Answer.

1. BVT first, I doe not well vnder­stand, what fulnesse of satisfa­ction in all points you did expect, and haue not found in the late New-yeeres Gift. For if you expected, that M^r. Widdrington, from whom the Author of the New-yeeres Gift, hath collected his Explication of the Oath, should haue taken vpon him in this contro­uersie of the Oath, (which is forbid­den by the Popes Breues, though vpon false informations and suppositions, and also impugned by diuerse learned men vpon the same false grounds) to [Page 6]proue it to bee lawfull by such cleare and euident demonstrations, as that no wrangling spirit, or stiffe Impug­ner of the Oath, could alledge any doubt, difficulty, or scruple against his arguments, or answers; you were herein greatly mistaken, neither had you any reason to expect the same: especially if you had duely conside­red what he did obserue in his Theolo­gicall Disputation In the Epistle n. 4.; both for that to bring such euident demonstrations in any controuersie whatsoeuer among learned Catholikes, is a very hard matter; and also because it was suffi­cient for him to answer probably all the arguments, which could bee brought against the Oath, and to al­ledge such probable proofes, groun­ded both vpon the cleare principles of Philosophie, Law, and Diuinitie, and also vpon the testimony, authority, and confession of his chiefest Aduersa­ries, which might perswade any pru­dent, learned, and indifferent man, that there is nothing in the Oath, re­pugnant to faith, or saluation, and conse­quently, that it may with a safe con­science [Page 7]bee taken. And whether hee hath sufficiently performed this, or no, the learned Reader must iudge, & you your self, by the answers to your doubts, difficulties, or rather, as you well tearme them, scruples, may easily perceiue.

2. Secondly, I cannot blame you, for labouring to haue this controuer­sie of the Oath, to bee throughly exa­mined, considering it doth so neerely concerne our duty to God and Caesar; and consequently, the spiritual safety, or hurt to our soules (to omit now all temporall losses) by taking or refusing the same. But truely, in my conceit, if without all partiality, or ouermuch affection to either part, you would be as curious and carefull to finde out fa­uourable Expositions of the Oath, as you haue beene to inuent doubts, dif­ficulties, or rather scriples against the same, you would easily perceiue, that no conuincing and demonstratiue ar­gument can be brought, to proue the Oath vnlawfull. And the variety, and diuersity of the grounds, whereupon the stiffe Impugners therof do chiefly [Page 8]insist, some disprouing the Oath for this clause, some for another, some for this reason, others not for that, some for the Popes Breues, others not daring to ground themselues on them, and few agreeing among themselues in any one point (besides the silence, both of the Popes Holinesse, in not ex­pressing as yet any one clause, or pro­position in the Oath, which is cleerely repugnant to faith, or saluation, although he hath beene often most humbly re­quested to declare the same, and the silence also of M^r. Widdringtons chie­fest aduerlaries, to whom hee hath re­plyed, who, as it seemeth, haue left him in the open field) and moreouer, the weaknesse of your doubts and dif­ficulties, which, after so long a dis­cussion of this controuersie, as the most principall obiections, you haue singled from the rest, doe sufficiently confirme, that no conuincing argu­ment can bee brought to proue the Oath vnlawfull. Now to your diffi­cultie.

Answere.

1 BVt this first difficultie of yours is easily answered. And first, al­though the matter of an Oath ought to be certain, yet it is to be vnderstood of the immediate matter, or obiect of the Oath, and also of morall cer­taintie, and that also not in respect of all men, but in respect only of the swearer, or, according to the reasona­ble iudgement of the swearer, as hath [Page 13]been sufficiently declared in the New­yeeres gift; In the first obser­uation for the same thing may be certain, or probable to the iudgement of one, which is not certaine, or pro­bable to the iudgement of an other. From whence these two things may be inferred.

2 The one, that Becanus houlding for certain,Becanus in controuersia Anglicana anno dom. 1612. im­pressa pag. 102 that King Iames is the So­ueraign Lord in temporals of his Do­minions, might lawfully sweare the same, although some others improba­bly hould, that the Pope and not King Iames is the Soueraigne Lord in tem­porals thereof. And Ʋasques houl­ding for certaine, that it is not lawfull so make warre vpon a probable title against a Prince, who hath not onely a probable title, but also possession (for he affirmeth,See be­neth sect. 10 num. 2. that the contrarie do­ctrine hath in his iudgement no pro­babilitie at all) might lawfully sweare the same. And likewise they who hould it for certain, that the Pope hath no lawfull power or authoritie to de­pose Princes, or, which is all one to practise their deposition, may lawfully sweare the same. And the reason is, [Page 14]for that the Ʋeritie, which is required in an Oath, is not to be taken from the thing sworn, as it is in it selfe, or a parte rei, but as it is in the vnderstanding of him that sweareth.

3 The other, which may be infer­red, is, that if the immediate obiect of this second Branch of the Oath be not this absolute proposition, That the Pope hath not any authoritie to depose the King &c. (as it hath been suffici­ently proued by M^r. Widdrington, and also your silence, in not impugning that first Explication of his, seemeth to confirme the same) then by this diffi­cultly of yours it can not bee suffi­ciently proued, that this second Branch of the Oath is vnlawfull: for when two answerers are giuen to one obiection it is necessarie to confute them both, to proue the obiection to be of force.

4. But secondly it is manifest, that also M. Widdringtons second Explication of this Branch is very true, notwith­standing your obiection against the same. For all the force of your diffi­cultie consisteth in your false glossing of those words, The Pope hath no pow­er [Page 15]or authoritie, practicè (that is for as much as concerneth practise) to depose Princes: Which is as much as to say (say you) we doe not sweare, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose Prin­ces, but that he can practise no such pow­er vpon any Prince being in possession, as long as it is but probable, that the Pope hath that power. But this Glosse of yours is very vntrue, and also expresly repugnant to the words themselues. For the plain meaning of these words, The Pope hath no power or authoritie practicè (that is for practise) to depose Princes, is, that the Pope hath no true, reall, sufficient, and lawfull power, or authoritie to practise the deposition of Princes, at any time, for any cause, crime or end whatsoeuer. And besides M. Widdrington saith in expres words, That the Pope hath no power or autho­ritie to depose, or practise the depositi­on of Princes, and not onely, that hee can not practise their deposition, or, which is all one, depose them: as though you would haue him to grant, that the Pope hath a true, and lawful power and authoritie to depose [Page 16]Princes, but that he can not lawfully or without sin practise this his authority.

5 Moreouer, I can not perceiue any difference in substance and effect, betwixt these two propositions, which you would seeme to distinguish, The Pope hath no power or authoritie to de­pose Princes, or to practise their depo­sition, and, The Pope can not practise any such power or authoritie to depose vpon any Prince, seeing that whosoeuer denieth all effects of any power, doth vertually and in effect deny the pow­er it self, Frustra enim est illa potestas, & proinde nulla (cùm Deus & Natu­ra nihil faciant frustra) quae nunquam reducitur adactum: for that power is vaine or idle (seeing that God and Nature doth no thing idly or in vaine) which is neuer brought to act. Where­upon Suarez from those words of the third Branch [notwithstanding any sen­tence of depriuation or absolution of the subiects from their allegiance, made or to be made &c. I will beare faith and true allegiance to his Maiestie &c.] doth well conclude a denyall of the Popes power to depriue Prince, and to [Page 17]absolue subiects from their allegiance, to be vertually conteyned in those words, for that the denial of all effects of any power doth imply a deniall of the power it selfe.

6 Wherefore if M. Widdrington, and the Author of the New-yeres gift, had denyed the practise of the Popes power only in some particular cases, as M. Blackwell did at the first deny the practise of the Popes power to depose the King, for that rebus sic stantibus, things standing as they doe at this pre­sent, the Pope could not, without great hurt to English Catholikes, pra­ctise vpon him his pretended power to depose Princes, and thereupon did ill conclude, that the Pope had no power nor authoritie to depose the King, then indeed you might wel infer, that they did only deny the practice of the Popes power to depose, but not the power and authoritie it selfe, which is repugnant to his Maiesties meaning, who by this Branch of the Oath intended to deny the Popes authoritie to practise his de­position, in any case, or for any cause, crime, or end whatsoeuer, and conse­quently [Page 18]to deny, not only the practise, but also the power it selfe. But consi­dering that they in expresse tearmes deny both the Popes power & authority to practise the deposition of his Ma­iestie, and consequently of any other Prince not directly subiect to the Pope in temporals, & also the practise thereof in all cases whatsoeuer, al­though the crime should deserue de­position, and the Pope should haue sufficient forces, and also conuenient meanes to put in execution his sen­tence of depriuation, truly you had no reason, nor colour of reason to say, that they denied onely the practise of the Popes power to depose, but not the power and authoritie it selfe.

7. But because you shall see, that my meaning is not to conceale, or ob­scure any difficultie, I will vrge this obiection of yours against M^r. Wid­drington somewhat more forcibly in forme and shew, than you haue done, in this manner.

Whosoeuer acknowledgeth, that the Pope hath some power and authoritie to depose Princes, cannot lawfully sweare, [Page 19]nor acknowledge by oath, that the Pope hath not any power, or authority to depose them. But M^r. Widdrington acknow­ledgeth, that the Pope hath some power and authority to depose Princes: There­fore he cannot lawfully sweare, or acknow­ledge by oath, that the Pope hath not any power, or authority, to depose them.

The Maior is manifest, for that in so swearing, he should commit mani­fest periurie, in swearing, or acknow­ledging by oath that to be true, which he acknowledgeth to bee false, seeing that to haue some authoritie, and not to haue any authority, are contradictories.

The Minor is proued thus: A pro­bable power to depose is some power; But M^r. Widdrington acknowledgeth, that the Pope hath a probable power, saltem speculatiuè, at least in speculation, to de­pose: Therefore hee acknowledgeth, that hee hath some power to depose; And yet in the Oath wee must sweare, or at least acknowledge by oath, That the Pope hath not any power, or authority, to depose the King, &c.

8. But this obiection is easily an­swered. For the true meaning of those [Page 20]words, That the Pope hath not any power or authority, to depose, &c, according to their plaine, proper, and vsuall signifi­cation, and the intention of his Ma­iesty, is, that the Pope hath not any true, reall, sufficient, and lawfull power, or authoritie to depose, &c. But a meere probable power to depose, is no true, reall, sufficient, or lawfull power, but for practise and effect it is only an imaginarie power, or a power in the con­ceit and imagination of some Doctors▪ but in very deed, and for practise & effect it is no true, reall, lawfull power at all, or which may bee a sufficient ground to de­pose. For euery power hath relation to the effect, and where there can bee no reall and lawfull effect, or practice, there is no reall and lawfull power to practise; for power, and effect, or pra­ctice, are correlatiues, and one de­pendeth vpon the other. And this is so plaine and manifest, that there nee­deth no declaration of his Maiesty, to explaine the same. And therefore I wish you to remember, that when the words of penall Lawes may, accor­ding to their proper and vsuall signifi­cation, [Page 21]be expounded in a fauourable sense, wee ought not, contrarie to the rules prescribed by Diuines, for the interpreting of lawes, seeke to wrest them to an absurd and inconuenient sense. Neither can any man, with any colour of reason imagin, that his Ma­iestie would haue vs to sweare, or ac­knowledge that, which hee himselfe knoweth to be vntrue, to wit, that the Pope hath not any power or authority to depose, so much as in the conceit, imagination, and opinion of some Catholikes, yea and of the Pope him­selfe; but his meaning is, to haue vs to sweare, or at least acknowledge by Oath, that the Pope hath no true, reall, and lawfull power to depose, and which may be a sufficient ground and founda­tion, to practise the deposition of any absolute Prince, notwithstanding this their conceit, imagination, or opinion.

9. But perchance you will obiect, that both the power to depose, and also the practice it selfe is approued for lawe­full and sufficient, not onely by the an­cient Schoole-Diuines, who peraduen­ture (as you insinuate aboue) might not [Page 22]haue marked all Widdringtons grounds, but also by our owne moderne Doctours, who no doubt haue seene the reasons, and examined the grounds on both parts, therefore the Pope hath at least wise a probable, lawfull, and sufficient power to practise the deposition of Princes. But this obiection hath beene answered at large in the Neweyeares Gift Cap. 9. num. 9. For those Doctors, who approue the practice of deposing Princes by the Popes autho­ritie, doe ground their doctrine vpon a very false principle, and which all the world now seeth to bee false and absurd, to wit, that it is certaine and vnquestionable among Catholikes, that the Pope hath authoritie to de­pose Princes; or else they did not ob­serue the manifest difference betwixt the lawfull practise of a probable power concerning fauour, and punishment. But that doctrine ought not to bee ac­counted probable in respect of extrin­secall grounds, or the authority of Doctors, when it is grounded vpon a principle, which is knowne to bee ma­nifestly false, as is this, that it is not now a controuersie among Catho­likes, [Page 23]whether the Pope hath authori­ty to depose Princes, or no. Neither can you alledge any one ancient, or moderne Doctour, who holding the doctrine, for the Popes power to de­pose Princes, to bee but probable, ap­proueth the practice thereof to bee lawfull. For which cause they haue so much laboured these latter yeeres, to proue it to bee certaine, and of faith, but all in vaine. And therefore they haue now thought it best to bee silent, then to write any more of this contro­uersie, lest their further writings proue the doctrine, which they in times past would haue had to be certaine, to bee now scarse probable. Yet I cannot but commend the ingenuity of Becanus, who although some yeeres past was as hot in this question,Becanus in Tract. de fide. ca. 15. q 4. as any of the rest; for before hee affirmed, that it is cer­taine at the least, In Con­trouersia Anglic. cha. 3. q. 3. that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, yet now hauing some occasion to treat thereof againe, is content to leaue it as a diffi­cultie, or controuersie. Certum est, &c. It is certaine (saith he) that if we regard onely the Law of God, or Nature, hereti­call [Page 24]Princes are not depriued of their Do­minions, or Iurisdiction, de facto: But whether a Prince may, by the Law of the Church, and the Popes sentence, be depri­ued of his Dominion and Iurisdiction, it is a difficulty. And therefore Card. Peron now in his last booke, cap. 91. p. 633. expressely affirmeth, That this contro­uersie ought not to hinder the re-vnion of those, who should bee reconciled to the Church. In so much, that he laboreth also to excuse Card. Bellarmine, and sayth, that Card. Bellarmine hath ad­monished his Readers, that what hee pro­pounded, concerning the Popes power in­directly in temporals, he did not propound it as a doctrine of faith, and whereof wee must needs hold the one part, or the other, vnder paine of Excommunication, and Anathema: which is as much as to say, that albeit Card. Bellarmine did hold it to be a doctrine of faith, yet he did hold it to bee so onely in his owne priuate opinion, which others of the contrary opinion were not bound to follow vnder paine of Excommunica­tion and Anathema. As likewise, al­though the Iesuites in times past held [Page 25]their doctrine de auxilijs gratiae, to bee of faith; yet because they held it to bee so onely in their priuate opinion, they knew right well, that the Domi­nicans, who held the contrary, were not bound to follow their priuate opi­nion, vnder pain of Excommunication, and Anathema: and therfore they did not thereby cause a Schisme in the Church, by seeking to exclude them from Sacraments, and Ecclesiasticall Communion. Neither ought they now, according to Card. Peron his do­ctrine, proceed otherwise in this con­trouersie of the Popes power to depose Princes.

10. And if you obiect again, which you vrge beneath, Sect. 11. concer­ning a probable title, that if a probable power to depose and punish, bee not a sufficient and lawfull power to pra­ctise, it is as good as no power at all. I answer, that for as much as concer­neth practice, it is in very deed as good as no power at all, for that a pro­bable power cannot bee a sufficient ground to punish, or depriue any man of that which he possesseth, as Lessius, [Page 26]and P. Kellinson well obserued, yet speaking generally your consequence is not good, for no power is good for nothing, but a probable power to pu­nish and depose, is good for this, to haue the matter examined by a lawful and vndoubted Iudge, who in respect of the deciding of the Popes power to depose Princes, can onely be a law­full and vndoubted Generall Coun­cell, as hath beene declared sufficient­ly in the New-yeeres Gift. And this may suffice for the cleering of this difficulty.

Answer.

1. BVT before I goe any further,Answ. to set downe and examine the proofes of what here you say, it is strange to mee, that a man of your learning and reading should conceiue, that the taking of hereticall in that sense, wherein Widdrington doth take it, to wit, for that false doctrine, which is contrary to the holy Scriptures, is not so proper neither with vs, nor Protestants. For the Protestants hold the Scriptures to bee the onely rule of saith, and consequently that to bee hereticall, or against faith, which is contrary to the Word of God, which is the rule of faith. And therefore e­uery falshood, which is repugnant to the Word, and testimony of God contained in the holy Scriptures, is in the doctrine of Protestants, and also [Page 28]of the most Catholike Diuines, hereti­call, and repugnant to diuine and su­pernaturall faith, though it be only in a poynt of some historicall narration, as to deny,Euod. 3. that God appeared to Moyses in a flame of fire out of the mids of a bush, & that the bush burned with fire, & was not consumed, Iob. 1. or to deny that Iob had seuen sons, and three daughters, or such like: for albeit these, and such like falshoods, doe not directly and ex­pressely subuert the foundation of faith, ex parte credendorum, in regard of the materiall obiect of supernatu­rall faith, which is principally contai­ned in the Articles of our Creed, yet they subuert the foundation of faith, ex parte regulae fidei, and in regard of the formall obiect of faith, which is the infallible truth and testimony of God reuealed to vs in the holy Scrip­tures: and so the auerring of these fashoods make God a Lyar, and doe indirectly, vertually, and by a necessa­ry consequence subuert the first Arti­cle of our Creede, and destroy the in­finite power, knowledge, or goodnes of God, and consequently God himselfe, [Page 29]and therefore are truely and properly hereticall falshoods, or repugnant to faith, both according to Protestants, and most learned Catholike Diuines. Whereupon all Diuines commonly doe put in the first place, or degree of hereticall propositions, those which are expressely and formally against the holy Scriptures, and in second, or third place those, which are repugnant to the definitions of the Church. See Cardinall Turrecremata in Sum. de Ecclesia lib. 4. part. 2. cap. 10. Canus lib. 12. de locis cap. 7. Bannes 2 a 2 ae. q. 11. ar. 2. Franciscus de Christo dist. 25. in. q. 3. de haeresi, in Excursu de Catholica veritate. Directorium Inquit sitorum part. 2. comment. 27. in prima regula, besides Alphonsus de Castro, and Couerruuias, cited by M^r. Widdrington, in his answer to M^r. Fitzherbert, part. 2. Append. p. 69.

2. Veritas Catholica est veritas, &c. (saith Franciscus à Christo) Catholike verity is a verity deliuered supernatural­ly, and made known by God alone; Wherof there are foure kindes. The first kinde is of those truths, or verities, which are for­mally [Page 30]and expressely contained in the holy Scriptures. And beneath saith hee: Therefore the first degree of hereticall propositions is of those, which are against Catholike verity, or truth contained for­mally & expressely in the holy Scriptures. The same saith Turrecremata in the places aboue cited.

Catholicae veritates illae habendae sunt, &c. (saith Franciscus Pegna in Comment. 27. vpon the Directorie of the Inquisi­tors part. 2.) Catholike verities are to be accounted those, which are contained in the holy Scripture of the old and new Te­stament. And a little aboue in q. 2. Illa propositio &c. That proposition is hee reticall (saith Eymericus, whom Pegna glosseth) which is against the holy Scrip­ture approued by the Church.

3. And therefore (as well sayth Card. Turrecremata cap. 3.) Ecclesiae determinatio &c. The determination of the Church doth not make, nor can make heresie, or an hereticall proposition, as nei­ther Catholike verity: because, as Cas tholike verities without all approbation of the Church; of their owne nature are im­mutable, and immutably true, so immu­tably [Page 31]they are to be accounted Catholike: And likewise, heresies without all condens­nation of the Church are heresies. The same saith Castro and Couerruuias ci­ted by Widdrington In his Appendix to the se­cond part of Master Fitzherbert. num. 206. pag. 69.. Wherefore you must distinguish (as the aforesayd Do­ctours doe well obserue) betwixt Ca­tholike verities and heresies secundùm se, & quoad nos, according to their owne nature, and in respect of vs; for heresies without all condemnation of the Church are heresies, although be­fore the Church hath declared them to bee heresies, they are not alwayes knowne to all Catholikes, but to some more or lesse, who see, that either di­rectly, or indirectly, they containe a falshood repugnant to the holy Scrip­tures. See also the definition which S. Robert of Lincolne maketh of here­sie, related by Matthew Paris, in the life of K. Henry the third. pag. 846.

Answer.

1. BVT this discourse of yours is farre more weake,Answ. and insuffi­cient then the former. And first to shew the insufficiency therof by some inconueniences; It is manifest, that, according to your principles, no par­ticular proposition is of faith, and the contrarie hereticall, although it bee neuer so cleerely contained in the ge­nerall proposition, which is expressed in the holy Scripture, vnlesse both the premisses, to proue the particular pro­position to bee included in the gene­rall, bee expressely contained in the holy Scripture. And so by your man­ner of arguing, it is not lawfull to ab­iure as hereticall, any particular do­ctrine, which approueth the dishono­ring of particular Parents, which ap­proueth any particular adultery, theft, or murther; although they bee neuer so vnquestionable dishonouring, vn­questionable adultery, vnquestiona­ble theft, or murther. For to proue these particular and vnquestionable [Page 34]vnlawfull actions to bee included in those generall precepts, Honour thy father and mother: Thou shalt not com­mit adultery: Thou shalt not steale: Thou shalt not kill: one of the premisses is not contained in the holy Scripture, but it must be deduced from naturall reason, or humane testimonice, which are not Scriptures. For although it be cleare in Scriptures, that wee must ho­nour our father and mother, yet it is not set downe in Scriptures, although it be otherwise certaine, that this par­ticular man, or woman, is our father, or mother, but this must bee proued by humane testimonies, and naturall reason, which are not Scriptures. And although it bee cleare in Scriptures, that wee must not commit adulterie, yet it is not cleare in Scriptures, al­though it bee otherwise vnquestiona­ble, that this woman is another mans wife, and consequently, that particular abuse to be adultery, but this must bee proued out of Scriptures: And al­though it bee cleare in Scriptures, that wee must not steale from any man his goods, yet it is not cleare in Scriptures, [Page 35]although it be otherwise certaine, that these goods are an other mans, but this must be proued out of Scripture. And although it be cleere in Scripture that we must not kill, and consequent­ly an vndoubted lawfull King, yet it is not cleare in Scripture, although it be otherwise certaine, either that this par­ticular killing of a priuare man is don by priuate, and not by publike autho­ritie, or that part cular man to bee a lawfull King, or a King, yea or to be a man, but these must bee proued by principles, which are no Scriptures. Many other examples may be brought out of the new Testamēt, as of Priests to remit sins, of Popes to be the chiefe Pastors of the Church, of Sacraments to be effectuall outward signes of in­uisible grace, for that out of Scripture only we cannot proue any man what­soeuer to bee a true Priest, any Pope whatsoeuer to bee a true Pope, or any Sacrament whatsoeuer to bee a true Sacrament, but to proue them to bee such, one of the premisses must be ta­ken out of the holy Scripture.

2 But least you should obiect, that [Page 36] to draw one to an inconuenience is not to solue the argument, Secondly, I answere directly, that it is very vntrue in my iudgement, and also repugnant to the common doctrine of Diuines, that to make a Conclusion to bee faith, and the contrarie hereticall, both the pre­misses must be expresly and formally conteyned in the holy Scriptures, but it is sufficient, that one onely of them bee expressed in the holy Scripture, and the other certaine by naturall reason.

Ad fidem aliquîd pertinet duplici­ter &c. To faith a thing belongeth two waies (saith S. Thomas 2.2. q. 11. ar. 2.) one way directly and principally, as the Articles of faith: an other way indire­ctly, and secondarily, as those things, from which doth follow the corruption of some article. Which words of S. Tho­mas Bannes declareth more plainely & distinctly in these words: Illa secundùm D. Thomam indirectè sunt fidei &c. Those things, according to S. Thomas, are indirectly of faith, by the denying wherof, it followeth necessarily by a good consequence that to be false, which is af­firmed [Page 37]firmed by faith. As if one deny Christ to haue power to laugh, doth erre in the Catholike faith consequently, and indi­rectly. Because it well followeth by a consequence knowne by the light of na­ture, that Christ is not a perfect man.

3 Et notandum est, aliquam propo­sitionem esse de fide duobus modis &c. And it is to be noted (saith Franciscus de Christo Pag. 23) that a proposition is of faith two waies, one way, proximè, and im­mediately, of which sort is euery propo­sition, which is formally and expresly conteyned in the holy Scripture, as that Abraham had two sonnes: the other way a proposition is of faith mediatly, of which sort is euery proposition, which by a good consequence is deduced from that which is immediately of faith, as that Christ had not power to vnderstand, & that he had not a will &c. Therefore that proposition, which is deduced from that, which is formally conteyned in the holy Scriptures, is of faith, and the pro­position repugnant to that is hereticall. Thus he. And Franciscus Pegna in his Annotations vpon the Directorie of the Inquisitours part. 2. Comment. [Page 38]27. citing for the same Cardinal Tur­recremata, and other Doctours, put­teth in the second place, or degree of Catholike verities, those; which are by a necessarie consequence deduced from the holy Scriptures. And a little after he affirmeth, that those propositions are to be accounted hereticall, which are re­pugnant to these Catholike assertions. And therefore I meruaile, that you should conceiue that proposition not to be heretical, which is deduced from two premisses, whereof the one is ex­presly repugnant to the holy Scrip­tures, and the other deduced necessa­rily from the light of naturall reason, or sensible experience, although wee should take hereticall in that sense, wherein Widdrington doth take it. For according to your principles, M. Wid­drington could not maintaine, that it is hereticall to affirme, that Christ had not humane vnderstanding and will, and that, euery Tyrant may and ought lawfully & meritoriously be slain by any whatsoeuer &c. which neuerthelesse are expresly condemned by Generall Councels for hereticall; Because to [Page 39]proue these propositions to be hereti­call, one of the premisses is only dedu­ced from the light of naturall reason, which is no Scripture.

4 And if perchance you should answere, that these propositions are therefore hereticall, because Generall Councels haue condemned them for heretical, now you fly from taking the word hereticall in that sense, wherein Widdrington with most Catholike Diuines, and all Protestants doe take the word hereticall, who hould that the definition, or declaration of the Church doth not make any Catholike veritie, or any doctrine hereticall, but suppose it, declare it, & make it known to all Catholikes, which neuerthelesse before any declaration, or definition of the Church, was indeed Catholike veritie, or hereticall doctrine, and also knowne so to be to diuerse learned men, who euidently saw the necessarie consequence from both the premisses. For also, as wel writeth Molina a most learned Iesuite, Concursus, Molina 1. part. q. 1. ar. 2 disp. 1. quo spiritus sanctus praesto adest Ecclesiae &c. The assistance, wherewith the holy Ghost is [Page 40]present with the Catholike Church, is not to make any thing of faith, which before was not of faith, but onely that she do not erre in declaring those things, which mediately, or immediately belong to faith. Wherefore, as in the Church there is not power & authority to make any thing of faith, which before was not of faith, but only to declare to the faith­ful, which is certainly to be held of faith, so also neither is there power and autho­ritie to make any sacred Scripture, or to add to it any canonicall booke, or any part, but onely to iudge betwixt canoni­call bookes, and not canonicall. Thus he, wherein, as you haue seene aboueIn the third Sectiō., he agreeth with the common doctrine of Diuines.

5 Now to that Logicall maxime, That the Conclusion followeth the wea­ker part, which is the chiefe ground of your obiection, I answer, that althogh it bee frequent in euerie mans mouth, yet you are not ignorant, that it is not by learned men vnderstood, and ex­pounded alike. And first, if you will vnderstand it without exception, limi­tation, or declaration, how will you [Page 41]make good Aristotles saying in his first booke of the Priors cap. 10. When the Maior proposition is necessarie, and the Minor de inesse, the Conclusion is necessarie, and not de inesse, if the Con­clusion doe alwaies follow the weaker part?

6 Secondly, you know, that many learned Diuines, whom Molina the Iesuite in the place aboue cited doth follow, expound it thus, That the Conclusion followeth the weaker part quoad certitudinem & euidentiam, in respect of certitude and euidence, wherein the Conclusion dependeth vpon both the premisses, non quoad superna­turalitatem, not in regard of superna­turalitie, wherein it only dependeth vpon Diuine and supernaturall faith. For to make an act supernaturall, it is suffi­cient, that one of the causes be super­naturall, as it is apparant in the acts of contrition, of faith, hope, and charity, to which concurre the vnderstanding. and will of man, which are naturall causes, and yet they are supernaturall acts, because they are produced by a supernaturall habite, for which cause [Page 42]they affirme, that a Theological conclu­sion deduced from one principle of faith, and from the other knowne by the light of naturall reason, is superna­turall, because it is produced by the supernaturall habite of faith.

7 Thirdly, others (who hould with S. Thomas, and the common doctrine of Diuines, that doctrine to be of faith which either directly and expresly, or indirectly, and vertually is conteyned in the holy Scripture, and the contra­rie to be hereticall, & that the Church doth not make Catholike veritie or heresie, but onely doth declare, and make it certainely knowne to all Ca­tholikes, which before her declaration was not certainly knowne to all) doe answere thus: That the Conclusion followeth the weaker part, principally, directly, and immediately: but when the weaker part is necessarily conne­cted with the stronger, then also the Conclusion doth follow the stronger part, secundarily, indirectly, and medi­ately. And the reason hereof is eui­dent; for when one thing is necessarily connected with an other, that which [Page 43]followeth the one, must consequently follow the other, at the least secunda­rily, indirectly, and mediately. Where­fore, seeing that all dishonouring of Parents, all Theft, all Murder, all A­dulterie are against Scripture directly and expresly, it necessarily followeth, that euerie particular contained in the generall, being sufficiently proued to be conteyned therein, (of whatsoeuer kind that proofe be) is also indirectly, vertually, or by a necessarie conse­quence repugnant to Scripture. And hereby also appeareth the weakenesse of the application you make of your argument to the murthering of Princes which are excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, in these words following.

Answere.

1 BVt first, although it be not cleare in Scriptures directly and imme­diately,Answ. that it is murther to kill a Prince excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, if he will not obey his sentence of depriuation (not to vse your vnrespectiue words, if hee still vsurpe, seeing that a Prince, who hath possession, and a probable title, is by none accounted an Ʋsurper) yet it is repugnant to Scriptures indirectly, vertually, and by a necessarie conse­quence, to kill such a Prince: for that [Page 45]neither Excommunication, which de­priueth him onely of spirituall graces, nor depriuation, which depriueth him onely of his kingdome (according to those that hould it for certain that the Pope hath authoritie to depriue Prin­ces) & not of his life, can hinder, that the killing of such a Prince is not included in that generall, Thou shalt not kill.

2 Secondly, I wonder that you houlding it probable (as I suppose) that the Pope hath not authoritie to depriue Princes, should so dangerous­ly & seditiously apply that similitude of killing Ʋsurpers, to the killing of Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, seeing that the doctrine of killing Ʋsurpers is vnderstood by all that approue it, of known, manifest and vndoubted Ʋsurpers, and not of such, as haue possession, & also a pro­bable title to the Crowne, as haue all those Princes, which are excommuni­cated or depriued by the Pope, suppo­sing it to be a controuersie among Ca­tholikes (as vndoubtedly it is) whether the Pope hath authoritie to depriue [Page 46]wicked Princes, or no.

if 3 Thirdly, that which you say [that he yeeld vp his Crowne as some haue done, it were euident murther in any one to go about to kill such a Prince] is very true, yet it is not cleare and expresly contained in Scripture, but to proue it euident murther, you must vse the helpe of an argument, whereof one of the premisses is not formally and ex­pressely contained in Scripture. And therefore, according to your grounds, you could not abiure as hereticall that doctrine, which should maintaine it for no murther, although you grant it to be euident murther.

4 Fourthly, if you will call to mind the Histories of those Princes, who haue yeelded vp their Crownes after depriuation, whereof you can name but very few, you shall find such stuffe about the practise of this doctrine of deposing, that any zealous Catholike may bee ashamed thereof. Among those few Princes, remember our king Iohn, who rendred vp his Crown after depriuation. But to whom did hee yeeld or render it? Not to the next [Page 47]heire of the blood Royall, who after King Iohns depriuation was forthwith the true King by right, if King Iohn was truly and really depriued, but hee gaue it to the Pope. And how, I pray you, could hee giue that to the Pope, whereof hee was depriued, and conse­quently had no right therein, if the Pope had truly authoritie to depriue him? Or how could the Pope accept thereof, if King Iohn when he gaue it to the Pope was depriued thereof, and consequētly had no right to giue that which was not his. But let vs on to the rest of your Discourse.

Answere.

1 BVt first, you greatly abuse the Author of the New-yeeres gift, Answ. in affirming, that he brought those examples to make a paritie or simili­tude betwixt them, and the deposing and murthering of Princes excom­municated or depriued by the Pope. [Page 49]For hee brought them onely to shew, that it is not necessarie to make a pro­position de fide, of faith, and the con­trarie heretical, that it be formally, and expresly contained in the holy Scrip­ture, but that it suffiseth to be contai­ned vertually, & by a necessarie conse­quence, and that no word, or circum­stance expressed in the particular pro­position doe hinder, that it be not in­cluded in the generall proposition, which is formally and expresly con­tained in the holy Scripture. Neither did he apply them otherwise, as you may see, if you will pervse the place.

2 Secondly, although he had com­pared them together, as hee did not, yet the paritie is not so vnapt, as you would seeme to make it. For albeit there be a great disparity betwixt them (as there is betwixt salt and sugar in tast but not in colour) yet they both agree in this, for which onely purpose he brought those examples, that they are not formally and expresly contai­ned in the holy Scriptures, but onely by a necessarie consequence proued to be Theft and Murther; as also the [Page 50]deposing and murthering of Princes excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, are by a necessarie consequence proued by the said Authour to bee Theft and Murther, and consequently comprehended in those generall words, Thou shalt not steale, Thou shalt not kill, as particulars in the vniuer­salls.

3 But to take a purse from his neighbour, or to kill him with a pi­stoll, if hee leade a wicked life, are vnquestionable Theft and Murther (say you) and included in the gene­rals &c. This is verie true, and for that cause the Authour of the New-yeeres Gift brought those ex­amples. But you can not proue by Scriptures onely, that they are vnquestionable Theft and Murther, because they are not formally and ex­presly forbidden in the word of God, but to proue them to be vnquestiona­ble Theft and Murther, you must vse a Syllogisme, whereof one of the pre­misses is not in the Word of God, but grounded on the light of naturall rea­son, which is no Scripture. And so, [Page 51]according to the Discourse you made aboue, although this Theft, and Mur­ther bee vndoubtedly contained in those generalls, Thou shalt not steale, Thou shalt not kill, yet you cannot ab­iure, as hereticall, that doctrine, which approueth them to bee lawfull. Nay, according to your grounds, you can­not abiure as hereticall that doctrine, which holdeth it lawfull to kill any particular man whatsoeuer, although it be most assuredly Murther, for that you cannot proue by Scriptures, that hee is a man, but this premisse you must proue by naturall reason, or eui­dence of sence, neither of which is Scripture.

4 But to depose (say you) or kill a Prince depriued, if after depriuation hee vsurpe, is with many questionable, and probably thought by some, neither Theft, nor Murther, &c.

To kill a Prince depriued by the Pope is by no man questionable,Suarez in Defens. fidei Ca­thol. &c. lib. 6. ca. 4. num. 10. vn­lesse the Pope, after depriuation, giue a particular commission to kill him. And in this case onely Suarez among all that euer I read, durst aduenture [Page 52]to teach expressely, That if the Pope giue such a commission to any priuate man, hee may lawfully kill such a Prince. But considering that this seditious, or rather diabolicall doctrine is, grounded vpon a most false and im­probable foundation, to wit, that it is a cleare poynt of faith, and out of all controuersie among Catholikes, that the Pope hath authority to dispose of the Crownes, and also liues of tempo­rall Princes in order to spiritual good, which all the world seeth not onely to bee a controuersie among them, but also to bee condemned by the Parlia­ment of Paris, for a false and seditious, damnable and pernicious doctrine, it is manifest, that the conclusion, which is grounded vpon this false and im­probable foundation, cannot bee pro­bable. And therefore those your words [and probably thought by some, to be neither Theft, nor Murther] are very vntrue, and dangerous, and also the examples you bring in taking spoyles from the enemy in time of iust war, and killing a Tyrant in call an Vsurper, are vn­aptly and perniciously (not to say se­ditiously, [Page 53]applyed by you to the kil­ling of a Prince depriued by the Pope, or taking from him his Crown: both for that depriuation doth not take away the right hee hath to liue, neither is that Prince, keeping his Crowne after depriuation, such a knowne and manifest Ʋsurper, as that he hath not at least a probable title to the Crowne, of which manifest Vsur­pers only, those Diuines, who approue the killing of Vsurpers, doe speake. And that it is manifest Theft, to take from a Prince his Crown, to which he hath a probable right after depriuati­on, you shal see more plainly beneath.

Answer.

1. BVT first, Answ. you are greatly mis­taken in setting downe M^r. Widdringtons doctrine concerning the nature of a conditionall disiunctiue proposition. For he doth not say, that to the truth, but to the falshood of a conditionall disiunctiue proposition it sufficeth, that the one part bee true, though the other befalse, and conse­quently that wee may, hee doth say, [Page 55]sweare, but abiure the whole proposi­tion, if the one part bee but true. But this your mistaking I do not attribute to any want of you in the vnderstan­ding of M^r. Widdringtons doctrine in this point, but onely to the errour and hastinesse of your pen.

2. Secondly, he doth not onely say, that sometimes and oftentimes, but also that most commonly the conditionall disiunctiue proposition, to wit, when the Coniunction [or] followeth the Verbe [may] is so to be taken; and that there can scarse bee alledged any one conditionall disiunctiue proposition, wherein it is not so to bee taken: and that therefore, according to the Se­uenth Branch, we ought to take it so in this Clause.

3. Thirdly, I maruell, that you should so resolutely affirme, without alledging any reason, that without doubt the intention of the Law-maker is, that wee should no lesse detest the one part of the proposition, then the other; especi­ally, seeing that M^r. Widdrington hath answered at large this obiection in his Confutation of M^r. Fitzherbert, who [Page 56]vrged the same obiection more fully, then you haue done, and yet you vrge here M^r. Fitzherberts obiection, and take no notice of M^r. Widdringtons an­swer to the same. And is it possible, that a man of your learning can ima­gine, that his Maiestie doth detest no lesse (that is in the same degree of de­testation and falsity) the doctrine of murthering Princes excommunicated, or depriued of the Pope, then he doth of deposing them? Or, that he concei­ueth, that the doctrine of murthering the said Princes, is not more mani­festly false, and against Scripture, then is the doctrine of deposing them? If you had diligently perused his Maie­sties bookes, you might haue seene, that against the doctrine of deposing Princes by the Popes authority, hee bringeth many proofes, both out of the old and new Testament, but against the doctrine of murthering them, hee doth not so much labour; for that he supposeth it to bee so manifestly false, that no Catholike, or Christian Di­uine could bee so temetarious, as to approue the same.

4. But howsoeuer his Maiestie bee perswaded, yet his intention (which in this Oath wee must chiefly regard, and not his beleefe, perswasion, or o­pinion) is (for as much as by reason, and his Maiestie declaration wee can coniecture) that wee should take the words, according to the common sense and vnderstanding of them, as wee are expressely bound by the Se­uenth Branch of the Oath, which, as M^r. Widdrington hath proued, is, that we are not bound to abiure both parts for hereticall. And truely I wonder, that whereas you may, and are bound to expound the words in a fauourable sense, you seeke all euasions and de­uises, to expound them in a sense most false and absurd, to the ouerthrowing of the temporall estates of English Catholikes, to the disgrace of his Ma­iesty, and to the scandall of the Catho­like Roman Religion.

Answer.

1. BVT first, Answ. albeit this rule bee oftentimes cited by Doctors, In causa dubia, or In dubio &c. In a doubtfull cause, or In a doubt, &c. yet both the Canon and Ciuill Law, and you your selfe aboue doe cite it, In paricasu, &c. In the like case, &c. And why doe not you now cite it in the [Page 59]same manner as you did aboue. In the like case &c. but, In a doubt. Is it possi­ble, that you can imagine, that when both sides haue probability, non est par casus, The case is not alike?

2. Secondly, not onely this rule, In pari casu &c. In the like case &c. But also (besides that other rule, Cum sunt inra partium &c. When the rights of the parties, who are in strife, are obscure, or not cleare; the Defendant is rather to be fauoured, then the Plaintiffe,) The common doctrine of Diuines, wherof some are cited in the New-yeares Gift In the first obser­uation. nu. 11. pag. 43., who vnderstand it not onely of a true, but also of a probable doubt, and who also in my iudgement proue the same by conuincing reasons: And yet you bring no other reason, or authoritie, that it is to be vnderstood onely of a true doubt, but your owne conceipt [which rule seemeth to me (say you) to be vnderstood rather in a true doubt, and when neither side hath probabilitie, then otherwise] Is this (thinke you) a sound and sincere confutation of Widdring­tons doctrine in a matter, which is so iniurious to the soueraigne right of [Page 60]Princes, and so preiudiciall and dan­gerous to the soules and temporall e­states of English Catholikes?

Answer.

1. BVT first, Answ. why do you vse those words [seem to hold] as though they did not in very deed hold, that none can bee depriued of his right to that, whereof hee hath possession, vp­on a probable power, or title onely, whereas it is manifest, that they doe expressely hold the same?

2. Secondly, why did you omit those words [vpon a probable power] whereas there is a great difference be­twixt [Page 61]a probable power to punish, and de­pose, and a probable title, Lessius in his Single­ton, part. 2. num. 38. and Lessius speaketh expressely of a probable power to punish, and to depriue one of that; which he actually possesseth.

3. Thirdly, Lessius proueth the in­sufficiency of a probable power to pu­nish by a conuincing argument: For if it were any way doubtfull, the person accused might except against the Iudge, and not obey him. And hereupon credit is not giuen to delegates, to the preiudice of another man vnlesse by an authenticall Instrument they shew their authoritie, so that no iust cause of doubt be further left: And D. Kellinson In his Treatise called, The Prince, and the Prelate, cap. 11. pa. 235. with others proue the insufficiency of a probable title, without possession by those two rules aboue cited, In pari casu, &c. and Cum sunt iura partium obscura, &c. And Vasquez confirmeth the same, as you shall see beneath,Sect. 10. num. 2. by other reasons in his iudgement vnanswerable. And yet you, without bringing any autho­rity, reason, or proofe at all, affirme too too resolutely [that it must bee vn­derstood first, if that right be not retained with the wrong of others, by whom you [Page 62]meane the Pope and Church] whereas they vnderstand it generally, and also the former Authors speake expressely of the Popes power to depose wicked Princes: where you falsly suppose a wrong done to the Pope and Church, in resisting the Popes sentence of de­priuation: For a Prince, being depri­ued onely by a probable power, doth no man wrong by keeping his proba­ble right and possession, according to that maxime of the Law, grounded on naturall reason, Qui vtitur iure suo ne­mini facit iniuriam: Hee that vseth his right doth no man wrong.

4. Moreouer, your first exception [if that right bee not retained with the wrong of others] is friuolous, for that alwaies in the case of rights to tempo­rall Kingdomes and goods, it may be presumed, that the right is retained with the wrong, or rather detriment of others, because temporall King­domes and goods, if they doe not be­long to the Prince, or person depri­ued, they must needes belong to o­thers. And besides, as it hath been said aboue, a probableright with possession [Page 63]is retained without wrong to any man. And lastly, your second excepti­on [or if the retaining of that right bee not a hinderance to a greater good] doth sauour too much of that false princi­ple, ouer much frequent in the mouths and actions of some vnlearned Iesu­ites, Ad maiorem gloriam Dei, &c. To the greater glory of God, &c. For good ends, and greater good are not to bee effected by bad meanes: And there­fore, albeit the retaining of that right should bee an hinderance to a greater good, it little importeth, vnlesse it be an vniust hinderance, and vnlesse the Prince depriued by a probable power onely, in keeping his probable right with possession, hindereth vniustly a greater good: which to bee an vniust hinderance, you cannot possibly proue with any colour of a probable argument, as more plainely you shall see beneath.

Answer.

1. BVT first it is manifest, that no man,Answ. who hath a probable right, and withall possession, doth any wrong to another, of what qualitie, condition, or state soeuer hee bee, by keeping his probable right and posses­sion: and that no good is to bee pro­cured by vniust meanes, and conse­quently, [Page 65]that the retaining of a proba­ble right with possession cannot be an vniust hinderance to the good of any, whether it bee the Pope, or Church it selfe. For if to inuade the Kingdome of a Prince, onely vpon a probable ti­tle without possession, bee no wrong, or any vniust hinderance of a greater good (as you, in Vasquez iudgement, very falsly, perniciously, and absurdly suppose) much more it is no wrong, nor any iust hinderance to greater good, for a Prince to defend his King­dome, to which hee hath not onely a probable right, but also possession thereof. And therfore that exception of yours [But if one by retaining his pro­bable right, should wrong others, whose good is more to be respected, then his, who is in possession of that right] is idle, and cannot bee applyed to a Prince, who iustly retaineth his probable right, to the Kingdome whereof hee hath pos­session, and consequently without any wrong to others, whose good must not be respected, or effected by do­ing wrong to him.

2 Secondly, albeit you do not see why [Page 66]one may not be depriued of his right vp­on a probable title, if those who contend for right haue no Superior to decide the matter, and to determine to whom the right belongeth, yet you might easily haue seene a reason thereof, if you had called to mind the doctrine of your Maister Ʋasquez, who saw and yeel­ded a reason thereof so clearely,Vasques 1.2 disp 64. c. 3. that hee feared not to taxe this your do­ctrine not onely of falshood, but also of pernitious improbabilitie, and ab­surditie. Immo semper existimaui hanc doctrinam nihil probabilitis habere &c. Yea I haue euer thought (saith he) this doctrine to haue no probabilitie, and to haue bin in no little mischief, and detri­ment of the Christian Common-wealth. And therefore hee would not haue sticked to detest your doctrin, as false, improbable, pernitious, and the contra­rie to acknowledge for certaine: and he proueth it by these reasons, which, in his iudgement, are conuincing: For warre is an act of punitiue Iustice, in­flicting a punishment, and chastising Re­bels: and the nature of iust warre consisteth in this, that by vindica­tiue [Page 67]iustice hee bee punished, who is worthy of punishment in regard of some fault, either actually com­mitted, or at least wise iustly presumed. But it cannot be iustly presumed, that a Prince committeth any fault, who, by way of defence, retaineth his pro­hable right to the kingdome which he possesseth, against the pretensions of any one, who claimeth onely a proba­ble right without possession. Et praete­rea omnis controuersia &c. And more­ouer euerie controuersie, saith he, which is in opinions concerning some right, is not to bee decided by powerfulnesse and armes, but by iudgment. For it seemeth to bee the custome of Barbarous men to decide the better right to reigne in the more powerfull armes. Quod si dicas, posse duos illos Principes &c. And if thou say (saith Vasques) that those two Princes may make iust warre on either side, for that both of them are led by a probable opinion, and thinke that the right to reigne belongeth to them, this is manifestly absurd &c. which he doth there, in his iudgement, most plainely conuince. Neuerthelesse, as you shall [Page 68]see beneathSect. 13. nu. 2. I rely vpon a more assu­red, & lesse questionable ground, then this doctrine of Vasques; for this que­stion concerning Princes making warre vpon a probable title, which is meerely temporall, I will shew to be impertinent to our present controuer­sie, concerning the Popes authority to depose Princes.

3 Thirdly, albeit some few Diuines doe hould (which Vasquez accounteth to be manifestly absurd and improba­ble) that it is lawfull for Princes to make warre vpon a probable title, yet some of them expresly affirme, that those Princes, who contend about their probable title, are bound, before they can lawfully make war,Nouar in Sion. cap. 25 nu. 4. to chuse and admit Arbitrary Iudges to decide the controuersie, for that there is no other peaceable way (they being both supreme Iudges, nor the one subiect to the other, or to any other superiour Iudge in temporals) to end it but by arbitrement: which if any of those Princes refuse to admit, then the other Prince (say these Diuines) may make warre, but not in regard onely of his [Page 69]probable title, but for doing wrong in not admitting Arbiters, to end the controuersie in a peaceable manner, without making warre, for that warre must not be waged, when the contro­uersie may otherwise bee peaceably ended. But neither also with this con­trouersie will I intermeddle.

4 Fourthly, whereas you say [that Kings and Princes, who haue no Supe­riours oftentimes fall to warres, and one seeke to dispossesse an other onely vpon a probable title] you might for answere hereof haue called to minde, what Card. Bellarmine, related by Wid­drington In his Apologie for the right of Princes, nu. 445, answereth to such kind of arguments, Aliud est facta Regum referre &c. It is one thing to relate the facts of Kings, and an other to proue their power & authoritie. And besides it may verie well be, that the Prince, who beginneth the warre, thinketh his title to be certaine, and the others title not to bee probable. And moreouer the title, for which they make warre, may be meerely temporall, which be­longeth not to our case, as you shall see beneath. But let vs go on to the rest of [Page 70]your obiections.

Answere.

1 BVt first, Answ. your consequence is not good. For no title is good for nothing, but a probable title with­out possession, in subiects is good for this, to call the title in question, and to haue it examined & decided by a law­full and vndoubted Iudge: and in ab­solute Princes, who haue no Superi­ours in temporals, it is good in the o­pinion of some Diuines to haue the matter put to arbitrement or compro­mise, which if the Prince, who is in possession refuse, the other Prince may (according to the doctrine of these Diuines, wherewith I will not meddle) [Page 71]make warre against him, for the wrong done him in not admitting Arbiters. Also a probable title without possessi­on is better then no title, for that it is good after the decease of them who haue possession, to haue the matter decided by the Kingdome or Com­mon-wealth, to whom it belongeth (as well obserueth Ʋasquez) to determin doubtfull titles, when none is in pos­session: As also, according to the do­ctrine of all Diuines, it belongeth to the Church, or Spirituall kingdome of Christ (which a general Councel doth represent) to determine and decide the doubtfull titles of two Popes, al­though both of them be partly in pos­session.

2 Secondly, your consequent, for as much as concerneth the making of warre vpon a probable title without possession, Ʋasquez would not feare to admit. For it is not absurd to graunt, that a probable title without possession is as good as no title, for the making of warre against a Prince, who hath both a probable title and also possession. As also it is no absurditie [Page 72]to grant, but rather a most certaine do­ctrine, that aprobable matter of Bap­tisme is in some case, for as much as concerneth practise, as good as no matter,See Vasques 1.2 disp. 63 & disp. 64 cap. 4. for that it is not lawful in some case to baptize with a probable mat­ter, to wit, when we may vse a certaine and vndoubted matter: And a pro­bable medicine is in some case as good as no medicine, for that it is not law­full to apply to one a probable me­dicine, when an vndoubted medicine may be applyed.

Answere.

1 BVt this hath beene fully answered aboue:Answ. For it is a most false and seditious doctrine to hould, that a Prince in keeping the possession of his Crown, to which (as you confesse) he hath a probable right after depriua­tion, doth any wrong, or iniurie to the Church, or any vniust preiudice to Christs flocke, or that the good of the Church, or of Christs flocke is to bee respected, or obtained by vniust meanes, and with the wrong of any man, much lesse of Princes, who in v­sing & defending their probable right being in possession, do no man wrong: For if it be no wrong (as you, in Vas­quez iudgement, falsly and absurdly suppose) for the Pope or Prince, who hath onely a probable title without possession, to inuade and assault an o­ther Prince, who hath both a probable title, and also possession, much more it is no wrong for this Prince so assaul­ted [Page 74]to defend himselfe. And therefore you must not bee so mindfull of the good of the Church, or other good ends, that you forget, that the good of the Church, and all good ends must be obtained by good meanes, for as you know, Bonum est ex integra causa &c. Good proceedeth from and entier cause, Dionisius Areo pag. 4. cap. de diu. nom. but euill from euerie defect.

2 Secondly, I doe not well vnder­stand that exception you make in your last words [though absolutely ab­stracting from such case it may not bee done] For I do not see, but that, accor­ding to the principles of your do­ctrine, if an hereticall or wicked Prince bee depriued by the Pope, his Kingdome must alwaies bee held by him with wrong to the Church, and preiudice to Christs flocke &c. and so that exception of yours, whereby you would seeme to limit your former false assertion, is in my conceipt to lit­tle purpose. And moreouer, whether it better for Gods glorie, and the good of the Church,Leo serm. 1. de SS. Petro & Paulo to haue somtimes per­secutions, Whereby (as S. Leo saith) the [Page 75]Church is not diminished, but increased &c. We cannot so easily know, and therefore wee ought rather to leaue it to the iudgement of him, who maketh a man that is an hypocrite reigne for the sinnes of the people, Iob. 34. then ouer rashly to iudge of the secrets of Gods proui­dence.

Answer.

1 MY conceit indeed is, that it is very probable that a generall Councel excluding the Pope is aboue atrue and vndoubted Pope,Answ. and that to conceiue the contrarie is altogether improbable and absurd. Now to your argument: First therefore I haue shew­ed aboue, that according to the do­ctrine of Ʋasquez (which he thinketh to be certaine, and the contrarie im­probable, absurd, and pernitious) no Prince can lawfully in regard only of the probabilitie of his title, make warre against an other Prince, who, besides a probable title, hath also pos­session.

2 But secondly (because I will not meddle with this question concerning Princes making warre vpon probable titles, which are meerely temporal, for that it is impertinent to our contro­uersie concerning the Popes authori­tie to depose princes) you may obserue a great disparitie betwixt the titles or rights, which temporall Princes doe [Page 77]commonly pretend to the kingdomes which other Princes possesse, and the right or title, which any Prince can pretend, by vertue of the Popes sen­tence of depriuation to the kingdom of an other Prince. For the first titles or rights are for the most part meerely temporall titles, nor grounded vpon any spirituall authoritie, and therefore they are not subiect to the determina­tion of a Generall Councell, or to the decision of the Spirituall authoritie of the Church, which, by the institution of Christ, hath infallible assistance to determine and decide only Spirituall, and not meere temporall causes: But the second right is grounded vpon the Popes pretended authority to depriue Princes of their temporall rights, which authoritie (if there be any such as I am fully perswaded there is not) it being a Spiritual matter, and depen­ding chiefly vpon the institution of Christ, deliuered to vs in the Word of God, is to be decided, when it is called in question among learned Catho­likes, by Spirituall and not temporall authority, and therefore it is subiect to [Page 78]the determination and decision of a Generall Councell, which, without all controuersie among Catholikes, is an infallible meanes, to know certainly, what authoritie Christ hath giuen to the Pope or Church.

3 And if you had duly obserued this disparitie betwixt temporall and spirituall titles, you might easily haue perceiued the weakenesse of your ob­iection. For it is too too manifest, that all Princes are bound to search out, by all possible & conuenient meanes, the truth, or falshood of the rights, which they with probabilitie pretend to the Kingdome, which an other Prince possesseth with a probable title before they can iustly make warre a­gainst him, in regard onely of their probable title; and if there be any as­sured and peaceable way to finde out the truth, they are bound to try the same, before they can, by warre or vio­lence, dispossess any Prince, who hath a probable title to his Crown: because according to the doctrine of all Di­uines, no Prince can lawfully make warre (wherein the blood of so many [Page 79]innocent men is by all probable con­iectures likely to be shed) to try an vn­certaine title, if the certainty of his ti­tle, may be cleerely knowne and deci­ded, by any other assured & vndoubt­ted peaceable way. Seeing therefore, that Christ hath left in his Church an assured and infallible way, and which all Catholikes acknowledge to be in­fallible, to finde out the truth and cer­taintie concerning the titles, which are grounded vpon the Popes pretended authoritie to depriue Princes, to wit, the determination and decision of a lawfull and vndoubted generall Coun­cell, it is euident, that both the Pope and Catholike Princes, are bound by this infallible and peaceable way to find out the truth of such pretended titles, before they can iustly make war, to dispossesse any Prince of his proba­ble right, by vertue of the Popes vncer­taine authoritie to depriue Princes of their temporall Kingdomes.

4 Wherfore this consequence of yours is not good, although the ante­cedent proposition were supposed (as it is not) to be true.

Temporall Princes may make warre vpon probable titles, which are meerely temporall:

Therefore the Pope and temporall Princes may make warre vpon probable titles, which are grounded chiefly vpon a probable spirituall authority. Because there is no authoritie on earth to de­cide infallibly the differences betwixt two absolute Princes in meere tempo­rall affaires, wherein they are subiect to God alone, neither are there now a­ny Prophets, as there were in the Ould Law, to declare vndoubtedly the truth, and will of God: And if there were now any such infallible way, Princes were bound to try the same, before they could lawfully make war, onely vpon a probable title, against a Prince, who hath both a probable title and also possession. But Christ hath left in his Church an vndoubted infal­lible way, to wit, the authoritie of an vndoubted Oecumenicall Councell, to determine and decide infallibly, what authoritie belongeth to the Pope or Church, & consequently to determine infallibly all doubtfull and contro­uersed [Page 81]rights or titles depending thereon. Neither is it to the purpose, whether a Generall Councell, not in­cluding the Pope, be Superiour, and aboue the Pope or no; for neither doe I speake here of a Generall Councell in this sense, as it excludeth the Pope. but as it includeth all the Prelates of the Church, and doth perfectly represent the whole body of that Church, which is without all controuersie the pillar and firmament of truth: and moreouer it is most certaine, that the Pope is no less subiect, and bound to submit him selfe to the definitions of faith ex Ca­thedra of such a Generall Councell, to which Christ hath promised the in­fallible assistance of the holy Ghost, then any inferiour Christian whatsoe­uer. And so likewise, if Christ had promised the like infallibilitie to Ar­bitrarie Iudges for the deciding of meere temporal causes, which he hath promised to a generall Councell for the deciding of spiritual, there is no doubt but that temporall Princes were bound to submit themselues to the iudgment of Arbitratours, before they could [Page 82]lawfully make warre vpon any doubt­full or controuersed title, be it neuer so probable, against any Prince, who hath not only a probable title, but also possession.

5 Finally, because you stand so much vpon the lawfulness of making warre vpon a probable title against a Prince, who hath both a probable title and also possession, consider diligently (which the Authour of the New-yeres gift chap. 6 nu. 12. recommended to English Catho­likes) whether if the French King (for example) or any other forrein Prince, should vpon a meere temporall pro­bable title to those Dominions, which our Kings Maiestie possesseth, make warre against him, it be not manifest, that his Maiestie may lawfully, and all his subiects are bound to defend his Royall Person and Dominions a­gainst such inuasions, and whether those his Maiesties subiects, who cōcurre with any forrein Prince to in­uade in that case his Maiestie, and the Dominions which he possesseth, may lawfully be put to death, as Tray­tours, and consequently, whether it [Page 83]be not euident, that we may lawfully detest, abhorre, and abiure that do­ctrine, as manifestly false and indirect­ly, or by a necessarie consequence re­pugnant to those words of our Saui­our, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesars, which houldeth, that they are not Traytours, nor can iustly be put to death, but rather doe well in taking part against their Soueraigne in the aforesaid case. And neuer­thelesse, as I haue shewed aboue in the former Section, the falshood and absurditie of the Doctrine, con­cerning the inuading of Princes, and seeking to dispossesse them by warre, only by vertue of the Popes sentence of depriuation, or vpon any probable title, which is grounded vpon a con­trouersed Spirituall authoritie, is farre more manifest for the reason there al­ledged.

Answere.

1 BVt it seemeth,Answ. that you haue not well considered M. Widdringtons meaning and drift, in bringing this last answere, for the expounding of these words [as hereticall] in the fourth Branch of the Oath. For in his former answere he tooke the word [hereticall] for that, which is directly or indirectly repugnant to Scriptures, and in which sence both Catholike Diuines com­monly, and also Protestants, and [Page 85]his Maiestie do vnderstand it; which sense neuerthelesse you aboue, in the third Section▪ seemed to disproue in those words [which sense is not in my conceipt so proper neither with vs nor Protestants, who most of them hould that for heretical which subuerteth the foundation of faith▪ and not that which is contrarie to Scripture] And yet now you will haue the Law-maker, who are Protestants, to take hereticall for that, which is against Scriptures. Now M^r. Widdrington, taking hereticall in this sense, to wit, for that which is a­gainst Scriptures, either directly, for­mally, and expresly, or at the least indi­rectly, vertually, and by a necessarie consequence (which sense I haue suffi­ciently proued aboue to be proper and vsuall both among Protestants and Catholikes) affirmed, that the do­ctrine euen of deposing Princes, being excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be abiured, not only as he­reticall but for hereticall.

2. But because some might perad­uenture contend (as you seeme to do) that the word [hereticall] according [Page 86]to the common vnderstanding of Ca­tholikes, is to be taken onely for that, which is expressely declared by the Church to be hereticall, and repugnant to Scriptures, and which maketh a formall hereticke, and to be punishable, as an hereticke, by the Canons of the Church, and the Imperiall Lawes, M^r. Widdrington, in regard onely of such contentious spirits, and admitting, for Disputation sake, that to bee true, which hee accounteth very false, gaue this last answer, to wit, that if wee will needs haue the word [hereticall] to bee taken for that doctrine, which is made hereticall by the Church, and maketh a formall heretike, and which before the declaration of the Church is not to be accounted hereticall, although it be a very false doctrine, and contrary to the word of God, then the Aduerb [as] doth signifie, both by vertue of the Word, and also of the matter, not an identity, or reality, but onely a simi­litude of that strict, and rigorous here­ticall. And this answer hee hath at large confirmed in his Adioynder a­gainst M^r. Fitzherberts Reply, where [Page 87]you may see, that the Aduerbe [As] being an Aduerbe of similitude, doth commonly, and not only sometimes, or oftentimes, signifie onely a simili­tude by vertue of the Word, and that it neuer signifieth a reality, identity, or equality, but onely by reason of the matter, to which it is applyed. And that if the matter of this Branch will not permit, without manifest absur­ditie, that it signifie a realitie, wee are bound to interpret it in that sense, which is not absurd, according to the rules prescribed by Diuines, for the interpreting of Lawes, vnlesse either the words will not beare a true sense, which as M^r. Widdrington hath proued, is very false, or it bee apparant, that the intention of the Law-maker was to haue it taken in an absurd, and incon­uenient sense, which were rashnesse and impiety, so to iudge of his Maiesty.

3. For howsoeuer his Maiestie be perswaded in his opinion, iudgement, or beliefe, yet his intention is not, but that wee must take the words of the Oath, according to the common sense and vnderstanding of them, as it is [Page 88]euident by the Seuenth Branch. And therefore a great difference is to bee made betwixt his Maiesties beleefe, or perswasion, and his intention, as he is a Law-maker, as M^r. Widdrington, and the Authour of the New-yeeres Gift In the third ob­seruation. haue proued at large, by his Maiesties expresse declaration, who, although he be perswaded▪ that he is the supreme Lord of his Dominions, not onely in temporall, but also in Ecclesiasticall causes, for as much as concerneth the external gouernment by true coactiue authority, and that the Pope hath not, by the institution of Christ, any au­thority to excommunicate him, yet his intention was not to meddle in this Oath with these poynts, nor to distin­guish Catholikes from Protestants in points of Religion, but onely to di­stinguish Catholikes from Catholikes, in points of their loyalty and temporall allegeance; for in poynts of Religion, Catholikes were sufficiently distingui­shed from Protestants, by the Oath of Supremacie. Neither also is his Ma­iestie perswaded, that the doctrine of deposing Princes depriued by the Pope [Page 89]is hereticall, taking hereticall in that strict and rigorous sense, for only that which is expressely and formally de­clared by the Church, or some vn­doubted generall Councell, to be he­reticall: but he is perswaded, that the sayd doctrine is therefore hereticall, because it is either directly and ex­pressely, or indirectly and vertually, or by a necessary consequence repug­nant to the holy Scriptures, in which sense it may bee abiured not onely as hereticall, but also for hereticall, as hath beene shewed aboue.

Answer.

1. BVt first, it is manifest in my iudgement, that in all declara­tiue precepts, especially belonging to manners, or of things to bee done, or omitted (for onely of these precepts, & not of definitions, declarations, or precepts of faith, or of things to bee beleeued, Suarez speaketh) the obli­gation of the precept dependeth vp­on the fundamentall ground, reason, & end of the precept: and that there­in also is implyed the intention and will of the Law-maker (which is the soule and life of the Law) who inten­deth onely to binde by his declaratiue [Page 93]precept, for as much onely as the thing he commandeth, or forbiddeth, is of it owne nature necessarie, or repug­nant to some former Law of God, Na­ture, or some other positiue Law, which the declaratiue precept doth declare and suppose: And therefore (as Sua­rez well obserueth) a pure declaratiue precept doth not make the thing, w^ch it forbiddeth, to be vnlawfull, but only supposeth and declareth it to bee vn­lawfull, as forbidden by some former Law. Whereupon it followeth, that if it bee but a probable opinion, that there is such a former Law, the decla­ratiue precept can binde no more, then the probabilitie of the opinion (which is the fundamentall ground and rea­son of the precept) hath force to bind.

2. Neither doth your obiection impugne this manifest doctrine. For, although in such generall precepts, wherein the Church cannot erre, to wit, when shee commadeth the whole Church something, which is necessary to saluation, the certainty and obliga­tion of the precept dependeth vpon the assistance of the Holy Ghost, yet [Page 94]this doth not hinder, but that it must also depend vpon the substantiall ground, reason, and end, for which the Law was made. But this onely at the most is proued by your obiection, that because the assistance of the Holy Ghost is annexed to the precept, it must consequently bee annexed to all those things, whereon the precept doth necessarily depend: But to af­firme therefore, that the precept doth depend on nothing else, then vpon the assistance of the Holy Ghost, were ridiculous.

3. As also due diligence and exa­mining of the cause is, according to the doctrine of all Diuines, necessari­ly required in a Generall Councell, to de­fine infallibly any doctrine of faith: And because the assistance of the Ho­ly Ghost is annexed to her definition, it must consequently be also annexed to all that, whereon her infallible de­finition doth necessarily depend. And thereupon the Diuines affirme, that if it be certaine, that the Church did not erre in her definition, it is also certain, that she vsed due diligence, and all o­ther [Page 95]necessary conditions, which by the institution of Christ are required to an infallible definition: But to af­firme, that because the infallibilitie of her definition dependeth vpon the as­sistance of the Holy Ghost, therefore neither due diligence, nor examinati­on of the cause, nor any other thing is necessarily required to her infallible definition, were absurd & ridiculous.

4. Wherefore you must distin­guish betwixt fundamentall, intrinsecall, and necessary reasons, or grounds, and Extrinsecall, or accidental, as M. Wid­drington hath often affirmed from the doctrine of Bellarm: & Canus, to w^ch also all other Diuines doe agree: for these last may be false, and yet the de­finition true. As in the second Coun­cell of Nice it was declared, that An­gels might bee painted, because they haue bodies, the declaration was true, although this reason, being extrinse­call, and accidentall, was false. But if shee had declared, that it is lawfull to paint Angels, because it is not repug­nant to faith, or good manners, which is a fundamentall ground, and reason [Page 96]of that declaration, the declaration can not be true, if that fundamentall reason and ground be supposed to be false. And thus much concerning the doctrine of Suarez in generall.

5 And therefore secondly, to apply it to the Popes Breues, if it were cer­taine, that the Pope, in making his de­claratiue prohibition of the Oath, had the infallible assistance of the holy Ghost, M^r. Widdrington would not sticke to affirme, that as the prohibiti­on is infallible, so consequenly the fun­damentall reason and ground, for which the Oath is by the Popes Breues forbidden, is also infallible: and that therefore some thing is in the Oath re­pugnant to faith or saluation, which is the fundamentall ground, reason, and end of the Popes forbidding the Oath: for if there were nothing in the Oath against faith or saluation, the Pope could not forbid it with such iniurie to his Maiestie, and so great damage to English Catholikes.

6 But thirdly, this obiection of yours▪ concerning the infallible assi­stance of the holy Ghost, promised to [Page 97]the Church for the making of general precepts ex Cathedra either touching faith or manners, doth not sufficiently confirme the infallibilitie of the Popes Breues forbidding English Catholikes to take the Oath: for that M^r. Wid­drington in his Theologicall Disputation cap. 10. sect. 2. hath clearely proued, that the Pope both might erre in the afore­said Breues, not onely because they were made without a generall Councell (which neuerthelesse, as you very well grant, were sufficient to proue, that he might erre therein) but also because they are not generall precepts, and be­longing to the whole Church, but containe only a particular precept di­rected to one particular nation (and therefore they are well called by En­daemon Ioannes in Praefat. paraleli tor­ti. the Popes priuate let­ters to English Catholikes admonish­ing them not to take the Oath) wherin not onely the Pope but also a generall Councell may erre (as M^r. Widdrington obserueth out of the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine, and Canus);Bell. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. ca. 2. Canus lib. 1 5. de locis c. 5. q. 4. And also that the Pope did erre in those Breues vpon false informations and supposi­tions, to wit, for that he supposed his [Page 98]Primacie in spirituals, his power to bind and lose, to excommunicate and inflict Censures to bee denyed in the Oath, which is manifestly false, & that his power to depose Princes is most certaine and of faith, and not questio­ned among Catholikes, which is no lesse vntrue, is sufficiently conuinced by him in his Theological Disputation in the place a­boue c [...]te [...]. and in his answere to M^r. Fitzher­bert part. 3.6.17.

Answere.

1 BVt first it is not true, that we must sweare, that this Oath is ministred vnto vs by lawfull authori­tie, but only that we must acknowledge so much, of which our acknowledg­ment, which is the immediate obiect of the Oath, we must be assured to ex­cuse vs from periurie.

2 Secondly, it is very true, that we must not equiuocate in this Oath; and [Page 100]this is not only deduced from the law­full ministring of the same (although this bee sufficient to proue, that wee must not equiuocate therein) but it is also deduced from the Seuenth branch wherein it is expresly ordained, that me must vse no equiuocation.

3 Thirdly, the lawfulnes, or vnlawful­nesse of this Branch dependeth wholy vpon the former Clauses: for if none of the former Clauses containe a de­nyall of any spirituall obedience due to the Pope or Church, nor be repug­nant to truth, or iustice, it is manifest, that they are ministred by lawfull au­thoritie. And therefore you must first proue, that some one of the former clauses is repugnāt to truth or iustice, before you can impugne the Oath as not ministred by lawfull authoritie. Whereupon you return backe to that which you aboue obiected against the second Branch, to wit, the Popes power to depose Princes, which (say you) is vncertaine and questionable &c. But, as I answered there, it is certain to me (neither can any man of learning that wel examineth the question, otherwise [Page 101]in my iudgement conceiue) that the Pope hath no true, reall, lawfull power and authoritie, and which may be a sufficient ground to depose Princes, or to practise their deposition, but on­ly an imaginarie power, in the conceit onely and approbation of some men, which neuerthelesse is no true, reall, lawfull and sufficient power to punish any Prince by depriuing him of the Dominions which he possesseth. And consequently the Kings Maiestie in causing his subiects to acknowledge and swear, that the Pope hath no true, reall, lawful authority, and which may be a sufficient ground to depose him (thereby to be the better secured from all inuasions vnder pretence of Religi­on, and to discouer his loyall and con­stant subiects from those who main­taine the principles of the Powder-Traytours) doth neither wrong the Pope, nor Church, nor cause his subiects to wrong them, or their consciences, but seeketh to preserue his owne right and Dominions which he really pos­sesseth, from all inuasions and Powder-Treasons, vnder colour of any proba­ble, [Page 102]or imaginary power or title, which is grounded vpon an vncertaine and controuersed spirituall authority. But contrariwise the Pope in forbidding this Oath, which cannot sufficiently be proued to be vnlawfull, doth wrong himselfe, the Church, his Maie­stie, and this whole kingdome: And those English Catholikes, that bend their wits to find out scruples, or ra­ther cauills against the Oath, and to wrest the words to the worst sense that may be, whereas they may expound them in a fauourable sense, doe wrong the Pope, the Church, his Maiestie, themselues, and all their Catholike brethren.

4. But many (say you) are not able to conforme themselues to those cōceipts Widdrington frameth of the Oath, though they were true, for that they cannot perceiue any solid ground there­fore.

But First, if they be learned, they may easily conforme themselues to Widdringtons explication of the Oath, if they will diligently, and without partialitie examine the soliditie of his [Page 103]proofes, and cousider, that his proofes and answeres are grounded, not only vpon his own conceipt, but vpon ma­nifest reason, his Maiesties declarati­on, the doctrine and authoritie of most learned Diuines, and which is more, euen of those, who be his chie­fest Aduersaries in this point: and if withall they will remember (as M. Widdrington hath heretoforeIn the Epistle De­dicatorie of his Theolo­gicall Dispo­tation. obser­serued) that no other solid ground, or proofe is sufficient to confute the Oath, but euident demonstrations, but to proue the Oath to be lawfull, and that it may be lawfully taken, it is a very sufficient and solid ground, to answer probably to all the arguments, which are brought against the same: which whether he hath performed, or no, and what kinde of demonstrati­ons, or rather most weake arguments, the impugners of the Oath haue brought, (seeing that few of them can scarse agree in any one conceipt) I dare remit euen to your owne iudge­ment.

5. Secondly, if they be altogither so vnlearned, that neither by their [Page 104]owne reading, nor naturall iudgment, they are able to examine the soliditie of the grounds of this controuersie, they must be guided, instructed, and directed by the learned, who if through ignorance, negligence, want of due examination, inconsiderate zeale, or partialitie either towards Popes, or Princes, they direct them a­misse, the chiefest fault is in the Dire­rectors, and Instructors, for which they are greatly to answer at the day of iudgement: and how farre these ig­norant men, being guided and instru­cted amisse, are to be excused in con­science, and before the sight of God, I will not iudge, but leaue it to his iudgement, who is the searcher of all mens hearts. This onely I wish them to remember, that temporall Princes doe not in their Tribunalls meddle with their consciences, but onely with their externall actions, for which they may sometimes be iustly punished by the externall Magistrate, although their conscience be neuer so cleare in the sight of God.

6. Thirdly, if some either can not, [Page 105]or can, but will not conforme them­selues to Wiiddringtons conceipts and explication of the Oath, to which ne­uerthelesse others both can, and doe conforme themselues, will you there­fore inferre from hence, that the Oath is of it selfe vnlawfull, or not mini­stred to them by lawfull authoritie? Call to mind, how aboue in your ex­ceptions against the second Branch you affirmed without any proofe at all, that to deny the practise of the Popes authoritie to depose, is not to deny the power and authoritie it selfe; and yet now from the deniall of the practise of the lawful authoritie to mi­nister the Oath to some, who can not conforme themselues to Widdringtons conceipts, and explication of the Oath, you would inferre, also without any proofe, a deniall of the authority it selfe to minister lawfully the Oath to them. But the plaine truth is, as I obserued there, that a deniall of all ef­fects, and practises of any power or authoritie is a vertuall deniall of the power and authoritie it selfe, but a de­niall of some particular effects & prac­tises [Page 106]is not a sufficient, or vertuall de­niall of the authoritie it selfe. And therefore although we should grant, as we doe not, that the State can not law­fully, or without sinne, minister this Oath to those who cannot conforme themselues to Widdringtons conceipts and explication of the Oath, to which neuerthelesse other Catholickes both can, and doe conforme themselues, yet it can not be inferred from hence, that the Oath is not ministred to thē by lawfull authority. As also although we should admit, as we doe not, that a Iudge cannot lawfully, or without sinne, minister an Oath to him, whom he morally knoweth wil sweare falsly, and against his conscience, yet it can­not be inferred from hence, that the Iudge hath not good and full power and authoritie to minister the Oath to him. For one may haue authoritie to a thing, which neuerthelesse in some cases he cannot lawfully doe. As a Priest being in mortall sinne hath au­thoritie to minister the Sacraments, (for example of Penance) and yet as a Priest he cannot lawfully minister [Page 107]them being in mortall sinne: and therefore although he commit sinne by vsing and exercising his Office ir­religiously, yet the Sacrament is valid because his being in sinne doth not depriue him of his authority, neither doth he sinne in that manner, as he should doe, who ministreth the said Sacrament without priestly authority. See Widdrington in his Answere to Master Fitzherb. part. 2. chap. 10. nu. 33. pag. 286. et seq. where he hand­leth this matter more at large.

7. Fourthly, according to your manner of arguing, you might also proue, that the King hath not autho­ritie to minister an Oath to his sub­iects, that they shall acknowledge his Maiestie to be their Soueraigne Lord in temporals; and yet Fa. Parsons him­selfe affirmeth,In the iudgment &c. pag. 13 16. that there is no Catho­like who sticketh, or maketh difficultie to acknowledge and sweare the same. And Becanus also in the first Edition of his Controuersia Anglicana pag. 101. affirmeth, that it is certaine to him, that King Iames is the Soueraigne Lord in temporalls ouer his Dominions. For to [Page 108]vse the like argument you framed a­boue; If it were certaine, that no­thing is exacted by the aforesaid Oath but temporall Allegiance, then we might not onely sweare, but also were bound to sweare, that such an Oath were ministred by lawfull authoritie. But when it is questionable and vn­certaine, whether the Kings Maiestie, or the Popes Holinesse be the Soueraigne Lord in temporalls, not onely of this Kingdome, but (according to the Ca­nonists doctrine, which most learned Victoria affirmeth to be altogither im­probable, as in very deede it is) of all the Christian Kingdoms in the world, and consequently whether the King exacting such an Oath of his Subiects should cause them wrong the Pope or Church, or make them sweare a thing vncertaine, or with the hurt of their consciences, not being able many of them to conform themselues to those conceipts, which the Diuines, who are opposite therein to the Canonists, doe make of such an Oath, though they were true, for that they can perceiue no solid ground therefore, I see not, [Page 109]how we may lawfully sweare, that such an Oath is ministred vnto vs by law­full authoritie. But how insufficient this manner of arguing is, I haue shew­ed partly in this Section, and partly aboue in the Second.

8. Fiftly, if we follow M. Wid­dringtons first answer, which you can not convince to be improbable, to wit, that the immediate Obiect of this Oath, is onely our sincere acknow­ledgement and perswasion, that the Pope hath not any lawfull power or authoritie to depose the King, and not the absolute proposition, then the ar­gument you make here is of no force at all, for of this our acknowledgment we must be and are most certaine and assured. And neuerthelesse you know right well, that to proue any Branch of the Oath vnlawfull, you must im­pugne all the explications M. Wid­drington hath made of that Branch, & that not onely with probable excep­tions, but with euident and convin­cing demonstrations.

Answere.

1. BVt first, Ans. this exception of yours doth not proue the Oath to be of it selfe vnlawfull, but at the most, that some, who are not of Widdringtens opinion in ad these points, can not [Page 111]take it against their opinion, or rather against their conscience: And the same exception you might make, al­beit the Oath should ouely containe, that King Iames is our Soueraigne Lord in temporalls. But this exception doth not proue, that those, who be of Widdringtons opinion in all these points, belonging to the Oath, may not sweare, that they take it willingly.

2. Secondly, albeit some be of this opinion, that the Pope hath authority to depose Princes, yet vnlesse they hold it for certaine, and a poynt of faith, and the contrarie doctrine alto­th crimprobable, and out of all con­trouersie among Catholikes, which neuerthelesse all the world seeth to be a great controuersie among them, they may, notwithstanding their opi­nion, take the Oath lawfully and wil­lingly, for that they may, and ought perswade their consciences assuredly, that the Pope hath not any true, reall, sufficient, or lawfull power to depose Princes, or to practise their depositi­on, which is the true and plaine mean­ing of the Second and fourth Branch.

3. Thirdly, whereas you seeme to insinuate, that those things, which are done through feare, are onely volun­taria secundum quid, willing in some sort, but not simply, and properly willing, and so he, that should for feare of loosing his libertie and goods, and incurring his Maiesties displeasure, take this Oath against his owne opinion, or al­so conscience, should not take it wil­lingly, simpliciter & proprie, simply and properly, but onely secundum quid, in some sort, you are herein greatly mis­taken. For, according to the common doctrine of all Philosophers and Di­uines, feare doth onely cause involun­tarium secundum quid, vnwillingnesse in some sort; and those things, which are done through feare, are simply willing, which willingnesse is both proper and sufficient: Doe not many both sweare and forsweare very willingly, against their opinions, yea, and consciences also, for loue of their sensuall plea­sures, for hope of great gaine and pre­ferment, for feare of great danger, for procuring the fauour of Princes, and auoyding of their indignation? You [Page 113]know, that a great loue and concupis­cence of any thing, which we greatly desire, doth not cause vnwillingnesse, but rather increase it, and that where there is a great loue and desire of ob­taining any thing, there is also a great feare of loosing, or not obtaining it. A Marchant doth very willingly, hic et nunc, in this particular case, when he is in danger of drowning, cast his goods into the Sea to saue his life, which hee more loueth and respecteth, then his goods. And many men, who preferre their corporall pleasures, and the auoi­ding of corporall punishment, before their soules health, doe very willingly hic et nunc, in this particular case, speak, and doe many things against their o­pinions, and consciences also. But it seemeth, that you abstract from hic et nunc, from this particular case, and that you consider voluntarium, or willing­nesse, if that particular case were not, which is the cause of your errour, or mistaking, for quae fiunt ex metu, sunt hic & nunc simpliciter, absolutè, efficaci­ter & propriè voluntaria, those things that are done for feare, are, hic & nunc, [Page 114]in this particular case simply, absolutely, actually, effectually, and properly done willingly.

4. But Fourthly, supposing the Oath to be lawfull, and ministred by lawfull authoritie, an other most per­fect willingnesse is to be found in tak­ing this Oath, as likewise in the ob­seruing of all iust lawes. For we are bound to obserue all iust lawes both of God, (although eternall damnati­on of soule and bodie be threatned a­gainst the breakers of the same) and also of man, (although great tempo­rall punishments are imposed vpon the transgressours thereof) not for feare of punishment, but heartily, wil­lingly, and sincerely, for the loue of vertue, and for the duty and obedi­ence we owe to God, and the King: as it hath beene insinuated in the New-yeeres-gift, Cap. 8. and declared more at large by M. Widdrington in his The­ologicall Disputation. Cap. 9. And therefore vnlesse you can sufficiently proue some one of the former branches to be vnlawfull, you neede not insist vp­on this clause, which according to [Page 115]your grounds, is therefore vnlawfull, because some one of the former clau­ses is vnlawfull: albeit, as I haue shew­ed, you cannot sufficiently proue that this Oath may not, hic et nunc, suppo­sing the great temporall harme is in­curred by refusing it, be taken willing­ly by some, who prefer their tempo­rall state and goods of body and for­tune before their soules health, al­though we should falsly suppose the Oath to be vnlawfull: & consequent­ly this clause may be true in regard of some that take it willingly, although they should suppose some one, or all of the former clauses to be repugnant to truth or iustice.

5. And thus you see (good Sir) that I haue taken a little paines, and spent some time, which in very deede I could hardly at this present haue spared, to answer all your difficulties in particular, partly for your owne sake and satisfaction, and partly of others, who, as I suppose, haue con­curred with you herein, whom, as also your selfe both in regard of our anci­ent acquaintance, and your singular [Page 116]learning and great zeale, I much loue and respect. And truely I make no doubt, but that if you had beene as diligent to finde out arguments and answers in fauour of the Oath, as you haue beene to invent scruples against the same, you would quickly haue per­ceiued, that no one Clause of the Oath can be sufficiently proued to be vnlawfull: especially if you had ob­serued, that to proue the Oath to be vnlawfull, euident demonstrations are required, but to proue it lawfull, only probable arguments and answeres are sufficient; and also that I haue here said nothing, but what M^r. Widdring­ton hath either expressely said before, or may be clearely deduced from the grounds of his doctrine. And so wishing you all happinesse, I take my leaue, hoping, that if, notwithstanding this my answer, you cannot conforme your conscience to M^r. Widdringtons conceipts & explication of the Oath, yet you will not condemne those Ca­tholikes, who both can and doe con­forme themselues therevnto; and that you will not be any cause, or occasion [Page 117]in word or deede, of making a separa­tion, disvnion, or Schisme among your Catholike brethren by exclu­ding them vniustly from Ecclesiasti­call Sacraments in regard of this con­trouersie, for which in France they are not excluded, nor thought vnworthy to be admitted therevnto, and which (as Card. Peron notably obserueth) ought not to hinder the revnion of those, Peron in his last great Re­ply cap. 91. pag 633. who are out of the Church, & should desire to be reconciled therevnto, espe­cially, seing that the cōtrary doctrin hath bin in France by many publike Edicts of Roman. Catholikes, cōdēned vnder paine of high treason, for false, pernitious, scandalous, and seditious; but that you will seeke, as you wished aboue, to make an happy atonement, reconcilement, and peace among them, and not ouer rashly and vncha­ritably to censure, for any point which is controuersie among Catholikes, their consciences, who, for cleare and vndoubted points of Catholike Reli­gion, are as ready and willing to loose by patient suffering, their goods, liber­tie, [Page 118]and life it selfe, as your selfe, or any other Catholike whatsoeuer.