of reason, I write and speake this, as well for their comfort and encouragement to follow goodnes, or for their terror, lest they follow evill. ‘Love, much greater than any creature owes or performes, or is capable of, either in respect of himselfe, or in others, is the essentiall and sole fruit of Gods antecedent will, whether concerning our nature as it was in the first man, or now is in the severall persons derived from him. And of this love every particular faculty of soule or body is a pledge undoubted; all, are as so many ties or handles to draw us unto him, from whom we are separated onely by dissimilitude; our very natures being otherwise linkt to his being, with bonds of strictest reference or dependency.’ On the contrary, Wrath and Severity are the proper effects of his consequent will, that is, they are the infallible consequents of our neglecting and despising his will revealed for our good, or sweet promises of saving health. The full explication and necessary use of this distinction, hath taken up its place, in the Articles of Creation, or Divine Providence. Thus much of it may serve our present turn. That Gods absolute wil was to have man capable of Heaven & Hel, of joyes and miseries immortall. That this absolute will whose possible objects are two, is in the first place set on mans eternall and everlasting joy, more fervently [Page] than man can conceive; yet not so, as to contradict it selfe by frustrating the contrary possibility, which unto man it had appointed. That Gods anger never kindles, but out of the ashes of his flaming love despised. Nor doth the turning of tender love and compassion, into severity & wrath, presuppose or argue any change or turning in the Father of lights and everlasting mercy; it is wholly seated in mens irregular deviation from that course which by the appointment of his antecedent will they should and might have taken (whereto his fatherly kindnesse did still invite them) unto whose crooked wayes, which they doe, but should not follow; from which the same infinite goodnesse doth still allure them by every temporall blessing, and deterre them by every crosse and plague that doth befall them.

2 This bodily Sunne, which wee see, never changeth with the Moone, his light, his heat are still the same; yet one and the same heat in the spring time, refresheth our bodies here in this Land; but scortcheth such as, brought up in this clime, journey in the sands of Affricke. His beames reflected on bodies solid, but of corruptible and changeable nature, often inflame matter capable of combustion. But (as some Philosophers thinke) wold not annoy us (unless by too much light) were we in that aethereall or coelestiall region wherein it moves. At least, were our bodies of the like substance with the heavens; the vicinity of it would rather comfort than torment us. Thus is the Father of lights a refreshing flame of unquenchable [Page] love, to such as are drawne by love to be like him in purity of life, but a consuming fire to such as he beholdeth a farre off; to such as run from him by making themselves most unlike unto him. No sonnes of Adam there be, which in some measure or other had not some taste or participation of his bountie. And the measure of his wrath is but equall to the riches of his bounty despised. To whom this infinite treasure of his bounty hath beene most liberally opened, it proves in the end a storehouse of wrath and torments, unlesse it finally draw them to repentance: According to the height of that exaltation whereunto his antecedent will had designed them, shall the degrees of their depression be in hell for not being exalted by it. Nor doth any man in that lake of torments, suffer paines more against his will, than he had done many things against the will of his righteous Iudge daily leading him to repenttnce. The flames of hell take their scantling from the flames of Gods love neglected; they may not, they cannot exceede the measure of this neglect. Or to knit up this point with evidence of sacred truth; God alwaies proportioneth his plagues or punishments in just equality to mens sinnes. And the onely rule for measuring sinne or transgression right, must bee taken from the degrees of mans opposition to Gods delight or pleasure in his salvation. Not so much as a dramme of his delight or pleasure can be abated, not a scruple of his will, but must finally be accomplished. The measure of his delight in mans repentance or salvation, shall beee exactly satisfied [Page] and fulfilled. Mans repentance he loves as hee is infinite in mercy and in bounty: mans punishment he doth not love at all in it selfe, yet doth hee punish as hee is infinitely just, or as hee infinitely loveth justice. This is but the extract of Wisedomes speech, Prov. 1. vers. 24. Because I have called, and ye refused, I have stretched out my hand, and no man regarded: But yee have set at nought all my counsell, and would none of my reproofe: I also will laugh at your calamity, I will mocke when your feare commeth, When your feare commeth as desolation, and your destruction commeth as a whirlewind; when distresse and anguish commeth upon you: Then shall they call upon me, but I will not answer; they shall seeke me earely, but they shall not finde mee: For that they hated knowledge, and did not choose the feare of the Lord. They would none of my counsel: they despised all my reproofe. Therefore shall they eate of the fruit of their owne way, and be filled with their owne devices. For the turning away of the simple shall slay them, and the prosperity of fooles shall destroy them. But who so harkeneth unto me, shall dwell safely, and be quiet from feare of evill.

And it were to be wished, that some moderne Divines, would better explicate than they doe a schoole tenet, held by many, concerning Gods punishing sinners in the life to come, citra condignum, that is, lesse than they deserve. For by how much their punishment is lesse than the rule of divine Iustice exacts: so much of that delight or good pleasure which God should have reaped from their salvation, may seeme by this remission [Page] to be diminished. But this point I leave to the judicious Readers consideration, who may inform himselfe from theQuod in fine versus 9. dicitur, Mesericordia ejus s [...] per omnia opera ejus, hoc, inquit Calv. ne (que) absurdum, ne (que) durum videri debet. Nam cum pec [...]ata nostra totum mundum involvant Dei maledictione, vbi (que) locus est misericordiae Dei ut brutis etiam animalibus subveniat. Hunc locum tractat Zanchius de natura Dei. l. 4. c. 4. q. 4 Quam magna sit Dei misericordia▪ i. Deus de justitia sua multum semper remittit. It reprobri cum postea puniuntur non pro meritis puniuntur [Haec Zanchij sententia] in igitur remittit illis propter satisfactionem Christi, an sine ulla satisfactione? [Verba Coppen.] Notandum hic in Diabolis & reprobis condemnatis, post hanc vitam non videri quaerenda misericordiae divinae vestigia. Coppen in Psal. 145. 9. videtur Zanchij expositio contradicere lac. c. 2. v. 13 Damnatio [...] ei qui non praestitit miseris ordiam. Expositors of that sacred Maxime. His mercy is above all his works. Psal. 145. 9.

3 To thinke God should punish sinne unlesse it were truly against his will, or any sinne more deeply than it is against his will and pleasure, is one of those three grosse transformations of the divine nature, which Saint Augustine refutes. For thus to doe is neither incident to the divine nature, nor to any other imaginable. Most of us, are by nature cholericke, and often take offence where none is given, and almost alwayes greater than is justly given; But to be offended with any thing, that goes not against their present wills, is a way wardnesse of men, whereof the humane nature is uncapable. To punish any, which doe not contradict their wills, is an injustice scarce incident to the inhabitants of Hell. It is the mutability of our wills or multiplicity of humors, which makes us so hard to be pleased. Our minds (at lest our affections) are set upon one thing fasting, upon another full; on this to day, on that to morrow; on sweet meates in health, on sowre in sicknesse; on kindnesse in mirth, on cruelty in anger; and because each hath his severall inconstant motions, wee cannot hold consort long together, without crossing or thwarring. But no man ever offended by merrily consorting [Page] with his brother disposed to mirth; nor by consenting to wreake his will, whilest hee was in rage. No man ever punished his servant for doing that which for the present he would have him doe; nor doe the Devills themselves vex the wicked (till Gods justice overtake them) but the godly; because the one doth what they would, the other what they would not have him doe; neither could displease them, were it not their wicked will to have all as bad and miserable as themselves. Could the damned by their suffering, either ease these tormentors, of paine, or abate their malice; they would be lesse displeased at them, and lesse displeased, torment them lesse. And, whom then have they made the subject of their thoughts, or did they rather dreame than thinke on God, that sometimes write as if it were not as much against Gods will to have men dye, as it is against mans will to suffer death. For they suffer death, not because God delighteth in it, but that Gods will may be fulfilled in their suffering or passion, according to the measure it hath beene neglected or opposed, by their actions.

4 But though the rule of justice bee exactly observed in proportioning their paines to the degrees or fervency of his love neglected; yet seeing the continuance of their neglect was but temporall, how stands it with his justice to make their paines eternall? The doubt were pertinent, if the immortall happinesse, wherunto the riches of Gods bountie, did daily lead them during their pilgrimage on earth, whereof they had sweet promises and full assurance, had not farther exceeded all the pleasures [Page] of this mortall life, for whose purchase, they morgaged their hopes of immortality, than the paines of hell doe these grievances or corrections, which caused them murmure against their heavenly Father. In this sense we may maintaine what Mirandula in another doth: that no man is everlastingly punished for temporall offences as committed against God. How then? Man wilfully exchanging his everlasting inheritance for momentany and transient pleasures, becomes the Author of his owne woe, and reapes the fruit of his rash For I reckon, that the sufferings of this present time, are not worthy to be compared with the glory which shall be revealed in us. Rom. 8. 18.bargaines, and so makes up that measure of Gods glory and pleasure, by his eternall sufferings, which he might and would not doe, by eternall participation of his joyfull presence.Quod si Christo salus nostra tam chara fuit, & tam charò constitit, quid est quare nostram ipsi salutem tantopere negligamus? Quibus supplicijs, & qua ignominia sempiterna non sumus digni, modicum laborem prore obtinenda tam praetiosa recusantes? Quomòdo nos effugie [...]us (inquit Paulus) si tantum neglexerimus salutem? Acosta con. 3. de circumcisione. And it is more than just, (for it is justice tempered with abundant mercy) that they should suffer everlasting paines, who not twice, or thrice, or seven times onely, but more than seventy times seven times, have wilfully refused to accomplish Gods eternall pleasure by accepting the sweet profers of their eternall joy. In every moment of this life, we have a pledge of his bounty to assure us of a better inheritance, the very first neglect whereof, might in justice condemne us to everlasting bondage. The often and perpetuall neglect, turnes flames of eternall love into an eternall consuming fire. For if love and mercy bee his property as hee is Creator and preserver of all mankinde: his love [Page] (as was said before) must needs be more indissolubly set on those attributes than on man. The end of his love to man, is to make him happy by being like him in the love of goodnesse: Now the more he loves him with reference to this end, or the oftner hee pardons him for neglecting or refusing the meanes that draw unto it; the greater is his wrath against impenitency, or finall contempt of his loving mercy. This is hisIsa. 42. 14 I have long time holden my peace, I have been still and refrained my selfe: now will I cry like a travailing woman, I wil destroy & devoure at once. most deare and tender attribute, which being foully wronged will not suffer justice to sleepe.

Patientia laesa sit furor. Long restraint of anger upon just and frequent provocations, makes the out-bursting of it, though unseemely and violent, seeme not altogether unjust nor immoderate. Albeit the forme and manner of proceeding, which humane patience much abused, usually observes in taking revenge, cannot in exact justice bee warranted or approved: yet this excesse of anger, or delinquency in the forme, is so tempered with matter of equity, that it makes those actions of patient men much abused, seeme excusable, which in others would be intollerable. The ideall perfection of this rule of equity, thus often corrupted by humane passions, is in the Divine Nature, without mixture of such passion or perturbation, as is pictured out to the terror of the ungodly in the propheticall characters or descriptions of his anger. Et excitatus est tanquam dormiens Dominus, &c. Then the Lord awaked as one out of sleepe, and like a mightie man that shouteth by reason of wine: Psal. 78. 65. Although he be a Father to all, and seeme [Page] to winke at his sonnes enormities: yet when hee awakes, he hath a curse in store, for such as abuse his patience, and make a mocke of his threatnings; more bitter than that which Noah bestowed on Cham. To attribute patience to him, and to deny him wrath and indignation; were, in Lactantius his judgement, to inrich his goodnesse, by robbing his Majesty.Ex his apparet vanas esse rationes Philosophorum, qui Deum putant sine ira: & inter caeteras laudes ejus id ponunt, quod est contra ipsā majestatem. Regnum hoc imperium (que) terrenum, nisi metus custodiat, solvitur. Aufer iram Regi, non modo nemo parebit, sed etiem de fastigio praecipitabitur. Imo vero cuilibet humili eripe hunc affectum, quis eum non spoliabit? quis non deridebit? Lactantius cap. 23. de ira Dei. p. 477. The reasons of those Philosophers are apparently vaine, which thinke that God cannot bee angry. For even earthly Empire or Soveraignty, forthwith dissolves, unlesse it be held together by fear. Take anger from a King, and in stead of obedience, he shall be throwne headlong from the height of dignity. Yea take anger from a man of meaner ranke, and hee shall become a prey to all, a laughing-stock to all.

5 I am not ignorant what censures passe upon this Author for his incommodious speeches in this argument of Gods wrath or anger. His words, I must confesse, sound somewhat harsh, to eares accustomed to the harmony of refined Scholastique Dialect. YetHactenus mihi magna contentio suit cum Lactantio, dum humanis rationibus, divinam iram ex humana metiretur fragilitate. Iam autem, quia dicit iram Dei sicut ipsum etiam Deum, eternam, nihil habeo quod repugnem. Nam ex syncrisi divinae atque humanae irae intelligas, ipsum de divina longe aliter quam de humana loqui: neque esse accidens quod in Deum non cadit, sed proprium, quia ira Dei à justitia Dei nihil differt. Iustitia verò Dei exeterna lage manet, contra quam si quis deliquerit, vindictam nimirum illius Dei sentiet, apud quem nullus vel temporum vel locorum terminus est. Betuleius in Com. in cap. 21. Lactant. de ira Dei. Betuleius, a man too learned, and too well seene in Lactantius, to let grosse faults pass without espiall, and too ingenuous to spare his censure upon errors espyed; after long quaerulous debatements, chides himselfe friends with his Author: [Page] whose meaning in conclusion he acknowledgeth to be Orthodoxall and good; albeit his characters of divine wrath in the premisses, may seeme better to fit the fragility of humane peevishnesse, than the Majesty of the Almighty Iudge. His phrase (perhaps) might be excused in part, by the security of those times wherein he wrote; his fault (if any fault it were not to speake precisely in an age more precise for maintaining the elegancy or life of style, than the right use or logicall propriety of words) is too common to most Writers yet, and consisteth onely in appropriating that to the Divine Nature, which is attributed to it onely by extrinsecall denomination. But leaving his phrase (about which perhaps he himselfe would not have wrangled) his argument holds thus farre true: God is more deeply displeased with sinne, than man is, though his displeasure bee not cloathed with such passions, as mans anger is: and yet the motions of the creatures appointed to execute his wrath, are more furious than any mans passions in extreamest fury can bee. What mans voice is like his thunder? What Tyrants frownes like to a lowring sky, breathing out stormes of fire and brimstone? Yet are the most terrible sounds, which the creatures can present, but as so many ecchoes of his angry voice; the most dreadfull spectacles that Heaven or Earth, or the intermediate Elements can afford, but copies of his irefull countenance. Howbe it this change or alteration in the creature proceeds from him without any internall passion or alteration. Immotus movet: He moveth all things, being himselfe immoveable.

[Page] 6 But as Lactantius may bee so farre justified, as we have said, so perhaps he is inexcusable in avouching anger to bee as naturall to GOD, as mercie, love, and favour are. To him that duely considers his infinite goodnesse, it may seeme impossible that hee should bee moved by us, or by any thing in us, to mercy; seeing, asDeus ex se sumil seminarium miserendi, quod judicat & condemnat nos, eum quodammodo cogimus, ut longe aliter de corde ipsius miseratio quam animadver. sio procedere videatur. Bernard. Ser. 5. in natal. Dom. Saint Bernard well observes, he hath the seminary of mercy in himselfe, and cannot take the seeds of it from any other. The fruits of it, wee may, by ill deserving, so hinder, that they shall never take nor prosper in our selves; but to punish or condemne us, we in a sort constraine him. And though he be the Author as well of punishment as of compassion, yet the manner how these two opposite attributes, in respect of us proceed from him, is much different; the one is naturall to him, and much better than any naturall comfort unto us; the other is in a sort to him unnaturall, and most unnaturall and unpleasant unto us: for as S. Vide Hierom. in cap. 1. Mich. vide Riberam in 1. Mich. num. 5. Et in 4. Mal. num. 4. Ierome saith, God when he punisheth, doth in a manner, relinquish his nature, and therefore when he proceeds to punishment, he is said to goe out of his place, and to worke alienum opus, a strange or uncouth worke. The wicked and reprobate, after this life, shall alwayes see and feele his anger: But though they see him thus, immediately, they doe not see his nature so immediately as the Elect shall doe, to whom he shewes himselfe in love; this is his proper visage, the live-character of his native countenance. The manifestation of his anger in what part of the world soever, or in what manner soever made, is a veile or vizard put betweene him and the [Page] Reprobate, lest they shold see the light of his countenance and be made whole. Hence, in the sentence of condemnation, it shall be said, Depart from mee yee cursed into everlasting fire. From his essentiall presence they cannot, but from the light of his countenance or joyfull presence, they must of necessity depart. For were it possible for them to behold it, no torments could take hold of them; the reflex of it upon whom soever it lighteth, createth joy; the fruition of it, is that happinesse which we seeke. To conclude: Lactantius rightly inferres, It were impossible sinne should not be odious to him, to whom goodnesse is pleasant and delightfull. Now his dispeasure at sinne, is the true cause of all displeasant motions or alterations in the creatures. His errour, albeit we take him at the worst, was not great: and as it may easily be committed by others, so it may as quickly be rectified, if wee say, that Anger and Hate are by consequent, or upon supposall of sinne, as necessary to the Divine Nature, as Love and Mercy, but not so naturall. But how either Love or Anger, both of them being either formally passions, or indissolubly linkt with passions, may be rightly conceived to be in God, is a point worth explication.

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CHAP. 21.
How Anger, Love, Compassion, Mercy, or other affections are in the Divine Nature.

NO affection or operation that essentially includes imperfection, can properly be attributed to perfection it selfe. But if the imperfection be onely accidentall, that is, such as may bee severed from the affection; the affection after such separation made, may without meaphor (in some Schoolemens judgement) be ascribed to God. Hence the same Schoolemen will have distributive justice to be in him, after a more peculiar manner than commutative justice is; because commutative justice (as they alledge) essentially includes rationem dati, & accepti; somewhat mutually given and taken. Mercy likewise is (in their judgements) more properly in God, than anger or revenge; because it may bee abstracted from compassion, which is an imperfectiō annexed, but not essential to the reliefe of others misery, wherein mercy (as they contend) formally consists. It sufficeth us, that such affections or morall qualities as in us formally and essentially include imperfectiō, may be contained in the Divine Essence; though not formally, yet eminently, and most truly, as we suppose anger is. For in this point wee rather approve ofDe Ira Dei, cap. 21. Lactantius his Divinity, than ofQuotiens impetu opus est non irascitur, sed exurgit, & in quantum putavit opus esse concitatur remittitur (que) non aliter quam quae tormentis exprimuntur tela, in potestate mittentis sunt, in quantum torque antur. Sen. lib. 1. de ira. cap. 9. Ita aut ira non est, aut inutilis est. Ibid. Seneca's Philosophy. Hee that bids us be angry and sin not, seeks not the utter extirpation, but the moderation of anger, Qui ergo [Page]irasci nos jubet, ipse uti (que) irascitur; He that bids us be angry, is doubtlesse upon just occasion angry himselfe. Nor should we sin, if we were angry onely as he is angry; or at those things onely that displease him, so far as they are displeasing to him; And were we as much inclined to mercy and loving kindnesse as we are to anger, the motions of the one would argue as great passion as the motiōs of the other. But seeingDum ergo ad verba mutabilitatis nostrae descenditur, ex iis quibusdam gradibus factis ascendet qui petest ad incommunicabilitatem Dei, ut rideat sine zelo zelantem, sine ira irascentem, sine dolore & penitentia, penitentems, sine misero corde, mis [...] ricordem, sine praevisionibus praescientem. Gregmoral. lib. 20. in 30. cap. Iob. Gods mercy which is proposed unto us for a patterne, is (if I may so speake) more reall and trnly affectionate in him than his anger, the difficulty how either should be in him is the same, or not much different: How can there be true compassion without passion, without motion or mutation? In many men it is observable; that the better use they have of reason, the lesse they participate of affection: and to cary those matters with moderation, which others can neither accomplish nor affect without excesse of passion or perturbation, is a perfection peculiar to good education, much & choice experience or true learning. And thus by proportion they argue, that God who is infinitly wise, must be as utterly void of passiō, though he be truly said mercifull in respect of the event. The conclusion is truer than the reason assigned. And in most men whom the world accounteth wise or subtile, reason doth not so much moderate as devoure affections of that rank we treat of. The cunningest heads have commonly most deceitfull or unmercifull hearts: and want of passion often argues want of religion, if not abundance of habituated atheism or irreligiō. Every mans passions are for the most part moderate [Page] in matters wch he either least affects or minds the most. Perpetuall minding, especially of worldly matters, coucheth the affections in an equall habit or constant temper; which is not easily moved, unlesse it be directly or strongly thwarted. Desires once stifned with hope of advantage by close sollicitation, secret cariage, or cunning contrivance; take small notice of violent oppositions which apparantly either overshoot, or come short of the game they lye in wait for. But even such moderate politiques, if their nets be once discovered and the prey caught from them, fall into Achitophels passion. Indignation and mercy, because incompatible with such meanes as serve best to politique ends, are held the companions of fooles. And unto the world so they seeme, because they are the proper passions of reason throughly apprehending the true worth of matters spirituall. For though gravity or good education may decently figure the outward motions; yet is it impossible not to bee vehemently moved, at the miscariage of those things, which we most esteeme. And the wiser we are in matters spirituall, the higher wee esteeme the promulgation of religion, the good of Gods Church, and promotion of his glory. The better experience we have of his goodnesse; the more we pity their case which as yet never tasted it: the more compassionate wee are to all that are in that misery whence we are redeemed. Did we esteeme these or other duties of spiritual life, as they deserve: the extreamest fits of passion, which any worldly wise man can be cast into, wold seem but as light flashes [Page] to those flames of zeale and indignation wch the very sight of this misguided world, would forthwith kindle in our brests. It is not then Gods infinit wisdome which swallowes up all passion, or exempts him from those affections which essentially include perturbation; for so the most zealous and compassionate should be most unlike him in heavenly wisdome. But as the swift motion of the heaven, better expresseth his immobility or vigorous rest, then the dull stability of the earth. So doth the vehemency of zeale, of indignation, or other passions of the godly (so the motives be weighty and just) exhibite a more lively resemblance of his immutability or want of passion, then the Stoicall apathy, or worldings insensibility in matters spirituall can doe.

2 How we should in godly passions bee likest GOD in whom is no passion; or how those vertues or affections which are formally in us, should bee eminently in him; cannot by my barren imagination bee better illustrated, then by comparing the circle in some properties with other figures. A circle, in some mens definitive language, is but a circular line; and to any mans sense (as in some respects (perhaps) reason must acknowledge) it is rather one line, then a comprehension of different lines, or a multitude of sides inclosed in angles. And from the unity of it perhaps it is, that many flexible bodies, as wands or small rods of iron, brasse, &c. which presently breake if you presse them into angles, or seek to frame them into any other figure, will bee drawne without danger into a circular forme. Notwithstanding [Page] some infallible mathematicall rules there be exprest in tearmes which in strict property of speech (or univocally) agree only to figures consisting of sides and angles; whose truth and use, reason experienceth to bee most eminently true in the Circle. Take a Quadrangle ten yards in length, and foure in bredth, another eight yards in length, and sixe in bredth, a third seven yards every way: The circumference of all three is equall 28. yards; so is not the superficiall quantity, but of the first 40. yards, of the second 48. of the third 49. The same induction alike sensible in other many-sided figures, affoords this generall unquestionable rule;Inter figuras [...], ordinator [...] est capacior. Among figures of the same kind, whose circumference is equall, that whose sides are most equall, are most capacious. Yet frame a five-angled figure whose whol circumference is but 28. yards, though the sides be not equall, the superficiall quantity of it will bee greater, then the superficiall quantity of the former square: and yet a sixe-angled figure of the same circumference, though the sides be unequall, will bee more capacious then that. And still the more you encrease the number of angles, though without any encrease of the circumference, the greater will the capacity or superficiall quantity of the figures be, specially if the sides be not unequall. From this evident induction ariseth a second tryed rule in the Mathematique.Inter figuras [...] Heterogeneas terminatior est capacior. Amongst figures of divers kinds, whose circumferences are equall, that which hath most angles, is alwayes most capacious. The circle which to our sense seemes neither to have sides, nor angles; by a double title grounded [Page] on both the former rules, hath the preheminence for capacity of all other figures. It is more uniforme than any other, or rather the abstract or patterne of uniformity in figures, admitting neither difference of ranckes, or sorts, as triangles, quadrangles, or other many-sided figures doe: nor of inequality betweene its owne internall parts or lines: neither can one circle bee more capacious then another of the same circumference: nor can any line in the same circle bee longer then another that is drawne from one part of the circumference, to another, through the same center. It is then in this respect more capacious then any other figure, because it is most uniforme. The sides of other figures may be exactly equall, but the distance of every part of their circumference from the center, cannot admit such equality, as every part of the circles circumference doth. The circle againe is more capacious then any other figure, because more full of angles. for the angles which it no where hath univocally, formally, or conspicuous to sense; reason apprehends it to have every where eminently. For as the Philosopher tells us, it is [...], a totangle, and so hath the prerogative or royalty, though not the propriety of the second Rule. It is more capacious than any other figure, not onely because it is more ordinate or uniforme, but withall, because it hath more angles than any other figures can have; even as many as can be imagined, it being a totangle.

3 This analogy betweene sides and angles as they are found in the circle and in other figures, [Page] mee thinkes well expresseth that analogy which Schoole Divines assigne betweene wisedome, science, love, hatred, goodnesse, desire, &c. as they are found in God and in man. For no one name or title of any affection can be univocally attributed to the Creator and to the creature: and yet the rules of equity, of mercy, of Iustice, of patience, of anger, of love, which we are commanded to follow, though not without passion or affection, are most truly observed by him: yea their truth in him is infinitely eminent: so farre must we be from conceiting him to bee without ardent love, without true and unfaigned good will to us, without wrath burning like fire to consume his adversaries, because he is without all passion. He is most loving, yet never moved with love, because he is eternally wholly love; He is most compassionate, yet never moved with compassion, because he is eternally wholly compassion; He is most jealous of his glory and a revenger of iniquity most severe; yet never moved with jealousie, yet never passionate in revenge; because to such as provoke his punitive justice, hee is eternally severity and revenge it selfe. Againe, how the indivisible Essence should bee wholly love, and wholly displeasure, wholly mercy, and wholly severity, I cannot better illustrate then by the circle, the true embleme of his eternitie, which is as truly [...] as [...], as well all sides, as all angles. And being such, the sides and angles cannot be distinguished in it: but the sides are angles, and the angles sides; at least they are, if not essentially, yet penetratively the same. The [Page] circle likewise is as truely [...] and [...], of equall sides and equall angles, as [...] & [...] a totangle or totilater; and did it not contiaine multiplicitie of sides, as well as of angles in most exact and eminent uniformity, it could not have the full prerogative of the former rules. Nor could the indivisible essence either be so great or excellent in himselfe, or a moderator of all things so powerfull and just, as wee beleeve hee is; unlesse he did eminently containe the perfections of all things possible as well as of any one.

4 Some Philosophers have placed the humane nature, as a line diameter or aequilibrium in this visible sphere; making man the measure of all things, as participating all other natures: much what after the same manner that mixt bodies containe the force and vertues of the elements. And mans nature, til it was corrupt, did (without doubt) include such an eminent uniformity to all things created, as the eye doth unto colours. As hee was then the true image of God for his essence; so did he in this property, beare a true shadow of the divine prerogative, whose essence, though, for number or greatnesse of perfections contained in it, altogether measurelesse, is the most true and exquisite measure of all things that are, or possibly can be: All the conditions or properties of measure assigned by the Philosopher are as truly contained in the incomprehensible essence, as sides or angles in the circle, but farre more eminently. A measure it is, not appliable to measurables, for kind or quantity much different, according to diversitie of parts, [Page] which it hath none, for it is immutably, eternally and indivisibly the same: and unto it the nature, essence, quality, and quantity of all things, are actually applyed, in that they have actuall being. It is impossible the immutable Creator should be fitted to any thing created; but in that he is immutable, and yet eminently containeth all things in his indivisible essence, he eternally and immutably fits all the possible varieties whereof contingency it selfe is capable. Being all things else, hee is fitnesse it selfe in a most eminent and excellent manner: the present disposition of every thing, either, whiles it first begins to be, or continues the same, or whiles it is in the change or motion (whether from good to evill, or from evill to good, from evill to worse, or from good to better) is more exquisitely fitted in it owne kind, by eternall, immutable and incomparable fitnesse; then it could be by any other measure, which the Creator himselfe could create with it, or devise for it, after the alteration or change were accomplished. In that he is indivisibly One, and yet eminently All, See Esay 66. 14, 15, 16. he is immutable, contrariety it selfe unto contraries:Ezek. 7. 4. Arithmeticall equality it selfe to things equall, Geometrically equall to things unequall;Deut. 7. 9, 10. according to every degree of their unequall capacities, in what sort soever. And as of his other attributes one truly and really is another, so in respect of man, his measure is his judgement or retribution whether of rewards or punishments, not the rule onely by which he rewards or punisheth. Vnto man in his first creation, and whiles he continued as he created him, he was and [Page] would have continued bountie it selfe; unto man yet as he is his creature, he is love it selfe: and unto man made by his own folly an impotent wretched and miserable creature, hee is so entyrely mercy and compassion if selfe, that were there a distinct god of love, or a goddesse of mercy, or two infinite living abstracts of meere love, and meere mercie; they could not be so loving and mercifull unto man touched with the sense of his owne miseries, nor solicite him so seriously and perpetually unto repentance as he doth, who is entirely infinite mercy, but not mercy only. Vnto the truly penitent he is so truly and entirely gratiousnesse it selfe, that if there were a Trinity of such abstract Graces, as the Poets have faigned, they could be but a figure or picture of his solid and infinite gratiousnesse. Vnto the elect and throughly sanctified, he is so truely and entirely felicity and salvation it selfe; that if the Heathen goddesses, Felicitas and Salus, or Platoes Idea of true happinesse might be inspired with life and sense;Qui quotidie contemnit Deum, etiam quotidie judicatur, non manifesto sed occulto judicio, non aperto sed tamen certo: occultiora saepe sunt certiora manifestioribus Coppen. in Psal. 7. they could not communicate halfe that happinesse to any one man (though they wold choose his hart for their closet, or actuate his reasonable soule as it doth the sensitive) that is imparted by him to al his chosen, who is entirely infinite happinesse, but not happinesse onely. For unto the impenitent and despisers of his bountie, of his love, his mercy, grace, and salvation; he is justice, indignation, and severity it selfe. Nemesis her selfe were she enabled with spirit, life and power much greater then the Heathens ascribed unto her, and permitted to rage without controle of any superiour [Page] law; should not bee able with all the assistance the Furies could afford her,Etiam Dei [...] est ipsius [...] Coppen. ibid. to render vengeance unto Satan and his wicked Angles, in such full and exquisite measure as the just Iudge will doe in that last dreadfull day. Then shall he truely appeare to be, as our Apostle speakes, All in All: the infinite abstract of all those powers which the heathens adored for gods, as authors either of good or of evill: Then shall he fully appeare to be mercy, goodness, grace and felicity; Nemesis, pav [...]r, and terrour it selfe; the indivisible, and incomprehensible Idea of all things which in this life our love did seeke after, or our feare naturally laboured to avoyd: The onely loadstone whereto our love, our desire in our creation were directed, was his goodnesse and loving kindnesse. And feare was implanted in our nature as an Helme or Rudder to divert us from his immutable justice or indignation; which are as rockes immoveable, against whom whosoever shall carelessely or presumptuously runne, must everlastingly perish without redemption.

FINIS.

A TREATISE OF THE Diuine Essence and Attributes: THE SECOND PART, Containing the Attribute of Omnipotency, of Creation and Providence, &c. J beleeve in God the Father Almighty.

A TREATISE OF THE Diuine Essence and Attributes: THE SECOND PART, Containing the Attribute of Omnipotency, of Creation and Providence, &c. J beleeve in God the Father Almighty.

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A TREATISE OF THE DIVINE ESSENCE AND ATTRIBVTES.

THE SECOND PART.

CONTAINING The Attribute of Omnipotency, of Creation and Providence, &c.

BY THOMAS IACKSON Doctor in Divinitie, Chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and Vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the Towne of Newcastle vpon Tyne.

LONDON, Printed for IOHN CLARKE, and are to be sold at his shop under St. Peters Church in Cornehill. 1629.

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THE CONTENTS OF THE SEVERALL Chapters in this ensuing TREATISE.

SECTION I. OF the Attribute of Omnipotency, and creative power.

Chap. Folio.

1 The Title of Almighty is not personall to the Father, but essntiall to the Godhead. 1

2 Of Omnipotency, and of its object: of possibility and of impossibility. 4

3 This visible world did witnesse the invisible power and unity of the Godhead unto the Ancient Heathens. 15

4 The first objection of the Atheist, Of nothing, nothing can be made. Of the doubtful sense of this naturall, how far it is true, and how far it is false. 19

[Page]5 By what manner of induction or enumeration of particulars, universall rules or Maximes must bee framed and supported. That no induction can bee brought to prove the Naturalists Maxime, Of nothing, nothing can be made. 25

6 The second objection of the Naturalist: [Every agent praesupposeth a patient or passive subject to worke upon] cannot be proved by any induction. The contradictorie to this Maxime proued by sufficient induction. 31

7 Shewing by reasons philosophicall, that aswell the physicall matter of bodies sublunary, as the celestiall bodies which work upon it, were of necessity to have a beginning of their Being and Duration. 45

8 Discussing the second generall proposed, Whether the making something of nothing rightly argue a power Omnipotent. 57

SECT. II. OF Divine Providence in generall: and how Contingency, and necessity in things created are subiect unto it.

Chapter. Folio.

9 Of the perpetuall dependance which all things created have on the Almighty Creator, both for their being and their operations. 65

10 The usuall and daily operations of naturall causes with their severall events or successes, are as immediately ascribed to the Creator by the Prophets, as [Page] the first Creation of all things, with the reasons why they are so ascribed. 80

11 Containing the summe of what we are to beleeue in this Article of Creation, and of the duties whereto it binds us: with an introduction to the Article of His Providence. 87

12 Though nothing can fall out otherwise then God hath decreed: yet God hath decreed that many things may fall out otherwise than they doe. 98

13 Contingency is absolutely possible, and part of the object of Omnipotency, as formall a part, as necessity is. 102

14 The former conclusion proved by the consent of all the Ancients, whether Christians or Heathens, which did dislike the errour of the Stoickes. 109

15 The principall conclusions, which are held by the favourers of absolute necessity, may be more clearly justified, and acquitted from all inconveniences, by admitting a mixt possibilitie or contingency in humane actions. 118

16 The former contingency in humane actions or mutuall possibility of obtaining reward or incurring punishment, proved by the infallibile rule of faith, and by the tenour of Gods Covenant with his people. 126

17 That Gods will is alwayes done, albeit many particulars which God willeth, bee not done, and many done which he willeth should not be done. 137

18 Of the distinction of Gods will into Antecedent & Consequent. Of the explication and use of it. 146

19 Of the divers acceptions or importances of Fate, especially among the Heathen writers. 151

[Page]20 Of the affinitie or alliance which Fates had to necessitie, to Fortune or chance, in the opinion of Heathen writers. 160

21 Of the proper subject and nature of Fate. 169

22 The opposite opinions of the Stoicks and Epicures. In what sense it is true, that all things are necessary in respect of Gods decree. 179

23 Of the degrees of necessity, and of the originall of inevitable or absolute necessity. 184

SECT. III. OF the manifestation of Divine Providence in the remarkable erection, declination and periods of Kingdomes: in over-ruling policie, and disposing the success of humane undertakings.

Chapter. Folio.

24 Of the contrary Fates or awards whereof Davids temporall kingdome was capable: and of its devolution from Gods antecedent to his consequent Will. 194

25 Of the sudden and strange erection of the Macedonian Empire, and the manifestation of Gods special providence in Alexanders expedition and successe. 213

26 Of the erection of the Chaldean Empire, and of the sudden destruction of it by the Persian, with the remarkeable documents of Gods speciall providence in raising up the Persian by the ruine of the Chaldean [Page] Monarchy. 224

27 Of Gods speciall providence in raising and ruinating the Roman Empire. 259

28 Why God is called the Lord of Hosts, or the Lord mighty in Battaile. Of his speciall providence in managing Warres. 288

29 Of Gods speciall providence in making unexpected peace, and raising unexpected warre. 314

30 Of Gods speciall providence in defeating cunning plots and conspiracies, and in accomplishing extraordinary matters by meanes ordinary. 320

SECT. IV. OF Gods speciall Providence in suiting punishments unto the nature and qualitie of offences committed by men.

Chapter. Folio.

31 Of the rule of retaliation or counterpassion. And how forcible punishments inflicted by this rule without any purpose of man, are to quicken the ingraffed notion of the Deity, and to bring forth an acknowledgement of Divine Providence and Iustice. 343

32 Of the Geometricall proportion or forme of distributive justice; which the supreame Iudge sometimes observes in doing to great Princes as they have [Page] done to others. 349

33 How the former law of retaliation hath beene executed upon Princes, according to Arithmeticall proportion, or according to the rule of commutative justice. 359

24 The sinnes of parents visited upon their children, according to the rule of retaliation. 365

35 Grosser sinnes visited upon Gods Saints according to the former rule of Counterpassion. 369

36 Of sinnes visited or punished according to the circumstance of time or place wherein they were committed. 376

37 What manner of sinnes they bee which usually provoke Gods judgments according to the rule of counterpassion. And of the frequency of this kinde of punishment foresignified by Gods Prophets. 387

38 The conclusion of this Treatise, with the relation of Gods remarkeable judgements manifested in Hungarie. 398

[Page]A TREATISE OF THE Diuine Essence and Attributes: THE SECOND PART, Containing the Attribute of Omnipotency, of Creation and Providence, &c.

J beleeve in God the Father Almighty.

SECTION I.
Of the Attribute of Omnipotency, and creative power.

CHAP. 1.
The Title of Almighty is not personall to the Father, but essentiall to the Godhead.

IN further explication of this Article, it is added in the NICENE CREEDE, I beleeve in one God the Father Almighty. This title of Almighty or Omnipotency, is not given to the Sonne, or to the Holy Ghost, nor are either of them expresly enstyled by the name of God, in the Creede. The omission of the title of [Page] God, and of the Attribute Almightie, (which is proper to the Godhead) when the persons of the Sonne and of the Holy Ghost with their severall offices are described; may administer this scruple to men, not much conversant in these great mysteries, [Whether the Father onely be God, or onely Almightie, or the onely God Almightie, in such sort as the Sonne and holy Ghost are not.] To say the Father onely is God, or the Father onely is Almightie, were to wrong the Sonne and Holy Ghost; to both whose Persons these titles are due: and our Faith in this point of the Trinitie, above all others, must be uniforme and unpartiall, without respect of Persons. And for the better instruction of such as did not fully apprehend the right meaning of the Apostolique Creede, this uniformitie of our Faith is expresly taught by Athanasius. Such as the Father is, such is the Sonne, and such is the holy Ghost: the Father is God, the Sonne is God, and the holy Ghost is God: the Father is Almightie, the Sonne is Almighty, and the holy Ghost Almightie: yet shall we often reade in Scriptures, and in Writers Orthodoxal, euen in Athanasius himselfe, [that the Father is the onely God.] So saith the Sonne of God, Iohn 17. vers. 3. This is life eternall, that they may know thee, the onely true God, and Iesus Christ whom thou hast sent. Doth Christ therefore deny himselfe to be the onely true God? or rather is it a part of our beleefe, and of our Saviours meaning in that place, that wee must know not onely God the Father, but Iesus Christ also, whom hee hath sent, to be the onely true God? And though it be [Page] not in that place expressed, yet it is necessarily implyed in other Scriptures, that the holy Ghost is the onely true God. No Christian may question this Proposition, (Pater est solus Deus) The Father is the onely God: nor this, (Filius est solus Deus) The Sonne is the onely God: nor this third, (Spiritus sanctus est solus Deus) The holy Ghost is the onely God. The Father likewise is the onely Almightie, the Sonne likewise is the onely Almightie, and the holy Ghost the onely Almightie: on whom our Faith is joyntly and uniformly set. This uniformitie of our Faith hath for its object, the unitie of nature in the Trinitie. But to say (Solus Pater est Deus, solus Pater est omnipotens) The Father onely is God, or the Father onely is Almightie; The Son onely is God, or the Sonne onely is Almightie; The holy Ghost onely is Almightie: were more then heresie, grosse infidelitie. For every one of these speeches include a deniall both of the coequalitie of their persons, and of the unitie of their nature. Of the ground of this distinction, or of the difference betweene these severall Propositions (Solus Pater est Deus, Pater est solus Deus) The Father onely is God, and the Father is the onely God, &c. by the assistance of this blessed Trinitie wee shall discusse, after wee have proved the Sonne to be truly God, and the holy Ghost likewise to be truly God, in the severall Articles which concerne their persons and offices. Now the same Arguments, which proves the Sonne to be truly God, and the holy Ghost likewise to be truly God, will likewise prove the Sonne to be the onely God, the onely Almightie. [Page] The point next in view, and first to bee handled, is the meaning of this Attribute Almighty, and how it agrees to the Godhead or divine nature as it is presupposed one and the same in the three Persons.

CHAP. 2.
Of Omnipotencie, and of its object: of possibilitie and of impossibilitie.

1 ὈΥκ αδυνατήσει παρα τῷ Θεῶ παν ῥὴμα. Nothing shall be unpossible unto God, saith the Angell to the blessed Virgin, doubting or moving this question, How shall I (instantly) conceive and beare a sonne, seeing I know not a man? That the accomplishing of that, which the Angell had said, was possible to God, the event did prove. But that nothing should be impossible unto God, can neyther be proved by any event, nor will it necessarily follow, at least the necessity of its consequence is not so cleare from the words uttered by the Angel, which admit of some restriction. For, to be God, or to be equall with God, is something, more then meere nothing. Is it then possible for God to make a God euery way equall unto himselfe? The Sonne of God, who was conceived by the holy Ghost, and borne of the blessed Virgin, was equall with God, yet not so made, but so begotten from all eternitie. Hee is more then [...], and is not comprehended under the former Proposition. For being God [Page] from all eternitie, it was impossible hee should be made. Must then the Angels speech, or the Article of Omnipotencie bee restrained to things possible? or is God said to be omnipotent onely in this respect, that hee is able to doe all things, that are possible to be done? In respect of whom then shall they be counted possible? In respect of God himselfe, or in respect of Men or Angells? Or with reference to Angelicall or humane knowledge onely? or in respect of knowledge divine? To be able onely to doe all things, that man or Angels can doe, or can conceive may be done, doth not exequiate or fill our conceit of power and wisedome truly infinite: it is much lesse than the full extent, or contents of Omnipotencie: which certainly containeth power and wisedome much greater than can be comprehended by man or Angell. Againe, to say that God can doe all things, that are possible for him to doe, or may be effected by his infinite power and wisedome, is to say the same thing twise, and yet to leave the true notion of Omnipotencie unexpressed.

Were the question propounded, what things can be seene or heard; What things cannot be seene or heard: a man should be little wiser by this answer, Things visible onely can be seene; Things invisible cannot be seene: Things audible onely can be heard; Things inaudible cannot be heard. For if one which knowes no Latine, nor the derivation of English words from it, should further aske what it is to be visible, what it is to be invisible; or what is the meaning or signification of audible and inaudible? [Page] the answer would be, That is visible, which can be seene; that is invisible, which cannot be seene: that is audible, which may be heard; that inaudible, which cannot be heard. So that he which formerly knew the signification of these words, or their forme in Latine (whence they are derived,) should learne nothing by this answer, which for reall sense is but idem per idem, a diversitie of words, without any difference in the thing signified by them. Againe, though these two Propositions be convertible, [1. Every object of sight is visible, and whatsoever is visible is the object of sight: 2. Every object of hearing is audible, and whatsoever is audible is the object of hearing;] yet is not visibilitie the true and proper object of sight nor audibilitie of hearing. To be visible, or invisible; to be audible, or inaudible, are termes relative. And euery relation or relative terme supposeth a ground or root, whence it ariseth or results; which in nature hath precedency of it: now it is the root or ground from which the relation results, which is the proper object of every facultie whether it be passive as our senses are, or active, as our understanding is.

2. This relation or relative terme, to be visible or audible, results from the impression, which the proper object of sight or hearing make upon these two senses, or at least from the aptitude which they have to imprint their proper shape or forme upon these senses. The object of sight, which is colour or light, cannot found the relation of audibilitie, because neyther light nor colour have any [Page] aptitude to imprint their forme upon the eare; nor can the relation of visibilitie result from sounds, which are the proper object of hearing, because sounds have no aptnesse or power to make any sensitive impression upon the eye. Sounds then are the proper object of hearing, and the ground or root, whence bodies take the denomination of being audible. Light or colour is the proper object of sight, & the ground or root whence bodies in which light or colour is found, receive the relative denomination of being visible. Vnto the question then, [What things may be seene, what things may not bee seene; what things may be heard, or may not bee heard,] the true and onely Philosophicall answer is, Those things onely can be seene, which are endowed with colours, or participate of light; those things which have no colour or participation of light cannot be seene. Those bodies onely which are apt to make or give sound, can be heard; those which can yeeld no sound, cannot be heard. If it should further be demanded, why sounds only are audible, when as neyther colours nor other qualities can be audible, or become the object of hearing? The only way to assoyle this question would be to instruct him that makes it, in the manner how sounds are produced, how they are carryed by the ayre unto the eare, how they are there entertained by the ayre, which the eare or organ of hearing continually harbours within it selfe for their entertainment. Hee that should see the fabricke of the eare, and take the use of its severall parts (of the anvile & the hammer especially) into serious consideration, [Page] would cease to enquire why sounds are audible rather then colours, and begin to admire the inexpressible skill of the Artificer, which framed this live-eccho in all more perfect sensitive creatures. No marvell if the eare perceive sounds, seeing the use or exercise of this sense is a continuall imitation of the production of sounds. And as no creature understands the expressions of our rationall internall notions, save that onely which is endowed with the like internall notions of reasons; so neither could the eare or sense of hearing perceive sounds, unlesse it had a continuall internall sound within it selfe. Hee againe that should view the severall humours of the eye, the Chrystalline especially, would never move question, why colours should make that impression upon the eye, which they doe not upon the eare.

3 The point questioned in this part of Divinitie, or concerning the meaning of this Attribute [Omnipotencie] comes to this issue. Whether power infinite & omnipotent have any object wherunto it is, or may be so immediately terminated, as sight or the visive facultie is unto light or colours, or as the faculty of hearing is to sounds, whence the relation or relative denomination of possibilitie doth so result, as visibilitie doth from the sight or visive facultie, as it respecteth colours. If infinite power presuppose any other object pre-existent to possibilitie, as light and colours are to visibilitie, this object must needs be eyther privative or positive: Something or meere nothing. If wee shall say this object is a positive entitie, eyther it was frō [Page] Eternitie without dependence on his Almightie power, & so it should be, as that power is, infinite. Or if we say this supposed object were from him, or by him, or had dependance on his power; then certainly it was possible, and therefore cannot bee precedent to all possibilitie. Whence it may seeme concluded, that Gods infinite power or Omnipotencie is the onely foundation of possibilitie, and by consequence cannot possibly have any object, whereto it is or can be terminated, or so fitted, as the visive facultie or sight is to light or colours. Howbeit in truth the former reasons onely conclude, that the object of Omnipotencie can be no positive entitie, nor the privation or negation of any determinate being. But that the same Omnipotent power may have an object purely negative, or including a totall negation of all things numerable, though their number were potentially infinite, the former reasons or the like cannot enforce us to deny. All things are said to be possible unto God, because by his omnipotent power, he can make all things not out of positive possibilities or Entities possible, but of meere nothing, that is, without any positive Entitie pre-existent, to serve either as matter, agent, or instrument. What? shall we say then, that things not possible onely, but impossible, may be done or made by power Omnipotent? Or may wee say that impossibilitie is eyther something, or at least (as some have taught) a degree or part of non esse, or of nothing? But how can that which is not, have any degrees or parts? Or, admit we might conceive things impossible or, impossibilities [Page] to be degrees or parts of nothing, yet so conceived, wee must needs conceive them to have the same negative conditions or properties, which are attributed to non esse, to simple not being, or to nothing, that is, they might be such objects of infinite power, as non esse, or not being is. Yet he that made all things that are, of nothing and can resolve them into nothing againe, doth never attempt or profer to resolve them into impossibilities, nor did hee make any thing of impossibles. Whether then impossibilitie or impossibles be something or nothing, how is it possible they should so resist the power Omnipotent, which can doe all things, as that nothing can be made of them? Lastly, if impossibilities can be no objects of Gods power, then things possible or possibilities, must be the onely object of it, and so we shall fall into the former circle, that God can doe those things onely that are possible, and those things onely are possible which God can doe.

4 Here the Schooles acutely distinguish betweene possibilitie relative and absolute. Certe non est per ectus & pulcher mundus, nisi omne quod sit palehrū, sit aliqua bonitas quae velit; & omne quod scibil [...], sit sapientia quae sciat; & quod possibile, potentia quae possit. Na qua aliquid possibile non potuit, aut scibile ignoravit, aut pulchrū nol it, vel invidet, maneum & imperfectum exierit opificium: ipsum verò pulchrum, aut scibile, nemo definit ad bonitatem volentis, aut scientiam scientis. Sed pulchrum est, quod rei cui accidit ad propriam bonitatem obtinendam, perfectionem adijcit; & scibile, quod in sese habet principium, unde sciri pos [...]it: igitur ne (que) possibile, quod simpliciter dicitur & non ad aliquid, definiri debet ad potentiam: sed simpliciter possible, est illud, quo facto & posito, nulla repugnantia fit, aut contradictio. Tune enim res per sese fuerit impossibilis, cum in ipsa est (ut ita dicamus) impossibilitas. Externum vero quiddam fuerit, si ob idsolum dicatur impossibilis, quod non sit causa quae possit facere. Oportet igitur sit in rebus causa aliqua, quae possit quidquid in sese repugnantiam nullam continet. At vero fieri ex nihilo non est simpliciter impossibile, sed impossibile cuidam virtuti fin [...]ae, puta naturali; qua virtute esse aliam superiorem, & potentiorem, non est impossibile. Vallesius de sacr. Philosoph. pag. 20. Possibilitie relative being the first draught or capacitie of all being or perfection limited, must needs be founded [Page] upon Omnipotencie: nothing is relatively possible, but by reference to, or by denomination from this Almighty power. Absolute possibilitie they conceive ad modum objecti, as it were an object that doth terminate Omnipotent power, not positively as colours do sight, but privatively as darknesse doth sight; or as an empty sphere without which Omnipotencie it selfe doth never worke. This absolute possibilitie, or possibilitie meerly Logicall, which is presupposed to relative possibilitie, as light or colour is to visibilitie, cannot otherwise be notified or expressed than by this negative, of not implying contradiction. But here the former difficultie concerning impossibilities meets with us in another shape. For it will be againe demanded, whether contradiction be any thing or nothing? or how it should come to oppose Gods Almightie power, more then eyther non esse, simple not being, or all things that are possibly can doe? Can it bee lesse then nothing? That is impossible; rather it is, if not so much more, yet so much worse then nothing, as that it cannot possibly beare the true forme or character of any thing; and for this reason can be no object of power Omnipotent. Vnder that notion which wee have of Omnipotencie or infinite Beeing, Truth it selfe, and Vnitie it selfe or Identitie, are as essentially included, as Entitie or Being it selfe. It is no impotency in God, but rather the prerogative of his Omnipotencie, that he cannot weaken his power by division, nor admit any mixture of imbecilitie, that he cannot deny or contradict himselfe. In that hee is infinitely true, or infinite [Page] Truth it selfe, the ratification or approbation of contradictions, is more incompatible with his nature or Essence, than falshood is with truth, than weaknesse with power, than malice with goodnes. There is no falshood unlesse it include some degrees or seeds of contradiction: as all Truth is the offspring of unitie or Identitie. In conclusion, as all things which are or possibly may be, can be no more then participations of his Beeing, who is Beeing it selfe: so they must by an eternall Law, whensoever they begin to be, beare a true though an imperfect resemblance of his unitie, of his Identitie, of his veracitie, as well as of his power which is omnipotently true, omnipotently just.

5 In answer to the last difficultie proposed, it must be said that impossibilitie is neyther any positive Entitie, nor is it any part or branch of non esse, or of nothing. For in respect of him who is All, more then all things, there can be no absolute non esse. Hee calleth things that are not as if they were, that is, hee can by his sole wrod make all things which yet are not, which yet have not beene, to have true being. Hee can make any thing of nothing. That then which we call impossibilitie, must not be derived from non esse, nor from falshood, which is finally resolved into contradiction. So that the rule of contradiction is the Test, by which impossibilities, as well as falshood must be discovered: and it is more to bee impossible then to bee false. From what fountaine then doth impossibilitie spring? From absolute and Omnipotent power, or from the infinitie of the Divine nature? But [Page] seeing in him all power and being is contained, seeing the very possibilitie of limited being takes its beginning from him, the possibilitie of weakening his power, the possibilitie of contradicting or opposing himselfe, must by the eternall Law be excluded from the object of Omnipotencie. As we say, two negatives make an affirmative, so to be unable to dis-enable it selfe, is no imperfection, no impotencie; but the greatest perfection, the highest degree of power wherof any nature is capable, because the impossibilitie of dis-enabling or weakning himselfe is a positive branch of the prerogative of Omnipotencie. 2. It is not so true an argument of power in men to be illimited by law, or to be able to doe what they list, as to bee willing to doe nothing, but that which is lawfull and just: unlesse mans will be a law to his power, and goodnesse a law unto his will, how absolute and illimited soever his power may bee in respect of other men, or of any coactive law which they can make to restraine it, it may quickly come to make an end of it selfe. And the end or cessation of power absolute is the worst kind of limit that can be set unto it.

The power of the Persian kings, was sometimes so absolute and so illimited, that Cambyses having no possitive law to curbe his will, fell in love with his owne sister. And yet so naturall is the notion of mans subjection unto some law, even unto men of corrupt mindes, that this lawlesse King consulted his Iudges, whether his desire to enjoy the love of his sister, might be countenanced by law. The [Page] effect of these Sages answer, was, that they knew no law in speciall, which might warrant the brother to marry the sister, but they had found a transcendent law, by which the Kings of Persia might doe what they list. By the like prerogative of this transcendent law; another King, upon her request did delegate his absolute power unto his Queene for a day. And she by delegation of this power, having libertie to doe what she list, did use it to the destruction of him that gave it her: for shee cut off his head, before she surrendred it. It is then a branch of the Almighties prerogative, that his omnipotent power cannot for a moment be delegated or bequeathed to any other; that as he can doe whatsoever he will, so nothing can be done or willed by him, which may derogate from the endlesse exercise of his infinite Majestie, power, truth, or goodnesse.

The use of this doctrine concerning the prerogative of Omnipotencie, and the absolute impossibilitie of doing any thing that may derogate from it, is in generall this. As no opinion in the judgement of Philosophers can be convinced of absurdity, untill it be resolved into a contradiction either unto it selfe, or unto some principle of nature from which it pretends some Originall title of Truth: so the only rule for the discovering impiety of opinions in Divinitie, or for cōvincing their Authors of heresie or infidelitie, is by manifesting their repugnancie or contradictiō to some one or other divine Attribute, or to some special promise or asseveration made by the Almightie in Scriptures, [Page] and whosoever denies or contradicts any part of Gods word, doth contradict the divine truth or veracitie which no man hath any temptation either to deny or contradict, but from some doubt or deniall of his Omnipotencie. Of such opinions as either contradict this Article of Omnipotency, or falsely pretend some colourable title of truth from it, wee shall have occasion to speake in the particular Articles, against which these Errors are conceived, or whose truth they prejudice. Having hitherto declared the object and meaning of this Arcle, we are in the next place to proove the truth of it against the Atheist.

CHAP. 3.
This visible world did witnesse the invisible power and vnitie of the Godhead unto the Ancient Heathens.

LEst any man should misconceive the1. former title of Almightie to bee but as a faire promising frontispice to an unresponsible worke, we have the fabricke of this Vniverse, the whole world it selfe and all things in it, produced as witnesses of the Almightie fathers alsufficiencie for effecting whatsoever either this grand Attribute of Omnipotencie, or any other Article of this Creed may promise or intimate unto us. For when wee professe our beliefe, that there is a father Almightie, who made the heaven and earth, wee must beleeve [Page] not onely that hee made both, but that hee which so made them both, is both able and willing to effect all things for us, for which wee have his promise; euen things which neither eye hath seene nor eare hath heard; things which cannot possibly enter into the heart of man, by any bodily sense. To this purpose the Nicene Creed expresseth this article more fully. I beleeve in one God the Father Almightie, maker of Heaven & earth, and of all things visible and invisible. Hee that hath already made many things to us invisible, cā prepare those things for us, which neither eye hath seene nor eare hath heard. The inspection of this great visible sphere, did convince the understandings of such as had no other booke, besides this great booke of nature, to instruct them; the understandings of men altogether unacquainted with Moses writings, that the Author of this great Booke, was the onely God, the onely invisible power, which deserved this soveraigne title. For though it be probable that Plato had read Moses his historie, and his Law; there is no probabilitie, that either Orpheus or Pythagoras, both farre more ancient then Plato, had read or seene them, or could understand the language wherein they were in their times onely extant: Yet Iustin. Martyr one of the most ancient Christian writers,Iustin martyr. De Monarchia Dei. produceth the testimonie of Pythagoras, (an heathen Philosopher against the Heathen) as a Second to Orpheus for confirmation of that truth, which we Christians in this Article beleeve.

[...]

[...].

[Page]

Let him that sayes, I am a God, win homage by his deed,

And lay a world like this to pawne, before I give him creede.

2. Now albeit neither Orpheus nor Pythagoras were Canonicall writers, though their joynt authoritie be not infallible, yet the holy Ghost a teaer most infallible, hath declared the reasons which they used, to be most infallible by the testimonie of two Canonical writers. The first is that of the Psalmist, Psal. 96. 4, 5. The Lord is great & greatly to be praised: he is to be feared above all gods. For all the gods of the Nations are Idols, or gods no-gods: but the Lord made the heavens. The Prophet Ieremy is more expresse and more peremptorie. chap. 10. vers. 10, 11, 12. But the Lord is the true God, he is the living God and an everlasting King: at his wrath the earth shall tremble, and the Nations shall not bee able to abide his indignation. Thus shall yee say unto them, The gods that have not made the heavens, and the earth, even they shall perish from the earth, and from under those heavens. Hee hath made the earth by his power, he hath established the world by his wisdome, and hath stretched out the heavens by his discretion.

3. The consonancie between the live oracles of God and the dictates of reason in heathen men, afford us this Aphorisme, that it is not nature her selfe (which is never otherwise than negatively, or at the most Privatively opposed to the goodnesse of God) but the corruption of nature, which is alwaies contrarie to the good Spirit of God, whereby men are seduced unto Atheisme. And seeing this corruption of nature whereof Atheisme is the symptome, is the onely disease of the soule; the disease [Page] and the symptome cannot more kindly be cured then by reviving the strength of nature. The receipt for reviving and strengthning nature must be compounded of these two Truths, both evident by light of reason not eclipsed by interposition of corrupt affections or malignant habits, or freed from these by illumination of the spirit. The first truth is, that this visible world did not make it selfe, but had a maker which gave it beginning and continuation of being: The two main principles contained in the Article of Creation the second, that the making of this visible world doth evince the maker of it to be Omnipotent, and able to effect whatsoever he hath promised. But before the former truth can have its operation upon the humane soule which is misaffected; the objections of the Atheists must bee removed. All his objections may be reduced to these two, ex nihilo nihil fit; of nothing nothing can bee made: whence seeing we acknowledge Creation, either to be a making of all things of nothing, or (at least) to suppose that some things are made of meere nothing: the truth which we Christians in this Article beleeve, may seeme directly to contradict a Philosophicall truth or principle in nature. This first objection is seconded by another. To create or to make something of nothing is to bee active: or thus, Creation supposeth an agent, and euery agent presupposeth a patient. Now if there were any patient, or passive power praeexistēt to the Act of creation, this passive power or patient wherein it lodgeth was not created, but must have a beeing from Eternitie. From the difficultie included in this last objection, some philosophers did conceive [Page] an unfashioned or confused masse, coëuall to the Eternitie of divine power, which they acknowledged to be the Artificer or framer of this great worke, into that uniformitie or beautie of severall formes which now it beares. The first objection admits a double sense or doubtfull construction, and hath no truth in respect of the Almightie maker, saue onely in the impertinent sense. The second objection universally taken, is false.

CHAP. 4.
The first objection of the Atheist, Of nothing, nothing can be made. Of the doubtfull sense of this naturall, how far it is true, and how farre it is false.

WHen it is said by the naturalist, that1. nothing can be made of nothing, or that every thing which is made is made of something: this particle ex or of, hath not alwaies the same importance: and in the multiplicitie of its significations or importances, the naturalist either hood winks himselfe, or takes opportunitie to hide his errour; or at least makes advantage of the doubtfull phrase against such as seeke to resell him. When we speake of naturall bodies or sublunary substances, this particle of, usually denotes the proper and immediate Matter whereof euery such body is made. Thus we say the Elements are mutually made one of another, or of the Matter which is common to them all; mixt bodies are made of [Page] the Elements wrought or compacted into one Masse; vegetables & living substances indued with sense, are made of mixt bodies, as of their immediate and proper matter. Sometimes the same particle of or that speech (this body is made of that) doth not denote the immediate & proper matter whereof it is made, but yet imports that that part of the bodily substance, wch was in the one, becomes an ingrediēt in the other wch is made of it. So of water, wine was made by miracle Iohn 2. yet not made of water as of its immediate or proper matter, not so as vapors are made of moysture, ordistilled waters of fume or smoake: for so, that great worke had beene no true miracle, had included no creation, but a generation only. Now it is impossible unto nature to generate wine of water, without the ingredient of any other Element. It cannot be made by generation otherwise then of the juyce or sap of the Vine, which is not a simple Element, but the Expression of a bodie perfectly mixt. Howbeit in this miraculous conversion of water into wine, some part of the corporeall substance of water did remaine as an ingredient in the wine. There was not an utter annihilation of the water, and a new production of wine in the same place, where water had beene, but a true and miraculous Transubstantiation of water into wine. AndDe verbo, creare, ego ita censeo, creare duplex esse, alterum & praecipuum, ex nihilo facere: alterum sine materiae dispositione facere. Nam substantia non videtur aliter fieri posse, quam generatione, aut creatione. Generatio vero non est nisi in materia disposita: quae igitur sine materiae dispositione est, creatio vocari debet. Qua propter sive ex nihilo omnia, sive ex nihilo quaedā, quaedam ex materia non disposita, sed jubendo fee [...] omnium est Deus effector & creator. Vallesius. c. 2. p. 22. thus we must grant that Trees and vegetables were on the third day made, not immediately of nothing, That fishes and beasts were made, the one of the bodily substance of the earth, the other of the bodily substance of the waters, neither immediately made of nothing, albeit both [Page] were made, not by generation, but by creation, that is, not of any bodily matter, naturally disposed to bring forth or receive that forme, which by the creators hand, was instamped upon them. For in true Philosophy, That which Philosophers call the matter of all things generable, was not the first sublunary substance, which was produced; nor was it comproduced or concreated with them, but created in them after they were made. God had gathered the waters into one place, and the drie land into another, before either of them had power to conceive or become the common mothers of vegetable and living things. Thus were the heaven, and the earth first made, and the waters divided by the firmament, whereas the earth did not become the Matter or common mother of things vegetable, before the third day,Of this Argument see Erastus in the beginning of his first Tome against Paracelsus. wherein God said, Let the earth bring forth grasse, the hearb yeelding seed, and the fruit tree, yeelding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in it selfe, upon the earth; and it was so. Gen. 1. 11. Nor did the waters become the common Matter or mother of fishes, before the fift day, Let the waters bring forth abundantly the moving creature that hath life, &c. Now this production of hearbs or plants out of the earth, of fish and fowle out of the substance of the water, was not a meer conservation or actuation of that power, which the earth & waters had before; but the Creation of a new power in them, the continuation of which power, is part of that, which we call the passive power of the matter. Nor had the fishes or whales, which God created, this passive power in themselves from [Page] their first creation, but received it from that blessing of God, ver. 22. Be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the waters in the seas, and let fowle multiply in the earth. Nor did the earth become the Common mother of vegetables, as of hearbs, grasse, trees, &c. and of more perfect livings creatures, at the same time. It received power to bring forth the one upon the third day; not enabled to bring forth the other, untill the fift day; God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattell, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth. So that all these and man himselfe were not immediately made of nothing, though immediately made by God himselfe: for they were made by him of the substance of the earth, which was visible & praeexistent to their making, though not made of it as of the matter. But when it is said, in the first of Genesis, [God in the beginning made the heaven and earth,] it cannot be supposed or imported, that he made them of any visible or invisible substance praeexistent: and if hee made them or their common masse of no substance praeexistent, here was something made of nothing: but how of nothing? or what doth this particle import? not that nothing should remaine as an ingredient in the first masse, or as if it had the like precedency to it, as the earth had to living things: the Almightie did not so turne nothing into something, as our Sauiour did water into wine. To say any thing could be made of nothing in this sense, or according to the former importances of the particle of, doth indeed imply an evident contradiction; for [Page] so nothing should be something, and simple not beeing should haue a true being. To make nothing to be something, fals not within the object of power Omnipotent; it can be no part of the Almightie makers worke. As Cyphers cannot bee multiplied into numbers, by any skill in Arithmetique, though supposed infinite; so neither can nothing be converted into something, nor become an ingredient in bodies created by any power, though infinite. As the Omnipotent Creator is one vnitie it selfe, so euery thing which he makes must have its unitie or Identitie, it cannot consist of contradictories.

2. When then it is said, that all things were made of nothing, or that creation supposeth some things to be immediately made of nothing, this particle of can onely import terminum a quo, the terme onely of the Action, not any matter or subject: and yet the tearme thus imported, can bee no positive Entitie, but a meere negation of any positive Entitie precedent. To make the heauens and earth of nothing, is in reall value no more, then to make them not of any matter or Entitie praeexistent, whether visible or invisible, on which their Maker did exercise his efficient power or efficacie; but to give them such beeing, as they then first began to have, that is, a corporeall beeing or existence, by the meere efficacie or vertue of his word. As, suppose the Sunne should in a moment be suffered to transmit his light into a close vault of stone; we might truely say, this heavenly bodie, did make light of darknesse tanquam ex termino, in that it made light to be there, where was no light [Page] at all before, but meere darkenesse. And thus to make light out of darknesse, doth no way argue, that it turned darknesse into light, or that darknesse did remaine as an ingredient in the light made. After this manner, did the Amightie make the heaven and earth of nothing, that is, he made the corporeall masse or substance, out of which all things visible were made, where no limited substance, whether visible or invisible, was before; and by the same efficiencie, by which this masse was made, he made place or spatiousnesse quantitative, which had no beeing at all before; he did not turne indivisibilitie into spatiousnes, or meere vacuitie into fulnes: fulnes and spatiousnesse were the resultance of that masse which was first made, without any Entitie or ingredient praeexistent. To make something of nothing in this sense, implies no contradiction; there is no impossibilitie, that the heaven and earth should be thus made, but this will not suffice to refute the Atheist or infidell. For many things are possible which are not probable, and many things probable which are not necessary. The next question then is, what necessitie there is in the infallible rules of nature and reason, that the Heavens & the earth, should be made of nothing. Against the probabilitie onely of Moses his historie of the first creation, the Atheist will yet oppose this generall induction, That all bodily substances that begin to be what before they were not, that all things which we see made, are alwayes made by some efficient cause, not out of meere nothing, but of some imperfect being praexistent. To examine then the general [Page] rule pretended to amount from this generall induction, s or what truth there is in that philosophicall maxime, ex nihilo nihil fit, is the next point.

CHAP. 5.
By what manner of induction or enumeration of particulars, universall rules or Maximes must bee framed and supported. That no induction can bee brought to proove the Naturalists Maxime, Of nothing, nothing can be made.

1 TO frame a generall rule or principle in any facultie, Art, or science, there is no other meanes possible besides induction, or a sufficient enumeration of particular experiments to support it. The particulars, from which this sufficiencie must amount, may be in some subjects fewer, in others more. How many soeuer the particular instances or alleaged experiments be; the number of thē will not suffice to support an universall rule, unlesse they erect our understandings to a cleare view of the same reason, not onely in all the particulars instanced in, but in all that can be brought of the same kind. Vnlesse there bee a cleare resultance of the same reason in all, the induction failes, and the rule which is grounded on it, must needes fall. For this cause, universall rules are easily framed in the Mathematiques, or in other Arts, whose subjects are more abstract, or not charged with multiplicitie of considerations or ingredients; [Page] from whose least variation, whether by addition or subtraction, whether by further commixture or dissolution, the cause or reason of truth so varies, that the rule which constantly holds in a great many like particulars, will not hold in all, because they are not absolutely or every way alike.

Hee which seriously observes the manner, how right angles are framed will without difficultie yeeld his assent unto this universall rule, That all right angles are equall, because hee sees there is one and the same reason of absolute equalitie in al that can be imagined. And this negative rule, will, by the same inspection, win our assent without more adoe, that if any two angles be unequall, the one of them (at least) can be no right angle. The consideration likewise of a few particulars, will suffice to make up these universall never-failing rules.

1. First, that the greater any circle is, the greater alwayes will the angle of the semicircle be.

2. The second, that the angle of the least semicircle which can be imagined, is greater then the most capacious acute-angle that can be made by the concurrence of two right lines. And yet it will as clearly appeare from the inspection of the same particulars, from which the former rules do amount, that the angle of the greatest semicircle imaginable, cannot possibly be so capacious, as every right angle is. The consideration of the former rules, specially of the first and third, will clearly manifest, that the quantitie contained in these angles, how little soever they be, is divisible into infinite indeterminate parts, or divisible into such [Page] parts, without possible end or limitation of division. But albeit the difference of quantitie between a right angle and the angle of a semicircle, bee potentially infinite, or infinitely divisible, according to parts or portions in determinate; yet will it not hence follow, that the one angle is as great againe as the other, according to the scale of any distinct or determinate quantitie, or expressible portions. And this observation in Mathematicall quantitie, would quickly checke or discover the weaknesse of many calculatory Arguments or inductions ofttimes used by great Divines in matters morall or civill. As for example, that every sinne deserveth punishment infinite, because every sinne is an offence committed against an infinite Being or Majestie. And the greater, or more soveraigne the Majestie is, which wee offend; the greater alwayes will the offence be, and meritorious of greater punishment. Yet all this onely proves, an infinitie of indeterminate degrees in every offence against the divine Majestie, by which it exceedes all offences of the same kinde committed onely against man: it no way inferres an infinite excesse or ods of actuall determinate punishment,See the first part of the Divine Essence & Attributes, chap. 20. pag. 219. 220. or ill deserts. For this reason, wee have derived the just award of everlasting supernaturall paines, unto temporarie and transeunt (bodily or naturall) pleasures, from the contempt of Gods infinite goodnesse, which destinates no creatures unto everlasting death, but such as he had made capable of everlasting joyes; nor were any of them infallibly destinated unto everlasting death, untill they had by voluntary [Page] transgression, or continuance in despising of the riches of his goodnesse, made themselves uncapable of the blisse to which hee had destinated them.

2 But to returne unto the force or efficacie of induction: that (wee say) is neyther so cleare, nor so facile in matters physicall or morall, as it is in the Mathematiques. Now, the reason, why perfect inductions are so difficultly made, in matters naturall, is, because the subject of naturall Philosophy is not so simple or uncompounded, as Mathematicall bodies or figures are: and yet are naturall bodies subject to greater varietie of circumstances, more obnoxious to alteration by occurrences externall, then abstract lines, or motionlesse figures, or bodies are. The cunningest Alchymist (albeit hee could exactly temper his furnace to all the severall degrees of heate, that any fewell, of what kinde soever, could afford) cannot by any fire, or by any degree of heate, which issues from it, hatch the most imperfect bird that flyes: yet if he should hence inferre, that no birds could bee hatched by any kinde of heate, daily experience would convince his assertion of falshood, and his induction, although it consisted of ten thousand instances or experiments taken from the heate of the forge, or furnace, to be altogether lame. A man mighty try the like conclusion of hatching birds, in all the sands, that this Iland affords, upon the eggs of all the fowles that breed in it, or about it, and finde their barrennesse and unaptnesse for bringing forth any flying Creature, to bee as great, as it is for [Page] bringing forth wheate or other corne. And I am perswaded the compost of this our soyle is an unapt to bring forth the former effects, as our sands are. Yet if any man should hence make this generall induction, that no sand orSee Macrobius in his relation of Augustus his Apophthegmes. compost could performe this midwifery to the conception of any fowles; his errour might bee confuted by the Ostriches, which have beene hatched in the sands of Arabia; and by some compost in Aegypt, which performes that office unto young chickens, which brood-hens doe with us. No man in his time, or since he died, hath beene either more accurate or more industrious in observing the externall causes of sicknesse and health, then Hippocrates was. And, no question, but he was as carefull to take his observations or frame his generall rules, from multitude of experiences, as any Philosopher or Physitian hath beene. NotwithstandingVide Septalium in Hippoc. de aere, aquis & locis. his observation concerning the nature and qualities of winds, and the dependence of mens health or sicknesse upon them, are farther out of date in France, then an Almanacke made the last yeare for the meridian of London, would be this yeare for the meridian of Mexico. The same winds, which in his Countrey, or in Countries wherein hee made his observations, were most healthfull; are most noysome in some parts of France. The diversitie of the soile, whence windes in severall regions arise or passe through, makes one and the same winde (in respect of the point or quarter of heaven from whence it comes,) to produce quite contrary effects in severall religions, or situations. The East wind may, in [Page] some regions, dispose mens bodies to the Iaundice, and yet purifie mens blood in other places not farre distant for latitude. So may the South-wind, in some regions, taint mens bodies with consumptions, coughs, or other infirmities, and yet bee healthfull, in other regions not much distant for longitude.

Let then the meere Naturalist tyre himselfe, and his Reader, by long inductions, or with multitude of experiments in agents & subjects natural, for supporting his generall rule, ex nihilo nihil fit, [Every thing is made of something] yet his observation, will reach no farther then to Agents or efficients, visible, or limited. Albeit his experiments in this kind were infinite; this inference neverthelesse [No visible agent can make any thing of nothing, therefore nothing can bee made of nothing by an invisible or supernaturall Agent] would be more disjoynted then this following; No heate of fire or of the Sunne in what degree soever, can hatch liue-creatures, ergo the heate of the Dam cannot hatch her young ones. The difference betweene visible agents, may be much greater, then the difference betweene the heate or warmth of divers bodies. No earthly bodies can produce heate in others, but either by heate inherent in themselves or by motion, yet this will not conclude, that no celestiall bodie (the Sunne for example) can produce heat in bodies sublunary, unlesse it selfe be inherently hot, or at least not without motion. It is more then probable, that the Sunne is not formally or inherently hot, and yet although [Page] it should stand still, (as once it did) in its sphere above our horizon, it would heat and warme us no lesse then now it doth, whilst it moueth. For cōclusion; to make any perfect inductiō sufficient to support an vniversall rule, from earthly bodies, which shall conclude bodies Coelestiall, or from agents sublunarie or uisible, which shall as uniformely hold true in an agent invisible and supercoelestiall, is more difficult then to twist ropes of loose sand. That which the Naturalist should proove, if hee would bee an Atheist or infidell in graine, or oppose the truth of Scriptures with probabilitie, is, that there is no invisible or spirituall Agent. And this is the point whereat the second objection aymes: there can be no agent without a patient, no exercise of Art, or power, without some matter or subject to worke upon.

CHAP. 6.
The second objection of the Naturalist: [Every agent praesupposeth a patient or passiue subject to worke upon] cannot bee proved by any induction. The contradictorie to this Maxime proved by sufficient induction.

1 ACtus agentium sunt in patiente bene disposito. The efficacie of every Agent (saith the Philosopher) is in the patient fitly disposed to receive it. And else-where hee determines it as a positive truth, that every action is in the patient, [Page] not in the Agent. And this his position, may bee ratified by perfect induction or experiments inpregnable: for every action is an operation, and every operation is so necessarily annexed vnto the effect produced, that where the one is, the other needes must be; and every effect is in the patient, or at least is the patient. The softning of waxe, the hardning of clay, the revivall of vegetables of severall kindes, are all actions proceeding from one and the same actuall force, or unvariable influence of the Sunne. The reason, why the active force is but one and the same, and why the actions or operations are many and much different, is, because the active force, is in the Agent, whereas the action or operation is in the patient, and is diversly multiplied according to the diversitie and multitude of the patients. We shall not need to question the universall truth of the former Maxime, That every action is in the patient, as some have done. For it holds as true in Divinitie as in Philosophy, & most apparent in the subject whereof we treate. Creation it selfe is an action, a reall action, yet not really in the Creator, but in the Creature onely. For no reall attribute, can be in the Creator, which was not in him from Eternitie; the Creature onely gets beginning of Being by Creation, which before it had not. If then there can bee no agencie without an action, and every action be in the patient, the cause is concluded, that every agent though Omnipotent supposeth a patient.

2. But it is one thing to suppose or require, another to praesuppose or praerequire patiēt; one thing [Page] to require or suppose a patient, another to require or suppose a matter or subject to worke upon. We are then to distinguish of Patients, and betwixt the workes wrought or effected by agents. A Patient is usually taken for the matter or subject on which the Agent doth exercise his active force, or out of which it produceth its worke. Euery finite agent, aswell naturall as artificiall doth praerequire and presuppose such a kind of patient, that is, some reall matter or subject, whereon to worke. But this kind of patient is no just compere, no full correlative to an agent universally taken. The relalatiō betwixt an agent & Patient taken in this sense, is neither so formall or necessary, as it is (inter agens & actum) betweene the Agent, and that which is acted, betweene the efficient and the effect, or betweene the worker and his worke. God wee grant could be no actuall agent, much lesse an Omnipotent actuall agent, without some Act or worke produced by him. As there could bee no Creature without a Creator, so could there bee no Creator without a Creature. But that which the Naturalist is to prove, is, that the worke of Creation presupposeth some matter or subject for the Creator to worke upon. To manifest the impperfection of his inductions to this purpose, and to cleare our contradictorie assertion, wee are to distinguish or explicate the severall workes, which are or can be wrought.

3. Three sorts of workes the meere Naturalist grants. 1. Meerely naturall. 2. Meerely artificiall. 3. Partly naturall, partly artificiall. Workes of [Page] the last ranke, (for instance) are Physicall medicines, or all such workes as Nature of her owne accord, doth not attempt or undertake, but onely as shee is set a working by Art. Natu [...]e makes no physicall doses, but onely affords the simples, of which they are compounded by the Apothecarie: who notwithstanding cannot compound them without the ministery or operation of Nature. The Physitian may allot the severall quantitie of every ingredient, besides the proportion betwixt them; but the mixture must be immediately effected by heate, or other naturall qualities. So likewise must the extraction or expression of many simples bee wrought by Nature, but at the appointment or direction of the Physitian. Nature doth not attempt the making of Bell-metall, much lesse of Bells; and yet she affords all the ingredients to the Bell-founder, who cannot mixe them by any art, or skill, without the heate of the fire, or other operations of Nature, set on worke or directed by him. Workes meerly naturall comprehend all sorts of bodies generable, whether the elements, or bodies mixt. The generation of every such body presupposeth a mutation or alteration of qualities in the matter, before it become capable of a new forme or nature. Every alteration of qualitie wrought in any sublunary body (whether it be a praeviall disposition or introduction to a new forme or nature; or whether it be accomplished without generation of any new substance) is the proper effect or worke of the agent, which causeth it. So is every artificiall worke or forme, the effect or worke of the Artificer. [Page] So that Art hath its proper effects as well as Nature, and every artificiall effect or worke supposeth an efficiencie or agencie in the Art or Artist: yet doth not the exercise of this active force or efficiencie, eyther presuppose or require any such passive alteration of quality in the matter or subject, whereon it workes, as Nature requires in her patients. Every Statue or Image of wood, is the effect of the Statuarie, or a worke of the Art of Imagery; yet doe not these workes, being meerly artificiall, eyther suppose, or necessarily require any alteration of qualitie in stone and wood. The Statuary produceth no naturall effect or qualitie, which was not in the stone before, but onely makes that visible and apparant to the eye, which was formerly hidden or enveyled in the stone. Every Letter of the Decalogue was in the Tables of stone, before they were ingraven, eyther by the finger of God or by Moses, and became legible onely by their Art or skill of ingraving; yet not made legible by any addition of substance, of quantitie, or qualitie, but by meere abscision of quantitative parts. And this abscision, from which visible characters, or terminate figures result, whether in wood or stone, is the proper effect of the Carver or Ingraver. Both these inductions following, universally taken, are false, (though both true in their proper subject:) [1. No Statuary, or Carver, or other like Artificer can produce his proper worke, without some abscision or variation of quantitie in the subject, whereon hee workes: therefore Nature cannot produce her proper effects, without some alteration [Page] of quantitie in the matter or subject wherein shee workes. 2. Naturall agents or efficients never produce their proper effects, but by working some alteration or qualitie in the Matter: therefore no Artificer can produce the proper workes of his Art, without the like alteration of qualitie in the subject whereon hee workes.] Nor will it follow, that because effects meerly artificiall may be wrought without any alteration of qualitie, therefore mixt effects, or workes partly naturall, partly artificiall, as compounded Medicines or Bell-metall, can be so wrought. Least of all can it be inferred, that because Art as well as Nature supposeth a subject praeexistent whereon to worke; therefore the Agent supernaturall, or the Efficient superartificiall, alwayes presupposeth some matter or subject praeexistent, out of which, or in which hee produceth his proper worke. The reason why the former Inductions faile, is because the Agents or Efficients are of a different ranke or kinde. And theVide Arist lib. 1. Poster. Analyt. cap. prohibition holds as true in point of induction as of demonstration, Non licet transcendere a genere ad genus. Hee that will demonstrate any conclusion, must not rove from one kinde of subject to another. And the reason why in thus roving he shall certainly faile of his intended conclusion, is, because the principles whence the intended conclusion must be inferred, cannot be gathered but by induction, and no induction can prove any generall Maxime, unlesse it consist of particulars of the same kinde. A philosophicall maxime cannot be gathered from Inductions meerly Mathematicall, [Page] nor mathematicall principles from experiments philosophicall. Nor can Artificiall Maximes or conclusions (especially negative) bee gathered from experiments naturall, nor Maximes naturall from observations in subjects meerely Artificiall. Least of all can any theologicall maximes, be ratified from experiments meerely naturall, artificiall, or mathematicall; but onely by inductions, or reasons abstract and metaphysicall, that is, such as hold true in all Arts or sciences whatsoever. The onely certaine rule, which all the former inductions can afford, is this: There can bee no reall effect, whether artificiall, naturall, or supernaturall, without an efficient: Nothing which now is not, or sometimes was not, could possibly bee made without some agent or maker: betweene every naturall Agent and its patient, betweene every Artificer and his worke, there alwayes results a mutuall relation of efficient and effect. But this rule will not abide the turning: Betweene every efficient and its proper effect, there alwayes results a mutuall relation of agent and patient; if by this terme patient wee understand a matter or subject praeexistent to the exercise of the agents efficiencie.

4 The usuall division of Agents into artificiall, naturall, and supernaturall, supposeth a three-fold diversitie in their objects, betwixt which there is this proportion, As nature alwayes affordeth art a compleat naturall subject to worke upon: so the supernaturall agent, or supreme efficient, exhibits that imperfect substance or matter unto nature, [Page] which shee brings unto perfection. Nature doth so unto Art, as it is done to her by a benefactor supernaturall. Vnto this observation upon the former division, wee can adde no more, nor can any more be required, besides a just proofe that there is an agent supernaturall, which sometimes had no matter at all to worke upon, but made even Nature her selfe, and the passive capacitie or subject whereon shee workes, of no worke or matter praeexistent. The matter it selfe, and nature it selfe, are the immediate effects of his active force or efficiencie. Now to beate the Naturalist at his owne weapon, wee are to make proofe of this assertion by full induction, and strength of reason grounded upon experiments in every subject wherein the Naturalist can instance. First, it is universally true of all the workes as well of Nature, as of Art, which now are perfect, and sometimes were not so, that they did not make themselves, but had (respectively) their severall makers or efficient causes, which brought them unto that perfect estate and condition which now they have. The most perfect works of nature cannot put themselves into a perfect artificiall forme, without the help of some Artificer. Stones doe not naturally grow into Statues, nor trees into the pictures or Images of men or birds: Brasse and Copper, with other metalls conceived in the bowells of the earth, doe not either by themselves, or by the help of naturall causes which produce them, cast or mould themselves into Guns or Bullets. The Earth and Water doe not worke themselves into the live-substance of plants or vegetables, [Page] but are first wrought, and (as it were) kneaded together by the heate of the Sunne; first altered, & then incorporated into the substance of such trees, by the vegetative faculty, which is actually resident and praeexistent in the trees or plants, which are nourished by them. There is no sublunarie substance which did not take beginning, either entirely and together, or piece-meale and successively. The elementall bodies of the ayre and water, were not totally the same a thousand yeares agoe, that now they are: both continue the same they were by equivalencie of succeeding parts, or daily addition by new generation. Now successive generation supposeth an end or destruction of that that was, & a beginning of that which succeedes in its place; and the beginning of every thing, supposeth a beginner or cause efficient, to give it being. The race or continuation of more perfect sublunary substances, as of vegetables and moving creatures, remaines the same, not by equivalency of succeeding parts, but by a totall production of distinct individualls. And every distinct individuall tree or liuing creature, hath its immediate and proper efficient, as well as its materiall cause, nothing can give it selfe a distinct numericall being.

5 What is the reason then, why the workes of nature, which are perfected in their kinde by their proper efficients (as trees come to full growth) cannot transforme themselves into bodies artificiall without the worke of the Artificer? What is the reason why the imperfect masse, wherein the seeds of nature are contained, cannot grow up into a [Page] perfect or compleate body naturall, without the efficiencie of some other in the same kinde already compleate? Fortes creantur fortibus. Nature makes nothing perfect, but by the help of some Agent formerly made perfect: Doth the perfection of bodies artificiall by an indispensable Law of necessitie, require a perfect worke of nature praeexistent to the operation of Art: and doth this perfect worke of nature, bee it brasse, wood, or stone, by a like indispensable Law of necessitie, require an imperfect masse or matter praeexistent to the naturall Agents or efficients, which mould or kneade it into its perfect or specificall forme? And shall not this imperfect masse, with all its severall Elements or ingredients that can be required to the perfection of any naturall body, more necessarily require some precedent efficient cause of its imperfect being or existence? This cannot be conceived; for if these imperfect substances, whereof any naturall body is made, could eyther give beginning of being to themselves, or have it from no cause efficient, they should bee in this respect much more perfect, than the more perfect workes of nature, in that they eyther make themselves, or have no maker.

Vpon this principle of nature, or from this impossibilitie in nature [That any visible work whether naturall or artificiall, should either give it selfe being or have its being from no cause precedent] did See Tully Lib. de natura Deorum. Tully rightly argue, that as a man comming into an house, wherein were no live creatures saue Rats and Mice, could not conceive that either the house [Page] did make it selfe, or had no other maker besides these Rats and Mice, which were found in it: So neither can it be imagined, that this visible spheare wherein the workes of Art and Nature, are daily seene, and doe daily begin to be and expire; could either make it selfe, or have beeing of it selfe, without beginning, without a Maker super-artificiall, or an efficient supernaturall. Every part of this Vniverse considered alone, is a worke of nature, but the exquisite harmony betweene them, is a worke more then Artificiall. All that nature can adde to art, or art to nature, is but a shadow of that great Artificers skill, which composed the severall workes of nature into so excellent a forme, and tuneth their discording qualities, into such exact harmony. The induction of Tully is more briefly, but more pithily and expressely gathered by our Apostle Heb. 3. ver. 4. Euery house is builded by some man, but hee that built all things is God. But if every house bee built by some man, how is God said to build all things? shall every builder of an house be a God? No: but whatsoever man doth build, God doth likewise build. For except the Lord doth build the house, they labour in vaine, that are builders of it. Psalm. 127. 1. Better it were to bee idle or to doe nothing, then either to be laborious in building houses, or watchfull in guarding Cities strongly built, unlesse the Lord doe afford not onely his concurrence, but his blessing to the labours of the one, and to the watchfulnesse of the other. But in this argument wee may expatiate without impeachment of digression from the [Page] matter, or of diversion from our ayme, in the following Treatise of divine providence.

6. This present Treatise requires an induction, sufficient to prove that every visible or sublunarie substance, aswell the common matter whereof all such things are made, as the severall formes, which are produced out of it, have an efficient cause precedent to their making or production. For the seuerall formes, or bodies generable which are constituted by them, the induction is as cleare to every mans sense or understanding, as any mathematicall induction can bee. The naturalist is neither able nor disposed to except against the universalitie of it, or to instance in any sublunarie bodie, which hath not a true efficient cause, or an agent precedent; from whose efficacie its physicall or essentiall forme, was either made, or did result. The question onely remaines about the efficiencie or production of the prime or common matter. Seeing it is the mother of generation, wee will not vexe the Naturalist by demanding a generative cause efficient of its beeing, but that it must have some cause efficient, wee shall enforce him to grant from a generall Maxime most in request with men of his profession. The Maxime is [That the philosophicall progresse from effects to their causes, or from inferiour to superiour causes, is not like Arithmeticall or geometricall progressions; it cannot bee infinite.] Wee must at length come to one supreme cause efficient, which in that it is supreame, is a cause of causes, but no effect, and being no effect, nor cause subordinate to any other Agent, [Page] it can have no limit of Beeing, it can admit no restraint in working. Whatsoever we can conceive as possible to have limited Beeing, or beginning of such Beeing, must haue both frō it & by it. Now if the perfect workes of nature, bodies sublunarie of what kind soever, suppose a possibilitie physicall included in the prime and common matter, before they have actuall Being; if it imply no contradiction for them to have beginning of Beeing, it will imply no contradiction, that the prime mater it selfe or imperfect masse, whereof they are made, should have a beginning of its imperfect beeing; That Physicall beeing which it hath, doth presuppose a logicall possibilitie of beeing, as it is; that is, no contradiction, for it sometimes to be, and sometimes not to haue beene. This supreame cause or agent which (as we suppose,) did reduce the logicall possibilitie of the prime matter of sublunary bodies into Act, cannot be the heavens, or any part of the hoast of heavē, neither the sun, moon nor stars. For, albeit the Sun be the efficient cause, by which most workes of nature in this sublunarie part of the world, are brought to perfection: yet is it no cause at all of that imperfect masse or part of nature, on which it workes. Vnlesse it had some matter to worke upon, it could produce no reall or solid effect by its influence, light or motion, how ever assisted with the influence of other stars or planets. Yet must this prime matter, have some cause; otherwise it should be more perfect than the bodily substances, which are made of it. For they all stand in neede, both of this prime matter, [Page] as a cause in it kinde concurrent to their production, and of the efficiencie of the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents to worke or fashion the materialls or Ingredients, of which they are made. If either this common matter of sublunary substances, or the Sunne which workes upon it, had no superiour cause to limit their beeing or distinguish their offices; both of them should bee infinite in Beeing; both infinite in operation. Now if the matter were infinite in beeing: the Sunne or other coelestiall Agents, could have no beeing but in it, or from it. For if the Sunne were infinite in operation, the matter it selfe could bee nothing at all; no part of nature, unlesse it were a worke or effect of the Sunne. Infinitie in beeing excludes all possibilitie of other Beeing save in it and from it. And infinitie in operation, supposeth all things that are limited, whether in beeing or operation, to bee its workes, or resultances of its illimited efficacie.

[Page]

CHAP. 7.
Shewing by reasons philosophicall, that aswell the physicall matter of bodies sublunary, as the celestiall bodies which worke upon it, were of necessitie to have a beginning of their Beeing and Duration.

1 FOr further demonstration, that as well the Sunne, which is the efficient generall, as the prime matter which is the common mother of bodies sublunary, had a beginning of beeing, there can be no meane eyther more forcible or more plausible, then another Maxime much imbraced and insisted upon by the great Philosopher, to wit, that as well the efficient as the materiall cause derive the necessitie of their causalitie from the end or finall cause, unto which they are destinated. The Sunne doth not runne its daily course from East to West, or make its annuall progresse from North to South, to get it selfe heate, or for the increase of its native force or vigour, by change of Climates; but for the propagation of vegetables, for the continuance of life and health in more perfect sublunary substances. If then wee can demonstrate, that those vegetables or more perfect sublunarie bodies, for whose continuall propagation, for the continuance of whose life and well-fare the Sunne becomes so indefatigable in its course, had a true beginning of beeing, that the propagation is not infinitely circular: the cause will be concluded, that as well the common matter, whereof they are [Page] made, as the Sunne it selfe which produceth them, had a beginning of beeing and operation from the same supreame cause, which appointed the Sunne thus to dispense its heate and influence, for the reliefe and comfort of this inferiour world. To prove that these sublunarie more perfect bodies, as vegetables, &c, had a beginning of beeing or propagation; no Argument can be more effectuall to the Naturalist, or others that will take it into serious consideration; than the discussion of that probleme, which Plutarch hath propounded, Whether the Egg were before the Hen, or the Hen before the Egg. The state of the question will be the same in all more perfect vegetables, or living Creatures, which usually grow from an imperfect or weake estate to a more perfect and stronger: [Whether the Acorne were before the Oake, or the Oake before the Acorne. Whether the Lyon had precedencie of nature to the Lyons whelp, or the Lyons whelp unto the Lyon. The induction may be for eyther part most compleate, in respect of all times and of all places, if with the Naturalist wee imagine the world to have beene without beginning, or without ending. No Naturalist can ever instance in any more perfect feathered fowle, which was not first covered with a shell, or contained in some more imperfect filme; in any Bull which was not first a Calfe; in any Lyon, which was not first a whelp; in any Oake, which did not first spring from an Acorne: unlesse he instance in painted Trees, in brazen Bulls, or artificiall Lyons. Of live naturall substances it is universally true, (Omnia ortus habent, sua (que) certa [Page] incrementa) All have their beginning, all their certaine increase or augmentation. The induction again is for the other partie as compleate and perfect. There never was a true Acorne, which did not presuppose an Oake; nor a Lyons whelp which did not presuppose a Lyon to beget it, and a Lyonesse to bring it forth. Now every productive cause, every live-substance, which produceth another by proper causalitie or efficiencie, hath alwayes precedencie of nature and of time, in respect of that which is produced by it. The Lyon is in order of nature and of time, before his whelp, and yet is every Lyon wherein the Naturalist can instance, a whelp before it be a Lyon; so is the Oake, in order of nature and of time, before the Acorne, and yet cannot the Naturalist instance in any Oake, which was not an Acorne or plant before it grew to be an Oake. If then eyther the race of Lyons, or the propagation of Oakes, had no beginning; it would inevitably follow, that Oakes had beene perpetually before Acornes, and Acornes perpetually before Oakes; That Lyons whelpes from eternitie had precedency or prioritie of time of Lyons, and Lyons the like precedencie or prioritie of time of their whelps. And if they had bin mutually each before other from eternitie, according to prioritie of time and nature, they must have beene mutually each after other. How the Naturalist will be able to digest this circular revolution of prioritie and posterioritie, in respect of the same individuall natures, or what hee will say to these following inconveniences, I cannot tell, but desire to [Page] know: Every whole or perfect Fish, which the Naturalist hath heard or read of, had beginning of its individuall Beeing from Spawne. This induction is most compleate and perfect in the Schoole of Nature, most irrefragable by the supposition of the Naturalist with whom wee dispute. Every Fish hath a beginning from Spawne, and that which hath a beginning from Spawne, hath a beginning of its beeing. No Fish or Spawne is or hath beene immortall, or without beginning. Now if it bee universally true, that every particular Fish hath its beginning, it implies an evident contradiction, to say that the race of Fishes, which consist onely of particular Fishes, was without beginning. There must in every race of Fishes be some first Fishes, or first Spawnes, before which there was none of the same kind, frō which this mutual propagation did take its beginning. And though this propagation be without end, yet could it not be without beginning, unlesse wee would grant that fishes are not onely of an incorruptible nature, but of a nature infinite or eternall. If there were no beginning of this mutuall propagation, it would bee demanded whether the number of fishes or Lyons that shall bee (granting what the Naturalists suppose, that this propagation shall be endlesse) can ever be as great, as the number of those Fishes and Lyons that have beene? Or whether the number of those that have beene, may not be conceived to be more infinite, or in another sort infinite, than the number of those that shall be. That the number of Fishes, or Lyons, which, from this time forward, [Page] may be, (suppose the world were never to end) can be no otherwise infinite then potentially or successively onely, or by addition, because there shall never be any last Lyon, or fish, &c. after which there shall bee no more, the Naturalist will not denie. For those Lyons or fishes, which from this point of time shall be, have as yet no actuall beeing, nor have they before this time had any such beeing. Whence it is cleare, that their number can never be actually infinite, but infinite onely by addition, as continuate quantitie is by division.Ego certe hac in re laudo Aristotelem, quod cum impossibilitatem (ut ita dixerim) aeternorum motuum, & corporum, non praeviderit, maluit ab Eterno esse pulchrā hanc mundi faciem, quam aliquando ex aeterna deformitate emersisse. Oportuit vero ipsum aternitatē illam temporis meditari; reperisset siquidem, ut ne (que) in corpore, ne (que) in loco (haec enim ille demonstravit) ita ne (que) in tempore infinitatem esse potuisse: si quidem est etiam tempus quantum, ut & corpus, & locus. Si igitur omnia quanta finita, tempus quoque totum finitvm est, & erit. Quare fact us est aliquando [...] ex nihilo. Vallesusde sacra philosoph. pag. 18. But if fishes have beene produced from Spawne, and Spawne from fishes, without any beginning of time, wee must of necessitie grant, that there have beene Fishes, Lyons, Oakes, &c. propagated each from other, for number actually infinite: for every Fish, which could produce Spawn, had actuall beeing before it could yeeld Spawne, & every Spawne wherof any fish is made, hath actuall beeing before any Fish can be made of it. Whence if this propagation had beene without beginning, their number must needes be actually infinite, so infinite that there could have beene no more than have beene, that there can be no more than now are. That onely is actually infinite, unto which nothing of the same kinde can be added. If this mutuall propagation had beene from eternity, the number of things propagated should have been actually infinite in every [Page] point of time imaginable. It is impossible that any thing should be actually infinite from eternitie, and not bee alike actually infinite throughout every part of time; as infinite yesterday as to day, or as it shall be to morrow. It is againe impossible, that any thing should be actually infinite in any part of time, or by any succession of time, which was not infinite from eternitie, and before all times. If wee shall suffer our imaginations of mutuall propagations, to rove backward without an imagination or acknowledgement of some first beginning to stay or limit them, our soules shall finde as little rest (with lesse securitie) as Noahs Dove did, whilest the earth was overflowed with water, if she had not returned to the Arke. Vnlesse wee thus pitch upon a first beginning of time and all things temporall, we shall not only make shipwracke of faith, but drench our immortall soules in a bottomlesse lake or poole of absurdities, even in nature.

2 The conclusion arising from these premises, is, that albeit naturall reason or discourse could never have found out that which Moses hath written, concerning the particular manner of the worlds creation; as that it, and all things in it, all the severall originals of propagation, were created in sixe dayes: yet Moses his narrations can onely give satisfaction to such Problemes, as men by light of nature may propose or cast, but can never, without the light of Gods word, be able to assoyle. By so much of this light as Moses in the first Chapter of Genesis holds out unto us, wee may easily free our selves from perpetuall wandring in that inextricable [Page] maze of mutuall or circular precedencie, betweene things generable, and their generative efficients, which the Naturalist can never avoid, untill with us hee grant, that which theAristor. nono mataphysicorum, cap. 8. Manifestū est, quod actus prior potentia est. Dico autem non solum illa potentia determinata quae dicitur principium transmutatorium in alio, prout aliud est, sed prorsus omni motivo, et Statorio principio. Et 12 Metaphys. cap. 7, Quare vita, & aevum continuum, & aeternum Deo inest. Hoc enim est Deus Quicunque vero (ut Pythagorici, et Speusippus putant) optimum & pulcherrimum non esse in principio, eo quod plantarum quo (que) ac animali ū principia, causae quidem sunt: bonum vero, & perfectum in ijs esse, quae ex his sunt, non recte putant. Sperma namque ex alijs prioribus perfectis est, neque Sperma primum est, sed quod perfectum est: veluti hominem dicere quispiam possit priorem spermate esse, non illum, qui eo generatur, sed alium, ex quo ipsum Sperma est. Quod itaque est quaedam aeterna, immobilis (que) substantia, & à sensibilibus separata, constat ex dictis. Philosopher by the light of Nature did indefinitely teach (Actus prior est potentia,) That which hath perfect beeing, is simply and absolutely before that which proceedeth from it, or is brought to perfection by it. Thus Moses tells us, Gen. 1. vers. 11. That there was an earth, before there was any grasse, that out of this earth was brought forth hearb yeelding seede; and fruit trees yeelding fruit with seed in them, before there was any propagation by seede. So he tels us againe, vers. 21. That God created great Whales, and every living creature [...]at moveth in the waters after their kinde, before there was any Spawne of fishes or seede of fowles: For so it followes in the 22. ver. That God blessed them, (after hee had made them) saying, Be fruitfull and multiply, and fill the waters and the Seas, and let fowle multiply on the earth. And it was this blessing upon fish and fowle (thus created at once, that is, made perfect in their kinde, not by growth or succession, but by present operation of his Omnipotent power) which gave first beginning to the naturall propagation of Fishes and Fowles by Seede or Spawne. Againe, in as much as the greatest Whales or other creatures most perfect [Page] in their kinde, though produced in a moment, did presuppose a possibilitie of their being, and in their most perfect actual beeing include more than a possibilitie of not beeing, a necessary inclination to returne unto the matter or masse out of which they were made. This beeing which they have, presupposeth an infinite and pure act, which every way hath precedencie of them, as having no cause at all of his beeing, but is beeing it selfe, without possibilitie of not beeing. The manner or method which Moses observed in the Creation, was this: Hee made the Heaven and Earth and first masse, of meere nothing, that is, without any masse or subject visible or invisible praeexistent, whereon to worke. That imperfect masse of this great Spheare, now distinguished into its severall parts, and, within sixe dayes, adorned and beautified in every part beyond all skill of Art, was the first effect or prime worke in order of time or nature of his all sufficient active power or efficiencie. Out of this masse hee made all things visible in their kind, not by meanes or efficiencie naturall, but by the same supernaturall or Omnipotent power, by which he made the first masse out of nothing. In the prime and Cardinall workes of the sixe dayes, the Almighty did proceede, though by supernaturall efficiencie, in that order or method, which Nature, by his appointment, since hath followed. Man which is the most perfect visible creature, was the last made, & next before him, the beasts of the field, which are next in perfection to him: Next before them, the fowles of the Ayre and fishes of the Sea; and immediately [Page] before them, the Sunne, the Moone, and the Stars. But in the severall fountaines or roots of propagation by seede, hee baganne the contrary way. Hee first made man perfect, before hee gave him the power of propagation. So did hee make every living creature actually perfect in his kinde, before he gave them power to increase and multiply by naturall seede or inchoation of now being.

3. It is a conceipt groundlesse, either in Philosophy or Divinitie, which some late Divines aswell of the Romish as of Reformed Churches, not without faire pretence of Saint Augustines Divus Augustinus censet omnia esse creata simul eodem momento, seu in eodem nunc; illam vero partitionem Dierum, non significare partes temporis, sed distinctionem, & gradus quosdam naturae verum: at (que) factum esse hominem ex terra, non actu praeexistente, sed existente potentia in ipso, velut quivis dicitur nostrum, vere factus ex quatuor Elementis, tametsi nulla terra, aut aqua erat actu id ex quo facti sumus, sed semen & sanguis. Ita (que) ut unico intuitu tota facies, & ejus omnes partes, inspeculo exprimuntur, ita unica Iussione Dei, constitisse totam hanc corpoream molem, & in ea refulsisse illum divinitatis fulgorem, quem vocamus naturam. Caeterum quia non omnes sancti hoc ita intelligunt, alia responsione est opus. Vallefius de sacra Philos. cap. 1. pag. 22. Ne (que) vero hoc ullam arguit primae causae debilitatem. Non enim eam causam naturalem ponimus, q [...]ae (que) faciat semper quantum potest, sed liberam & sapientissimam, quae facit ut maxime expedit, at (que) omnia pulcherrin [...]a & concinna, in nnmero, pondere, & [...]c [...]sura. Quapropter verba illa capitis 18. Ecclesiastici, Qui vivit in aeternum creavit omnia simul, ego ita interpretor; Creata esse omnia intra illam hebdomadam, perfectum (que) esse mundum, ita ut nulla ejus pars princeps, quaeque a creatione habitura esset initium, deesset. Nam ut initio capitis secundi dicitur, perfecti sunt caeli & terra, & omnis ornatus eorum, complevit (que) Deus dic sexta opus suum. Valles cap 1. pag. 45.Authoritie, have taught, that all things were created at once, or in one day, by the Almightie maker: that the mention of Gods six daies worke, is interserted by Moses, onely for distinction sake, or in respect of our incapacitie to conceive distinctly of Gods workes. But if all things had beene made in this sense, at once, that is, upon one day: no reason could be given why Gods commendation [Page] of something which hee made, should bee omitted, and exprest upon the making of others; or why the commendation of his workes, should have beene oftner exprest than once, if the productiō or finishing of al things which he made, had beene momentarie, or in the compasse of one day. Now in the first part of Moses his historie [In the beginning God made the heaven and the earth] we doe not reade, that God saw it was good. What is the reason? because as yet they were not perfected in their kind; but destinated onely unto more perfection. Of the light which was created the first day (saith Moses) God saw that it was good. But so he saith not of the second dayes worke, which was the separation or division betweene the waters which are above the firmament, and the waters beneath it. What doth this omission of the divine approbation intimate unto us? thus much, if no more, That the second dayes worke did not bring the waters to that perfection and use whereunto they were destinated. But of the third dayes worke, in which the earth was severed from the waters, under the firmament, and enabled by his creative power, to bring forth Hearbes and other Vegetables, God (saith Moses) saw that it was good. And so it is likewise said of the fourth dayes worke, in which the Sun and Moone and the Stars were made; and so likewise of the fift, wherein the water was authorized to bring forth fowles and fishes perfect in their kind: and lastly of the sixt day, wherein man was made, it is said, that God saw all that he had made, and it [Page] was exceeding good. To explicate every dayes worke in particular, would require a larger Treatise, then we project our intended Commentaries upon the Apostles Creede, shall bee. Of such Euangelicall mysteries, as the Historie of the sixt dayes worke and the seaventh dayes rest, did by way of Embleme, portend or foreshadow, wee shall have occasion to treate, when wee come unto the Sonne of Gods consecration unto his everlasting Priesthood; or of the Sonne of mans residing three dayes and three nights, in the wombe of the earth: which speech of our Saviour, cannot bee verified either of three naturall dayes, or of three artificiall dayes and nights, but hath a peculiar reference to three of those evenings and mornings, which Moses mentioneth in the historie of the Creation. The taske for the present undertaken, was to shew theSi facta omnino non sunt (viz. corpora coelestia) fit ut sint per sese ab aeterno, et esse proprio existentia. Quapropter nullum illorum ab alio pend [...]at, aut alio posterius sit, sed per sese sint, & operentur ab aeterna (cum operatio procedat à cujus (que) rei natura, & proprio esse:) quare nulla illis prior causa sit, (si enim haec effecta ab alio non sunt, non sit ulla eorum causa) quapropter mundus hic universas, ne (que) unus erit, ne (que) totus, neque perfectus, cum non pendcat totus ab unica virtute & causa, neque causae omnes in unam omnium primam, referantur: sed sint multae mundi partes, à quibus non procedatur ad ullam aliam superiorem, & priorem, hoc vera fieri non potest. Nam ant illae partes habent aliquam naturam sive essentiam communem, aut omnino habent nihil commune. Ex adeo diversis, ut nihil commune dicatur de illis, nulla ratione potest constari unum: Nam neque ordo esse [...]otest inter omnino diversa. Ordo enim secundum aliquid commune est, dicimus enim inter Petrum & Franciscum ordinem quendam esse. Si concedis partes illas mun [...]i habere aliqu [...] essentiam communem; constat, quandoquidem non sunt omnino cadem, habere as aliquid commune & aliquid diversum. Est autem quod commune unum: quae diversa multa. Illud ergo commune prius erit illis omnibus diversis: si quidem ex co constant haec: non ergo [...] partes, suo quaeque ordine primae causae, sed pend [...]bant illae omnes ab aliquo [...] causa, à qua daeta erat eis communis illa essentia. Vallesius de sacra Philosophia▪ pag. 16. possibilitie of the Creation, or making all things of nothing, and that there is a necessitie in nature, that things generable [Page] should have a beginning, that the propagation of living Creatures, could not be from Eternitie, not before all times imaginable. And if sublunarie substances, or vegetables had a beginning: Not the Elements onely whereof they are made, but the Heavens themselves, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, by whose influence they are produced, must have their beginning too; because the end of their beeing, of their operation, of continuance in their course or order, is for the continuall propagation of vegetables, and living bodies. I may conclude this first point, with that acute collection of Iustin Martyr, [...]] If there were no Sunne, there could be no use of the eye, and if there were no eye, there should be no use of the great eye of this world, at least of its light. But in asmuch, as the Sunne is necessary for the eye, and the eye for the Sun, there is a necessitie that both of thē should have a beginning of Beeing. For that which hath no beginning of beeing, cannot have its beeing for any other sake, besides it owne. Nor can we truely say, that it is for its owne sake. And this Authors reason for this assertion, is most judiciously acute. [...], praeter causam enim est cujus cansa non est, so the Latin translator. The Authors full meaning is, That which hath no efficient cause to give its beginning of beeing, can have no finall cause of its beeing, or rather no cause at all, whether finall, formall, or material. But is it selfe the cause of causes, [Page] the prime efficient, by which all things are what they are, and the last end or finall cause, for which they are.

CHAP. 8.
Discussing the second generall proposed, Whether the making something of nothing rightly argue a power Omnipotent.

1 THe discussion of the second generall Principle,See Chapter 3. § 3. might well have had its admission into Divinity denyed, had not some Schoole Divines, by disputing whether there can be any instrumentall cause of Creation, given it a colourable pretence for intruding it selfe. Their meaning may in more civill language be thus exprest; [Whether the power of creating may by omnipotency be delegated to any agent, not omnipotent.] That Omnipotency it self cannot be delegated, all agree. Now if the production of spirituall grace in the heart of man be, a true and proper effect of creative power; they who teach that the Sacraments of the Gospel do conferre grace ex opere operato, that is, by their proper efficacy; are ingaged to make proofe, that the power of creation may be delegated, by the Almighty Father, either to the consecrated Sacramentary Elements, or to the Priest which consecrates them. But leaving the discussion of this Question (in the explication of whose termes or meaning, the favourers or maintainers of it, do not [Page] agree) [...] proper place [...] our present question is, Whether ability to create substances visible or invisible, doth necessarily inferre it to be Omnipotent. Spirituall grace, all grant, is no substance. But here againe, the Schoolemen have troubled themselves and their Readers, with a question, if not more curious, yet as unnecessary as the former; as whether this visible world, or at least some part of it, might not have beene created immediately by Angels, as by Gods instrumets. The Question (perhaps) might be more pertinent and more distinct, were it framed thus; [Whether to make any visible or invisible substance of nothing, or without any matter pretedent, which should remaine, as an ingredient in the substance made, do rightly infer the immediate maker to be Omnipotent.] That any cause efficient of substance, which hath beene created, or hereafter may be created, could be enabled to create or make any other substance, without any entity praexistent, whereof it should be made, is an hypothesis or supposall, which hath no other ground either in Philosophy or Divinity; besides the vncertaine grounds, from which some have attempted to prove, that creation is a prerogative of the one Omnipotent, which cannot be delegated to any other. This truth some labour to prove from this Maxime, Inter [...] & non ens infinita distantia est: [Betweene something, betweene any thing which truly is, and meere nothing, there is an infinite distance or disparity.] Now this breach of disparity or distance infinite (which they conceive) between something & nothing, cānot be fully [Page] made up save only by power truly inf [...]nite, whence it may seeme concluded, that it is impossible for any thing to be made of nothing; save onely by power in it selfe Omnipotent, or absolutely: infinite. The conclusion it selfe, or the last proposition in the inference, I verily beleeve to be most true; but the meane to inferre it, or manner of inferring it, is not so certaine, as the conclusion is sound. The Argument is b [...]t calculatory. And this kind of argument is deceitfull, unlesse the degrees of proportion whether between the disparity o [...] cong [...]ity of termes compared, bee determinate and certaine. The degrees of disparity, betweene something and nothing, cannot be more in number or more infinite, than are the entitive degrees of any created substance. And these are not actually or absolutely infinite, nor can the disparity betwixt something and nothing, betwixt nothing and the most excellent eventure that is, be so great or so absolutely infinite, as is the disparity betwixt the most excellent creature that is or can be, and the one Omnipotent Creator, who alone is absolutely infinite.

2 But be it onely supposed, no way granted, that the power of making some visible substance out of nothing, might be delegated to some Creature; the exercise of this power thus delegated, would not inferre the Exerciser of it, but only the Author, to be Omnipotent. For to be Omnipotent, includes as much as to be able to do all things, which imply no contradiction; as much as to make all things that can be conceived as logically possible, [Page] out of nothing, because all sorts or kinds of being, numerable or comprehensible, are eminently contained in the incomprehensible Essence; of which the attribute of Omnipotency is a chiefe prerogative. It is not then all one, to be enabled to make some thing, suppose a gnat or flye, out of nothing; and to be able to make as many things, as now are extant in the world, or much better than these are, out of meere nothing. It is a maxime evident by light of reason, that no Doner can really give more than he hath to give: suppose he were willing, enabled and authorized to give himselfe: to give its whole nature with the appurtenances to any other Creature already extant, or in possibility to bee created. It being then supposed, that an Angell by some speciall delegation from the incomprehensible Essence or power Omnipotent, might be enabled to make something of nothing, it were not possible that he should make any nature or essence more excellent than himselfe. Yet it is possible, that there might be some more excellent created substance than this Angell: yea of necessity there should be a possibilitie of his being more excellent in his kind, than now he is. However; for him to give, for him to bestow a more excellent being upon that which is not, than, for the present he himselfe hath, is no way possible. Suppose then hee might entirely alienate from himselfe, or bequeath the best being, which for the present he hath, upon some possibility of being, or advance some numerable not being to his own estate by his utter annihilation; this could not argue him to be Omnipotent, [Page] because there be many other effects possible, which are not in his power to produce; albeit he could resume that which he had given unto another, and bestow it againe where he pleased. Lastly, seeing the prime Essence, who alone is absolutely infinite, did not make all things out of nothing by a necessity of nature, but because it was his will so to make them: no creature by any delegated power imaginable, could possibly make any one thing, or more things out of nothing, besides those which the Omnipotent was willing should be so made; nor these any better either for substance or qualitie, than his will was, they should be. Nor could any creature be enabled by his will out of nothing to make any thing, which was not eminently contained in the nature of that creature, to whom this power of creating, is supposed to be, by his will, delegated. For albeit some efficient or productive causes bring forth effects for substance or qualitie more excellent then themselves: yet this they never doe, this they cannot doe, unlesse they worke upon some advantage, which the subject or matter whereon they worke doth afford them. But this advantage cannot be supposed in the production of any substance, out of no subject or matter praexistent. All the excellency, which any effect or substance so produced can have, must be intirely derived from its efficient. And that can be no greater excellency or perfection, than the efficient it selfe hath; not altogether so great, because it must be eminently contained in the perfection of its efficient: if so be the efficient have any [Page] perfection or being left, after the production of such an effect. So that every efficient cause, which is or can be supposed, as an instrumentall cause of creation, or as enabled to produce something out of nothing, is thus farre limited, that it can produce no effect more excellent that it selfe, and being thus limited in it selfe, and by dependance on an higher cause, as well in its being, as in its operation, it cannot be conceived to bee Omnipotent. For that includes as much as to be illimited in operation, or, which is all one, to bee the operative power of the incomprehensible Essence, or of Being infinite.

3 But though to be able to make something out of nothing be not formally aequipollent to the attribute of Omnipotency: yet can it not hence be concluded, that any agent besides the one Omnipotent, is either able or can be enabled to produce the least substance that is, the least portion or matter ingredient to any bodily substance out of meer nothing. To lay the first foundation or beginning of being of any finite substance, is the sole effect of being it selfe, and therefore of that which is truly infinite in operation. Whatsoever is finite or limited, can have no other kind of being, than borrowed or participated. And this kinde of being must bee immediately derived, without intervention of any instrumentall cause, from being not participated or borrowed, but from increated and authentique being. To create, is to give actuall being or existance, without the help or furtherance of any Contributer or Confounder. Now if this power of creating [Page] could possibly bee delegated to any created substance, it were possible for that which is created by it, to have its being extra infinitum esse, that is, it should not be immediately and intirely contained in the infinite and incomprehensible Essence or Being. For in this very supposall [That one created substance might by power delegated from Omnipotency, create another] it is necessarily implied, that the substance created should have its being intirely, or part of its being immediately from the other, which, by power delegated, is supposed to create it. And having such being, as it hath, either intirely or in part immediately from the other, it could not be immediately and intirely contained in the first cause of all things. And if the least substance possible, could have its Being, not immediately and intirely from the first cause or supreame Efficient, he could not bee actually and absolutely infinite in Being, or Omnipotent in working. For that onely is absolutely infinite, or infinite in Being, in which all things possible are immediately contained; without whose incomprehensible Being, nothing can have existence; without whose immediate operation nothing can begin to be or exist.

These agitatiōs discussions may notifie unto us the strength & soundness of that treble rule or fundamentall principle layd by others, and before touched by us. First, it is peculiar unto Art to turne bodies already formed and perfected by nature, into another fashion: It is the property of nature, and of naturall and finite Agents, to worke the unfashioned [Page] or confused matter into some determinate forme or set kinde of being. It is the prerogative of the Omnipotent Maker, to afford naturall Agents the intire matter and stuffe, whereon they worke; and to bestow on them such being as they have, whether that be materiall or immateriall, celestiall or sublunary, spirituall or bodily; and to bestow i [...] intirely, without the helpe of any Co-efficient, without the contribution of any stuffe or matter, of any reallitie praeexistent.

[Page]

SECTION II.
Of Divine Providence in generall: and how contingency, and necessity in things created are subject unto it.

CHAP. 9.
Of the perpetuall dependance which all things created have on the Almighty Creator, both for their beeing and their operations.

1 BVt will it suffice us to beleeve, that as Art hath its proper subject made or fitted by Nature; or as more perfect substances praesuppose an imperfect state in Nature: so this imperfect state of nature, or the subject on which naturall efficients do work, was made of nothing, without any coagency of Nature or Art, by the sole power of the Almighty Father? To beleeve all this, is but the first part of our beleefe of this Article of Creation. For better apprehending the intire object of our beleefe in this point, we are [Page] to observe the difference betwixt the dependance, which Art hath on nature, or which workes artificiall have on the Artificer, or which more perfect naturall substances have on the imperfect substances, whereof they are made, or on their naturall efficients; and the dependance which both naturall Agents & Patients, & which efficient causes as wel artificiall as naturall, with their severall matters or subjects, have on the Almighty Creator and Maker of all things. First then nature or causes naturall, after they have finished their proper works, and fitted them for Art to worke upon, do not cooperate with the Artificer in fashioning them to his ends or purpose. The Artificer againe, after he hath finished his worke, doth not continually support, preserve or apply it to those uses, unto which it serves; but leaves this unto their care for whose convenience it was made. The Clocke-maker doth not tye himselfe to keep all the Clocks which he makes: nor doth he which undertakes to keepe them, binde himselfe to watch their motions perpetually, or to observe them as curiously as Physitians doe their sicke Patients. Againe, the most perfect works of nature, as vegetables and living things, depend upon their causes, whether materiall or efficient, (for the most part) onely in fieri, not in facto, whilest they are in making or in perfecting, not after they be made and perfected. The Lyonesse doth not perpetually nourish her whelps with her owne substance; nor doth the Raven continually provide for her young ones; or any other creatures more kinde than they, perpetually [Page] support or direct their brood in their motions, but leave them to fend for themselves. If the Almightie Creator should doe no better by his most perfect Creatures, their returne to nothing, would be as speedy, as their production from it. All of them have a perpetuall and undispensable dependance upon his power, not onely whilst they are in making, but as great after they are made. And thus great and perpetuall it is, not in respect of their substances onely, but as truly in respect of their motions or operations. The imperfect masse or matter whereof bodies naturall are made, is not onely his sole worke, or effect of his Omnipotency; but that it is workable or fashionable unto any set forme, this likewise is an effect of his operative power; it could not be perpetually thus fashionable, but by his perpetuall working. That the most perfect naturall Agent, should worke or dispose this matter to any set forme: this likewise is his worke. He doth not onely support both Agent and Patient in that being which he gave them, but doth perpetually cooperate with them in their motions; doth apply and direct their motions unto those ends and uses, whereto his wisdome hath ordained them.

2 Concerning the manner of that perpetuall dependance, which all finite Agents with their effects, have on the one Omnipotent and supreame illimited efficient, whether in respect of their existence or operation; the disputes in Schooles are intricate, and the questions perplexed. But the best is, the ingenuous Reader may quit them, if he will be but pleased to take unto himselfe, if not [Page] an ocular demonstration, yet a visible representation of this truth, in that perpetuall dependance, which light diffused (whether through the celestiall bodies, as the moone or starres, or through the ayre or other inferiour elementary bodies capable of enlightning) hath on the Fountaine of Light, to wit, the body of the Sunne: or which the light in rooms, otherwise dark, hath on the light of Fire or candles by night. So perpetuall, so essentiall is this dependance which light, in bodies inlightned by others, hath on the bodies which enlighten them; that someVide Zabarel. de Lumine. good Philosophers, from observation of this dependance, have concluded, that [Lumen. non est inhaesive in corpore illuminato, sed in corpore lucente▪] The lightsomnesse which appeares in these inferiour bodies, or in bodies not lucent in themselves, is not inherently or subjectively, in the borrowers, or bodies enlightned, but in the bodies which enlightens them. To prove this conclusion, they use this Antecedent, that light borrowed or participated, doth follow the motion of the body which bestowes or lends it; and this Antecedent they thinke sufficiently proved by sense. For if we hold a looking-glasse to a candle by night, the light which for the present appeares either in the whole glasse or in some part of it, will alter its place or seat according to the motion of the candle. If you move the candle higher or lower than it was, the light in the glasse will remove with it, from the highest place to the lowest, and from the lowest to the highest, as it shall please the mover to alter the aspect betwixt them, so will the light move from [Page] one part of the roome to another, as the candle is removed. And if you take the candle quite out of the roome, the light will follow it, and leave nothing but darknesse behind. The same observation holds as true in a Dyall, in which the light or shadow constantly followes the motion of the Sun. But to hold this conclusion, [That light borrowed from the Sunne or a Candle, should be inherently or subjectively in the Sunne or Candle] is more than true Philosophy will warrant; more than the unquestionable truth of the former experiment can logically inferre. For though light in bodies not lucent in themselves, bee not their owne, but borrowed; yet in that it is borrowed, it must bee truly in the borrower, not in the body which lends it. For every one which lends, is presumed to transfer the use of what hee lends unto him that borrowes: the borrower must have the possession of what is lent him, during the time of the loane. As for the former experiments, they may be retorted upon such as use their helpe for inferring this pretended conclusion, [Vide Anton. Scarmilion. de coloribus. That light diffused is not inherently in the body enlightned, but in the body lucent, or enlightning.] For the mutation of the seat of borrowed light, whether in a looking-glasse held to a candle, or in a Sun-dyall, will be the very same, albeit the Candle or Dyall stand still in the same place; if so we move the Looking-glasse the same way from the Candle, or the Dyall the same way from the Sunne, by which the Sun did move from the Dyall, or the Candle was moved from the Looking-glasse. This conclusion is [Page] most certaine, [That the motion of light, according to the motion of the body which diffuseth it, doth no way inferre the light not to be inherently, (according to the inherency which it hath) in the body, through which it is diffused; but rather that this light, however inherent in the body enlightned, hath a perpetuall indispensable dependance upon the light of the body which produceth it; a dependance on it, not onely in fieri, that is, whilest it is in production, which is in an instant; but a dependance in facto, so long as it continues in the body enlightned. And we cannot better conceive the manner, how a line should be made by the continued fluxe of a point, or a surface by the continued motion of a line; or how time should receive its continuation from the continued fluxe of an instant, than by observing the manner how light being produced in an instant in the body, which borrowes it (the extremity of it being terminated to a mathematicall point or line) doth vary its place of residence in the same body, moving continually from one part to another, according to the degrees of motion, either of the body which gives the light, or of the body which is enlightned, one from the other. If either body could move or bee moved from the aspect of the other, in an instant, the light would remove from the body enlightned in the same instant. But moving as it doth, the motion of the light from one part of the same body or roome into another, is perpetuall; there is no interruption in the motion so much as momentary, no interposition of darknesse so long as the motion [Page] lasts. And yet it is not the same numericall light, which thus moveth in the bodie or roome enlightned. There is a continuall production of light fully answerable to the continuall succession of the motion. The light, whilest in motion, continues no longer the same than the aspect betweene the bodie enlightning and enlightned continues the same. And it may be questioned, whether there be not a perpetuall production of new light, even whilest neyther the body enlightning nor enlightned remove one from the other, whilest both stand or rest upon their severall centers.

3 But what ever Philosophers may dispute one way or other concerning the proper subject of light diffused or participated, or concerning the identifie or multiplication of it in bodies not lucent in themselves, but enlightned: the dependance of borrowed or participated light upon the fountaine of light, whence it is borrowed, is the most perfect Embleme, which the eye of man can behold, of that dependance which all things numerable that are, or can be, have on the incomprehensible Essence, or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing. Whether light participated or diffused, have any true inherence or no in bodies enlightned, or whether it be present with them or in them, (ad modum spiritalium) after such a manner as spirits are in sublunary bodies, or with them; this is certaine, that light participated, is not deduced or drawne out of any matter praeexistent, or out of any positive qualitie inherent; it is produced out of darknes or want of light. And herein it is the true Embleme of created Entities, [Page] wch were not made of any entities praeexistent, but of nothing. As light participated or diffused, hath no permanent root in bodies enlightned: So things created have not their root of beeing in any maetter praeexistent, nor hath the prime matter, of which things generated are made, any root precedent out of which it groweth. Such being as it hath, it hath intirely by its perpetuall dependance upon beeing it selfe. The most excellent numerable beeing that can be imagined, is more truely participated or borrowed from beeing it selfe, than the light of the Moone or Sarres, than the light in the ayre, water, or yce, is from the body of the Sunne. And albeit the formes or perfect bodies, which, by operation of efficients naturall, respectively result or are produced out of the matter, have a being distinct from the matter, out of which they are made or produced: yet even these have the same immediate dependency upon the incomprehensible Essence or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing, which the prime matter hath. As the resplendencie or irradiation of coloured glasses, be they yellow, greene or azure, have the same immediate dependance upon the light of the Sunne, which the light diffused throughout the heavens, water, ayre, or pure glasses, hath; unlesse the Sun send forth his beames upon them, these colours have no resplendencie, they cannot affect the sense of sight. Nor can any created Agent (albeit endowed with qualities operative, more forcible and permanent, than any coloured glasses can bee) produce any reall effect, without the cooperation or coagencie of the incomprehensible[Page]Essence, or inexhaustible fountaine of Beeing. As impossible it is, that any agent should move, or be moved, otherwise than by the vertue of his Almighty power, as that it should have beeing or existence (extra infinitum esse) without his infinite Beeing or immensitie, or that the continuance of it in such being, should not be comprehended in his infinite and interminable duration, which wee call Eternitie. Againe, as light borrowed or diffused throughout this inferiour world, hath a beeing in its kinde distinct from that light, which is permanently seated in the fountaine of light, on which, notwithstanding, all borrowed light absolutely depends as being eminently contained in it: so every numerable beeing, or part of this world, the Sunne, the Moone, the Starres, the Elements, mixt bodies, vegetables, man, and beast, have their proper kinde of Beeing distinct each from other, and distinct againe from the incomprehensible fountaine of beeing; on which notwithstanding all of them have more immediate, more essentiall dependance, than either the lights, or different shapes in a glasse, have on the Sunne which gives the light, or on the bodies which they represent. And in this incomprehensible fountaine of beeing, all things not onely which are, but which possibly may bee, are more eminently contained, than the least-sparkles or portions of borrowed light, which appeare in broken glasses, are in the body of the Sunne.

4 In this point onely, or in this especially, is the production of light in this inferiour world by the Sunne, unlike the Creation of all things by the Almighty [Page] Father of lights, in that the Sunne produceth light or resplendency, without any free choice or intelligence, but by a necessitie of nature, that is, it so produceth light, as it hath no power not to produce it. So doth not the Almighty Father eyther create the things that are, or preserve them in their estate of beeing, or cooperate with them in the production of such effects, as they in their severall kindes and rankes are truly said to produce. For albeit the Almighty Father, bee more immutable than the Sunne, yet is hee immutably free. For freedome of will, by which creatures rationall exceede all creatures meerly naturall, or capable of no better endowment then sense, being a true and reall branch of beeing, a perfection of the most perfect creatures, must be as truely and really, though in an eminent manner, contained in the Maker of all things, as any other branch of numerable beeing is. Now the object of this freedome of will in the Omnipotent Maker, is not onely the Creation or not creation of things that are or may bee; not the preservation or destruction of things created, or of the severall endowments or qualifications: but part of this object of divine freedome is the enabling or inhibiting of all his creatures, to exercise those qualities or faculties which are to them most naturall, and in their kinde most powerfull. Albeit Nebuchadnezzar had power to make the flames of intēded persecution, much hotter than any ordinary fire; though other Tyrants might have power to make the like againe, much hotter than hee did, or to environ Gods Saints with the fire of Hell; yet [Page] if the Almighty Creator withdraw the influence of his power from such fire or flames, they can have no more power to burne or scorch his Servants, than they have to coole them; although we suppose their nature and qualities to be preserved still entire, by the same power, by which they were created. For as (but now) was said, the inhibition or enabling of naturall qualities or faculties to exercise their native force, is as truely the object of divine freedome, as the preservation or destruction of the Agents themselves, with their qualities or endowments is. For the same reason, the Sunne was no way wounded in his substance, nor hurt, nor tainted in its influence or other qualitie, when, by the divine power, which is immutably and perpetually free, it was inhibited in its course or motion.

5 That the Almightie Creator neyther in our time, nor in the times long before us, hath laid any such restraint upon the Sunne, that it should not move, or upon the fire, that it should not burne, is not from any restraint which hee hath laid upon his power by his eternall decree; but from his immutable and eternall freedome. Wee may not say, that he cannot, for the times present or which are to come, lay the like inhibition upon the Sunne, upon the fire, or upon other celestiall or sublunarie bodies, for exercising the functions most naturall to them. That hee will not, at any time, lay the like restraint upon them, wee are not bound to beleeve, untill thus much be by his word revealed unto us. That God cannot at this time bring such a generall Inundation [Page] upon the earth as hee did in the dayes of Noah, we may not say or thinke: but that hee will not destroy the world by water, wee must beleeve, because wee have his solemne promise to this purpose sealed unto us, by the signe of the Bow in the Cloud. But when the iniquitie of this present world shall come unto the same height and measure, which the old world had made up, wee beleeve hee will destroy it by fire. For other mutations in the course of nature, the condition or exigence of times ensuing, may be such, as that they may be as strange and miraculous, as at any time heretofore they have beene. The not interposing of miracles in these our dayes, proceedes not from any Act passed by the Almightie to the contrary, nor from the unchangeablenesse of his eternall will; but from the condition or course, which his creatures hold de facto, whose condition or estate is in it selfe, and by his Almighty will so to have it, so changeable and so improveable to different purposes, that many events, which to our observation would be most strange, might upon speciall occasions be produced, without any change or alteration in his power, whose exercise ad extra, that is, in respect of effects producible in the creature, is immutably free, untill hee promise to inhibit them, as hee hath done the generall Inundation. And although hee be most immutable in all his promises or inhibitions: yet doth not every promise or inhibition which hee makes, induce an absolute immutabilitie or necessitie of the things promised or inhibited. Their immutabilitie or necessitie is the [Page] proper effect of his more solemne or peculiar promises. Nor are such inhibitions as he hath set unto the water absolutely necessary from Eternity, but grow necessary in revolution of time, by the changeable condition of the Creature. And albeit we can neither prescribe limits to his will, nor conceive any reason of the mutations which fall out in the Creatures by his inhibition, by his permission, or by his positive enabling them to exercise their native functions; yet of the least mutation, that can fall out in the world, he knowes a cause or reason, nor doth he suffer any thing to be done, for which his immutable freedome in governing the world, hath not an eternall rule or reason infinitely more perfect, than the wisest man living can give any for his best Acts or undertakings. But suppose the Sun to have that freedome of power in the emission or not emission of his beames, which men have over their breath, or that dexterity in tempering or moderating its light or influence, which skilfull Musitians have in modulating their voices: and the former representation of that power which God hath over all his creatures, and of their dependance on him in their beings and operations by the dependance which light hath on the Sunne, would be more lively and full.

6 But the Psalmist hath made choice of that free power, which man hath over his animall faculties, as over his breath or operation of his senses; as the fairest picture of Gods free power creative and providence over his Creatures. These wait all upon thee, that thou mightest give them their meat in [Page]due seasons. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thine hand, they are filled with good. Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they dye, and returne to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth. The glory of the Lord shall endure for ever: the Lord shall rejoyce in his workes. He looketh on the earth, and it trembleth: he toucheth the hils and they smoake. Psal. 104. vers. 27. &c. Yet even in these and the like emblematicall expressions of the Creators free power over his Creatures, or in the choisest that can bee taken or gathered out of the Propheticall descriptions, from the exercise of mens free and purest thoughts, there will still remaine this disparity: We cannot alter the objects of our intellectuall or abstract contemplations, without some alteration or change of Acts. It is then the prerogative of the Almighty, freely to will things most contrary and different, without any diversity in his will. And this his free will not onely worketh greater varietie or change in the Creature, than the wits of all men in the world can conceive, but withall irresistibly determines the issue of every possible change, without any shadow of change or alteration in his thoughts or resolutions; which in him are not many, but more truly one infinity, than any one thought in us is one. This disparity betweene the Identity of his Eternall knowledge, and of his immutable freedome, and the manner of our understanding or intellectuall choice, I cannot yet better represent than by the See the first part of the Divine Essence & Attributes, chap. 21. pag. 229, 230. &c.former disparity, betweene the circle and many [Page] sided figures. Mans purest intellectuall thoughts or actuall choices, are in the contemplative part of the soule, as angles are in many sided figures, all as different each from other, as one angle is from another in a quadrangle, and every one is as distinct from the substance of the soule wherein they are, as angles in a quadrangle are from the sides or surface of it. But those which wee terme, or conceive as severall Acts or exercises of the Divine power, as the Act of creation, the act of preservation, the act of conseruation, the production of miracles, &c. are in the Almighty, not so much distinct one from another, or from his incomprehensible essence, as the Angles in a circle are from the sides or from the circumference, which notwithstanding is a totangle, in which there is no sensible distinction betweene sides and Angles, albeit both of them bee truly contained in the circumference, as all power and freedome of power is contained in the immutable, infinite and incomprehensible Essence.

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CHAP. 10.
The usuall and daily operations of naturall causes with their severall events or successes, are as immediately ascribed to the Creator by the Prophets, as the first Creation of all things, with the reasons why they are so ascribed.

1 FRom the forementioned hundred and fourth Psalme, which is no other than a sweet paraphrase upon the sixe dayes work of Creation, and from the like propheticall emblazoning of Gods glory, which amounts from consideration of his workes; the intelligent Reader will informe himselfe, that the continuall rising and setting of the Sunne and Moone, their incessant diffusion of light through this visible World, the perpetuall ascent of springing waters into the hills, their continuall decursion from them into the Sea, the limitation of the Seas ebbing and flowing, the daily growth of plants and vegetables, the motion of living things on the earth and in the waters, are as immediately and as intirely ascribed unto the operative power of the Creator, as their first Creation out of nothing was. Yet the reason of their ascribing all this unto the immediate and sole power of God, will no way warrant the truth of their criticisme, who teach that neither the fire doth truly heat or burne, or the water really coole or moisten, or that no visible creature hath any reall operation [Page] upon another, but that our assigning of their motions or operations, as true causes (in their kind) of the effects which we see daily produced, is but a solaecisme of vaine Philosophy, or of sciences falsly so called; whereas the right resolution of this solaecisme into distinct and Christian phrase, is but this, God doth produce heat, cold, moisture, vegetables, and other living things, (ad praesentiam creaturarum) the Fire, Water, Sunne, Earth, &c. being but bare witnesses of the Creators power, which is manifested in them, or of its operation in their presence, by which operation alone, all those effects are produced, which the Philosophers ascribe unto the Creatures. And most true it is, that the Creator doth daily worke all those effects, which we attribute to naturall agents: yet doth hee not worke such effects onely in them, or where they are present, but he truly worketh by them and with them. And if the Omnipotent power be truly said to worke by and with natural meanes or causes, they must truly worke with him, in their kinde. When the Apostle saith, in him wee live and move, and have our beeing, this necessarily implies, that wee have a life in its kinde distinct from his life, a motive power different in its kinde from his power, a kinde of beeing likewise distinct from his infinite Essence, or from being-it-selfe. But in as much as the life of all things living, the motions of every thing that moveth, the being of every numerable thing, that is, hath such an absolute dependance as hath been declared upon his creative power; hence it is that the Prophets and Divine Philosophers, [Page] ascribe all the visible effects or events, which time presents or place accompanieth, no lesse intirely to the Creator, than the first production of their visible and naturall causes. As for the former Critickes, in whose language, God onely worketh in his creatures, or (his creatures being present) they might with as good reason, affirme that the Sunne did not really move, but that God did move, the Sun being present; yet could he not move or create motion ad praesentiam Solis, unlesse the Sunne did truly move. The truth is, the Sunne doth move, or is moved by Gods presence in it, but he doth not move with it or by it. But with the Sunne or other Creatures, he truly worketh, as they truly worke with him. And, by this concession of some true power and property of working unto naturall Agents, more is ascribed to the Creator of all things, than can bee ascribed by the contrary opinion, which utterly denies al power or property of working to the Creatures. For he that denyes any effects to be truly wrought by them, cannot ascribe their abilities or operative force (which, in his opinion, is none) unto their Creator. ButWho fed thee in the wilderness with Manna, which thy fathers [...] not, that hee might humble thee, and that he might prove thee, to doe thee good at thy latter end: Lest thou say in thine heart, My power and the might of my hand hath [...] is wealth. But thou shalt remember the Lord thy God, for it is Hee [...] power to get wealth, that he may establish his covenant, which hee [...], as it is this day. DEVT. 8. vers. 16, 17, 18. Moses taugh the Israelites, that it was God which gave them power to gather substance. Nor were they more bound to praise God for the substance which they gathered, or for the Manna which by miracle [Page] hee sent unto them, than for the [...] which he gave them to gather the one or other.

2 Ye [...] is not this absolute and immediate dependance, which every creature, as well or its being, as for its power or exercise of it, hath o [...] the Almighty Creator, the intire ground or reason, why the effects which are (in their kinde) produced by the Creatures, are by the Prophets wholly ascribed unto power Almighty. For this dependance, or the reason of ascribing all things to God which is grounded on it, being for the present [...] questred; he hath a peculiar title to all the works or effects, (especially to all of greater and more publique consequence) which the Creatures produce, from his skill or wisedome in contriving the combination of second causes, with their severall operations, for the assequution of their last or utmost end. Nor was the entitative goodnesse of every creature in his kinde, albeit considered in that perfection wherein God made it, the ground or reason of that approbation which hee bestowed upon them, as they severally began to bee, or after hee had accomplished them all. God (saith Moses) saw all that he had made, and loe it was exceeding good. What goodnesse then was this, which hee thus commends? the goodnesse of order or of harmony betwixt them, as they were parts of this Vniverse. This harmony, was the accomplishment of his severall workes, the ground of his praises, and the complete object of our beleefe of this Article of Creation. Hence saith the Apostle, Heb. 11 By faith we beleeve; What? Secula facta esse, nay [Page] more then so [...], that the worlds were harmonically made. It was a double over-sight in some good Divines, from one or both of these two principles, (Omne ens qu [...]ens, est bonum,) What soever hath being is good, whatsoever is, was made by God, and all things which God made were good; to infer, that sinne or morall evill could have no positive entitie. For the greater the entitative goodnesse of any creature is, the greater measure of morall evill it alwayes includes, unlesse its entitative goodnesse hold such harmony or correspondency with the rest, as may helpe to make up or support that goodnesse of order, that is, that goodnesse of coordination amongst themselves, or of that joint subordination unto their Creator, which he first framed and placed in this Vniverse, as it was his worke. Vnlesse sinne or morall evill had some positive entitie, or some positive degrees or measure, all sinnes should be equall, there could bee no different kinds of sinne, no numericall difference or degrees betwixt particular sinnes of the same kind. But of the nature of sinne or morall evill, and how compatible this evill is with goodnes entitative, more at large, by Gods assistance, in the Treatise of Originall sinne, or the estate or condition of the sons of wrath, which estate every child of Adam by participation of this first sinne doth inherit. The peculiar title which the Almighty Creator by right of Creation, or by the combination or contrivance of naturall and intellectuall agents, hath to all the praises, which either the Souldier orVide Salvi [...]num lib. 7. num. 227. Statesman, the Landlord, the Husbandman, or such as [Page] live by Merchandizing daily rob him of, will come more fitly to be declared in some following Treatises of Divine speciall providence.

3 If the Reader desire a briefe abstract or summe of what hath beene said of Gods power in creating the world, or of the reservation of this free power unto himselfe to alter, to innovate or amend the estate wherein he hath hitherto preserved it; I cannot exhibite this generall view more clearly or more succinctly than Iustin Martyr hath done in his answer to the fourth question of the Grecians. The question was thus proposed, [An Deus faciat, feceritve, facturusve sit: Et si facit, suaptene voluntare, an praeter voluntatem?] Whether God do make the things that are, whether hee hath made the things that have beene, whether hee will make other things which yet are not, or the things which are, after a better manner than as yet they have beene made: or if he be or hath beene a maker, or continue to make things better, whether he do all this out of his owne free will, or besides his will. His full answer to this question is, Fecit Deus, & facit, & facturus est, suapte sponte & voluntate: nam creaturam ipse condidit, quae antehac non fuerat, volens. Eam providentia sua in eo ut sit, conservat: quod quidem est, facit. Quam etiam instauraturus est, & in statum meliorem redacturus per restitutionem sive renovationem: quod est facturus est: ut repurget cam ab absurditate omni, ex rationalium ignavia contracta. Non quod per judicii considerationem & deliberationem posterius id quod melius sit, invenerit; sed quod longe antea & prius quam mundum condidit, [Page] constitutum habuerit ut faceret. Neque enim possibile est ut vel ad notionem vel ad potentiam, Deo posterius quidquam accedat, quod prius non habuerit. Volentem autem Deum mundum creasse, illud est documento, quod cum Deus potuerit plures efficere soles, non plures, sed unum duntaxat effecerit. Nam qui plures non potest condere soles, neque unum condere potest: & qui unum solem creare potuit, necessario quoque plures creare potuit. Quomodo igitur quos facere potuit plures soles, Deus non fecit, nisi certe quod plures soles facere noluit? Sin quos non fecit soles, voluntate non fecit: perspicuam utique fuerit, cum etiam quem fecit, voluntate fecisse. Et veluti sol, ita & reliquae creaturae partes omnes, quae vel obnoxiae vel non obnoxiae sunt corruptibilitati, ex voluntate Dei & id quod sint, & id quod hujusmodi sint, habent.

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CHAP. 11.
Containing the summe of what wee are to beleeve in this Article of Creation, and of the duties whereto it binds us: with an introduction to the Article of His providence.

TO beleeve that God is the maker of Heaven and Earth, and of all things visible and invisible, includes in it an acknowledgement not onely of the six dayes worke, but that he still makes all things that are, and shal make all things which hereafter shall be. So long as any thing which hath beene continues in beeing, so long as any thing which now is not, shall beginne or not cease to be, so long the Almighty continues a Maker. And in as much as some things which are made, or which hereafter shall be made, shall have no end, he continues an everlasting Maker. This title of Maker is none of his Eternall Attributes, but a denomination ascribed unto him from his workes which all had their beginning in time, or rather with time, or with duration finite or numerable. It is an everlasting Attribute, for that properly is everlasting, which though it have beginning yet it hath no end. But albeit the acts or exercises of his will or power had a beginning with the world, (for they are alwayes in the creature or effect) yet his will and purpose to make the world are eternall: So is the power by which he made it, so is the combination [Page] of all these, to wit, his providence, by which hee orders and governes all things, coeternall to his essence. All moderne controversies to my knowledge account it an heathenish solecism to say, God only did make or hath made the world and all things in it, he doth not now make them. For this were to deny the necessity of his everlasting worke in preserving, supporting, and continuing all things in their proper being. And to deny this, would bee more than a solecisme of speech, a reall branch of infidelity. Is it then a lesse solecisme of speech to say, or a smaller portion of infidelity to thinke, that God only hath decreed before all times what shall fall out in time, but doth not now decree nor shall any thing hereafter be decreed by him? Questionlesse, if his decree be coeternall to his power, the same with his will or purpose, if hee cease not to worke or will, he ceaseth not to worke or decree. He did decree to worke when he did not worke, or produce any effect ad extra, but hee never produced any effect or worke when hee did not decree. For he worketh all things by the Counsell of his will, not by the Counsell of his will as past and ended, but by the Counsell of his will, which was, which is, and which is to come. And he decreeth all things for the times present after the selfe same manner that he decreed them from eternity, otherwise his decree were not eternall, could have no resemblance of eternity. To infer that Gods decree is an act past, or that God doth not now decree, because he hath decreed al things before all worlds, is a solecisme or ignorance, to say no worse, of the [Page] same nature, quality & scantling, as if you shold say, God was before the world was, therefore God is not since the world was, nor shall be after the end of this world. For the world could neither begin, continue, nor cease to be, but by his eternall and irresistible decree, which neither hath beginning nor end, nor can admit any interposition of change. It is true, that if we consider the Deity in himselfe or his decree as it is in him, or the same with him, there is neither praeteritum nor futurum, no such difference in them as wee character or notifie by these termes past or to come: yet if wee consider God or his eternall Decree, as they include a reference of precedency to things temporall, past, or to come, or as times current have coexistence with him, wee may not deny that God was before all times, and did decree things to come, that he is in all times current, and doth decree the issue of times present or ensuing. Thus in all times, and in all places, the Almighty Father is present with us, present in us, as our maker and preserver, present by his eternall providence to order and governe us. And the government of the world, specially of Men and Angels, is in true Divinity, the proper object of the Eternall Decree. And if God be thus with us, nothing can goe amisse with us, save only by our ignorance, by our misbeleefe or weake beleefe of this first Article.

2 The true, that is, the firme and sound beleefe of every morall or sacred truth, specially of such fundamental truths as are contained in this Article, alwayes include a correspondency in the beleever [Page] unto the thing beleeved. And this correspondencie must have its place, not in the braine or apprehensive faculty onely, but in the affection. The sympathy of affection unto the thing beleeved, results from the impression which the speculative forme or representation in the braine makes upon the heart, which is the seat of the affection. The meanes subordinate to the Spirit of God for making this impression, are two: A right explication or branching of the article or object to be beleeved: & a serious and frequent meditation upon the object rightly branched, or a taking not of the truth onely, but the consequences of it into deepe and setled consideration; or as we say, a laying of both to heart. The maine branches of this Article are three: First, that God is the maker of all men that are, not of Adam onely. Secondly, that he is the preserver of all. Thirdly, that he perpetually ordereth and governeth all things, even the thoughts of men, by the irresistible uncessant working of his Omnipotent decree or will. In our beleefe of the two first branches (bee it lesse or more, weake or strong) so it be uniforme, it is essentially included, that God is good to all, in that he hath given life and being unto all. Of this his goodnesse no man can want store of witnesses, so long as either he injoyes himselfe or the necessary supplyes of life. One speciall duty, whereunto the beleefe of this Article doth immediately bind all men, is expresly commended to us by our Saviour, Matth. 6. The generall neglect whereof is more than sufficient to condemne not the Heathens or Infidels onely, but [Page] the greatest part of such as professe the Christian Faith, of infidelity: Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eate, or what ye shall drinke, nor yet for your body what you shall put on. Is not the life more than meat? and the body than rayment? It is a sin for him which beleeves that God hath given him that life and being which he hath, not to beleeve that God did give him both for his greater good, or that he will not increase his blessings upon him, so he doe not distrust his fatherly care and providence: A greater sinne it is to suspect or question, whether God have not a more fatherly care over all men, than he hath over other creatures. So our Saviour addes, Behold the fowles of the ayre: For they sow not, neither doe they reape, nor gather into barnes, yet your heavenly Father feedeth them. Are ye not much better then they? In that God hath given man a better kind of life and being than the fowles of the ayre; this is an undoubted pledge unto all, that he hath prepared far better food for them than for birds and beasts, an everlasting food; so they do not distrust his providence. And as hee provideth better food for man than for beast, so hath he better rayment for them in store, than he hath for vegetables; so they will seeke it from him, and not be their owne carvers. Which of you by taking thought can add one cubit unto his stature? And why take ye thought for rayment? Consider the Lillies of the field, how they grow; they toyle not, neither do they spin. And yet I say unto you that even Salomon in all his glory, was not arrayed like one of these: wherfore if God so cloath the grasse of the field, which to[Page]day is and to morrow is cast into the Oven; shall hee not much more cloath you, O ye of little faith. That to distrust Gods providence or doubt of his love, of such love as is ready to bestow better rayment upon them than Salomon in all his royalty had, is a point of infidelity, is included in our Saviours inference or conclusion: Therefore take no thought, saying, What shall we eate? or what shall we drinke? or wherewithall shall we be cloathed? For after all these things do the Gentiles seeke. For your heavenly Father knoweth that ye have need of all these things. Is it then unlawfull to make any thing which the Gentiles sought after, any part of our care? No, the Gentiles after their fashion, sought after God, who (as the Apostle saith) giveth to all life and breath and all things, even to the Gentiles, that they should seeke the Lord: if happely they might feele after him and finde him. Acts 17. 25, 27. The onely reason why they did not find him, was because they sought him amisse. And the reason why they sought him amiss was their ignorance of this truth which our Saviour and S. Paul hath taught, to wit, that God did give the very Gentiles themselves food and rayment, with other necessaries of life, even life it selfe, with all its contentments, to the end that they might seeke him and taste his goodnesse. But they ran counter, and sought only after those things which were good not in themselves, but as they were pledges of his goodnesse. And the more eagerly they thus sought after these temporall good things, the further they ran from the Fountaine of goodness, which alone must sweeten [Page] the best things we can desire, and season our soules for the right entertainment or fruition of them.

3 Our speculative assent unto this Article, or approbation of this truth, whereof these Gentiles were ignorant, will rather aggravate than mitigate our Saviours censure of them; if we be as greedy seekers after the necessities of life, or as solicitous hunters after superfluities, as the Gentiles were. The distinctions or divisions of care, with annotations what kinde of care, is by our Saviour forbidden, what allowed of, are easie to be found almost in every Writer, especially in the Expositors of that 6. chapter of Matthew. But whether through the default of hearers or of teachers, or respectively of both: too much liberty is every where taken for employing the greatest part of mens times and indeavours in providing things of this life. Notwithstanding all the prohibitions which have been given by our Saviour to the contrary: Covetousnesse and ambition, the two grand enemies of beleefe in God and his loving providence, have no where in any age thriven better, than amongst zealous Christian professors in these later times. And which is most to be lamented, Scripture is secretly opposed to Scripture for justifying or countenancing unchristian care of wordly matters. The warrant, which many take to themselves from the mistaken sense of one place in S.1 Tim. 5▪ 8 Paul, He that provideth not for his family is worse then an Infidell, is used as a countermand to our Saviours prohibition. For the right limitation whereof, the onely caveat which I have to commend unto the Reader, is this, [Page] As S. Paul, how mightily soever he debase workes, not ceremoniall onely, but morall, doth never denie their use or necessity either for attaining to justification, or for making our Election sure, but onely seeks to strengthen our relyance upon Gods mercies in Christ by denyall of our selves, and of the best works wch we can do, whether before regeneration or after: so our Saviour, albeit he seeme universally to forbid all care of minding temporall contentments, yet in deed and reall meaning, forbids us onely to place any part of our hopes or confidence in our owne endeavours. He doth not simply forbid all care of things temporall, but so farre onely as it is an hindrance to our care and watchfulnesse for trying and tasting the goodnesse of God, or as it weakens our relyance upon his fatherly providence. If we be watchfull in prayer, and frequent in meditations upon Gods goodnesse already experienced, our care of heavenly things and estimate of Gods goodnesse will better teach every one of us in his severall calling, the right limitation of his domestique cares, than any generall rule which can be gathered from the nature, quality, or quantity of cares. For conclusion, he which forbids us to take care for the morrow, commands us to pray this day for to morrowes bread, that is, to pray every day for the good successe or blessings of the dayes following, with all attention and watchfulnesse.

4 Another fundamentall duty, and one of the most formall effects of faith, as it respects this Article, is that of the Preacher, Ecclesiastes the 12. [Page] vers. 1. Remember now thy Creator in the dayes of thy youth. But why is this duty in particular prest upon youth? Because the prints of Gods creative power are then most fresh in our nature, and might transmit a fairer copy or truer estimate of the Creators goodnesse unto old age, than old age can take any: so young men by often reflecting upon the present comforts of health and strength, upon the activity of body, the quicknesse of sense and spirit, would ingrosse them deeply in their memories. Youth then is the fittest season for estimating the benefits of Creation, and old age the choicest time for surveying our unthankfulnesse to our Creator. If the former contentments of youth, with the comforts which accompany our best thoughts and actions, were truly calculated in our fresh and choicest daies, and rightly waighed upon their proper center, our thankfulnesse would reciprocate upon the Fountaine from which they flow, and be returned to their doner in a measure equiponderant to their waight upon our soules. And nothing but want of thankfulnesse in such as have tasted the ordinary benefits of Creation, can hinder the descent of Gods choice of blessings in great abundance. Would we but sequester that delight which we take in health and strength from our selves, and surrender it wholly into his hands that gave it, he is still ready to renew and better our present and former estate. Did we empty our hearts of pride, of selfe-delight, or complacency, by powring forth such joyfull thanks giving as the Psalmist doth, It is he that hath made us, and not wee our [Page] selves: [...]t is he that gives us all those good things wherein we joy, we did not receive them from our friends or parents, wee cannot take them to our selves: the same Lord, as the Psalmist elsewhere avoucheth, would give us our hearts desire, even fill our hearts with joy and gladnesse which shall never saile or decrease. This is his sole and proper gift, for though we could take unto our selves all the temporary contentments of transitory pleasures, which either our hearts could wish, or our inventions calculate, yet should wee not have our hearts desire, so long as we fixe our delight either in the things enjoyed, or in the enjoying of them, and not in the Lord which gave them unto us, and us power to enjoy them.

From thus delighting in the Lord, or from rendring according to the benefits bestowed upon us, the generall withdrawments are but two. First, an over prizing of such externalls as procure or increase our contentments. Secondly, an ouervaluing the feare or dread of mens persons, or other externalls which seeme to menace disgrace, vexation, or torment unto us, if we should doe as in our calmest thoughts we often desire to doe. The sinister sway of both temptations or withdrawments from the duties commended unto us, cannot be otherwise counterpoized than by taking the last branch of this Article into deepe and serious consideration. The last branch was, that God doth nor onely make and preserve us, but doth withall perpetually order, direct, and governe both us and all the externalls which we love or feare, by his all-seeing, [Page] ever-working Decree or Counsell. If our soules or senses have for once or twice beene overjoyed with the possession of any externalls or instrumentall causes of contentment, let us call to minde, that as the Almighty Creator gives both us and them their being, so hee likewise stints and limits as well their operations, as our capacities to receive their impressions at his pleasure. The same externalls which formerly wrought our comfort or contentments, may procure our griefe and misery by too much or unseasonable familiarity with them, or fruition of them. If in feare or dread of evill menaced by man, or represented to us by fire, by sword, or other unruly instruments of wrath or vengeance, wee cannot hope that the Almighty Creator will by miracle abate their strength, or inhibit the exercise of their native qualities or dispositions, as he did in Daniel and the three childrens cases; yet unlesse our faith in the last branch of this Article faile, it will confirme us in this resolution, that he can and will so contrive the concurrence of hurtfull agents, as they shall become instruments of greater good to such as love him, and in temptations adhere unto him. The rule or Maxime is universally true: No agent or instrument, whether of temporall harme or comfort, whether of joy or griefe, can worke any other wayes or any further than he by his Eternall Decree or Providence hath appointed it for the present to worke. And in that promise made unto us by our Apostle, That hee will not suffer us to bee tempted above our strength; it is included that he will so restraine or abate the [Page] force and efficacy of all second causes, as they shall not conquer our patience or quell the comfort of our unwounded conscience.

CHAP. 12.
Though nothing can fall out otherwise then God hath decreed: yet God hath decreed that many things may fall out otherwise than they doe.

1 MEn, otherwise of light and vaine behaviour, gaine oftentimes respect amongst the multitude by pretended descent from worthy Families, with whom their names have some alliance: so doe inconsiderate positions or conclusions dangerously erronious, many times get more esteeme among the Learned, than ordinary truths doe, as being mistaken for the true and naturall off-springs of undoubted Maximes. There is no Christian, but thinkes himselfe bound upon his allegiance to submit his assent unto the former Principle, [It is impossible, that any thing should be, which God hath decreed not to be; or any thing which is, should otherwise bee, than God hath decreed it should be.] And many which make a conscience as well of their words as of their wayes, (herein perhaps especially faulty, that they are too zealously [Page] sollicitous not to speake amisse,) make no scruple of entertaining these and the like inferences following, as naturally descending from the former Maxime: [It is impossible ought should fall out otherwise than it doth: all things in respect of God and his Omnipotent Decree, are necessary: Contingencie is but a solecisme of secular language, or if any thing may without offence be termed contingent, it must be reputed such, onely with reference to second causes.]

2 Howbeit such good men as doe thus write and speake, will give us leave (I know) to take it in the first place as granted, that God is wiser than we are, and knowes the nature of all things and their differences better than they or we doe. This being granted, we will in the second place suppose that Contingency is not a meere fictitious name of that which is not, as Tragelaphus; nor altogether Synonymall to Necessity. The question about Contingency, and of its difference from necessity, is not such as one in merriment once proposed in schools; An chimera calcitrans in vacuo terat calceos: The very names of Contingency and Necessity to ordinary Latinists differ more than Ensis and Gladius, than Vestis and Indumentum, betwixt which perhaps the ancient Latine Artificers or Nomenclators knew some difference. Yet was it impossible for them to know any thing which God knew not, who out of all controversie knowes the true difference betweene Contingency and Necessity, much better then we can doe. For both of them are Entities of his making, and serve as different Lawes to the diversity of his creatures, or their different [Page] actions. All the reasons that can be drawne from the immutability of Gods Decree to the contrary, may with greater facility and strength of the same Decree be retorted than brought against us. For God immutably decrees mutability. Now who will say that things mutable, are in respect of Gods decree or knowledge immutable? The Heavens and other bodies moveable according to locall motion, are truly moveable in themselves, absolutely moveable, not immoveable in respect of Gods decree or knowledge: for he knowes them to bee moveable, because he decreed them so to be; hee doth not know them to be immoveable because he decreed them not to be such, unlesse for a time by interposition of miracle. It implies lesse contradiction, to say, Deus immutabiliter decernit mutabilia, than to say (which hath beene accounted an ancient orthodoxall Maxime,) Stabilis dat cuncta movere. For Mobility is a branch of Mutability.

3 Every thing in respect of Gods decree or knowledge is altogether such as God hath decreed it should be.In what good sense all things may be said necessary in respect of Gods decree. If then God hath decreed there should be contingency, as well as necessity; it is altogether as necessary that some events should be contingent as others necessary: and as truly contingent as the other is necessary in respect of Gods decree.See chap. 22. parag. 2. Albeit to speake properly, the natures of contingency and necessity consist not in meere relation or respect. For in as much as both are immediate and reall effects of Divine Omnipotency; both must have absolute being, the being of neither is meerly relative. Now if Contingency have a true and absolute [Page] being, it is neither constituted in the nature of contingency by any respect or relation to second causes, nor can any respect or relation to the first cause deprive it of that absolute nature, which the Omnipotent efficacy of the cause of causes hath irrevocably bestowed upon it. Briefly, if Contingency be any thing, it is that which it is by the Omnipotent Decree; and being such, it is altogether as impossible that some effects should not be absolutely contingent, as that such effects as the Divine Decree hath appointed to bee necessary, should not be at all. Or if we would make impartiall inquiry into the originall of all things, nothing without the precincts of the most glorious and ever blessed Trinity, is absolutely necessary.

4 By Contingency (lest haply we might be mistaken) we understand the possible meane betweene necessity of being and necessity of not being, or of being such, or of not being such; or betweene necessity of doing, and necessity of not doing, or necessity of being done, or necessity of being left undone. This meane betweene necessity of doing, and necessity of not doing, is that which in agents intellectuall, as in men and Angells wee call freedome of will or choice. Vnto which freedome, necessity is as contradictory, as irrationability is to the nature of man, and contingency as necessarily presupposed as life and sense are to reason. Adde reason to contingency, and we have the compleat definition of Free-will. In those cases wherein the Creator hath exempted man from restraint of necessity, his will is free. The divine will it selfe is [Page] not free in those operations which are essentiall, though most delectable. God the Father is more delighted in the eternall generation of his Sonne: so is God the Father and the Sonne in the eternall procession of the Holy Ghost; than in the creation, production, or preservation of all the creatures. Yet are not these or other internall operations of the blessed Trinity so free in respect of the divine nature, as is the production of the world. Whatsoever God decrees he decrees it freely, that is, so as he might not decree it. Whatsoever he makes he makes it freely, that is, he so makes it, as that it was not necessary for him to make it.

CHAP. 13.
Contingency is absolutely possible, and part of the object of Omnipotency, as formall a part as necessity is.

1 IT is an unquestionable rule in the Art of Arts, that propositions, for their forme not incompatible, may from the necessity of their matter or subject, become equivalent to propositions directly contradictory; whose indispensable law or rule it is, that if the one be true, the other must needs be false, they admit of no meane betwixt them. Now there is no matter or subject in the world, which is so absolutely necessary, as the existence of the Divine Nature, or the internall operations of the Trinity. Whence it is, that betweene [Page] these two propositions [The generation of the Sonne, is necessary, the not generation of the Son is necessary.] there is no possible meane which can be capable of truth. The first is so absolutely necessary, and so necessarily true, that the latter is eternally false. But such is not the case or condition of these two propositions following: [The Creation or Existence of the World is necessary: The not Creation or non existence of the World is necessarie.] These are not contradictories for their form, nor equivalent to contradictories for their matter or subject, and therefore may admit a meane betweene them. To say the creation or existence of the world was absolutely necessary, hath no truth in it: for it had a beginning of existence and being, and may have an end: and the other extreame or contrary [The not creation or non existence of the world is absolutely necessary,] hath lesse appearance of truth in it. It remaines then, that the two contradictorie propositions to these false ones, must be true. The contradictory to the former is this: [The creation or existence of the world is not absolutely necessarie.] The contradictory to the latter is this▪ [The not creation or non existence of the World is not absolutely necessary.] Now seeing the world is created, and yet it was not necessary that it should be created: both these propositions following (seeing either of them is a true meane betweene the two former extreames or false ones,) are most true: [1 The creation of the world was possible, 2 The not creation of the world was possible.] And if as well the not creation, as the creation of [Page] the world, was possible; wee may not deny that God did freely create it: seeing freedome properly taken, includes or is a possibility of doing or not doing. It was likewise free for the Almighty, to create or not to create Man or Angell. But his free purpose to create them after his owne Image being supposed: it was not meerly possible, but altogether necessary that they should bee created good. In as much as he is goodnesse it selfe, it is not possible that evill should bee created by him, that he should be the Author of it. As is his being, so is his goodnesse, perpetually absolute, eternally necessary. But though Men and Angels were necessarily created good, yet their goodnesse in the beginning was mutable, not perpetually necessarie. The question is, whether continuance in that goodnesse, wherein God created them, were truly possible in respect of Gods decree, unto such as have not so continued, or their non continuance necessary: Or whether, neither their continuance or non continuance were necessary, or both alike possible. To say that Adams continuance in goodnesse was, in respect of Gods decree, necessary, is [...]vidently convinced of falshood by his fall. So that the other part onely remaines questionable, whether Adams non continuance in the state of goodnesse, were so absolutely decreed by God, that it was not possible for him to continue. For resolution of this point, we are to inquire, First, whether in respect of Gods power it were possible. Secondly, whether in respect of his goodnesse it were necessary or most congruent, to ordaine or [Page] decree neither a necessitie of continuance, nor a necessitie of non continuance in goodnesse; but the meane betweene them, that is, an absolute possibilitie of continuance, and an absolute possibilitie of non continuance. That it was possible to decree such a mutuall possibilitie, may thus be proved.

2. Whatsoever implies no contradiction, is absolutely possible, and fals within the object of omnipotencie. But this mixt possibilitie of continuing or not continuing, being a meane betwixt the necessitie of Adams continuance, and the necessitie of not continuance in the state of integritie, implies no contradiction: Ergo, it was possible for God to decree it. That it implies no contradiction in respect of the forme, is a point so cleare from the first principles of argumentation▪ that hee which vnderstands not this, is neither fit to dispute, nor to be disputed with. But the same forme (notwithstanding) of contrarietie applied to the divine nature, the persons in Trinitie, or their internall operations, admits no meane. What is the reason? The nature and attributes of the Deitie are absolutely necessary and precedent to all divine decrees or effects of Gods power. And it implies a contradiction, that any thing which is absolutely necessarie, should admit any mixture of contingency, or of possibilitie of the contrary. But the nature, state, condition, or existence of man, are not proper obiects of the divine decree, yet proper effects of his power, and being such, they are not absolutely necessary; and not being necessary [Page] in themselves, they cannot incomber or involve propositions, for their forme, not necessarie with absolute necessitie. Whatsoever had a true possibilitie of beeing before it was, may bee actually such as it was absolutely possible for it to be, or such as it might please the Almightie Creator (who is free in all his actions ad extra) to make it. It was possible for him to make mans goodnesse or his continuance in it, not to be necessary, but contingent. He that made man of nothing, had nothing to resist or hinder him from squaring or framing his nature, to that abstract forme of truth which was in its selfe, or (as we say) objectively possible. For absolute Omnipotencie includes an abilitie to ingrosse or fill meere logicall possibilities, with true and Physicall substances or qualities, as truely answerable unto them, as naturall bodies are to bodies mathematicall. But concerning Gods power to decree an absolute contingencie in the state, Condition, or Actions of men, there can bee no question amongst such as grant his Omnipotencie to be out of question. What could necessitate his will to lay a necessitie of sinning upon Adam, whose fall or first sinne, if it were necessary in respect of Gods decree, the necessitie must needs proceed from Gods Omnipotent decree, without which nothing can haue any reall possibilitie or true title of beeing, much lesse a necessitie of beeing. For Divine Omnipotencie is the first and sole Foundation of all Beeing, otherwise then by it; and from it nothing can come to passe either necessarily or contingently.

[Page] 3. Whatsoeuer is and hath not beene, must of necessitie have some cause of now beeing. And as is the event or effect, such must the causalty bee. If the one be necessarie or inevitable, it is impossible the other should bee contingent or meerely possible. Both, or neither, must bee necessarie. Man we suppose did once stand upright, his first sinne or fall, That action what soever it were, which brought him downe, the evils which thence ensued, are not meere nothing: Evill it selfe got some kinde of beeing by his negligence, which from the beginning it had not. Of all, or any of these, the question still revolves, whether they were necessary or not necessarie, but Contingent. If Contingent, we have no more to say, but Gods peace be on them, which so speake and thinke: If any reply, that they were necessarie, he must assigne a necessary cause of their beeing. For without some cause they could not be, and without a necessitating cause, there was no necessitie that they should bee. Was this supposed necessitie then from man or from God? from any second cause, or from the first cause of all things? if from man onely or from other second causes; then were they necessary not in respect of the first cause, but in respect of the second: that is, some second cause did make them necessarie, when as the first cause had left them free, or meerely possible; which to affirme is contrary to their positions, with whom we dispute, and in it selfe unconceiveable. For who can make that necessarie, which God hath made contingent or subject to change? What can [Page] be said then? that God did make mans fall, his first sinne or appetite of the forbidden fruite, to bee necessarie, or necessitate his will in his sinister choyces? This were all one, as to say, that God were the immediate and necessarie cause of sinne, of death, of all the evills that have befallen mankinde since Adam. For he is the sole immediate and necessarie cause of all things which hee so decrees as they cannot possibly fall out otherwise. For him to erre in decreeing, or for the execution of his decree to bee defeated, is impossible. In respect of his proper and adaequate object, and peremptorily intended effect, his will is a more irresistible, more powerfully necessitating cause, than any other cause whatsoever. Now if Gods will had beene, to leave no possibility for Adams perserverance, his fall had beene the compleat object of Gods decree concerning our first estate, and by consequence Gods decree, or will had beene the first cause of sinnes first entrance into the world.

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CHAP. 14.
The former conclusion proved by the consent of all the Ancients, whether Christians or Heathens which did dislike the errour of the Stoikes.

THE incommodious or inconsiderate speeches, which some of better note and antiquitie, have let fall, were (as I perswade my selfe) but symptomes of their provoked zeale, or eager desire to salve those grosse absurdities, which they had rightly espied in others. But it is alwaies more easie to expugne an errour or salve a particular inconvenience, then to provide, that no more shall follow upon the cure or medicine. Had those famous lamps of Gods Church, by whose light many grosse opinions have beene discried and reformed, seene the inconveniences, which follow upon their owne positions, as clearely, as many of their friends since have done: it would bee a foule slander in us to suspect, that they would not wil-willingly have altered their dialect, or taken advise for expressing their good meaning in tearmes more safe, more proper, and scholastique. If otherwise we abstract their speeches from that respect and reverence, which we owe unto their memorie, or that good opinion which best men have had of their sinceritie: I cannot see wherein the necescesarie consequences of their opinions, as they are usually expressed, comes short of the Manichees [Page] errors, or wherein they differ at all from the Stoicks. The Manichees held all evill, and mischiefe in the world to fall out by inevitable necessity: but this necessitie they derived from an evill Author, from a prime cause or Creator of evill onely, not of any thing that was good. And better it is (for it is more consonant to our Saviours advise) to acknowledge the tree for evill, where the fruite is evill, then to justifie it for good, when the fruite is apparently and of necessitie naught. The pertinacie or stiffenesse in this common error, [Evils and mischiefe, or wicked actions fall out by necessitie] being presupposed aequall; they adde lesse sinne or errour to it, which hence acknowledge a prime cause of evill, or a cause evill by fatall necessitie; then those which hold evill to be necessary in respect of his Omnipotent decree, who is infinitely good. In fine, the Manichees were grosse haeretiques in holding evill and mischiefe to fall out by inevitable necessitie; but this heresie once admitted, it was rather a consonancy of error, then any addition of new heresie, to admit two prime causes or Creators, the one of good, the other of evill. They durst not slander goodnesse with any crime, or for being the Author of any thing that was not good: nor were they disposed to flatter greatnesse, as if evill were no evill, because it proceeded from it.

2. That which the Ancients reprooved in the Stoicks opinion, as most injurious to God and all good men, was, that they held all things (and evill things amongst the rest) to fall out by fate or [Page] unavoydable necessitie. This foundation being once laied, the rootes of vertue must utterly perish, and that which we call vice should bee a meere name, or matter of nothing: there is no place left for just reward or punishment. Whether by fate the Stoicks meant the influence of starres, the course of nature, or the decree of GOD (who to them was all one with Nature;) all was one in respect of the former inconveniences, which necessarily followed from admission of an inevitable necessitie in humane actions, whence soever that be derived. To say, it comes from the first cause, or from the second, is meerly accidentall to the error or inconvenience so sharply & justly reproved by the primitive Church. In respect of a Tradesmans commoditie, it is all one, whether he be prohibited for setting up or trafiquing, by the companie of his own profession, or by some higher powers, so the prohibition or restraint be as large & peremptorie, without hope of release: or if he bee restrained upon his allegiance by the Prince or privy counsell, his hopes of thriving will be much lesse, then if he were tied onely by the locall statutes of some pettie Corporation. Thus if the Stoick derived the necessitie of all things from the revolution of the Heavens, or from other second causes, as their supposed guides: the impossibilitie of doing otherwise then we doe, was, in every Christians conceipt, evidently much lesse, then if we derive this necessitie from the Omnipotent decree. Now the danger or incenvenience of their opinion, did formally consist, in nursing a conceipt [Page] in men, that it was impossible for them to doe otherwise then they doe, or to avoyd the evills and mischiefes into which they fall. And these dangers or inconveniences, are so much greater in Christians then they were in the Stoicks; as the God which wee acknowledge is more Omnipotent, then nature or the Stoicks god. For the more Omnipotent he is, the more impossible is it for any creature to avoid the necessitie which by his decree is layed upon him.

3. In respect of the former inconveniences, or of the opinion it selfe, it is meerely accidentall, whether this necessity bee layed upon us by coaction, or willingly and cheerefully entertained by us; whether it proceed from Gods power or impulsion, or from his wisdome: so our actions and their issues, bee, in respect of his Omnipotent power or will, alike unavoidable. If birds and fishes could speake, I suppose the one would as much complaine of those that in hard frost or snow, allure them with baites to come within the fall of the trappe, as the other would doe of Fishers for driving them violently into their nets. If the birds once taken be used as hardly; their expostulations would be so much more just, as their usage before their taking, was more kinde. To make a man willing to undoe himselfe, upon faire promises made, not with purpose to doe him good, but to circumvent him; is greater cruelty then can accompany open violence. Hee that wittingly ministers poyson instead of Physick, is in all mens judgement, as true a Murderer, as hee that [Page] kils with the sword, albeit the partie to whom it is ministred, having no reason to suspect any danger, doe willingly drinke it. And the lesse suspitious or more charitably affected hee is to his professed Physitian, the greater wrong he hath in being thus uncharitably dealt with. It would little boote the malefactor in this kinde, to plead; Albeit I gave it him, hee might have chosen whether he would have drunke it, because I did not inforce him with a drawen Dagger or other weapon to be his owne executioner. In many cases, one may be the true cause of anothers death, and deserve death himselfe, although he be not any necessarie cause of his death, or plot his destruction without possibilitie of avoidance. But if our willing choyse of those waies which lead to death, be necessarie in respect of the Almighties decree, so that there be no possibilitie left, to escape it; hee is a more necessarie and more immediate cause of all their deaths that thus perish, then any man can be of his death whom he poisons. And if the case stood thus with any, their miserie were greater, by how much they did lesse suspect his goodnesse: However, most miserable, because most desperate. Reason and knowledge (the two ornaments of the humane nature) should be to them a curse. He that neither knowes nor doth his Masters will, shall be beaten; because it was possible for him to have known it: but wth fewer stripes, because not knowing it, there was no possibility left for him to doe it. But he that knowes it, and doth it not, shall be beaten with many stripes, because the knowledge of his [Page] will to punish sinners, and reward the righteous, did include a possibilitie to avoyd death, and to be made partaker of life. If otherwise, there bee no possibilitie left for him, that knowes Gods displeasure against sinne, to avoid the wayes of sinne (those are death;) his case before and after death, is much more miserable than his, whom God in just judgement, hath deprived of knowledge. And the Praeserver of men should be accounted much more favourable to stocks and truncks, than unto many men upon whom hee besto [...]es his best gifts in great plentie; if these be bestowed upon the Conditions now mentioned, or be charged with remedilesse miserie.

4 But admitting their miserie to be fatall and inevitable by divine decree; is it not possible to acquit this decree, or the Author of it from being the Author of evill? did the Stoick condemne all Iudges of injustice that sentenced malefactors unto violent death, whereto by their opinion, all that suffered it, were inevitably destinated? Perhaps the feare of censure in publique Courts, did make them silent in this point: But was not this care to keepe themselves harmelesse, or feare not to offend Magistrates, altogether fatall? Galen ( [...] my remembrance) in his Stoicall discourse, quòd mores animi sequuntur temperamentum corporis, hath framed this answer to the question proposed: We doe not offend in killing Snakes or Toades or other like venemous creatures; albeit their naturall temper or disposition be unaltrably harmefull unto men. And if nature or temper of bodie make [Page] some of our owne stamp and ranke more noysome than these creatures are, unto their neighbours; to fit the one sort with the same measure of punishment, which is due unto the other, is no injustice, no inequality. AndIn Dialogistam. Lipsius, a man not too much abhorrent from any opiniō, that was fashionable to his new stile, or might serve to set forth the point, which for the present he much affected; gives this briefe placet, in favour of the Stoicks opinion: (Fatali culpae fatalis paena,) punishment is fatall to fatall crimes. But this is principium petere, to take that for granted which is questioned. For, if the harmes which malefactors do and suffer, be truly fatall; the one is no true crime, the other is no just punishment. To Galen I answer, that if we could by any skill in physick or complexions discerne some men to bee as naturally disposed to mischiefe all that come in their way, or by chance offend them; as are the Snake, the Sloworm, or other serpent, it would be the wisest way for such as love their lives, to rid the world of these fatally mischievous reasonable creatures, as fast as they met with them▪ or to appoint some certaine daies for hunting them, as wee do noysome beasts. But to examine their suspitious intentions, to question their actions, to arraign their persons, or put them upon a formall or legall tryall of their life, would be as ridiculous, as to produce witnesses against a Snake, to empannell a Iury upon a mad Dog, or to take bale for a Wolfes appearance, before a Butcher, in an assembly of Mastives.

5 The common notions of good and evill, & the ingraffed opinion of contingency in humane actions, [Page] have taught the Lawgivers of every nation, to put notorious malefactors unto more exquisite tortures, than we do harmfull creatures; either to enforce them to utter, what no destiny nor complexion makes them voluntarily confesse, or else to deterre others (that are as naturally disposed to evill, as they were) from doing the like. Scarce any malefactor (unless he be poysoned with this opinion of absolute necessity) but will acknowledge that it was possible for him to have done otherwise thē he hath done; possible for him to have avoided the doome, which is passed upon him by man: which to have avoided had been absolutely impossible, if it were to be awarded upon him by Gods eternall decree, or (which is all one) if in respect of this decree, it had been necessary. As ignorance of the true God, and his saving truth, makes the former error more excusable in the Stoicks, than in such Christians as shal maintain it: so might impotency exempt that God which the Stoicks worshipped, (whether Nature, Fate, or some other distinct celestiall power) from those imputatiōs, unto which omnipotency makes the God of Christians lyable, if all things were by vertue of his decree absolutely necessary. It was a received opinion among many Heathens, that the gods themselves were subject unto Fate, & for this reason, when any thing fell out in their judgement amiss; Fates commonly did either intirely bear the blame, or the greatest part of it. And their gods (indeed) had deserved pity rather than blame, if they could do no better than they did, as being overmastered by Fates. But for a Christian to inveigh against [Page] Fates, is to accuse or deny his God. If Fates be nothing, hee hath no reason to complaine of them: if any thing they bee, they are of the true Gods making, who made all things, who cannot possibly be subject to any thing that he hath made. Nor can it stand with our allegiance to say when any disasters befall us, that our God could no otherwise choose, that our mischances were the absolutely necessary effects of his Omnipotent decree. One speciall cause of this error, and of some mens adherence to it, is a jealousie or zealous needlesse feare, lest they should grant God to be impotent, or not so omnipotent but that some things might take possession of beeing without his leave or notice. The originall of this feare, is, want of distinction, betweene chance or casualty, and such contingency as hath beene expressed.

6 Many reasons might be alledged sufficient to demonstrate the inevitable absurdities of this supposed absolute necessity. But it is one labour to convince an error before indifferent hearers; another to make men forsake the errours which have long possessed them: a third to win them unto a liking of the contrary truth. For effecting the two latter, no meanes can be so effectuall in respect of their disposition with whom we have to deale, as a plaine declaration, how ill this opinion of absolute necessity, how well this doctrine of mixt possibility or contingency consorts: first with their owne resolution of other difficulties in this very argument whereof wee treate: secondly, with the perpetuall voice of Gods Spirit, and his Messengers, [Page] specially when they seeke ex professo, to perswade to good, and to disswade from evill.

CHAP. 15.
The principall conclusions, which are held by the favourers of absolute necessity, may be more clearly justified, and acquitted from all inconveniences, by admitting a mixt possibility or contingency in humane actions.

1 THe most I have met withall, are afraid in plaine termes to maintaine; That God did as immediately and as necessarily decree Adams fall or state of sinne, as his originall justice or state of integrity. For this were to make him as true, as proper, and necessary a cause of sinne, and of all evill, as he is of goodnesse. To allay the harshnesse of some speeches, heretofore used, by those men whom they favour, they will grant no more then this: that God did decree to permit his fall. But the speech is improper and very ambiguous▪ and in what sense soever it may be taken, it must plead its warrant or right use, from our opinion; theirs can afford it none. Permission, to speake properly, is a vertuall part of the Decree it selfe; not the object whereto the decree is terminated. But to let this passe; we will take [Gods decree to per [...]it] to be all one, as if they had said Gods permissive decree. Did God then by his decree, permit Adam to sinne? if [Page] he did, this decree was either just or unjust. Whatsoever is by just decree permitted, is by the same decree sufficiently warranted. At least the punishment, otherwise due unto it, is dispensed with. Such divorces as were unlawfull from the first institution of Matrimony in Paradise, were permitted to the Israelites for the hardnesse of their hearts by Moses, and for this reason, they were not punished by the judiciall Law. If it should please our Soveraigne to permit sickly Students to eate flesh in Lent, we would take his professed permission, for a sufficient dispensation with the penall Statutes in this case provided. God questionlesse would never have punished Adam for eating an Apple, if by his eternall decrece he hadQuàm lon [...]è quaeso est à jubente [...]ermittens? Qui en [...]m, [...] nos ista [...]mala) perferre, et prohibere potest ne perferamus, probat abs (que) [...] [...]ebe [...] [...]ferre, & quaecunq [...] pati [...]ur. sustin [...]e Salvi [...]n. lib. 8. in initio pa. 260. permitted him to have eaten it. But their meaning haply is not, that God did allow or approve his eating of it, seeing he threatned it with death. But if, by his decree, he did not allow it, he did permit it onely in such a sense, as we may say the Lawes of our land, permit men to be hanged because they keepe not men close prisoners, nor so tye their hands that they cannot steale, rob or kill, before they bee suspected or convicted of felonie, robbery, or murder. But▪ no tyrant did ever before hand forbid such a fact, under paine of death, without a supposed naturall possibility to avoid it. And just Lawes afford ordinary or civill meanes for satisfying nature in necessities, lest these (as they know no l [...]w) enforce men to use their naturall possibilities or faculties amisse. The lawes of this Land and others, which make theft matter of death, permit men the free [Page] imployment of bodily faculties, to earne their bread, or (if they be impotent) to crave or accept the benevolence of others, lest they should perish for hunger, or be enforced to steale. If our lawes or Lawgivers, not permitting any of these meanes or the like, should punish the taking of a loafe of bread or cup of drinke, with death; they might be more truly said to enjoyne, then permit theft; to be more delighted with the bloud of the needy, than with preservation of publike peace; albeit they did not set other mens meat before thē, when they are hungred, nor lead their hands to take it. In like manner, he that saith, God did permit Adam to eate the forbidden fruit, and by eating to incurre death, doth necessarily imply, that God permitted him the free use of his externall and internall faculties to satisfie his appetite, with some other meate. Now the free use of any faculty includes the concourse or cooperation of God, without which it is impossible any creature should move. And this concourse was a part of his decree or will as it concerned this act. More plainly: He that permitted Adam to sinne, did more than permit him to abstaine from sinne, or to persevere in obedience. If then God in permitting him onely to sinne, did afford meanes necessary for reducing this possibility of sinning into a sinfull act not allowed; his more than permission of him to abstaine from sinne, his commandement to persevere in obedience, did not onely suppose a true possibility for him to abstaine and persevere, but include withall better meanes for reducing this possibility into act, [Page] then were afforded for enabling him actually to sinne. These two contrary possibilities, and the severall meanes for accomplishing them, must beare a proportion answerable to a meere permission without approbation, or to a prohibition, and to a peremptorie command of civill authoritie. Now every just Lawgiver affords better meanes and incouragement for accomplishing his commands or requests, then he doth for breaking or neglecting them.

2▪ For conclusion, when they say God, by his aeternall deree, did permit Adams fall, their meaning rightly expressed, is no more then this; God did not decree that his perseverance should bee necessarie. For necessitie of perseverance excludes all possibility of falling. But if his fall had beene necessarie in respect of the aeternall decree, it had not onely beene permitted, but allowed and required. It remaines then that both were possible, neither necessary in respect of the divine decree. Or to untwist the knot a little further; God by his decree did permit and allow him a possibility to fall; but he did not allow the reduction of this possibility into act, that is, he gave it him, not to the end that he should fal, but that his perseverance might be more beneficiall. He did not onely permit or allow him a possibitie of perseverance, but did command and require the reduction of this possibilitie into act.

3 This forme of wholsome doctrine admitted, will clearely enlighten the truth of another distinction or resolution much used, but mightily obscured, [Page] or rather quite stifeled, by such as hold all things necessary in respect of the aeternall decree. The distinction is: God is the cause of every action, but he is not the cause of the obliquitie which accompanies sinfull actions, nor of sinne as it is sinne. This is their last Apologie for avoyding that imputation of making God the author of sinne. Herein wee both agree; The coexistence of the all-working decree (or divine cooperation) is necessarily required to every action or effect. Every action includes a motion, and in him wee move, wee live, and have our beeing. But hee that will grant this cooperation or actuall coexistence of the all-working decree to be the necessarie cause of every action, unto which it is most necessarily required; must, upon the same tearmes, grant, God to bee not the necessarie onely, but the onely cause of all and every obliquitie, of all and every sinne, of all that hath beene, is, or can be blame-worthy in men or devills, from their creation to euerlasting. The demonstration of this inconvenience or absurdity, wherewith we charge the adverse opinion (but no maintainer of it) must be referred unto the discussions of the state of Innocency and the manner of sinnes entring into the world: we are now engaged to extract a better meaning out of their other words, than they themselves expresse, or can truely be contained in them, untill they abandon the opinion of absolute necessity in humane actions, as they have reference to the aeternall decree.

Seeing it is agreed vpon, that God and man are [Page] joynt agents in every sinfull action, or in effects essentially evill (such questionlesse was mans desire to be like God, or his lusting after the forbiden fruite:) The Probleme remaines, why both should not be aequall sharers in the sinne: or how it is possible justly to condemne men of iniquitie, without some imputation unto God, who is the principall agent in all actions. Shall wee bee partiall for him or seeke to excuse him by his greatnesse? Shall wee say hee cannot doe amisse, because he is supreame Lord over all, and may doe with his creatures what hee list? To such as count the donative of robbers a true boone or reall curtesie; to such as can magnifie their owne integrity, whereof they give no proofe, save onely as he did by negatives, (non hominem occidi,) I am no murtherer. The Poet hath shaped an answere, as fit as pertinent, (non pasces in cruce corvos,) Thou shalt not feede Ravens upon a Gibbet. To say God is the Author of sinne were hideous blasphemie: yet to say he is no tempter, no seducer of mankind to evill, is not to offer praise unto him. Let my spirit vanish with my breath, and my immortall soule returne to nothing, rather then suffer her selfe to be overtaken with such a dead slumber, as can rest contented to set forth His Glory by bare negatives, or by not being the Author of sinne, who is most highly to be praised in all his works, whose goodnesse is infinitely greater in concurring to sinfull actions, then the goodnesse of his best creatures in the accomplishment of their most syncere intentions.

[Page] 4 The truth of this conclusion is necessarily grounded upon these assertions hereafter to bee discussed: That mans possibilitie or hopes of attaining everlasting happinesse, was of necessitie to bee tempered with a possibilitie of sinning, or falling into miserie. To permit or allow man this possibility of sinning, & to bestow upon him the contrary possibility of not sinning and hope of happines was one & the same branch of divine goodnesse. One & the selfe same branch of Gods goodnesse it was, to allow this possibilitie of sinning, and to afford his concourse for reducing of it into Act. For unlesse he had decreed to afford his concourse thereto, it had beene impossible for man actually to have sinned. And if for man to sinne had beene made impossible by Gods decree: it had been alike impossible for him to have done well or ill, or to become truly happy. Briefly, God in that hee decreed a mixture of contrary possibilities, decreed withall a concourse or cooperation sutable unto, and sufficient for the actuall accomplishment of both. To the probleme propounded, the answere from these grounds, is easie: Albeit God and man bee joynt agents in every action or effect essentially evill, yet the whole sinne is wholy mans: because the nature of sinne consists either in mans using the possibility of sinne allowed of God for his good, to accomplish such acts, as God disallowes, or in not using the contrary possibilitie unto such acts, as he not onely alloweth and approveth, but requireth and commandeth, such as he most bountifully rewardeth, and unto whose accomplishment, [Page] hee affordeth, not his ordinarie concourse onely, but his speciall furtherance and assistance. In every sin of commission, we approve and make choice of those acts which his infinite goodnesse disalloweth. In every sinne of omission, we do not approve those acts, which he approveth: although perhaps it may be questioned, whether there can be any sinne of pure omission, or not mixt with commission; that is, any sinne wherein we doe not either like what God dislikes, or reject and contemne what he likes & cōmends unto us for good.

5 From these resolutions we may finde some truth in an usuall position; which, without this truth presupposed, is palpably false. Every action or effect, as it is an effect or action, or as it proceeds from God, is good. The best meaning whereof it is capable, must be this; Gods goodnesse is seene in every action, even in those which are most sinfull. To vouchsafe his cooperation to them, is a branch of his goodnesse, because man could not be happy without a possibility of deserving to be miserable. But humane actions or effects in their owne nature, indefinitely considered, or in the abstract as they are actions, are neither morally good, nor morally bad. When it is said that every action, as an action, is good, this must be understood of transcendentall goodnes only, of wch kind of goodnes moral evill or sin it selfe is partaker. If every action, as it is an actiō were morally good, it were impossible any action shold be morally evill. If we consider humane actions not indefinitely, or with this reduplication, as they are actions, but descending unto particulars, [Page] some are good, some are bad, and some (perhaps) positively indifferent, but of this hereafter.

CHAP. 16.
The former contingency in humane actions or mutuall possibility of obtaining reward or incurring punishment, proved by the infallible rule of faith, & by the tenour of Gods covenant with his people.

1 THough manifest deductiōs of ill sounding Consequences from their positiōs, which we refute, and more commodious explanations of other tenents common to both, may somewhat move the Favourers of universall necessity to a dislike of their owne opinions, & in part incline them to the opposit truth: yet is it positive proofe of Scriptures that must strike the maine stroak, & fasten their assents unto it. And God forbid they should bee so uncharitable, as to think, that we or any sonnes of the true Church, would be unwilling to put our selves upon this tryall. Scripture wee grant (and are ready upon as high and hard termes as they, to maintaine,) is the onely infallible rule of rectitude or obliquitie in opinions concerning God, or mans salvation. Yet are we not hereby bound to reject reason, and infallible rule of Art, as incompetent Iudges, what propositions in Scripture are equipollent, which opposite, which subordinate: or what collections from undoubted sacred Maximes, are necessary or probable, or what conclusions are [Page] altogether false and sophisticall. Nor ought they to suspect reason in others to bee unsanctified; because it is accompanied with rules of prophane sciences. For even these are the gifts of God, and are sanctified in every Christian, by the rule of faith. And in as much as both of us admit Scripture to be the onely rule of faith in it selfe most infallible: both of us are tyed by infallible consequents of truth from this rule derived, to admit of this Maxime following;Vid. Suffrag. Britannorum in Concil. Dordr. thesi 3. de Antecedaneis ad Conversionem. Vide etiam D. Wardum Concione de Gratia discriminante pag. 5, 6, 7. editionis 2. Gods threats and promises, his exhortations, admonitions, or protestations, whether immediately made by himselfe or by his Prophets, containe in them greater truth and syncerity then is in our admonitions, exhortations, and promises. His truth and syncerity in all his wayes are the rule or patterne, which we are to imitate, but which wee cannot hope to equalize.

2 Put the case then a religious, wise, and gracious Prince, should exhort a young gentleman (that in rigour of Law had deserved death for some aemulous quarrell in the Court) to behave himselfe better hereafter, and he should be sure to find greater favour at his hands than any of his adversaries: no man would suspect any determination in the Prince, to take away his life for this offence, or any purpose to intrap him in some other. A minister of publique iustice in our memory told a Butcher, (whom he then sentenced to death for manslaughter,) that he might kill Calves, Oxen and Sheepe, but mankinde was no butchery ware; hee might not kill his honest neighbours. The solecisme was so uncouth, and so ill beseeming the seat of gravity [Page] and of justice, that it moved laughter (though in a case to be lamented) throughout the assembly; and a young Student standing neare the barre, advised the poore condemned man to entreat a Licence to kill Calves and Sheepe that Lent. The wisest of men may sometimes erre, sometimes place good words amisse, or give wholsome counsell (such as this was, had it beene uttered in due time and place) out of season. But to spend good words of comfort and encouragement, upon such as thou hast certainly appointed to dye; to floute the children of destruction with faire promises of preeminence;Gen. 18. 15▪ That be farre from thee O Lord. Shall not the Iudge of all the earth doe that which is right and just: a thing welbeseeming the best and wisest Princes of the earth to imitate? Was then the sentence of condenmation for Cains exile or utter destruction without possibility of revocation, when thou entreatedst him as a most loving Father;Gen. 4▪ 6, 7, 8. Why art thou worth? and why is thy countenance fallen? If thou doe well, shalt not thou bee accepted? and if thou doest not well, sinne lyeth at the doore: and unto thee shall be his desire, and thou shalt rule over him? Did that, which the Text saith, afterward came to passe, come to passe by inevitable necessity? And Cain talked with Abel his brother: and it came to passe when they were in the field, that Cain rose up against Abel his brother and slue him. My adversaries (for I am not theirs) must be entreated to pardon me, if I be as resolute and peremptory for my opinion hitherto delivered, as they are for any other. For reason and conscience ruled by Scripture perswades [Page] me, it is possible for the Iudge of quick & dead to be unjust in his sentences, or unsyncere in his incouragement, as that Cains destruction should be in respect of his decree, altogether necessarie or impossible to have beene avoyded. When the Lord tooke first notice of his aemulation and envie at his yonger brother; God would not banish him from his brothers presence, nor so tie his hands that he could not strike: But he used all the meanes that aequitie (in like case) requires to move his heart, that way which it was very possible for it to bee moved. And unto this motion Cain had both Gods assistance and incouragement, as readie as his generall conc [...]urse to conceave anger in his heart, or to lift up his hand against his brother.

3 The very tenor of Gods grand covenant with the sonnes of Abraham includes this twofold possibilitie, one of attaining his extraordinary gracious favour by doing well, another of incurring miserable calamities by doing ill. If yee walke in my statutes, and keepe my commandements, and doe them; then will I give you raine in due season, and the land shall yeeld her increase, and the trees of the field shall yeeld their fruit. And your threshing shall reach to the vintage, and the vintage shall reach unto the sowing time: and yee shall eate your bread to the full, and dwell in your land safely &c. I am the Lord your God, which brought you forth out of the Land of Aegypt, that yee should not bee their bondmen, and I have broken the bands of your yoke, and made you goe upright. Levit. 26. ver. 3. ad 14. But [Page] if yee will not hearken unto mee, and will not doe all these commandements; And if yee shall despise my statutes, or if your soule abhorre my judgements, so that ye will not doe all my commandements, but that ye breake my covenant: I also will doe this unto you, I will even appoint over you terrour, consumption and the burning ague, &c. Levit. 26. ver. 14, 15, 16, &c.

This tenor or condition was to continue one and the same throughout all generations. But some generations, as the event hath proved, were de facto partakers of the blessings promised; others have had their portion in the curses. Shall wee hence inferre, that prosperitie, was in respect of GODS decree or good pleasure altogether necessarie unto such as prospered, not so much as possible unto those that perished, or that their calamity was absolutely necessary? I would say rather, & I have Gods word, yea his heartie wishes, for my warrant, that the most prosperous times, which any of Abrahams or Davids posteritie enjoyed, did come farre short of that measure of prosperitie, which by Gods aeternall decree, was possible to all, even to the whole stocke of Iacob throughout all their generations. O that my people had hearkned unto me: and Israel had walked in my wayes! I should soone have subdued their enemies, and turned my hand against their adversaries. The haters of the Lord should have submitted themselves unto him: but their time should have endured for ever. Psal. 81. verse 13, 14, 15. But in what estate? fed with the finest of the wheate, and satified [Page]with hony out of the Rocke. verse 16. Were these meere wishes of winde which vanished with the avouchers breath? did the Pslmist utter them out of tender affection to his people and country, without commission from his Maker? or was He lesse affected towards his people then this his messenger, that his message wants the waight of everlasting truth? To these and the like demands, of many bad answers, this is the best and most common: God would undoubtedly have made his promise good, and done aswell by Israell as here hee wisheth, if Israell could have turned to him or done what he requires. But that, say the same men, was in repect of Gods decree or secret will, impossible. Whēce, seeing the condition neither was nor could be performed by Israel, God was not bound to bestow these blessings upon them, but free to reserve his store unto himselfe, or for some other people; which was profered (but upon conditions impossible to bee performed) unto Israell. Might not churlish Naball have promised abundance of bread, of wine and flesh to Davids servants, upon like tearmes? May not cutthroate Vsurers assure bags of Gold to bedridden or decrepit limbs, upon condition they will fetch them from the toppe of high towers or sleep mountains? But what kindnesse, what synceritie could there be in such lavish profers, specially if the impotent wretches were by covenant excluded from al use of crutches? Yet is it more possible for a creeple to goe without his crutches, then for Israell to walke in the waies of God, without his aide or assistance. Necessitie [Page] therefore constraines us to confesse the one of these two, Either that there was no more synceritie in the Almighties protestations, then in Nabals or the Vsurers supposed bountie, which they never meant to use, but upon performance of impossibilities: Or else his promises, if they had any syncerity in them, did include his furtherance and assistance unto Israell for performing the condition required. Now unto whatsoever effect or event the furtherance or speciall assistance of Omnipotent power is, upon the truth and synceritie of divine promise, alwaies ready and assured, the same effect cannot truly be deemed impossible in respect of the aeternall decree. And whatsoever is not in respect of this decree impossible, the non existence of it, or the existence of the contrary effect, cannot, in respect of the same decree, be necessarie. So then neither was Israels well-doing and prosperitie, nor their ill-doing and calamitie at any time absolutely necessarie, in respect of Gods decree; both were possible, both contingent.

4 The truth of these collections from Gods word (or rather of these infallible consequences of his essentiall goodnesse, sincerity and truth) though necessarie and evident unto Artists, may from other positive authorities of the same word be ratified à fortior to common sense. If Neither these good things which God sincerely purposeth and expressely promiseth, nor that evill which he seriously and expressely threatens, bee necessary in respect of his decree: much lesse can that good which is neither particularly promised or avouched; [Page] or that evil which is not expressely threatned or foretold by his infallible messengers, be held necessary in respect of his decree. Now, that the prosperity which he expresly promiseth by such messengers, is not so necessary, as to exclude all possibilitie of cōtrary Evill; nor the evill which he solemnly denounceth so necessarie, as not to leave a true possibilitie for a contrary blessing: his Prophet hath given such a generall and evident assurance, not to Israell onely out to all the Nations of the earth; as we cānot deny, but that it was devised of purpose, by the Lord himselfe, as a post statute to prevent this strange misconstruction, which his people had then made, & which he then foresaw would afterwards be enforced upon his decrees or lawes, by this praejud [...]cate opinion of absolute necessitie. At what instant I shall speake concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdome, to pluck up and to pull downe, and to destroy it; if that nation against whom I have pronounced, turne from their evill, I will repent of the evill that I thought to doe unto them. And at what instant I shall speake concerning a nation, and concerning a kingdome to build and to plant it; If it doe evill in my sight, that it obey not my voyce, then I will repent of the good wherewith I said I would benefite them. Ier. 18. ver. 7, 8, 9, 10. And, if wee may gesse at the nature of the disease, by the medicine, and the manner of applying it; the house of Israell, was at this time almost desperately sicke of this errour which we refute. Or what need we frame conjectures from the qualitie of the medicine, when as the working of it hath made the Crisis [Page] palpable and apparent. The pestilence is best knowne by the botch, or outbursting. What then was the issue of that Cordiall which the Prophet ministred unto them, being but the extraction of the former generalls? Thus saith the Lord; Behold, I frame evill against you, and devise a device against you; returne yee now every one from his evill way, and make your wayes and your doings good. We have seene the application of the medicine, what was the operation? And they said, there is no hope, but wee will walke after our owne devises, and wee will every one doe the imagination of his evill heart. Ier. 18. ver. 11, 12. But did the Prophet take their answere verbatim, as they uttered it? No, God did not appoint him to keepe a Register of their words, but to make a comment upon the secret language of their hearts. They are sufficiently convicted to have said, wee will every one doe the imagination of his evill heart, in that the imaginations of their heart were evill, and they had resolved to retaine their wonted principles, and not to hearken unto the Prophets doctrine. The true and literall paraphrase of their replye, no interpreter extant hath so fully expressed, as the usuall language of some in our times briefly doth; What shall bee, will be: there is no hope the world will amend: if it bee Gods will to prosper the courses which are taken, all will be well: if not, his will however must be done. Thus we delude and put off our Maker with Ifs, and Ands: when as his will revealed, aswell for private as publike good, so wee would addresse our selves to doe it, is plaine and [Page] absolute. And it is impossible we should addresse our selves to doe it, vnlesse wee would hearken [...] to such as teach it. To expect any other fruite, or use of this doctrine of absolute necessitie, then carnall securitie in time of peace and prosperitie, and than desperate wilfulnesse in distresse and adversitie, were a madnesse. And seeing this frenzie did still grow greater and greater, in the Iew, as the destruction of Ierusalem (whereof it was both times the principall cause and most fearefull prognostique) grew neerer: the Lord authorized another Prophet (after Ieremie) to interpose his oath for the cure of it. They thought that death and destruction, when they approached, were armed with absolute necessitie, (derived from Gods decree) to punish them for their fathers sinnes: and in this conceipt many yeelded unto them, when they might easily haue conquered them. To discover the vanitie of this skale and to acquit his omnipotent decree from the suspected imposition of necessitie. As I live (saith the Lord God) yee shall not have occasion any more to use this Proverbe in Israel: The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the Childrens teeth are set on edge. Behold, all soules are mine, as the soule of the father, so also the soule of the son is mine: the soule that sinneth, it shall die. Ezek. 18. ver. 2, 3, 4. Have I any plasure at all that the wicked should die, saith the Lord God? And not that he should returne from his wayes and live? ver. 23. Cast away from you all your transgressions, whereby yee have transgressed, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit: for why will yee dye, O[Page]house of Israel? For, I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God: wherefore turne your selves and live ye. vers. 31, 32. If the returning of this people, wherein God tooke pleasure, were not necessary, as the event hath proved (for, the most part of them did not returne) it must needs argue a spice of their frenzy, to think their death, wherein he tooke no pleasure, should be necessary. The onely orthodoxall resolution of this point then, must be this, [It was Gods good will and pleasure,] (the formall dictate, and absolute injunction of his eternall and irresistible decree,) that neither the life or death of such as perished should be necessary; but that both should be possible: albeit the choise of life had beene more pleasant to God, who had complained with griefe, Perditio tua ex te O Israel.

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CHAP. 17.
That Gods will is alwayes done, albeit many particulars which God willeth, bee not done, and many done which he willeth should not be done.

1 AVt erit aut non erit, is a Prophecie which will never bee out of date, impossible ever to bee impeached of falshood: an answer as universally true to all, as unsufficient to any question concerning things to come. The truth of every disjunctive proposition, as Logicians teach, is fully salved, if any one member, though of never so many, be true. Or if the disjunction or division be artificially formall, the actuall existence of one part or member, excludes the actuall existence of the other: so doth the absolute necessity of the one exclude all possibility of the others reduction into act. If I should wage any summe that it would either raine all day to morrow, or be faire all day to morrow; no man of understanding would put me to prove, that it did both raine all the day, and hold up all the day. The proofe of either part, would be sufficient to evince the truth of my disjunctive assertion; that both should be actually true is impossible. Or if my adversary could substantially prove, either any intermission of raine or interruption of faire weather: His advantage against mee would bee as evident; because the proposition, which he was to make good against me, was but [Page] disjunctive: so that of any two minutes in the whole day, if the one were rainy, and the other faire, my universall disjunctive must needs be false, and his apparantly true, because directly contradictory unto mine. That it should at one and the same time raine and not raine, is impossible, and comes not within the compasse of any contradictory contestation, it can be no object of lay or wager.

2 When wee say that God in many humane actions decrees a mixture or multiplicity of possibilities; our meaning is, that the tenour of Gods eternall & omnipotent word, from which all things derive as well the law and ma [...] of their being; as their being it selfe: is in respect of the severall possible events decreed, not conjunctive or categoricall, but disjunctive. And we hold it a sinne to thinke or say, that the onely wise Almighty Creator is not able to conceive or make propositions as truly disjunctive, as any of our making are, or not able to make as formall and contradictory opposition betweene their severall parts, as any humane wit can conceive. Thus much being granted, our intended inference is an everlasting truth. Gods decree or determinate proposition, concerning the supposed multiplicity of possibilities or manifold events, all alike possible; is alwaies exactly fulfilled, when any one of the events, whose possibilities are decreed, goes actuall existence. To reduce more of them then one into act at one and the same time, is, in many cases altogether impossible, and falls not within the object of Omnipotency. If the reduction of any one of them, into actuall possession of its [Page] owne being, were in respect of his decree, or by any other meanes, altogether necessary; his decree should necessarily; be broken, and his omnipotency might be overborne. For the necessity of ones being, takes away all possibilitie of being from the contradictorie, which omnipotency (as is supposed) had bestowed upon it. Finally, Gods decree in respect of all and every part of its proper object, is alike Omnipotent: and therefore it is as impossible for any necessity (by vertue or respect of what cause soever,) to incroach upon those events, the Law or manner of whose production God hath decreed to be contingent; as for Contingency to hinder the production of those events, the law or manner of whose production or existence, he hath decreed to be necessary. As impossible for necessity to mingle with absolute contingency, from which God hath separated it; as for contingencie to be wedded to absolute necessity, whose mariage God hath forbidden by an everlasting decree.

3 The onely difficulty,Objection wherewith these conclusions can (as I conceive) with probability bee charged, may be conceived thus: Admitting Gods decree concerning the house of Israels life or death, were (as evidently it was) disjunctive, and did essentially include a possibility of life, and a possibility of death, in respect of all or most of their persons, or of their publike state; Yet no man will denie but that amongst the severall or opposite members of this or the like decree, God wills one, more than another. For so he saith, That hee willed not the death, but the life of him that dyed. Now if that [Page] which God willeth not, may come to passe; and that which he willeth may not come to passe; or if, of two possible events, that whose actuall being he willeth tenne thousand times more ardently, never get actuall being or existence (as being prevented by the actuall accomplishment of the contradictorie or incompatible event which he lesse willeth,) How can his will, in this case bee fulfilled? and if his will be not fulfilled, his decree must needs bee broken; and if his decree may be broken, how is his will said to be irresistible? how do we beleeve him to be Omnipotent? Some perhaps would hence conclude, that if of two objects, which we suppose to bee alike truly possible, there bee no necessity, that that should come to passe, which GOD willeth most, or any probabilitie for that to come to passe, which he lesse willeth, or willeth not at all, but rather the contrary: Then there is a possibilitie or rather a necessitie, that his will should not be alwaies fulfilled, that he might sometimes sit downe with a kinde of losse, and say with impotent man,Answer. I have failed of my purpose. The best preparation for fit and peaceable entertainment of the Orthodoxall solution to these difficulties, will be to declare the evident and necessary truth of that assertion, which they object unto us, as a dangerous inconvenience able in their judgement to infer the last conclusion.

Truth fully and evidently declared will justifie it selfe against all gainsaiers. The assertion which we grant will necessarily follow from our former discursions, and comes now to justifie it selfe is [Page] this; That such things as God no way willeth, ofttimes come to passe, when as their contradictories, which he wils most ardently, come not to passe.] The principall instance for justifying this truth, is the repentance and life of a sinner, which God hath sworne that he willeth; so doth hee not his death, if we will beleeve his oath. If any mans verdict shall scatter from mine, or others, which maintaine this doctrine, I must call God and his conscience to witnesse, whether he hath not left that undone, wch God wold have had him to do, & sometimes done, that which God would have had him not to doe? Let him that will answere negatively to this Interrogative, indite that confession which we daily make in our Liturgy of falshood or slaunder. Let him call for Iacobs Ladder downe from heaven, and require a guard of Angels to conduct him safely into Gods presence. For if hee have as truely and continually done Gods will here on Earth, as the Angels doe it in heaven; hee may justly challenge speedie admission into their societie. But if he can with safe conscience communicate with us sinnefull men, in that confession; his exceptions against our assertion are but needlesse scrupulosities, altogether against reason? whatsoever they bee in respect of his conscience, yet to his exceptions wee are to frame a further answere.

4 There is an absolute necessity, that Gods will should alwayes be fulfilled: but there is no such necessitie, that it should alwayes bee fulfilled by the parties to whom it is revealed or directed. [Page] They are tyed indeed by necessitie of praecept, and at their perill, alwayes to doe it; but the Almightie God, doth not referre the fulfilling or evacuation of it, to their fidelitie, choice or resolution: for so the certaintie or infallibilitie of executing his decree, should bee but commensurable to the fragility of our Nature; and that which some object unto us would fall directly upon themselves, to wit, That Gods will should depend upon mans will. As hee alwayes grants the requests of the faithfull, or, as the Psalmist speakes, gives such as delight in him, their hearts desire, albeit he alwaies gives them not the particulars or materialls which they request or heartily desire: so he knows how to fulfill his own will, or do his pleasure, albeit those particulars or materials, which he ardently wils and takes most pleasure in, be not alwayes done by us. And this answer might suffice unto a Reader not scrupulously curious. But sophisticall and captious objections require artificiall and formall solutions. The former objection may perhaps be framed more captiously thus. Of more particulars proposed to the choise of men, if that bee not alwayes done, which God willeth most, his will is not done at all. For as a lesser good whilest it stands in competition with a greater, is rather evill than good: so, that which is lesse willed or desired, cannot be said to bee willed or desired at all, in respect of that which is more desired, specially in the language of Gods Spirit, which expressely saith, that God will have mercy, and not sacrifice. Whence it will follow, that when sacrifice [Page] was offered, without performance of duties of mercy, or obedience; Gods will was not done, but broken. It is Gods will likewise, that we should goe unto the house of mourning, rather then unto the house of mirth. The duties to be performed in the house of mourning are many: To mourne, to fast, to pray, with other branches of humiliation; all which God truly willeth, in different measure according to the diversity of their nature, or the more or lesse intensive manner of their performance. The transgressions likewise usuall and frequent in the house of unhallowed mirth, are many and much different as well in quality as degree; all detested of God as contrary to his most holy will, but more or less detested according to their nature, quality or degree, or other circumstance. Suppose a man, to whom choise of going into the house of mirth or mourning is solemnly proposed; the inconveniences of the one, and gracious acceptance of the other in Gods fight, seriously prest by Gods Minister; do vtterly reject the Preachers counsell, and adventure upon the most desperate evill that is practised in the house of mirth: shall wee say Gods will is in this case fulfilled? Yes, though the evils which he willeth not, were tenne thousand, and man did desperately resolve to doe the very worst and most contrary to his will; yet that which he willeth most, shall still be done: for it is his absolute and peremptory will, that all the particulars offered to mans choice, as well those which his Holinesse most abhorreth, as those which hee willeth most, should bee truly possible for a man to [Page] choose without impediment, that none should bee necessary. Now this liberty being left to man which way soever his will inclineth, Gods will shall be most infallibly fulfilled, in the selfe same measure, as if the very best had beene chosen by man; seeing it is his absolute will to grant him freedome (at his perill) to choose the very worst and refuse the best. And the perill is, that Gods will shall be done upon him according to the measure it was neglected by him. As this proposition [The Sun will either shine or not shine this day at twelve of the clocke] will be as true if the Sunne shine not, as if it shine: so Gods will being (as is supposed in this case) disjunctive, shall bee as truly fulfilled, albeit man doth that which he willeth not, as if he did that which he willed most. For his will (as was now said) may (according to the same measure) be fulfilled two wayes, either by us, or upon us; whether it be this way or that way fulfilled, it is all one to God, but much better for us to doe it, then to have it done upon us. And though it be possible for us not to doe it, yet not doing it there is no possibility left, that it shall not be done upon us. In as much then as Gods will must of necessity be done, and no man can doe it by doing evill, (seeing it is set onely on that which is truly good;) the punishment of such as continue to doe evill, is absolutely necessary, that is altogether as unavoydable, as if they had beene appointed to it from all eternities, or created to no other end, then that they might be punished. For the punishment of evill is good, and is for this reason a part of Gods will, or rather a [Page] part of the object of his irresistible will or inviolable decree; yet may we not say that GodEt vere clamor & grandis clamor est, quando pietas Dei, peccatorum clamoribus vincitur, ut peccantes punire cogatur. Ostendit ergo Dominꝰ, quam invitus puniat etiam gravissimos peccatores, dicens, quod clamor Sedomorum ad se ascenderit. hoc est dicere: Miseritordia quidem mea mihi suadet ut parcam, sed tamen peccatorum clamor cogit ut puniam. Salvianus lib. 1. simply willeth evill, or delighteth in punitive justice, which he never willeth, but upon supposall of evill deserts in the Creature. As for the evill it selfe, which deserveth punishment, that, God is not said (in true Divinity) to will at all, either voluntate signi, or beneplaciti, either by his secret or revealed, or by his antecedent or consequent will. For nothing is evill, but that which swarveth from, or is contrary to the rule of goodnesse, and other rule of goodnes there is none, besides Gods goodnesse; nor doth he wil any thing that is not consonant to his goodnesse; so is not any thing that is truly evill. They which otherwise teach, that God in any sort can will that which is morally evill, have mightily forgot the rules of Logick: For if nothing be evill, but that which God would not have done, then nothing which God would have done, can be evill.

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CHAP. 18.
Of the distinction of Gods will into Antecedent and Consequent. Of the explication and use of it.

1 GOds will being, as all confesse, indivisible, some there bee which hold all distinctions concerning it, no lesse unfitting, then the division of Christs seamlesse coate. Others mislike that distinction of his antecedent and consequent will, and yet are content to distinguish his will into revealed and secret, or into voluntatem signi & beneplaciti. The use notwithstanding of the first distinction [of his antecedent and consequent will] is most ancient; warranted by the authority of Chrysostom, and well exemplified by Damascene. And of this distinction I have made choise in other meditations, as most commodious (to my apprehension) for resolving many problemes arising out of Propheticall and Euangelicall passages, concerning the fulfilling of Gods will in his threats or promises. The ingenuous Reader will not bee so uncharitable or injurious towards Chrysostom or Damascene, as to suspect, that either of them imagined two wills in God; unto which imputation, they are more justly liable, which affect the distinction of Gods secret and revealed will, or of voluntatis signi & beneplaciti. For every distinction of Gods will, must bee framed ex parte volitorum, non ex parte volentis, in [Page] respect of the things willed, not in respect of him that willeth them. We must in charity and good manners permit Chrysostom and Damascene that liberty of speech which we take our selves. Now it is usuall with all of us, to attribute that verbo tenus unto the cause, wch really and properly belongs only unto the effect, or to denominate the intellectual faculty from the qualitie of the object to which it hath reference; as when we say the Sunne is hot, the understanding is practique, &c. The meaning of those two good Authors, whom we follow in the use of the distinction of Gods antecedent or consequent will, was this, or the like: That God by one and the same indivisible will, might differently affect or approve divers objects, according to the nature quality or degrees of goodnes contained in them. And certaine it is, that the immensity or greatnesse of our God, doth not make his power or will to bee unweildy. Though he be in power truly infinite, yet he alwayes worketh not according to the infinity of his power, but oft-times more gently and placidly, then the weakest or softest spirited of his reasonable creatures can doe. Though his will likewise be alwayes irresistible, yet is it not alwayes so peremptorily set on this or that particular object willed by him, as mans will, for the most part, is. The variety of particular objects which hee truely willeth in different measure, is much greater than the wit of man can comprehend So is the liberty or variety of choise, which hee alloweth unto his creature, much greater then we can without grudging, afford to such as have dependance on us. [Page] Some things he willeth in the first place and directly; though not so peremptorily, but that things lesse willed by him, or contrary evills, which hee willeth not, may get the start or take place of them in humane choise. Other things he willeth in the second place, or by consequence, as in case, that which in the first place he willed, be (by abuse of mans free will) rejected. The former he is said to will by his antecedent will, because the object willed by him, hath antecedence or preeminence in respect of his beneplacitum or acceptance: the latter he is said to will by his consequent will, that is not in the first place or directly, but by consequent, as supposing those objects, which he better approved, to be neglected. Whatsoever is good in it selfe, and good withal for a reasonable creature to make choise of, that, God is said to will by his antecedent will, as the repentance of a sinner, and the joyfull fruits which the sinner shall reape by his penitencie. Whatsoever in it selfe is not evill, or contrary to the rule of goodnesse, but evill to the reasonable creature, which must suffer it, as sicknesse, death, all kinde of torture or calamity, that God willeth onely by his consequent will. We may not deny but that he truly willeth the death of obstinate sinners, yet this he willeth by his consequent will. Their obstinacy in sinne he willeth not at all, for if he did, he would not punish it: for punishment is the necessary consequent of his will neglected. Both these branches of one and the same will (which from the reference onely which they have unto their different objects, wee conceive to [Page] bee two or divers) are subordinate to his absolute and peremptorie will, which is, that man should have a libertie of doing, and not doing those things which in the first place he willed or liked better. But is not this libertie of man an imperfection?

2 An issue though a blemish to youth and livelihood, is ofttimes a good meane or principall cause of health to an unsound and crasie bodie. So possibility of declining to evill, albeit in it selfe an imperfection, and not possibly incident to aeternall and immutable goodnesse, is no way contrary to the participated actuall goodnesse of the reasonable creature; whereof it is an essentiall or constitutive part, at the least a necessarie ingredient or condition precedent to the constitution of it. And imperfection with reference to this end, may be the object of Gods antecedent will, or part of that which in the first place he willeth and principally intends. But inasmuch as actuall evill is formally dissonant to actuall goodnesse; hee which is actually and infinitely good, cannot but hate or dislik actuall evill in whomsoever it is found, as much as he loveth the contrary good. Now punishment or malum poenae, being as necessarie a consequent of Gods hate or dislike of sinne, as reward or happinesse is of his loue to vertue and pietie: the reasonable creature by declining from vertue to vice, from good to bad, doth ipso facto and inevitably bring evill [malum poenae & damni] tribulation and anguish upon it selfe. By reward and punishment in this place, wee understand not [Page] onely life and death everlasting (of whose reference to Gods aeternall decree, we shall in particular dispute hereafter, if Superiours shall so think fit:) but every temporall blessing or crosse, all prosperity or calamitie, specially publike & remarkable. Prosperitie we alwayes take to be a pledge of Gods love (though not alwaies of the Person, on whom it is bestowed, yet of some good quality in him or in some of his, serving for publique use or private imitation;) and is alwayes (in the beginning at least) an effect of Gods antecedent will. Calamitie we take alwayes for a token of Gods dislike, though not alwaies of the person afflicted, yet either of somewhat in him to bee amended, or of somewhat formerly done by him, to bee by others avoided; and is an effect of Gods consequent will. For hee wils no evill at all, not malum poenae, but as it is either a punishment or correction for evill done, or good neglected, or as it is a medecine to prevent the doing of evill, or neglect of goodnesse.

3 From the infinite varietie of possibilities authorized by the aeternall decree, and their correspondent consequences, which one time or other actually follow upon their reductions into Act, by the irresistible award of the same decree; wee may resolve many difficulties, and abandon sundry inconveniences, wherewith the Heathen in their vaine speculations, and many Christians in more grievous temptations, charge, either the truth or goodnesse of Gods Providence. The varietie of such possibilities, amounts, partly from the specificall [Page] nature of the objects, made possible by the divine decree: partly from the severall degrees of good or evill contained in such objects, or in mens actions concerning them. The whole latitude (if I may so speake) of Gods providence, as it concernes kingdomes, states or persons, consists in moderating and ordering the possible devolutions or alternations of the resonable creature from his antecedent will to his consequent. The alternations or devolutions themselves, may be numberlesse, save onely to God; so may the degrees bee of mans dissonancie or consonancie to Gods antecedent will, throughout the course of his life.

CHAP. 19.
Of the divers acceptions or importances of Fate, especially among the Heathen writers.

1 THE very name of Fate, will be I know, to many very offensive, unto whom I am unwilling to give the least offence. The use of it (I must confesse) is in some cases prohibited by St. Austin, a man too modest, to vsurpe greater authoritie then he had; and oecumenicall authoritie in this point hee had none, or none so great as might impose silence upon all posteritie. Would to God such as are most forward to presse us with this Reverend fathers interlocutorie sentence once or twice perhaps vttered for not vsing the name; [Page] could be perswaded to stand to his definitive sentence often pronounced against the nature of the Errour, which the Heathens, against whom hee disputes, covered under this name. Vpon condition they would be pleased not to revive the nature of the errour, or bury their opinions that way tending; my heart and mouth should never give breath unto the name. The opinion which some rigid Stoicks had of Fate, is an haeresie not to bee named among the Heathen; so deepely tainted with the very dregs of heathenisme, that it is a wonder any Christian writer should come neere it; that any at least should take infection from it: especially seeing the Reverend and learned Fathers of the primitive church, had provided so many excellent preservatives against it. But albeit Fate, according to that sense or meaning, where in some heathens tooke it, was become a wicked Idol: yet seeing the word or name, whether in the ordinary use of Greeke or Latine writers, hath greater varietie of significations or importances, then almost any other word in the world besides▪ to abandon all, for one ill sense, or importance, seemes to me as rude and uncivill a part, as to roote out a whole clan or surname, because one of the same name and stocke had beene at deadly sohood with our family or had otherwise deserved death. Vpon diligent perusall of the best Philosophers, historians or Poets amongst the Heathens, of some historians and Moralists of best note amongst Christians; we may finde realities, or solid matter answering to this word Fate, which cannot bee so [Page] well expressed by any other terme or name, by any paraphrase more briefe than the true and proper definition of the matter or reality signified by it. Now if the matter defined, prove to bee no Idoll; the name certainly is indifferent, and of the definition there may be a good morall or historicall use. For finding out the true and proper definition or description of it, we are to explicate the divers acceptions or importances of the name.

2 Fatum à fando dictum, and sometimes imports no more then the dictate of nature, or the certaine course appointed to things naturall. Thus naturall death, is by some accounted fatall. And Dido according to this importance, did not die by Fate, because shee prevented Lachesis by cutting the thred of her owne life, before this great Arbitresse of mortality had passed sentence upon her;

Virgil. 4. Aeneid. vid. Rodiginum lib. 21. cap. 4▪ pag. 972.

Sed quia nec fato, merita nec morte peribat.

And according to this importance it is used by the Prince of Romane Historians in the sixt booke of his Annals; Per idem tempus Lucius Piso Pontifex (rarum in tanta claritudine) fato obijt. About the same time L. Piso High Priest died a naturall death (being 80. yeares of age;) a matter rare in those times, in a man of so great birth and place. Sometimes againe Death it selfe, howsoever it come upon men, is termed Fate or Destiny; perhaps because the comming of it is by course of nature certaine, albeit the time and manner of it, be unknown or incomprehensible. So another Roman Poet [Page] saith, The parthians poysoned arrowes carryed Fates upon their points, able to let in Death at the least breach of skin, Fatum (que) in sanguine summo est. It may be Virgil held naturall death to be fatall, because it cannot be avoided, being otherwise of our opinion, that Dido might have lived longer, or that it was not absolutely necessary from the houre of her birth, that she should live so many yeares and noSee Cha. 23. §. 2. more. For so some of the wisest amongst the Heathens held death to be fatall, that is, simply necessary unto all; albeit to dye at this or that set houre, were in their opinion contingent, or at least supposed a Contingency before it became necessary. Of this opinion wasThat Death it selfe is fatall, Pythagoras supposeth in those verses;

Iura colas non ore tenus; sed rebus & ipsis:

Nec pravis mentem suescas rationibus uti:

Sed mortem fato subituros noveris omnes:

Divitias quando (que) dari; quando (que) perire.

That disasterous or untimely death was not fatall but preventable, he supposeth in the verses following, for he calleth all Calamities Divina Infortunia. See Hierocles upon both places. See his Annotations upon the latter. Chap. 21. of this Booke. Parag. 2.

Pythagoras and his followers. And so it seemes wasQuaest. 32. Si Deus mortalem naturam nostram fecit, cur Deum mortem non fecisse dicis? Explicatio. Non si quid est mortale naturâ, id omnino mori necesse est. Argumente sunt Enoch & Elias, qui cum naturâ mortales sint, in immortalitate etiam manent superiores excelsiores (que) effecti quàm ad quos elogium illud pertineat, Terra es, & in terram revertêris. Verum est igitur, naturam nostram à Deo factam esse mortalem, mortémque invectam esse in mundum hominis inobedientiâ. Si enim Deus ut naturam fecit mortalem, sic etiam mortem fecisset, non inobedientia mortem induxisset: ac si Deus inobedientiam non fecit, ne mortem quidem fecit. Iustine Martyr. But Lucan, we know, was somewhat allyed unto the Stoicks, and out of his private conceit that the set time or manner of every mans death, was no lesse necessary then death it selfe, he might, not inconsequently terme violent or sudden death, Fatall. And [Page] Tacitus, who seemes to be doubtfull, whether all things fell out by Fate or Necessity or no, ascribes violent and undeserved death, as well as naturall, unto Fate. For, speaking of Agricola his untimely death, (as we would terme it) he saith, Constans & libens fatum accepit: He constantly and willingly entertained his Fate. Martials conceit concerning Death and Fates, is not much different from Lucans, or this last cited place of Tacitus, though not altogether the same.

Nullo fata loco possis excludere: cum mors

Venerit, in medio Tybure Sardinia est.

From Fates no place is priviledg'd:

but when Death is their doome,

The pestilent Sardinia,

in Tyber findeth roome.

And as Death, in his opinion, could not bee repelled where Fates had granted his admission; so neither could it be obtruded, or admitted, without the leave or approbation of Fates, if the authority of the Father of Poets be authentique.

Homer. Iliad. 2. non procul à fine.

[...].

[...].

[...]

[...].

[Page]Vexe not thy soule, for none can send

me to my grave, before,

My day be come, since all mens lives

runne on a fatall score

Which none may passe, none not make up;

'tis not mans power or will

Can change the period which is set

as well to th' good, as th'ill.

Virgil was somewhat of a better minde in this point than Homer was, or they are, which can thus liberally dispose of their friends bodies or bones.

Similis si cura fuisset,

Virgil. Aeneid. lib. 8.

Tum quoque fas nobis Teucros armare fuisset.

Nec pater omnipotens Troiam, nec fata vetabant

Stare, decem (que) alios Priamum superesse per annos.

Had like care beene, nor mighty love,

nor Fates did fore-ordaine

Or Troy to fall, or Priamus

not tenne yeares more to raigne.

3 That no man can dye before his Day come, is an opinion in whose truth some are so confident, as they will not stick to bequeath the bones of their dearest friends unto the divell, if they should dye otherwise. And it is certaine, all things have their appointed time, yet may wee not hence collect that no man can live longer or dye sooner than he doth, or that the number of his dayes cannot possibly bee diminished or encreased: But [Page] of this argument seeQuaestio. 33. Si hominum natura ut mortalis, proprium ac suum finem agnoscit, tempus autem unuscujus (que) non est certi cujusdam termini; quod quidem fotum vocant ij qui à religione nostra abhorrent: quomodo Ezechiae addita sunt tempora? Quod enim additum est, in praefinito determinato (que) numero certè sumitur. Vnde igitur in merientibus incertum interminatum (que) tempus docetur? Explicatio. Non esse uniuscujusque tempus certum ac definitum, [...] divi [...] scripturae verbis docetur, Si in campo invenerit homo puellam desponsatam, eique vi [...]llata dormierit: vitum quidem interficite, puellam autem ne interficite. Mores e [...]m corrupit homo proximi sui, eum (que) puls [...]ns non crat qui juvaret, atque ita haecres [...]. Et puella clamavit, nec suit qui ei auxilium [...]ret. Non autem divina scriptura violatum therum coactae morti comparasset, simor [...] certa desinita (que) fuisset. Quod enim apud Deum definitum est, id nec viola [...]i, nec transiri potest. Quod si ita est, profecto definitae Ezechiae vitae tempora vitae non sunt addita, sed annis ejus qui indefinite occupaverant, quorum sinis morbo lethali eveniebat, nisi Deus morbam ejus curasset, eumque ad vitam revocavisset. Iustin. Martyr. explicat. pag. 29. Iustin Martyr, or the Author of the questions and explications, which have for a long time gone under his name. In all these or the like acceptions of Fate, and the very common conceipt which this name suggests, there is an importance of necessitie. And according to the severall degrees of necessitie, Fates good or bad (for so they divided them for their qualitie) were subdivided into (majora & minora) into lesser and greater fates. (Fata minora) lesser fates, were held alterable by enchantment or other curious practises, taught by Sathan, as imitations of those sacred rites or solemnities, which God had ordayned for averting imminent plagues. (Fata majora) chiefe or supreame fates were so unalterable, so inflexible, that their great god Iupiter could not command them, but was to doe whatsoever was designed by them [...] done. Whence as Lactantius wittily [...] they could not rightly enstyle him Maxi [...] because hee was lesse then this kinde of Fate [...] in this heathenish division notwithstanding, there was a true glimpse of a Christian truth, hereafter [...] [...]sewere to be discussed. Subordinate to this division of Fates, were the [Page] opinions of the Caldean and Aegyptian Astrologers concerning the power or efficacie of the heavens, over sublunary bodies. TheVide Bellantium. Caldeans were impious not in practise only but in opinion, in that they held the operation of the heavens to be unalterable and unpreventable by the wit, industry or skill of man: all which such as follow Ptolomie the Aegyptian, expressely deny, & bring good reasons for their deniall. If their practises to foretell things to come, bee no worse than their opinions concerning the manner how they come to passe; it would bee no great sinne to be their Schollers.

4 There is no Christian but will grant his God to be greater then Heathenish Fate, and his Law to be above all controll of any other Law or power whatsoever. And yet by the doctrine of many Divines, the Almighty Lawgiver is made aeternally subject to his owne decrees. Their meaning is taken by many to be in effect this: That albeit God be Omnipotent, yet it is true of him,

Post semel emissum volat irrevocabile verbum.

That he had past his Omnipotent word, concerning the ordering and managing of all things to come, before it could be taken or accepted by any creature: and that by his word thus past once for all for ever, such irrevocable doome had passed upon some of his best creatures before their nonage, (in their non existence;) as they would not have accepted life or being it selfe, when they first entred vpon possession of it, if they had knowne upon [Page] what hard conditions it had beene tendred. Or, were it yet left free for them to disclaime those covenants or conditions of life and beeing, whereunto they never gave their consent; The greatest part of divine goodnesse which they could hope to be partakers of, were to be released from the right of creatures, and to returne againe to nothing. Briefly, by making God supreame Lord of such hard weirds or sinister Fates, as are by these men inevitably awarded to absolute reprobates; they doe not adde so much unto his greatnesse, as they derogate from his goodnesse, in respect of the heathen gods. For, unto such of the heathens, as granted Fates a negative voice in some cases against the good purposes of their gods; it was some comfort to thinke, that their gods wished them well, and did entreate them, as great personages or courteous gentlemen do their sutors, whom for the present they cannot pleasure, as being overborn by the opposite faction. But alas, what can it boot poor impotent man, to beleeve his Maker was not from aeternitie subject to Fates, or any other law; if by his owne Lawes, or decrees, he hath bound them before the world had beginning, (without all hope or possibility of release) to harder conditions of Life, then the heathens imagined could bee injoyned by Fates. For it is probable, that such of the heathen as were most peremptorie for the absolute necessitie of fatall events, did thinke bad Fates had spit their poyson, when this life was ended. They did not suspect the miseries inflicted by them, to be for time so everlasting, or for their qualitie so [Page] unsufferable, as wee Christians beleeve the torments of the life to come shall bee to all that are ordained for the day of wrath. But bee the torments for their qualitie more exquisite than the Heathens could conceive any; was it absolutely necessary for the Almightie from aeternitie to appoint them? If so it were, there was a fatall necessitie praecedent to the Almightie decree. But if his decree hath brought this absolute necessitie upon men; the execution of this decree by instrumentall or second causes, differs nothing save onely in excesse of rigour and severitie, from the most rigid stoicall Fate.

CHAP. 20.
Of the affinitie or allyance which Fates had to necessitie, to Fortune or chance in the opinion of Heathen writers.

BVT that we may finde out, which wee most desire, some mittigation or tolerable reconciliation of the most harsh opinions, whether maintained by heathens or Christians in this argument: it is a common notion received by all, that every fatall event is necessarie; but very few of the heathen, were of opinion, that all necessarie events were fatall. Albeit by way of such a Poeticall licence in substituting the speciall for the generall, as he used that said, [Page] ‘Hunc ego si potui tantum sperare dolorem.’

Fate is sometimes taken for necessity without restriction. It was not usuall with ancient Heathens, nor is it with such as to this day use to ascribe many events to Fates, to terme the rising, or setting of the Sunne, the ebbing and flowing of the Sea, or other like effects of hourely observation (necessary by the common course of nature) fatall. In the literall construction of many good Writers, Fate and Fortune, are, if not Synonimall in their formall,

At vos, O superi, & divum tu maxime rector

Iuppiter, Arcadij quaeso miserescite regis:

[...]t patrias audite preces, si n [...]mina vestra

Incolumem Pallanta mihi, si fata reservant:

Si visurus eam vivo, & venturus in unum,

Vitam oro: patior quemvis durare laborem.

Sin aliquē infandū casum Fortuna minaris,

Nunc, ô nunc, liceat crudelem abrumpere vitā.

Virgil. Aeneid. lib. 8.

prime, or direct significations, yet coincident in their importances or connotations. Their titles, to the selfe same events or effects, were ofttimes undistinguishable, by such as ascribe too much to the one or to the other. Ausonius, but for verse sake, might as well have said, Dum vult fortuna, as,

Dum fata volunt, bina venena juvant.

When such successe the fates shall will,

One poyson shall another kill.

Or Iuvenal as well, Si fata velint, as,

Si fortuna volet, fies de Rhetore consul:

Si volet haec eadem, fies de consule Rhetor.

Of Rhetorician whom she will,

Dame Fortune Consull makes:

And when she will, to meaner state,

her Favorite downe she takes.

[Page] Others held Fortune to be a branch of Fate, or an instrument for executing what was by Fates designed.

Quid referam Cannas? admota (que) moenibus arma?

Varronem (que) pigrum, magnum quod vivere posset

Post (que) tuos Thrasimnene lacus? Fabium (que) morantem

Accepisse jugum victas Carthaginis arces?

Spectatum Hannibalem nostris cecidisse catenis?

Exilium (que) Rogi furtiva morte duisse?

Adde etiam Italicas vires, Romam (que) suismet

Pugnantem membris, adjice & civilia bella:

Et Cimbrum in Mario, Marium (que) in carcere victum:

Quod consul totiens exul (que) ex exule consul:

Et jacuit Libicis compar jactura ruinis

At (que) crepidinibus cepit Carthaginis orbem:

Manil lib. 4 cap. 4.

Hoc nisi fata darent, nunquam fortuna tulisset.

The resultance of this long Oration, is no more than this: Fortune was but the messenger to bring all those welcome, or unwelcome presents to the Romane State, which Fate did bestow upon it. Of this argument see more in the 27. Chapter of this Booke, parag. 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14.

2 In Tacitus his language Fate and Fortune have sometimes the same reference or importance. Occulta lege fati, & ostentis ac responsis destinatum Vespasiano liberis (que) ejus imperium post fortunam credidimus: After his good fortune we surely beleeved, that the Empire was by the secret course of fate, by signes and Oracles destinated to Vespasian and his sonne. Tacit. 1. histor. cap. 10. Yet is not this difference[Page]betwixt Fate and Fortune constantly observed by these two Writers themselves, much less observed at all by others: with Cominaeus, Machiavel, and other later Historians or Politicians, Fortune and Fate, are used promiscuously. The properties or attributes of Fate, are, in ordinary construction the same, or equivalent to those of Fortune. The titles of Fate were anciently these, or the like, unavoydable, insuperable, inflexible, ineluctable. And it is a conceit or prenotion, that to this day runnes in many Christians mindes, that nothing can be against a chance: Where Fortune failes, nothing prevailes. This difference notwithstanding betwixt them, might bee observed in many Writers (or in their language, which have cause, in their owne apprehensions to like well or complaine of them.) That the ordinary successe of others labours or consultations, are for the most part ascribed by envy or aemulation unto Fortune: whereas Fates are usually charged with the calamities or disasters, which befall themselves or such as rely upon their counsells. Most men are by nature prone to excuse themselves in their worst actions, si non à toto, yet à tanto, by accusing Fortune; and can be well content to exonerate their galled consciences, of inward griefe, by venting bitter complaints, or receiving plausible informations from others, against Fates. Attonitis etiam victoribus, qui vocem preces (que) adhibere non ausi, lacrymis ac silentio veniam poscebant, donec Cerealis mulceret animos, fato acta dictitans, quae militum ducum (que) discordia, vel fraude hostium evenissent. Tacitus lib. 4. [Page] [...][Page] [...][Page] [...][Page] [...][Page]Histor. num. 72. Even the Conquerors were astonished at the sight, who not daring to speake, begged their pardon with silence and teares, till such time as Cerealis with comfortable words revived their spirits; affirming that those things, which indeed came to passe through the mutinousnesse of the souldiers, or the dissention of the Leaders, or the malice of the Enemies, were but fatall mischances which could not bee escaped.

3 Some againe derive Fate and Fortune from one and the same fountaine, and distinguish them onely by excesse of strength, as the same streame in Winter differs from it selfe in drouth of Summer.Caelius Rodigin. lection, antiq. lib. 10. c. 20. Advertendum vero illud, quandocunque illa coelestium causarum ratio ita digeritur, ut artem exculcatam exsuperet, dici à platonicis fatum: ubi vero sic, ut vincere inertem desidiosum (que) evaleat rursum à solerti strenuo (que) vinci, Fortunam. Vtrobi (que) vero divinam statuunt providentiam, quae ad finem agat sibi soli notum quae universa modis contemperet occultioribus. Lection. Antiquar. lib. 10. cap. 20 The Platonicks, which derive most humane events or successe from the order or disposition of celestiall causes, call this disposition, Fate; when it is so strong, that no endeavours or skill of man can prevaile against it: but when the strength of it is of such a middle size, as may prevaile against sloathfull and carelesse men, but may bee vanquished by the vigilant and industrious, they call the same disposition Fortune. In both cases they admit a Divine Providence, which worketh to ends knowne onely to it selfe.

[Page] 4 For this affinity betweene Fortune, Chance and Fate in best Writers, it will bee expedient to touch at the seat of Chance or Fortune in our way, and to declare what is meant by these termes; and whether such events as we say fall out by Fortune or Chance, have any alliance with necessity. In this discussion, I hope wee shall arive at that point, whereat the favourers of absolute necessity, and the favourers of other opinions concerning Fate and Fortune, more fluctuant, will bee content to cast anchor. Fortune (saithCasus autem latius patet quam Fortuna: quando & eam complectitur, & multa alia quae alias aliter accidere suapte naturâ possunt. Ipsum nomen hoc indicat. Est enim [...] Graecis quod ultrò & à se fit: intelligitur (que) casus, quum quod alterius causa sierisolet, [...] propter illam caus [...]m, quale frigus sub caniculae ortum esse videtur non enim frustra, ne (que) denique sicut quod est in nostra potestate, pars est contingentis: sic fortuna pars est casus. Vtque casus contingenti, ita i [...]s quae in nostra sunt potestate, fortuna accidit: non omnibus tamen, sed in quibus consilium delectus (que) adhibentur, uti diximus. Proinde casus communis est animatorum & animae expertium: fortuna hominis est propria, ejus qui jam agere possit. Idque hinc constat, quòd fortunatum esse & foelicem esse pro eodem habentur, & foelicitas est quaedam agendi dexteritas: haec autem solius est perfecti hominis. Quae ergo fato comprehenduntur, haec sunt▪ contingen [...], possibile, delectus, in nostra situm potestate, fortuna casus, iis (que), adjuncta, de quibus est etiam [...] fortassis, & perinde: quae omnia continentur quidem fato, nullum autem eorum fatale est. Plutarch. de fato. pag. 418, 419. Faium iamen sub provi [...]e [...]lia comprebendit. Plutarch) is a part of Chance, as free-will or choise is of contingency. Every casuall event is contingent, but every contingent effect is not casuall or a chance: [...], quasi [...]. The very name of Chance in Greek (saith Aristotle) implies as much as to be to no end or purpose: yet this etymology (under correction) was no part of the Ancients meaning, which gave the Greek name [...], to such events as we terme casuall, unlesse [ [...] frustra] be referred onely (as perhaps Aristotle intended) to the efficient cause. After a manner of speech not much unlike to this, [Page] the Schoolemen say that is gratis dictum (as wee would say freely spoken) not for which a man takes no fee, but for which he hath no just ground or reason. And that in phrase of Scripture is said to bee done gratis or frustra, which is done without just motives or provocation, not that which is done or attempted to no end or purpose. Oderunt me frustra, and Oderunt me gratis, They hated me without a cause, or They hated me vainly, are in some translations equivalent. The word in the originall answers to both. In analogy to this kinde of speech, those events were said to fall out by chance, or to be [...], which in the opinion of such as gave this name, had no efficient cause, or at least none discernable, but were supposed to move themselves or to take possession of such short beeing as they had, without the assignement of any superiour power, or of any constant or setled cause; intruding themselves into the course of nature, like unbidden guests, sometimes as unwelcome as frost in summer, sometimes as welcome as warme weather to such as want fire in winter.

5 Fortune hath her authority placed onely in reasonable actions orPlato fortunam causam in propositis constitutis (que) per accidentiam & consequutionem. Aristoteles, causam per accidens in ijs quae ex animi appetentia propter quid fiunt, obscuram illam quidem & instabilem. Diff [...]rre autem à fortuna spontaneum temer arium (que) casum. Quod enim à fortuna, idem à temeritate quoque fieri: hoc (que) gerendis in rebus esse. Quod autem temerarium spontaneum (que) sit, non continu [...] idem à fortuna fieri, id (que) citra omnem rerum administrationem usu venire. Porò fortunam rationalium esse; spontis autem casum, tum rationalium, tum rationis expertium animantium, tum inanimatorum corporum. Epicurus, causam non sibi constantem, personis, temporibus, modis: Anaxagoxas & Stoici, indeprehensam humano captui causam. Siquidem eventorum quaedam è necessitate, quaedam è fato, quaedam ex libero & constituto, quaedam è fortuna, nonnulla è suae spontis casu. Plutarch. de placitis & decretis Philosoph. lib. 1. p. 213. deliberations, yet not in [Page] all these, but onely in such events as fall out either so farre beyond or contrary to mens intentions, that they may be rather wondred at, then expected. If husbandmen should digge their Vineyards with purpose to finde Gold, the fruitefull vintage thereon following (though no part of their intentions) could not so properly b [...]e ascribed to Fortune, as if a husbandman, intending onely to dig his Vineyard in hope of a plentifull vintage, should finde store of Gold.

6 The meaning of Plato, of Aristotle and Plutarch may bee better perceived by fit instance, then by large scholastique commentaries upon their severall definitions of Fortune. Valerius Maximus (and to my remembrance, Plutarch) hath a memorable storie of one Iason Phereus, that was cured of an impostume in a fray or Duell. The blow of an enemy was the cause of this mans health, but by a rare and unusuall accident, quite contrary to his intention that gave it; and altogether beyond his expectation that received it. His purpose was only to maintaine his reputation or revenge his wrongs, either to wound or to be wounded, without any hope or thought of curing his disease, the danger wherof was not fully discovered, til it was past. But a more perfect Idaea or exemplarie forme of fortune good or bad, then any historian relates, the greeke Epigrammatist hath pictured for our contemplation. The matter of the Epigram was in English thus: A silly poore wretch, being deprived of all meanes to live, resolves to deprive himselfe of breath; but, whilest [Page] he sought a place convenient for acting this desperate purpose, finding store of gold which another had hid; he returned home againe leaving his halter in the place, which was worse taken by him that hid the gold, then meant by him that left it: for he hanged himselfe in it for griefe of his losse.

[...]

[...].

A poore wretch finding gold, for ioy,

left's halter in its steed:

Which he that left the gold, for griefe,

did make his fatall threed.

To finde Gold was no part of that poore mans hopes, whom despaire of like meanes to live by, had made desirous of death: the other had as little minde to dispatch himselfe, when he came to visit the supposed stay and comfort of his life wherein his soule had solaced her selfe with the foole in the Gospell.

[Page]

CHAP. 21.
Of the proper subject and nature of Fate.

1 THE most usefull issue which these or the like cases afford is this, whether the event specified in them bee meerely casuall, contingent, or (in some sort) necessarie. One and the same determination, will as well befit the like quaestion, concerning such events as are properly tearmed Fatall, whose proper subject, nature and definition, we are more particularly to inquire after. The first quaere, which few meddle withall, would bee this: Whether fatall events participate more of contingencie, then of necessitie. But setting aside all comparison, it sufficeth us that they truely participate of both; but in different degrees or measures according to the diversitie of times. Contingencie is alwayes as necessarily praesupposed to the production of events fatall, as necessitie is included in them. And as the proper forme or essence of Fates consists not in every sort of necessitie, but in some peculiar branch thereof; so neither is every Contingent subject a fit matter for receiving that forme or branch of necessitie, wherein the nature of Fate consists, and which giues denomination and being to events fatall. I have heard many unthrifts, upon the loosing of a faire game at Tables, curse the Dice or cry vengeance upon ill luck; but I never heard any Gamester frame such inditements [Page] either in verse or prose, against Fates, as were usuall amongst the heathens, whose language in other cases, is with our unthrifts most familiar. Such pettie adventures as Cardes and Dice, are as met all too base to be instampt with the inscription of Fate: whose proper subject in publike affaires, is matter either of tragedie or of triumph: in private matter either of extraordinarie and unusuall prosperitie or of calamitie.

Most of Gods creatures are the subject of contingency; mankind onely or humane societie, is the the proper sphaere, without whose circumference, neither fortune or fatall events doe wander. Yet is not every part of man subject to fate, though man according to every part bee subject to that contingencie, which is praesupposed to Fates. Si fato fieret, ut esset aut improbus, aut bonus; profectò contraria in cum cadere nunquam possent, nec saepissime mutaretu [...]; quin nec alii quidem probi essent, alii malitalioqui fatum causam malorum esse, contraria (que) sibi facere sentiremus, aut illud quod ante dictum est, videri verum esse, nihil esse virtutem nec vitium sed opinione solum bona, & mala judicari: quae, ut vera ratio docet, maxima est & impieta [...] & injusti [...]ia. Verum fatum hoc immutabile esse dicimus, iis qui praeclaras bonas (que) res cligunt, ac sibi proponunt, digna praemia, item (que) iis qui contraria, digna praemia constituens. Non enim ut alia, veluti a [...]bores & quadr [...]pedia, quae nihil voluntate & judicio facere possunt, sic hominem Deus condidit. Ne (que) enim praemio ac laude dignus esset, si per se, & à se, bonum non deligeret, sed bonus [...]actus esset: nec si malus esset, jure supplicio afficeretur, cum non à se talis esset, sed aliud nihil esse posset, nisi quod factus fuisset. Iustin. Martyr. Apolog 2 pro Christ pag. 32. Itaque Deus non est sic mundum deletu [...]us & eversurus ut nulli sint jam futari improbi angeli, daemones, & homines, propter Christianorum semen & genus quod ipsum causam rerum esse intelligit. Nam nisi hoc esset, ne vobis quidem haec jam à malis geniis fieri ullo modo possent, sed ignis judicij delapsus omnia dissiparet & incenderet, quemadmodum etiam cl [...]vies superioribus seculis nemini pepercit, nisi uni illi qui à nobis Nochus appellatur, à vobis Deucalion, ejus (que) familiae, ex quo rursus tam multi nati sunt quorum partim improbi, partim boni fuerunt. Sic enim conflagrationem fore cens [...]mus, non, ut Stoicis placet, omnium rerum inter ipsas mutatione, quod turpissimum videtur: nec fato homines facere aut pati quicquam co [...]ū quae fiunt & evenium, judic [...]mus, sed voluntate ac judicie unumquen (que) bene agere aut peccare: malorū (que) geniorū operā bonos, veluti Socratē ejus (que) similes exagitari & in vincula conjici: Sar [...]anapatū aut [...] ̄, Epicurū ac fimiles in rerū abundantia & gloria beatae vitae compotes videri: quod cum non intellexissent Stoici, fati necessitate fieri omnia censuerunt. Iustin Mart. Apol. 1. pro Christ. pag. 8. Iustin Martyr; though a professed enemy to Stoicall [Page] Fates, and a most valiant champion, a chiefe leader to all the rest which have defended the Christian truth against that sect, being most potent in the infancie of Christianitie; was not so nice, as either to deny us the right use of the name Fate, or the nature of the thing thereby signified. This, saith he is immutable Fate, that such as doe well, shall be rewarded, and such as doe ill shall bee punished. Quid aliud est fatum, saith Minucius Feli [...] quàm quod de unoquoque nostrum Deus fatus est, qui cum possit praescire materiam▪ pro meritis & qualitatibus singulorum, etiam fata determinavit. Both of them follow their Master St. Paul, that God will render to every man according to his workes: unto them that are contentious, and disobey the truth, and obey unrighteousnesse, shall bee indignation and wrath. Tribulation and anguish shall bee upon the soule of every man, that doth evill, of the Iew first, and also of the Graecian. But to every man that doth good, shall bee glorie, and honour, and peace, to the Iew first, and also to the Graecian. For there is no respect of persons with God. Rom. 2. verse 8, 9, 10, 11. It is a point cleare from the authoritie of Minucius Felix and Iustin Martyr, and from the grounds of Christianitie it selfe, that the reasonable soule is not subject to Fate, Rodiginus lection. Antiquar. lib. 10 cap. 20. Caeterum quo planius fati ratio pernoscatur, ita omnino colligendum, sicuti animi rationalis summus creator est Deus, at (que) idem gubernator, ita et corporis geniter est mundus, ac moderator, vnde consequitur illud, uti animus velut Dei filius ab Deo, tanquam à patre, providentiae legibus clementer agatur, & suaviter. Corpus verò ut mundi membrum à mundano corpore fati viribus, velut particula quaedam ab mole tota impetu quodam [...]ra [...]atur violento: unde fit, uti in mentem nulla pror sum sati vis queat assultare, nisi quatenus corpori ipsa se fatalibus obnoxio legibus, addixerit. propterca semper ferè divinus Plato ab corporis amore, ac externorum cura ad animi & Dei cultum praecipit defugiendum, quando non alia ratione declinari mala queunt. taken (in the Stoicall sense) for [Page] absolute necessitie, whencesoever such necessitie be derived. For as Iustin Martyr strongly concludes, if the soule of man were by the necessitie of the Divine decree, either violently driven or placidly drawne to good or evill, there could bee no vice or vertue, or God should bee as truely the onely author of all vice, sinne, and wickednesse, as he is of vertue and godlinesse; or as St. Austin infe [...], hee could not justly punish any besides himselfe, who is altogether incapable of punishment, but more uncapable of deserving it, or of doing evill. That freedome of choyse or Contingencie, which these good Writers, with all the auncients suppose as granted, by the divine decree, to the humane soule, is the proper subject or immediate matter whereto Fate is limited. The nature or essence of Fate, in their doctrine consists in the infallible doome or sentence, past by the Divine providence upon mens actions according to their nature or qualitie. The actions or choyses themselves are truely and properly contingent, not Fatall, the events or issues of them are Fatall, not contingent. And in this sense did most of theNe (que) enim si non esset providētia, ordo ille in mundo existeret, quod fatum possit aliquis appellare: nec si ista deessent, ulla esset mulcta ullum (que) adversus sceleratos judicium: immo nec bonorum praemium, nec cōmendatio. At vero, Providentiā at (que) ordine existentibus, omnes oportebat qui jam nascuntur eadem bona Sortiri; si nihil à seipsis ad inaequalitatem contulissent. Hierocles in Carm. Pythag. pag. 127. And again pag. 136. Tot tanta (que) adeo ex versibus istis possumus baurire prae [...]epta quae ad virtut [...] institutionem primam conferunt. Videntur enim & Providentia, & Fati, liberatis (que) animi verissimimas rationes complecti; quibus molestiam illam, quae in eorum, quae c [...]rnuntur, dissimilitudine versatur, oratio examinavit; inque omnibus malorum caussam Deum nequaquam existere demonstravit. That Fates may stand with freedome of Election in man, Tacitus observes out of the ancient Heathens. Sed mihi haec, ac [...]alia audienti, in incerto judicium est, fatone res mortalium & necessitate immutabili, an forte voluantur. quippe sapientissimos veterum, qui (que) sectam eorum aemulantur, diversos reperies: ac multis insitam opinionem, non initia nostri, non finem, non denique homines diis (que) curae. Ideo creberrima & [...]ristia in bonos, laeta apud deteriores esse; contra alii, fatum quidem congruere rebus putant sed non è vagis stellis, verum apud principia & nexus naturalium causarum, ac tamen electionem vitae nobis relinquunt: quam ubi elegeris, certum imminentium ordinem. ne (que) mala vel bona, quae vulgus putet: multos qui conflictari adversis videantur, beatos: ac pleros (que) quamquam magnas per [...], miserrimos: si illi gravem fortunam constanter tollerent, hi prospera inc [...]nsulte utantur. Caeterum plurimis mortalium non eximi, quo primo cujusque ortu ventura destinentur: sed quaedam secus quàm dicta sint cadere, fallacijs ignara dicentium, ita corrumpi fidem artis, cujus clara documenta, & antiqua aetas & nostra tulerit. Quippe à filio [...]jusdem Trasulli, praedictum Neronis imperium in tempore memorabitur, ne nunc incepto longiù [...] abierim. Cornel. Tacit. lib. 6. Annal. num. 22. heathens, in their sober moodes use the name of [Page] Fates. So Virgil ascribes the want of anAeneid. 7.

Filius huic, fato divum, prolésque vir [...]lis

Nulla fuit; primá (que) oriens erepta juventa est.

heire male by the untimely death of the first borne and the illVirgil. Aeneid. 7.

Vndique collecti coeunt, Mattémque fatigant.

Illicet infandum cuncti contra omnia bellum,

Contra fata Deum, perverso numine poscunt.

Certatim regis circunstant tecta Latini.

Ille, velut pelagi rupes immota, resistit.

Vt pelagi rupes, magno veniente fragore,

Quae sese, multis circum lat [...]antibus undis,

Mole tenet; scopuli ne quicquā, & spumea circū

Saxa fremunt, later ique ill [...]a refunditur alga.

successe of warre unseasonably undertaken, or begun (as a man would say) in an ill time, unto the Fates, or Weirds allotted by the gods. The fained cō plaint or speech which hee puts in Latinus his mouth disswading

Verū ubi nulla datur caecū exuperare potestas

Consilium, & saevae nutu Iunonis eunt res:

Multa deos aurásque pater testatus inanes,

Frāgin [...]ur heu fatis, in quit, fer [...]múr (que) procell [...].

Ipsi has sacrilego pendetis sanguine poenas,

O miseri, te Turne nefas, te triste manebit

Suppliciam: votisque Deos venerabere seris.

Turnus & his people from going to war, is a true picture of Moses his expostulation with the Israelites, which had gone out to warre contra [...]y to Gods Commandement, and found that successe by experience, which Latinus fore-warnes Turnus of: Yee answered, and said unto mee, we have sinned against the Lord, wee will goe up and fight, according to all that the Lord our God commanded us. And when yee had girded on every man his weapons of war, ye were readie to go up every man into the Hill. And the Lord said unto me, say unto them, Goe not up, neither fight, for I am not among you: lest yee be smitten before your enemies.[Page]So I spake unto you, and you would not heare, but rebelled against the Commandement of the Lord your God, and went presumptuously up into the Hill. And the Amorites which dwelt in that mountaine, came out against you, and chased you as Bees doe, and destroyed you in Seir, even unto Hormah. And yee returned and wept before the Lord; but the Lord would not hearken unto your voyce, nor give eare unto you. Deuter. 1. vers. 41, 42, 43, 44, 45.

Plagues or punishments are properly then termed fatall, when GOD will not repent or change the Doome threatned; when his eyes are shut unto mens teares, and his eares unto their prayers. But of all the heathens which I have read, this point is most divinely discussed bySi quidem per se alteri quidem divitias; alteri autem paupertatem, divinum judicium tribuit: Divinam voluntatem nominari istud oportuit, non infortunium. Sin autem nih [...]l hujusmodi nominibus imperat; sed fortuito & temere accidit, ut felix iste sit, sicuti dicunt; ille autem infelix: Infortunium vocare tantummodo istud oportuit; non Divinum Infortunium. Sin porro Deus arbiter unicuique tribuit, quod meritis convenit; neque in caussa est, ut tales ipsi simus; sed eo fine tantum justitiam possidet, ut ex praescripto ipsius, gestis paria referat: non immerito conjunctis nominibus judicij decreta Divina Infortunia nuncupat: sive, (quia Divinum sit judicium, atque intelligens) praeponendum putarit quod Divinitatem atque scientiam demonstret: sive etiam (quod sponte malitiam idipsum amplectatur, de quo agitur, unde etiam calamitatibus istis dignum est) Infortuniorum nomen adjecerit, tanquam non ex professo certum hominem vel supplicio, vel praemio afficere Deus statuat; sed eum semper, qui i [...]o se, atque illo modo gesserit; cujus rei caussa non sit extra nos investiganda. Itaque voluntatis nostrae, divini (que) judicij nexum Infortunium parere; nihil (que) aliud totum hoc Divinum existere Infortunium, quam Dei adversus peccata calculum. Hieroc in aurea Pythag. carmina pag. 111. Hierocles in his commentary upon Pythagoras golden verses. If Calamitie (saith he) be the award of divine power, Pythagoras might better have called it Divine will, than Divine misfortune. If it bee not the award of Divine power, it had beene enough to have called it misfortune; a Divine misfortune it cannot bee. Out of these straights he winds himselfe with this [Page] acute distinction, Inasmuch as Calamitie or vengeance is the award of Divine power, it is in this respect rightly called Divine. But with reference to this or that particular man, it is a misfortune. His meaning (as he elsewhere illustrates himselfe) is this: The Divine power (as every just iudge) doth onely intend to punish evill, suppose Adulterie, Murder, Incest, &c. But that this or that man should commit these or the like evils, which necessarily draw calamitie upon themselves, this is contingent. Now the necessarie award of a contingent evill, is by the Pythagoreans, sometimes termed Fate, sometimes Divine misfortune.

2. Not to interpose ought one way or other praejudiciall to the different opinions concerning freewill, as it hath reference to merit, election or predestination (for all which points wee have allotted a peculiar place in this long worke:) we hold it for the present as a part of our Creede or fundamentall point of Christianitie; That man in in respect of some objects, hath a true freedome of choyse or Contingencie, and is enabled by his Creator to make varietie of antecedents in thought, word or deede. But theSee chap. 28. §. 1. antecedents being once made by man, though not without divine cooperation; God alone allots the consequents, without any concurrence or suffrage in man. To repaire to Gods house or loyter at home, or in worse places on the Lords day, is left free unto us by the divine decree: but what good or evill, spirituall or temporall, shall befall us upon our better or worse choise, is intirely and meerely in the hands of God. [Page] wee have no power or freedome to resist the doome or sentence which God hath appointed to our resolutions, be they good or bad. As unto evill or goodnesse indefinitely taken, some measure of reward or punishment is, in the language of Iustin Martyr and other of the Auncients, truely fatall: so everyNos ita judicandū humanū gen [...]à Christo dicim [...], ut tamē etiā nūc omnia Deum, prout rationabileputat, regere ac dispensare credamus: & ita in futuro judicio judicaturum affirmemus, ut tamen semper etiam in hoc seculo judicesse doceamus. Dum enim semper gubernat Deus, & semper judicat: quia gubernatio ipsa est judicium. Salvian. lib. 1. And again: [...]deo etiam sanctos homines castigatos quōdā judicio Dei legimus, ut judicandos nos, Deo judice, etiam presenti seculo nosceremus; quia sicut Deus est semper, sic justitia Dei semper: sicut omnipotentia Domini indeficiens, sic censura indemutabilis: sicut Deus jure perpetuus, sic justitia perseverans. Salvian. lib. 2. possible degree of good or evill, whether meerly moral, or spirituall, hath successe from aeternitie fitted to it quoad pondus, in measure more exact then the cunningest Arithmetician can devise. Gods Iustice holds one scale, his mercy and bountie the other; their severall awards are most exact, most infallible and irresistible; yet alternant. Punishment or chastisement for offences past is necessarie, yet not absolutely necessarie to any mans person in this or that degree; because the aeternall decree hath left him a possibilitie not to offend in this or that kinde, or not to offend in such a degree; or in case hee so offended, to seeke for pardon. Nor shall wee, by this assertion bee enforced to imagine any new act or determination in God, either for daily awarding different successe, or the same successe in different measure, according to the diversitie or contingency of humane choise, which may varie, every moment. For the infinite, incomprehensible and all comprising essence, as isIn the Treatise of the Divine Essence. Part. 1. before observed, is fitnesse it selfe, an vnchangeable rule aeternally fitting every alteration possible to the creature, without any alteration [Page] in it selfe. A rule it is, which needes no application to the event, the event by getting existence or actuall beeing is actually applied unto it. The just measure and qualitie of that successe, which is by the Idea of equitie, bountie, or mercie allotted to every event, is no lesse essentially contained in goodnesse it selfe, then the event it selfe or its beeing, is in infinite essence, or in Essence it selfe.

3 The immediate and proper subject of Fate, is Freedome of choise or contingencie in humane actions; the genus proximum, is the certaintie of Divine retribution according to the nature and qualitie of the choyse wee make. Yet are not rewards or retributions, but retributions extraordinary and remarkeable, aswell for their manner of execution as for their matter or qualitie, properly termed Fatall. Of sinister Fates, there is no contingent subject, which can exhibit a more exact picture or modell, for the manner how they come to passe, then a game at Chesse or Tables. Many games at both, which at the beginning, or untill the middle of time spent, in them, are very faire and more then tenne to one; after some few oversights, or ill dice, become desperate and irrecoverable, by any skill that can be vsed: so events properly fatall, become at length unpreventable, irresistible; but such they were not from the beginning of time, or from their infancie or first attempts, on whom they fall. Such disasterous or dismall events, for which the Heathens usually indited Fates, were commonly remarkable checks given, they know not by whom, to humane policies [Page] or cunning contrivances. They were, as the unexpected winning of an after-game, upon some great stake or wager. Good or dexterous Fates, were the unexpected issues of mens contrivances, for their owne or associates good Fortunes. The manner of accomplishing such fates or Fortunes, is like a game wonne by a bungler, against a skilfull player, by extraordinarie dice, or by the suggestion of some by-stander, more skilfull then both. This kinde of Fate or strange Fortune, of which most of the Heathen knew not well what to make, wee may define, To be the incomprehensible disposition, or irresistible combination of second causes, conspiring for the infallible execution of Gods will, maugre all plots or conspiracies of men to defeate the events, which hee had purposed. Sinister or disasterous Fates were the infallible execution of his consequent will. Good fates or fortune, were the infallible effects of his antecedent will; both were sometimes strangely & remarkeably accomplished against cunning and potent oppositions, not so much for the parties sakes whom they befell, as for others. Many disasters have befallen some men, though deservedly for their owne sins, yet withall for the admonishing of others, to prevent the like. Hence it is that the Heathen Poets observation [Multi committunt eadem diverso erimina Fato] though in many cases most true, is no way prejudiciall to the unchangeable rules of the All-seeing Providence, which is alwayes full of equitie, whose justice is still allayed with mercy.

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CHAP. 22.
The opposite opinions of the Stoicks and Epicures. In what sense it is true, that all things are necessarie in respect of Gods decree.

1 THE Stoicks did well in contradicting the Epicures, which held fortune and Chance to rule all things, or at least to bee in themselves somethings, not meere denominations of such events as had no certaine or constant cause, apprehensible by man. The Originall of their Errour, was, their desire to be extreamely contrary to the Epicureans in a matter contingent, or rather in contingencie it selfe: for that is the common subject of Fortune, chance or fate. Fortune and chance they deny to be any thing, with no other purpose, it seemes, then that they may make Fate to bee all things. They were Orthodoxall in acknowledging an infallible unerring providence, but they [...]rred againe as much in not acknowledging this infallible providence, oft-times to hold the meane betweene Chance or Fortune, and absolute necessitie; or not to order and moderate contingencie it selfe. From the same originall, some have thought it to be the most safe and compendious course for rooting out errour and superstition, to overthrow the a [...]tecedent, when their commission directs them onely to deny or refute the consequence. As not a few, no lesse affraid (and the feare [Page] it selfe is just) to grant merit of workes, then the Stoicks were to admit of Chance, have taken away all contingency in humane actions, save onely with reference to second causes. Wherein they seeme to invert that rule of Tyrannicall policie: He is a foole that kills the Father, and leaves his braits behind to revenge his blood. These take away the harmelesse Parents for the faultie issues sake, seeking to destroy true and Orthodoxall antecedents for the incommodious consequences which others have falsely fathered upon them. The reclaiming of men from this one Errour is my present and scope.

2 For the better effecting whereof, we will subscribe at length unto their general Maxime, [That all things are necessary in respect of Gods decree,] upon condition they wil not extend it beyond its naturall and proper subject, or not take decree in the Stoicall, but in a civill sense. Now hee that saith [All things are necessary in respect of Gods decree,] cannot in civill construction bee conceived to meane any more then thus; All things which God hath decreed are necessary. The question then is, whether every thing that is, may truly bee said to be the object, or part of the object of Gods decree. To which question our answer must be negative. For those things onely are properly said to be decreed, which are enacted and appointed for better ordering and moderating such things as either by nature, custome, or ill example, are apt to grow worse, or may be amended by good education, wholesome advice or discipline. Every decree [Page] of man supposeth the subject or party whom it immediately concernes, to be capable of perswasion to good or evill, to be alterable in his inclinations, through feare of punishment, or hope of reward. Magistrates or Corporations take order that mad men or dogs should doe no harme; yet are not these creatures the proper subject of their decrees or sanctions. They do not tie Mastives by penall laws not to bite, they do not bind mad men to good behaviour: but they i [...]joyn men of reason and understanding to muzzle M [...]stives lest they bite; to keepe mad men or franticks, close, lest they should doe mischiefe by going abroad. Now the Divine decree concerning the ordering of man, is the rule or patterne of all humane decrees, and therefore supposeth somewhat in man, which makes him more capable of the divine sanction, than reasonlesse or inanimate creatures are. This capacity of the reasonable creature or man, consists in freedome of choise or contingency, in his actions or resolutions. The donation of this freedome upon man, is an act of Gods free bounty, and is presupposed as the proper subject to the divine decree, or to all acts or awards of divine justice or mercy. The proper and formall object of the same decree, is, the moderation of this contingency or freedome of man, by awarding the issues or consequences, in mercy, justice, or bounty, exactly proportioned to the nature and manner of his choise and resolution. For illustrating the truth of our intended conclusion, let us take the EpigrammatistsSee Cha. 20. relation, or that idaea of Chance or Fortune, which hee hath [Page] pictured, for a true story. It was not necessary in respect of the divine decree, that the one should be so extreame poore, or the other so miserably rich, as to come within the compasse of that snare, wherin the latter was taken. The meanes by which the one came to that depth of poverty or melancholly passions, wherewith hee had almost beene stifled, and the other to that height of covetousnesse, from which he fell headlong into despaire, were contingent. Neither were driven into such excesse of passion or distemper by irresistible necessity. But taking them as now they have made themselves; that the one should be led unto temptation, the other into it; fell not out by chance, but by the especiall disposition of the Divine providence. The great Tempter intended mischiefe to the one, but failed, God having yet a blessing in store for him. To the other, perhaps he intended not this particular harme, untill opportunity did offer it. So that the inriching of the one by a chance rare and unusuall, in respect of man, was necessary in respect of Gods decree of mercy and fatherly providence; the delivering of the other unto Sathan, was likewise necessary, in respect of Gods justice.

3 Now if such events, as to the apprehension of meere naturall men come by chance, be necessary in respect of the divine decree: disasters by common consent reputed fatall, must by efficacy of the same decree be divorced from contingency, with which formerly they had connexion. For though Fortune, as well as Fate, be a branch or particle of the proper object of the divine decree; yet as they have [Page] reference to man, this difference may in the last place be observed betwixt then: Those things fall out by meere chance or fortune, whose procuration or prevention hath not beene thought of at all by man, or but sleightly, before they happen: Those by fate, which have beene often and seriously thought of, but either farre exceed all expectation, or frustrate sollicitous care or forecast. Ofttimes the unexpected accomplishment of one mans expectation defeates the industrious hopes or anxious contrivance of another, and such events are in a twofold sense termed fatall.

Heu stirpem invisam, ac fatis contraria nostris

Fata Phrygum.

Both Phrygian race, and Phrygian fate,

As contrary to ours, we hate.

4 All events properly fatall include a kinde of canvas betweene man and man, nation and nation, or betweene divine providence and humane policie, or betwixt the soule of man and wicked spirits licensed by divine providence to sollicite, tempt, or assault her.

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CHAP. 23.
Of the degrees of necessity, and of the originall of inevitable or absolute necessity.

1 VVEre the maine question hitherto disputed, thus proposed, Whether all things were only so farre necessary, so farre contingent, as it pleased the Omnipotent to appoint: or whether the successe or issue of humane intentions or contrivances, were so far avoydable or unavoydable, as he hath made them by his decree: I should have Infidels only for mine adversaries: Christians, I am perswaded, will move no questions about his power or ability, but only about his will or pleasure, for determining all things. And who can deny that Gods Law or covenant for effecting some things, is more strict and peremptory, then for effecting others. The Prophet supposed his covenant for day and night to bee more certaine and invariable, than his covenant for the former and latter raine. And yet the Law which he hath appointed for the most glorious creatures in the Firmament, is not like the law of the Medes and Persians. It was dispensed withall all at Iosuahs suit, and may againe be dispensed with at his pleasure. The motion of the Sun and Moone, is not perpetually necessary in respect of his decree. The seasons of seed time, harvest, and the disposition of these lower Regions (in which Fortune [Page] may seeme to have placed her wheele, and Chance erected his tottering throane) may become certaine and constant to such as constantly observe his holy Covenants: If you walke in my statutes, then will I give you rain in due season. Levit. 26. 4. &c Such was the wisedome of the Lawes given unto this people, that by observing them, they might have changed the disposition of the Ayre, altered the influence of the Heavens, and have had dominion over the Starres.

2 Constancy of assent or adherēce unto these fundamental truths of religion, wold fasten our minds unto a point of inestimable use (as wel forreforming or curing maladies of State▪ as of private life) often in this Treatise intimated, but not fully declared. The point is this; maine events which at this instant are meerely contingent, and may easily bee prevented by diversity of practices, not onely possible but acceptable by the divine appointment, may in succession or revolution of time, become more necessary, and at length truly fatall, altogether unavoydable. Absolutely necessary from all eternities, nothing can truly be reputed, besides the Deity, and the internall operations of the ever blessed Trinity. Many things which from the beginning of time had but the first degrees of possibility, (their contraries or incompatible opposi [...]es being in the highest degree of probability,) have by the continued sinister sway of mans thoughts and practices, beene drawne from meere possibilities to be more then probable, and unto the first degree of necessity: yet at the first not absolutely or [Page] irresistibly necessary. Some meanes there may be, though but a few left of many, and those not easie to be put in practice, for preventing them. The events of greater consequences which stood thus, were with the Heathens accounted Fata minora: For Fates (as we said before) admit the selfe same division or degrees that necessity doth. The same events by omission of practices appointed by the divine decree for their prevention, become altogether irresistible and absolutely necessary in respect of any meanes possible for averting them: yet not absolutely necessary from eternitie, but absolutely necessary only from that point of time, wherein the eternall decree or providence did cut off all contrary possibilities, which before were concurrent with the possibility of their being. And events thus utterly bestript of all contingency, or al possibility of being recalled or avoyded, were by the Heathens ascribed [Fato majori] to greater Fates. The symptomes or characters of events becomming thus irresistibly & absolutely necessary, comeIn the Treatise of Prodigies & of their usefull observation. elsewhere (by Gods assistance) to be deciphered. Here it sufficeth to advertise the Reader, that as divers things besides, so necessitie may be enstyled absolute many waies, but two especially. Some things are said to be absolutely necessarie, that is, altogether inevitable, albeit this necessitie or inevitablenesse did accrue from some occasions or set points of time lately past. As many diseases, in their nature curable, and easie to have beene cured by ordinarie medicines (if they had beene administred in time,) do, by some few daies ill diet, by carelesse [Page] attendance, or casuall relapse, become altogether incurable, by any after-care or helpe of physick. Other events there be, which were absolutely necessarie in respect of all times: their exhibition or production could not by any policie of man have beene prevented. So our Saviours death was absolutely necessary from the beginning of the World, but whether absolutely necessary from eternity, or absolutely necessary, without supposall of Adams fall (which was not necessary) shall not here be disputed. Certaine it is, that nothing decreed by God, can be so absolutely necessary as the Divine Nature, or blessed Trinity is. Many errors have found opportunity to mingle themselves with divine truth for want of a commodious distinction or explication of this indistinct and confused terme Absolute: the anatomy of it were worth the paines of the Learned. Evident it is, that some things which are not to day, may to morrow be, in their kind, absolute.

3 We truly say, that the summe of mony wherin one man stands bound unto another, is absolutely due from the time of the forfaiture, or non-performance of the condition: that is, there is no plea left in Law, no course or meanes of Iustice to avoyd the payment of it. Yet was not the same sum absolutely due from the first date of the bond; the performance of the Condition in due time had prevented the losse, which negligence or breach of promise hath now made necessary and irrecoverable. Moneys lent upon no other consideration, but upon meere good will, to be repayd whensoever the [Page] party lending shall demand them; are absolutely due, from the date of the recognizance, and for that which is absolutely due, there is a necessitie of payment or satisfaction.

4. Some disasterous events become, by divine providence, irresistibly necessarie long before they be actually accomplished, or inflicted: such was the destruction of Pharaoh, of Senacherib, the desolation of Iudah and Ierusalem by Titus. Others become fatally irresistible within some few dayes or houres before they happen, other not till the very moment wherein they are awarded either for some grievous sinne then committed, or for some remarkable document of Gods justice. Some againe are for a long time totally irresistible and unpreventable; others resistible quoad See Cha. 24. parag. 9. & 10. tantum, though not quoad totum, that is, part of the evils might be prevented, though not the whole. All that we have said concerning the alteration of possibilities, or contingencies, or change of events contingent into necessary, may easily be conceived, without any surmise of alteration in the Omnipotent, or in his everlasting decree. The least degree of possibility or contingency, is as necessarily derived fromNos calamitatum nostrarum authores s [...] mus. Deus enim pius est & misericors, & qui, ut scriptum est, neminem velit perire vel laedere. Nos [...] ergo adversum nos omnia facimus. Nihil itaque, nihil est in nobis crudelius nobis. Nos inquam, nos etiam Deo nolente cruciamus. Sed videlicet adversum meips [...]im dicere arbitror, qui cum superius dixerim, ob peccata nostra nos puniri à Deo, nunc dicam nos puntri à nobis ipsis. Vtrum (que) verum est; Deo quippe punimur, sed ipsi facimus ut puniamur. Cum autem punire nos ipsi facimus, cui dubium est quin ipsi nos nostris criminibus puniomus: quia quicunque dat causam qua puniatur, ipsese punit, secundum illud; Funibus peccatorum suorum unusquisque constrin gitur. Salvianus lib. 8. his absolute irresistible will, as necessity it selfe in the highest degree. It is impossible for possibility to [Page] have any right to actuall being without his speciall appointment. To think that Fate, Chance, or Fortune, should nestle in some certaine periods of time, or be brought forth by revolutiōs of the heavens, is altogether heathenish. But neither doth Scripture insinuate, nor can reason justly suspect any danger in avouching, that the Almighty suffers that contingency or multiplicity of possibilities betweene good and evill, or the severall degrees of evill, wherewith hee hath endued the reasonable creature, to explicate or contract it selfe in every moment of time. And according to the nature of the free motions of man, the irresistible decree brings [...] such events or issues, as were truly possible from eternity, but become necessary by revolutions, not of the heavens, but of mans hart and thoughts; publike plague or calamities become necessary, or inevitable by these meanes onely. We must ever remember that God hath not so decreed all things before they come, or the manner how they shall come, as that he doth not yet decree them. For he continually decrees as well necessity as contingency, and brings forth effects as well contingent as necessary, from this present houre; both being sometimes meerly possible. The truth of this our last assertion, may be demonstrated from our former principle: If one part of a disjunctive proposition be denied or faile, the other may be necessarily inferred, though neither bee absolutely and determinately necessary, but become such by consequence, or upon supposition of the others failing. Many things which in respect of our present purpose or resolution [Page] are free or contingent, may within a short while after become altogether necessary and unavoydable, without any alteration or change in us. Suppose a Iudge should be tied by oath to execute justice upon a malefactor within eight dayes; there is no necessity that he should performe his vow the first, second, third or fourth day. The execution or not execution of Iustice, is during the first seven daies, free and contingent, without any breach or violation of oath: but omitting the opportunities, which the first seven dayes have offered, the execution of Iustice upon the eighth day, is as necessarie, as his honesty or fidelity; as necessary, as if hee had beene tied by oath to execute it upon that day alone. The parts of indefinite time, or of the matter promised or threatned by man, may be farre more than this instance implies. So that the performance of those duties or promises, which for a long time was free and arbitrarie, and might have beene performed in different measure, becomes at length absolutely necessary, and necessary to such a determinate degree. The parts of Gods disjunctive decree, and the degrees as well of every matter decreed by him, as of the time allotted for the execution of it, may be numberlesse in respect of us. And man by not entertaining the opportunities, which by severall times have beene allotted him, for reducing his possibilities of doing Gods antecedent will into act, may forfeit the very possibilities themselves for ever, or for a long time. And by continuance of such neglect of many parts or kindes of successe, all truly possible, in respect of [Page] the eternal decree; that only shall in the end become necessary, which he least desires, which his soule shall most de [...]est. In respect of some future events not as yet become necessary, the eternall decree leaves fewer branches of contrary contingencies or possibilities, in respect of others more. Their multitude may expire or revive every moment, according to the diversity of mens waies, on which Gods will is alwaies done by means infinite, at least to man incomprehensible.

4 The incarnation of our blessed Saviour, was in the opinion of some of the Ancients, absolutely necessary before the creation of mankind, & should in time infallibly have been accomplished for confirming or augmenting that happy estate wherein Adam was created; if so he had continued stedfast in it untill the time appointed by God for his change or translation. But however the Schooles may determine or wave this question (I must confesse, neither very usefull nor in this place much necessary) there was no necessity questionlesse, that the second Adam should become a bloudy sacrifice for our sinnes, unlesse the first Adam had sinned: but after he, by his actuall transgression, had utterly cut off that possibility of perseverance, which the eternall decree had bestowed upon him, the humiliation and bitter passion of the Sonne of God, became as necessary in respect of Gods mercy and bounty towards man, and of his infinite justice which (notwithstanding his infinite mercy) was to be fully satisfied, as his incarnation. After Cain had despised Gods [...] and had slaine his brother [Page] Abel, it was necessary the Messias should proceed from Seth; yet not then so necessary, that he should be the sonne of Abraham, as the Son of Seth. Others lineally descended from Seth, might have forfeited their reall possibilities, or ordinary hopes of attaining unto this glorie. At the least, when God first made his promise to the Woman and her seed, the birth of Abraham was not in respect of the eternall decree so necessary, as Christs birth was. It was possible to have written Terah as childlesse as Iechoniah, after his mariage with Abrahams mother. But after the same God had passed that promise unto Abraham and confirmed it by solemne oath, In thy seed shall al [...] the nations of the earth be blessed: It was thenceforth altogether as necessary, that our Redeemer should be the seed of Abraham, as of the Woman: Yet not then so necessary, that he should bee the sonne of Iudah, or that Iudah should have a sonne called Iesse, or that Iesse should have a son called David, a man after Gods owne heart. That glory, which long after Gods oath to Abraham, befell the Tribe of Iudah, was (for ought we know or can object unto the contrary) a part of that dignity; whose possibility was once really possessed by Reuben, though utterly forfeited by his misdemeanour. But after Iacob had prophesied, that the Scepter should not depart from Iudah, till Shilo come, or rather after the Lord had sworne not to faile David in bestowing the prerogative promised to Iudah upon his seed, the necessity becomes as great, that our High Priest, after the Order of Melchisedeck, should bee the [Page] sonne of David as the son of Man, or seed of Abraham. Now if we can perswade our selves, that God either speakes or sweares as he truly intends, or that mortall man may certainly know where to have him, or what to trust to: wee must beleeve and acknowledge those events concerning which he hath sworne not to repent, to be farre more necessary in respect of the irresistible decree, from the first interposition of such oath; then those ordinary blessings or cursings, which hee seriously threat [...]eth or promiseth, but disjunctively, & with expresse reservation of their repentance whom he threatneth, or of their defection whom he incourageth by his promises: yet such was his covenant of life and death with his people, such was his decree concerning the prosperity or calamity of Davids temporall Kingdome; as theIer 18. [...]. &c. Prophets comments upon the promise made to2 Sam. 7. 12. &c. See the next chapter of this Book parag. 2. David expresly testifie. By these and the like oracles fully exemplified in the alternation of Ierusalem and Iudahs contrary fates, or successe; we may discerne the course of that eternall providence, by whose irresistible unerring disposition, all other States or Kingdomes have the certaine periods of their prosperity or calamity assigned, and by which Princes and greatest statesmen stand or fall.

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SECTION III.
Of the manifestation of Divine Providence in the remarkable erection, declination, and periods of Kingdomes: in overruling policy, and disposing the successe of humane undertakings.

CHAP. 24.
Of the contrary Fates or Awards whereof Davids temporall kingdome was capable: and of its devolution from Gods antecedent to his consequent Will.

1 HOMER was not so blinded with the heathenish misconceit of Fate, as not-to-see more wayes to death than one. In Achilles he described two courses of life, the one shorter but decked with glory; the other longer, but bare and naked of [...]ame: both alike possible by Fates.

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Thetis foresaw, Fates by two wayes,

Homer. Iliad. 1.

Might bring me to my end;

The one by Troy, where if my time

I should with honour spend,

It was but short: but if at home,

A sluggard still I stayd;

My life was long, but with no Fame,

Or praise to be repay'd.

Now as one poyson sometimes expels another: so this opinion of double Fate, (if men be disposed to use this terme) takes away the malignity of that error, which holds all events to be fatall; albeit of such twofolded fates or successe, the one part or the other must by absolute necessity be fulfilled, according to the parties choise, unto whom they are awarded. The body of that which Homer shadowed in Achilles, is evidently contained in Gods forementioned covenant with Israell, and sealed unto us by manifest experience in Davids line. For of Gods speciall providence over the seed of Abraham or the Iewish nation in generall, we have treated at large in the first Booke of the Comments upon the Apostles Creed. The contrary Fates of Davids kingdome in succeeding ages, seeme to wrastle & strive, as Iacob and Esau did in the womb, or to countersway each other, like two opposite scales unequally ballanced, by turnes. That thus it fared with Davids Kingdome, doth not argue Gods decree concerning it to have beene mutable, but rather immutably to have elevated & depressed [Page] both Prince and People, according to the degrees of their mutability in turning to him or from him.

2 Salomon had the largest talent of wealth, and the greatest measure of wit to use it, that any earthly King either before or after him had. His possibilities to increase his kingdome, and propagate greatnesse to his posterity, were much greater than any earthly Monarch since him might expect. Many parts of Gods glorious promises made to David, were literally meant of him, which were never literally fulfilled in him, or in his naturall linage; because they did not performe the conditions, which God required, that they might bee more capable of his extraordinary undeserved favours. The Covenant with David is expressed Psal. 89. I have found David my servant: with my holy oyle have I anointed him. With whom my hand shall bee established: mine arme also shall strengthen him. The enemy also shall not exact upon him: nor the sonne of wickednesse afflict him. And I will beat downe his foes before his face: and plague them that hate him. This promise pertaines to David and to his successors: but however the promise was on Gods part unalterable, yet the prerogative promised was subject unto change on contingency. For so a little after the Psalmist distinguisheth betwixt Davids seed and Davids sonnes. His seed will I make to endure for ever, and his throne as the dayes of Heaven. This he speakes not of many, but of one, to wit, of Christ, to whom onely the Kingdome of David was predestinated. Of such as were ordained to this Kingdome, he speakes in the plurall, not absolutely [Page] but conditionally: If his children forsake my Law, and walke not in my judgements; if they breake my Statutes, and keepe not my Commandements: Then will I visit their transgression with the rod, and their iniquity with stripes. The tenour then of Gods Covenant with David as it concerned Christ was absolute, but as it concernes Davids other sonnes, it was disjunctive, or conditionall. If any shall question why God for many generations did deale no better with Davids successors, than with the successors of other Kings, the answer from the tenour of the Covenant is plaine, They forsooke his Lawes, and would not walke in his Iudgements. Psal. 89. vers. 32. and thus breaking his Statutes, their visitation was altogether unevitable, not on a sudden, but by degrees. The Lords arme even in Salomons time was stretched out, ready to fetch the blow, which after his death fell upon his son Rehoboam, as heire to his chastisements. The blow was sudden and smart; for of twelve Tribes, ten were rent from his Kingdome by Ieroboam. The wounds Inflicted by the Egyptian upon Iudah and Benjamin, and upon Ierusalem her selfe, were grievous, though as yet not uncurable. So grievous as might give that people plainly to understand, that the prosperity of Davids earthly Kingdome was not like the dayes of heaven, nor the glory of Salomons throne like the Sunne in the Firmament, altogether priviledged from change, or mutability. But albeit the motion of the creature, appointed to execute Gods wrath, were sudden, yet the waight of Ierusalems burthen was not permanent, because [Page] shee was not as yet frozen in sinne.

3 Of Rehoboams successors some were good, and these by their penitency and heroicall reformation, set back the Diall of such dismall Fates, as still did threaten them: many were bad, and did draw Gods plagues upon themselves and their people. And whilest the blow of Gods stretched out arme, is diverted and borne off by the fervent prayers of godly Princes; the waight of the whole Nations burthen, is much increased by the iniquity of the people. Either the number of the supplicants was not equall to the number of the delinquents; or the fervency of their prayer and repentance, not so constant, as the others delight in sin and wickednesse. The waight of their sinister Fates, by this meanes secretly and insensibly increasing (even whilest their motion was restrained or abated) increased the swiftnesse or violence of the motion, when by permission of the Divine Decree, they had liberty to take their wonted course. Ioas and Achas pulled them on so fast, that Micha threatned judgement, not against the King and Nobles onely, but against City and Temple, in such a thundring voice, as if desolation had even then besieged the City round about, and utter destruction was ready to enter in at the breach: Therefore shall Sion for your sake be plowed as a Field, and Ierusalem shall become heapes, and the mountaine of the house, as the high places of the Forest. Micha 3. ver. 12. Spake he this of his owne times, or of some others following? was it in respect of the Eternall Decree, altogether impossible for this dreadfull sentence to have [Page] beene forthwith put in execution? Indeed many of their Magistrates and Politicians, most of their Priests and Prophets, untill this very instant had said to the like purpose: Is not the Lord among us, none evill can come upon us. vers. 11. This vaine confidence presumptuously and falsly grounded upon the immutability of Gods promises, made the doome menaced by Micha more necessary and fatall at this time, than otherwise it would have beene; though to such as understood the tenour of Gods Covenant with his people, neither at this time nor many yeares after, altogether unevitable.

4 The good King Hezekiah knew the Lord did not threaten in jest, and for this reason his feare was hearty, and his prayers earnest: Did he not feare the Lord, and besought the face of the Lord? Ier. 26. ver. 19. But did this his feare or hearty prayes impaire the present possibility or necessity of the plagues threatned? Yes, The Lord repented him. Of what? that he had denounced all this evill against Ierusalem, or intreated Hezekiah so roughly by his Prophet Micha? no: But the Lord repented him of the evill which he had denounced against him and meant to execute. For who repents himselfe of that which he did not so much as truly intend? Is God then as man that he should repent? It is impossible that there should be any change of purpose in God, & herein he is most unlike to man, or the son of mā, whose repentance alwayes includes some internall alteratiō of wil or purpose, not of the matter purposed only. Our best intentions of good to others, often [Page] expire upon particular respects, and cannot be revived againe, albeit we neither had just occasion to take dislike, nor the same reasons to continue it, which we had to take it. Through the inconstancie of our nature we loath to morrow what we like to day: our affections alter without any change in the matter affected by us. Far otherwise it is with God, whose will or purpose is still immutable; and yet exactly fitteth every change or mutation in the creature. To have punished Ierusalem continuing her wonted course (but sixe moneths longer after the Prophet had thus warned her) with such miseries as Senacherib had menaced, was one part of the eternall and unchangeable decree: another part of the same decree (no lesse immutable) was to avert these plagues from Ierusalem truly repenting upon their denunciation. No former wickednesse could alienate his love from her, or make him recall the blessings promised to David, so long as this people was so affected, as in that covenant was required.

5 The possibility of the desolation menaced by Micha, was, for the present, as great, as the Assyrian was potent. It might truly have beene said of this City, in respect of his army, what one saith of Navigators:

Est tua tam prope mors, quàm prope cernis aquam.

That extraordinary power wherewith the Lord had armed this Tyrant to take vengeance upon his neighbour nations, might well make the present [Page] avoydance of the plagues menaced by Micha, seeme almost impossible. But good Hezekiah, by turning with all his heart, and all his soule unto the Lord, unto whom all things are possible, did not only remove destruction threatned from the City and Temple, but caused it to turne upon the destroyer. Ierusalem and Iudah, by the unfained penitence of Prince and People, became the object of Gods antecedent will, and fell under the former part of Gods Covenant with David: The enemy shall not exact upon him, nor the sonne of wickednesse afflict him. And I will beat downe his foes before his face, and plague them that hate him. Psal 89. vers. 22, 23. The Assyrian by going beyond his commission, in daring not Hezekiah only, but the Lord of Hosts, unto whose protection Hezekiah had fled, becomes the object of Gods consequent will, which by divine appointment, he was at that time to execute upon Ierusalem; but upon Ierusalem fallen away by disobedience, not upon Ierusalem returning in heart unto her God.

6 That this people might have some time of breathing and respite to gather themselves for the better accomplishing of so great a worke, as Hezekiah had begun; the Lord in his wisdome so disposed that Tirhakah King of Cush should make forward to entertaine Senacherib with battaile at that very instant, wherein he had purposed to give the on set upon Ierusalem. This unexpected removall of present terror, was (no doubt) a sure pledge unto the people for strengthning their relyance on Gods promise, for setling their hearts and continuing [Page] their constancy in fervent prayers, during the time of the enemies absence. And seeing the force of Egypt and Cush were not sufficient to dissipate Senacheribs mighty army, perhaps not able to hold him play any longer; the Lord sends Hezekiah and his people deliverance from heaven: Then the Angell of the Lord went forth, and smote in the Camp of the Assyrians, a hundreth fourescore and five thousand: and when they arose, early in the morning, behold they were all dead corpses. Isaiah, 37. vers. 36. The noise of this great overthrow was as the joyfull sound of a Iubile unto Ierusalem, and did portend another more admirable and victorious Iubile to bee accomplished in the same place; of whichIn the Treatise of Christs answer to Iohn. elsewhere. This for the present might witnesse to Hezekiah and the people, that rather then one tittle of Gods Covenant with David should fal to the ground, the host of heaven should leave their station, and keepe garrison on earth. A little after this miraculous deliverance, the Sun is compelled to goe fifteene degrees backwards, for setting forward the course of Hezekiah his life, whom Death and Fate had now, in the worlds sight, arrested. God hereby testified unto Prince and People, that if they would continue such in health, as they were in sicknesse, so well-minded in peace and prosperity, as they had beene in strait siege, or other distresse of war: Ierusalems good dayes might become as certaine and constant, as the dayes of heaven; seeing that great light, which was appointed from the beginning to rule the day, did now give place to Hezekiahs prayers. But most [Page] of this people were most unlike their Prince, albeit even he, after he had received those two miraculous pledges of Gods loue, did not render according to the reward bestowed upon him. 2 Chron. 32. v. 25. For his heart was lifted up, therefore there was wrath upon him, and upon Iudah and Ierusalem. Notwithstanding, Hezekiah humbled himselfe for the pride of his heart (both he and the inhabitants of Ierusalem:) so that the wrath of the Lord came not upon them in the dayes of Hezekiah.

7 After the yoake of Ashur was taken from off this peoples neck, many of them became wanton, others secure, as not suspecting that a Cockatrice should spring out of this Serpents root, that his fruit should be a fiery flying Serpent. Isai. 14. v. 29. Vnto Hezekiah himselfe, though a most wise and prudent King, the Babylonian tyranny, being now in his infancy, did seeme by nature mor [...] mild and gentle, than the Assyrian had beene. And not content to entertaine the King of Babylons Ambassadors with curtesies sutable to their congratulations, he shewed them his treasury and all the good things wherwith the Lord had blessed him: willing (perhaps) to give their master and the world to wit, that notwithstanding the former wars and exactions, hee was no begger; but a fit confederate for neighbour Princes, to curbe the insolency of the Assyrian, whose strength though much abated by the terrible blow, which the Angell of the Lord had given Senacheribs host, was not quite broken till many yeares after. But the Prophet knew this fawning whelpe to be of wolvish kinde, and discovered [Page] those implanted seeds of cruelty in him, which when they came to be ripe, would be more noysome to the Kings and Princes of Iudah, than his predecessor the Assyrian had beene. Isaiah said unto Hezekiah, Heare the word of the Lord: Behold, the dayes come, that all that is in thy house, and that which thy fathers have laid up in store unto this day, shall be caried unto Babylon: nothing shall bee left, saith the Lord. And of thy sonnes that shall issue from thee, which thou shalt beget, shall they take away, and they shall bee Eunuches in the palace of the King of Babylon. 2 King. Chapter 20. vers. 17, 18.

8 Any Heathen which had held Esaias for an undoubted Sooth-sayer, would instantly have concluded hence, that the captivity of Hezekiahs successors, and all the miseries which the Babylonian afterwards brought upon Iudah and Ierusalem, were absolutely fatall, altogether impossible to be avoided. And many good Christians (perhaps) will question, whether the plagues here threatned, were not from this point of time, necessary in respect of the Divine Decree. To answer this question by interrogation: Why should not the spirit of the Prophet Esay be as truly subject to the former propheticall rule, as Micahs was? Now God, according to that rule, was ready to repent him of all the evill, which he had threatned, whensoever the people should repent them of whatsoever they had done. The Lord had given Hezekiah and his successors a farre larger and longer time, for preventing the evill which Esay threatned, than they [Page] had for avoiding the doome denounced by Micah. The very tenour of the denunciation made by Esay, shewes them a ready meanes for preventing the woe denounced; so they would have laid it to their hearts, or followed the advise of succeeding Prophets. But mortality must needs be rife, where variety of diseases and multitudes of unskilfull Empyricks do meer. The common transgressions of the people, are the epidemicall diseases of States: and such projects as Princes or Statesmen, without the prescript of Gods Word, or suggestion of his Providence, use for their recovery, are like unseasonable ministration of Empyricall or old wives medicines, to crased bodies. They usually invite or entertaine the destruction or ruine of kingdomes, otherwise ready to depart. Not the best amongst the Kings of Iudah, but were smatterers in empyricall or secular policy. Some were more, some lesse, all too much given to put confidence in multitude of men and store of treasure. And for increasing this supposed sinew of Warre and nutriment of Peace, they used meanes, neither warrantable by Gods written Law, nor by the rule of charitie. To prevent this mischiefe which is the root of all evill, what perswasion could be more fit or pertinent, than this prediction of the Prophet: That the wealth which Hezekiah and his fathers had heaped together, which his successors would be too carefull to increase, would in succeeding ages steale their children, for whom it was provided, from them, and make them miserable captives in a forraigne Land. To heape up riches we know not for [Page] whom, is a vanity; to heape them up with care and toile to the destruction of our best private friends, and advancement of the publike enemy, is the extremity of folly mixt with misery. Had Hezekiah his successors beene as ready to aske counsell of Gods Prophets as of Politicians; these could have instructed them, that the miseries foretold by Esay, were fatall unto covetousnesse and unconscionable care for posterity; yet not simply necessary after covetousnesse was much increased in Hezekiahs successors. For long after the going out of this decree, whensoever the Princes of Iudah repented for their owne oppression, and the oppression of their fathers, the Lord repented him of the plagues denounced, and shewed himselfe ready to remove the oppressor from them. And though in penitency in other sinnes, did in part concur; yet continuance in violence and oppression, was the principall string and fatall cord, by which the Princes of Iudah did draw captivity upon themselves and their children, and desolation upon the City.

9 To passe over the various alternation of Iudahs and Ierusalems different fates, in the dayes of Manasses Ammon, and Iosias, and come to Iehoikim, Iosias sonne, in whose dayes the inveterate disease of Iudah came to a Crisis: Did not thy Father (saith the Prophet Ieremy to this untoward and Prince) eate and drinke, and doe judgement and justice, and then it was well with him? He judged the cause of the poore and needy, then it was well with him: was not this to know me (saith the Lord?) But thine eyes and thy heart are not, but for thy covetousnesse, and for to [Page] shed innocent blood, and for oppression, and for violence to doe it. Therefore thus saith the Lord concerning See Iosephus in the history of Iehoiakim. Et Seder Olam.Iehoiakim the son of Iosiah King of Iudah, They shall not lament for him, saying, Ah my brother, or ah sister: they shall not lament for him, saying, Ah Lord, or ah his glory. He shall bee buried with the buriall of an Asse, drawne and cast forth beyond the gates of Ierusalem. Ier. 22. vers. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.

Shortly after the execution of this sentence upon Iehoiakim in full measure, Ieconiah his son, with other of the royall seed, according to Esaias former prophesie, were caried captives unto Babell, and all or some of them made Eunuches. Howbeit the execution of the same decree upon Zedekiah and such as were yet left behinde, was not as yet unavoydable, or meerly fatall; but such notwithstanding they made it at last by continuance of like covetousnesse and oppression.

When the City was more narrowly besieged by the Chaldean, than it had beene by the Assyrian: the Lord of hosts calls for the Aegyptian, as he had done for the King of Cush, to remove the siege. The libertie and respiration which Zedekiah and his besieged people in the meane time got, being much greater then Hezekiah had for two years space together; was a true pledge of Gods antecedent will, which in part they had fulfilled, and which should undoubtedly have beene fulfilled in greater measure for their good, so they had used this liberty to Gods glory; or gone on so well in this time of breathing, as in their distresse they had [Page]begun. Ye were now turned, and had done right in my sight, in proclaiming liberty every man to his neighbour, and ye had made a covenant before me in the house which is called by my name. But ye returned and polluted my name, and caused every man his servant, and every man his hand-maid, whom hee had set at liberty at their pleasure, to returne; and brought them into subjection, to be unto you for servants and for hand-maids. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Yee have not hearkned unto me, in proclaiming libertie every one to his brother, and every man to his neighbour: behold I proclaime a liberty for you, saith the Lord, to the Sword, to the Pestilence, and to the Famine: and I will make you to be removed into all the Kingdomes of the Earth, &c. Ier. 34. v. 15, 16, 17. And Zedekiah King of Iudah and his Princes will I give into the hands of their enemies, and into the hand of them that seeke their life, and into the hand of the King of Babylons army which are gone up from you. Behold, I will command, saith the Lord, and cause them to returne to this City, and they shall fight against it, and take it, and burne it with fire, and I will make the Cities of Iudah a desolation without an inhabitant. ver. 21, 22.

10 Too much skill in secular policy made them put too great confidence in the strength of Aegypt: and this confidence in the helpe of man, made them secure, whilest they were conscious of breaking the Covenant which their Fathers had made, and they lately renewed with their God. The probabilities of the Aegyptians success against the Chaldean, were (in all politique esteeme) very [Page] great: and likely it is that the Chaldeans were brought back againe with speed unto Ierusalem by the speciall hand of the Almighty, that they might execute his judgements upon this rebellious people. How necessary, how fatall and unevitable the execution of his consequent will alwayes becomes, where his antecedent will hath beene thus openly and wilfully neglected, may best be gathered from the same Prophets reiterated threats unto this people, resuming (as it seemes) their former vaine confidence of the Chaldeans finall departure, after his forementioned prophecy to the contrary. Ier. 37. ver. 9, 10. Thus saith the Lord, deceive not your selves, saying, The Chaldeans shall surely depart from us: for they shall not depart. For though ye had smitten the whole army of the Chaldeans that fight against you, and there remained but wounded men among them; yet should they rise every man in his tent, and burne this Citie with fire. To extinguish this flame, or prevent the extinction of Zedekiahs royall race and Iudahs earthly glory, there was no possibility left, so long as they wrestled with Fates, and made policie their strength: yet was there after this time, a possibility, as true, as Gods promise can make any, for escaping à tanto, though not à toto; a possibility for Zedekiah to have kept himselfe and his family in a better estate, then they afterwards enjoyed; a possibility to have left the City and Temple standing, after death had disposed of them; so he would at the time appointed by God, have submitted himselfe unto the King of Babell, unto whom he had sworne allegiance. Then said Ieremiah[Page]unto Zedekiah, Thus saith the Lord the God of Hostes, the God of Israel; If thou wils assuredly goe forth unto the King of Babylons Princes, then thy soule shall live, and this Citie shall not bee burnt with fire, and thou shalt live and thy house. But if thou wilt not goe forth to the King of Babylons Princes, then shall this City bee given into the hands of the Chaldeans, and they shall burne it with fire, and thou shalt not escape out of their hand. Ier. 38. ver. 17, 18

And Zedekiah the King said unto Ieremiah; I am afraid of the Iewes that are fallen to the Chaldeans, lest they deliver mee into their hand, and they mocke me. But Ieremiah sayd, They shall not deliver thee: obey, I beseech thee, the voice of the Lord, which I spake unto thee: so it shall bee well unto thee, and thy soule shall live. But if thou refuse to go forth, this is the word which the Lord hath shewed me. And behold, all the women that are left in the King of Iudahs house, shall bee brought forth unto the King of Babylons Princes, and those women shall say; Thy friends have set thee on, and have prevailed against thee: thy feet are sunke in the mire, and they are turned away back. So they shall bring out all thy wives, and thy children to the Chaldeans, and thou shalt not escape out of their hand, but shalt be taken by the hand of the King of Babylon: and thou shalt cause this Citie to bee burnt with fire. &c. vers. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23.

11 This last neglect of Gods antecedent will, so often revealed for his good, procured the speedy execution of his consequent will without all possibility to avoid it. Not a title of Ieremies or Ezekiels [Page] prophesie, which hisSee Josephus in the Historie of Zedekiah. Politicians sought to set at variance, but is exactly fulfilled upon him, and so is Micahs prophesie upon this Citie. The manner how Ieremies and Ezekiels prophesie, which seeme to contradict each other, were both fulfilled, is admirable, and might well move a man, not well acquainted with the nature of prophecies and Gods speciall providence, to think the Fates had plotted his ruine. But this particular argument is prosecuted elsewhere more at large.

12 To recapitulate the summe of many arguments to like purposes vnto every possible choise or resolution made by man, whether concerning matters private or publique, there is a distinct correspondent successe allotted by the omnipotent and immutable Decree. Every actuall choise or resolution, is as the drawing of a new lott, whose just price or recompence, be it good or bad, is instampt upon it from eternity. And for the awarding or payment of it in due time, the whole host of Gods creatures stand bound by the very tenour of their beeing or dependancy upon their Maker. Seeing all of them were made by his word, and are continued by his meere will and pleasure; sooner shall they forfeit their very beeing, and be resolved into nothing, than the least tittle of Gods will, concerning any creature, should not be fulfilled; or, that successe, be it good or bad, should not be awarded to private men or publike States in that exact degree and measure, which God from eternity hath appointed.

From ignorance of this essentiall subordination, [Page] which fate or conspiracy of second causes, have unto Gods irresistible providence, who by his infinite creative power, can at all times dissolve their combination, or compose them anew, by wayes to man for number incomprehensible, as pleaseth him; the wisest amongst State wizards have erred and do erre more grossely in assigning the causes of Kingdomes ruines or erections, or in prognosticating the successe of politick skill, than a vulgar Astronomer should do, which would take upon him to foretell the peculiar disposition of the Ayre or weather in every place throughout this Iland, for every houre of the yeare following. The observation which many of them gather from the inspection of times present or past, are of as little use for future ages, as an Almanack of this yeare, is for the yeares following. Sooner may moderne Scholars prove extraordinary Husbandmen, by observing Virgils Calender of the rising and setting of Stars, or other rules of that ancient husbandry, which he describes; than pragmaticall wits become wise Statesmen by reading Tacitus, Livy, or others, better acquainted with the mysteries of State, or Princely secrets, than with Gods providence or with the Almighties Decree concerning the successe of their projects. Though that decree bee as He is most immutable, yet the variety of mens dispositions, especially in sundry ages, is greater than any alterations in the heavens; the divers conjunctions or oppositions of mens wils to his, are more then can be found amongst the Starres. Now it is his immutable will to render unto every people and [Page] nation, according to the degrees of that conformity or dissonancy, which they hold; with his mercy, bounty, or justice, or with his most holy will.

CHAP. 25.
Of the sudden and strange erection of the Macedonian Empire, and the manifestation of Gods speciall providence in Alexanders expedition and successe.

1 ARISTOTLE [...]. Arist. l. 7. cap. 7. polit. being born when Greece did flourish, and living when the Halcyon dayes of Macedon beganne to dawne, would gladly tie the light of GODS countenance, which in his full age was inclining to the Meridian of Greece, unto the situation of his Country, and disposition of his Countrimen, whose politick vertues, in his Philosophicall vanity, were intailed to the peculiar temper of that clime. The people (saith hee) that live in cold countries, and in Europe (as distinct from Greece) are stout and hardy, but not so wise and politick; more free then civill, much apter to be their owne men then their neighbours masters. The Asiatickes (that want no wit) are destitute of courage: therefore they remaine in servitude and subjection [Page]unto others. The Grecians as they enjoy the middle place for situation, so they participate with the Asiaticks for wit, and colder countries for courage, in such proportion, as enapts them to preserve their libertie, and to beare rule and soveraignty over others. Many Comets at their first appearance, are usually mistaken for fixed Starres, reputed next in glory unto the Moone; untill their parallax bewray their place, and their sudden end discover their orginall to bee corruption. Thus the brightnesse of the Grecian Monarchy, whilest it was in rising or comming unto its height, misperswaded their hearts whose eyes it dazeled, that it was to endure like the daies of heaven; whereas it proved but like the glistring bubbles of the morning dew, which dissolve with the strength of those beames, that gave them lustre. This is the onely difference: the period of their splendor falls in the compasse of an houre, and Comets usually continue not many months. Wheras the rise and fall of Kingdomes commonly outreach any one mans age or observation, and such as follow marke the occurrences of their owne times more then their connexion with former. Whence it is, that secular politicians are alwayes learning, and never attaine unto the knowledge of what they seeke. Howbeit, Aristotle lived long enough to have seene his error, for Alexander (I take it) did dye before him, and with Alexanders life the light of Macedon was extinguished, and the glory of Greece much eclipsed and abated. And though neither Greece nor Macedon have changed their clime or site, yet Aristotles [...], Keene [Page]Cocks of the game, have proved as arrant Cravens since, as the Asiaticks in his time were; as any Europe ever hatched: infamous for effeminatenesse under the Romanes, so deeply infected with the Asi-aticke luxury, that their very nature seemed to be tainted with servility, and to sollicite that barbarous yoake, which for a long time hath been laid upon them. But their present estate stands in more need of our prayers, then their fore-elders did of our censure. To returne unto their best times.

2 Never had any Monarchy on Earth save one (if happily that may be called a Monarchy) either so speedy an erection or so sudden a dissolution, as the Macedonian had. The true reason of its sudden dissolution, as aPa [...]san. Writer in this case unpartially tells us, was, because the Foundation of it was laid by perjury. The true cause of its swift erection, was partly the execution of Gods justice upon the Persian, and other Nations communicants with him in his present luxury, partly the accomplishing of Gods antecedent will for the good of his Church, as isIn the fulfilling of that prophesie, Zac. 9. v. 9. elsewhere specified. In Aristotles time, Alexander was, as Nebuchadnezzar had beene Gods scourge or hammer to bruise all Easterne Nations.

3 The incredible successe of Alexanders furious attempts were such, as no Heathen which outlived him, could ascribe unto policy, wealth, or strength, or whatsoever meanes meerly humane. Amongst others, the heroicall Romane Poet so describes his beginnings and proceedings, as if the Fates had used his restlesse instinct to purchase same, but as a [Page] spur to make him runne the race, and his sudden death as a curb to check his fury, lest he should transgresse the bounds that they had set him.

—Macedum fines, latebras (que) suorum

Deseruit, victas (que) patri despexit Athenas,

Per (que) Asiae populos fatis urgentibus actus

Humana cum strage ruit, gladium (que) per omnes

Exegit gentes: ignotos miscuit amnes;

Persarum Euphraten, Indorum sanguine Gangen:

Terrarum fatale malum, fulmen (que) quod omnes

Percuteret pariter populos, & sydus iniquum

Gentibus. oc [...]ano classes inferre parabat,

Exteriore mari, non illi flamma, nec undae,

Nec sterilis Libye, nec Syrticus obstitit Ammon.

Isset in occasus, mundi devexa secutus,

Ambisset (que) polos, Nilum (que) à fonte bibisset:

Occurrit suprema dies, natura (que) solum,

Hunc potuit finem vesano ponere Regi.

Lucan. lib. 10.

Sed cecidit Babylone suae, Partho (que) verendus.

Pro pudor! E [...]i propius timuere sarissas,

Quam nunc pila timent populi: licet us (que) sub Arcton

Regnemus, Zephyri (que) domos, terras (que) premamus

Flagrantis post terga Noti: cedemus in ortus

Arsacidum domino, non foelix Parthia Crasso

Exiguae secura fuit provincia Pellae.

Lucan. ibid.

The Easterne Nations (to our shame)

The Grecian pikes did dread

[Page]More than they doe the Romans dart,

Whose soveraignty is spred

Through Climates hot, and Climates cold;

Through all the winds that blow.

Did not proud race of Arsacus,

Vs in the East o're-crow.

Yet Parthia stout, which, (unreveng'd)

Drunke Roman Crassus blood,

To little Pella, on safe termes,

Of conquer'd Province, stood.

4▪ Some passages in this Poet may serve as a Motto to Apelles his devise, who painted Alexander with a thunderbolt in his hand; as if hee had beene appointed for a sudden terrour to Nations farre and near, astonishing more places with dread of his swift approach, then felt his stroke. But whatsoever the Poet or Painter could expresse, was more excellently represented by Gods Prophet, many yeares before Alexander or Darius was born. And as I was considering, behold, an hee Goat came from the West on the face of the whole earth, and touched not the ground: and the Goat had a notable horn betweene his eyes. And hee came to the Ramme that had two hornes, which I had seene standing before the river, and ranne unto him in the fury of his power. And I saw him come close unto the Ramme, and he was moved with choler against him, and smote the Ramme, and brake his two hornes, and there was no power in the Ramme to stand before him, but hee cast him downe to the ground, and stamped upon him; and there was none that could deliver the Ramme out of[Page]his hand. Therefore the hee Goat waxed very great, and when he was strong, the great horne was broken: and for it came up foure notable ones, towards the foure windes of heaven. Dan. 8. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. What should move the Prophet to compare the Kingdome of the Medes and Persians to aThe Persian Rams, as some relate, are of an extraordinary greatnesse, and might serve as an Embleme of Darius his excessive power in respect of Alexanders, if it were to be measured by visible cōjecture. Ramme, or what the comparison did in particular portend, is not so usefull for me at this time to know, nor so easie to finde, as the mysticall portendment of his resembling the Macedonian Kingdome to a Goat. The Macedonians in Daniels time, and untill Philip of Macedons time (who asNon sum facturus verba, Macedones, ut vos abista domum redeundi cupiditale demoveam (siquidem per me integrum vobis est quò libuerit abire) sed ut intelligatis, quid ego vobis praestiterim, & qualē vos mihi vicē rependentes discedatis. Ac primum à Philippo patre (ut par est) ordiar. Philippus enim vos incertis sedibus errantes atque inopes, & pleres (que) sub Pellibus degentes, exiguos (que) ovium greges in montibus pascentes, ac pro ijs parum feliciter adversùs Illyrios, Triballos, & finitimos Thracas bellum gerentes; pro Pellibus Chlamydes gestendas dedit, ex montibus in planitiem deduxit, pares (que) hostibus ad pugnandum effecit, ut non tam in Locerū munitione deinceps, quā in vestra virtute sal [...]tē collocaretis urbes vobi [...] habitādas dedit, optimis (que) legibus at (que) institutis ornavit. Idem vobis in eos ipsos barbaros qui vos assiduis populationibus lacessebant, imperium acquisivit, & dominos èservis effecit: magnam Thraciae partem Macedoniae adjecit oppidis (que) ad marit [...]mam oram peroppor tunis in potestatem suam redactis, commerciorum sacultatem aperuit, & tutas metallorum fodinas suppeditavit. Thessalos praeterea, quorum metu olim exanimati eratis, vestro imperio subjecit: Gente Phocensium afflicta, aditum in Graeciam amplum & expeditum pro angusto & difficili vobis patefecit. Arrian▪ de expedit. Alex. lib. 7. p. 151. Alexander in his choler, upbraided them, first made them Gentlemen) were poore shepheards or goath [...]ards scarce able to defend their owne mountaines; no way likely to assault the Persian in his owne Land. Now as the swiftnesse of Alexanders expedi [...]ion, and the fiercenesse of his onset upon Darius, is lively resembled by a Goat running to push; so his tender yeares are excellently characterized in the Hebrew, which is verbatim hircus caprarum, which properly signifies rather a Kid, then a Goat come [Page] to full growth; or a male kid that followeth the Damme. For, Alexander, when hee undertooke this expedition against Darius had more of his mothers countenance, then of his fathers. But the yonger he was, the more ready he was to conceive hope of victory against all hope in the forecast of man. His too much haste had procured worse speed, unlesse he which had raised up his spirit to this attempt, had a while arrested him with sicknesse at Tharsis. His abode there and at Solis to sacrifice for his recovery, made Darius presume that hee had runne himselfe out of breath, and durst not looke upon his puissant host, much lesse abide his push. And in this errour, into which his owne and others presumptuous confidence, in the multitude and magnificence of his army, had led him, he makes haste to follow after Alexander, who, before either knew of others removall, was gotten beyond him. The circumstances of their mutuall errour and of their conflict, are so consonant, to the Prophets predictions, that I must beleeve the same God, which decreed Absalons fal by overthrowing Achitophels counsell, had now fully decreed to ruinate the Persian Monarchy, by suffering Darius to listen more unto his flattering braggards, then unto the mature advice of Amyntas. This wiseDarius interea cum exercitu castris locum delegerat, Assyriae cā pum planū omni (que) ex parte apertum, qui & magnitudini exercitus maxime commodus esset, & ad ducendum equitatum peropportunus visus fuerat. A quo quidem loco ne recederet, Amyntas Antiochi filius, ab Alexandr [...] transfuga, su [...]serat. Loci enim amplitudinem, & multitudini Persarum & impedimentis percommodam esse. Et mansit quidem eo Loci Darius. Caeterū quum Alexander longiorem moram Tarsi ob aegritudinem sa [...]ret, ne (que) minorem Solis, ubi & sacrificarat & Ludos fecerat; mullum etiam temp [...]ris in expeditione adversùs Cilicas montanos posuisset: Darium à sententia sua abduxit, ne (que) invitus adid quod maxime cordi erat credendum, protractus est. Siquidem ab ijs qui ad voluptatem tantam loquuntur (maxim [...] semper regibus, cum quibus versantur, damno futuri) impulsus, Alexandrum ulterius progredi [...] sibi [...] adventûs perculsum. Arrian. de expedit. Alex. lib. 2. pag. 35. Captaine, [Page] by birth a Macedonian, well knowing Alexander to be of such a forward spirit, as would scorne either not to seeke his adversary any where, or not to incounter him wheresoever he found him; counselled Darius to expect him in the plaine of Assyria, whither he assured him that hee would shortly come, though to the great disadvantage of the Grecians: But that advantage which Alexander scorned to seeke, the Lord mighty in battaile, vouchsafed to give him, as Alexander himselfe freely acknowledged, after he knew where Darius his army was encamped. Although hee could hardly be brought to beleeve that Darius had left his station and marched toward Cilicia, untill his Scouts brought him certaine word that he had his adversary in his hands, so it would but please him to put them forth whilest time served to take him.

But the Historians censure of Darius his fatall miscariage, will give the ingenuous Reader better satisfaction, then any discourse can be made upon it. To excuse his folly in not hearkning to Amyntas, which had beene too grosse if it had been meerly naturall, he saith, [...], &c. which the Translator misinterprets, when he saith, Ac fortasse Deus illum eo loci adduxit. The Authors words import thus much in English: Assuredly some divine misfortune led him into that place, in which his horsemen, his chiefest trust, would doe him no Hoc etiā modo ejus animum commoverant, quòd Darij Equitatum facile universas Macedonum copias proculcaturum dicebant: quantumvis Amyntas Alexandrum, ubicun (que) is Darium esse audi [...] et, venturum affirmasset: ibi (que) eum opperiri suasisset. Caeterum deterior sententia, quod primo accessu gratior auribus accideret, vicit. Ac fortasse Deus illum eo Loci adduxit, ubi nec equitatus magno usui esse posset, ut nec infinita hominum pariter & jaculorū ac telorum multitudo; sed nec ipsam quidem excercitus magni ficentiam ostendere poterat: sed Alexandro facilem omnino victoriam praebebat. Oportebat enim Asiae imperiū Persis à Macedonibus adi [...]i, quemadmodum Persa Medis ac prius Medi Assyriis ademerant. Arrian, ibid. service, wherein nor multitude of men, nor store [Page]of munition, could advantage him, being so straitned that he could not make any true representation of the gaudinesse or goodlinesse of his army. It was a place so fit as Alexanders Counsell of Warre, could not have made choise of a fitter for delivering vp the Scepter of Persia into his hands.

5 Alexanders sollicitous, though superstitious care to render thankes or supplications for good successe unto the reputed Gods of every place where he touched in this expedition, is to me a sufficient testimony or assured signe, that he had taken certaine notice of some peculiar divine instinct impelling him to undertake it. And not knowing from what speciall God this instinct or impulsion came, he tendred his service unto all he knew. Postquam nam (que) è longinque vidit candidatum populum, & Sacerdotes ante agmen in amictu byssino, Pontificem (que) in stola hyacinthina auro distincta, tiaram in capite gestantem, prae fix [...] aureâ lamina Dei nomine inscript [...], vix mentis compos, solus accedens ad Pontificem [...]lexander, comiter salutans nomen Dei adoravit, quem se in Macedonia vidisse memoravit, dum deliberaret quo pa [...]to Asiam posset subigere, ejusque [...]ortatu expeditionem suscepisse. Quare & Deo immolavit▪ salvis vitibus in templum ascendens, gavisus admodum o [...]enso sibi libro D [...]elis, in qu [...] Graecum quendum Pers [...] debellaturum significabatur. Lib. antiq. 11. cap. 8. Iosephus his narration of his devotion at Ierusalem, and great respect of Gods High Priest there, sutes well with his usuall demeanour towards other Gods, related by this Heathen Writer, and is not improbable from his princely kindnesse unto the Iewes, to whom he allotted free habitation in the City called by his owne name. Vide Dion.

6 Many particulars not impertinent to this discourse, I leave to the ingenuous Readers observation, that shall be pleased to peruse Diodorus Siculus, Arianus, or Quintus Curtius. These present rightly applyed, may asswage that declamatory humour of some pedantick politicks, which would have Alexanders [Page] strange successe to be the naturall issue of Macedonian valour, and Asiatick effeminatenesse. Such collections might bee tollerated in a young Student appointed to make a theame or declamation in praise of masculine or frugall spirits, or in dispraise of feminine luxury. Howbeit these politick conjectures, are rather imperfect, than altogether untrue: whether the Authors of them did apprehend so much or no, I know not, but certaine it is, their opinion supposeth a Divine truth, which they expresse not. It is not improbable in true Divinity, that the Persians were plagued as for many other sinnes, so in speciall for their riot & luxury, and that God to give them notice hereof, did make speciall choise of the Macedonian to bee his scourge; a people remarkable in those dayes for austerity of life and masculine behaviour. For so it is usuall with the just Lord to upbraid those whom he severely punisheth for some predomiant vice, with some contrary vertue in them, by whom he punisheth, as elsewhere is exemplified more at large out ofDupliciter in illa Hispanorū captivitate Deus ostendere veluit, quantum & [...]disset acrius libidinem, & diligeret [...]stitatem, cum et Vandalos ob solam maximè pudicitiam illis superponeret, & Hispanos ob solam vel maxime impudicitiam subjugaret. Quid enim? Nanquid non erant in omni orbe terrarum b [...]rberi fortiares, quibus Hispaniae traderentur? multi abs (que) dubio, imo ni fall [...]r, omnes. Sed id [...]o ille infirmissimi [...] hostibus cuncta tradidit, ut ostenderet scilicet, non vires valere, sed causam; ne (que) no [...] tunc ignavissimorum qu [...]rundam hostium fortitudine obrui, sed sola [...] nostrorum impuritate superari. De gubern. Dei. lib. 7. Salvianus. But unlesse the Lord had otherwayes disposed of time and place, the Persian horses were not so effeminate or cowardly, but they might easily have put the Macedonian pikes to flight, or trampled the footmen under their feet, as Darius Courtiers proudly bragged [Page] before their encounter. But pride goes before destruction, and God for this [...]on brought them into those straits, wherein they might perceive and see the truth of what his Prophet had said, An horse is but a vaine thing, neither shall hee deliver an [...] by his great strength. Psal. 33. 17. And againe: Woe to them that goe downe to Aegypt for helpe, and stay on horses, and trust in charets, because they are many, and in horsemen, because they are very strong: but they looke not unto the holy One of Israel, neither seeke the Lord▪ Isaiah 31. ver. 1. I should think my selfe infideli deteriorem, worse then the Heathen Writer, if I did not derive Alexanders victory over Darius, from the divine decree: The time appointed (to use hisParag. 4. words) was now come, that the Macedonian should take the Empire of Asia from the Persians, as the Persians had taken it from the Medes, and the Medes from the Assyrians. Now who is it that can appoint the times, but hee which sitteth above the circles of the heavens, and moveth all things, being himselfe immovable?

[Page]

CHAP. 26.
Of the erection of the Chaldean Empire, and of the sudden destruction of it by the Persian, with the remarkable documents of Gods speciall providence in raysing up the Persian by the ruine of the Chaldean Monarchy.

1 THe weapons of war woūd more or lesse, according to their skill or strength that weild thē. So is the whole strength of warre it selfe; so is the might and policie of every Kingdome more or lesse successefull to friends, or hurtfull to foes, according to the proportion which it holds, with his will or purpose, who is enstyled the Lord of hosts, the Lord mighty in battaile. Behold, they shall surely gather together, but not by me: whosoever shal gather together against thee, shall fall for thy sake. Behold I have created the Smith that bloweth the coales in the fire, and that bringeth forth an instrument for his worke, and I have created the waster to destroy. No weapon that is framed against thee, shall prosper, and every tongue that shall rise against thee in judgement, thou shalt condemne. This is the heritage of the servants of the Lord, and their righteousnesse is of me, saith the Lord. Isaiah 54. vers. 15, 16, 17. Vnlesse the Grecians had beene generally lyable to the Aegyptians censure [ [...], The Grecians are alwayes children] in true antiquity, Aristotle might have informed himselfe and his followers, that the Assyrians, and other inhabitants of the southerne coasts of Asia, had sometimes beene a people so fierce and terrible in war, that Alexander attended with the whole strength of Macedon, would have beene but as a flock of Sheepe or an herd of Goats to an host of Wolves or Lyons. Whilest Tiglath Pelezer,[Page]Senacherib, and other Kings of Assyria, were Hammers in the hand of God, who could resist them? The strength of these Assyrians was so great, that the Prophet foresaw the sudden advancement of the Chaldeans to the like or greater height or strength, would hardly be beleeved by neighbour Nations, Iew or Gentiles, untill they felt it to their smart.Hab. 1. v. 5. to 10. Behold ye among the Heathen, and regard, and wonder marvellously: for I will worke a worke in your dayes which ye will not beleeve, though it be told you. For loe, I raise up the Chaldeans, that bitter and hasty nation, which shall march through the bredth of the Land, to possesse the dwelling places that are not theirs. They are terrible and dreadfull: their judgement and their dignity shall proceed of themselves. Their horses also are swifter then the Leopards, & are more fierce then the evening Wolves, and their horsemen shall come from far, they shall flye as the Eagle that hasteth to eate. They shall come all for violence: their faces shall sup up as the East winde, and they shall gather the captivity as the sand. And they shall scoffe at the Kings, and the Princes shall bee a scorne unto them: they shall deride every strong hold, for they shall heape dust and take it.

The true and finall reason, as well of the Assyrians as the Chaldeans sudden greatnesse and successe in battaile, was the accomplishment of Gods consequent will upon Israel and other neighbour Countries, growne, by speedy increase of their iniquitie, slaughter-ripe. Howbeit, the power it selfe or successe of these two Monarchies was a sure pledge of Gods antecedentVide S. Hieron. in cap. Isai. 45 v. 2. & 3. will for their [Page] owne greater good; so they had gratefully acknowledged his goodnes in making them so great. But when these Battaile-Axes began to lift up themselves against him, which hewed the Nations with them; he abated their edge and softned their temper. Of Nebuchadnezzar, whose excessive pride had made him prouder then the rest, that Oracle was verified in an exquisite sense:Psal. 49, 20. Man being in honour had no understanding, but became like the beast that perisheth. And that other remnant of the last forecited prophecie, was literally fulfilled in him, of whom it was meant; Then shall his minde change, and he shall passe over, and offend, imputing this his power unto his God. Habak. 1. v. 11. And Balshashar his sonne not taking warning by his humiliation, nor by the hand writing upon the wall, was surprized with sudden destruction, either the selfe same night wherein the hand was seene writing, or (which is more probable) the same night of some yeare following. He had filled the measure of his fathers sinnes, as full with iniquity, as the boules wherein he caroused were with wine; and that being full, to drinke the cup of Gods wrath was to him at that time, necessary.

2 Now according to the Chaldeans growth in former iniquity, the prosperity of the Medes and Persians did daily increase, and their successe in warre, become every day more assured, than formerly it had beene, and at length (in such a sense as hath beene observed) altogether fatall. The frugality of their private life, and publique discipline, specially in warre, were qualifications without [Page] which (perhaps) the Lord would not so highly have advanced them, or used them as his instruments in this service. But even these, and all other morall vertues, unto which the Politician ascribes their good successe, were proper effects of Gods consequent will, now absolutely set to plague the Chaldeans, and of his antecedent will for Israels redemption; sure tokens withall, of his love unto these Conquerors.

The Historicall syncerity of Xenophons intentions, or literall truth of his ingenuous relations, have not beene so much disparaged by any other pretences what soever, (if by any other at all) as by the heroicall sweet exemplary disposition of his admired Cyrus, by his dexterity in consultations, and the extraordinary speedy successe of what hee put in execution. Whatsoever Xenophon hath said concerning his successe, it doth not so farre exceed the unsuspected stories of Alexanders swift growth in fame and greatnesse, as that did the greatest increase or excesse, which any one Generall, (though much longer live'd than Alexander was) or which any one age did ever bring into the Romane State. TheFama est [Caesarem] quū alio tē pore in Hispania, legeret per otium Alexandri historia, diu eum secum cogitabundum sedisse, inde lachrymas profudisse, Mirantibus causam amicis dixisse; Annon videtur vobis gemendum, quum hae aetate, Alexander tot jam regna subegerit, me nihildum gessisse praeclari? Vt ergo Hispaniam attigit, mox accinxit se operi, atque intra paucos dies cobortes decem ad priores viginti conscripsit. Plutarch. in vita Iul. Caesaris. best spirits which Rome had bred, whilest they lookt on Alexanders picture, and the Map of his conquest, were ashamed of their owne dulnesse and slow progresse of their victories. The Parthian though not so masculine and valorous as in Alexanders [Page] time he had beene, was able, in Pompeys. judgement, to have given Caesar the check, after his Pharsalian victory. And in this perswasion Pompey had sought [...] from him, had not Ca [...]es indignation at the motion deterred him:

Si servère potes, miserum quid decipis urbem?

3 The ods of antiquity betweene Cyrus, Alexander, Caesar and Pompey, and other circumstances of severall times, being rightly allowed (according to the rate ofSee the first Booke upon the Creed. pag. 59. &c. former discussions to this purpose,) will make the credit of Xenophon in his institution of Cyrus, of Arianus, and Quintus Curtius, in their Histories of Alexander, and of the best Romane Writers from Livie downewards, to any unpartiall Examiner, much what eaven. Or what if Cyrus, as he is set forth by Xenophon, did in his infancie, youth, or maturity, (all odds and allowances of antiquity rightly made) farre excell Alexander, Pompey, Caesar, or any other whosoever that lived after him, as well in dexterity of wit, as in exemplary disposition of life, military or civill: all this may, without any just suspition of Poeticall fiction, without the least transgression of a faithfull Historians bounds, bee referred unto a more intimate, more placid, and more loving touch of that Spirit, wherewith, all that much excelled others in any age, have beene in some measure or other inspired, and incited to those exploits which have beene performed by them. I cannot blame the latter Romane Heathen for mistrusting Xenophons [Page] relations in the forementioned booke; but surely, that Christian which will not acknowledge some extraordinaryIt is memorable which Xenophon relates in his fourth book, at the time when Cyrus did prosecute the victory, which he had gotten over the Babylonians in the first conflict, wherein their King was slaine. Quum autem progrederentur, & nox a [...] petiisset; proditum est; Cyro & exercitui Lucem claerissimam caelitus ablatam fuisse: quo factum ut in animis [...]mnium quidam horror erga numen divinum, & in hostes confidentia existeret. Xenopon. Lib. 4. fruits of Gods peculiar calling, of his professed fatherly institution, instruction, and protection of Cyrus, shall much forget himselfe.

Thus saith the Lord to his anointed, to Cyrus, whose right hand I have holden, to subdue Nations before him: and I will loose the loynes of Kings to open before him the two leaved gates, and the gates shall not be shut. I will goe before thee, and make the crooked places straight; I will breake in pieces the gates of brasse, and cut in sunder the barres of iron. And I will give thee the treasures of darknesse, and hidden riches of secret places, that thou maist know, that I the Lord which call thee by thy name, am the God of Israel. For Iacob my servants sake, and Israel mine elect; I have even called thee by thy name: I have surnamed thee, though thou hast not knowne me. I am the Lord and there is none else, there is no God besides me: I girded thee, though thou hast not knowne me. That they may know from the rising of the Sunne, and from the West, that there is none besides me; I am the Lord, and there is none else. Isai. 45. ver. 1. usque ad 7.

The Spirit of God (so farre as my remembrance or observation serves mee) doth not elsewhere vouchsafe to grace any Heathen Prince with such honourable titles, or affable speeches as these here mentioned are. Of Gods owne people, but few were called by their names, before these were imposed [Page] by men. This is the prerogative of such as were types of the true Emanuel. The veryEgo vero sic [...]io, mi Rex, inquit. Nam regem natura ni [...]ilo te minil [...] ortum arbitror: quam ille rex est, qui dux apum in alveo nascitur. Illi enim semper apes ultro parēt, ac quocun (que) loco ma [...]serit, ab eo nulla earum discedit. Quod si aliquò prodierit, nulla ipsum deserit. lam mirisicus eis amor erga principem hunc suum innascitur. Itidem erga te mihi quodam modo videntur hi homines adfecti esse. Xenophon. lib. 5. p. 118. characters, which the Heathen have made of Cyrus his amiable cariage towards men, his devotion, and vigilant care to testifie his thankfulnesse towards the Gods for his good speed, are evident tokens of this his speciall calling to the present service, and of his seeking to expresse himselfe in outwardCyrus autem domum reversus, precatus (que) vestam patriam, & Iovem patrium, & Deos caeteros in militiam domo profectus est, quum quidem & pater eum una prosequeretur. Ac postquam domo egressi essent, fulgura tonitrua (que) dextraei oblata fuisse perhibentur. Quae quum adparuissent, alio praeterca nullo captato augurio perrexere; quod maximi Dei signa nemini obscura esse possent. Xenophon lib. 1. p. 25. Hee knew by experience that he was set on worke by some divine instinct, and this made him seeke to please all which he tooks for Gods or Divine Powers. So Xenophon relates in his third book: Bonis avibus hostile solum invasit; ut vero primum fiaes transierat, Tellurem libationibus prepitiam sibi reddidit, & Deos atque Heroas regionem Assyriorum incolentes sacrificiis placa [...]t. Quibus peractis rursum Iovi patrio rem divinam fe [...]it, nec si quis alius se Deorum [...], ullum neglexit. The watchword which he gave unto his Souldiers in that battell wherein the King of Babylon was slaine, was, Iupiter auxiliaris & Dux. Xenophon. lib. 3. performances: albeit young Samuel-like, he could not distinguish the callers voice, wanting an Ely to instruct him; yet can no Atheist bee so impudent as to surmis [...] that Esay, leremy, and Xenophon, should conspire like partners to make a faire game by seeing one anothers hands. For what common stake could they hope to gaine by this practice? but to omit generalities for justifying Xenophon and Herodotus in relating such rare documents of Cyrus his infancy (albeit these being compared with the former prophecie and sacred relations concerning Salomon, or others whom God hath called by name, are in themselves capable enough of credit:) we will descend to such particulars [Page] in Heathen Writers, as are consonant to the sacred passages, concerning the Babylonian warre, and may serve to set forth the wisedome and providence of God in effecting his good purpose towards the captive seed of Abraham. for (according to the intent and purport of the former Prophecy) the Reader is alwayes to beare in minde, that the true and finall cause of Gods extraordinarie blessings upon Cyrus, and of his conquest of the Babylonians, was the appointed deliverance of his chosen people, and the manifestation of his power and wisdome to the ends of the world.

4 A man of moderne experience in treatise of Leagues, and but of speculative acquaintance with the difficulties which interpose to hinder the association of lesser Segniories against mighty neighbour Monarcks, would happely deeme that Xenophon had framed his relations of Cyrus his successe, in linking bordering Nations to the Medes and Persians, by the modell of some Academicall canvas, or suit for some annuall office amongst fellow Citizens. The Armenians, the Hyrcanians, the Cedrosians, with many other naturall subjects to the Babylonian, all unacquainted with the project at the beginning, come over unto Cyrus with as great facility and speed, as if there had beene no greater danger in undertaking this doubtfull and (in common experience) most desperate war, than in giving a free voice to one competitor before another in a free and popular State.

But Xenophon was not so meane a contemplative Scholar, as to commit so foule a solaecisme as[Page]this had beene; albeit his pupose had beene to poetize in these narrations. Poeticall fictions must beare a true resemblance of probability. Truths themselves must bee set forth in their native colours, although they appeare to ordinary experience, most incredible. Such was the successe of Cyrus in the former businesse; if it were to bee deriued onely from his owne witt or contriuance. But Xenophon might have good historicall reasons not to suspect the Persian annalls or Persians reports of Cyrus, as we haue sacred authoritie to beleeue the matters reported by them. He that called Cyrus by his name before hee was borne, and had now set him vp as Competitor with the Babylonian, for the Asiaticke Monarchie, had layd the plot, and made the canvas for him before hee set forth: and (which is principally to bee obserued) had giuen publick warning to those Nations, which Xenophon mentions (more then threescore yeares before) to bee ready with others in armes against Babell: Ier. 51. 27, 28, 29. Set up a standard (saith Ieremie) in the land, blow the Trumpet among the nations: prepare the nations against her: call together against her the kingdomes ofThe first occasion of Cyrus his expedition was to regaine the revolting Armenians unto his uncle Cyaxarez, King of the Medes. And these hee won to their allegiance, partly by love, partly by sleight, having [...]ur prized some parts of their country (under pretence of hunting) before they were aware. See Xenophon, book 2. and 3. how Cyrus won the Chaldeans which bordered upon the Armenians to his side. And his 4. book, how the Hircanians, after the King of Babylon was slaine in battaile, revolted to him, and of the good service which they did him. And after them the Sacae and the Cadusii, with Gobrias and Godatas two great Princes. Ararat, Minni, and Ashchenash: appoint a Captaine against her: cause her horses to come up as the rough Caterpillers. Prepare against her the nations with the Kings of the Medes, [Page] the Captaines thereof, and all the Rulers thereof, and all the land of his Dominion. And the land shall tremble and sorrow: for every purpose of the Lord shall be performed against Babylon, to make the Land of Babylon a desolation without an Inhabitant. It is intimated by another Hab. 2. v. 2, 3, &c. Prophet, that the Lord would have these prophesies concerning Babylon so remarkeably fulfilled, that all the world might take notice of them: The Lord answered mee and said; Write the vision, and make it plaine upon tables, that he may runne that readeth it. For the vision is yet for an appointed time, but at the end it shall speake, and not lye: though it tarry, waite for it, because it will surely come, it will not tarry. Behold his soule which is lifted up, is not upright in him; but the just shall live by his faith. Yea also, because he transgresseth by wine, hee is a proud man, neither keepeth at home, who inlargeth his desire as Hell, and is as death and cannot be satisfied, but gathereth unto him all nations, and unto him all people. Shall not these take up a parable against him, and a tanting proverbe against him and say; woe to him that increaseth that which is not his: how long? and to him that ladeth himselfe with thick clay? Shall they not rise up suddenly that shall bite thee? and awake, that shall vex thee? and thou shalt be for booties unto thē? Because thou hast spoyled many nations, all the remnāt of the people shall spoyle thee: because of mens blood and for the violence of the land, of the Citie, and of all that dwell therein.

Cyrus in the beginning of this expedition was but Cyaxarez his agent, to regaine the revolted [Page] Armeneans. The warre was managed in the King of Media his name, albeit God (according to Esaias Prophesie) did prosper Cyrus under him, as hee did David under Saul. The same did goe of Cyrus amongst the Medes and Persians, as it had of Dauid through the host of Israell, Cyaxarez hath slaine his thousand, and Cyrus his tenne thousand. The Monarchy was to be setled on the Persian; Cyaxarez was feoffee in trust for Cyrus, as Saul was, by Gods appointment, for Dauid.

5 TheirPr [...]cedente vero tempore moritur apud Medos Astyages, & Cyaxares Astyagis filius, matrisque Cyri frater, Medorum imperio potitur. Rex autem Assyriorum quum Cyros universos, non exiguam sane nationem, subegisset, Arabum regem imperio suo subjecisset, Hyrcani [...]s subditos haberet, Bactrios appug [...]aret; futurum existimabat, ut si Medorum vires d [...]bilitasset, facile finitimis omnibus imperaret. Xenophon. lib. 1 p. 22. taking of armes was just, and in their owne defense. Their first resolutions did reach no further, then to the safeguard of their borders, much trespassed upon by the Caldeans, untill unexpected successe & hopefull opportunities of better, daily presenting themselves without seeking, did invite them to come neerer. After they had gotten secret intelligence of the enemies estate, many new associates, and qui [...] possession of so much of his dominions, as would suffice to maintaine their doubled armie; they had no hope to conquer, no purpose to besiege the Metropolies of the kingdome. That, which after a doubtfull consultation, did chiefly sway them in the height of all their strength to continue their war, was the complaint of their trustyThe Medes themselves were unwilling to follow the warres after the King of Babylon was slaine, untill the Hyrcanians did perswade them; and Cyrus himselfe was doubtfull what to doe, untill he saw in what desperate estate he should leave Gobryas, if his army were dissolved. See Xenophon in the 5. book. confederates, justly fearing [Page] lest they should become a prey to the insolent Tyrant, (much exasperated by their revolt) as ready, as able to take revenge upon them, if once their armie should be dissolued. The overthrow of Craesus, following upon their resolution to continue the warre, brought great accesse of new associates and fresh supplies unto their armie. Had Cyrus or his confederates understood the tenour of the Commission which the Lord of hoasts had sealed them before they undertooke this warre; they had no question giuen the onset upon Babylon before the overthrow of Craesus, at that time when they marched by it. Their written warrant, if they could have read it, was very expresse, and their invitation to attempt, full of hope: Remove out of the midst of Babylon, and goe forth out of the Land of the Caldeans, and be as the hee goates before the flocks. For loe, I will raise and cause to come up against Babylon, an assembly of great nations from the North countrey, and they shall set themselves in array against her, from thence she shall be taken: their arrowes shall be as of a mightie expert man: none shall returne in vaine. And Caldea shall be aspoile: all that spoile her shall bee satisfied saith the Lord. Ier. 50. vers. 8, 9, 10. But such is the infinite wisedome of the Lord, that ignorance or concealement of his purpose from men whom hee imploies in his service, is oft-times the best meane to have it spedily executed by them. In this assembly of great Nations from the North, foretold byEsa. 48. 20. Esaiah; besides the Armenians and Hyrcanians, the Lydians and the Cappadocians, with others mentioned [Page] by Xenophon, were included, without whose presence and assistance the enterprise had beene in vaine. The opportunitie which Cyrus after his conquest of Craesus tooke, was the definite time, appointed by God, but concealed from men, perhaps from the Prophet himselfe, which pe [...]ned the Commission. The entire presence of these nations now assembled, and skilfully set in array, before the Citie (as God had commanded, for representing their terrour and strength) was yet nothing so terrible to the besieged spectators as the fame of their absence had beene, when they were [...]ewer. TheQui autem in mure stabant, obsidionem hanc irridebant, quòd ei [...] commeatus esset copiosior, quam in annos viginti. Quae Cyrus quum audiisset, in partes duodecim exercitum divisit, ut pars quaelibet unum anni mensem in excubiis esset. Quibus iterum auditis, multo etiam Babylonii magis irridebant, qui cogitarent secum, Phryges ac Lycios & Arabes, & Cappadoces futur [...]s c [...]ntra se in excubiis; quos omnes arbitrabantur animia erga se magis esse benevolus, quam erga Pers [...]. Ac Fossae quidem jam actae erant. Cyrus vero quum audiisset, celebrari Babylone festum, quendam ejusmodi diem quo Babylonii omnes nocte tota potarent & comessarentur: quamprimum eo die tenebrae accessissent, magna mortaliam multitudine adhibita, Fossarum ostia versus amnem aperuit. Hoc quum factum esset, aqua noctu in Fossa [...] manabat, & alueus fluvii per urbem tendens hominibus permeabilis esse cepit. &c. Xenoph. de instir. Cyri Histor. lib. 7. pag. 190. magnificence of Babylons wals, did seeme to outface them in the height of their bravery, & made them contemptible in her proud childrens eyes. Cyrus himselfe despaired of doing any good by violent assault; his chiefe hopes, were, not in the multitude of his souldiers, but in the multitude of his enemies, more easie to bee vanquished by famine, then if they had beene fewer. But this his project seemed to them ridiculous, being stored with provision for twenty yeares; within which space, some of those companies which hee had set by course to keepe quarter before the City, would forsake him, others they hoped would [Page] become their friends, as they anciently had beene: and in this confidence, they rest secure, as if they had thought to have out-laughed their sudden destruction.

6 The doome which our Saviour gave upon the Foole in the Gospell, doth so well befit the King of Babylon, his wisest Counsellors and Followers, as if it had beene framed of purpose for them. Each of them had said unto his soule, Soule thou hast store of provision layd up for many yeares, take thine ease, eate, drinke, and be merry: but the Lord had said unto them all, by his Prophet Daniel, Yee Fooles, in this night of your merriment and solemnity of your God, shall your soules bee taken from you, and whose then shall those things be, that you have provided? The hand which wrote that dreadfull sentence upon the wall, Mene, Mene, Tekel, Vpharsin; was not more visible to Belshazzar himselfe, then the finger of God in all this businesse, is, or may be to such, as will conferre Xenophons Historicall Narrations, with Propheticall Predictions.

7 FirstAc primum quidem turres propter flumen exstru [...]bat palmis [...]undatas, quarum non minor erat, quam jugeri longitudo. Nam hac majorem etiam in longitudinem excrescunt. Has autem pa [...]mas operi propterea subjiciebat, ut quam maxime videretur id facere quod solent, qui ad urbem obsidendam sese comparant, ut tametsi flumen in fossem dilaberetur, ipsas turres non everteret. Etiam multas, alias supra terram egestam excitabat, ut quam plurima essent excubiarum loca. Xenophon. de instit. Cyri lib. 7. Histor. pag. 190. Cyrus casts his trenches neere the River, whether wth purpose to interrupt or divide its course, or only for more commodious defence of his army, or annoyance of his enemy, Xenophon expresseth [Page] Yet it seemes by Cyrus his answer to Chrysantas, that he had no hope to finde any entrance into the citie, otherwise then by famishing the besieged. Vbi jam in Castris essent Cyrus ijs, quos oporteret, convocatis, dixit: urbem socij undi (que) contemplati fuimus: at (que) equidem, quo pact [...] quis adeò firmos & excelsos muros oppugnando capere possit, videre mihi non videor. Quanto autem plures homines in urbe sunt, quando ad pugnandum non exeunt, tanto citi [...]s fieri arbitror ut fame in potestatem redigantur. Nisi igitur aliquem alium modum habetis, quem nobis ostendatis, hoc ipso nobis istos expugnandos esse autumo. Et Chrysantas inquit: Hic [...]ine fluvius per urbem mediam labitur, cujus latitudo [...]adia duo superat? Ita profecto, ait Gobryas, ac tanta quoque prefunditas ejus est, ut ne duo quidem viri, alter alteri insistentes, supra aquam exstare possint. Quo fit, ut fluvio sit urbs etiam munitior, quam moenibus. Et Cyrus: Missa faciamus haec, ait mi Chrysanta, quae viribus nostris potiora sunt. Xenophon. de instit. Cyri lib. 7. pag. 190. The reason why Cyrus did cast his trenches so wide and deepe, was in his first intention, as it seemes, onely for the more commodious defence of his Souldiers against the sallies of their enemies. Adibita vero mensura quamprimum fossa latissima profunditissima (que) vobis erit agenda, pro parte cui (que) [...]ua; quo paucissimis custodibus vobis sit opus. Xenophon. ibid.not; Herodotus is of opinion, that this opportunity was rather taken when it offered it selfe, then sought by Cyrus, when he first began to cast his trenches. However, the trenches being made, were ready, when opportunity served, to rob the City of the deepe streame, whose naturall course was through the midst of it; and the streame diverted from its wonted chanell, left an easie entrance for Cyrus and his army, under the wals and [...]loodgate through which it passed. His stratagem to make this entrance into the City now drowned with wine, opens to us the literall meaning of divers aenigmaticall prophecies: A drought is upon her waters, and they shall be dryed up: for it is the Land of graven Images, and they are madde upon their Idols. Ier. 50. v. 38. Whatsoever Cyrus might intend, it was Ierusalems and Syons curse upon Babylon, which gave successe unto his stratagem. The violence done to me, and to my flesh, be upon Babylon, shall the inhabitants of Zion say; and my blood upon the inhabitants of Chaldea, shall Ierusalem say. Therefore thus saith the Lord, Behold I will plead thy[Page]cause, and take vengeance for thee, and I will dry up her sea, and make her springs dry. Ier. 51. ver. 35, 36. All these plagues here threatned, are exactly fitted to the patternes of cruelty which Nebuchadnezzar had exhibited in the destruction of the holy City, and the derision of her and other captivated Princes. Ierusalem in the present sense and fresh memory of her griefe had thus complained: Nebuchadnezzar the King of Babylon hath devoured me, he hath crushed me, he hath made mee an empty vessell: (therefore must Babylon bee drawne dry of water) he hath swallowed mee up like a Dragon; hee hath filled his belly with my delicates, he hath cast me cut. Ier. 51. vers. 34. Therefore must Babylon become as heapes, a dwelling place for Dragons, an astonishment, and an hissing without an Inhabitant. vers. 37. It is significantly foretold by Habakkuk that Nebuchadnezzar had consulted shame to his house. Habak. 2. And it is the opinion of good interpreters, that the woe following should be particulatly directed unto him and to his family: Woe unto him that giveth his neighbour drinke; that puttest thy bottle to him, and makest him drunke also; that thou maist looke on their nakednesse. Thou art filled with shame for glorie; drinke thou also, and let thy foreskinne bee uncovered: the cup of the Lords right hand shall be turned unto thee, and shamefull spewing shall be on thy glorie. Habak. 2. vers. 15, 16. Divers Authors of good note have left written, whether upon any better authoritie then tradition of the Hebrews, I know not (though that I know in many cases worthy of respect and credence) that [Page] Nebuchadnezzar did use to make himselfe sport, by making his captive Princes drunke. This and the like insolencies the Lord avengeth upon his sonne and people: In their heate I will make their feasts, and I will make them drunken, that they may rejoyce, and sleepe a perpetuall sleepe, and not awake, saith the Lord. Ier. 51. vers. 39. and when the time appointed was come (whether that were the first or second yeare after the hand writing upon the wall) the Lord gave Cyrus notice of the Babylonians intended aniversary revellings, whom hee had now more infatuated, then they at other times used to infatuate themselves. Cyrus his stratagem to drie up the water, either first conceived or put in execution upon this notice of their drunken festivall, and whatsoever purposes of his that tooke effects, are all directed to the accomplishing of Gods revealed purpose or consequent will upon Babylon, as it were so many arrowes to their marke. The Lord of hoasts was the Archer, and Cyrus his bow, whose intentions against Babylon must therefore prosper, because, The Lord of hoasts hath sworne by himselfe, saying, Surely I will fill thee with men, as with caterpillers; and they shall lift up a shout against [...]hee. Ier. 51. vers. 14. There is not one clause of Cyrus his advise or exhortation to his followers, after they had found the river to bee passable, or of his proclamation after their entrance through the watergate which Xenophon relates, but is parallell to some part or other of Ieremies Prophesies. Wee may boldly say all that Cyrus commanded, was [Page] faithfully executed, that the scripture might bee fulfilled.

8 That At si hoc in mente [...] alicui venit quod fertur esse formidabile urbem intrantibus; ne tectis illi conscensis hinc inde tela in nos conjiciant: id ipsum maxime vobis animos addat. Nam si qui conscendent aedes, opitulator nobis est deus Vulcanus. Et sunt eorum vestibula crematu facilia. Nam januae palmarum è materìa fabricatae sunt, quae ingens incendium citò parient; & copia pici [...] ac stuppae, quae citè magnam flammam eliciunt. Quo fiet, ut vel celeriter necesse sit hos ab [...]dibus aufugere, vel celeriter exuri. Verum agite, arma capite, Diis equidem juvantibus praeibo. Xenophon. de instit. Cyri Histor. lib. 7. p. 191. which in reason might most daunt or deterre his souldiers from raunging the streets of Babylon, was opportunitie of annoyance from the tops of their flat-roofed houses. But this inconvenience Cyrus by his good foresight turnes to his advantage. If any (sath hee) clime up to the tops of their houses (as it is likely many of them would) we have God Vulcan our confederate: for their porches are very apt to take fire, their gates being made of palmetrees, & asphaltites inunctae, which will serve as oyle to cause them to take fire, and wee have store enough of torches pitch and straw to inlarge the flame after the fire be once kindled. By this meanes either we may enforce them to forsake their houses or burne both together. The execution of this stratagem would quickly amate men already affrighted with the sudden surprisall of the Citie. To this purpose, the Lord had spoken long before: The mightie men of Babylon have forborne to fight:Cyrus autem co [...]ortes equitum per vias passim dimittebat, edicens, ut si quos extra domos invenirent, [...]cciderent: at illis, qui adhuc in aedibus essent, per Syriacae linguae peritos [...] jussit, ut intus manerent. Quod si quis foris deprehenderetur, enus morte mult a [...]dum. Et [...]i quidem haec exs [...]quebantur. Xenophon. ibidem. pag. 192. they have remained in their holds: their might hath failed, they became as women: they have burnt their dwelling places: her barres are broken. Ier. 51. vers. 30. One post shall runne to meete another, and one messenger to meet another, and shew the King of Babylon that [Page] his citie is taken at one end. And that the passages are stopped, and the reedes they have burnt with fire, and the men of warre are affrighted. verse 31, 32. Xenophon tels us, that after Cyrus had given Gobrias and Gadatas in charge to conduct the Armie with all speede to the Kings Palace: Si qui occurrebant, of such as Atqui, aiebant illi, qui erant cum Gobrya, Demō strate nobis i [...]inera quū vob [...]s ea cognitasint. Vrbs enim tota, hac nocte comessationi est intenta. Sed in excubias tamen ante regiae portas incidemus, quod cae semper i [...]tic coll [...]centur. Non negligenda res est, ait Cyrus, sed eundum, ut quam maxime imparatos offend imus. Quae quum essent dicta, pergebant. Si qui eis obviam venirent, partim caesi peribant, partim retrò vicissim fugiebant, partim clamorem edebant. Cum his & Gobrya [...]i clamores edebant [...]osdem, velut ipsi quo (que) comessationum socii. Simul pergentes, quà celerrime progredi poterant, ad regiam perveniunt. Et hi quidem Gobryae Gadatae (que) adjuncti portas regiae clausa [...] invoniunt: qui verò adversus Regiae custodes ire jussi f [...]erant, irr [...]unt in eos in ignem luculentum potantes, statim (que) hostili cum eis more agunt. Xenophon ibidem. came in their way, some were slaine, others retired againe into the citie, others cryed out. That which made the noyse more confused and the danger lesse apprehended, was, that Gobrias and his souldiers being Babylonians by birth, did counterfaite the roaring of that unruly night. Whatsoever occasion of distast or implacable discontent the proud King had given to these two captaines, (whether those which Xenophon reports or others) the finall cause of that successe, which their bloody intentions against their native King did finde, was the accomplishment of Gods will reuealed against him for his Grandfathers crueltie against Ierusalem, whereof being gently warned by Gods Prophet, he no way repented, but added gall to wormwood, and thirst to drunkennes, O thou King, the most high God gave Nebuchadnezzar thySo Grandfathers are usually called Fathers in Scriptures, specially in respect of such as inherit after them. It is evident from Ier. 52. vers. 51. that Evil-Merodach did immediately succeed Nabuchadnezzar. This Evil-Merodach was that King of As [...]yria which was slain in the battaile betwixt Cyrus and the Babylonians related by Xenophon in his 4. book. A King much better beloved of his subjects than his son Belshazzar. father a kingdome, and majestie, and glorie, [Page] and honor. And for the Majestie that he gave him; all people, nations, and languages trembled and feared before him: whom he would, he slew; and whom hee would, he kept alive; and whom hee would, hee set up; and whom hee would, hee put downe. But when his heart was lifted, and his minde hardened in pride: he was deposed from his Kingly throne, and they took his glorie from him. And hee was driven from the sonnes of men, and his heart was made like the Beasts, and his dwelling was with the wild Asses: they fed him with grasse like Oxen, and his body was wet with the dew of heaven, till hee knew that the most high God ruled in the kingdome of men, and that hee appointeth over it whomsoeuer he will. And thou his sonne O Belshazzar, hast not humbled thine heart, though thou knewest all this: but hast lifted up thy selfe against the Lord of heaven, and they have brought the vessels of his house before thee, and thou and thy Lords, thy wives and thy Concubines have drunke wine in them, and thou hast praysed the gods of silver, and gold, of brasse, yron, wood and stone, which see not, nor heare, nor know: and the GOD in whose hand thy breath is, and whose are all thy wayes, hast thou not glorified. Then was the part of the hand sent from him, and this writing was written. And this is the writing that was written, MENE, MENE, TEKEL, VPHARSIN. This is the interpretation of the thing, MENE, God hath numbred thy kingdome, and finished it. TEKEL, thou art weighed in the balances, and art found wanting. PERES, thy kingdome is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians. Dan. 5. vers. 18. to 29.

[Page] 9 Thus wold Daniel have cured Babel, but she was not cured by him; howbeit Belshazzar was more kinde to Daniel then to himselfe, then most great Princes are to Gods best Prophets that reprove them: For he commanded and they cloathed Daniel with scarlet, and put a chain of gold about his neck, & made a proclamation concerning him, that he should be the third Ruler in the kingdome. In that night was Belshazzar the King of the Caldeans s [...]aine. And Darius the Median tooke the kingdome being about threescore and two yeere old. Dan. 5. vers. 29, 30, 31. For it is not the bestowing of a Scarlet robe, of Court holy water, or of reall honour in greatest measure upon Gods servants, that can couer a scarlet sinne in Princes. The staine of blood can never be washed off, nor the crie of the oppressed blowne away (though the whole element of water, winde, & ayre were at their commands) without the teares and sighs of the oppressors, whose hearts cannot be cleansed without repentant prayers. Ierusalems sighs and teares in her sorrow had sunke too deepe into the Almighties eares, to be expiated without the sacrifice of many sorrowfull hearts and contrite spirits throughout Babel: Israel is a scattered sheepe, the Lyons have driuen him away: first the king of Assyria hath devoured him, and last this Nebuchadnezzar King of Babylon hath broken his bones. Therefore thus saith the Lord of hosts the God of Israel, behold I will punish the King of Babylon and his Land, as I have punished the king of Assyria. And I will bring Israel againe to his habitation. &c. Ier. 50. vers. 17, 18, 19. Thus Israel [Page] is revolved from Gods consequent wil to his antecedent, & Babylon from his antecedent to his consequent will. And for the speedy execution of both parts of this his will, for Israels good, and Babylons hurt, the Persian Monarchy is with such speed erected.

10 But some happily will here demand, wherein the similitude mentioned by Ieremie, betweene the King of Assyria and the King of Babylons punishments, did consist? Senacharib is the onely Assyrian King, whose disastrous end is registred in sacred story: and Belshazzer is the onely King of Babylon, that did parallell him in his plagues. Senacharib was slaine by his owne sons, Belshazzar by his naturall subjects, sometimes his dearest friends, but made his enemyes by his unnaturall He had slaine Gobrias his sonne, because hee was a better Archer than himselfe: and gelded Gadatas being jealous lest he should prove his corriuall▪cruelty. Senacharib for blaspheming the God of Israel was murthered whilest he offered sacrifice in the house of Nisroch his god: this was one remarkable branch or issue of Hezekiah his praiers against him in the Temple, to wit, That the Lord would declare himselfe to bee a God above all the gods of the nations. Beshazzar is slaine in his royall pallace, whilest he solemnizeth the feast of his great God Bell; Part of whose ceremonies were to praise the gods of silver and gold, of brasse, wood, yron, and stone, and to sawce this Idolatrous luxury, with such sacriledge and blasphemie, asDan. 5. 21. Daniel had forewarned them to avoyd. Senacharib had a large time of repentance allotted, from the sudden destruction of his armie untill his death. Belshazzars disaster and dissolution of his empire, [Page] fell out both in one houre;both (it may be) were more sudden, because his warning to desist from oppression, sacriledg and Idolatry, were more expresse and solemn. The justice of God, though executed upon the Assyrian hoast, by the more immediate hand of his power, upon Babylon by his wisedome; in managing the opportunities and moments of warre, was in both alike remarkable; in that both had their fatall sudden blow in that very night, wherein they had lifted up themselves against the God of heaven, and blasphemed the holy one of Israel: It came to passe that night (not imediately after Ezekias had received Zennacheribs blasphemous message, but in the same night some two yeares after) that the Angell of the Lord went out, and smote in the campe of the Assyrians, an hundred fourescore and five thousand, &c. See Abulensis and [...] in their Comments upon this place. 2 King. 19. 35. And in that night (saith Daniel) was Belshazzar the King of the Caldeans slaine, to wit, in that night, which was solemnly consecrated unto the Caldeans God, and solemnized by aniversarie custome; but whether in that night tweluemonth, wherein the handwriting was sent from God, or more yeares after, is not certaine: that it should be the selfe same night, is from many sacred circumstances, most improbable, if not impossible.

11 In what night soever it was; the sudden surprizall of Belshazzers court and kingdome, though to moderne politicians it may seeme strange; yet no circumstance related by any sacred writer is in it selfe so incredible, as that which Aristotle in his second booke of his politicks reports, as credited [Page] by him; to wit, that some parts of this great Citie did not perceive the deadly blow, which the principall parts of it had felt, till three dayes after it was given. It is a very inconsiderate note which Ramus, or he that set forth his translation of Aristotles politiques, hath left in the margine of this text: Hic locus indicat post Alexandri victorias hos libros scriptos esse, & tamen permirum sit in his Alexandri nullam mentionē fieri. A judicious Criticke would rather have conjectured that these bookes had been written before Alexander tooke Babylon from Darius; in that, there is no mention in all these bookes of Alexanders projects or successe; fit matters (specially being fresh) for politick discourse or instance. At the least, he which had read and remembred the Prophesies of Ieremie or Daniel concerning. Babylons destruction, stood bound in Christian charitie to have demurred upon the point (before he had giuen sentence) whether this place were not to bee understood rather of Babylons surprizall by Cyrus thē of Alexanders taking of it; though it had beene out of question that Alexander had taken it before Aristotle wrote his politicks. Aristotle might haue more good Authors then one, for this report. Herodotus, wee know, (whom Aristotle had read) relates the like; whose entire narration concerning the taking of Babylon by Cyrus I have transcribed, that the Reader may compare his historicall relations with the prophecies before rehearsed, or hereafter to be cited.

[Page] [Cyrus quum Gyndem mulctasset in trecentos & sexaginta rivos diductum, & alterum ver illuxisset, ita porro ire Babylonem pergit, Babyloniis eum producto exercitu praestolantibus. Qui, ubi propiùs urbem ille promovit, cum eo conflixerunt, praelio (que) fugati, in oppidum compulsi fuerunt. Ii tamen, quia Cyrum jampridem animadverterant inquietum esse, viderant (que) omnes pariter gentes aggredientem, comportaverant permultorum annorum commeatus: ideo (que) tunc obsidionem nihili faciebant. Et Cyrus, quum jam longo tempore nihil admodum res ipsius proficerent, inops consilij erat. Tandem sive alius ei anxio suggessit, sive ipsi in mentem venit quid in rem esset, sic statuit faciendum: Instructis universis copiis, partim quà fluvius urbem ingreditur, partim à tergo quà egreditur, praecipit ut, quum cernerent alveum posse transiri, illac urbem invaderent. Ita instructis atque admonitis suis, cum inutiliori exercitus parte abijt ad paludem. Eò ubi pervenit, quae Babyloniorum Regina fecerat circa flu [...]en & circa paludem, eadem & ipse fecit. Nam revocato flumine, alveum ejus pristinum vado transibilem reddidit. Quod quum ita factum esset, Persae qui ad hoc ipsum instructi erant, per alveum unde fluvius Euphrates abscesserat mediorum ferè femorū tenus fortiter Babylonem introierunt. Quos Babylonij, si factum Cyri priùs aut audissent, aut sensissent, haud dubiè contempto eorum ingressu, pessimo exitio affecissent. Nam obseratis omnibus quae ad flumen ferunt portulis, conscensis (que) septis, ipsi pro ripis stantes illos progressos veluti in cavea excepisset. Nunc ex inopinato eis Persae [...]stiterunt: & quum capti essent qui media urbis incolebant [Page] Babylonij, propter ejus tamen magnitudinem non sentiebatur (ut fertur) ab iis qui circa extrema habitabant. Sed quòd fortè dies festus eis esset, exercendis choreis atque oblectationibus operam dabant, donec planè hoc resciverunt. Atque ita primò capta est Babylon. Herodotus Lib. 1.]

One materiall circumstance there is in Herodotus, which is not so much as intimated by Xenophon; and it is this: Albeit the Babylonians could neither have prevented Cyrus in diverting the course of the River, nor withstood his entrance by its chanell; yet might they with ease have stopped his passage along the chanell, or his entrance into any street of the Citie, had they beene mindfull to shut those gates, which at the end of everie street did open upon the river. But that night being consecrated to revelling, the passage by water from one part of the City to another was freely permitted. They had a solemne custome of leaving those gates open that night, which on other nights were to be shut. And by this meanes, destruction found a more easie entrance into that great City.

12 Some modern Politicians have discoursed in folio, against the vastnesse of Cities as most incommodious for defence, taking occasion from Aristotles exceptions against Babylon, which in his censure was a Region; no more a Citie then Peloponesus should be, if it were walled about. But it was not Babylons vastnesse which bred this insensibility when the day of destruction was come, that some members of her should not so much as feele any paine when others were utterly cut off. Should [Page] any Prince now living, in confidence of this experiment, attempt the like upon Quinzie, Moscho, or if any other greater Cities there be in the world, he might finde their Citizens better prepared uppon few houres warning then Babylon was in three dayes, unlesse perhaps he made his assault upon Moscho upon some great Festivall, wherein her citizens enjoy the liberty of Lacedemonian slaves, to be beastly drunke without censure. Cities farre lesse then Babylon, onely her matches in impiety, have beene surprised with Babylonish stupidity, when the ful measure of their iniquity had brought forth the day of visitation. Carthage was farre greater and fuller stuft with all sorts of people when Scipio razed it, then when the Vandals tooke it. And yet no member of it, in the former calamity, was so senselesse of their fellow-members, or of their common mothers griefe, as the whole body was, when most of its naturall members were cut off by the Vandall.

[Fragor ut ita dixerim, extra muros & intra muros praeliorum & ludicrorum confundebatur; vox morientium vox (que) Bacchantium: ac vix discerni forsitan poterat, plebis ejulatio, quae cadebat in bello, & sonus populi qui clamabat in circo. Et cum haec omnia fierent, quid aliud talis populus agebat, nisi ut, cum eum Deus perdere adhuc fortasse nollet, tamen ipse exigeret ut periret. Salvianus Lib. 6.] The noise of battaile without the wals, and the noise of sporting within the walls; the voice of dying men, and the voice of riotous or drunken men, were so mingled and confounded, that a man could hardly have distinguished the [Page] outcries of such as fell in battaile from the noise or cry of the multitude in the game-court. And by such doings, what did this people else, but solicite their owne destruction at Gods hands, who otherwise would not (haply) have destroyed them; or not at this time. With the like stupidity was Treers taken, none of the greatest Cities then in Europe, though one of wealthiest amongst the Gaules, after she had beene thrice lanced. The very Babylonish madnesse did possesse another Citie not farre from Treers: such a lethargie had over-spred the whole Corporation, Vt Principes illius urbis, ne tunc quidem de convivijs surgerent, cum urbem hostis intraret: Ideo enim Deus ipsis evidenter, uti credo, manifestare voluit cur perirent, cum per quam rem ad perditionem ultimam venerant, eam ipsam agerent cum perirent. Salvi [...]nus ibidem. Her Governours did not breake off their feasting and banqueting, when the enemie did enter the City. God (as I conjecture) did purposely manifest the reason why they perished, in that they were doing that very thing when they perished, which had brought them to utter destruction.

13 But of the causes, symptomes, or signes of divine infatuation, elsewhere. Thus much I thought expedient in this place for the young Readers information; that albeit Babylon had beene much greater in compasse, then she was, so that the measure of her iniquity had beene lesse; the date of her prosperity might have beene much longer. Chaldea might have sate as Queene of Nations, in despight of all politicke prognostications, which have beene framed since her overthrow. The best [Page] service which this kinde of Critick usually performes to States or Kingdomes, is to fixe their bol [...]s upon the gates of great Cities, after they have beene ransacked by the enemy. But Babylons iniquity being grown unto that setled height, at which it stood in Ieremies and Daniels times; although her strength, her wealth, provision, and policie, had beene farre greater then they were, and contracted into a narrower roome, than the compasse of her walls; the date of her soueraignty would have beene as short; the device of the Lord would have beene performed against her by other meanes, as sure, and speedy, as Cyrus used, if his stratagem had beene defeated. ForSee Section 1. cha. 9 parag. 3. & chap 10. parag. 2. strength of body, or strength of wit, skill in armes, or skill in policie; all of them are but the gifts of God, hee can either deny them when he pleaseth, or inhibit the use of them where they most abound. He that commanded the fire not to touch his Saints in the furnace, can as easily prohibite the strong to use his strength, the swift his flight, and intoxicate the politicians braine that shall displease him. This is the word of the Lord which came to Ieremiah the Prophet, against the Gentiles, against Aegypt, against the armie of Pharaoh Necho King of Aegypt, which was by the River Euphrates in Carchemish, which Nebuchadrezzar King of Babylon smote in the fourth yeare of Iehoiakim the sonne of Iosiah King of Iudah. Order yee the buckler and shield, and draw neere to battaile. Harnesse the horses, and get up yee horsemen, and stand forth with your helmets, furbish the speares, and put on the brigandines. Wherefore[Page]have I seene them dismaid, and turned away backe? and their mighty ones are beaten down, and fled apace, and looke not back: for feare was round about, saith the Lord. Let not the swift flee away, nor the mighty man escape, they shall stumble and fall towards the North by the River Euphrates. Ier. 46. vers. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6. Goe up into Gilead, and take balme, O Virgin, the daughter of Egypt: in vaine shalt thou use many medicines: for thou shalt not be cured. The Nations have heard of thy shame, and thy cry hath filled the Land: for the mightie man hath stumbled against the mightie, and they are fallen both together. vers. 11, 12. If a few shall chase a multitude, we know the reason, the one was either lesse valiant, or lesse skilfull then the other; But why the valiant should turne their backs in the day of battell, it is Gods Prophet, not the Politician must resolve us: They could not stand because the Lord did drive them. vers. 15.

14 The Lord had given Moab wit and strength and wealth abundance: Hee had beene at ease from his youth, and he had setled on his lees, and had not beene emptied from vessell to vessell, neither had hee gone into captivity: therefore his tast remained in him, & his sent is not changed. Ier. 48. 11. But when he begun to ascribe his prosperitie to his strength or policie, to trust in wealth, and deride his poore neighbour Israel now going into captivitie, the Lord who is debtor to none; bereft him of all: Therefore behold, the dayes come, saith the Lord, that I will send unto him wanderers that shall cause him to wander, and shall emptie his vessels, and breake [Page] their bottles. And Moab shall bee ashamed of Chemosh, at the house of Israel was ashamed of Bethel their confidence. How say yee, we are mightie and strong men for the warre? Moab is spoyled and gone up out of her cities, and his chosen young men are gone downe to the slaughter, saith the King, whose name is the Lord of hoasts. The calamitie of Moab is neere to come, and his affliction hasteth fast. Ier. 48. 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, &c. The horne of Moab is cut off, and his arme is broken, saith the Lord. Make yee him drunken: for he magnified himselfe against the Lord. Moab also shall wallow in his vomit, and he also shall be in derision. For was not Israel a derision unto thee? was he found among theeves? for since thou spakest of him, thou skippedst for joy. ver. 25, 26, 27. They shall howle, saying; How is it broken downe? how hath Moab turned the backe with shame? so shall Moab be a derision, and a dismaying to al them about him. For thus saith the Lord, Behold he shall flee as an Eagle, & shall spread his wings over Moab. Kerioth is takē, & the strōg holds are surprised & the mightie mens hearts in Moab at that day shall be as the heart of a woman in her pangs. v. 39. 40, 41

As for Babylon, if she were stupid and blinde, without all foresight, feare or apprehension of that hideous stormes approach, wherein shee perished: the wonder is lesse to any Christian, then their stupiditie; who thinke her destruction might by rules of policy have bin prevēted. For,Orto autem clamore ac strepitu, quum ij, qui erant in [...]us, tumultum sentirent, & inspici rex juberet quid illud esset rei; apertis aliqui portis, soras procurrunt. Eas quum patefactas Gadatai conspicerent, iruunt & illos rursus fugientes intro sequuti, ac ferientes, ad regem accedunt: eum (que) jam er [...]ctum cum acinac [...], quē strictum tenebat, inveniunt. Hunc Gadataei & Gobriani numer [...] plures opprimunt, interfectis etiam jis, qui regi aderāt ac partim aliquid objiciebant, partim fugiebant, partim se quacunque re peterant, tuebantur. Xenophon. l. 7. pag. 192. though [Page] her defendants had beene more in number then her proud wals could containe, though every one had beene more stout then Hector, armed with more hands then Briarius had; though every one of her sta [...]gazing statesmen had had more politick eyes then Argos had, all had beene one, totidem (que) occulos nox occupatuna. A messenger from the Lord of hoasts, had called for a dimnesse of sight upon her Seers, and sung a lullaby to her souldiers everlasting sleepe: I will make drunke her Pinces and her Wisemen, her Captains and her Rulers, and her mightie men: and they shall sleepe a perpetuall sleepe, and not awake saith the King, whose name is the Lord of hoasts. Ier. 51, vers. 57. So infallibly doth divine Iustice observe the rule of retaliation, whereof I shall hereafter speake: Though Babylon should mount up to heaven, and though shee should fortifie the height of her strengh, yet from me shall spoylers [...] unto her; saith the Lord. Ier. 51. ver. 53. For, seeing her people hath entred into the sanctuary of the Lords house, the Lord wil doe judgement upon her grauen Images. vers. 52.

15 To conclude, The reason of Babels stupiditie, and whatsoever oversights the Politician can discover in her (related by Xenophon or Herodotus) was, that the fulfilling of Ieremies Prophesies against her, might become more manifest to succeeding ages: How is the hammer of the whole earth cut asunder and broken? how is Babylon become a desolation among the nations? I have layd a snare for thee, and thou art also taken, O Babylon, and thou wast not aware: thou are founde and also caught, because[Page]thou hast striven against the Lord. The Lord hath opened his armorie, & hath brought forth the weapons of his indignation; for this is the worke of the Lord God of hoasts, in the land of the Caldeans. Come against her from the utmost border, open her storehouses, cast her up as heapes, and destroy her utterly, let nothing of her bee left. Ier. 50. vers. 23, 24, 25, 26. For she had carried away all that was in Ezekias house, all that his father had laid up in store, nothing was left, as Esaiah had foretold. c. 59. v. 36. the exact fulfilling of whose Prophecie is registred by the sacred Historian. 2 Chron. 6. verse 18. The sudden surprizall of the Citie and Court of Babylon made the finding of the treasure of Darkenesse and the riches of secret places, which the Lord by his Prophet had promised to Cyrus, more easie, then if his entrance at that time had beene suspected or feared: for so the besieged might have had leisure to have hid their treasure where the enemy should hardly have found it.

16 But what speciall comfort is this to Sion, that Cyrus had done to Babylon, as Babylon had done to her. This might satiate or somewhat allay the boyling heat of a revengefull minde. But is the miserie of an enemy of like use unto Gods people, as was the Brazen serpent? Can the sight of it cure their griefe, or beget true happinesse in such as looke on it? It is very probable that Babylons spoiles did helpe to reedifie Ierusalem. And albeit, the God of Sion, had other meanes in store (more by many, then man can number or conceive) for reducing his people into their owne [Page] Land; we may, notwithstanding, without censure of curiositie, safely conjecture, that the disgraces wch Nebuchadnezzar & his successors has done unto the royall seed of Iudah, were the first seedes of their speciall favour and grace with Cyrus. Of the plagues threatned by Esaiah unto Ezekiah for shewing his treasures unto the Babylonians, it was one part that of his sonnes some should bee Eunuches in the Palace of the King of Babylon. Is. 39. 7. Now it is unlikely that Cyrus would eyther make the Persians Eunuches, or trust the Caldeans about his bodie. Daniel and other his fellowes of the royall seed of Iudah, being made such unto his hand, were men as fit for his purpose as hee could seeke. And it was his purpose upon consultation (asQuum (que) in mentem ei veniret, quid in se nego [...]ij suse episset, qui multis mortalibus imperare niteretur, & habere domicilium in urbe inter illustres amplissima institueret, quam sic adfecta in eum esset, ut urbs alicui maxime infesta: quum haec inquam expenderet, corporis sibi custodia opus esse existimavit. Quod item sciret, homines opprimi faciliùs non posse, quam inter vescendum, bibendum, lavandum in cubili & somno: circumspiciebat, quos [...]am in his sibi maxime sidos habere posset. Arbitrabatur autem, non posse fidum hominem unquam esse, qui magis amaret al um, quam illum, qui ejus custodia indigeret. Quamobrem [...]lios, quibus essent liberi, vel conjuges genio congruentes, vel amores alij, naturae quadam coactione judicabat ad eos maxime diligendos impelli. At Eunuchos omnibus his carere cernens maximi facturos putabat illos, à quibus locupletari plurimum possent, & opem habere, si injuriis adficerentur, atque etiam honoribus ornari. A quo autem beneficiis in hos conferendis ipse superari posset, neminem fore censebat. Xenophon. lib. 7. pag. 192. Xenophon tels us) to have Eunuches next about him, as men most likely to be trusty. Daniel or others of good note amongst this people, being admitted to favour, for to be of Cyrus bedchamber; would not bee defective in procuring their countries good. And easie it was for him, that causeth darkenesse to bring forth light, that turneth the shadow of death into the morning, to raise vp a blessing unto his people out of their expiring curse. But whether by this meanes or [Page] others, certaine it is, that such of Iudah as escaped Nebuchadnezzars sword, were detained captives to him and his sonnes untill the erection of the Persian monarchy. 2 Chron. cap. 36. vers. 20. Now in the first yeare of Cyrus King of Persia (that the word of the Lord spoken by the mouth of Ieremiah, might bee accomplished) the Lord stirred up the spirit of Cyrus King of Persia, that he made a proclamation throughout all his kingdome, and put it also in writing, saying; Thus saith Cyrus King of Persia, All the kingdomes of the earth hath the Lord God of heaven given mee, and he hath charged mee to build him an house in Ierusalem, which is in Iudah, who is there among you of all his people? the Lord his God be with him, and let him goe up. vers. 22, 23. This last passage compared with the forecited Prophecie, Esaiah 45. vers. 4, 5, 6. may acquit Iosephus his report of Daniels conference with Cyrus, from all suspition of fiction or uncertainty of tradition.

Blessed be the name of God for ever and ever: for wisdome and might are his: and hee changeth the times and the seasons, he removeth Kings and setteth up Kings. Dan 2. vers. 20, 21. He hath yet a fourth hammer in his hand, to bruize and crush these Westerne Nations, as the three first had done the Easterne, and yet appointed to take fuller vengeance upon these Iewes (whom he had now redeemed by Cyrus) then the Chaldean had done; after the second measure of their iniquity, became more full then the former had beene.

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CHAP. 27.
Of Gods speciall providence in raising and ruinating the Roman Empire.

1 THe lingring growth of the Romane Monarchy hath made the print of Gods speciall hand in erecting it, lesse discernable, then it had beene in the sudden advancement of the three former. Nor was it come to any competent height before Prophecie did cease in Iewry. So that we are (for the most part) destitute of such Comments, as God had furnished us with, upon the histories of other Monarchies. But whatsoever the registers of Romes successe have ascribed to Fortune, wee may recover it, by the former ruled cases, as entirely due unto Gods providence. Now the ancient Romans were not of their later Satyricall Poets minde: Nullum Numen abest, si sit prudentia. Not Felicity her selfe, whom they tooke for a Goddesse, much lesse was Prudence, or any other supposed patronesse of inferiour vertues, so much honoured by them as Lady Fortune; the multitude of whose Temples testified they tooke her for their soveraigne Mistris. From this reall testimony of the ancient Romans, (who best knew by what meanes their state was raised, or at least perceived it to bee often held up and inlarged by meanes in particular unknowne to them;) Livie and Plutarch give [Page] Fortune Existimarunt multi, & inter caeteros Plutarchus gravissimus autor, populum Romanum in acquirendo tanto imperio majore fortune prosperitate, quàm virtute usum esse; idque vel ipsiusmet populi Romani autoritate constare. Neque enim fortunae tot Templa dedicasset, nisi ei victorias suas acceptas tulisset. Nam Romae nulli Deorum, Dearumve tot erant posita templa, uti Fortunae. Eidem huic sentiae videtur Livius quoque suffragari, eò quòd in recitandis orationibus Imperatorum, nunquam solius virtutis mentionem facit, sed fortunae auxilium adjungit. Ego vero contrarinm sentio, neque Plutarchi hanc opinionem defendi posse contendo. Nam si nulla extitit Respublica quae tantum Imperium, uti Roma acquisivit: cur id fortunae potiùs, quam bonis ipsius legibus & institutis tribuamus? virtus exercituum, & Imperatorum singularis industria Imperium Romanum peperêre: res autem p [...]rtas conservarunt bona rei [...]: institutio, recta (que) gubernandi ratio à primo Legislatore constituta: uti deinceps copiosiùs disseremus. Disput. Nic. Machiavel. Lib. 2. Cap. 1. in initio. precedence of vertue (civil or martiall) in the Roman territories, as being a more speciall Benefactresse or principall Foundresse of their Empire. Machiavel is of a contrary minde, perswaded thereto, by such a reason, as argues he had not God or his providence in his thoughts; that his thoughts were not his owne, when he conceived it: so dissonant it is to truth and his owne politick principles. His words are these; If no other State did ever compasse such a mighty Empire as Rome did, why should this be attributed to Fortune, rather then to good lawes and discipline?

2 With Plutarch and Machiavel it fares just so in this controversie, as it usually doth with other controversors; each of them hath the truth under his levell, whiles he oppugnes the adverse opinion; both of them overshoot it whilst they deliver their owne. Plutarch rightly denies the morall or civill goodnesse, whether of Romane lawes or lives, to have brought forth their greatnesse. Hee erreth as much in adjudging all that to Roman fortune, whereto Roman vertue had no just title. Notwithstanding if by Fortune hee meant any certaine latent cause more then humane, which did convay success to the current of Roman policies, by secret [Page] and hidden passages; his meaning is better then his manner of expressing it. To thinke thus charitably of this ingenuous Philosopher, wee have reason, as knowing him to be a perfect enemy, aswell to Epicurean chance, as to Stoycall Fate: and therefore no adversary of Divine Providence. In favour of Machiavels opinion, who deserves no favour himselfe, thus much on the other side might be said; If the auncient Romans had beene as vaine as the Graecians, as luxurious as the Asiaticks, as perfidious as the Carthagineans, as uncivill and barbarours as many nations, which they conquered: they should not have beene so constantly fortunate in their enterprises at home, and abroad, as Livie and Plutarch had observed them to bee. That is, in our language, Divine Providence would not have destined them unto that greatnesse, unto which at length they grew, if they had beene alwayes, or for the most part, as bad, as in the period of their prosperitie, they proved. For albeit God be debtor unto none; yet the abandant riches of his bountie, will no suffer him to leave morall vertues or constant execution of Lawes comparativly good, vnrewarded with blessings temporall. All this, notwithstanding will not inferre, what Machiavell undertooke to prove that the Romans did raise themselves, more by vertue, then they were raised by Fortune; if wee take Fortune (as in all probabilitie Plutarch did) for an hidden fountaine, secretly feeding those courses which the Romans tooke for their good, with successe and speed farre above their expectation. [Page] Vnder this indefinite latitude of unknowne causes, the Divine Providence or coelestic fortuna (as the Pythagorians terme it) may bee comprehended, and this divine providence or celestiall Fortune it was, which raised the Romans: they did not raise themselves by their vertues. For wee do not use to say that Princes favorites do advance themselves, albeit Princes would not advāce them to such great dignities as they enjoy, unless they were in some measure qualified unto their liking.

3 Some nations have beene, others might have beene more observant of better Lawes then the Romans knew, and have used the same discipline of peace and warre, even all their policies, with greater sinceritie of good intentions then they did; & yet not have propagated their soveraignty ouer others, halfe so farre, as the Romane Empire was (by Gods speciall Providence) propagated. For vertues morall, and ciuill discipline, or reformation of misdemeanors, (though all more exact, then the practise of any nation could hitherto patternize) are no such meritorious causes of temporall prosperitie or Dominion, as may binde God in justice, to dispense the one in greatest plentie, where the other most aboundeth. Without these qualifications the Romans had not beene capable of such prosperitie, as God in bountie bestowed upon them; but the true positive cause of their extraordinary greatnesse, was the speciall service, whereto his wisedome had appointed them. The rule of his liberalitie in disposing kingdomes, is the correspondency or proportion, which temporall [Page] greatnesse holds with the execution of his will, whether for punishing those which have made up the measure of their Iniquitie, or for the propagating or preservation of his Church already planted, or for preparing or ploughing up the hearts of wilde and unnurtured Nations, for better receiving the seed of his Gospell.

4 When the measure of that prosperitie, which GOD for these and like purposes had allotted Rome heathen, and her iniquitie became full; shee and her Provinces became a swifter prey to Barbarous Nations, some scarce so much as heard of before, then any neighbour countries had beene to her. The incredible successe of the Goaths and Vandals, of the Franks and Almaines &c, but specially of the Hunnes, (whose furious progresse was like to the Vultures flight, & seem'd to presage the slaughter which they made) will justifie the probability either of Xenophons stories concerning Cyrus, or of Curtius, Arianus, or other writers of Alexanders conquests. Was it then naturall policy or skill in warre, which did seate all, or most of these barbarous Nations in these westerne countries? Vertues they had not many amongst them, yet each of them some one or other commendable qualitie, which did manifest the contrary predominant vice or outcrying sin in the Christian people, which God had appointed them to plague, asDe providentia. lib. 7 Salvianus hath excellently observed. Howbeit this great power was not given them altogether to destroy others, but withall to edifie themselves in the faith, and to bee made partakers of [Page] Gods Vineyard which hee had now in a manner taken from these vngratefull husbandmen, whom they conquered. The Francks became Christians through feare of theVide Annonium lib. 1. cap. 15. See the Treatise containing the Origi [...]nall of Vnbeliefe, &c. cap. 18. §. 1 Almaines; dread of the Hunnes did drive the Burgundi [...]ns to seeke sanctuary in the same profession And no question, but such of the ancient Christian Inhabitants, as outlived th [...]se stormes, did beleeve God and his servants better afterward, then they had done before. Never were there any times more apt or more powerfull to kindle devotion in such as were not altogether frozen in unbeliefe, or benummed with the custome of sinning, then these times were. Rome, which had beene the watch tower of politicke wisdome, became more stupid then Babylon had beene, when the day of her visitation did come upon her. Her Citizens, (were a meere politician to be their judge) deserved to be buried in their Cities ruines, for not awaking upon such and so many dreadfull warnings as shee had. Extraordinary Prophets the Christian world at that time had none, because it needed none: the Prophecies of ancient times did so well befit them, as if they had beene made of purpose onely for them. Nor Senacherib, nor Nebuchadnezzar in the prime of their strength and power could better have brooked that title (though given them in expresse termes by GOD) which Attilas (as it seemes from certaineOther Barbarians had the like apprehension of their calling to the like service as Salvianus witnesseth. Potuerant (Wandal [...]) ergo ille degere, nec timebant: sed illa utique coelestis manus, quae eos ad punieuda Hispa norum flagitia illuc traxerat, etiam ad vastandam Africam transire cogebat. Ipsi denique fatebantur, non suum esse quod facerent. Agi enim se divino jussu at perurgeri. Ex quo intelligi potest quanta sint mala nostra, ad quos vastandos atque cruciandos ire barba [...]i compelluntur invi [...]i, secundùm illud quod vastator terrae Israeliticae Rex Assyriorum ait. Esa. 35. & Ier. 25. Salv. lib. 7. de Gubern. Dei. apprehension [Page] of his extraordinary calling to doe the like service,) had inserted into his royall titles,Chronica Hungarorum. Malleūs Orbis & Flagellum Dei; The Hammer of the World and Scourge of God. The fame of Alexanders first victories, was nothing so terrible to Asia, as the noise of this Scythian Thunderbolt was to the utmost parts of Europe, and would have beene to Africa and Asia, unlesse the Lord had put his hook into his jawes, when he begunne to swallow these and other Nations in his greedie hopes. But when the time of his commission drew neare to an end, this Sampson had a Dalilah to abate his strength. H [...] that had made himselfe sport with others miserie, and counted it his greatest glorie to shed much blood, was choaked with hisVide Chronica Hungarorum. Et Bonfin. lib. 7. dec. 1. owne, in his mariage bed: these were the first fruits of his luxurious nuptiall feasts; what the after crop was, wee leave to God.

5 The knowne successe of these Hunnes, throughout Hungary and other parts of Europe, may serve as a leading case to determine the question proposed betweene Plutarch and Machiavel; Their valour or strength of warre was not so much as knowne by fame to Europeans, until they felt it. The passages into Europe, out of these places of Scythia, which they inhabited, was unknowne unto themselves, much lesse did they dream of invading the Roman Empire, untill he that had decreed to make them a scourge to Europe, did lay a traine to teach them the ready way unto it.Bonfin. lib. 2. dec. 1. The manner of their introduction was in the Philosophers language by as meere a chance or fortune, as if a [Page] Sexton should finde a casket of Gold, whilest hee digs a grave. They had no other intention, that very morning wherein they first became acquainted with the confines of Europe, then to chase the Hart, and the Hart no other desire, than which was meerly naturall, to save his life. That this reasonlesse creature by seeking thus to satisfie his naturall de [...]ire, should shew these Hunnes a safe passage through the Fens of Maeotis, into Europe; was meere Chance in respect of them or their shallow forecast, but providence in respect of him, who hath the product or issue of every attempt possible, in numerato, as we say, in ready coyne: who can so temper all occurrences at his pleasure, as that the selfe same ingredients may be an wholesome potion unto some, and deadly poison unto others; and so combine the carelesse intentions of men, and the desire of brute Beasts, as they shall become more faithfull cofederates for accomplishing his will, then men can bee (albeit they purposely conspire together, and binde themselves by solemne oath or Sacrament) for effecting their owne designes.

6 The report which these roving Hunters had made to their Countrimen of that pleasant Land, into whose confines the chased Hart had led them, did invite the chiefe heads of their Clans, with their severall rascalities, to flock into Europe like beggers dismist out of a prison, invited to a solemne banquet. And their hunger-starved appetites, being once fed with variety of uncouth pleasures, did whet their wits and arme their spirits, to attempt greater matters then they could conceive before. [Page] Artis magister ingenii (que) larg [...]torventer. Their bellies taught them new Arts, and practice of inventions unsuspected unto Christians. The mixt Inhabitants of that Country, which from them was after termed Hungary, having sufficient warning of their intended invasion, had prepared a competent army, whose Leaders presumed, they were more safely guarded against the sudden assault of their barbarous enemies for one night, by the River of Danow which ranne betweene them; then they could be by any wall or trench. And in this presumption they rested as secure for that night, of the Hunnes, as the Babylonians were of Cyrus. It is very likely, that Detricus Generall for the Romance, and Matrinus, alias Martinus, (or Macrinus) chiefe Commander for the Pavonians, one or both had read how Cyrus had divided the River Gyndis, and so turned the course of Euphrates in one night, that the usuall Chanell of it became passable to his foot Souldiers before the morning. But that the like should be attempted uponSee chapter 26. parag. 11. Danow was not credible; to be effected by their enemies, they knew it impossible. And what other passage there was possible for these Hunnes to find, being utterly destitute of Ship or Boat, they could not suspect. But they bought the knowledge of their new invention a great deale too deare; with the losse of the better part of their armie, which encamping in the open fields, were pittifully slaughtred like wandring sheepe by theBonfinius. lib. 3. dec. 1. Hunnes, who with the helpe of bladders had swum over to the number of an hundred thousand, in the deadest [Page] time of the night. This sudden disaster, which being now past, might in some moderne politicians judgement easily have beene prevented, did so lessen the Roman forces, that albeit they became cōquerors in the next conflict, yet purchased they victorie with the losse of so many souldiers, that they were not able to stand before the multitude of their furious enemies in the third encounter: And to try them the fourth time, they had no courage. The stumpe of that arrow, which Detricus carried in his forehead to Rome, in witnesse that he had confronted his enemies, and was not wounded in the backe, did pierce the hearts of some and daunt the spirits of other Romans. And the fresh bleeding experiments of these Hunnes incredible fury, might well occasion, that generation and their children, to flatter their cowardly fancies, with forged tales, as if it were no disparagement to the Romans (though as yet in highest esteeme for valour amongst the sonnes of men) to bee outdared by an inchanted generation of infernall monsters, borne of witches and begot by Devils. For such legends of these Hunnes originall, have gone for currant amongstAëtius postquam audivit Attilam exercitum infinitae multitudinis ductare in Gallias, obviandum maturè putavit: &, ut ipse dicere solebat, enitendum, ut Ala [...]tores, seu mali genii procul ferro exterminarentur: alludens ad naturam umbrarum & Daemonum, qui gladium eductum timent & minus, ut Psellius ait; ac praeterea scite alludens ad originem decantatam Hunnorum ad Daemones referendam. Nam cum Filimer Rex Gothorum post egressum Scanziae insulae terram Scythicam ingressus, reperisset mulieres quasdam magas maleficâ arte populum vexare, longè fugatas adegit in solitudinem, ubi spurci ac vagi spiritus in complexum suumeas illexere, humanae, figurae, sed in humanae prorsus mentis & impietatis supremae edituri sobolem, nempe Hu [...]nos, rapto & venatu ali consuetos. Forcatulus. lib 5. pag. 72 [...]. ex Iornande in lib. rerum Getic. Fabulosum putarem, nisi D. Augustinus Sylvanos & Faunos, agrestia veterum numina, improbos extitisse mulieribus, appetisse & peregisse concubitum retulisset: & Daemones quosdam, quos inquit, Dusios Galli nuncupant, eadem cupidine inquinatos pr [...] comperto haber [...]tur. Ibid. ex Augustino. lib. 5. de Civit. Dei. cap. 23. good writers, [Page] and are not altogether out of date in some places unto this present day. But the Romanes did want a Marius, Sylla, or Camillus, to be their Dictator in these times; Detricus was no Iulius or Germanicus: what the best of these could haue done, or durst haue attempted, had they been living then, is more then the spirit of any now living can divine; hee that had made these in their times valorous, had now decreed the beggerly Hunnes should bee victorious, and there is neither counsell nor might against the Lord.

7 Or if this bee not canonicall scripture with politician, let us examine whether the evidence of truth manifested in the historicall narrations, whereon Machiavel comments, have not extorted as much from him in a manner against his will, and contrary to his purposed conclusions, as the author of truth in this point hath taught vs. Hee, Disput. lib. 2. cap. 29. Quod si quis igitur animo comprehendat res à populo Romano, prius tam praeclarè, longo annorum numero, gestas: iis (que) has conferat, quas adversùs Gallos gessere: tam diversat esse comperiet, ut non ab uno eodem (que) sed diversis populis, g [...]estae esse videantur. Vsque ad [...]o scilicet, occaecat fortuna animos hominum, ait Livius: cum vim suam ingru [...]entem ref [...]ngi non vult. Quo [...]it, ut qui in perpetuis pericul [...] versantur, min [...]s vit [...]perari debeant; & min [...]s laudari qui continuâ foeli [...]itate fruuntur: cum & illos & hosfata tr [...]ere videantur [...] ne (que) consilium illorum ad resistendum malis; neque horum virtus ad comparandam foelicitatem multum facere queat. &c. saith Machiavel, that wil compare the Romans wise carriage of state-businesses for many yeares together, with their ill managing of matters, whē they were invaded by the Gauls, shal find them so different, as that the latter grosse error may seem to haue bin committed by another people, not by the same. So stangely doth Fortune (so he now accords in termes with Livie, whom herein he contradicted before) blind the [Page] judgements of men, when it is her pleasure not to have her power controuled, whose authority is so great, that neither they which are commonly exposed to danger deserve much blame, nor they much praise, which enjoy perpetuall felicity. Fates may so strongly draw both parties this way or that way, as the policie of the one shall not be able to prevent the evils which happen, nor the others vertue be sufficient to bring forth good successe. In fine, taking Fortune and Fates for terms equivalent, throughout his whole Discourse, hee He concludes; Cum urbi Romae tanta Imperii magnitudo fatalis esset; opprimi, ac vehementissime affligi [...]am oportuit, ut deinceps cautior, prudentior (que) fieret, ac tantam imperij molem acquirendam: delere tamen planè non debuit. Ita (que) ut omnia h [...]ec ita succederent, Fata Camillum in exilium misêre, non necaverunt, urbem à Gallis permisêre occupari non Capitolium: ut (que) commodiùs occupari urbs posset, efficêre, ut major exercitus pars, ex praelio non Romam, sed Veios fugeret. Et (ut omnia uno quasi fasce comprehendam) effecerunt, ut ad avertendum à Republica tantam malorum molem, nihil à pepulo Romano prudenter sapienter (que) fieret: ad defendendum Capitolium & recuperandam urbem jam captam omnia commodissima instructa essent. Disput. Nic. Machiavel. lib. 2. cap. 29. concludes for Plutarch; That the greatnesse of the Romane Empire was decreed by Fate; and with reference to this end, as Rome could not in her growing age be overthrowne, so it was expedient that she should often be oppressed and afflicted, that her Statesmen might become more wary and wise, for procuring that greatnesse which Fates had decreed to accomplish by them. Wherefore, that all these might take place: the Fates (which as he grants, use meanes convenient for effecting their purpose) had put Camillus to exile, not to death; suffered the City to bee taken by the Gaules, but not the Capitoll: and that the Citie might be taken with lesse adoe, they had likewise ordained that the greatest part of the Romane army, being discomfited by the Gaules, should not retire to Rome, but flye to Veios. To knit up all (as he speakes) [Page] in a bundell, it was the ordinance of Fates, that the Romanes should for this turne use neither their wonted wit, nor discretion, for averting the evills which befell them, and yet have all things made ready to their hands, for defending the Capitoll and recovering of the City. By the forecast of Fates, not of the Romanes, it was, that exiled Camillus, who was no way guilty of the wrongs which the Senate had done unto the Gaules, no way obnoxious unto them, but free from all obligements, should bee at Ardea with one army, and expected at Veios by another, that they might with joynt forces assault the Gaules, when they least expected, and so recover the City.

8 Had Machiavel told us what hee meant by Fates or Fortune, wee might either quickly agree with him, or easily confute him, as disagreeing most from himselfe: whatsoever hee meant by them, it had beene a point of honesty in him, to have craved pardon of Plutarch for contradicting him in the former discourse; seeing hee borroweth Plutarchs owne language in this Comment of Romes surprizall by the Gauls. If Machiavel by Fate or Fortune, understand some branch of Gods decree or providence, mentem teneat, linguam corrigat. For though he comment upon a Heathen writer, it would no way misbeseeme him sometime so to speak, as men might suspect him to be a Christian. But not to question in what signification he used the words Fates or Fortune; the reall attributes which he gives to Fate or Fortune, cannot belong to any power in heaven or earth, save onely to the onely wise invisible GOD, for [Page]who can blinde the mindes of men, of such politicke wise [...]men as the Romanes were, save onely hee who made our soules, and giveth wisdome to whom he pleaseth, who can make choise of excellent spirits, for managing humane affaires present, or entertaine occasions offered for great atchievances? who againe can deprive such men (men so qualified as Machiavel would have them) of life, depose them from their dignities, or so abate their strength; as they shall not bee able to make resistance when evills are determined? That power onely can doe all these, which knoweth all things, worketh all things, determines all things, ruleth all things. Yet all these attributes here specified hath Machiavel, bestowed on Fate. Either was this man stricken with heathenish blindnesse for detaining the truth in unrighteousnesse, or else in seeing thus farre into events, in his judgement, Fatall, hee might have seene Gods providence ruling in them, and disposing of all humane affaires whatsoever. The like contemplation of fatall or fortunate events, led Commineus, a man aswell seen in matters of state, as Machiavel was, unto a distinct view of Divine Prouidence, as shall be shewedSee cha. 29. parag. 1. heareafter. Whatsoever effect these observations wrought in Machiavel; the perusall of them will lift up the Christian Readers heart to sing with Daniel: Blessed bee the name of God for ever and ever, for wisedome and might are his. Hee changeth the times and seasons, he giveth wisdome unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding.

9 But though wee could make this or the like [Page] orthodoxall construction of Machiavels meaning, in this discourse, though fate and fortune in his language were the same that Gods providence is in ours; Yet the use which hee makes of this his doctrine, would neither be consonant to his owne principles elsewhere delivered, not to the eternall truth: Hoc unum pronunciabo de fortunae viribus & fati necessitate, quod historias omnis generis percurrenti facile apparebit, homines fati necessitatem evitare non posse: sed faciliorem eventum ijs, quae ab eo impendent, efficere, eum (que) promovere; adeo (que) parcarum [...]elas texere, non retexere, aut rumpere. Quod etsi ita se habeat, non decet tamen, ut animum abjiciamus, nos (que) plane committamus fato; sed, quacun (que) fortunâ aspirante, bene speremus, diligenter prudenter (que) rebus nostris provideamus: quòd fatorum viae & rationes producendorum effectuum, obscuriores sint, quam ut a nobis intelligi qu [...]ant. Machiavil. in fine lib. 2. What great matter is this, which is so plainely witten in histories of every kinde, as he [...] that runnes may reade it? His resolution is this, that men cannot avoid the necessitie of fate, but rather facilitate the events by it decreed: So vnable are they to undoe the contrivances or contextures of destinie, that by how much the more they struggle with them, they weave and knit them faster. But shall state-pilots for this reason strike saile to Fortune, and suffer the world to floate, whether fates doe drive it? No, rather beare out against all blasts of chance, because the wayes of fate, and manner how it brings its matter about, are so obscure, that no wit of man can discerne them. But what bootes it us to know the [Page] wayes of Fates to be so obscure, that they cannot be knowne, if neither knowne nor unknowne, they can bee avoided▪ It would inspire our indeavours with greater alacrity, and our indeavours would be blessed with better successe, were wee taught (as the truth is) that such events as Politicians terme fatall, are in their nature, alterable, though not by us, or by any humane skill or policie, yet by him whose almighty ayd, is alwayes ready for us, so we seeke it with due humilitie. But Machiavel (if I mistake him not) was once of opinion, that Fates and Fortune interpose their authority only in some more principall humane affaires; he acknowledgeth no generall providence over all. The generall Maxime whence hee falsely derives his fruitlesse inference, is, That Gods Decree (whereof Fates good or bad, are necessary branches) is altogether immutable. The most necessary, immediate, and most usefull consequent of which truth, is this, As long as the parties against whom he decrees evill, continue the same; the evill decreed, is as immutable as his decree, and men by seeking to avoid it by their wit or strength, doe draw it more speedily, or more heavily upon them. For, it is impossible, that humane power should not bee foiled, whilest it opposeth it selfe against Omnipotency; or the devices of humane wisedome not be defeated, whilest they counterplot Wisdome infinite. But though in the Almighty, or in his decree, there be no shadow of change; yet as Daniel speakes, he changeth times and seasons; and in that his mercy is immutable, he is alwayes ready to [Page] repent him of the evills forethreatned, when men repent them of the evill, for which hee threatneth them. Or, in termes (perhaps) more proper, it is one essentiall part of his immutable decree to alter the events decreed, or foresignified, (bee they good or bad) according as men alter their mindes for better or worse. But how Fates are invited or may be avoyded, wee are to speake more particularly hereafter.

10 The very instance whence Machiavel framed his forementioned Aphorisme, will bee a fit example for illustrating our present rule. The Romanes (as he observes) were usually most religious observers of the Law of nations, and whilest they continued thus, Gods blessings did rest upon their policies: But at the time when the Gaules inuaded Italy; the Fahii, being sent Embassadours in a Treaty of peace, unaduisedly put on the girdle of warre, and slew a standard-bearer of the Gaules in defence & quarrell of the Clusini, betwixt whō they should have been indiferent arbitrators. And in stead of just punishment (which by the Law of nations was, to have beene delivered up unto the Enemies whom they had wronged,) the Romans did grace them with the office of Tribunes, at their returne, and appointed them chiefe managers of that warre with the Gaules, whichImprimis igitur habenda ratio est earum rerum, quae fato ipso, seu astrorum influxu, evenire videntur, & quibus ut resistamus, fortuna non permittit. Quarum exemplum luculentissimum est id, quod, populus Romanus, in clade Gallica accepit. Nam cum fatis urgentibus, tanta moles mali instaret: primam occasionem, ad illam accelerandam dederunt tres Fabij Legati, qui cum agere debuissent de pace, inter Clusinos & Gallos; contra jus gentium, pro Clusinis, adversùs Gallos praelio decertarunt: at (que) ita Gallorum iram, adversùs populum Romanum provocarunt. Machiavel. lib. 2. cap. 29. their insolencie [Page] had provoked. The successe whereof was such, as the Israelites had, before Achans sacriledge was punished by Iosuah. Romes present calamitie had spred much farther, if the whole State had beene as deepely infected with this foule crime, as the whole Senate and people,Magnus ille nostrorū temporum Medicus Vindicianus, consultus à quodam; dolori ejus adhiberi jussit, quod in tempore congruere videbatur: adhibitum sanitas consecuta est. Deinde, post annos aliquot eádem cursus corporis causâ commotus, hoc idem ille putavit adhibendū: adhibitum vertit in pejus. Mira [...]us, curr [...]t ad Medicū, indicat factum: at ille, ut erat acerrimus, ita respondit; Ide [...] [...]a [...]è acceptus e [...], quia ego non jus [...]: ut omnes qui audîssent, parum (que) hominem nossent, non eum arte medicinali fidere, sed nesci [...] qua illicitâ potentiâ putarent. Vnde, quum esset à quibusdam postea stupentibus interrogatus, aperuit quod non intellexerant, videlicet illi atati jam non hoc se fuisse jussurum. August. Epist. 5. ad Marcellinum. then resident at Rome were: Sed Veios habitante Camillo, illic Roma fuit: In as much, as the life and soule of the Roman estate did then reside in the exiled Camillus and his company, (who had suffered much wrong from the Romanes, but had done none unto the Gaules;) it pleased the Lord to raise up his spirit, to rescue the Citie from their tyranny, who would have revenged the offence committed, with greater severitie, then this aeternall aequitie had appointed for this time, wherein Romes iniquitie was not fully ripe for utter destruction.

11 To doe justice, though to a publick enemy, is a fundamentall rule of Propheticall and Christian policy, whereto Machiavel hath one, and Plutarch another discourse very pertinent. Thus to doe, is good and acceptable in the sight of God, without whose speciall direction and benediction, the practise of most approved rules of policy, prove more fruitlesse, if not more dangerous to great Estates, then choisest receipts doe to illiterate or ordinarie patients, being administred without the Physitians advise or prescript.Magnus ille nostrorū temporum Medicus Vindicianus, consultus à quodam; dolori ejus adhiberi jussit, quod in tempore congruere videbatur: adhibitum sanitas consecuta est. Deinde, post annos aliquot eádem cursus corporis causâ commotus, hoc idem ille putavit adhibendū: adhibitum vertit in pejus. Mira [...]us, curr [...]t ad Medicū, indicat factum: at ille, ut erat acerrimus, ita respondit; Ide [...] [...]a [...]è acceptus e [...], quia ego non jus [...]: ut omnes qui audîssent, parum (que) hominem nossent, non eum arte medicinali fidere, sed nesci [...] qua illicitâ potentiâ putarent. Vnde, quum esset à quibusdam postea stupentibus interrogatus, aperuit quod non intellexerant, videlicet illi atati jam non hoc se fuisse jussurum. August. Epist. 5. ad Marcellinum. To a Patient [Page] demanding why the same medicine, which had once done him much good, did at the second time doe him harme; Vindicianus a learned Physitian in S. Augustines time answered, because at the first time, I gave it you; you tooke it the second time your selfe, being of that age, in which I would not have given it. Now as diversitie of times, alteration of humors, or constitution of mens bodies, may cause the selfe same medicine, which at some times brought health, at another time to bring forth Death or dangerous sicknesse to one and the selfe same body: so may Kingdomes, whether for forme or government the same, or different, be speedily overthrowne, by following that method of reformation, or the selfe same rules of policy, by which most States formerly have beene preserved. Hee that changeth times and seasons, disposeth the concurrents, or dissolveth the combination of occurrent circumstances or opportunities; must give his approbation or allowance, before any contrivance of man can be effectuall. He is the supreame Physitian of mens soules, the preserver of States and Kingdomes. The greatest statesmen are at the best, but his Chyrurgions, or his Apothecaries, and if they adventure upon any difficult cure without consulting him; the same hand which healed this yeare, may wound the next; the same receipt which gave life to day, may kill to morrow. From these Collections, Machiavel, so hee would bee constant unto himselfe, cannot vary.

12 The diversitie of Fortune much furthering [Page] some, and crossing others,Dum sape multum (que) ipse mecum cogito de fortunae diversitate quae aliis secundam, aliis adversam se in eorum actionibus, institutis (que) exhibet: hanc ejus causam invenisse mihi videor, quòd ut diversi sunt agendi modi, aliis at (que) aliis hominibus consueti ac naturales: ita aliae atque aliae sunt temporum rationes, occasiones (que) ▪ Quidam in rebus gerendis, administrandis (que) ferocia quadam utuntur, & omnia cum impetu agunt. &c. Mac [...]iavel. lib. 3. cap. 9 in initio. he derives from these originalls: As there be divers kindes of proceedings in managing the affaires of peace or warre, with whose diversities the dispositions of men, by nature or custome much different, suit, some with one, some with another: so have different times their seasons and opportunities. Some times require quick dispatch, others delay of businesse; some businesses speedy execution, others maturity of consultation and long forecast. Now seeing no one man is fitted for all kindes of proceedings, nor no one kinde of proceeding can befit all or most times, but all have their limits, which without errour or danger they cannot transgresse. Hence it is that those men least erre, and become most fortunate in their atchievements, which have the hap to be imployed in such times and seasons, as best agree with their naturall and accustomed manner of projecting. Statefortune then by Machiavels conclusion, is no bastard brood, no fatherlesse bratt, but the true and legitimate ofspring of Time, fitly matched with the peculiar disposition of experienced practickes. On the contrary, publique misfortune or ill successe, is the naturall issue of mens endeavours, when they are undertaken in an unfit time. The onely question then remaining, is, whether there bee any, or if any, who is the chiefe author of all fit matches or disagreements betweene the severall dispositions of men, and the opportunities of times? It is a point unquestionable, that the prime author of such matches, is the first author of all successe, be it good or bad, in humane affaires. The greatest amongst [Page] the sonnes of men cannot command what opportunities they please, but must bee content with such as time affords them: nor are the wisest of men alwaies able to make choyse of the best which time presents. Time likewise, though thus affording opportunities, cannot appoint the men, that are most fit to entertain them. So that neither is time the fountaine or author, nor can men bee their owne Carvers of good successe. Doth this office then belong to Goddesse Fortune? If shee could see this, she might see all things; and were no longer to bee reputed Fortune: wisdome and prouidence should be her titles. It is That wisdome by which all things were made, which disposeth their operations. It is that Providence, which was before all times, that dispenseth the times and opportunities, that are. These sit supreame scrutators in consultations of state, and have more casting voyces, then the world takes notice off. They secretly sway every election: other suffragants may freely declare their opinions, and vent their breath; which these tune and moderate as they please.

13 That we may descend to Machiavels instance; The Romanes appointed no generall without publick consultation. Whether Fabius Maximus were chosen generall by unanimous consent of the Senate, or with difficultie and contradiction, we have not observed, or doe not remember. Even such as were most forward, or factious for him, did little thinke how well his peculiar temper did sute with the opportunitie of those times, wherein he was appointed to cope with Hannibal. [Page] The common rumors, which run of him throughout Rome, argue a generall dislike of his proceedings; if lingring, might in their censures be called proceedings rather then cowardly delay or detrectation. The best proofe he gave for a long time of his courage, was his constant contempt of others censures.Non ponebat enim rumores ante salutem. But after, the event did as farre surpasse their hopes of his slow proceedings, as these had come short of their first expectations; their note was changed. Fabius was now the Vnus home nobis cunctande restituit r [...]m. Ennius.onely man, and (as some of them make him) more then a man; in—Sed mens humana major; nec t [...]la nec enses Nec fortes spectabat equos, tot millia contra Poenorum invictum (que) ducem, tot in agm [...]ne, solus Ibat, & in sese cuncta arma viros (que) gerebat. Sillius Italicus. lib. 7. common esteeme the onely Author of their Cities preservation. Howbeit, to such as can resolve effects into their prime and native causes, children might more justly be fathered upon the woman that beares them, then this joyfull issue, which was brought forth by his lingring, can be upon his forecast or wisedome. For this cunctation, of which the peculiar opportunities of these times begat good successe; was to Fabius (Ne (que) Fabius sua cūctatione, [...]llâ cōmodiori tēporū occasione uti potuit, quam illâ ipsâ: cum tamen naturalis esset in Fabio illa cunctatio, non ex praesenti temporum statu su [...]pta. Id enim vel eo ipso satis declaravit, quòd cum Scipio in Africam postea ad conficiendū bellum trajicere vellet: Fabius ei vehementer resistebat, & omnibus modis impedire conabatur: ut qui naturâ suâ magis ad cunctandum, arcenda (que) praesentia pericula ferretur, quàm ad alia majorasubeunda. Ita (que) per Fab [...]um non stetit, quò minus Punicum bellum absolvi fini [...]i (que) non posset, quòd is non animadverteret alia jam tempora esse, & aliam belli gerendi rationem commodam existere. Quod si solus rerum potitus fuisset, victoriam de Carthaginensibus obtinere nequivisset, quod belli gerendi rationes temporum diversitati nescivisset accommodare. Se [...] [...]um in ea republica totessent insignes Imperatores, ac rei militaris peritissimi homines, voluit fortuna, ut sicuti difficilibus illis temporibus Fabius bellum sustinere, ac pericula arcere; ita postea, commodiori rerū statu, Scipio id conficere, & victoriā obtinere pot [...]erit. Ma [...]h [...]. 3 c. 9. as [Page] Machiavel well observes) a disposition naturall: he could not have changed with the times, nor fashioned himselfe to new occasions. Hee had held the same byas still, though on another much different ground: and so might he well have lost his late purchased fame, and Rome her prize; unlesse there had beene more skill used in playing the game, than the supposed Roman Gamesters practised. As suppose Fabius had beene sent to have bid Hannibal play in Africk, and Scipio appointed to keepe the goale in Italie: Rome and Carthage, by the misplacing of these two men, might have changed Fates and Fortunes. Rome, in all likelihood, had beene taken, when Fabius saved it; and Carthage inriched with Romane spoiles, at the time when Scipio ransacked it. Rome could not have found a surer buckler to beare off Hannibals blowes in Italy, then lingring Fabius: nor a fitter sword to beat him in his native soile, then forward Scipio. And yet was Fabius the most forward man to oppose Scipio his expedition into Africk: and it may be some of Scipio his friends had bandied as earnestly against Fabius. Either of them liked his owne course best: if haply either liked any other besides. Neither of them knew, what temper was fittest for every season; nor is it possible for the wisedome of man to match these alwayes aright, because albeit the temper or dispositions of men did never alter, ye [...] the occasions or opportunities of times are more changeable than the Moone.

14 The Aphorisme which Machiavel gathers from the former discussions is not so false, as imperfit, [Page] and it is this: Seeing different times require different manners of proceedings, and state-agents cannot easily change their manner, whereto they have beene most accustomed; it were most expedient for States to change their agents, that their severall dispositions might more exactly sute with the alterations of times and opportunities. The facilitie of observing or practising this rule in Aristocratis, is in his judgement, one speciall cause why, that kinde of government is more durable then Monarchicall. For Princes will hold their wonted wayes, they will not change their resolutions, much lesse will they give place to others, that are better fitted for entertaining the opportunities or change of times.Petrus Soderinus, cujus alias etiam mentionē fecimus, naturâ humanus erat, et patientiâ suâ multas injurias ferebat, quae res salutaris fuit Reip. simul at (que) ipsi quandiu tē pora clemē tiora fuere. Sed cum tē porū mutatione ferrea quaedā aetas adesset, quae severitatem postulabat: at (que) ille à cō sueta sua patiētia & bonitate discedere nesciret, semetipsum simul, atque patriam perdidit. Machiavel. lib. 3. cap. 9. Petrus Soderinus, a man for his moderation and wisedome fit to have governed an Empire, did (as hee thinkes) overthrow himselfe and the Florentine estate, by continuing his authoritie, being unable to put off his wonted lenitie and patience, in times requiring austere imperious reformation. Whereas Pope Iulius the second, plaied the Lyon all his time with the Foxes luck: the more he was cursed for his impetuous insolency, the stronger hee grew: no thankes to him or his witt, but to the times, which had they changed, he must have fallen. But was not Septimius Afer, for his native severitie, aswell fitted to the impetuous disposition of the Roman Empire when he undertook it, as any medicine can be to the malady, for which it is by art prepared? And yet his practise (though exactly answering [...]o Machiavels rules of reformation (here and elsewhere [Page] set downe) found but the Mountebankes successe; hee cured some present mischiefes, but procured more grievous, secret, and more permanent inconveniences. The barbarous nations which longed most for Romes destruction, learned the use and art of making the Romans weapons and artillerie, from the discontented Exiles, which his severitie thrust upon them. Nor did Constantine the great (though Leunclavius be willing to preferre the unsanctified Zozimus his bill against him, to Christian Princes) halfe so much weaken the Empire, by his largesse towards the Christians, as Septimius did wound it, by seeking to restore or rather to intend the rigour of ancient discipline amongst moderne dissolute Romans. Many like practises, in the issue became meanes of the Empires more speedy dissolution; though all, (as farre as the eye of policy could see,) most convenient for the present season, but it is not for politicians to know the exact temper of times & seasons, which the father hath put in his owne power, as cases reserved for infinite Wisdome.

15 Had Rome in the dayes of Arcadius and Honorius stood at the same point of liking with God, as she sometimes had done: these oversights (as it pleaseth posteritie now to censure them) of Constantine and Septimius with infinite other particulars of like nature, falling out before and after them, should have added much to the measure of her wonted prosperitie. But being now declined from Gods favour to the aspect of his Iustice, all conspire against her: and her best supporters [Page] become stumbling-blocks, to cause her to fall. And, although it had beene possible for the severall successions of her ancient and choisest Senators, to have beene assembled together in counsell for her good; yet what possibilitie was there left to prevent the combination of second causes secretly conspiring her destruction, when as the unavoidable mischances of Nations, which they knew not, even the disasters of her enemies became confederates with domestick miscariages to worke her mischiefe. If we consider onely the visible causes, or meanes observable, by which this mightie Empire came to miserable ruine: not all the oversights committed by any one, though the very worst of al her Governours or Counsellors; not all the devises of any one natiō or cōmon enemy, did sow the seedes of so much evill and mishap, as befel her from one example of severitie, unseasonably practised by theBonfin. lib. 2 dec. 1. King of Goathes, upon a wicked woman, that sought to cover her adultery, by her abused husbands blood. The fact indeed deserved the height of Princely indignation, and more then an ordinary death, but to pull her in peeces with horses (as Hermanarichus commanded) was so indignely taken by her brethren, that in revenge they killed this grave and auncient King; by whose wisedome and authoritie the Goathes had beene able so well to have matched the Huns, as the Romanes might have stood as arbitrators to moderate the quarrell as they saw fit, or to have devided the prey. But the Goathes, being suddenly deprived of their▪ Governour in the very [Page] nicke▪ when the warre was begun, left their habitation to the Hunnes, and (upon protestations of more then ordinary fidelitie and good service) got to be admitted as naturall subjects within the Empire, which by this meanes became exposed to a double mischiefe. It hath the Hunnes as neare, but more insolent and noisome neighbours, then the Goathes had beene: and through the folly and greedinesse of the Imperiall officers, the Goath in short time of a former open enemy, became a treacherous friend. The Romans nurst this young snake in their bosome, after such an unpleasant and untowardly fashion, as they might bee sure, hee would be ready to use his sting, when God should send him one. And albeit the Goath and Hun, did naturally worse agree, then the Toade & Spider: yet in relation to the execution of Gods justice upon the Roman Empire, they hold this exact subordination, that wheresoever the one had broken skinne, the other was ready to infuse his poyson; the one alwaies ready to inlarge the wounds, which the other had made, before they closed. Howbeit, when both these enemies had done the worst to Rome that they intended, (for both of them had power in respect of any help that man could make, to do her as much harm, as they listed) yet the Prophets speech concerning Israel, was remarkably true of her, Perditio tua ex te O Roma, Romes destruction was from her selfe. Her very enemies would have healed her, but Babylon-like shee would not be healed. Alaricus the Goath had taken the Citie, but made conscience of defacing [Page] it: he spared the suppliants for the Temples sake. Attilas was kindly intreated by Pope Leo not to visit it; the rather thereto perswaded, because God had visited Alaricus for polluting it. It was the crie of the noble Aetius his blood treacherously shed, not by the Enemy, but by the Emperour Valentinian, at the instigation of Maximus, which did solicite Gensericus King of Vandals to come out of Afrique to visit Rome, now sunke so lowe by Aetius his fall, that she could never bee raised againe.

16 The concatenation of sinister Fates, that is, (in better language) the combination of second causes designed by God for the execution of his consequent Will upon the Roman Empire, is in this case so pregnant: that I cannot make a fitter close of this discourse, then by relating the historicall Circumstances, occasion and consequence of Aetius his death. Maximus a Roman Senator, and principall Favorite of Valentinian the Emperour, Vide Pr [...] cop. l. 3. de bell [...] Vandalico.sporting with him on a time in his Palace, chanced to leave his ring behind. The Emperour, by this token invites Maximus his Lady to come and visit his Empresse Eudoxia, his intention being to visit her in such a manner, as was no way pleasing to her, but most displeasing to her Husband, unto whō she disclosed their joynt wrong & her speciall griefe. The indignity of the Fact (being done by so deare a friend as he supposed Valentinian was) made so deepe impression in his heart, that an ordinary revenge could not suffice. The Emperors life seemed too small a recōpence, without [Page] hopes of succeding him: & his hopes of succession (he saw) were but vain if Aetius should survive Valentinian: Maximus therefore, smoothly dissembling his discontent for the present, perswades the Emperour that Aetius was too potent in the opinion of the State, and become more popular than before, by the happy successe of his late employment against Attilas the common enemie and terrour of Christendome.Paulus Diaconus. lib. 15 The Emperours weakness is easily wrought to put Aetius to death, which (as one observes) was in effect to cut off his owne right hand with his left, and to expose himselfe to publike hatred and danger, without a Defendant. Thrasilas, a Centurion to Aetius, knowing his Generalls loyalty and innocency, in [...]venge of his undeserved death, kills Valentinian▪ And Maximus not content to usurpe the Empire, unlesse he might have the Empresse Eudoxia in to the bragaine, abuseth her as Valentinian had done his Lady. Eudoxia more impatient than Maximus his wife had beene,Vide Bonfinium lib. V. dec. 1. & Niceph. l. 15 hist. Eccles. cap. 11. sollicites Gensericus King of the Vandalls to revenge her husbands death, and her wrongs. In the execution of Gods will or wrath upon Maximus, the Roman [...] prevent him, for they stone him to death; but [...]ould not prevent the ransacking of the City by him, and the finall overthrow of the Romane Empire. As for those imperiall titles which some afterwards tooke upon them, these were but as ominous formalities for the more legall resigning up of the Romane Soveraignty into the hands of strangers, as Momillus surnamed Augustulus (the last of Italian blood which bare rule [Page] in Rome) did it into the hands of the Hunnes, the reliques of Attilas his race, their inveterate enemies; whose rage and cruelty when it was at the height of its strength, had beene broken by Aetius his valour. As the Romane Rulers and Senate had done to him: so hath the Lord now done to them.

CHAP. 28.
Why God is called the Lord of Hosts, or the Lord mighty in Battaile. Of his speciall providence in managing Warres.

1 ALBEIT the sole authority of Scripture without the assignement of any reason, be a warrant alsufficient for us to enstyle our God the Lord of Hosts: yet why he is so often in Scripture thus enstyled, as by a most speciall and peculiar attribute, these reasons may without offence bee given. His peculiar hand is not in any subject of humane contemplation more conspicuous, then in the managing of Warres. Why it should bee more conspicuous in this then in other businesses, wherein men are much imployed, the reason is plaine: for Contingences are no where more ticklish than in Warre, not is their number in any other subject so incomprehensible to the wit of man. It is hard to use wit and valour both at once; hard to spie an errour upon the first [Page] commission of it, harder to redeeme the time, or regaine opportunities lost. It is a grosse errour which hath insinuated it selfe into some Politicians thoughts, if wee may judge of their thoughts by their writings; that the chances which may fall out contrary to Warriours expectations, are not so many but that they may be forecast or numbred. It is the Politicians errour likewise, (though would to God it were his alone) to think all occurrences which are casuall in respect of man, to be from the first occasions of warre begun, so determined by him, which gives successe in battaile, as that victory must in deed and truth (though to men she seeme not so) incline to one party more than to the other. These casualties of War, or doubtfull inclinations of victorie, are in succession infinite. Their possibilities one way or other, may every moment increase from misdemeanours either of them which fight the battailes, or of the parties for whom they fight. The fairest probabilitie of good successe may be abated from every good act or reformation of the adversarie. Gods eternall freedome either in determining new occurrences, or altering the combinations of others already extant, cannot be prejudiced by any Act past. He hath not so before all time decreed them, that hee doth not still decree them, at his pleasure, as well during all the time of warre and fight, as before. Ita accidit Lazius. saepenumero, ut fortuna ad utrum (que) victoriam transferat, quò Bellum extrahatur, animos (que) nunc horum, nunc illorum accendat. So it oftentimes falls out, that Fortune makes faire profer of victory to both sides,[Page]and one while incourageth this partie, another while that, by which meanes warres are usually prolonged. Now whatsoever in these cases befals men either beyond their expectation, or contrary to their forecast, is counted fortunate, if it be for their good; or fatall, if it be for their harme. Hence men not only of most accurate booke-learning amongst the Romanes, but of best experience in matters of war, have given more to Fortune, then by-standers or Historicall Relators usually acknowledge to bee her due.

Had Caesar upon a diligent and accurate survey of the meanes, by which he got his victories, allotted Fortune her just part in severall, or told us truly how much fell out beyond or above his expectation, how much just according to his reckoning: the world (I think) would have beene of the same minde with Machiavel in hisCha. 27. §. 7. forementioned contemplations of Romes surprisal by the Gaules, which was, That the most victorious do not deserve much glory either for wit or valour, nor the conquered much dispraise for the contrarie imperfections; seeing Fate or Fortune have alwayes the chiefest stroke as well in the exaltation of the one, as in the dejection of the other. Notwithstanding it is no part of mine, whatsoever it was of Machiavels meaning, to have any man deprived of that commendation which is due to him in respect of other men. And it is not the least title unto true praise, to be in favour with the supreame disposer of Martiall successe. In respect of him the victorious have no cause to boast, but rather to condemne [Page] their sloath and negligence in that the fruites of their successe, was no better then usually it proves, they having so good assistance, and sure pledges of divine favour.

2 Wheresoever Cicero, Caesar, Vegetius, or other heathens, could suspect or descrie the secret assistance of fate or fortune, specially in matters more remarkeable, as are the usuall consequents of warre; there we may without solecisme say, the finger of the Lord of hoasts did worke. For if the least wound that is given or taken in fight, doe not make it selfe, but is made by the vigilant and working hand of man; shall not the chiefe stroke or sway of battaile, which usually falls without Warriers comprehension, lead us to a direct, a certaine and positive cause? Now if this cause were otherwaies unknown, by what name could we more properly call it, then by the Lord of hoasts, or great Moderator of warre.

If wee may guesse at Gods working in all, by the manifestation of his speciall hand in some: I am perswaded there was never any great battaile fought since the world began, much lesse any famous warre accomplished with such facilitie or speed, but that if it had pleased the Historians to expresse all circumstances of speciall moments, or could the reader survey such as they expresse, with as diligent and curious eyes, as one Artificer will anothers worke: the consultations of their chiefe managers, & the executions wch seem to have most dependance on them; would beare no better proportion wth their entire successe, then the day laborers [Page] work doth with a curious edifice, or then the Pioners paines doth wth the defence or expugnation of strōg forts or Castles. And yet even in the maturest deliberations or most exact consultations of warre; related by ordinary historians, the finall determination, may for the most part be resolved into some speciall Divine instinct: the execution of that which men by such instinct determine and resolve upon, essentially depends upon the disposition of Gods peculiar providence, who hath an authentique negative in the use of every meanes, which men make choice of; albeit in using them he admit men, as his coworkers, but not as sharers in production of the principall effect or end. He alone bestoweth victorie where hee pleaseth, by what meanes or whose agency hee pleaseth, but not alwayes with victorie and successe, unlesse such as be his agents or instruments in the execution of his consequent will upon others, be ready to doe his antecedent will or pleasure themselves.

3 This is a subject whose fuller explication would require a larger volume, then this whole Treatise in my intendment shall be. I will therefore instance especially in one battaile, and another warre, of the greatest consequences, that the histories of these three hundred yeares past present unto us. The first shall be in that fierce and violent conflict at Grūwald betweene Iagello or Vladislaus King of Poland and Lituania, and the Crucigeri or Knights of Prussia, about the yeare one thousand foure hundred. Should a Politician or Souldier, that will beleeve no more, then hee sees [Page] grounds for out of his owne Art, have seene, the mighty preparation and couragious resolution of both parties, hee would haply have demanded a signe of Gods providence, and said in his heart, Let us see either of these two Armies take flight upon a conceipted noise of Chariots or Horsemen, or an imagination of an Army not really existent: or what Gedeon is hee now alive, that dare adventure on the weaker of them, with three hundred men, although hee had thrice three hundred Trumpeters to encourage them. We will not therefore presse any with beleefe of Miracles in these later times, but rather perswade them with us to acknowledge, that those extraordinary manifestations of power more then naturall, in battailes fought for Israell and Iudah by Gedeon or Sampson, by the Angels, by the Hoast of Heaven, or by inferiour Elements, were not more pregnant documents of Gods immediate hand in managing warres, nor better proofes of his just title to be the Lord of Hosts; than the contrivances of ordinary causes and occurrences in martiall affaires of moderne times, doth or might afford to all such as rightly survey them. To make a mighty armie fall by the free and unimpeached exercise of their owne valour and strength, can be no lesse wonderfull to unpartiall eyes, than to scatter them by fire and lightning, than to beat them downe by mighty hailestones from heaven. To cause the stronger and more skilfull in warre to faint, without diminishing of their courage and strength, is no lesse the Lords doing, than if their hearts had beene [Page] surprised with a panick terrour, or their armes suddenly deprived of life and motion, as Ieroboams was. Yet this was the case of the Prussian Knights of the Crosse, and the Germane Forces which assisted them against Iagello.

4 The conduct of the right wing of Iagelloes Army, which did consist of Lituanians, was commended to his brother Vitoudus, not out of any foresight of advantage, but in honour of his person, or of that Nation; which was perhaps an oversight in point of warre. However, this wing was fiercely assaulted by the opposite wing of the Germane Armie, which was a great deale the stronger, especially for horsemen. God by his secret Vide Varsevicii paral. in vita Iagell.providence did so dispose that this advantage should redound unto their greater overthrow. For the Lituanians being the farre weaker part of Iagello his Army, both for want of skill and of Armour, after a furious encounter fled the faster: and the Germane wing, which had put them to flight, not suspecting but that their other wing had beene as able to match the Polonian, as they had beene to defeat the Lituanian; pursued the victorie so long and so farre, that they were neither able fully to succour the other wing being scattered and broken by the Polonians, before their returne, nor to flye from their enemies with that speed they desired; as being over wearied with the former chase. Of the Germans, by this oversight and presumption, fiftie thousand were slaine, and (as some relate) almost as many taken prisoners. They had put their confidence in the valour, skill and multitude [Page] of their Armie, which did consist of an hundred and fortie thousand choice souldiers. The good King Iagello his trust was in his praiers to God; and in the presumption of his Enemy, which had beene so triumphant before the victory, so certaine of victorie before the joyning of the battaile; that they would not give Iagello leave to say his prayers, or doe his wonted service unto God, but sent him two swords in mockerie, one for himselfe, and another for his brother Vitoudus, as if they had wanted weapons to defend themselves; profering him withall, that if the place wherein hee then was, were too strait for ordering his men they would goe back, as in contempt and scorne they did, and make him roome. This insolent message was by the religious King embraced, as a welcome prognostique that they should give him place against their wils. And so it fell out, that they were not able to defend themselves within their trenches; their Tents and cariages became a prey to Polonians, being so well fraught with all manner of provision, not for necessitie onely, but for pleasure, that Iagello caused a great number of Wine-vessels to bee burst in pieces, lest his souldiers should be overcome with plenty of wine, after they had overcome their potent enemies, or at lest be hindred from further pursuite of victorie. There a man might have seen a strange spectacle, a flood or stream not of blood or wine, but as if it had bin of gore by the mixture of the wine and the blood alike violently shed in the Germane Camp. The gaudinesse of their Armour [Page] would not suffer such as escaped by flight, toly hid in the fennes or reeds into which they ranne. This was the issue of their unhallowed confidence, which had in their Tents abundance of Torches and of chaines; the one provided [...]or leading the Nobles of Poland Captives, the other for firing their Cities.

5 There is a storie mentioned by Salvianus, exactly paralleld to the former, for the different d [...]spositions of the parties conflictant, and for the contrary successe which befell their contrary demeanours before the battaile. The conflict was betwixt the Goathes and the Gaules. The Goathes were a kinde of Christians, but Arrians, through default of their Instructors. The Gaules were Catholiques, as good as Rome had any in those dayes; so were the Prussian Knights: Iagello was a late convert [...]Christian, and very devout in his kinde, yet not quite purged from some Heathenish inbred superstition. It was a custome with him, to turne thrice round about, and to breake a straw in three pieces before he went abroad. How much more acceptable or lesse displeasing unto God, how much more availeable in the day of battell un [...]ained humilitie, fear & devotion, (though in part tainted with e [...]roneous opinion, and superstition) are, than confidence in the puritie of opinions, or profession of Orthodoxall religion, without correspondency of practise, cannot better be expressed than it is byNon ita Gothi, non ita Vuandali, qui & in discrimine positi opem a [...]eo postulant, & prosperitatis suae munus divinis nominibus appellant. Deni (que) probavit hoc, bello Proximo infelicitas nostra. Cum enim Gothi metuerent, praesumpsimus [...]os: nos in viribus spem ponere, illi in Deo: cum pax ab illis postularetur, a nobis negaretur: illi Episcopos mitterent, nos repelleremus: illi etiam in alienis Sacerdotibus Deum honorarent, nos etiam in nostris contemneremus: prout actus utriusque partis, ita & rerum terminus fuit. Illis data est in summo timore palma; nobis in summa elatione confusio. Ve [...]è & in nobis tunc & in illis evidenter probatum fuit illud Domini nostri d [...]ctum: quoniam, qui se exaltat, humiliabitur, & qui se humiliat, exaltabitur. Illis enim exaltatio data est pro humilitate; nobis pro elatione dejectio. Nam (que) agnovit hoc ille dux nostrae partis, qui c [...]ndem urbem hostium, quam [...]odem die victorem se intrat [...]rum [...]sse prasumpsit, captivus intravit &c. In quo quidem pr [...]ter ipsam rerum infelicitatem, praesens judicium Dei patuit, ut quicquid facturum se usurparat, ipse pateretur. &c. Salvian. lib. 7. Salvianus. That saying of our Saviour, Hee that exalts himselfe shall bee brought lowe, was evidently experienced in the [Page]Goaths and in us: they h [...]mbled themselves and were exalted; we exalted our selves and were dejected. This our Generall found true in himselfe, being led captive into that Citie of the Enemies, into which he presumed he should the same day have entred as Conquerour. Herein the judgement of God was apparent upon him, that hee should suffer, whatsoever hee had presumed or undertaken to doe. The King of the Goathes (as hee concludes,) fought with prayers and supplications before he came to fight with the arme of flesh; and he therefore went out with confidence unto Battaile, as having obtained victorie in his prayer.

A second parallel to the former battaile, for the alternant inclinations of victorie▪ or sudden turning of wofull and sad beginnings unto joyfull issue, might bee taken from that famous battaile of Flodden, if wee may beleeve eyther the ordinarie Scottish Historie, or the constant report of the English, which were then alive, and tooke the Relation from the mouthes of such as were imployed in that service, being men of note & no way partiall. In their observation, it was the extraordinary valour the of Scottish [Page] vauntguard in the very first onset or joyning of battaile, which brought victory (otherwise doubtfull or declining from them) to the English. For the sudden discomfiture and confused flight of the English Vantguard unto the maine Battaile, made that unfortunate King beleeve, that the English Army began to reele; and out of this mistake, as one that had prepared himselfe to follow the chase, rather then to order his owne Battaile, hee was encompassed by the English in that very place (as some report) which he had beene forewarned, but in termes generall and ambiguous, to eschue.

6 That great warre betweene Charles the fift, and the confederate Princes of Germany, begun in the yeare 1546. was more lingring. For as the Iudicious Thuanus Anno 1546▪Historian observes, we shall hardly finde any record in antiquity of two such great Armies lying so neare one to the other, so long as these two armies did without a ful battel. The war was managed, as if it had bin a game at Chess, wherein divers oversights were cōmitted on both sides; & yet the disadvantage given or taken, still so recoverable, that the old Maxime, Non licet bis peccare in bello, may seeme by the event of this warre, to be restrained to praelium, rather to a set battaile then to war▪ Charles the Emperour, did in the esteeme of Warriours, manage his businesses more cautelously than the Confederates did: and yet if wee should speake in the ordinary Politician or Souldiers language, was more beholding to Fortune, than to prudence or counsell of Warre. It was a great oversight to expose himselfe unto such imminent [Page] danger, as he did atThuanus ibidem. Genge, out of a desire to view his Enemies Army. For (as the Spaniards confesse) if the confederate Princes had beene as vigilant to take advantage, as he was carelesse to give it; they might have put an end to this war, as soone as it was begunne. It is noted likewise, as a great oversight in them, that they did not assault him, whilest hee was encamped about Ingolstade and R [...]isborne, expecting fresh supplies out of Italy and the Low Countries: yet the losse of this opportunity they had easily redeemed not long after, had not their project beene disclosed to Charles, who removed his Camp before they had notice, and, by favour of the great windes, which that night hapned, surprized Donaverd, a place of good importance for his present designes; That Count Egmond with his Netherland forces, on whose skill and valour Charles did most relye, should escape the surprisall intended by the Landgrave, was more from good hap and Caesar Magius his extemporary sophisme, than from any forecast either of the Emperour himselfe, or of Count Egmond. For unlesse his Souldiers had been perswaded that the Landgrave was nearer to them over night, than indeed he was; hee had beene nearer to them, or sooner upon them in the morning, than they could have wished. But this false Alarum, given by Magius, made them willing, though much wearied, to march all night. Not long after their safe conduct unto the maine Campe, the chiefe Counsellors of warre were instant with Charles to dissolve his Army for that w [...]nter, untill the next [Page] Spring. That his resolution to the contrary, proved so successefull, was more than in humane wisdome could be forecast; so long as the successe of Maurice Duke of Saxony, and the Bohemians which had invaded the Territories of Iohn Duke of Saxonie, was uncertaine. But the prevailing power of this unexpected enemie, being a known Professor of that Religion for whose maintenance his noble Vncle and Father in Law had taken arms, enforced the Confederates to divide their Army, which could not but give advantage to Charles. But that Henry the eight of England, and Francis the first of France, (neither of them likely to have stood as by-standers in this great businesse, if they had lived) should both dye in this interim, this was the Lords doing, not Fortunes. Charles could not ground any resolution upon the hope of it, nor could the confederate Princes foresee the disadvantage, which from their death did redound unto them. Yet after all these prejudices on the confederate Princes behalfe, Charles his expedition into Saxony against Iohn Prince Elector, who had retired thither with part of the Army, to prevent Maurice his further proceedings; was very doubtfull and full of danger: and yet was Charles (who before had shewed himselfe to bee more timorous and backward) more resolute and forward, in this expedition, than any of his Captaines or Commanders.

7 Doubtlesse lest his Captaines, his Souldiers, or Counsell of Warre should boast, as if their own right hands, their policy and strength had gotten [Page] the victory; the Lord of Hosts, the Lord mighty in Battaile, did so dispose that the Emperour one while should feare, where no feare was, and another while be couragiously wilfull or resolute, against his grave Counsell of Warre, and against all probabilitie of hopefull successe. At Nordling, when his Army was full, and his Souldiers fresh, when the Spaniards (after some difficult passages had beene conquered by their undaunted Resolution,) were perswaded that victorie was hard before them; Charles would not give them leave to overtake it, or (as if it had beene snatched out of their jawes) they did gnash with their teeth for very indignation; nor was this hope of victory in the Spaniards conceived from intemperate heate of warre, or longing desire to fight without good grounds of reason. For Maximilian Egmond, a wise and well experienced Commander, was so taken with the same perswasion, that when the Emperour called him back, he pulled his Helmet off his head, and for anger and indignation, threw it with violence against the ground. Had Egmond followed his advantage and presently overcome his enemies, this might have beene attributed to Scipioes valour in him. Or, if Charles himselfe had continually sought to drive away danger by delay, he might have beene reputed another Fabius. But this [...]mper changed with the time, Versâ tabulâ cu [...]ebat, qui modo stabat, & stabant qui modo currebant. They drew back, which formerly could hardly be recalled from fighting; and hee which recalled them, drawes them forwards against their [Page] wills. For comming neere toThuanus anno 1547▪ Mulberg, where Iohn Prince Elector of Saxony was taken; albeit the Duke of Alva (one at that time as notoriously knowne for his resolution, as for his cruelty afterwards) and the rest of the Counsell of Warre, did utterly mislike his intended passage, over the River of E [...]ve that day, as an attempt too adventrous and desperate, which might yeeld great advantage to his enemy; no perswasion could move or weaken his resolution, but fight he would upon that very day upon what termes soever. And it afterwards appeared that unlesse he had put this his unseasonable desire of battaile (as to them it seemed) in present execution, he might long have waited, before he had laid hold on the like opportunitie againe. For some few houres start, might either have secured the Duke of Saxony from a necessity of battaile, or assured him of victory, if hee had beene enforced to fight. The next morning, after his overthrow, the Emperour met with new supplies, which had received the Duke in a well-fenced place, whereas it was Caesars good fortune to take the Duke the day before, beyond all expectation, in such a place, as he could not fight upon equall termes, nor make from him but by a disgracefull flight.

8 Alva out of his experience and skill might foresee much hazard and danger in his Masters adventrous resolution to passe over an unknowne River in such haste; and his Master, out of some humour or restlesse instinct, might be pusht forwards to fight that day, without apprehension of any [Page] just reason why: but who besides him alone, which appointeth the occurrences and opportunities of time, could foresee or forecast, that the Duke of Alva, being sent on a sudden to seek a guide, should forthwith light on a Man, from whom some of the Duke of Saxonies followers (a few dayes before) had taken two Colts, and made him ready and willing in hope of revenge, or recovery of his loss, to discover an unknowne passage of that uncouth River. They had reason to enstyle him, as they did, Dux via: for he stood the Emperour in more stead, than any ten Captaines in his Army, he being resolved to try the fortune of Battaile that day. Thus the Lord of Hoasts, as skilfull as mighty in battaile, can turne and winde the whole fabrick of Warre with the least finger of his hand, and overthrow or establish the cunningest projects of greatest Princes, and their Counsels of Watre, by the experience and information of a silly▪ Countrey Swaine. Captaines may consult, but he determines; they throw the Dice, he appoints the chance; they may set their men as it pleaseth them, but he in the issue will play the game as it pleaseth Him. When we see great Statesmen, or subtile Politicians more grossely infatuated in some particulars of greatest consequence, then ordinary men usually are; this is a sure token, that the wisdome which they formerly used, was not their owne: but when we see them wittingly cunning to worke their owne overthrow, this is an argument that there is one wiser then they, which sometimes gives wisedome, sometimes onely lends it so, as he will require satisfaction [Page] for the mis-imployment of it. And it is not so great a wonder, to see a wise man infatuated, or utterly deprived of wisedome, as to see his wit and skill continually imployed in weaving a net, to insnare himselfe in, and such as rely upon his projects and power.

9 Hitherto Charles the fift had the fortune of good Dice, and played the fore-game exceeding well. But seeing Religion lay at the stake, God instructs others to play the after-game a great deale better against him; albeit he had two great Counsellors, the one for matters of State, the other for Warre, to wit, the Duke of Alva, and Granvel the Chancellor, as by-standers to helpe him. The sum of their advice, was to account severity the best fruits of victory; and to keepe them under by strong hand, whom hee had conquered; and to bring them in by cunning, which had yet some opportunity to stand out against him. His first oversight, was in committing the ever-renowned Duke of Saxony, to the custody of a Spaniard, to Alfonsus Vives, brother to the famous Ludovicus. This bred great alienation of affection and discontent in some Nobles of Germany, of whose fidelitie and good service in this Warre, he had proofe sufficient. But more mightily overseene he was, in the cunning draught of those Articles, upon which the Landgrave of Hessen did yeeld himselfe, not as a Prisoner, but as a reconciled friend, or Subject, as he presumed. The Emperour and his Counsell, had wit enough to take this man prisoner, but not to foresee the blot, which would hereupon follow, [Page] not to the stayning onely of the Emperours honour, but to the hazard of the maine game, and utter losse of his late Conquest. They did not consider that Maurice of Saxonie, sonne in Law to the Landgrave, was as subtill as valorous, and being as ambitious as subtill, would meditate as full a requitall of this reall disgrace and delusion, (he being interested in the reconcilement) as hee had done of a friendly but sharpe check, given by his Vncle and Guardian (the now captive Duke of Saxonie) for being too prodigall of his patrimony in his nonage. But Maurice his disposition and abilities, were happily unknowne unto the Emperour: and it was not usuall, for a forward young Captaine, not above twentie six yeares of age, to be of as deepe a reach in matters of State, as his gray headed and most experienced Counsellors. The more patient hee was for the present, the more deeply hee layed his plot, the more vigilant hee was to entertaine all opportunities which should be offered for the redemption of his Father in Law, and the libertie of his Countrie. The making of Maurice Prince Elector in his captive Vncles stead, did adde much to his power: the Spanyards securitie and insolency expressed in their printed bookes of the conquest in Germanie as of some meaner province, or appendix to their affected Monarchie, did much exasperate the Germane Princes especially, all but of Brandeburgh hitherto a faithfull adherent unto Charles the fift, and a trusty friend and companion unto Maurice, to whom he was [Page] now more neerely li [...]kt by the sure tye of common discontent. The first opportunitie, which Maurice had for effecting his long concealed plot, was the manifestation of Charles his purpose for reducing the Romish religion into the free States and Cities of Germanie (which had abandoned it) contrary to his former promises, when hee solicited their ayde against the Duke of Saxonie and Landgrave of Hessen, not as the chiefe maintainers or patrons of reformed religion, but as rebels against his imperiall Majestie. This unexpected purpose of Charles was most clearely bewrayed in the siege of Magdeburge, against which Citie, no occasion of hostility could be pretended, besides her Citizens resolution to maintaine that religion, which by publique Authoritie had beene established. The whole body of Germany besides, was in a manner so drowned and choaked, that libertie (especially in points of religion) could scantly draw breath, save onely through Flaccus Illyricus▪ his penne. For subduing this Citie, which for a while had held out stoutly against others set to besige it, Maurice of Saxony was adjudged the fittest man, who being imployed in this service, gaines opportunity by protraction of the warre to make leagues as well with the French King as with some Princes and States of Germany: but after many suspitions and jealousies taken against him, so cunningly goes on with his project, that he came upon Charles the Emperour on such a sudden manner at Inchborrouh, as made him and his Courtiers, with the forraine Embassadours [Page] there attending, to leave the Supper which had beene provided for them unto Maurice and his company. There was a horse-liter and torches provided for the Emperour himselfe with some few attendants, but such scarcity of horses for the rest, that a man might have seene that common resemblance of Princes, of Nobles, and common people, to a company of Chesse men promiscuously put up into a cō [...]on bag, when the game is ended, really acted in the confused flight of this great Emperours amazed Court. Dukes, Earles, & Lords, great Commanders in Warre, common Souldiers and Kitchin Boyes, were glad to trudge it on foot in the mire hand in hand; a Duke or Earle not disdaining to support or helpe up one of the blacke Guard ready to fall, lest he himselfe might fall in the mire, and have none to helpe him. This was the issue of the greatest Warre which Germany had seene or knowne since the dayes of Charles the Great; in the managing and prosequution whereof more excellent Commanders were imployed by Charles the fift, than any Prince in Christendome since hath had to imploy.

10 Vnto many is given power and wit sufficient for compassing the conquest of their potent enemies, unto whom the wisedome of using the victorie aright (which they oftentimes purchased at too deare a rate) is denyed. The same Lord of Hoasts which put his hooke into Senacheribs nostrills, and thereby dragged this furious Monster, which had ranged farre and neere to devoure others, into his owne Land; there to fall by his [Page] owne bowells in the house of his false gods; had all this while led Charles the fift (a Prince of more calme and moderate spirit,) as it were in a silken string, yet strong enough to bring this roving projector back againe within the Rheine, where he is now to encounter with the French. And being thus overwearied in the Germane Warre, the Duke of Guise at the siege of Metz, beates his Souldiers out of heart and breath, and makes Charles himselfe thus to pant: Iam me desertum & circa me nullos viros video; Now I see I am a man forsaken, and have no men about me. Few there were besides himselfe, that were willing to have the siege continued any longer: and one of his common Souldiers, out of the bitternesse of his discontented soule and diseased body, calls him the sonne of a mad woman to his face, for continuing it so long. But whether his undertaking or prosequuting this siege, did relish more of his mothers disposition, than of his owne; let Warriours judge: he never shewed more wisedome in any enterprise before, then he did in this; that he sought not from this time, to wooe his wonted fortunes, by wrestling with Fates. But after he perceived the Lord of Hoasts did not goe out with his Armies, as before he had done; he willingly puts off his imperiall Robes with his Armour, and betakes himselfe to a private retired life. How much happier in this resolution, than either the Davus or Diabolus Germaniae, than the often mentioned Maurice of Saxony, surnamed the Victorious, or the turbulent Albert of Brandeburgh, which had brought [Page] him into these straits! As these two Princes in all their undertakings, in their secret confederacies, whether for Charles the fift, or against him, had aymed more at their private ends, than at the publique weale of Germany: so it pleased the Lord of Hoasts (after he had by their joynt forces, so turned the seales of the Germane Warre, as is before set downe) to settle the publique peace, by their fatall discord. So I terme it, partly because they had beene so deare friends,Inter Mauritiū et Albertum, cum essent aequales, maxima sē per fuerat necessitude; sic ut nihil esset illis cō junctiu [...]. Tribus enim bellis a [...]bo simul Caesari militarunt, Gallico, Smalcaldico Magdeburgi [...]o deinde, quartū at (que) postremum hoc in Caesarem susceperunt. Sed natis offensionibꝰ, hunc tam funestū habuit exitum ipsorū amicitia. Sleidanus Comment. li. 25. anno 1553. See the occasions of their out fall. lib. 24. anno 1552. partly because a reconcil [...]ation betwixt them was so earnestly sought by many, and would have beene readily embraced by Maurice, had not Albert, more out of the strength of wine, than either of wit or courage, provoked him to battaile by a most gross and most unseasonable challenge. Maurice had given good tokens of his inclination to peace, and the like was expected from Albert. ButVide Thuanum anno. 1553▪ the messenger being dispatched after dinner, when Bacchus was more predominant with Albert, than either Minerva or Mars; in stead of a pledge of peace, hee sent his colours to Maurice, and so after they had eaten and drunk, they rose up to play, after such a manner as Abners young men and Ioabs did, 2 Sam. 2. 14, 15. The manner of their mutuall assault, was more like a butchery, than a sober warre. Albert in this furious conflict was so foyled, that hee never recovered root or branch againe: but after some few attempts, lived as a perpetuall Exile or Vagabond; his memory being as hatefull to his Country in his absence, as his presence had beene terrible, whilest he was able to gather forces. And [Page] Sig [...]a militaria sunt hostibus erecta, & ad ipsum ex prael [...]o relata: Pedestria quidē quinqu aginta quatu [...]r, equestria vero qu [...]tuordecim. Mauritius ergo vitam quidem ipse profudit, sed Alberti tamen vires at (que) r [...]bur admodum fregit: nam ab eo praelio vix [...]quam ille potuit vel m [...]diocres recolligere copius. Sleidanus▪ comment. lib. 25. anno 1553. Vide plur [...] Thuanum. Maurice who deservedly enjoyed the title of Victorious, did take up victory upon exchange of life; having so much use of sense and memory, as to have his Enemies colours presented to his eyes, now ready to be closed up in perpetuall darknesse. This was the end of this victorious Prince, which had outstripe the greatest Statesmen of those times in maturitie of wit, and deepnesse of judgement, in matters Martiall or Civill, before his body was come to its full growth: in so much that Policy (whom Caesars in their greatnesse are oft-times forced to serve) did seeme to attend on him, enabling him to atchieve those projects with an heroicall carelesse resolution and majestique grace, for the purchase of which, many powerfull Monarchs have beene often drawne to use untowardly shifts and slye coll [...]sions, odious and contemptible to their inferiours. He was the only man of his age (as one writes of him) that had the skill to take occasion (when it offered it selfe) by the very point, and to carve opportunities out of perplexities. Yet for all this [...]ad no skill or forecast to prevent; no fence to put by the sudden stroke of Death, which se [...] a short period to his farre reaching plots, and dashed the masterpiece of his projects, when it was come to the very height, and ready to fall upon the marke it aymed at. The Spaniards have more cause to blesse the day of this Princes death, then the day of their victory over the Duke of Saxony his uncle. For if he had lived but a little longer, the wings of Austria and Spaine had (in all probability) beene cut a great deale shorter throughtout Germany and [Page] the Low-Countries, than since they have beene, by the confederacy which the French King and he had made lately for ruinating Charles the fift. But whatsoever devices were in their hearts, the counsell of the Lord was against them: and that must stand, though by the sudden fall of the Confederates.

11 To reflect a little upon the more speciall interpositions of Gods providence in moderating the proceedings and issues of this warre. The Romanists have small cause to brag (though many of them doe so) of Charles his victorie over the two confederate Princes, as of some speciall token of Gods favour to their Church and religion.In the life of Charles the fift. Chytreus, a most unpartiall Writer, and well acquainted with the State of Germany as then it stood, and with the severall dispositions of the chiefe confederates; ingenuously confesseth as a speciall argument of Gods favour towards the professors of the reformed Religion throughout Germany, that the Duke of Saxony and Landgrave of Hessen had not the victory which they expected over the Emperour. Hee might have more reason thus to write, then I know or now remember: but certainly their agreement during the time of the war, was not altogether so good, as to promise any lasting concord or sure establishment of true Christian peace throughout the severall Provinces of Germany, if they had prevailed. Shertelius, who commanded in chiefe for the free Cities, did (as some write) forsake the Campe, as being wearie of their wranglings. However their [Page] few yeares captiuitie, was a fatherly chastisement, no plague or token of Gods wrath against them. As the unjust detention of the Landgrave, brought greater dishonour to the Emperour Charles, then any one Act that ever he did: so the Duke of Saxonie wonne himselfe more honour by his durance, then the Emperour could bestow upon him. Victorie in battaile, abundance of wealth, and titles of honour, are gifts and blessings from the Lord; yet of which Pagans and Infidels are capable; and such, as many Heathen have scorned or not affected. But for a Prince by birth, which had beene continually borne upon the wings of better Fortune, alwayes reputed the chiefe stay and pillar of his Country; to endure captivity in an uncouth Court, with such constancy of minde, as could turne the intended contempt and scorne of his witty enemies, into kindnesse and admiration, and cause such as had led him captive, not only to pitie but to honour him, and propagate his fame unto posterity. This was a blessing peculiar to Gods Saints. That character which forraigne Writers have put upon him, will hardly befit any that is not a Christian inwardly and in heart; [Neque in prosperis elatum, neque in adversis dejectum sui hostes unquam vidêre:] His enemies did never see him either puft up with prosperitie, or dejected with adversity. But was it not the greater pitie, (if we may speake after the manner of most men, and as many Germanes in those times did,) that so noble a Prince should be punished with the perpetuall losse of his Electorall dignity? Yet even [Page] this (that we may with veneration rather admire than question the secret wayes of Gods providence) was no losse, but gaine unto Gods Church, and the publique weale of Saxony, which he more sought, than his owne ends or commodities. For by his falling into Charles his hands, the Electorall dignity of Saxony fell into another Collaterall line, which proved as beneficiall and favourable to good learning and Reformed Religion, as any other Princely Family of Germany in those times. Witnesse (to omit their other good deeds in this kinde) that Princely munificence of Duke Augustus (brother and heyre to Maurice the victorious) annually exhibited to Ministers Orphans, related byIn his Preface or Epistle dedicatorie to the continuation of Chemnitius his Harmony. Polycarpus Lyserus. How well those good examples which Maurice himselfe, and his brother Augustus had set, have beene followed by their Successors, falls not within my reading or observation.Of Maurice his munificence and good affection towards learning and Religion, see Sleidan. lib. 19. anno 1547. But surely these two advancers of this second Line did better imitate the princely vertues of their deprived Vncle, than his owne sons were likely to have done. For the judicious unpartiall French Historian, assignes this as one speciall reason, why the fame and memory of Iohn Duke of Saxony did not continue so fresh and pretious after his death, as he deserved, Quia reliquit filios sui dissimillimos.

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CHAP. 29.
Of Gods speciall providence in making unexpected peace, and raising unexpected warre.

1 THE hand of the Almighty is not more conspicuous in managing warres begunne by men, than his finger is in contriving their first beginnings. Love is his nature, and friendship or mutuall love betwixt man and man, Princes or Nations, is a blessing which descends from him alone, who is the onely Author of all true peace, but not the Author onely of peace. Sometimes hee kindles unquenchable dissentions where the seeds of secular peace have been sowne with greatest policy, and watered with continuall care and circumspection. Sometimes againe hee maketh sudden unexpected concord between spirits which jarre by nature, and joynes the right hand of inveterate foes, to strengthen the stroke of Iustice upon his enemies.

2 Later Chronicles will hardly afford any example of worse consort betweene neighbour Princes, than was betweene Charles of Burgundy, and Lewes of France; whether wee respect the contrarietie of their naturall dispositions, or the incompossibilitie of their projects or engagements. Nature had planted, and policie had nourished a kinde of Antipathy betwixt them. And yet how quickly [Page] and unexpectedly did these two great Princes (after irreconcileable variances) close and agree together to crush the wise, the rich, and martiall Earle of Saint Paul, then High Constable of France. He that had beene of both these Princes Courts, and of both their Counsels, hath left it observed, that they could never bee brought in all their life time to concurre in any other action or project besides this: albeit they had often greater motives to entertaine peace betweene themselves, than provocations to conspire against this Earle. Perhaps his experience of their ill consort made him more confident than otherwise hee would have beene; though confident he might have beene upon better grounds than most great Subjects or inferiour Princes can be, if wit, if wealth, if policie, if martiall power or authority could secure any from the execution of Gods Iustice.

3 The best use which Machiavel or his Scholars make of this Potentates mishap, is to forewarne great Subjects or inferiour Princes not to interpose as Arbitrators or Vmpires upon advantage, when their betters fall at variance. The advice I confesse is very good, and ignorance hereof, or want of like con [...]ideration (it may be) was some part of this great Earles folly, not his principall fault; some occasion, no tue or prime cause of these two great Princes combination against him. For besides Lewes and Charles, Quid v. hoc loco dicas de Fortuna, mund [...]i gubernatrice? ut nonnulli putāt▪ Cominaeus, a man no way inferiour to Machiavel in politique wit, had espied a third principall actor in this Tragedy, whose first appearance was (to his apprehension) [Page] in the likenesse of Lady Fortune, but was discovered upon better review to be Divine Providence. Obtinebat ille summā in Gallijs authoritatem: finitimus erat utrique principi; arcem habebat munitissimam, & rebus omnibus instructam. Praesecerat eum Rex quadring entis cataphractis: valebat ingenio; & peritia rei bellicae praestabat; magnum habebat rerum usum, & auri vim ingentem possidebat. Statuendū est igitur Fortunam, qua nihil est mutabilius, ei fuisse planè adversariam. Sed revera nihil aliud est Fortuna, quam sigmentum poeticum. Quin potius ita judicandum est iratum ei fuisse Deum & graviter offensum. Et si de consiliia arcanis fas esset ulli homini pronunciare, dicerem illum excitasse iram Dei adversum se, hac unare po [...]issimum quod per emnem vitam, mente & animo totus in hoc fuerat ut perpetuum bellum a [...]eret. Nam in eo positam esse putabat sua dignitatis materiam, ac v [...]luti segetem. Neque vero difficile ei erat istud perfi [...]. Tota enim natura & moribus & ingenio Principes in [...] se dissidebant. Vix igitur credendum est fortunam aliquam eo dementiae adduxisse virum longe prudentissimum, ut eos Principes adversum se concitaret, quorum fuerat per omnem vitam in rebus omnibus contraria, & diversa voluntas: qui nullam rem unquam simul ex animo comprobarunt nisi hanc in illius caput factam conjurationem. Cominaeus commentar. lib. 6. juxta finem. This good Authors Comment upon this accident is so full and lively, as it will not admit any paraphrase of mine, without wrong, not onely to him, but to the Reader. Onely of one clause pertinent as well to the Discourse following, as to that or the like passage of sacred Writ, [As every man sowes, so shall he reape,] I must give the Reader speciall notice. This Earle was alwayes delighted to sow the seeds of warre, war being (as he and the World thought) the chiefe field or surest ground of his glory, and he ends his thus honoured life with a bloody and unglorious death. This was by Gods appointment the most naturall crop and proper harvest of such a seed-time as he had made. Yet was not the finger of God more remarkable in knitting these two Princes, which al their life times had stood (as we say) at the staffes end, than in loosing the strict link of mutuall amity between other ancient Friends, and sworne Confederates; albeit the Politician seeke in this case, as in the former, altogether to cover or obliterate all impression of it. For it is his manner or humour, as was observed [Page] before, to bring as much grist as he can, and more then he ought, to his owne Mill; to entitle such partiall and subordinate meanes, as fall within the compasse of his profession, sole or prime causes of those effects which are immediately produced by Divine Providence.

4 He spake merrily that said, A man could not bestow his almes worse than on blinde men, seeing they could finde in their hearts to see their best benefactors hanged. But it hath beene delivered in good earnest as a cautelous rule by some politique Discoursers, that the most thanklesse office any great Personage can doe to his dearest friend, were to make him King. It is a lesson of every dayes teaching, The greater men grow, the more they scorne to bee thought to be beholden unto others. The very sight of such as they have beene more beholding unto, than they can handsomely requite, seemes to upbraid ambitious minds. Hee is a meane Historian that cannot instance in divers upstart Princes, which could not long suffer the heads of those men, whose hands had put Crownes on theirs, unto which they had no lawful title, to stand where nature had given them lawfull possession, ( [...]i.) upon their owners shoulders. Politique rules or Aphorismes grounded upon historicall observations of this kinde, are not altogether without use. But the doctrine inveiled in Poeticall fictions, is in this and many other cases more Catholique than the Historians or Politicians observation. Vsuall it is with the Poets when they represent the originall and progresse of tragicall dissentions betweene [Page] quondam friends; in the first place to dispatch the Furies abroad with fire-brands in their hands to kindle or blow the coales of cruell and (without the mutuall blood of the Actors) unquenchable hatred. And to speake the truth without fiction, it seemes scarce possible that such light sparkles of humane anger as are usually the first seeds of quarrels betweene neighbour Princes or confederate States, should grow unto such raging and devouring flames as they often doe, unlesse some spirit more potent than the spirit or breath of man did blow them. Now if by Furies the Poets meane infernall Fiends or evill Spirits, their language doth not varie much from the ancient dialect of Canaan. God (saith the Author of the Booke of Iudges, cap. 9. ver. 23, 24.) sent an evill spirit betweene Abimelech and the men of Schechem: and the men of Shechem dealt treacherously with Abimelech: That the cruelty done to the threescore and ten sonnes of Ierubbaal might come, and their blood be layd upon Abimelech their brother which flew them, and upon the men of Shechem which ayded him in the killing of his brethren. The mutuall disasters of both parties related in the verses following, is but the just award of lothams imprecation. vers. 19, 20. If yee then have dealt truly and sincerely with Ierubbaal, and with his house this day, then rejoyce ye in Abimelech, and let him also rejoyce in you. But if not, let fire come out from Abimelech, and devoure the men of Shechem, and the house of Millo: and let fire come out from the men of Shechem, and from the house of Millo, and devoure Abimelech.

[Page] 5 It would be more easie than safe, out of the Histories of times ancient and moderne, domestique and forraine, to parallell this last instance so exactly as well for successe as practise, as might be sufficient, if not to perswade the irreligious Politician, yet to leave him without excuse for not being perswaded, that there is an immortall King of Kings and Lord of Lords, from whose jurisdiction no corner of the Earth can be exempted; an everlastingly wise and righteous Iudge, which oversees the inventions of mans heart with a stedfast eye, and measures their actions with a constant hand; one that visiteth the same irregularities by the same rule or canon, and fitteth like sinnes with like punishments, after thousand of yeares distance in time, in places distant some thousand of miles. But leaving the collection of parallell examples or experiments sutable to the rule proposed unto the Readers private observation: the proofe of the last mentioned conclusion will bee more apparent and concludent from the examples or instances in the last Section concerning the rule of retaliation.

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CHAP. 30.
Of Gods speciall providence in defeating cunning plots and conspiracies, and in accomplishing extraordinary matters by meanes ordinary.

1 WHen it is said that In God we live, wee move, and have our beeing, this is not to be understood only of being or life naturall, or of motion properly so called, but is to be extended unto life and operations purely intellectuall. So that the incomprehensible Nature in respect of our apprehensions, is as properly an agent superartificiall, as supernaturall. All the skill wherewith any intelligent Creature is or can be endowed, all the devises and projects of mens hearts, are as essentially subordinate to his incomprehensible wisedome, or counsell of his will, as the life, being, and motions of things naturall, are to his creative, conservative, or cooperative power. Howbeit this subordination of the rationall creatures cogitations to his infinite wisedome, doth no way deprive it of all liberty or freedome, in projecting, devising or consulting; but onely of power to appoint successe unto its owne projects or devises. Thus much, to my apprehension, is included in the wise Kings Maxime,Pro. 19. 21. Many devises are in the heart of man: but the counsell of the Lord, that shall stand. This freedome or liberty of mans wil in devising or projecting, and the want of all liberty or power to allot successe unto his [Page] projects, doth more truly argue, that which the Latines call servum arbitrium, that is, mans servitude so misery and sinne, than if he had no more liberty in the one case than in the other. The more ample the spheare of his liberty in projecting or devising, is, or (by divine permission) may be; the more admirable doth the Counsell of the Lord appeare in directing and ordering his free courses, most infallibly unto such ends as hee appoints, by meanes for their kinde, ordinary and naturall. And if we would diligently consider the works of God in our dayes, they are as apt to establish true beleefe unto the rules of Christianity set downe in Scripture, as were the Miracles of former ages, wherein Gods extraordinary power was most seene: yea the ordinary events of our times, are more apt for this purpose in this age, than use of miracles could be. For the manifestations of Gods most extraordinary power, cease, by very frequencie, to be miraculous; and men (such is the curiosity of corrupted nature) would suspect, that such events (were they frequent or continuall) did proceed from some alteration in the course of nature, rather than from any voluntary exercise of extraordinary power in the God of nature. But the continuance of these ordinary events, which the all-seeing wisedome of our God daily and hourely brings to passe, is most apt to confirme the faith of such as rightly consider them. For by their successive variety, the amplitude of his unsearchable wisdome is daily more and more discovered, and by their frequency the hidden fountaine of his [Page] Counsell, whence this multiplicity flowes, appeares more clearly to be inexhaustible. Only the right observation or live-apprehension of these his works of wisedome, is not so easie and obvious unto such as minde earthly things, as his workes of extraordinary power are. For such works amate the sense, and make entrance into the soule, as it were by force; whereas the effects of his Wisedome or Counsell, make no impression upon the sense, but upon the understanding only, nor upon it, save onely in quiet and deliberate thoughts. For this reason, true faith was first to be planted and ingrafted in the Church by Miracles, but to be nourished and strengthned in succeeding ages, by contemplation of his providence. The limits of this present contemplation, shall be by example or instance to shew in what manner the wisedome of God doth sometimes defeat the cunningest contrivances or deepest plots of Politicians, and sometimes accomplish matters of greatest consequence by meanes or occurrences light and slender in the esteeme of men. But how weake or slender soever they bee for their particular nature, or in themselves, yet the combination or contexture of them must needs be strong, because it is woven by the finger of God.

2 What plot could have been invented against any land or people, more deadly, then that of Hamans against the people of God, storied Ester 3. 8, 9. His information against them was bitter, and easie to finde entrance into an absolute Monarchs eares, whose words must be a Law to all, especially [Page] to his captivate and conquered subjects. And the Iewes on the other side more likely to change their lives, than the lawes of their God, for any Princes pleasure. What hope (in humane sight) for Mordecai to finde any favour, when as He was to execute this bloody Law, whose particular spleene and revengefull mind against Mordecai, had for his sake procured it, in most absolute forme against the whole Iewish Nation? You will say, that Ester lately received to greatest favour with the King, and now made consort of his bed, might prevaile much. And for a barbarous King to shew mercy, at his Queenes entreaty, unto such as had done him so good service, as Mordecai had done Assuerus, is but an ordinary thing. I confesse as much, that many occurrences, which seem to conspire for Mordecai and his peoples deliverance, are not extraordinary. For a King in his cups, to take a displeasure at his former Queene, that would not consent unto his folly; or for his displeasure unto the divorced, to shew greater love unto his late espoused Queene, is a matter neither strange nor unusuall: but that Queene Vashti should bee displaced, and Ester (unknowne to bee of the captive Hebrewes kinde) admitted to be Assuerus his mate, just at that time, when Haman, the Iewes sworne enemy, was exalted next to the King and Queene in dignity; this can only be ascribed to him, who, as the wise sonne of Syrach speakes, hath made all things double, one against another, Ecclus, 42. v. 24. Againe, that the King, the very night before hee came to the banquet which Ester had prepared, [Page] should take no rest; this was the Keeper of Israels vigilant care over his people, who neither slumbers nor sleepes, whilest his enemies are a plotting mischiefe against them. Againe, that the King taking no rest should seeke to solace his restlesse thoughts by reading the Chronicles, that reading them hee should light on that place, wherein the now distressed Mordecaies faithfull service, in bewraying the treason intended against his person, by Bigtan and Teresh his Eunuches, was registred: All this doubtlesse, was only from his wisedome, that hath the disposition of al the lots, much more of all the plots which man can cast. Many other occurrences might here be considered, no one of which considered apart, from the rest, but is ordinary and usuall; and yet the entire frame or composture of them, such as cannot bee referred to any but his workmanship, who hath created all things in number, waight, and measure.

Yet a Politician that should have read this story in the Persian Chronicles, could at the first sight have discovered a great oversight in Haman, in not putting sooner in execution this his absolute commission; Semper nocuit differre paratis. Perhaps this conditionall proposition may bee true, that if he had executed his Commission with speed, the Iewes had fared worse; but for this cause the Lord did not suffer him to entertaine this resolution. Yet, let us see whether haste in execution could accomplish the like designes against a State in like case.

3 Fliscus that nobly descended and potent Genoesi, [Page] with his familiar Verina, had enacted as cruell a Law against the Dorian Family, and the other Nobility of Genoa; which they had resolved to have writen, first with characters of blood upon their pretended enemies brests, & after their death, to have condemned them by proclamation, when as Fliscus through popularity should have got the Diadem.Vide Thuanum anno. 1547 Their plot for effecting their enemies death and their owne advancement, was layed as exactly as policy could devise; their practise and execution of meanes invented, was more exact then the patterne which Machiavel gives for like designes. First, because store of armour and munition was necessary for such an action, and provision of such store of munition would be suspicious for a private man to undertake in a popular and factious State; Fliscus perswades young Doria (whose death he especially sought) to be his partner in setting out a Man of Warre against the Turkes. Doria kindly accepts the offer, altogether ignorant of the others intent, which was by this colour to furnish himselfe with armour and munition out of the Countrie for Doriaes overthrow. And being once furnished with such tragicall attire, without suspition of any tragedy to ensue: for to provide himselfe of sutable actors; hee invites a multitude of the Commons to a night feast, where in stead of thanksgiving before meat, hee makes a patheticall oration, exhorting them to banquet it that night in the Nobilities blood, assuring them that they should bee their owne carvers for ever after, of the good things of that Citie. Some for love to [Page] Fliscus, others for hate to the Nobility, some for feare of present danger, and others for hope of greater dignities; for one cause or other, all at length, save two (who desired to be spared for their faint hearts) offer themselves to Fliscus his service. And by their forwardnesse, the City gates, next to the key, whose command made most for their purpose, are presently surprised: yet not without some noise, which comming unto Doriaes eare, makes him suspect that his Mariners were quarrelling; and rifing out of his bed to compose the supposed quarrell by his presence, he falls immediately into his enemies hands before he was sought for. But however this yong gallant had committed no actuall crime, that by course of humane law, deserved a violent death by such executioners; yet the right hand of the Lord had found him out, for consenting by Piracy to disturbe the publique peace lately concluded betwixt Charles the fift and the Turke: which peace the Genoezes amongst others, the Dorian faction above other Genoezes, but especially this young Doria & his Fathers house (which had stood for Caesar against the French) were bound in conscience to observe. But leaving the cause of his death unto the righteous Iudge: his sudden end in any Politicians judgement was a good beginning to Fliscus mischievous designes. And what more could Machiavel have in the next place given in charge, but that the Gallies which made some stirre at the noise, should with all speed bee boorded to make all sure, untill the Tragedy were fully acted. This Fliscus sought to put in execution with [Page] as great speed as Machiavel in like case could have wished. But haste (as wee say) makes waste: his forward minde had made him forget, that his body was not so nimble in armour, as out of it; not so apt either to avoid a slip, or to recover himselfe when he began to slide. By his hasty treading upon a loose plank (as if the snare had been set for his soule by the Almighties hand) he, and one or two of his companions, fell some yard or two short of their purpose, and drowned themselves and their plot, even whilest it was come to such perfection, that the younger Fliscus yet hoped to make himselfe Duke of Genoa, as haply he might have done, if the Lord had lent him so much wit as to have concealed his elder brothers death, scarce knowne to any till he bewrayed it to such as enquired for him, in hope to finish all instantly by his presence. But they partly amazed with the elder brothers sudden disaster, and seeing no sufficiency in the younger, to satisfie their expectation, dissolve the rout, and ceasing to project the ruine of others, begin every one to seek the best meanes for his owne safety. Thus hath this politique Gentleman consulted shame unto his house, his stately Palace is demolished, and his Noble Family almost extinct. Yet were all the conditions which greatest plotmasters require in such projects, exactly observed in this: the plot it selfe as acurate as could by the reach of man be devised, their counsell communicated but to a few at the first, the execution of it so speedy, that the appointed actors could have no leisure to deliberate whether it were better to relent, [Page] or goe forwards; and yet the successe more dismal and sudden, than their enemies could expect or wish. Thus Machiavels rules have their exceptions, but the Prophets Calendar is never out of date; Non est viri dirigere gressus ejus. Not Machiavel himselfe had he been present, could so have directed Fliscus his steps, that his treadings should not slip; yea, he should have fallen, though Machiavel had held the plank. For his iniquity had overgrown his plot, and being come to ful height, it strikes upon that immutable & irresistible doome which God by Moses had pronounced, Deut. 32. v. 35. Vengeance and recompence are mine, their feet shall slide in due time, and the day of their destruction is at hand, and the things that shall come upon them, make haste. These men we spake of, hastned their owne destruction, by making too much haste to destroy others.

4 Perhaps the Politician will reply: As Haman was too slow, so Fliscus was too hasty, and should have observed the contrary rule, ‘Differ; habent parvae commoda magna morae.’ Suppose this hot-spur were revived, to re-act his former or the like cunning plot, and for his better remembrance should take the Dolphin and Harrow for his devise, with this inscription, Festina lente; it were not possible his speed should be better, so long as his intentions were as bad, or worse then they had beene; and his adversaries no worse then they were, when he conspired their death.

[Page] To omit more examples ancient or foraigne: the fresh memory of the Powder treason eclipseth all that have gone before it. No Politician can justly accuse the Actors of this intended Tragedy, either of Hamans too long delay, or of Fliscus his haste. Such maturity and secrecie they used in their actions and consultations, as none on earth could have used more, considering the many lets and impediments which did crosse their projects. Hell it selfe had gone so long with this hideous monster, that it was weary and well content to make an abortive brood, as fearing the pangs that must have accompanied the full delivery of what had beene conceived within her bowels, would be unsufferable. But Achitophel had wit at will, to plot a treason to his Soveraignes overthrow; yet herein blinded by him, that gave him sight in other projects, that he could not forecast what harmes might befall him by Absoloms folly. And though the Archplotter were Vir profundae dissimulationis, one that could give traiterous counsell, as the destroying Angell of the Lord, and hide his counsell as deep as Hell; though he had this extraordinary quality in him, of making his friends so sure unto him, that they would adventure both body and soule at any time for his sake: yet thus farre infatuated he was, as not to consider, that some of them which were so willing to worke a publique mischiefe for his pleasure, might also have a desire to secure their private friends from danger, by giving them some generall or ambiguous admonition, albeit against their oaths of secrecie. That one of them should [Page] seeke to admonish his Honourable friend of the instant danger, was a thing not extraordinary, except in this, that so much good nature could be left in his brest, that could consent unto his Countries ruine. That a man of the Iesuites instruction, should finde an evasion in an oath, which he held lawfull, is a matter usuall. And who knowes whether hee that permits evill, because he knowes to turne it unto good, did not at this time make use of the Iesuites doctrine of playing fast and loose with his sacred and dreadfull name, to animate this Discoverer to dispense with that solemne oath of secrecy which he had taken, and afterward to forsweare the fact so deeply. I do not think he durst have adventured upon either, without some secret mentall reservation. But without all question, it was his counsell which moderateth the maine devises of mans heart, that moved him to expresse his minde in such termes, as might represent or call the fathers disaster, unto the remembrance of his royall sonne, whom nature had taught to make jealous constructions of every speech, word, or circumstance, that might revive the memory of the intendments against his father, and to forecast all possible interpretations of all occurrences, which might portend or intimate the like designes against himselfe. As the sincerity of his royall heart and consciousnesse of clemency towards all, especially towards that faction which deserved none; had brought our Soveraigne asleepe in security: so the collections which he made out of the disclosers aenigmatical admonitions, were such as a man would make, [Page] that had heard the Letter read in a dreame or slumber, not such as so wise and learned a Prince would in other cases have made in his vigilant and waking thoughts. But from what cause soever the dreame came, the interpretation was from the Lord, and Let it be unto the Kings enemies for ever. The event hath proved the discloser to have beene a false Prophet, and to have spoken presumptuously when he said, that God and man had concurred to punish the iniquity of those times, by such a blow as he meant. We must with the true Prophet make confession: Not unto us Lord, not unto us, but unto thy Name give the glorie. It was not God and man, but God alone, that did sute and order the severall occurrences by which the intended blow was prevented. It was not God, but the devill, that did intend it.

5 That the Iewes in the dayes of Mordecai, that the Genoezes within this age, that this Land and people within our memory, have not become a prey unto their malicious enemies, was meerely from the counsell of the Lord, which must stand, for our good, if we decline not unto evill. It is not the breath or vapour of Hell, that can undermine our State, or shake our Princes Throne; whilest God is with us. But if he be against us, what can be for us? If he doe but speake the word, even the least word of mortall man, whose breath is in his nostrils, shall be sufficient to blow up or overturne a Kingdome.

If subjects should rebell, as often as Princes breake jests upon them, they might worke their owne greater real disgrace, and wrong both themselves [Page] and their posterities farre more in deed, than the other had done in words. But opportunitie makes a theefe, and want of opportunitie oftimes keepes great mindes much discontent, from rebellion. But when it shall please him that hath reserved the perfect knowledge of times and seasons to himselfe, not to dispose their opportunities to any Land or peoples good; a womans unseasonable word may breed mightiest Empires greater reall mischiefe, than Emperours Swords for many generations can redresse. So it fell out, when Iustin the Emperour had removed Narses the Eunuch from his regency of State upon importunate accusations, which, for the present, he could not put off, but only by putting him from his place. Sophia his Empresse (not so wise herein, as after-experience might have taught her to have beene) whether willing (as the old proverb is) to adde scathe to scorn, or whether desirous to sooth Narses his calumniators in their humour;See the Histories which write of Iustin the second. said she would have Narses come unto Constantinople, there to spin amongst her maids. The jest, being brought unto his eares, provoked him to give her proofe of his masculine spleene and indignation. For he thus resolved, Seeing it hath pleased her Excellency to appoint mee this taske, I shall shortly spinne her such a threed, as shee and her Husband shall hardly bee able all the dayes of their life to untwist. Not he, but the Lord by his mouth had spoken the word, and it was done. For Alboinus King of the Lombards comes instantly out of Hungary at Narses his call, who could not disswade him from entring into Italy, after it repented [Page] him of his former spleene against Sophia, and of his encouraging of this King to revenge his wrong. The Easterne Empire had received many wounds before this time, but lately cured of the most dangerous by Narses his good service. This was the first perpetuall and irrecoverable maime: the second more grievous did follow upon as light occasions, but where in the concourse of many circumstances were more notable.

6 WhenSee the writers of the Emperours lives▪ in the life of Heraclius. Mahomet first begun to counterfeit extaticall visions, and practise Sorcery; he aymed perhaps, at no greater matters than Simon Magne did, onely to be accounted [...], some great one among his fellow Badgers and Camel-drivers. He did not so much as dreame of Nestorius or his heresie. And Sergius the Monke, when he began to maintaine that heresie at Constantinople, did think as little of Arabian Sorcery. After these two, by Satans instigation, and Gods permission, had made a medley of Iewish infidelity and Grecian heresie, as if it had beene a garment of English wool and out landish [...]int; they least thought of any mutinie towards, in Heraclius his camp for want of pay. The Romane Quaestor was altogether ignorant of Mahomets visions or his new coined Lawes, when he thus disgracefully intreated the Arabians or Sarazens: There is scarce sufficient provision for the Romane and Grecian Souldiers, and must this rascality of Dogs be so importunately impudent, in demanding their pay? Sed habet & Musca splenem. These poore Barbarians were such hungry Dogs, as looked to be cherished where they fawned, [Page] and could be content to change many masters, rather then be continually raited thus. Now albeit the Romane Quaestor did thus uncourteously dismisse them, without a pasport or direction whither to goe: yet the Lord by his harsh language did hisse for these Hornets, unto Mahomets Campe; who had beene lately foiled by the Persian, untill these fugitives raised him up, and made him Lord of Aegypt. Thus of the heresie of Sergius (by birth an Italian, by profession a Monke) and of Mahomets sorcery, and of these Sarazens mutiny, hath the Divine Providence, made up a triple cord, which cannot to this day be broken, having continued almost these thousand years, as a fatall scourge to Christendome.

7 A meere Politican, that considers the causes of Iustinus his losse, by the discontent of Narses, or of Heraclius his prejudice by these Sarazens revolt, would from both draw that Aphorisme which divers have done, from a trustyCamerarius ex Ferrono. Gascoignes answer unto Charles the 7. French King. The Aphorisme is that Princes must beware what speeches they use unto great Souldiers or men of valour, seeing that Gascoigne ingenuously told his Lord and Master, that for a foule disgrace he could turne Traytor, though all the riches of France, though the French Kingdome it selfe would not suffice for a bribe to make him prove false, or to corrupt his loyall minde. The Rule or Aphorisme is in many cases good. Yet if this and all other like caveats were strictly observed, and other matters not amended; he that at his appointed time turnes disgracefull [Page] speeches unto the speakers overthrow, can make the mildest words, which Generalls or other Confederates in Armes can utter, for accomplishing their joynt purposes, to effect their owne ruine, and delivery of their enemies.

8 It is a knowne story of a Family or faction in Perusium, who having gathered a competent armie of their Allies, to surprise the citie from which they had beene lately banished; made their forcible entrance into it by night, but sting all the chains that otherwise would have hindred the passage of the horsemen, untill they came unto the Market stead or chiefe place to bee surprized. But here their Hercules, wanting roome (by reason of the presse) to fetch a full blow with his club, for bursting that chaine, much stronger (in all likelihood) than the rest, criesSee Guicciardine and Machiavel, locis citatis. Back, back, unto those that were next unto him, and they the like unto such as were behinde them, untill the same words had run like an eccho to the hindmost ranks or reere; who imagining that those in the front had descried some danger, resolved to be the first in retiring, as they had beene the last in entring: and hence they in the front perceiving themselves suddenly destituted of their company, give their enterprize for lost, which one blow more, or one word lesse, had presently effected. But perpetuall exile was by Divine justice the enterprisers due; and though iron chaines may be burst by the strength of man, yet the Counsell of the Lord, that shall stand, more firme than walls of brasse, or rocks of Adamant; [Page] that his enemies at the appointed time may fall before it.

The onely use which the Politician hath made of this and like experiments, is this: First, that Generalls should bee very wary what words should passe throughout their army, and for this purpose to keepe servants, women, or other talkative or clamorous creatures, farre from the army, when any service is toward. Secondly, to accustome their Souldiers, onely to respect their Commanders speeches, and to account of others as winde, that blowes afarre off. These caveats were given above 70 yeares agoe; and yet have greater forces than these Italians had, beene upon as light occasions defeated in their intended surprisalls of Cities by night, after they had blowne open their Gates with Petars. However, the admonition hath its use and seasons, though oftentimes observed without successe, because it is too much relyed upon. Mordecai spake with confidence unto Ester; If thou holdest thy peace at this time, comfort and deliverance shall appeare unto the Iew out of another place; because as he supposed, the counsell of God was for their good. But though Souldiers should hold their peace, and Generalls speake nothing but what the Politician should prompt, yet shall destruction come upon them upon other occasions; if the counsell of the Lord bee once against them. Yea though the parties disagreeing should lay all enmity aside, and consult for the establishing of peace, yet shall they conclude in blood, if the Lord of Hosts be displeased with them.

[Page] 9 A fit instance to this purpose is registred, as Camerarius tels us in foraigne Annalls, though not intimated by our English Historians, who had as much reason as any other to have recorded it, if the story had beene true. But seeing they have omitted it, I will not expect the Readers historicall assent unto it, but only commend it unto him as an example for illustrating the probability of the last observation. The English and French Army being ready to joyn battell in Normandy, the French Captaines perswade their King to intreat a parley with the King of England, that so all matters might be compromised without further harme or danger to either partie. The place agreed upon for the parley was a ruinated Chappell, a little distant from both armies. A friendly compromise was by both Kings resolved upon to be further ratified upon deliberation of their severall Counsells. But before their parting, a huge Snake, whether stirred up by the noise of their attendants which waited without, or upon other occasions, seemed by her hissing and swelling necke to make towards them. Both of them alike afraid, draw their swords, and yet neither willing to trust other within the walls, run out with their naked Swords in their hands: their attendants upon this sight misdeeming some outfall in the Chappell betweene them, doe the like; and the Armies upon this view joyne battaile, and could not bee recalled, untill much blood on both parties was, and more had beene spilt, unlesse the night had come vpon them.

10 Be this, as it may be, a true story, or a fiction: [Page] the possibility of such unexpected occurrences (all which are at the Almighties disposition) are infinite, and cannot be comprehended, much lesse prevented by the wit of man which is but finite. So that although the plots and devises of mans heart be many, yet hath the Lord more counterplots perpetually in store, and therefore of all counsells, the counsell of the Lord it shall stand.

Whilest I reade some speculative Politicians, that seeke by observing the errors of former times in managing civill affaires or projects, to rectifie or correct their oversights, and take upon them to make an Ephimerides of future events: their Discourses in my slender observation, argue a greater ignorance in them, of divine Providence, than their practises would in the Mathematicks, that would labour out of a surd number to extract a perfect square. He that knowes the rules of Arithmeticall division, might in every working or attempt of resolving a full number into its proper square, come nearer and nearer to the square number, and yet be sure not to finde it, though he spent Nestors yeares in dividing and subdividing the same number, or resolving fractions into fractions. The reason is this, how little soever a surd number exceeds the next square, yet the overplus is in division infinite. And so are the events which the Politician seeks to rectifie or determine of, and therefore not certainly rectifiable or determinable; save onely by him whose wisdome is actually infinite. It is an errour incident to little children to think they might easily shake hands with the man in the Moone, or [Page] with Endymion kisse the Moone it selfe, if they were upon the next hill where it seemes to them to set: and if you bring them thither, they think they came but a little too late; if they could bee now at the next hill where they see it goe downe, they imagine they might doe so yet. Such for all the world is the practicall Politicians errour, the cause of both in proportion the same. Children are thus deceived, because they imagine no distance betweene heaven and earth, or betweene heaven and that part of earth which terminates their sight. And so the secular Politicians minde, reacheth no farther than the hemisphere of his owne facultie. Either he knowes not, or considers not, how farre the height and depth of his wisedome and counsell that sits in the heavens, and rules the earth; exceeds the utmost bounds or horizon of his foresight and limited skill: in this only different from the childe, that his wit is more swift and nimble than the others body, so that he is not so soone weary of his pursuit. But if hee misse of his purpose at the first, he hopes at his next flight to speed, and thus in seeking after true felicity (which was hard by him, when hee beganne his course) he runnes round all the dayes of his life, even as he is led by him that daily compasseth the earth. Better might Painters hope, by looking on the multitude of men now living, to draw accurate pictures of such as shal be in the Age to come; than any Politician can expect, either by observation of former times, or experience of his owne, to prescribe exact rules for managing of future projects. [Page] For if we consider the whole frame or composition of circumstances, or all the ingredients, (if I may so speake) of every event; there is as great a varietie in humane actions, as there is in mens faces. Never were there two events of moment upon earth altogether alike; each differs from other, either in the substance, number, or quality of occurrences, or in the proportion of their consonancie or dissonancy unto the counsell of the Lord; as there is no visage but differs from another, if not in colour or complexion, yet in shape or figure. I have beene perhaps rather too long, then too bold in decyphering the vanity of this proud Criticke, which accuseth Christianity of cowardize in actions, and devotion of stupiditie and dulnesse in consultation of State. But so might Bats and Owles condemne the Eagle of blindnesse, were tryall of sight to be made in that part of twilight, wherein darknesse hath gotten the victory of light. Some men not able to discern a friend from a foe, at three paces distance in the open Sunne, will reade their Pater noster written in the compasse of a shilling by moone shine, much better than others clearer sighted, can reade a Proclamation print. The purblinde see best by night, yet not therefore better sighted than others are, because the absolute triall of [...]ight is best made by day. So is the meere Politician more quick fighted, than Gods children in matters permitted by divine providence, to the managing of the Prince of darknesse. For albeit the righteous Lord do in no case permit, or dispense with perjury, fraud, or violence; yet he suffers [Page] many events to be compassed by all or some of these, or worse meanes. Now when matters usually managed by speciall providence, come by divine permission once to catching; hee that makes least conscience of his wayes, will shew most wit and resolution. For whatsoever falls to Satans disposalls, shall assuredly bee collated on him that will adventure most. It is his trade and profession to lend wit, might, and cunning, for satisfying present desires, upon the mortgage of soules and consciences. And his Scholar or Client (the politique Atheist) perceiving fraud and violence to prosper well in some particulars, imagines these or like meanes throughly multiplied to be able to conquer all things, which he most desires. But when Satans commission is recalled, or his power by Gods providence contracted; the cunningest intentions or violent practises of Politicians, prove much like to a peremptory warrant out of date, which being directed to one County is served in another. Both indanger the party prosecuting, and turne to the advantage of the prosecuted. I conclude this Chapter and Section with the observation of a namelesse Author, but set downe in verses, related by Camerarius.

Si vitam spectes hominum, si denique mores,

Artem, vim, fraudem, cuncta putes agere.

Si propius spectes, Fortuna est arbitra rerum:

Nescis quam dicas, & tamen esse vides.

At penitus si introspicias, atque ultima primis

Connectas, tantum est Rector in orbe Deus.

[Page]Who looks on men, and on their manners vile,

Weenes nought is wrought, nought got sans force or guile:

Who nearer looks, spyes (who knows what?) her wheele

Who coozneth fraud, and oft makes force to reele.

But Eagle sights which pierce both far and neare,

Eye One who onely ruleth all this Spheare.

[Page]

SECTION IV.
Of Gods speciall Providence in suiting punishments unto the nature and qualitie of offences committed by men.

CHAP. 31.
Of the rule of retaliation or counterpassion. And how forcible punishments inflicted by this rule without any purpose of man, are to quicken the ingraffed notion of the Deitie, and to bring forth an acknowledgement of Divine Providence and Iustice.

1 ARISTOTLE did rightly denie retaliation or counterpassion to be [...], exact justice; and yet it may be, Pythagoras his thoughts did soare much higher than his, when he pitched upon the affirmative. In ordinary offences committed by unequall or extraordinary persons, Pythagoras his tenent, is not [Page]universally true. As if a great person should beat his farre inferiour, without just cause, it stands neither with the Law of God, Interrogavi paulò antè, quis habiturus sit quaestionem de potentibus, quis illo accusabit, quis litem defi [...]iet, quis poenam irrogabit? Certè querimoniae & lachrymae miserorum hominum, quos crudeliter vexarunt, item viduarum & pupillorum gemitus atque suspiria, quos parentibus atque maritis inhumanè spoliarunt, breviter eorum, quos afflixerunt & fortunis omnibus denudarunt, lamentationes atque planger, erunt accusationis loco, quam illi coram suprem [...] Dei tribunali sislent. Qui magnitudine scelerum offensus, non semper concedit diuturniorem impunitatem, sed illos aliquando verberat prasentibus poenis, ita quidem evidenter & clarè, ut dubitari non possit, ipsum esse justissimum impietatis nostrae ultorem. Plerique vero Principes, imperiti quidem illi & inconsulti, quam diu prospera utuntur fortuna, nihil tal [...] metuunt, sed cum maximè securi sunt omnium rerum, tunc ecce Deus repentè illis adversarium aliquem excitat, de quo minime suspicati fuerant. Cominaeus in fine lib. 10. or rule of equity, to beat him in the same fashion, or according to the same measure againe. But when Kings and Monarks doe extraordinary wrongs unto their subjects, or practise prodigious cruelties upon their inferiours; they usually suffer the like harmes or plagues themselves. But who (saith Cominaeus) shall call Potentates in question, who shall accuse, who shall condemne, who shall punish them? All (as he resolves) that can be required to a formall processe, shall be supplyed by the complaints and teares of such as are agrieved by them; by the sighes and grones of the fatherlesse and widowes. These are more authentique than any witnesses of fact, more powerfull then any Atturney or Advocate, before the supreme tribunall of God. So good and gratious a Iudge is He, and so compassionate to the oppressed, that even in this life he often punisheth Kings for their sakes, so evidently and so remarkably, as there can be no place for doubt amongst the observant, that he is a most just avenger of humane impietie. But most Princes (as the same Author notes) are so unexperienced, so inconsiderate that whiles prosperous fortune smiles upon them, they feare no stormes, no punishment, no conviction. And [Page] for want of this feare, which is the beginning of wisedome, God suddenly raiseth up some adversary or other, when they least suspect.

Affliction in some kinde or other is the surest friend, the most trusty Counsellor, that any Prince can use; for of all the rest of his retinue, it onely knoweth not how to flatter. And affliction or calamity of the same kinde, which they have undeservedly brought upon others (when that befalls them) is the most sincere, most powerfull Preacher that enters in at any Court gate, for bringing Potentates to the knowledge of God and of his Lawes, or to acknowledge him to be as well the Iudge of Iudges, as Lord of Lords.

2 For as Iustice cannot be done upon private offenders but by the warrant of supreame authoritie; so when wee see such judgements befall supreme Magistrates themselves, as to the notions of naturall reason are just and right, and as it were exactly fitted to that which they have done to others; this clearly argues there is a Supreme Tribunal in heaven, which hath more soveraigne Authoritie over the highest Thrones and Principalities on earth, than they have over the meanest subject that lives under them, or filliest wretch that sojournes within their territories.

3 And if the tallest Cedars be not without the reach of Divine Iustice, shall it not controll the lower shrubs? Never was there any man on earth (I am perswaded) save one (who was more than man) but upon a diligent survey of what hee had done & suffered, might have taken just occasion to [Page] repeat that lesson, which the suffrance of such calamitie from the hands of men, as he had procured unto others his neighbour Princes, had taught Adonibezech to say by heart, Threescore and ten Kings having their thumbes and their great toes cut off, gathered their meat under my table: as I have done so God hath requited me. Iudg. 1. 7. This Tyrants offences had beene many and grosse, more barbarous than many Princes in this age would (perhaps) commit; yet an usuall practice upon the conquered in those ancient times; a politique embleme of slavery, in thus fitting their hands for the oar [...], and disenabling them to use the Pike, or other like instrument of warre. However; more at this day would be ready, upon like provocation or custome to deale as boysterously with their vanquisht foes, as Adonibezech did with his, rather than to make the like ingenuous confession; though God did call their sinnes to minde by such sensible remembrances, as awaked him. This I have generally observed, that lighter touches of Gods afflicting hand, did more affect the outragious people of the old world (unlesse such as were delivered up into a reprobate sense) than his severe blowes do many amongst us, which have the reputation of moderate, of civill, yea of sanctified men. The minds of most men are so blinded and choakt with cares of this world, that they looke no further than into second causes; and hence (like idiots) they suspect such blowes as are reached them from heaven, to be given by such as are next unto them. But even amongst such as look farre enough beyond second [Page] causes; amongst such as see God in his word, and daily heare his promises, some there bee which either distinguish too nicely between Gods temporall punishments, and his fatherly chastisements, or else make not right application of this distinction to their owne particular. From the one or other mistake, (perhaps from both) whatsoever affliction befalls them, after they have taken speciall notice of their regeneration, is entertained as a meere loving correction, sent for no other end than to worke for their future good, not as a touch of Gods punitive justice requiring serious repentance for some particular sinnes past. But whatsoever may be thought of the distinction it selfe, this application of it, was not in use amongst the ancient Saints and people of God.

4 Few moderne Spirits of ingenuous birth and breeding, but would scorne to be suspected of such rude and vast behaviour, as some of Iacobs Sonnes used towards their Father, others towards Ioseph, or the Shechemites. And yet, how quickly doth the feare, rather than the sufferance of lighter affliction than Ioseph suffered at their hands, call their offences against him to their remembrance. They knew themselves to bee as free from the crime wherewith he charged them, as he was from merit of death, when they put him into the pit, or from desert of bondage, when they sold him to the Madianites. Notwithstanding, his very not being so flexible to their requests, as their instant occasions required, (though nothing so inexorable as they had been to him in his extremity, when they knew [Page] him (as now they do not) to be their brother) caused them to make this mutuall confession one to another, [We are verily guilty concerning our brother, in that wee saw the anguish of his soule when hee besought us, and we would not heare: therefore is this anguish come upon us. Gen. 42. 21.] This speedy relentance upon this warning, is an assured testimonie, that the feare of God and of his just judgements, did in some measure lodge in all their harts; but most abundantly, now, in Reubens, whose former sinnes against his father, did equalize, if not superabound his brethrens sinnes against young Ioseph, of whose miscariage he was least guilty. For unto the rest confessing their sinnes, as was set downe before in the next verse, hee thus replyes; Spake I not unto you, saying, doe not finne against the childe, and ye would not heare? therefore behold also his blood is required. Yet was this confession uttered thirteene yeares after the fact was committed, untill that time never called in question.

[Page]

CHAP. 32.
Of the Geometricall proportion or forme of distributive justice; which the supreame Iudge sometimes observes in doing to great Princes as they have done to others.

1 BVt these Sonnes of Iacob were private men. And God in putting them into the same feare & anguish of soule into which they had put their harmlesse brother, might observe the strict rule of retaliatiō or counterpassion, without swerving from the rule of equitie, seeing their brother was their equall: but doth the righteous Lord observe the same rule betwixt parties for condition or state of life most unequall? doth he mete out punishment unto Princes, in just equality to the harmes which they have wrongfully done to their subjects or inferiours? Surely he is no respecter of persons, in cases of justice or revenge. But where the blow or matter of punishment, which lights on Potentates is much lesse, the griese or smart may be fully as great, as their fury can procure unto their subjects. In the case betweene Kings and Subjects, properly so called, or betweene superiour and inferiour subjects, there is a kinde of allowance to bee made, according to Geometricall proportion, without swerving from the exact rule of Retaliation. It is a memorable [Page] comparison whichComponā ergo illius accrbitates ac dolores, quos pertulit ante mortem, [...]um ijs malis & incommodis, quibus alios affecit. Magnitudine quidem inter se differunt, ac longè aliud etiam fuit ipsius munus: verùm, quò prosperiori fuit usus fortuna, & quò major extitit ejus per omnem Europam authoritas: eo quoque vehementiùs fuit af [...]ictus, dum praeter consuetudinem suam & naturam aliquid perferre coactus est. Ineo, quem diximus, Eremica, summam perpetuò spem habebat, ac subinde missis nuncijs interpellabat eum ut vitam sibi produceret. Nam etsi res suas, quasi jam moriturus, constituerat: tamen redintegrato animo, sperabat se posse evadere. Cominaeus lib. 10. in initio. Cominaeus (according to this allowance) hath made, betweene the evills which Lewis the eleventh French King, had done to others, and the like evils, which God, in the end of his raigne, did bring upon him.

2 To be disrespected by them, whom hee had advanced far above their deserts, and graced with dignities whereof their education and profession was uncapable, could not but be a great griefe unto this great King, as the like ungratefulnesse would be unto any other: yet a just & usuall award of Divine Iustice upon such Princes as thus neglect the rule of humane distributive justice, in the dispensing of honorable favours. But for a Prince, which had alwayes required exact obedience, alwayes accustomed to expect an observance from his Subjects, more than ordinarily is given unto other Princes; to be, in his old age, inforced to observe and flatter the churlish humour of hisa Physitian, whose untoward service hee had recompenced with a standing fee of a thousand Crownes a month, besides other gratuities extraordinary:▪ this was a perpetuall torment, whereof Lewis in his perplexity could not but often complaine unto others, yet could [Page] not remedy.Mortem nullus unquam veh [...]m [...]ntius exhorruit: n [...]mo etiam majori studio & ratione de remediis unquam cogitavit, quam ipse. Familiaribus suis per omnem vitam, & mihi quo (que) saepenumerò mandaverat, s [...] quando ipsum in ea necessitatate positum esse conspiceremus, ut nulla prorsuo fact [...] mentione mortis, ad peccatorum expiationem solummodo adhortaremur, ac videbatur essen [...]nc temporis molliori animo, quam ut adeò duram sententiam audiret. Ibidem. For this was a disease which he durst not make knowne unto his Physitian, whose displeasure he feared more than any thing else, besides death; which was the only cause why he so much feared his displeasure. And is it not (as the wise King speakes) a vanity of vanities, or more than so, a misery of miseries, that the feare of this last point or close of life, should make great men slaves, for the most part of their lives, and bring a necessity upon them, of fearing every one with more than a slavish feare, that may in probability be conceived as an instrument or messenger of its approach. Now this King was so excessively afraid of death, that he had given it in strict charge unto his friends and followers, not to give him warning of this his last enemy, by name, whensoever it should (to their seeming) approach: but to exhort him onely to a confession or expiation of his sinnes. Yet was it his ill hap or fate, after he had set his house in order, and after his dejected spirits had beene somewhat raysed with new hopes of recovery, to have death rung into his eares by his servants, after such an indiscreet and unmannerly fashion, as if they had sought to put him into purgatory, whilest he was alive. His Barber, with others, (whom he had rewarded farre above their deserts) without any preamble or circumlocution of respective language, (as if they had come unto him, rather as Iudges to pronounce the sentence of death upon him, than as gentle remembrancers of his mortality) told him bluntly and peremptorily, that his houre was come, that hee was not to expect any further comfort [Page] from his Physitian, or from the Hermit, who (as he thought) had prolonged his life.Jpse d [...]os Ga [...] principes D [...]cem [...] & C [...] nest ablium, capite mu [...] ctaver [...], & quod alterū n [...]usset, jā cū esset moritur [...], ipsū punituit. Et quem ad [...]dum illis per homines delectos, denunciatum fuit supplicium, paneis verbis, & breve temporis spa [...]iū, quo de solu to sua statuerent, cōcessū, ad eundem plane modum isti, nulla verborum [...] circuitione, cū ei praesignificarēt mortem: ut officio nostro satisfaciamus, ai [...]bant [...]res ipsa postulat. Spem nullā d [...]inceps collocare debes, vel in Eremita, vel in quovis alio. Nam actū est de te prorsus. Ibid.

3 If we could unpartially weigh the quality and condition of the parties, who were thus uncivilly and unseasonably bold with him, in the one scale of just estimation, and the greatnesse of his person, his natively timorous disposition and accustomance in the other; the disparity would move us to bee of Cominaeus his minde in this point; That this untoward remembrance or denunciation of death, was more bitter and grievous unto Lewis, than the sharp message of death, which he had sent by Commissioners, unto those two great Peeres of France, the Duke of Nemours, and the Earle of Saint Paul, giving them but a short respite to marshall their thoughts, and order their consciences before their finall encounter with this last enemie of mortality; which they could not feare so much as Lewis did. As this great King had done unto these great subjects, so have his servants done to him.

4 Lewis again, had caused certain places ofCarceres [...] ravit horrendos, & valde tetros, nempe caveas aliquot, partim ferreas, partim ligneas, ferreis laminibus coopertas, latitudine octo pedum, & altitudine paulo majori, quam est staturae hominis. Excogit [...]verat hanc rationem Cardinalis Baluensis, & in cam, quae primum perfecta fuit, inclusus est ipse, per (que) totos quatuordecim annos detentus. Ibid. Little ease to be made, or (at least) did well accept the invention of iron cages or grates, little more in compass than the square of a tall mans length, wherein he detained such as offended him; some for divers, months, others for many yeares together.Et sicut per ipsius imperiū carceres illi funesti fuerunt inventi: ad eundē plane modū ipse quo (que) ante mortem, consimilibus omnin [...] vinculis sese induit, in (que) majori versabatur metu, quam illi, quos aliquando captivos detinuerat. Ibidem. And [Page] through consciousnesse of this his rigorous dealing with others, he confined himselfe (for a long time) to a custody or durance as strait for his greatnesse, as the iron cages were for their mediocrity. They were not more desirous to see these close prisons opened, or to heare of the day of their deliverance from them, than he was carefull to cause the iron. Fences, Ingrediendum erat omnibus non quidem per patentē portam, sed per parvnlū ostium, & praeter paucos aliquot familiares, quorū erat opera necessaria, nemo quisquam, nisi voluntate ipsius, introibat. Ibidem. wherewith he had incompassed the Castle, wherein he had imprisoned himselfe, to bee close shut; save onely at such times, as hee appointed them (upon speciall occasions) to be opened. His miserable Captives were not afraid of passengers, or of such as came to visit them, they needed no guard to secure them: Lewis caused certaine Archers to keep Centinell as well by day as by night, to shoot at all that came neere his Castle gates, otherwise than by his special command or appointment. In fine, he was more afraid to be delivered out of his Prison, by the Nobility of France, than his Captives were to be put in such cages▪ That which he feared from his Nobility, was not death or violence, but his deposition or removall from the present government, from which many wise Princes in their declining age, have with honour and security sequestred themselves.

5 Whether Lewis in entertaining the invention of iron cages, and the use which he made of them, or the Cardinall, which to please his severe humor, first invented them, were more faultie, I cannot tell, nor will I dispute; the rule of retaliation was more conspicuously remarkable in the Cardinall. For as [...]ominaeus tells us (who himselfe had lodged [Page] eight months in one of them) the Cardinall was by Lewis command detained prisoner (fourteene yeeres together) in the first that was made. It was well observed, whether by a Christian or Heathen, I now remember not,

—Neque lex hâc justior ulla est,

Quam necis artisices, arte perire sua.

A law [...]re just than this cannot beset,

Which cruell skill doth catch in ijs owne net.

One Perillus was the body or subject of the Embleme whereof this Motto was the soule. He died a miserable death, in that brazen Bull, which he had made, at the Tyrants request, for the deadly torture of others. And albeit, this Cardinall did not dye (for ought I reade) in the cage of his owne invention, yet had he a greater share of vexation in it, than was intended for others. What good effect this long and hard durance wrought in the Cardinalls soule, is not specified by my Author. But it is an observation of excellent use, which an Heathen

Hierocles in haec aurea Pythagorae carmina:

Mortales quaecunque Deus mittentibus, angunt;

Vt tua sors tulerit; pati [...] ne ferre recusts:

Nec speranda medela tamen, sed novis & istud▪

Parcius ista viris immittere numina justis.

Philosopher hath made upon like accidents in generall; That law or rule of equity (saith he) which wretched men in effect deny whilest they doe wrong to others, the s [...]m [...] law the sam [...] men desire might be in force whilst they suffer wrong or harms by [...]t he [...]s. For example, he th [...] [...] wrong, doth wish what the F [...]le saith in his [Page] heart, there were no God: for so he might hope to escape that vengeance which whilest he thinks of a God or justice divine, hangs over his head uncessantly threatning to fall upon him. But hee that suffers wrong, is willing to beleeve there is a God, and heartily wisheth it so to be, that by his assistance he may bee supported against the evills, which he suffers. It is for this reason (saith this Philosopher) expedient that such as grieve and afflict others, should have experience of the like affliction, to the end that being taught by their owne losse or grievance, they might learne that truth, which being blinded by avarice or other unruly desire, they could not see before. And this truth or good lesson they may easily learne, so they will undergoe the mulct or punishment due to their offence, with submission or patience.

6 Albeit the Cardinall had beene a flat Atheist before, or one at least that had not God in his thoughts, whilest he sought to please the rigorous humour of this King, with an invention so displeasing unto others; yet after experience had taught him how exactly that misery had befalne himselfe, which by his furtherance had befalne many, or was likely to befall them; hee did (no question) often wi [...]h in his heart, that the rule of retaliation, wherwith he was visited, might be constant and unpartiall; that King Lewis himselfe might not bee exempted from its visitation. Now unto what rule or law could so great a King bee subject, besides that one everliving rule or eternall Law it selfe? He that heartily wisheth Iustice might bee done on such, as have full power and authority to doe it, [Page] but will not doe it; doth implicitely, yet necessarily acknowledge a Law or Iudge supreame, Iustice it selfe; so is God.Multos ipse, per omnem vitam, perpetuo metu et solicitudine excruciaverat: & nunc ecce videmus [...]ū ad con [...]imilē plane modū affligi. Cui enim se cō mittat, qui liberis etiā suis, & genero fidem non habet? Haec autem non ad ipsū modò pertineat: verū etiam ad cos omnes Principes, qui metui volunt: qua quidē in re quanta sit servitus, quū ad senectutē pervenerunt, tunc demū aperte sentiunt, quiae coguntur invicem plurimos formidare. Com. ibid. And he that seriously desires mitigation of that paine or misery, which by the irresistible force of humane authority is inflicted on him doth, acknowledge a mercy more soveraigne than any earthly power, and this can be no other than God, who is mercy it selfe. Many may cast the feare of God out of their thoughts; but none all notions of divine Iustice out of their hearts. These notions or apprehensions of an everliving rule of equity, mercy, and justice, are so deeply rooted in the consciences of all, and are themselves of such an immortall nature, as they can never be so utterly extinguished in any, but that affliction will inspire them with fresh life and motion, and make them breathe out supplications to the supreme Iudge, either for mercy towards themselves or for justice upon other.

7 The particular evills which Lewis, by Divine Iustice, in this life, suffred (haply) had never come to the exact notice of posterity, unlesse Cominaeus his wits, had beene set on worke to observe them, by his experience or foresufferance of the like evills from Lewis, or by his procurement. Besides this Authors imprisonment eight months in the iron Cage; another evill there was, wherein no ancient servant or follower of this King, but had a large portion. For, he had either a naturall inclination, or a disposition acquired by custome, to hold them, whom he did not formally sentence to any set punishment, in a perpetuall feare or anxiety of [Page] minde. Now the consciousnesse of this his disposition and customary practice in his best and able dayes, did (as it were) binde him over to indure the like torments in his feeble and declining yeares. ‘Metus pessimus Tyrannus, To live in perpetuall feare, is to live under the most cruell Tyranny,’ that can bee. And unto this Tyranny greatest Tyrants are more subject and more obnoxious, than their inferiours can be to them. For though it be possible for one man to keepe many thousands in perpetuall awe and feare, yet is it not so much for every man (of so many) in his owne particular to feare one man, (how greatly soever) as it is for one man (how great soever) to stand in feare, but of halfe so many. Yet can no man be so great or so well guarded, as not to have often and just occasion to feare some harme or other, from everie one, whom he hath made to feare him more than is fitting. Whence, he that seekes to sowe the seedes of feare in the hearts of others, doth but thereby (as it were) consecrate his owne heart or brest to be the receptacle or store-house of the multiplied increase or crop. For even in this case that saying is most true, As every one sowes, so shall he reape.

What other issue could be expected from Lewis his rigid practise upon others, and his owne native timorous and ignoble disposition, than such tormenting jealousies and perplexities, as Cominaeus tells us in his old age did seize upon him, and enforce him to feare the vertue and worth of his dearest friends, not daring to trust sonne or daughter, [Page] or sonne in law. Now it is more than a Purgatorie, even an Hell upon earth, for a man which can take no joy in himselfe, to deprive himselfe of all comfort from his dearest friends, and them of all comfort from him. SoBorbonius & Comes Dunensis, Legatos Flandriae, qui nuptius Deiph [...] interfue [...]ant Ambosae, honoris causa, quod fieri solet, deduxerant. Vbi Plessiū revertissent magno cum comitatu; è stipatorum, & satellitum suorum praefectis quendam accersit, & explorare jubet, an essent arma [...]isub veste, sed ut dissimulanter faceret, mandat, intereà dum familiariter cum iis loquitur. Com. ibidem. uncomfortable was the Duke of Bourbon his Sonne in Lawes companie to Lewis, and Lewis his company unto him, that when he came to visit him in peace, and out of loyall respect and duty, he caused a slye search to be made of him, and of another Earle his companion, whether they did not beare offensive weapons under their garments; thus polluting the nuptiall joyes of his late maried sonne and heyre, with sordid jealousies of his sonne in Law.

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CHAP. 33.
How the former law of retaliation hath been executed upon Princes, according to Arithmeticall proportion, or according to the rule of commutative justice.

1 BVt however Lewis of France were punished, according to the rule of Retaliation or counterpassion: yet in the manner of retribution, the righteous Lord did observe a kinde of Geometricall proportion. The affliction or visitation it selfe, was the just award of punitive Iustice: & yet the form of proceeding bears the character of humane distributive Iustice, which hath usually some respect to the dignity of the persons awarded. So humane Laws, wch punish capital crimes with death, are dispensed with, by the favour of the Prince, for the manner of death. That, is not so ignominious or dishonorable in the execution upō Nobles, as upō inferiors involved in the same capitall crime, or treason; no not, albeit the Nobles be principalls, and inferiours but accessories or assistants. But this favourable kind of punishment for the externall forme, God doth not alwaies use towards Princes. If many times he may seeme to beare respect or favour unto their place or persons, this ariseth not from their greatnesse, but from some other causes best knowne unto himselfe. His judgements upon Princes and other Potentates, are often executed, according to the most strict arithmeticall proportion that can be required in the rule of Retaliation upon equalls, as well for the manner as for the matter [Page] of punishment. And although God in this life never plagueth any according to the full measure of their offences committed against himselfe: yet he often visiteth Kings and Monarks, with a fuller visible measure of calamity, than they have brought upon others, and with calamity of the same kinde. Though Pharaoh had beene the greatest Monark, and his Court the most glorious seat of Nobility (till their time) on earth: yet because hee and his Nobles had plotted cruelty against the innocent, without relentance or remorse, the dignity of his or their persons procures no mitigation either for the matter or manner of punishment. Their dues are fully paid them (as we say) in kinde; the guiltlesse blood of poore Hebrew infants is rendred seven [...]old into the bosome of the Aegyptian Nobility and men of Warre.

2 Never did any State or Kingdome, since the foundation of the world were laid, receive so terrible a wound within its owne territories, in one day, as at this time Egypt did, but females did in some measure feele the smart. Yet in this last, as in the former plagues, no Egyptian woman had cause to lament for her selfe, for her sister, or daughter; but many for their husbāds, their brothers or sons. What was the reason? TheExod. 1. 15. &c. Egyptian Mid-wives (and they were women) if no other of their sex besides, had beene more merciful to the infant males of the Hebrewes, than the Egyptian men had been. And as they had done, so hath the Lord requited the one and rewarded the other. To the mercilesse Cour [...]iers, Politicians, and men of Warre, he hath [Page] rendred vengeance and judgement, without mercy, and punished them with miserable and ignominious death, shewing compassion on the weaker and more pitifull sex.

3 It was a rare document of divine justice to ordaine, & of divine wisdome so to contrive, that the dogges should lap King Ahabs blood in the same 1 King. 21. 19.place, where they had lapped the blood of Naboth (stoned to death through his connivance or permission.) As sure a token it was of justice tempred with mercy, and of the great Kings speciall grace or favour unto this gracelesse King of Israel, that the1 Kin. 22. 18. dogs which lapped his blood should not so much as touch his body. Being slaine in battell, his death was honourable, as the world accounteth honour, yet was it not so much the dignity of his royall person, as his humiliation upon the Prophets chalenge, which made him capable of this favour; but not a dram either of disgrace or misery from which Ahab was by Gods mercy in part released, which did not fall into the scale of Iustice, wherein the impiety of proud Iezabel was exactly waighed. The measure of her husbands punishment is not so much less as hers was fuller than Naboths had been. The sight of her cōmanding1 King. 21. 8. letters caused poore Naboth to be stoned to death by the men of his citie: and at Iehues call, her body is dashed against the stones by her owne servants.2 Kin. 9. 33. The dogs lapped Naboths blood, but they devoured Iezabels flesh: she had beene shamelesly cruell in her life, and she hath a most shamefull and a most fearfull death. Nor would the all-seeing Iudge suffer that respect to be [Page] done to her corps, which her cruell2 King. 9. 34. executioner intended, upon remembrance that she had beene daughter to a King. It was I must confesse a ruefull case, and yet a judgement, more righteous than rufull, that she which had issued from royall womb, she from whose wombe had issued royall progenie, (for she had beene respectively lawfull daughter, lawfull wife, and lawful mother unto three Kings) should be entombed, ere her corps were cold, in the entrailes ofIbidem. dogs, should have no better burial than the dead Ass or other carion; albeit she died in her owne royall palace. But thus the Almighties arme sometimes reacheth greatest Princes even in this life heavier blowes, than they can give unto their poorest subjects. But where the blow or matter of punishment which falls on them is much lighter, the wound or torment may be more grievous, as was observed before, than their furie can procure unto their despised brethren.

4 But neither doth the sacred relation concerning Pharaohs overthrow, or Iezabels death containe a more perspicuous, ocular demonstration of Divine Iustice executed according to the rigour of Retaliation, than hath beene represented or rather really acted upon a publike Stage within the memory of some now living. The subject of this rufull spectacle was Henry the second French King of that name. The accident is not recorded by Gods Spirit, yet the experiment (as unpartiall Writers, which I take it were eye witnesses of it, have related) is as exactly parallell to the rules of Gods Spirit, and affords as good instruction for [Page] moderne Princes, as examples in the Sacred Story, did to posterity. This youthfull King in the beginning of his reigne, had licenced others to feed their eyes with the sight of a deadly Duell, authorized by him in favour of Vivonus to the disgrace and prejudice (as the Court of France expected) of Chabotius: whose hands notwithstanding the Lord did strengthen, to kill the Favourite, who after many bitter provocations had drawne him within the Lists, more against his will, than an old Beare is brought to the stake. The death of Vivonus though most just, doth no way excuse the barbarous injustice of this King, who hath this justice done upon him: hee had made a sport of shedding blood,Vide Thuanum ad finem lib. 20. and he himselfe is slaine in Ludicro certamine, running at Tilt: and slaine by that hand which had beene his instrument to apprehend those Noble and religious Gentlemen, which had been lately imprisoned, and in whose misery the Court of France did then rejoyce: and adding gall to wormwood, solemnized these and the like triumphant shewes or sportings in their sight: yet was it not Count Montgomeries hand, but the right hand of the Lord, which did at one and the same instant unty the Kings Bever, and guide the splinter or glance of Montgomeries Speare into that eye, which had beheld a Duell, that could not be determined without the death of the one or other combatant (both being Frenchmen, & his natural subjects) with such delight, as yong Gallants do ordinary prizes, or other like spectacles of recreation. Of Vivonus his death, few or none but Frenchmen were eye-witnesses; [Page] but of this Kings tragicall triumph, Spain & Germany with other countries were spectators by their proxies or Ambassadors. As if the Lord would have these thē present to cary this message to their masters to be by thē directed to the rest of Christiā Princes. Discite justitiā moniti & non temnere divos.

Take warning by this Princes Fate, Not to approve what God doth hate.

God is no accepter of persons: in respect of the execution of his most righteous law; as is the people, so is the Prince: his word must be alike fulfilled in both; not only subjects that kill one another, but Princes (be they Kings or Monarks) that authorize murder, or suffer their subjects blood to be unjustly spilt, by man shall their blood be spilt; if other executioners faile, even by the hand of their dearest friends: such was Count Montgomery to this king.

5 The caveat, which from the untimely death of this Earle, a judgement inflicted by divine justice, not so much for this, (though this were pretended by the Queen Mother and Dowager to take away his life) as for other offences, hath beene elsewhere commended to yong gallants or Princes servants, was (to my remembrance) this, Not to be instruments thogh to Kings in the execution of manifest injustice, seeing this noble Gentleman after much honor & many victories [...]otten by war, in defence of those of the reformed Religion, whom he had formerly wronged, came at length to lose his head in that very place, whither, by Henry the seconds appointment, he had brought divers noble Gentlemen to the fagot, & some of that honorable bench, which afterward sentenced him to death.

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CHAP. 34.
The sinnes of parents visited upon their children, according to the rule of retaliation.

1 ALL the parties hitherto instanced in, were visited by the rule of retaliation in their owne persons, some of them not in their owne persons alone. But it is usuall with the supreme Iudge to visit the ou [...]crying sinnes of irreligious parents, upon their children, according to the former rule. And to this purpose the visitation of Ahabs, and of Iezabels bloody sinnes against Naboth▪ may, by See the 1. Kings 21. 24. and 2 King. 9. 26. &c.expresse warrant of Sacred Writ, be improved. But no Histories, profane or sacred, afford more fit instances for the proofe of this conclusion, than our owne Chronicles doe. It was a question amongst the Heathen Philosophers, An res posterorum pertineant ad defunctos; Whether the ill or welfare of posterity, did any way increase or diminish the happinesse of their deceased ancestors. The negative part is determined by the great Philosopher in his Moralls. And I know no just cause or reason, why any Christian Divine, should either appeale from his determination, or revive the doubt. Yet if the affirmative part of the former question, were supposed as true, or were it lawfull to imagine or feign such interchange of speech, or Dialogues, betwixt deceased Grandfathers, Vnkles, and their Nephewes, [Page] as our Saviour (I take it) not by way of reall history, but of fiction, doth betweene Abraham and Dives; me thinks Edward the third, and Lionel Duke of Clarence might have taken up Iothams parable against Bullinbrooke and the House of Lancaster, If yee have dealt truly and sincerely with us, and with the prime stemmes of this royall stock, then rejoyce yee and your posterity in your devises: but if not, Let fire come out from among your selves, or from our stock, to devoure you, and to make your posterity curse your dealings with us. And in what region soever [...] soule did in the third generation reside, it might have framed its responsary unto this parable out of Adonibezeks song, As I have done to you and yours, so hath the Lord requited me and mine. And had this or the like saying (upon the deposition of Bullinbrookes heyre) beene daily rung into the eares of Edward the fourth,

Felix quem faciunt aliena pericula cautum.

Amongst men, none more happy is than he,

That can his owne by others harmes foresee:

it might have wrought better effects for the bodily or temporall good of his harmlesse sonnes, than any dirge could, after his death, procure unto his soule. Few Chronicles else will exhibit such a continued pedigree of unhallowed policies ill successe, as our owne Annalls of those times doe.

2 Vnto Richard the second and his misleaders, it seemed a branch of plausible policy to banish his [Page] cozen (Henry of Bullinbrook) this land; the vicinity of whose heroicall spirit was an heart-sore to this degenerate Prince. But what successe did the Counsell of the Lord award unto this jealous devise? Bullinbrook by his presence amongst foraine Nations (which scarce knew him before) gained so much honour, and so much love with the chiefe Peeres of this Realme (which had knowne him before) by his absence, that Richard the second was taken in his owne feare, and his Crowne set upon Bullingbrookes head, with generall applause. But the lesse right he had unto it; the greater was his jealousie, lest Richard the second, or some other more principall stemme of the royall Stock might take it off againe. The only meanes, as he thought, for securing himselfe from this feare, and for setling the Crowne upon the House of Lancaster, was, to put the poore deposed King to death; whose errours deserved pitie and compassion from every true English heart, if not for his Grandfathers, yet for his heroicall Fathers sake, that Gideon which had brought so much honour to the English Nation. And after Richards death, the master-piece of his policy was, to suffer Mortimer the lawfull heyre unto the Duke of Clarence, and now unto the English Crowne, to live a miserable Captive under the enemy, who had more reason to revenge himselfe upon the English by Mortimers death, than Bullinbrook had to murther Richard the second. This soule sinne of Bullinbrooke was visited upon the third generation. His grandchilde and heyre, Henry the sixt, a man more free from staine [Page] of guiltlesse blood, than either Richard the second or Bullinbrooke had beene, is cruelly murthered by Edward the fourth, a stemme of Mortimers stock, and of Lionel Duke of Clarence. For though God hath sworne not to punish the children for their fathers offences; yet he hath professed it, as a rule of his eternall justice, to visit the sinnes of fathers upon the children. And from the equity of this rule, many Princely Races have utterly determined and expired, in the dayes of such Princes as were most free from the actuall sinnes of their Ancestors, which were the causes of their expiration; as is in other Meditations shewed at large.

3 But though it were just with God to visit Bullinbrookes sinne on Henry the sixt: did Edward the fourth commit no injustice by doing that which God would have done? yes; he did therefore most unjustly, because he did doe that, which God would not have done by him. And therefore the Counsell of the Lord, which overthrew the bloody devises of Bullinbrooke for setling the Crowne of this Kingdome on himselfe and his heyre males, did more speedily overthrow the devise of Edward the fourth. God visits his sinne in the next generation upon his lovely and harmlesse Sonnes in their nonage, before the devises of their hearts were capable of any evill or mischiefe towards men, and did visit them by the hands of their bloody uncle Richard the third, who, by their Fathers appointment, had practised butchery upon the House of Lancaster, that he might become a more skilfull slaughterman of the House of York. [Page] Thus did blood touch blood, and for a long time run in the blood of his royall race, untill the issue was staunched by the blood of the cruell Tyrant slaine in battaile by Henry the seventh. All these instances mentioned in this, with some others in the former chapters, will fall under another more usefull consideration, in the Treatise of Prodigies. or Divine forewarnings betokening blood.

CHAP. 35.
Grosser sinnes visited upon Gods Saints according to the former Rule of Counterpassion.

1 AS it is generally more safe to speake the truth of times past, than to open our mouths against the iniquity of times present: so to trace the prints of Divine Providence, in thus fitting punishments to mens enormities, will be lesse offensive, whilest this search is made abroad, than it would be, were it or the like made neerer hand, or at home. Yet were it well, and it might goe much better with this Land and People, if every ancient, every noble, or private Family, specially such as have had much dealings with other men, would make the like search within their owne pale. Few Families there be of greater note, but either have or might have had undoubted experience of some visitations upon them, according to the rule of [Page] Counterpassion, within two or three descents. That most private men doe not finde experiments of this rule in themselves, this falls out for want of observation, or because they keepe not a true Register of their owne doings or sufferings. No man can plead any personall exemption from this Canon, by reason of his righteousnesse or integrity; none can altogether secure his posterity, that some one or other of his sinnes shall not bee visited upon them. Nor can it justly be accounted any taxe or prejudice, unto any Family, to undergoe with patience, that mulct, which the righteous Iudge hath laid upon them. To murmure or grudge at our owne or others visitation, whose welfare we wish or tender, is blame-worthy with God and good men. And albeit this distemper be not (onely) meritorious of death; yet is it this, which for the most part brings a necessity of dying upon such, as have otherwise deserved death, whether bodily or spirituall. For no man, which with patience and humility, acknowledgeth the equity or justice of his punishment, as it proceeds from God, but will, in some measure, recall himselfe, or inhibit his progresse in that sinne, the smart of whose punishment he feeles. And unto every degree of sincere revocation or repentance, some degree of mitigation is awarded. The best meanes for instilling the Spirit either of meeknesse or patience, in suffering for offences past, or of feare to offend in the like kinde againe, will be to take the punishments or corrections of Gods Saints, into serious consideration.

[Page] 2▪ If for the manifestation of Gods justice, it must be done unto his dearest Saints, as they have done unto others, either whilest they themselves were his enemies, or made him their enemy, after their reconcilement had beene wrought: what may they looke for in the end which still continue adversaries to the truth. David was a man after Gods owne heart (excepting the case of Vriah,) yet not therefore free from disgrace, danger, or harme, after the Prophet had solemnly denounced his pardon; Thy sinnes are forgiven thee: In respect of the adultery committed by Bathsheba, Absolons offence against his Father David, was much greater than Davids had beene against Vriah. The one was done in 2 Sam. 16. 21. secret, the other in the open Sunne. The death,2 Sam. 12. 12 if not of Bathshebaes childe, yet of his Son Absolon, was more bitter unto David, than his owne death could have beene. So much he confesseth himselfe, and testifies the truth of his confession with his teares. And the King was moved, and went up to the chamber over the gate, and wept; and as he went, thus hee said, O my sonne Absolom, my sonne, my sonne Absolom: would God I had dyed for thee, O Absolom my sonne, my sonne. 2 King. 18. 33. So that here was more than a full retaliation, if we consider his offence, as it had reference onely unto Vriah. For one mans life is as much worth as anothers, and Vriah lost but one life, David was to suffer the losse of two. Yet this is not all that the Prophet had to say to him for this offence; for so he saith, 2 Sam. 12. 9. Thou hast killed Vriah the Hittite with the sword, & hast taken his wife to be thy [Page]wife, and hast slaine him with the sword of the children of Ammon. Now therefore the sword shall never depart from thine house, because thou hast despised me, and taken the wife of Vrias the Hittite to bee thy wife.

3 But when it is said that David was a man after Gods owne heart, excepting the matter of Vriah, this exception includes, if not an interruption in the bond of grace, by which he had beene intirely linked unto Gods favour, yet some wound or breach in the estate of his wonted favour and liking with God. And no marvell, if that sinne which made this breach, and for a time removed the fence of Gods favourable protection, were visited upon his person and upon his posterity. But are the sins which men commit, whilst they are Gods enemies thus visited upon any, after their full admission into the estate and favour of Gods sonnes, or whilest the bond of their reconciliation remaines unwounded and entire? We doe not reade of any grosser sinnes committed by Saint Paul, after our Saviour had effectually called him. We may without breach of charity, perswade our selves, that he was as free from that time forward, from wronging any man, Iew or Gentile, as Samuel had beene from wronging Israel. Saint Stephen, at his death, prayed for him, not against him. But though hee freely forgave him, yet will not the righteous Iudge suffer the wrongs, which he had done, unto this blessed Martyr, passe without some solemn remembrance. Those which stoned Saint Stephen, laid downe their garments at Pauls feet; and his willingnesse [Page] to take charge of them, argues he was consenting to his death:Saint Paul acknowledgeth his consent unto Saint Stephens death, either as expresly given by him or as included in his willingness to keep the garments of such as stoned him to death. so I thinke was not Barnabas. And for this reason, we doe not reade that Barnabas was stoned, as Paul was, by the Iewes which came from Antioch and Iconium unto Lystra and Derbe; albeit both had beene alike offensive for preaching the Gospell at Iconium; where the sameActs 14. 5, 6. violence had beene likewise joyntly attempted against both. Vpon the matter then betwixt Saint Paul and Saint Stephen (albeit Saint Stephen make himselfe no partie) this is the onely difference; Stephen dyed by the hands of his persecutors, so did not Paul. Yet, it seemes, the righteous Lord suffered these malignant Iewes to doe as much unto Saint Paul, Acts 22. 20. And when the blood of thy martyr Stephen was shed, I also was standing by, and consenting unto his death, and kept the rayment of them that slew him: as had beene done by his consent unto Saint Stephen, even as much as they themselves desired, which did despite him no lesse than their countrimen and brethren in iniquity, had done S. Stephen. For they drew him out of the Citie, supposing he had beene dead. Howbeit as the Disciples stood round about him, he rose up and came into the Citie, and the next day he departed with Barnabas to Derbe. Acts 14. 19, 20. Paul (wee may conclude) was more extraordinarily preserved by God, not lesse rigorously dealt withall by the Iewes, than Saint Stephen had beene. That he was extraordinarily preserved, we have reason to beleeve, because he was appointed to be a patterne of suffring more violence than this, from the time of his calling. That he was appointed to bee a patterne of suffering evills, we must beleeve, because God himselfe doth expresly testifie as much, at the time of his calling, [Page] unto Ananius, who was to ratifie his calling so farre as the notice of it concerned the visible Church. For when Ananias did demurre upon his admission into the Church, The Lord said unto him, goe thy way: for he is a chosen vessell unto mee, to beare my name before the Gentiles, and Kings, and the children of Israel. For I will shew him, how great things he must suffer for my names sake. Act. 9. 15, 16 And yet (perhaps) Saint Paul had not been made such a spectacle to the world of suffrance or persecutions, unlesse he had persecuted more than Saint Stephen; unlesse hee had made havocke of the Church.

4 It is not probable, that these Iewes had any minde to punish Paul for his offence against Stephen; of which if they had any notice or remembrance, this would have made them more ready to pardon him, for preaching the Gospel at this time, than to put him to death for persecuting such, as had preached it before. Their resolution to stone him, at this time, rather than beat him with rods, as their usuall manner was, argues that their wills, though otherwise free (more than enough) to doe mischiefe, were, by the all-seeing Providence, determined or guided in the manner of practising mischiefe. To say, the Author of beeing, and Fountaine of goodnesse, did instill this spirit of fury and malice, into the hearts of these Iewes, or did, by any decree, absolutely necessitate them to conceive so full a measure of mischiefe, as now possessed them, were (I take it) to swerve from the forme of wholsome words, & would give some advantage to [Page] the adversaries of truth. It was Sathan & thēselves, which had charged their brests with this extraordinary measure of fury and malice. But these, being so overcharged, as that without some vent or other they were ready to burst; He, who is as well the supreme moderator of mens thoughts and resolutions, as Iudge of their actions, did not onely permit or suffer, but direct, appoint, and order, that they should exonerate or discharge their furious malice upon Saint Paul, not upon Barnabas; and upon Saint Paul, by that peculiar kinde of violence, which now they practise, rather than by any other, unto which they were more accustomed.

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CHAP. 36.
Of sinnes visited or punished according to the circumstance of time or place wherein they were committed.

1 IT may be, the circumstance of the time, wherein this visitation happened to S. Paul, might suggest as much, as wee have observed, unto himselfe, or unto others then living, whom the remembrance or notice of his former trespasses, might concerne. But however it were in this particular, the identitie, whether of the time, or of the place, wherein men have done, and afterwards suffer extraordinary evill, are in their nature, better Remembrancers of Gods justice, than the exact identity or likenesse of the evills, which they have done to others, and from others suffer, is▪ If a man should meet with mischiefe in the same place, or be overtaken by it on the same day, wherein he had done the like mischiefe vnto others: the event would naturally argue a legall and formall processe of Divine Iustice, calling time and place (which are alwayes witnesses of actions done in greatest secresie) to give speciall evidence against him; and to make his owne conscience confesse that, which all the world besides were not able to prove. Some [Page] within our memories, have concluded their unseasonable sportings with death, sudden and casuall in respect of men, upon the same day after revolution of times, wherein they had deserved or cunningly avoided the sentence of death, being more than due unto them, if Iustice might have had its naturall course. And it might peradventure have gone better with them, if they had hid themselves, for that day, in the house of mourning, or not adventured upon the house of mirth, or fields of sport.

2 To particularize in, or comment upon domestique moderne examples, would bee offensive; Beatus populus qui scit jubilationem: That people or Family is happy, which knows the times & seasons of rejoycing and mirth, but more happy are they, which know the times and seasons of mourning, or for preventing the day of visitation. And the best meanes to foresee or prevent it, would be to keepe an exact Calendar of our owne and of our forefathers sins, for these we are bound to confesse with our owne. And if we would unpartially judge our selves, for both, by unfaigned repentance and hearty contrition: we might escape the judgements of God, which by our neglect hang over us, and, without amendment, will fall upon us. It is a saying amongst the later Iewes, Volvitur meritum in diem meriti: Though punishments do not immediately pursue the fact which deserves it, nor instantly overtake the party which committed such fact; yet it resteth not, but roules about untill it meet with them or their posterity at the same point of time, wherein it was deserved. The Temple by their [Page] calculation, was twice destroyed upon the same day of the same month, upon which Moses had broken the Tables. Though so it were de facto, yet this revolution infers not this destruction to be fatall. It might have beene, at both times, prevented, had that generation wherein it hapned, beene as zealous of Gods glory, as Moses had been; or had they held idolatry or hypocrisie in as great detestation as Moses had done. Some foraigneVide Thuanum. writers have observed, that the hope of this Land, whilest he lived, Edward the sixt, did dye upon the selfe same day (after revolution of some yeares) in which his Father had put Sir Thomas Moore to death, a man otherwise faulty, yet so true a pattern of morall justice, as it cannot seeme strange, if the righteous Iudge did take speciall notice of King Henries dealing with him, and insert the day of his death in his everlasting Calendar, to be after signed with the untimely death of King Henries only Son. How the sins of parents are often punished in their harmlesse, or lesse harmfull posterity, is elsewhere discussed. I will not interrupt this Discourse, with any digression concerning Divine equity in this point, nor with any Apology for these curious observations, as some enstyle them: I relate onely matters of fact, or punishments answerable to offences, as well for the circumstance of place, as of time.

3Pausanias in Achaic. lib. 7. p. 425. Pausanias a famous Antiquary, or, to describe him better to a meere English Reader, the Cambden of Greece, hath observed as much, as now we doe, in his narrations of the warres between [Page] the Romans and the Corinthians, or Achaians, managed by Metellus and Critolaus. The History, though briefe (as being but an appendix of his intended Topography) is fraught with many remarkable circumstances, pointing out unto us a Divine Provid [...]nce; of which, two (concerning the selected band of Arcadia put to flight, but with more honour than the rest of Critolaus army) are more specially parallell to the rule of retaliation. These Arcadians after the foile, retyred safe (to the number of a thousand) unto Elatea, a City of the Phocenses; where they found good welcome at the first, upon some [...]ermes of ancient confederacy or alliance. But the sudden noise of Critolaus and his companies overthrow, dissolved the links of former amity. The poore Arcadians were commanded, by the State of Phocis, forthwith to relinquish Elatea; and, in their returne to Peloponnesus, meeting unexpectedly with Metellus forces, were all slaine by the Romans, in the selfe same place, in which their fore-elders had forsaken the Grecian L [...]guers, or con [...]derates against Philip of Macedon. Honest Countrimen see Meteors or other appearances, as perfectly as Philosophers do; but they often erre in guessing at the place or subject where in the appearance is made. Thus many imagine the Sunne to be reddish, in a foggy morning; when as the rednesse is in the ayre. So did this heathen Antiquary, expresly and fully discern the power of Divine Iustice in this event; from the circumstance of the persons (a race of truce-breakers) and from the place of their discomfiture. His [Page] eyesight or apprehension herein, was as cleare as any Christians. Wherein then consists his error? In attributing this award of Divine Iustice unto the Gods of Greece. But did any Southsayer of Greece foretell, that the fathers breach of truce should be thus visited upon their children as Elias foretold, that the dogs should lap Ahabs blood, and eate Iezebel and their childrens flesh, in the same place where they had lapt the blood of Naboth, whom Iezebel had caused to be stoned to death? The identity of Iustice done upon divers people and Nations, rightly argues that the God of Israel, did then rule and execute judgement unto the ends of the world; although he did not deale so with any Nation, as he did with Israel; neither had the Heathen knowledge of his Lawes, much lesse such distinct foreknowledge of his judgements or visitations as was usuall in Israel; unlesse it were in some cases extraordinary.

4 To have seene with our eyes, what we have read in a faithfull and judiciousDubravius in histor. Boem. Historian, one to dye in a fit of the Falling-sicknesse, or, (as it was then presumed) to bee vexed to death by an evill spirit, at the time appointed for his consecration, even whilest he did prostrate himselfe before the Altar to receive the Holy Ghost, by the imposition of his Metropolitans hands, would have moved the like question to that of Christs Disciples, concerning him that was borne blinde; Lord, who did sinne, this man, or his parents? Whose shame did he fome out with his last breath, his owne, or some others? Such as is here expressed, was the [Page] [...]ate of Strachyquaz sonne to B [...]leslaus the first, and brother to B [...]lesla [...]s the second, King of B [...]h [...]me, who with the Bishop of Mentz, was an eye witnesse of this prodigious fearefull accident. And if consecration dinners were then in use, (as doubtlesse they were, when Kings sonnes and brothers thought it no scorne to be consecrated Bishops) Respondent ultima primis; Strachyquaz did better brooke his name after his death, than at his birth or baptisme, or (as my Author speakes) on his lustration day. The realitie answering to his name, and portended by it, he left behinde him: The dinner provided, was indeed (terribile convivium) a banquet of dread or horrour to all spectators, a feast of whose d [...]ies few (I thinke) would eate. And thus much doth the name Strachyquaz in the Bohemia [...] language import; A name imposed upon this unfortunate person, at his birth, in triumphant memorie of that bloody banquet, unto which his father Bolestaus the first, had invited Wenceslaus the King his Elder brother, with intent to murther him, as he did; taking opportunitie to accomplish this impietie, in the Temple of God, where this King (afterwards Sainted) was at his midnights devotions.

5. To sit as Coroners upon the soules of men deceased, is a thing which I have ever misliked, though sometimes practised by men, otherwise of deserved esteeme. And whosoever in this case will take upon him to sit as Iudge, my request shall bee not to serve upon the Iury. Yet if my opinion were in this particular demanded, ‘[Whether this [Page] man dying (as the story presumes) of a Deuill, the manner of his death were any certaine prognosticke, or probable presumption of his damnation]’ my verdit should goe in mitiorem partem, That, thus to dye of a Devill, unlesse his former life had beene devillish, (which the historie no way intimates) doth no more argue his damnation, than the untimely death of Ieroboams Child, did argue him to have beene guiltie of his Parents actuall sinnes; in the manner of whose death; notwithstanding, as wel as in Strachyquaz his tragicall end, the sinnes of their Parents were remarkeably visited, according to that rule of Iustice, which now we treat of, that is, by way of counterpassion, in respect, if not of time, yet of the places wherein they were visited. That Ieroboams child dyed in Gods favour, the text instructs us. 1 King. 14. 13. All Israel shall mourne for him and bury him: for hee onely of Ieroboam shall come to the grave, because in him there is found some good thing toward the Lord God of Israel, &c.

6 But to returne to Strachyquaz: the maner of whose death, (as is apparent) was more fearefull and prodigious, yet no signe of damnation. For as there is (vates praeteritorum & futurorum) a branch of prophesie in discovering times past, as well as events to come; so there may bee, and oft-times are prodigious and portentuous accidents, which point at nothing (de futuro, s [...] a retro) which looke backwards, not forwards. The best use or signification of this fearefull disaster was to advertise the present generation, and their successors, that the [Page] execrable and sacrilegious murder, committed by Boleslaus, father to Strachyquaz, was not expiated as yet, but to be vis [...]d upon more generations without heartie repentance and confession of this wicked usurpers, and his complices sinnes, wherewith the land of Boheme had beene polluted. The first borne of Egypt, was slaine for their fathers offences against the infant males of the Hebrewes; And Strachyquaz dyed this fearefull death by the visitation of his fathers sinnes upon him? But he might (perhaps) have lived much longer, and have dyed in peace, had he lived according to that rule whose profession hee had taken upon him; that is, if hee had continued (as hee once resolved to doe) a true p [...]nitentiarie, and not affected to be a prelate. For, if God would not suffer his Temple to be built by David (a man otherwise after his owne heart) onely because hee had beene a man of warre: wee may, from the morall Analogie of this sacred embleme, collect that the same holy Lord would not suffer the sonne of that malignant cruell Pagan Fratricide, which had imbrued his hands in the blood of his Priests, and murthered his annointed King in the holy place, to beare rule over his house, or Church. This his unseasonable ambitious humor, without any other actuall remarkable crime, might in Divine Iustice exact some print of the supreame Iudges indignation. All this (notwithstanding) being granted; doth not prove, there was no good thing found in the partie, that was thus punished, as well as in Ieroboams child. It was a fauour to [Page] the one, that he dyed in peace, though in his infancie, and it might be some matter of honour or favour to the other, that he had Christian buriall in the Church, wherein hee died; and that hee was not made a prey to the fowles of the ayre. But this wee speake skeptique wise, what became of Strachyquaz after his fearefull end, we leave it for the eternall Iudge to determine.

7 Whatsoever became of him, the death of his grandmother Drahomira, was much more terrible: as she had lived, so she dyed, a malitious blasphemous Pagan; a cruell bloody step-dame to Christs infant Church, in that Kingdome. The storie (I know) will unto many seeme strange, yet in my observation very capable of credit; if we consider the exigence of those times, and the then desperate state of Boheme. Christianity and paganisme lay then at stake, whether should be entertained, whether expelled: the Pagans by their unconfeionable policie (which aymes at nothing but some private end, alwayes readie to hazard whatsoever lyes within their levell, rather then misse of it) had so cunningly played the foregame, and, by their bloody plots, removed so many principall men out of the way, that there was no possibilitie left, save onely in the Almighties immediate hand, to make any thing of the aftergame. Now in case of such desperate extremities (specially when they happen during the infancie of any particular Church) it cannot to mee seeme incredible, if the good spirit of God doe out vy those prodigious cruelties, which Sathan deviseth against the Saints, [Page] by sudden miraculous executions upon their Actors, Sathans instruments. The Tragedy of Drahomira was briefly thus: This Queen-mother, had animated her Pagan-sonne Boleslaus, surnamed Savus, the Cruell, to murder his elder brother, and Liege Lord Wenceslaus, onely because he had approved himselfe a zealous professor of the doctrine of life. To terrifie others from taking the sacred function upon them, she caused the bodies of those Priests and Prelates, whom Boleslaus had [...]assacred, to lye unburied; andIn [...] à breve igitur tempus va [...]cu [...]um Divi Wenceslai compictū fuit, vaticinantis, [...]o e, ut à discessu suo, a [...]m Pauli Presbyteri Sacerdotibus vacuum redderetur. Co [...]eptus inter precipuos ad suppliciū, Podivivus quoque totum biennium in Furcâ sub dio pendena, nulla tabe violati, nedum corrumpi, consici [...]ue potuit, donec post haustam terrae hiatu Drahom [...]m, sepeliretur. Nam quo manifestior, gravior (que) paena appareret, quae merito de crudelissima atque impiissima muliere exigenda fuerat; eo loci▪ quo adhuc insepulta jacebant ossa occisorum Sacerdotum, terra sua sponte dehiscens, vivam D [...]ahomiram, una cum curiu & qui simul vehebantur, absorbuit, auriga solo incolumi, qui ad arā juxta sitam (nune haud extat) equo desiliens, accurrit, eum sorte tintinnabulum tinnire audisset, ut corpus domini adoraret, execrante illum Drahomira on nibus maledictis. Quare locum eum etiamnum, ut execratum funeslum [...]ue declinant viatores, qui arcem Pragensem ab occidentali plaga petunt. Quar quam terra eodem loci in statum pristinum cohaeserit. Puniti & illi divinitus, qui Boleslaum assectati, gladios etiam suos adversus divum Wenceslaum strinxerunt. Pars enim eorum mente alienata, in rabiem [...]ue versa praecipites ex alto deorsum se dabant: quidam in eos gladios, quos nudaverant, incubuere. Ad haec Templi paries, quem pr [...] pe occisus fuit Divus Wenceslaus, velut caedis ipse quoque conscius, aut potius, ut testis foret sceletis sempiterni, nulla ullius opera abstergi, elui [...]ue potuit à cruore, quo respersus ex corpore Divi Wenceslai fuerat. Haec tandem tot prodigia, tam [...]ue varia supplicia, Boleslaum exterruerunt, ut mitius deinceps cum Christianis agere, saevitiam [...]ue suam adversus illos remittere inciperet. Dubravins in Histor. Boem. Lib. 5. p. 40. one Podivivus, a man of principall note in his time, to hang two intire yeares, upon the gallowes. Vpon these and many like provocations of Gods just vengeance, her grave was made before she felt her selfe sicke; her buriall like to that of Corah, of Dathan, and Abiram. Whether this opening of the earth were [Page] truly miraculous, or whethet it happened in the period of some naturall declination (the supporters or pillars of it being digged up, or undermined before) the opening of it at that time, wherein this wicked woman was to passe over that very place, in which she had caused the Priests bodies to lye unburied, was the Lords doing, and no lesse wonderfull to Christian eyes, than if it had beene (as perhaps it was) a meere miracle. The truth of this story, wanted not the testimony of many ages. For passengers, from the day of her death, untill the day, wherein mine Author wrote this Story, (which was within this age current) eschewed the place wherein she dyed, as execrable and accursed by God.

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CHAP. 37.
What manner of sinnes they be, which usually provoke Gods judgements according to the rule of Counterpassion. And of the frequency of this kinde of punishment foresignified by Gods Prophets.

1 IVstice, as was intimated before, doth not formally consist in retaliation, and yet is retaliation a formall part or branch of Iustice. And of this branch Nemesis amongst the Heathen, was the ordinary Arbitresse. Shee was, in their Divinity, a Goddesse of Iustice, not Iustice her selfe; nor did everySee the Treatise of the originall of Atheisme & Idolatry. chap. 17. parag. 10. wrong (in their opinion) belong unto her cognizance, but such insolent wrongs onely as deserved vengeance or indignation. Nor doth the righteous most mercifull Lord and onely God, usually punish ordinary or private, but publique and outcrying sinnes, by the severe Law or Rule of Counterpassion. And it is observable, that most Prophesies, which are powred out against any Land, City, or People, with fuller indignation, are so intermingled with threats of judgement by way of Counterpassion, that the quality and circumstances of the crimes may seeme to serve the Prophets as glasses for representing the nature and quality of the judgements [Page] to come. And if the crimes were as well knowne to m [...]n as the judgements are, we would thinke the one were moulded in the other. This exact proportion betwixt the patterne of sinnes which Babylon had set, and the manner of Gods judgements upon her for them, hath beene observed chap. 26.before, and I will not make the prophesies concerning her destruction, any part of this observation. The prophesies concerning other Nations and Cities, will afford plenty of instances to this purpose.

2 Samaria shall be as an heape of the field, and as plantings of a Vineyard: and I will powre downe the stones thereof into the valley, and I will discover the foundations thereof. And all the graven images thereof shall be beaten to pieces, and all the hires thereof shall be burnt with the fire, and all the idols thereof will I lay desolate: for she gathered it of the hire of an harlot, and they shall returne to the hire of an harlot. Micah 1. 6, 7. The wound of Samaria, as the Prophet addes, vers. 9. was incurable, but so was not the wound of Iudah as yet, although it was come to Iudah by infection, and had touched at the very gates of Ierusalem. For so he saith vers. 12. The inhabitant of Maroth waited carefully for good, but evill came downe from the Lord unto the gate of Ierusalem. Thither it came, but it found no entrance in for the present, as it did into the gates of other Cities of Iudah. Lachish of all the Cities of Iudah was the first which tooke the impression of Israels idolatry, and did in part derive it unto Sion. And as she was the first and principall in sinne, so[Page]she was the first in the plagues here threatned. The Chariots of Ashur did first triumph in her streets, and her inhabitants felt the dint of the Assyrian swords, when 2 King. 18. 15 & 17 Esay 36. 2. Esay 37. 33 Ierusalem escaped with the lash of Rabshakehs tongue. That which is afterwards related in the sacred story, concerning Ierusalems defence against Senacherib, (who had surprised most of the strong Cities of Iudah, and had made Lachish his seat of residence) was significantly charactered by the Prophet Micah in the place forecited, Evill came downe from the Lord unto the gate of Ierusalem, but it entred into the gates of Lachish, for so he addes, O thou inhabitant of Lachish binde the charet to the swft beast: she is the beginning of the sinne to the daughter of Sion: for the transgressions of Israel were found in thee. They sacrifice upon the tops of the mountaines, and burne incense upon the hills under Oakes, and Poplars, and Elmes, because the shadow thereof is good: therefore your daughters shall commit whoredome, and your spouses shall commit adultery. I will not punish your daughters when they commit whoredome, nor your spouses when they commit adultery: for themselves are separated with whores, and they sacrifice with harlots: therefore the people that doth not understand, shall fall. Hosea 3. 13, 14.

3 The Children of Ammon, of Moab, and Edom, did triumph more then other Nations in the day of Iudahs heavy visitatiō by Nebuchadnezzar, and for this cause they have an heavier doome read by Gods Prophets, which lived at that time, then other Nations had. Ezekiel 25. 2, &c. Sonne of [Page] man, set thy face against the Ammonites, heare the word of the Lord God; Thus saith the Lord God, because thou saidst, Aha, against my Sanctuary when it was prophaned, and against the Land of Israel, when it was desolate, and against the house of Iudah when they went into captivitie: Behold therefore, I will deliver thee to the men of the East for a possession, and they shall set their palaces in thee, and make their dwellings in thee: they shall eate thy fruite, and they shall drinke thy milke. And I will make Rabbah a stable for Camels, and the Ammonites a couching place for flocks: and yee shall know that I am the Lord. For thus saith the Lord God, Because thou hast clapped thine hands, and stamped with thy feet, and rejoyced in heart, with all thy despite against the Land of Israel: Behold therefore I will stretch out mine hand upon thee, and will deliver thee for a spoile to the Heathen, and I will cut thee off from the people, and I will cause thee to perish out of the countries: I will destroy thee, and thou shalt know that I am the Lord.

Thus saith the Lord God, because that Moab and Seir doe say, behold, the house of Iudah is like unto all the heathen: therefore behold, I will open the side of Moab from the Cities, from his Cities which are on his frontiers, the glorie of the Countrey Beth jeshimoth, Baal-meon, and Keriathaim, unto the men of the East, with the Ammonites, and will give them in possession, that the Ammonites may not bee remembred among the Nations. And I will execute judgements upon Moab, and they shall know that I am the Lord.

[Page] Thus saith Lord GOD, Because that Edom hath dealt against the house of Iudah by taking vengeance, and hath greatly offended, and revenged himselfe upon them: Therefore saith the Lord, I will also stretch out my hand upon Edom, and will cut off man and beast from it, and I will make it desolate from Teman, and they of Dedan shall fall by the sword. And I will pay my vengeance upon Edom by the hand of my people Israel, and they shall doe in Edom according to mine anger, and according to my fury, and they shall know my vengeance, saith the Lord God.

4 The doome of Moab is more particularly set forth by Ieremy. chap. 48. 2. There shall be no more praise of Moab in Heshbon, they have devised evill against it: come and let us cut it off from being a nation; (so Moab had said of Israel) also thou shalt be cut downe, O mad men, the sword shall pursue thee. And againe, verse 25, 26, 27. The Horne of Moab is cut off, and his arme is broken, saith the Lord. Make yee him drunken; for hee magnified himselfe against the Lord: Moab also shall wallow in his vomit, and he also shall bee in derision. For was not Israel a derision unto thee? was hee found among theeues? for since thou spakest of him, thou skippest for joy.

The like doome of Moab is foretold by Zephanie. chap. 1. 8, 9, 10. I have heard the reproach of Moab, and the revilings of the Children of Ammon, whereby they have reproached my people, and magnified themselves against their border. Therefore, as I live saith the Lord of Hosts the God of Israel, surely [Page] Moab shall bee as Sodome, and the children of Ammon as Gomorrah, even the breeding of nettles and saltpies, and a perpetuall desolation, the residue of my people shall spoile them, and the remnant of my people shall possesse them. This shall they have for their pride, because they have reproched and magnified themselves against the people of the Lord of hoasts. The Lord will bee terrible unto them: for hee will famish all the gods of the earth, and men shall worship him, every one from his place, even all the Iles of the heathen. So farre wide were Moab and Edom in their divinations, when they said, the house of Iudah is like unto all the Heathen. (Ezek. 25. 8.) that all the yles of the Gentiles were to become, such as the house of Iudah had beene, that is, professed worshippers of the true God, who had now appointed to make himselfe known, to all the world, by his judgements upon these proud Heathens, which for their blasphemies have now forfeited their nationall interest in this blessing here promised to the Iles of the Gentiles, for they ceased to bee Nations.

5 Whiles Gods plagues are thus fitly suited to the matter or manner of mens sins: the longer the punishments themselves are delayed, the surer document they may afford unto the observant, that there is a watchfull eye of an alseeing Providence, without whose presence no fact can bee committed; an attentive eare which never shuts, alwayes readie, alwayes able to take notice of every word that can bee spoken, and to register proud blasphemous boastings in the indelible characters of an [Page] everlasting booke. It is an observation worth the noting, which a learned Commentator hath made upon the place last cited out of Zephaniah. [Verbum audivi suam Emphasim habet] These words [I have heard] are emphaticall, They intimate as much unto us, as if in the name of the Lord, the Prophet had said, ‘Though Moab saw not me, yet I heard him (for I was present with him) when hee pronounced the coast of Israel waste. And what I heard I cannot forget, nor will I forgive: according to his intentions against Israel at the time appointed, will I doe to him.’

6 The cryers of Edom against Ierusalem when Ierusalem was drowned with her childrens teares, (which yet could not quench the fire then kindled in her pallaces) were more bitter then the cry of Edom and Ammon against Iudah had beene. [Rase it, rase it, even to the foundation thereof.] The scope at which their wishes did ayme, was that Ierusalem and the Temple, might so be demolished that they should never be raised againe. And according to this scantling of their malicious wish, the Psalmist proportions that imprecation against Edom, which in the issue proved a Prophesie: Remember O Lord the Children of Edom, in the day of Ierusalem, who said, rase it, rase it, &c. The more full expression or ratification of this implicit prophesie, we have in another Prophet, who lived about eighty yeares after the Edomites had uttered that accursed cry against Ierusalem: I have loved you saith the Lord, yet ye say, wherein hast thou loved us? was not Esau Iacobs brother, saith the [Page]Lord? yet I loved Iacob, and I hated Esau, and layd his mountaines and his heritage waste for the Dragons of the wildernesse. Whereas Edom saith, wee are impoverished, wee will returne and build the desolate places: Thus saith the Lord of hoasts, they shall build but I will throw downe, and they shall call them, the border of wickednesse, and the people against whom the Lord hath indignation for ever. Mal. 1. 2, &c. Some good expositors have from the litterall sense of this place collected, that Edom, not long after the Babilonish captivitie, did utterly cease to be a Nation. And whether any of Esaus posteritie bee left upon the face of the Earth, some have questioned, and (to my remembrance) determined for the Negative. These (whatsoever besides) were the Effects of Gods professed hate to Esau. But there is a seed or Nation yet on earth, which shall at the time appointed be made partakers of his blessing so often promised to Ierusalem, and enjoy the fruites of his professed love to Iacob.

7 These Prophetical passages cōcerning Ammon, Moab, and Edom, afford many usefull speculations, did either these times afford us freedome, or this place opportunitie to dilate upon them. But leaving the rest unto the juditious Readers owne collection, out of the seuerall Expositors of the places by mee quoted, I shall onely request him to take this one admonition from mee, ‘[Not to rejoyce, much lesse to triumph in any others calamitie, although hee knew it to be the speciall award of divine justice, or a condigne punishment purposely [Page] suted by the All seeing Providence to some peculiar sinne.]’ Edom and Babylon knew that Ierusalem and Iudah were justly punished for their offences against the righteous Lord, and themselves to be the appointed executioners of his justice: yet all this doth no way excuse them, for their presumption in the manner of execution. My people have beene lost sheepe, their Shepheards have caused them to goe astray, &c. All that found them have devoured them, and their adversaries said, Wee offend not, because they have sinned against the Lord, the habitation of Iustice, even the Lord, the hope of their Fathers. Yet all this acquits not Babylon from guilt of Gods judgments in spoyling Gods people: for so it followes; Remove out of the midst of Babylon, and goe forth out of the Land of the Caldeans, and be as the hee-goats before the flockes. Ier. 50. 6, 7, 8. And againe, Verse 10, 11. Caldea shall be a spoile; all that spoyle her shall be satisfied, saith the Lord, because yee were glad, because yee rejoyced, ô yee destroyers of mine heritage. Not onely the practise, or reall intention of mischiefe, but the delight, or joy, which men take in the calamitie of others by whomsoever it bee procured or intended, doth make men lyable to the rule of Retaliation. For every degree of delight or joy in others misery, includes a breach of that fundamentall Law of equitie, [Quod tibi fieri non vis, alteri ne feceris] VVhatsoever wee would not have done vnto our selves, wee should bee vnwilling to doe, or to see done vnto others.] And all visitation by the rule of Counterpassion, as it concernes [Page] wrongs intended or done by one man to another, is but a resarcination or making up of that breach, which hath beene made in the fundamentall Law of equitie, that is, of doing as wee would be done unto.

8 But besides the wrongs which Potentates or priuate men practise upon, or intend to others, there is a peculiar disposition, which makes men liable to the iudgements which they feare, or at least hasten the execution of iudgements otherwise deserved. And that is a tempting God by the curiositie of superstitious feare, or by dissimulation. An instance to this purpose (and that is all which at this time I meane to use) we have in1 King. 14. 1, 2. Ieroboam and his wife, who went disguised unto the Prophet Ahijah, (as if it had beene unto some cunning man) to know what should become of her young sonne Abijah then visited with sicknesse. The doome or punishment doth so well befit the temptation, that the circumstances of the time and place, &c. wherin the discovery of her dissembling was by the spirit revealed unto the Prophet, may seeme to have suggested unto him the time of the Childes death, with other circumstances. The Prophets eies were dimme, that he could not discerne her by sight, but the Lord so supplyed this defect, that hee knew her by the sound of her feete, before shee came in at the doore. The vers. 5. &c. Lord said unto Ahijah, Behold the wife of Ieroboam commeth to aske a thing of thee for her sonne, for hee is sicke. Thus and thus shalt thou say unto her, for it shall bee when shee commeth in, that shee will faine herselfe to bee [Page]another woman. And it was so, when Ahijah heard the sound of her feete as shee came in at the doore, that hee said; Come in thou wife of Ieroboam, why fainest thou thy selfe to be another? for I am sent unto thee with heavie tidings, &c. Arise thou therefore, get thee to thine owne house; and when thy feet enter into the Citie, the childe shall dye, &c. And Vers. 17.Ieroboams wife arose, and departed and came to Tirzah: and when shee came to the threshold of the doore, the childe dyed. But of that peculiar branch of Divine Providence, which takes men in the nets of their owne superstitious feare or imaginations, wee shall have fitter occasion to speake in the Treatise of Prodigies or Divine Fore-warnings.

[Page]

CAP. 38.
The conclusion of this Treatise, with the relation of Gods remarkable judgements manifested in Hungary.

1 DID GOD alwayes fit his plagues to exorbitant or out-crying sinnes immediately after their commission, men would suspect that hee did distrust his memory. Should hee deferre all as long as hee doth sundry, for many yeares, and some speciall ones till the second, third, or fourth generation; this would tempt us in the interim to thinke hee tooke just notice of none: Because sentence against an evill worke is not executed speedily, therefore the heart of the children of men is fully set in them to doe evill. Ecclesiastes 8. 11. But the same Preacher to counterpoyze the sway of this inbred temptation, addeth; Though a sinner doe evill an hundred times, and God prolongeth his dayes, yet I know that it shall bee well with them that feare the Lord, and doe reverence before him. But it shall not be so well to the wicked; neyther shall hee prolong his dayes, hee shall bee like a shadow, because he feareth not before God, Verse 12, 13. Besides this [Page] authoritie of the Preacher (concerning the determinate extent or meaning of whose words. I will not here dispute) wee have a propheticall generall Rule, which never faileth in it selfe, nor to the apprehension of the observant. How mightily soever iniquitie abounds in any Citie, Land, or Countrey, yet the just Lord is in the midst thereof: hee will not doe iniquitie. Every morning doth hee bring his judgement to light, hee faileth not; but the unjust knoweth no shame. Zephaniah 3. vers. 5.

2 But these sacred as well as other Maximes, have their peculiar subjects, in which they are more remarkably verified at out time then at another. The extraordinarie documents of Gods punitive justice, had beene no doubt more rise in Iudah about Zephanies time, than in former ages. And amongst moderne Christian States, none have beene so fertile as the Kingdome of Hungarie, since it stood upon the same termes with the Turke, that Iudah in Zephanies dayes did with the Chaldaean. I will give the Reader onely a hint or taste from one or two particulars, to set his meditations (if it shall please him) on working to observe the like out of the Histories of that Countrey.

3 Amongst all the persons of better place, or same mentioned in those Histories, could there bee found but tenne (as for ought I know there may bee more) whose Legends eyther in, respect of wrongs done to others by them, or of wrongs [Page] done to them by others, might afford so many pregnant proofes of Divine Retaliation, as doth the Legend of Fryer George or (as Thuanus calls him) Martinusius: the Prophets Proposition [Every morning hee bringeth forth judgement to light] might by exact Logicall Induction be proved to have beene universally true in that Kingdome for more than tenne yeares together. This man by his valorous wit had advanced himselfe from a Turne-spit, or Cole-carrier to be a Cardinall: otherwise for his temporall dignitie and authoritie, full Peere to most Princes of Christendome; no way inferiour to many Kings, save onely in want of Royall Title. In the height of his prosperitie he had entertained one Marc Anthony de Ferraro, Secretarie to Castaldie, Lieutenant to Ferdinand the Emperour in those parts, as a secret Intelligencer to betray his Master, but was in the end miserably betrayed by him. For this Assassinate (Hac vero arte conjurati in Georgij cubiculum irruperūt: Marcus Antonius Ferrarius, Castal do ab Epistolis homo prostitutae audacia jam abaliquo tempore tantam cum Georgio familiaritatem contraxerat, dum se berum prod [...]re simulat, ut cubiculorijs ejus proptereà factus noti [...]r, quavis [...] ad ipsum admiteretur. Thuanus lib. 9. (Ferrarius) having at all houres free accesse upon this hope, tooke hence opportunitie to conveigh the rest of the bloody actors into the Bed-chamber of this usually well guarded Prince, or Tyrant, in a dismall morning, before hee was dressed. Ferrary himselfe giving the first wound, whilest hee was reaching penne and Inoke to subscribe unto the counterfeit Letters or Patents, which hee then did tender him. [Page] This Fryer or Cardinall (Marlinusius) had plaid the Hypocrite (as was then presumed) with his Christian neighbours, being either in affection to his owne country, or for his private ends, more engaged to the Turke. And Captaine Lopez, with the Spanish Harquebuzes designed by Ferdinand and Castaldie to assist Marquesse Pallavicino for effecting this plot, were permitted, without suspition of hostility into the Castle, being apparelled in Turkish weeds or long gownes, under which they covered their Harquebuzes, and such other armour, as they thought expedient for this feat.

4 His death though bloody and cruell in the highest degree did not so deeply affect unpartiall hearts, either with pity toward him, or with indignation at his murderers, as the strange and unusuall neglect of hisAnd so this assembly was discomfited, every man taking his neerest & safest way, leaving their Masters dead body to be a prey and spoile unburied. It remained there many dayes above ground naked and without light, there being not any who respected to cover or bury him, being so stiffe with cold, that he seemed as a man made out of marble, having in his head, brest, and armes, many wounds, upon which was yet remaining the blood all frozen▪ which to say truly was an object worthy of compassion: and on the other side it was execrable and enormous to see, so great a personage so vildly lest without buriall by those, who (God knowes for what cause) had practised his death. Martin Fu [...]ee in his Historie of Hungary. Booke 4. mangled Corps, did their hearts, which either through partialitie or credulitie, have professed a delectation of his tyrannicall life, upon higher termes than hee deserved. His enemies it seemes, were so carefull to effect their intended plot, and his friends so affrighted with his sudden disaster, that his dead bodie remained many daies together above ground, unburied, or uncovered, with the blood frozen upon it; so stiffe with cold [Page] that it might rather seeme to have beene a blurred or besmeared statue of stone, or marble, than a dead man. A fit relique for a sacrilegious Palace; such was the Castle wherein hee was murthered, for whose erection he had demolished an ancient Church and Monasterie of religious persons. And whether it were, thatSi natura negat, facit indignatio versum. indignation doth sometimes make men as well peeces of Prophets, as of Poets; or whether it were spoken by way of bitter imprecation; theBehold now the end of the proudest and insolentest man in the world, and the greatest and closest Tyrant that ever lived. God permitting that hee should in that very place end his dayes, which hee had caused to be built upon the foundations of an ancient Church and Monastery of religious persons, which for that occasion he caused to be defaced and pulled downe; and for the ruine whereof his death was foretold unto him by the Abbot of that place. See the History of Hungary in the place before cited. See Thuanus Lib. 9. Abbot upon the sacrilegious oppression, did foresignifie, that this Castle, whose foundations were laid with others, should at length be seasoned with the blood of him that built it.

Who buildeth so, me thinkes, so buildeth he,

As if his house, should his Sepulcher bee.

5 Though Gods judgements upon this man were (as all his are) most just; yet were they unjustly done by these Assassinates. They were Gods instruments, but the devills agents, in acting this plot: and by doing to this Cardinall as hee had done to others, they themselves become lyable, in this life, to the rigour of the indispensable Law, As they have done to him, so must it be done to them. Gods will is fulfilled upon them, as the devills will was fulfilled by them. Hee was a murderer from [Page] the beginning, and they are his sonnes. And, though they afterwards disperse themselves throughout divers Kingdomes or Nations, yet the cry of this Cardinals blood doth still pursue them. Which way soever they wander; the Almighties net is spred out for them, and being still hunted after by Gods judgements, all of them are driven at length into it. This wee are sure of (saith the forementioned Author of the Hungarian historie) that all those which were Actors of his death, in time fell into great misfortunes. The Marquesse Sforce, within a while after was overthrowne and taken Prisoner by the Turkes, who inflicted great torments upon him. Captaine Monin, was beheaded at Saint Germanes in Piemont. Marc Anthony Ferraro in anno 1557. (which was about six yeares after) was also beheaded in Alexandria (his native Country) by the Cardinall of Trent his command. Another was quartered by the French men in Provence. Cheualier Campegio in anno 1562. was in the presence of the Emperour Ferdinand mortally wounded with a Bore in Bohemia. Certe percusseres Georgij post ejus necem ad unum omnes p [...] nas dedisse plerique scripserunt: ac Sfortiam quidem diuturna & morte pejore apud Turcos captivitate. Moninum vero insubalpi [...]a regione ad Germani fanum cervice abscissa; Ferrarium denique qui Alexandriae, quae ipsa patria erat, Cardinalis Tridentini [...]ssu sexennio post securi percussus est. Postremo equitem Compegium, qui hujus, saeculi anno 62 inter venandum in Ferdinandi ipsius conspectu apri fulminio dente in Bohemia discerptus est, honestiori, nec tamen minus infortunata morte. Thuanus lib. 9. Thuanus relates the selfe same accidents, from the testimonies of more Writers than this, save onely that hee omits the mention of him that was quartered in Provence.

6 What one of many hundred mornings after [Page] this fact was there, wherein Ferdinand did not lose soting either in Hungary or in Transylvania; wherein the Turke did not sensibly incroach upon Christendome, and gaine advantage against Christians? The just comparison betweene the misery of Iudah in Zedechiaes dayes, and of Hungary under Lewis the second, with the parallell manner of these two noble Kings and their adherents miscariage, must be referred for breuities sake, to other Treatises. Onely to shut vp this exemplification of the Prophets assertion verified in peculiar sort in Hungary: what example of Divine Iustice, either more pregnant or more durable was ever manifested in Iudea, than was to bee seene every morning for more then twenty yeares together in the fields of Moacz, where the horse and his royall rider (King Lewis) found a miserable grave before they were quite dead; but where the bones of such as were slaine in that unfortunate battaile, lay unburyed in such abundance as did exhibit a wofull spectacle to every Christian passengers eye, from the yeare 1526. untill the time ofQuidex eo sperandum sit, satis eum docent superiorum temporum exempla, acceptae ad Nicopoli [...], & ad Varnam clades, absentes (que) adhuc [...]ibus caeserū Christianorum ad [...] Busbeq. epist. 4. Busbequius his embassage to Constantinople (how long after I know not) which was upon the mariage betweene King Philip and Queene Mary, about the yeare 1555. The Christian Hungars of those times after the losse of their late mentioned King, had as just cause to insert that lamentation into their Liturgie, as Ieremie had to take it up: The annointed of the Lord was taken in their nets, of whom we said, under his shaddow we shall be preserved alive among [Page]the Heathen. Lamentations 4. 20. As full an interest in that complaint of the Psalmist, as the ancient Iewes had during the time of Nebuchadnezzar or Antiochus his rage: The dead bodies of thy servants, have they given to be meate unto the fowles of the heaven, the flesh of thy Saints unto the beasts of the earth, their blood have they shed like water, & there was none to burie them. Ps. 79. 2, 3. The pittifull women of Iudea did eate their Children, when Titus besieged Ierusalem. The women of Hungarie (no lesse mercifull (as may be presumed) than other Christian women are, buried their Children alive, lest their timorous outcryes might bewray the place of their abode, or latitation, when Soliman and his furious helhounds did so greedily hunt after their lives. The people of Hungary would not take example from the miseries which had befallen Iudea, nor breake off those sinnes which brought this miserie upon them: GOD grant the Prophets and Seers of this kingdome, eyes to discerne, and this whole people, one and other, patient hearts to heare those sinnes, whether of practise, or opinion discovered, which threaten the like judgements unto this Land, as have befallen the Kingdome of Hungarie, one of the most flourishing Kingdomes in the Christian world, within a few yeares before its ruine.

FINIS.

Notes

a

Medico suo menstruum dabat stipendium, ut supr [...] quoque diximus, decem aureorum millia: nec id modò, verum etiam Episcopatum Ambianensem ejus Nepoti, & munerae publica multa largiebatur ejus propinquis & amicis. Et tamen Medicus tam erat verbis in eum asper & durus, ut nihil supra: valde igitur eum Rex metuebat, & ad suos familiares, de illine asperitate [...], saepe querebatur, neque tamen andebat eum à se dimittere. Ibid.

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A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first partCommentaries upon the Apostles Creed. Book 6

Jackson, Thomas, 1579-1640.

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1629

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2007-01 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

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— A treatise of the divine essence and attributes. By Thomas Iackson Doctor in Divinitie, chaplaine to his Majestie in ordinary, and vicar of S. Nicolas Church in the towne of Newcastle upon Tyne. The first part, Commentaries upon the Apostles Creed. Book 6, Jackson, Thomas, 1579-1640..

Extent

[12], 236; [8], 405, [1] p.

Printed by M[iles] F[lesher] for Iohn Clarke, and are to be sold at his shop under St. Peters Church in Cornhill,. London :: 1628 [i.e. 1629]. (The second part has separate pagination, register, and title page with imprint date 1629.) (The two parts comprise book 6 of the author's "Commentaries upon the Apostles Creed".) (Printer's name from STC.) (In this edition of part 1, B1r has catchword "others.". Part 2 is in the same setting as STC 14318.5.) (Reproduction of the original in the British Library.)

Creation

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