1. This Branch (which is the ground and foundation of the whole Oath, and as it were the roote and fountaine, from whence all the other branches, wherein the Popes autho­ritie is any way denyed, doe spring and are deriued) is so cleere and ma­nifest, that no learned and well affe­cted subiect can take any colourable exception against the same. In so much that Fa. Parsons In his Booke entituled, The Iudgement of a Catholike En­glish man, &c. part. 7. nu. 22. pag. 13. & 16. himselfe feareth not to affirme, that there is no man, who sticketh or maketh difficulty to acknowledge our Soueraigne to bee true King and rightfull Lord ouer all his Dominions, for that euery English Catholike will sweare and acknowledge most willingly all those parts and clau­ses of the Oath, that doe any way ap­pertayne to the Ciuill and Temporall Obedience due to His Maiestie whom hee acknowledgeth for his true and lawfull King and Soueraigne ouer all [Page 57]His Domioions. And Martinus Be­canus a famous Iesuite in the first E­dition of his Controuersia Anglicana writeth thus:Becanus in Controuersia An­glic. cap. 3. p. 102 And truly to me it is cer­taine, that all the parts and propositions of the Oath are not false if they bee well declared. For these are true: first, that King Iames is lawfull King of England, Scotland and Ireland: Se­condly, that in the same Kingdomes he is the Supreme or Soueraigne Lord in Temporalls.

2. First therefore, if wee consider the end of this Oath (which is only to make profession of our temporall Allegiance, and to make a true distin­ction not betwixt Catholikes and Pro­testants, &c. the expresse declaration of His Maiestie, and the rules be­fore mentioned in the second and third Obseruation, it is euident, that by those wordes [Soueraigne Lord] is not to be vnderstood the Kings Sup­remacie in Spirituall and Ecclesiasti­call, but only in Temporall and Ci­uill causes.

3. Secondly, it is also euident, that albeit by force of the expresse wordes, [Page 58]and the plaine and common vnderstan­ding of the same, to which the se­uenth branch of this Oath tyeth the swearer, wee are bound only to ac­knowledge that King Iames is lawfull and rightfull King of this Realme, and of all other His Maiesties Domi­nions and Countries, and not that Hee is the Soueraigne Lord of the same, both for that those words [Soueraigne Lord] are put only ex parte subiecti, and not ex parte predicati, and there­fore by vertue of the words are not af­firmed; as likewise he that stileth the Pope most holy and most blessed, doth not affirme him to bee most holy and most blessed vnlesse the words most ho­ly & most blessed be put ex parte predi­cati; & also that if we regard the force and vertue of those words [Soueraigne Lord] they haue not the same sense, which the words [lawfull and right­full King] haue, seeing that one may be a lawfull and rightfull King, and yet not the Soueraigne Lord of His Kingdome, as if the Emperour should make the great Duke of Toscan King of Hetruria, he would be lawfull and [Page 59]rightfull King of that Countrie, and yet not the Soueraigne or Supreme Lord of the same, because hee is as a feudarie subiect to the Emperour. Neuerthelesse because the lawfull and rightfull King of England. is also the Soueraigne Lord of the same, by rea­son and vertue of the matter we may lawfully, and if it bee demanded at our hands, are bound to acknowledge and sweare, that King Iames is not only the lawfull and rightfull King of England & of all other His Maiesties Dominions, but also the Soueraigne or Supreme Lord of the same. And in this sense, both the XIII. Priests, and also M. Greene vnderstood the word Soueraigne in their Protestation and Declaration.

4. Neither is it to the purpose which some obiect, that the King of England is the Popes Ʋassall, and as a feudarie subiect to him in Tempo­rals, and therefore the Pope, and not King Iames is the absolute Soueraigne and supreme Lord in Temporals of this Kingdome. For although wee should absurdly admit, that for the [Page 58] [...] [Page 59] [...] [Page 60]title and clayme of Temporall Soue­raigntie, which the Pope pretendeth to haue ouer this Kingdome by vet­tue of some grant of former Kings, may bee brought some probable proofe, as there cannot, seeing that it is euident, that no King of England hath authoritie to giue away His Kingdome, or make it subiect in Tem­porals to another Prince without the consent of the Kingdome it selfe; and that no colour of any probable proofe can bee brought from any Au­thenticall Instrument to shew, that the Kingdome of England euer con­sented to any such grant, yet conside­ring that no probable title can bee a sufficient ground to depriue any man of that Right, Dominion, or any o­ther thing which he actually possesseth, but such a title must bee most certaine and out of all controuersie, as I shewed aboue in the Fift Obserua­tion, it is manifest, that, notwithstan­ding any such probable title, euery subiect of this Land may lawfully acknowledge by Oath, that King Iames is not only the lawful and right­full [Page 61]King of this Realme, and of all o­ther His Maiesties Dominions and Countries, but also the Soueraigne or supreme temporall Lord of the same.

1. This Branch supposing the for­mer Obseruations, hath in it no diffi­cultie [Page 62]at all, although wee should ad­mit, that the immediate obiect there­of, or which is all one, that, which in this Branch by force of the words we are bound immediately to sweare, is not only our sincere acknowledge­ment, and perswasion, but also that absolutely and assuredly the Pope hath not any authoritie to depose the King, &c. For considering that the whole tenour of this Branch tendeth to pra­ctise, namely, to depose, to dispose, to inuade, annoy, beare Armes, rayse Tumults, offer violence or hurt, and to discharge subiects of their Allegiance, and also, that it is a doctrine approo­ued by many learned Catholikes, and who haue examined all the argu­ments on both sides, and consequent­ly, that it is truely probable, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue Princes, or to dispose of their Tempo­rals, it is as cleere and manifest, that a­ny man, whether hee bee the Kings subiect or no, what opinion soeuer he followeth in speculation concerning the Popes authoritie to depriue Prin­ces, yet hee may as certainly acknow­ledge [Page 63]and sweare, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depose the King, that is, to practize his deposition, or any other of those things mentioned in this Branch, as it is cleere and mani­fest, that hee may certainly acknow­ledge and sweare that the Pope hath no authoritie to commit open iniu­stice, and that in a doubtfull vncer­taine, and disputable case, the condi­tion of the possessour is to bee preferred.

2. Neither doe temporall Princes, or other priuate men that haue any thing in their possessiō greatly regard, what learned men, who by the sub­tiltie of their wits can easily finde out some probable colour of a broken and pretended title, may speculatiuely dispute in Schooles concerning their titles, so that in practice, notwithstan­ding such disputations and speculati­ons, they bee secured from being put out of that which they really and bo­na fide doe possesse. And doubtlesse most miserable were the state of all men that possesse any thing of worth, and much more of Princes, if vpon a title, which some learned m [...]n may [Page 64]in speculation approoue, it were law­full to inuade their possessions, before a lawfull Iudge, and who is certainly knowne so to bee, hath decided and determined the title or controuersie▪ To preuent which mischiefe all Nati­tions being guided herein by the light of naturall reason haue agreed in this manifest principle, that it is open in­iustice to put any man out of his possession vpon any title which is not most certaine and free from all contro­uersie vntill a lawfull and vndoubted Iudge hath decided the matter. (I said a lawfull and vndoubted Iudge) for if it be doubtfull, vncertaine, and questionable whether he be a lawfull and competent Iudge to determine that cause, his decision cannot be suf­ficient to end the controuersie. For which cause the Pope is not to bee ac­counted a lawfull and competent Iudge to decide this question concer­ning his owne pretended authoritie to depriue Princes, for that it is a con­trouersie among learned Diuines and approued by very many (as Pope A­drian, the Cardinaell of Cambray, the [Page 69] Cardinall Cusanus, the Cardinall Pa­normitan, the Cardinall of Florence Master to Panormitan, Iohn Patriarch of Antioch, Abulensis, Ioannes Pari­siensis, Ioannes Gerson, Iohn Maior, Almaine, and almost all the Vniuer­sitie of Paris cited by Widdrington Widdring. in the discouerie of D. Schulke­uius slanders. §. 7.) that the Pope is not a competent Iudge to decide or define infallibly any do­ctrinall point (and much lesse in his owne cause) without a true and vn­doubted generall Councell, and ther­fore although he should hereafter, (as yet he hath not) attempt to define and decide this question, his decision could not end the controuersie, nor giue sufficient warrant to any man to practize the deposition of Princes, vpon so doubtfull, vncertaine, and questionable power or title.

3. Neuerthelesse it behooueth temporall Princes to be very carefull, that their titles to the Dominions which they lawfuly possesse, be not so much as speculatiuely, or only for Disputation sake disputed pro and con­tra, by learned men, least that some ignorant or turbulent spirits, which [Page 70]either doe not know, or of set pur­pose to colour their practices, vnder a pretence of a probable title, will not take notice of the manifest difference betwixt speculation and practice, may take occasion thereby to disturbe the publike peace, and to molest, annoy, or to offer any violence or hurt to their Royall Persons, States, or Go­uernment. For which cause the Par­liament of Paris hath with great wis­dome and reason oftentimes by pub­like Edicts ordained,See beneath in the end of this Treatise some of these Decrees. that the doctrine of deposing their Kings should not bee so much as taught and maintay­ned to bee probable, or problematike, that occasion be not giuen to seditious spirits (who know not, or will not take notice of the difference betwixt speculation and practice) to attempt, vnder pretence of a probable title any violence against the Crowns or sacred Persons of their Kings. And the rea­son is manifest, for that the temporall Common-wealth hath good and full authoritie to forbid the teaching and publishing of any doctrine which is not necessarie, whereby probable [Page 71]danger to the Crownes and liues of temporall Princes, and perturbations in the Common-wealth may arise.

4. First therefore, by those words of this Branch [nor by any other means with any other] it is euident, that the Parliament, which representeth the whole bodie of the Kingdome or Common-wealth did not intend to meddle with the authoritie which the whole Kingdome or Common-wealth may (according to the opinion of some Doctors) pretend to haue in some cases ouer their soueraign Prince, as Lessius and others (whom the Au­thors of the Prelate and the Prince, doth seeme to follow) doe idly ob­iect. And although the meaning of those words were, to deny, that the whole Kingdome, or Common-wealth hath no authoritie to depose their King, yet considering that it is also a probable doctrine, & approued by many learned Catholike Diuines, and Lawyers cited by Widdrington, Widdr. in Apo­log. nu. 111. and in his Answere to Fitz-herb. part. 3. & cap. 11. nu. 36. 37. that the Common-wealth hath no such authority, it is also lawful for any man (of what opinion soeuer hee bee in [Page 72] speculation concerning this authoritie of the Cōmonweath) to acknowledge and sweare, that the Common-wealth hath no more authoritie to depose the King, that is, to practize his de­position, then she hath to commit o­pen iniustice; But the true meaning of His Maiestie and the Parliament is, as the words themselues doe plainely signifie, only to deny the Popes au­thoritie to depose, &c. to wit, that the Pope neither of himselfe, that is, neither as a sole and totall cause, nor by any authoritie, &c. that is, neither as an Instrument or Minister of the Church or See of Rome, nor by any o­ther meanes with any other, that is, nor as a principall, or true and proper par­tiall cause or Agent, hath any authoritie to depose the King, &c.

5. Neither by those wordes [or to authorize any forraigne Prince to in­uade or annoy Him or His Countries] did His Maiestie and the Parliamen [...] intend to denie the authoritie which temporall Princes may haue in som [...] cases to make warre against their neighbour Princes, and consequently [Page 73]against His Maiestie, if he should giue them iust cause of warre (yet euer ob­seruing, that no probable power, cause, or title can bee a sufficient ground to punish any Prince, or to inuade His Countries) but, as the expresse words do plainly shew, only to deny the Popes authoritie, to authorize any forraigne Prince to inuade or annoy Him or His Countries: because all the authoritie which temporall Princes haue to make warre, or to inuade the Kingdome of an other Prince for what cause, crime, or end so euer it bee, is deriued from their temporall Soueraigntie groun­ded vpon the Law of Nature, or Na­tions, & not from the Popes authoritie. And likewise all the authority, which the temporall Common-wealth may pretend to haue in some cases to rise vp in Armes against their Prince, is not deriued from the Popes warrant, license or authoritie, but (if there be any such power) from the Law of Nature. And therefore with great reason this Clause denyeth in the Pope all power and authoritie to authorize a­ny forraigne Prince to inuade or annoy [Page 74]His Maiestie, or his Countries, or to giue license or leaue to any of his sub­iects to beare Armes, rayse Tumults, or to offer any violence or hurt to His Ma­iestis Royall Person, State, or Gouern­mēt: because although they shuld haue any such authoritie, leaue, or licence, wherewith His Maiestie and the Par­liament would not in this Oath inter­meddle, they haue it not from the Pope, but from the Law of Nations, or Nature.

6. Secondly, in this Branch is not denyed the Popes authoritie to com­mand in temporals in order to spiritu­all good, or to declare, that they who haue authoritie to depose, or to make warre, are bound to vse their tempo­rall authoritie, and to draw forth the temporall Sword, when the necessitie of the Church, and the spirituall good of soules shall require the same; for this authoritie of declare and com­mand doth not exceede the limits of spirituall power, as Widdrington hath shewed at large heretofore:Widdr. in Apol nu. [...]. and in all his other Bookes very often, but e­specially in his Answere to Fitz-herb. But here is only denyed the Popes authoritie to depose temporall Princes, to dispose of [Page 75]their temporals, to vse or draw forth the temporall Sword, or to authorize temporall Princes or subiects to vse or draw forth the same: for whosoe­uer giueth authoritie to another man to vse the temporall Sword, hath au­thoritie to vse it himselfe, although sometimes for want of strength or some other necessarie Instrument hee cannot vse it himselfe, yet still he hath authoritie to vse it.

7. And although a Commander (which I wish the Reader to obserue for the Author of the Prelate and the Prince) is commmonly said to doe that thing which is done by his Comman­dement, (and so hee that counsaileth, consenteth, or any way concurreth al­though per accidens, and not by any proper vertue, or influxe of his owne, is said to doe that thing) as hee that applyeth fire to straw, or comman­deth, counsaileth, yea, or doth not hinder the applying thereof, when hee is bound to hinder it, is said to burne the straw, although hee bee no true and proper efficient cause of the burning thereof, but on­ly [Page 76]a cause per accidens) yet a Comman­der is not said to doe that which hee commandeth, as a true and proper cause, or as hauing authoritie to doe that thing which hee commandeth▪ (whereof this Branch of the Oath doth only speake) but only as a cause per accidens, (which according to the doctrine of all Philosophers, is no true and proper efficient cause) vnlesse by his proper power, vertue, influxe or authoritie hee concurre to the do­ing thereof, and that the person com­manded hath his power, vertue, or au­thoritie to doe that thing deriued from the Commander, or depending on him.

8. For which cause a Painter, who commandeth his Seruant to make a Picture, and giueth him rules and di­rections how to mingle his Colours, and afterwards to apply them, which without the directions of his Ma­ster, hee himselfe could not doe, is the principall cause and agent of ma­king that Picture, and the Seruant is only his Instrument or Minister, for that all the Arte hee hath to [Page 77]make that picture is deriued from the commaundement and directions of the Painter, and depending on him, and yet a King, who hath no skill to paint, and commaun­deth the Painter to make a picture, is no true and proper efficient cause of ma­king that picture, but onely a cause per accidens, by morally applying the Painter that hath skill to vse the same. So likewise a Prince, who com­mandeth his Officers to condemne and put to death an egregious male­factour, is the principall cause of his death, and the Officers are onely his Instruments, Ministers, and Executi­oners, for that all the authoritie, which they haue to condemne and kill that malefactour, is deriued from the Prince, and depending on him, be­cause onely the Prince doth autho­rize, or giue them authoritie to pro­nounce and execute that sentence: And yet the Pope commaunding a Prince to vse his temporall sword, power, or authoritie when the neces­sitie of the Church shall require the same, as to make warre, inuade any [Page 78]Countrey, or to put any egregious malefactor to death, is onely a cause per accidens, of that warre, &c. by ap­plying morally, to wit, by his com­mandement, the person, who hath au­thoritie to make warre, &c. to the ma­king thereof. But the Pope is no true and proper cause of that warre, &c. neither can hee bee said to make that warre, as hauing authoritie to make it, or as authorizing, or giuing authority, leaue, or licence, (whereof onely this branch maketh mention) to the Prince to make that warre, &c. Neyther is the Prince in making that warre, &c. the Popes Instrument, Minister, or Executioner, (as the Author of the Prelate and the the Prince absurdly affirmeth) for that he hath not his au­thoritie to make warre, &c. deriued from the Popes commandement, or de­pending on it, whereas (according to the doctrine of all Philosophers) it is necessary to an Instrument, that it haue all it vertue to worke deriued from the principall Agent, or depending on it; but all the authoritie, which tem­poral Princes, or Common-wealths haue [Page 79]in temporall affaires, is deriued from the law of Nations, or Nature, and not from the Popes authoritie or com­mandement.

9. By which it is apparant, how grosly the said Author of the Prelate and the Prince, in excepting against this Branch, was mistaken, for not considering the difference betweene a Commander, who hath onely autho­ritie to command, but not to execute, or doe that which hee commandeth to be done, and a Commander, who hath authoritie both to commaund, and also to execute or doe that which he commandeth to be done, although perchance he cannot effect it for want of strength or effectuall meanes, but not for want of authoritie, as euerie lawfull Prince hath sufficient authori­tie to subdue his Rebels, and yet hee cannot alwaies effect it, not for want of authority, but for want of strength, force, or effectuall meanes, because his Rebels are more strong and potent then he is.

[Page 81]1. This Branch of the Oath is some­what clearer then the former, because it doth not expressely and in plaine tearmes deny the Popes Authoritie to depriue or depose Princes, but it onely containeth in expresse words a promise, which the Subiect confir­meth by Oath, that if in case the Pope hath denounced, or hereafter should denounce any sentence of Excommu­nication or Depriuation against the King, his Heires, or Successours, or any absolution of the said Subiects from their obedience, yet he wil beare faith and true allegiance to his Maie­stie, his Heires and Successours, and him and them will defend, &c. Neuer­thelesse the lawfulnesse or iustice of this promissorie Oath supposeth for the principall ground thereof, the ve­ritie of the former assertorie Clause, and therefore it implieth, and vertu­ally containeth a deniall of the Popes authoritie to depriue or depose Prin­ces, and to absolue Subiects frō their temporall allegiance: for that who­soeuer doth sweare, that notwith­standing any sentence of depriuation, [Page 82]or absolution of subiects from their obedience made, or hereafter to be made by the Pope or his Successours against his Maiestie, his Heires or Successours, to make this promise iust and lawfull, he must consequently de­ny, that the Pope hath Authoritie to depriue Princes, or to absolue Sub­iects from their obedience, as Suarez examining this Branch of the Oath doth most clearely demonstrate.Suarez in De­fens. lib. 6. cap. 3. See Widdring. against Fitz­herbert part. 1. cap. 5. For if the sentence of depriuation to be made at any time hereafter against the King, his Heires or Successours, for any manifest cause or crime what­soeuer, may be iust, lawfull, and effe­ctuall, it is as vnlawfull to take this clause, as it is vnlawfull for one to sweare, that he will not obey the Popes sentence and commandement, which hereafter he shall impose, be it neuer so inst, and without all errour or default: But if this sentence of depriuation at any time hereafter to be made can neuer be iust, it must needs follow, that the Pope hath no more authoritie to depriue or depose the King, his Heires or Successours, [Page 83]then he hath authoritie to commit open iniustice.

2. Wherefore those thirteene Reue­rend Priests, who solemnly protested to Queene Elizabeth, that notwith­standing any authoritie (which words are farre more generall, then notwith­standing any sentence of depriuati­on) or any Excommunication either denounced, or to be denounced against her Maiestie &c. they would yeeld to her Maiestie all obedience in temporall causes, would then haue made no dif­ficultie to take this Branch of the Oath, and consequently to free them­selues from periurie, they must also deny the Popes Authoritie to depriue and depose Princes, for that the iustice of this Branch implieth & supposeth as a chiefe ground thereof a deniall of the Popes authoritie to depriue and depose, as Suarez doth most plainely conuince.

3. First therefore in this Clause is not denied the Popes power to Ex­communicate, but onely that Excom­munication being a spirituall censure doth not worke this temporall effect, [Page 84]as to make Kings no Kings, or to depriue them of their Royall right and Soueraigntie, and consequently not to absolue Subiects from their natu­rall allegiance, which, according to the doctrine of Card. Bellarmine and Suarez they doe by the law of God and Nature owe to their lawfull Prince.Bell. in Tract. contra Barclai­um cap. 21. pag. 202. Suarez in De­fens. &c. lib. 6. cap. 3. nu. 6. And thus much his Maiestie hath also in expresse words declared. The truth is, saith his Maiestie, The Kings Ma­iestie in his Premonition &c. pag. 9. that the Lower house of Parliament at the first framing of this Oath, made it to containe, that the Pope had no power to Excommunicate mee, which I forced them to reforme onely making it to con­clude, that no Excommunication of the Popes can warrant my Subiects to pra­ctise against my Person or State, deny­ing the deposition of Kings to be in the Popes lawfull power, as indeede I take any such temporall violence to be farre without the limits of such a spirituall censure as Excommunication is, And also that depriuation or deposition from temporall kingdomes is not an effect of Excommunicatiō, Widdring­ton hath shewed at large heretofore, [Page 85]and Becanus and Suarez doe also in expresse words affirme the same.Widdrington in his Apolo­gie nu. 346. in his Answer to Suarez part. 2. sect. 4. and in his Answer to Fitzher. part. 3. cap. 1. Frō hence it is very apparāt saith Becanus, Becanus in quest. de fide haereticis seruan­da ca. 8. nu. 16. and in his Controuersia Anglic. cap. 3. qu. 2. that Heretikes by this precisely that they are excommunicated, are not de­priued of their Dominion or Iurisdicti­on either ouer their subiects, or ouer their temporall goods, but this depriua­tion is a destinct punishment, and infli­cted by a destinct law. And againe, It is one thing, saith he, to excommunicate a King, and another thing to depose him, or depriue him of his Kingdome, neither is the one necessarily connected with the other. Many Kings and Em­perours haue beene excommunicated, and yet not therefore deposed, and con­trariwise many deposed, and yet not therefore excommunicated. See also Suarez cited by Widdrington in his Apologie, Suarez tom. 5. disp. 15. sect. 6. nu. 3. and in his answere to Sua­rez and Fitzherbert.

4. And therefore in very truth I am sorie, and doe in some sort pittie the Author of the Prelate and the Prince (a man whom heretofo [...]e I haue much loued, respected, and honoured) that he should so grosly forget himselfe, as [Page 86]to bewray so palpably such great want of learning, iudgement, and sinceritie, in affirming so boldly, and without any proofe at all, Pag. 298. that depri­uation of Regall authoritie is an effect of excommunicating Kings and Princes, and so in denying the effect, the cause is denyed. For as, saith he, if you should say, A man is not risibilis, that is, hath not power to laugh, you should deny him to be a man, so in denying that the Pope can depriue Princes of their King­domes, you deny in effect that he can ex­communicate. Whereas this Authour knew right well, that Widdrington in that very Chapter which hee citeth, did, by the expresse doctrine of Sua­rez and Becanus, but now related, cleerely prooue against Lessius, (who vrged euen as nakedly and without any proofe at all the same obiection) that depriuation is no effect at all of Excommunication, much lesse pro­prium quarto modo, as risibilis, a power to laugh is to a man, as this Authour most vnlearnedly affirmeth. And yet forsooth he taketh vpon him, as it may appeare by the very Title and Inscrip­tion [Page 87]of his Treatise, to giue a full In­struction and appeasement to the consci­ences of English Catholikes concerning the Oath of Allegiance. But this shall suffice at this present for an imperfect portraying of this Authours want of iudgement and sinceritie in his Expli­cation of the Oath of Allegiance, (e­specially if wee consider his person, the Office hee now beareth, and the doctrine which in former times hee held) for that (as I am told) his per­fect Picture both in this and other points is alreadie drawne, and will be set forth in liuely colours ere it be long.

5. Secondly, it is euident by the former Obseruations, that those wordes [Heires and Successours] doe not signifie Vsurpers, as some would wrest them contrarie to the meaning of the Law, the plaine and common signification of the wordes, and the rules before alleaged: For albeit this word [Successour] may in generall bee taken for euery Successour, who ei­ther vnlawfully or vnlawfull doth succeed, yet particularly and proper­ly [Page 88]when it is placed in a Law, it is v­sually taken only for a lawfull Succes­sour: wherefore according to that rule of the Ciuill Law before mentio­ned in the second Obseruation, that the doubtfull words of euery Law must be taken in that sense, which is with­out default, this word [Successours] must in this Oath established by His Maiesties Law bee limited only to lawfull Successours, and who accor­ding to the Lawes of the Kingdome doe succeed. For as according to Law, Id tantum possumus quod iure possumus: We can only doe that, which wee can doe lawfully or by Law, so according to Law, he only is accoun­ted to succeed, who by lawfull right doth succed. Whereupon the Ciuill Lawyers doe define Inheritance, to be a succeding to all the right of one de­ceased, and an Heire, who succeedeth him in all his right, without adding lawfull succeeding, or lawfully succee­deth, for that it is alwayes so to bee vnderstood, and therefore being ne­cessarily supposed, it is not expressed, but altogether omitted in the defini­tions [Page 89]of an Heire and of Inheritance. And whensoeuer in the Common or Statute Lawes of this Kingdome any mention is made of the King and his Successours, this word [lawfull] is but few times added, although alwayes it ought to be vnderstood.

6, Thirdly, it is also euident by the former Obseruations, that by those words [Treasons and Trayterous Con­spiracies] are only vnderstood true, proper, and naturall Treasons, and which among all Nations, what Reli­gion soeuer they professe, are accoun­ted Treasons, and repugnant to natu­rall Alleagiance and Temporall and Ciuill Obedience, and not such Trea­sons, which in regard chiefly of Reli­gion are by the positiue Lawes of some Nations made Treasons, and ac­counted Treasons onely for that they are punished with the penalties which are due to proper and naturall Trea­sons, as are the comming in of English Priests into this Kingdome made by the Popes authoritie, and all reconcile­ments to the Pope, though in matters that concerne Religion. For as His [Page 90] Maiestie and the Parliament haue de­clared, the only intent of this Oath is to contayn the profession of naturall Al­legiance, and such ciuill and temporall dutie and obedience, which euery true and well-affected subiect ought by the Law of God to beare to their lawfull Prince and Soueraigne with a promise to resist and disclose all contrarie vnciuill violence. For to preuent such hainous attempts and mischiefes, which in time to come might be plotted by the example of the Powder-Traytours, who vnder colour of Religion at­tempted that barbarous and deuillish Conspiracie, this forme of Oath was framed, saith His Maiestie, In his Apolo­gie, pag. 2. nu. 2. to bee ta­ken by all my subiects, whereby they should make cleere profession of their resolution, faithfully to persist in obedi­ence vnto me, acrording to their naturall Allegiance; to the end that I might hereby make a separation, not only be­tweene all my good subiects in generall, and vnfaithfull Traytours that inten­ded to draw themselues from my Obe­dience; but specially to make a separa­tion betweene so many of my subiects, [Page 91]who although they were otherwise Po­pishly affected, yet retayned in their hearts the print of their naturall dutie to their Soueraigne; and those who be­ing carryed away with the like fanati­call zeale, that the Powder-Traytours were, could not contayne themselues within the bounds of their naturall Al­legiance, but thought diuersitie of Re­ligion a safe pretext for all kinde of Treasons and Rebellions against their Soueraigne. Wherby it is apparant, that only such Treasons and Trayte­rous Conspiracies are here vnderstood, which are repugnant and contrarie to naturall Allegiance, and not such Trea­sons which are not naturall Treasons, but only in regard of Religion are by positiue Lawes made Treasons, and to be punished with the ordinary penalties of true proper and naturall Treason. And in this sense also those thirteene Reuerend Priests vnderstood the words Conspiracies, Attempts, and Practises in their Protestation.

1. Although this Branch may at the first sight seeme somewhat suspi­cious in regard of that word hereti­call, yet if it be duly examined, ac­cording to the former Obseruations, it will easily appeare, that it contay­neth no such difficultie, as some im­pugners of the Oath would seeme to imagine, but that if it bee lawfull to abhorre, detest, and abiure the afore­said position, as cleerely false and in­iurious to Princes, which the former Discourse doth plainly conuince, it is [Page 93]also lawfull to abiure it as hereticall: or, which is all one, as contayning in it a falshood, which is repugnant not onely to naturall reason, but also to the Word of God reuealed in the holy Scriptures: For, as euery Doctrine and position, which is agreeable to that truth, which God hath reuealed, is to be accounted of faith: so contra­riwise, euerie Doctrine and position, which contayneth in it a falshood, which is repugnant to the Word of God reuealed in the holy Scriptures, is to be accounted hereticall, and re­pugnant to faith. And in this sence, the word hereticall is not onely by all Protestants, but also by many learned Catholique Diuines commonly and vsually taken, as Widdrington hath shewed at large in his answer to Fitz herbert. Widdrington in his Adioinder to the first and second part.

5. Neyther is it necessarie, that we must take the word hereticall, as like­wise no other ambiguous word con­tayned in this Oath, in that strict and rigorous sense, wherein some Catho­lickes take the word hereticall, to wit, for that doctrine which not onely [Page 94]contayneth a falshood repugnant to the holy Scriptures, but also which by the Church or a generall Councell, which representeth the Church, is ex­presly and particularly declared and defined so to be, but it sufficeth that we take the word, hereticall, in a pro­per and vsuall signification, and wher­in Catholickes doe commonly take it, especially when this common sense is agreeable to the meaning and vnder­standing of the Law-maker: for that, according to the approued rule be­fore set downe in the second obserua­tion, in a penall and odious matter, when the wordes of any Law are doubtfull or ambiguous, and there be many common senses of the same word or sentence, we ought to take them in that common sense, which is more fauourable, especially when it is not against the meaning of the Law-maker.

6. Neither also is it necessarie to make any Doctrine or Position to be hereticall, that the proposition with all particular circumstances therein expressed, must bee contained in the [Page 95]holy Scriptures, but it sufficeth, that it contain a particular falshood, which onely in the generall is expressed in the holy Scriptures, and that no particular word, or circumstance bee added in the particular proposition, which doth make it not to be contayned in the ge­nerall falshood, as a particular in the vniuersall. For which cause, these pro­positions, It is lawfull for one to take from his neighbour his purse, or to mur­ther him with a pistoll, if hee liue a wan­ton or wicked life, are hereticall, and re­pugnant to those words of holy Scripture, Thou shalt not steale, Thou shalt not kill, Exod. 20. although those particula­rities of being a wanton or wicked man, or of killing him with a pistoll, are not expresly contained in the holy Scrip­tures, because they doe not giue any warrant to stealing or killing, or make that particular stealing or killing not be included in those generall words, Thou shalt not steale, Thou shalt not kill.

7. First therefore, although by rea­son of the matter of this Branch we may truely abiure as hereticall, not onely [Page 96]the Doctrine of murthering, but also of deposing Princes, which are excom­municated or depriued by the Pope, yet if we onely regard the force and vertue of the expresse words, according to the plaine and common sense and vn­derstanding of them, to which the se­uenth clause of the Oath tyeth the swearer, we are not bound to abiure both Doctrines as hereticall, but it sufficeth, by vertue of the words, to ab­iure as hereticall, onely the Doctrine of murthering such Princes, as Wid­drington hath shewed in his Theologi­call Disputation, In his Theo­log. Disp. cap. 5. Sec. 2. and proued more at large in his Answer to Fitzherbert, in the end of the second part. And the reason is, for that to make hereticall a conditionall disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth a free choyce to take eyther part of the disiunction if wee please, it sufficeth that one part of the disiunction be hereticall, although the other part be not hereticall, but per­chance most true and of faith, which contrariwise happeneth in an absolute disiunctiue proposition, which suppo­seth and implyeth no such condition [Page 97]or choyce. As for example, This pro­position, It is lawfull for any man to ho­nour or blaspheme God, if hee will, or, which is all one in sence with this, A­ny man may lawfully honour or blaspheme God, is false and hereticall, and may be abiured as hereticall, although one part only thereof be hereticall, and the other part of faith: For such conditional disiunctiue propositions, for as much as concerneth the truth or falshood of them, doe not follow the nature of an absolute and ordinarie disiunctiue pro­position, but of a copulatiue propositi­on, to the veritie whereof is required, that both parts must be true, and to make it false and hereticall, it sufficeth that onely one part thereof bee false and hereticall, whereas contrariwise to the veritie of an absolute disiunctiue proposition, which implyeth no such choyce or condition, it sufficeth that one part thereof be true, and to make it false and hereticall, both parts ther­of must needes be false and hereticall: for which cause this proposition, God is honoured or blasphemed by good and vertuous men, is true, because one part [Page 98]of the disiunction is true, and this pro­position, God is honoured and blasphe­med by good and vertuous men, is false, because both parts of the proposition are not false, but one of them is true.

8. That this proposition, Subiects may lawfully depose, or murther their Prince, who is excommunicated or depri­ued by the Pope, or which in sence is all one with the Doctrine and positi­on contayned in this Branch of the Oath (seeing that onely the Verbe passiue is changed into the actiue) is such a conditionall disiunctiue proposi­tion, as implyeth a free choyce and condition to take eyther part of the disiunction if wee please, as likewise all such disiunctiue propositions, wherein the Coniunction [or] followeth the Verbe [may] doe imply and suppose, according to the vsuall signification of our English phrase, a free choyse and condition to take eyther part of the disiunction if we please, Widdring­ton proueth by many examples of pro­positions, neyther can there be alled­ged scarce any one proposition, [Page 99]wherein it is not commonly so taken. As for example, You may stay here or depart: You may eat or drinke: you may buy in such a place Wine or Oyle: You may haue in the shambles Beefe or Mut­ton: You may goe to such a place by land or by water: You may buy that land in fee-farme or by lease. The King by ver­tue of an Act of Parliament, may take of conuicted Popish Recusants, twentie pounds for euerie moneth, or the third part of all their lands. The Sherife may presently hang a theefe condemned to die, or delay his death for some small time. If any person hold any lands of any other Lord, then of the King, by Knights ser­uice, he may giue, dispose, or assure by his last Will and Testament, two parts of the said lands holden by Knights seruice, or of as much thereof as shall amount to the full yearely value of two parts. If a man by his last Will and Testament ordayne, that his Executors may bestow twentie pounds vpon the poore, or repayre such a Bridge, it is in the free power of the Executor to chuse whether of those two he please. Finally, in clauses of reuocation, where the words are, That one [Page 100]may by any deed in his life time, or by his last Will and Testament, reuoke the sayd vses, and limit new, it is in his free pow­er and choyce, to doe it by the one or by the other, as he shall thinke good. In these, & infinite such like examples, which may bee brought, the Verbe [may] implyeth a free power to chuse eyther part of the disiunction one plea­seth, neyther can there scarcely bee alledged any one example, wherein the Coniunction disiunctiue [or] im­mediatly following the Verbe [may] is not commonly so taken: and espe­cially when the latter part of the dis­iunction, which is affirmed, is no way lesse certayne, but rather more cer­taine then the former part: which note, I wish the Reader to obserue chiefly for the Doctrine of this pre­sent clause, which doth not affirme, that Princes beeing excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, may be mur­thered or deposed by their subiects, for then some might imagine the sense to be that such Princes may be mur­thered or at least wise deposed, because the deposing of such Princes, is lesser [Page 101]then the murthering of thē, but seeing that it is affirmed, that such Princes may be deposed or murthered, it is ma­nifest, that the Coniunction [or] can not signifie at least wise, because if the Doctrine of deposing such Princes may be abiured as hereticall, much more and not much lesse the Doctrine of murthering them may bee abiured as hereticall.

9. And by this it is apparant, that to abiure as hereticall this Doctrine, & conditionall disiunctiue position, That Princes which be excommunicated or de­priued by the Pope, may be deposed or murthered by their subiects, or any other whatsoeuer; it sufficeth by force and vertue of the words, onely to abiure as hereticall the Doctrine of murthe­ring such Princes, although, by reason of the matter, it be lawfull (as you shal see forthwith) to abiure as hereticall not onely the Doctrine of murthering, but also of deposing such Princes.

10. That the Doctrine of murthe­ring such Princes is hereticall, or, which is all one, contayneth in it a manifest falshood, which is repugnant to the [Page 102] Word of God, it is euident by those two places of holy Scripture cited by Widdrington, Thou shalt not kill, Exod. 20. which words are generall and common to euerie vniust killing, and Kill him not, for who shall extend his hand vpon the Lords annoynted, and bee innocent, 1. Reg. 26. Which wordes are proper and peculiar to the mur­thering of Princes. Neyther doth the excommunicating, or depriuing of Prin­ces by the Pope, which are added in this Doctrine and position, giue suffi­cient warrant to murther such Prin­ces, although wee should admit that the Pope hath authoritie to depriue them; for that Excommunication de­priueth onely of spirituall graces, and depriuation onely of temporall King­domes, but neyther of them of cor­porall life, as Suarez also confesseth.Suarez in de­fens. &c. lib. 6. cap. 4. nu. 10. & seq. Yea we may truely abiure as manifest­ly false, damnable, and repugnant to those words of holy Scriptures, Thou shalt not kill, and consequently as here­ticall, this Doctrine and position, That it is lawfull for euery man to kill a male­factour, who is condemned by the Iudge [Page 103]to dye, for that the sentence of death denounced against him by the Iudge doth not giue leaue, licence, warrant, and commission to euerie man to put him to death, but onely to the She­rife, or others, who are appoyn­ted Executioners of iustice in that case.

11. That the Doctrine also of de­posing such Princes is hereticall, and contayneth a manifest falshood repug­nant to the Word of God, it is eui­dent; for that to take away by force and violence the Crowne and King­dome of a Prince who is in possession thereof, only vpon a probable or con­trouersed title, is open iniustice, as you haue seene before in the fift Ob­seruation; and consequently Theft and Rapine in a most high degree, and therefore repugnant both to that pre­cept of the Decalogue, Thou shalt not steale, and to the third Commaunde­ment, Honour thy Father and Mother, wherein the honour and reuerence, which is due from subiects to their Prince, who is the Father of the Coun­trie, is according to the doctrine of all [Page 104]Diuines included, and it is also speci­ally against that commaundement of our Sauiour, Render to Caesar the things that are Caesars, which precept inclu­deth also the negatiue, not to take a­way from Caesar that which is his due,Matth. 22. as contrariwise that precept, Thou shalt not steale, includeth also the affir­matiue, to render and restore backe what hath beene wrongfully taken a­way. Wherefore there is no more scruple to be made, to abiure the a­foresaid Doctrine and position as im­pious, damnable, and heretical, then to abiure it as manifestly false and iniuri­ous to Princes, seeing that the mani­fest falshood and iniustice contayned therein, is expresly repugnant to the word and commaundement of God reuealed to vs in the holy Scriptures: and it is also grounded vpon these two manifest principles, and which without manifest impudency cannot be denyed by any man; The one, that it is a contouersie among Catholicks, whether the Pope hath authoritie to depriue Princes, & the other, that it is open iniustice to depose, or to thrust [Page 105]one out of his possession vpon a title, which is not most certaine but in con­trouersie.

12. Lastly, I wish the Reader to consider the third and last exposition of this Branch, which Widdrington brought in his Theologicall Disputati­on, and defendeth at large in, his An­swere to Fitz-herberts Reply against the same, to wit, that albeit in regard of the matter, wee may lawfully ab­iure for heretical, the doctrine not on­ly of murthering, but also of desposing Princes, which bee excommunicated or depriued by the Pope, yet, by force and vertue of the wordes, wee are not bound to abiure either the doctrine of deposing, or also of murthering such Princes, for hereticall, but only as hereticall, that is, for a very false and iniurious doctrine in the highest degree almost of fal­shood and iniustice, and which there­fore in regard of the abhorring, de­testing, and abiuring thereof, hath some resemblance and similitude with hereticall doctrine, although we take the word hereticall in the most [Page 106]strict and rigorous sense that may be. And the reason is, for that the Ad­uerbe [as] being an Aduerbe of simi­litude, doth properly and vsually by force and vertue of the word denote only a similitude, and if at any time it signifie an identitie, equalitie, or realtie, as (sometimes it doth, but most commonly it doth not) it is not by force of the word, but only in re­gard of the matter, to which it is ap­plyed. And this Explication will serue very well to conuince the wil­fulnesse of him, who out of his ha­tred to this Oath, will contrarie to all reason, and the rules before assigned out of Suarez, needes haue the word hereticall to bee taken only for that, which the definition of the Church maketh hereticall, and which before was not hereticall, although it was most euidently false, and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, and the word impious only for that, which is against pietie, which is due to God or car­nall Parents, albeit otherwise it bee neuer so wicked and iniurious to Princes who are the Fathers of the [Page 107]Countrie. For we may verie well an­swere him, that the Aduerbe as being an Aduerbe of similitude, and by force of the word, and, according to the plaine and common sense and vn­derstanding of the same, signifying only a similitude, & not a reality, but in regard of the matter to which it is referred, doth in this Branch denote only a similitude of that strict and ri­gorous Heresie and Impietie, because the matter, to which it is applyed, will not suffer it to signifie a doctrine impious and hereticall in that strict and rigorous manner, but only by way of comparison and similitude: and then the sense and meaning of this Branch is, that I doe abhorre, detest, and ab­iure that doctrine and position as im­pious and hereticall, that is, in a most high degree of horror and detestati­on, and not much vnlike to the dete­sting of that doctrine, which is impi­ous and hereticall, in that ouer­much strict and rigorous manner. Ne­uerthelesse this Explication, as hath beene shewed aboue, is not necessary, but only for such wilfull persons, as do [Page 108]seeke to expound the wordes of the Oath in the most odious sense, con­trarie to the plaine and common vn­derstanding of them, and the true meaning of the Law-maker.

1. This Clause hath in it no more difficultie, then is in the former, see­ing that it implieth, supposeth, and is grounded vpon the iustice and ve­ritie of the Third and Second Branch. First, therefore by those wordes. [And I doe beleeue] is not vnderstood a supernaturall beliefe, but only a morall credulitie, as the next wordes [and in conscience am resolued] which are an explication of the former, doe sufficiently declare: and the sense of them is, that I doe thinke and am [Page 109]perswaded in my conscience, that nei­ther the Pope, &c. For it cannot with any reason be imagined, that the words which are last added, must di­minish, but rather increase, or at least wise more fully declare the truth and veritie of the former wordes: As for example, it were vnaptly spoken to say, that such a one is a man, and also a liuing creature; Princes may be mur­thered, and also deposed by the Pope: I doe most certainly beleeue so, and also I doe thinke or am perswaded so.

2. Secondly, the meaning of this Clause is not to deny the Popes power to absolue, or dispence in Oaths in ge­nerall, but only in this Oath, or any part thereof, as the expresse wordes doe plainly signifie; neither doth it follow, that because the Pope cannot dispence in this Oath, therefore hee cannot in other Oaths, wherein there is not the like reason as of this, or that because hee can dispense in other Oaths, wherein there is not the like reason, therefore hee can dispence in this.

3. Thirdly, neither is it the mea­ning [Page 110]of this Clause, that if perchance any one should offend God by taking this Oath against his conscience, thin­king it to be vnlawfull, the Pope hath not power to absolue him in the Sa­crament of Penance from the guilt of sinne thereby committed, but only the meaning is, that the Pope hath not power to absolue or dispence, with any man in this Oath, or any part thereof, that is, to free, release, and discharge him from performing any of those things, which in this Oath hee hath promised to performe, or, which is all one, to giue him leaue or licence to do against that, which in this Oath hee hath promised to doe, or not to doe. For all the parts and parcels of this Oath are either assertorie, as that Our Soueraigne Lord King Iames is lawfull and rightfull King of this Realme, &c. and that the Pope hath not any power or authoritie to depose him, &c. or to au­thorize any forraigne Prince to inuade or annoy Him or His Countries, or to discharge any of His subiects of their Allegiance, &c. and that from my heart I doe abhorre, detest, and abiure [Page 111]as impious and hereticall, &c. and no assertorie Oaths can bee dispenced withall, neither hath the Pope any power or authoritie, according to the receiued doctrine of all Diuines, to absolue any man from the bond of these kind of Oaths;So S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 9. and all other Di­uines. And the reason is, because the matter of an assertorie Oath being of an act present or past, is now made altogether necessarie and irreuocable, for that as soone as euer the Oath is made, it is either true or false by reason of the truth or fals­hood of the act which now is past. Wherefore seeing that it is impossi­ble, that the act which is past, be not past, so also it is impossible, that the Popes Dispensation or Absolution can alter it or recall it: for it is impossible, that the act of swearing, which is now, or hath beene true, be not now, or hath not beene true: Or else they are promissorie, to wit, wherein some thing is promised for the future time to bee done, or not to be done. And only these kinde of Oathes can bee dispenced withall. For as well saith Saint Thomas, S. Thom. 2. 2. q. 89. ar. 7. with whome all other [Page 112]Diuines doe herein agree, the bond of an Oath is referred to some thing which is to bee performed or omit­ted, wherefore it doth not appertayne to an assertorie Oath which is of a thing present or past, but only to a promissorie Oath.

4. Now in this Oath of Allegiance only three things are promised by the swearer, all which are contained in the third Branch; to wit, that not­withstanding any declaration or sen­tence of Excommunication or depriua­tion made or to bee made against the Kings Maiestie, his Heires or Succes­sors, First, he will beare faith, and true allegiance to his Maiestie, his Heires and Successors: Secondly, hee will de­fend them to the vttermost of his pow­er against all Conspiracies &c. and Thirdly, he wil make known vnto them all Treasons & trayterous Conspiracies, which hee shall know or heare of to bee made against any of them. Wherefore there is no more difficultie in this Clause, then is in the third, whereon this Clause is chiefely grounded. And therefore it is most euident, that the [Page 113] Pope hath no more authoritie to Ab­solue, or dispence in any of these three things, which the swearer promiseth, then hee hath authoritie to depose the King, and to make him no King: for that it is most certaine, as Cardinall Bellarmine him selfe confesseth,Bell. in Tract. contra Barclai. cap. 21. pag. 202. that Subiects are bound by the Law of God to beare faith and true Allegiance (which includeth the resisting and disclosing of all Treasons and Trai­terous Conspiracies) to their lawfull Prince, so long as he remaineth Prince: seeing that it is euident, as well ob­serueth Suarez, Suarez in De­fens. &c. lib. 3. cap. 3 num. 3. that the obligation of obedience in any degree or state whatso­euer doth so long endure in the subiect, as the dignitie, or power and iurisdicti­on doth endure in the Superiour, for these are corelatiues, and the one de­pendeth on the other. Therefore it is manifest, that the Pope hath no more authoritie to absolue, or dispense in this Oath, or any part thereof, to wit, in those three things before mentio­ned, then hee hath to make Kings no Kings, and to depriue them of their Regall dignitie, power, and iurisdicti­on.

[Page 114]5. Fourthly, neither is it the mea­ning of this Clause, that the Pope hath not any power to absolue the swearer from the promise which hee maketh to performe those three things mentioned in the third Branch, only with this reduplication, as it is sworne or confirmed by Oath, or, which is all one, only from the sacred and religious bond of the Oath; but the meaning is, that the Pope hath not authoritie to absolue from this Oath or any part thereof for as much it concer­neth the ciuill and naturall obligation of temporall Allegiance; both for that, when it is said that the Pope hath authoritie to absolue one from an Oath, which he hath made to doe some certaine thing, the meaning is, (according to the plaine and proper signification of the words, the com­mon Doctrine of all Diuines, and the vsuall practices of Popes, who when they absolue from any Oath, they absolue from all obligation whatsoeuer contained thereinSee the Ca­nons Nos San­ctorum, Iuratos, Absolutos.) that the Pope, hath authoritie to release him of that promise, and to giue [Page 115]him leaue to doe otherwise then hee hath promised by Oath to doe: And also for that his Maiestie and the State, according to whose meaning especially the doubtfull words of this Oath are to bee vnderstood and determined, doe little regard this subtile quircke of refined wits, whe­ther the Pope hath power to absolue his Maiesties subiects from the sa­cred and religious bond of their na­turall Allegiance, or, which is all one, only as it is sworne, or confirmed by Oath, so that notwithstanding the releasing of this sacred bond, they may bee assured, that the ciuill and naturall obligation of the subiects temporall Allegiance, to the confir­mation whereof this Oath is superad­ded, doth remaine inuiolable, and indispensable, and by the Popes au­thoritie cannot any way be dissolued or diminished, but that his Subiects, although they might by the Popes authoritie bee absolued from the sa­cred bond of their Allegiance as it is confirmed by Oath, are neuerthelesse by the Law of God and Nature obli­ged [Page 116]to beare faith and true Allegi­ance to his Maiestie, and that there­in the Pope hath no authoritie to dis­pense.

6. And although wee should for Disputation sake admit, that it were the meaning of this Clause, that the Pope hath no authoritie to absolue the swearer so much as from the Sa­cred bond of this Oath, or any part thereof, or, which is all one, from any of these three things promised in the third Branch, only with this re­duplication as they are sworne, or confirmed by Oath (of which nice subtiltie his Maiestie and the Parlia­ment by all likelihood little dreamed) yet any man may with great reason thinke, and in conscience be resolued, that the Pope hath no such authoritie: for that, according to the common doctrine of Diuines, the Pope hath not power to absolue from Oaths, when the absoluing from them tendeth to the temporall preiudice of a third person, vnlesse either directly or in­directly hee hath power to dispose of the temporall goods of that per­son. [Page 117]For hee hath not power, saith Sotus, Aragona, and Sayrus Scotus lib. 8. de Instit. q. 1. art. 9. Aragona 2. 2. q. 89. art. 9. Sayrus lib. 5. Thesauri cap. 8. num. 4. to release an Oath which one hath made to ano­ther man to pay him that debt which he oweth him, because he hath not pow­er to take from another man that which is his owne, and therefore he can not doe him wrong in releasing the Oath which was made vnto him. Wherefore this difference is betweene Vowes and Oaths, that in changing and dispencing of Vowes that only must be regarded which is more pleasing to God, but in releasing of Oaths great caution must be vsed, that no wrong be done to a third person.

7. And this is farre more euident in the doctaine of Saint Thomas, S. Thom. 2. 2. qu. 89. art. 9. whom the greatest part of Diuines doe herein follow, who houldeth, that the Pope cannot dispence in Oaths by releasing directly the sa­cred obligation of the Oath, for that this obligation is de iure naturae, wherein the Pope cannot dispence, but only by declaring, that the thing promised by Oath, which before was a fit thing to bee sworne, and [Page 118]therefore by vertue of the Oath to be performed, so long as it remay­neth so, is now, by reason of some particular accident or circumstance, become vnlawfull, hurtful, or an hin­derance of greater good, and there­fore now no fit matter to be sworne, nor by vertue of the Oath to be now any longer performed. From whence it plainely followeth, that the Pope cannot absolue from this Oath of Al­legiance, vnlesse hee hath power to declare, that temporall Allegiance, which Subiects by the Law of God, and Nature owe to their lawfull Prince so long as he remaineth Prince, be vnlawfull, hurtfull, or an hinde­rance of greater good, which he can­not in any wise declare, vnlesse hee hath power to make a King no King. For consequently hee should also de­clare, that God and Nature comman­ding Subiects to beare true faith and Allegiance to their lawfull Prince, should enioyne them an vnlawfull or hurtfull thing, or which is an hinde­rance of greater good, which is im­possible. And so in this Clause there [Page 109]is no more difficultie concerning this point of the Popes authoritie not to absolue from this Oath of Allegiance, or any part thereof, then is in the for­mer clauses, wherein the Popes autho­ritie to depose Kings, and to absolue Subiects from their naturall allegi­ance, is denyed.

8. Lastly, by those words [nor any person whatsoeuer] is not vnderstood the Kings Maiestie: Both for that in the Lawes of this Realme the Kings Maiestie is not vnderstood by the name of person, or persons, when the matter is odious: & also, as in no penal law the Prince or Law-maker himselfe is included vnder any generall word, because he is not subiect to such laws, according to that principle of the law, Princeps legibus solutus est, The Prince is free from lawes: Leg Princeps. ff. de Legibus. so also when it is said in the Law, that no person what­soeuer hath power to dispence in that law, or to change or alter that Law, the Law-maker himselfe, who is aboue the Law, is not comprehended vnder those generall words; yea and, as well obserueth Salas and Sa, both Ie­suites, [Page 120] In a generall speech the person who speaketh is vnderstood to bee excep­ted. Salas disp. 21. de Legibus sec. 3. regula 22. & Emanuel Sa verbo Interpre­tatio. nu. 14.

9. And although we should admit, that the Kings Maiestie were inclu­ded in those wordes [nor any person whatsoeuer] yet this clause would ne­uerthelesse be very true: And the rea­son is, for that albeit his Maiestie hath power to dispence with his sub­iects, that they shall not take this Oath, which is not the meaning of this Clause, yet he hath not power to absolue them from this Oath, or any part thereof after they haue once ta­ken it, which is the true sense & mea­ning of this Branch. First, for that to dispence or absolue from Oaths (taking those words [to dispence or absolue] according to their proper significati­on, and as they are taken commonly by Diuines) doth belong onely to spirituall and not to temporall pow­er. Wherefore the Diuines make a great difference betweene absoluing or dispencing in Oathes or Vowes, and releasing or annulling the same; and they affirme, that to release or annull [Page 121]an Oath or Vow, a temporall power, yea and sometimes priuate authoritie may suffice, as Parents may release and annull the oathes and vowes of their children; but to absolue or di­spence in an Oath or Vow, a spirituall authoritie and iurisdiction is necessa­rily required. But secondly, and prin­cipally, for that his Maiestie hath not power to release his subiects from their temporall and naturall allegi­ance, vnlesse he will cease to be their Prince, because temporall allegiance is by the law of God and Nature due to him from his Subiects, so long as he remayneth their Prince; and ther­fore he cannot absolue, discharge, or release them from the Obligation of this Oath or any part thereof; or, which is all one, he cannot giue them leaue, not to beare faith and true allegi­ance to his Maiestie, and consequently not to defend him to the vttermost of their power against all Treasons and trayterous conspiracies, which shall be made against his Royall person, Crowne and digni­tie, and not to doe their best endea­uor to disclose, and make them knowne [Page 122]vnto his Maiestie, seeing that to per­forme all these things Subiects are bound by the law of God and Nature, wherein no temporall or spirituall au­thoritie can dispence. And therefore the Authour of the Protestants Apolo­gie for the Roman Church, trac. 3. Sec. 5. doth very well affirme, that all Ca­tholikes are by all Lawes, Diuine and Humane, indissolubly obliged in the highest degree of all earthly Allegiance to his Maiestie that now is, as to their true, vndoubted, lawfull Soueraigne liege Lord and King.

1. This Branch contayneth in it no difficultie at all, if wee consider what [Page 123]hath beene said before; to wit, that in this Oath is onely demanded a sincere profession of true temporall allegi­ance, and that no authoritie or obe­dience, which is due to the Pope, is de­nied therein: And that to treat of the Popes authoritie, not affirmatiuely what power he hath, but affirmatiuely what authoritie in temporalls the Kings Maiestie hath ouer his King­dome and Subiects; and consequent­ly what authoritie in temporalls the Pope hath not ouer the said kingdome and subiects: and also, that to exact of Subiects an Oath not onely of their temporall allegiance in generall, but also of such allegiance in particular, which his Maiestie and the State shall for prudent reasons & motiues thinke to be necessarie for the preseruation of the Kingdome from future Trea­sons, Inuasions, or Perturbations, so that it bee contayned within the bounds of true temporall allegiance, doth no way exceede the limits of temporall authoritie.

2. First therefore by those words [good and full authoritie] is not vnder­stood [Page 124]any authoritie of the Kings Ma­iestie in Ecclesiasticall causes, but onely in temporall matters, as is the mini­string of an Oath of true temporall allegiance. For although his Maiesty be perswaded, that hee hath full and supreme authoritie not onely in tem­porall, but also in Ecclesiastical affaires, for externall gouernement; and that the Pope hath not ouer him or his Subiects within this Realme, any au­thoritie or iurisdiction, nor power to excommunicate his Maiestie, yet his meaning is not to meddle at all in this Oath eyther with his owne, or with the Popes Ecclesiasticall Supremacie, but onely with his owne temporall So­ueraigntie, and consequently with the Popes authoritie not to depose him, or to dispose of his Kingdome, or to au­thorize any forraigne Prince to inuade or annoy him, or to absolue his Sub­iects from their obedience, &c. And therefore, as I obserued before in the third obseruation, wee must distin­guish betwixt his Maiesties vnder­standing or perswasion, and his mea­ning or intention: for his meaning [Page 125]was not to exact in this Oath of His Subiects all which hee is perswaded he might lawfully exact of them, but only to demand of them in this Oath a profession of that temporall Allegi­ance, which all Subiects are bound by the Law of God to giue to their law­full Soueraigne, as it is manifest by the declaration both of His Maiestie and also of the Parliament: and therefore Hee was carefull not to meddle with the Popes authority to excommunicate Him,

3. Secondly, it is certaine, that al­beit Christian Princes haue not au­thoritie to define and determine what position is hereticall, or to punish He­retikes with spirituall punishments (for these are meere spirituall things) yet they haue authoritie to command their subiects to abiure such positions as are alreadie defined, or knowne to bee manifestly false and repugnant to the holy Scriptures, for such: and to punish with temporall punishments the obstinate maintayners of the same, especially as the mayntayning of such positions is hurtfull to the [Page 126]publike temporall peace, whereof the King hath charge: and who there­fore may also by the materiall Sword repell the wrongs and iniuries offered to the temporall Kingdome or Com­mon-wealth by Clergie-men, and al­so the abuses of the spirituall Sword, when they tend to the hurt of the ci­uill Common-wealth, as Franciscus Ʋictoria, Ioannes Parisiensis, and Co­uerruuias doe well obserue.Victoria Relect. 1. de potest. Ec­cles. sec. 7. §. o­ctaua propo­sitio. Parisiensis de potest. Reg. & Pap. cap. 11. ad 37. Couerruu. cap. 35. Practic. question. Where­fore a King, saith Dominicus Bannes, Bannes 2. 2. q. 11. ar. q. 1. doth punish Heretikes as most seditious Enemies to the peace of His Kingdome, which cannot be preserued without vni­tie of Religion. And Marriage, saith Dominicus Sotus, Sotus in 4. dist. 29. q. 1. ar. 4. being a Sacrament in such sort, that it is also a ciuill con­tract, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiasticall Court, so in regard of the later it is subiect also in some sort to the Ciuill. Not that Princes can alter those things which are of the substance of Matrimonie, but that they may pu­nish them, who contract they shall offend a­gainst the publike peace: for against [Page 127]those crimes, whose iudgement doth be­long to the Ecclesiasticall Court, they may also ordayne punishments, as they disturbe the peace of the Common­wealth. Which doctrine of Sotus may in the very like manner bee ap­plyed to Heresie, which being a spiri­rituall offence in such sort, that also it disturbeth the temporall peace of the Common-wealth, it nothing letteth, but that as in the former respect it belongeth to the Ecclesiasticall Court, so in regard of the later it is subiect also in some sort to the Ciuill; not that Princes can determine and define what is Heresie, but that they may punish Heretikes, when by defending hereticall positions, they shall offend against the publike good. For against those crimes, whose iudgement doth belong to the Ecclesia­sticall Court, they may also ordayne pu­nishments, as they disturbe the peace of the Common-wealth. And therefore Christian Princes haue good and full power to compell their Subiects to abiure impious, damnable, and here­ticall positions for such, when it is ne­cessarie to the preseruation of the [Page 128]publike temporall peace, and to dis­couer how their Subiects stand affect­ted in point of their Loyaltie and due Obedience.

4. Thirdly, it is euident, that Clergie-men being truely subiect to temporall Princes, in regard of their naturall birth, and of their liuing in Ciuill Societie with others, and con­sequently bound, according to the common doctrine of Diuines, to ob­serue their iust Lawes not only vira­tionis, but also vi legis, by force of the Law, doe owe true Allegiance to their naturall Prince, no lesse then Lay men, and that therefore hee may lawfully demand of them, as they are Sub­iects, an Oath of their Allegiance, whensoeuer hee shall iustly suspect their fidelitie. And although some Clergie-men should bee so capricious, as to imagine, contrarie to the pra­ctice of the Primitiue Church, the doctrine of the Ancient Fathers, and manifest reason, that they are not sub­iect at all to the authoritie of tempo­rall Princes, and thereupon should make a scruple to take this Oath as [Page 129] lawfully ministred to them by good and full authoritie, yet this could not bee a sufficient proofe, that the Oath is vnlawfull in it selfe, or that Lay-men cannot lawfully take it, and also ac­knowledge, that it is lawfully mini­stred vnto them by good and full au­thoritie.

5. Lastly, in those words [And I doe renounce all Pardons and Dispen­sations to the contrarie] is not implyed a renouncing in generall of the Popes authoritie to giue Pardons and Dis­pensations, but, as the wordes doe plainly signifie, in them is only con­tayned a denyall of the Popes autho­ritie to dispence with the Swearer, or to giue him leaue and license to doe contrarie to that which hee hath pro­mised in this Oath. Wherefore the veritie of these last wordes is chiefly grounded vpon the lawfulnesse of the Fift Branch. For if the Pope hath no power and authoritie to absolue the Swearer from any part of this Oath, because those three things be­fore mentioned, which he promiseth to performe, he is bound by the Law [Page 130]of God and Nature to performe, and that therein no authoritie of Pope or Prince can dispence, it is manifest, that hee may lawfully renounce all Pardons and Dispensations to the contrarie.

1. This Branch is greatly to bee regarded, for that it expresly decla­reth, in what sense the Swearer is bound to take all the parts and par­cels of this Oath. And first, by those first words And all these things I doe plainly and sincerely acknowledge and [Page 131]sweare, &c.] it is manifest, that the immediate obiect of all this Oath and euery part therof, or, which is all one, that which in all the for­mer Branches I doe directly and im­mediatly sweare, is my plaine and sin­cere acknowledgement, to wit, that our Soueraigne Lord King Iames is the lawfull and rightfull King of this Realme, &c. and that the Pope hath not any power or authoritie to depose him, &c. and that I will beare Faith & true Allegiance to His Maiestie, &c. and that from my heart I doe abhorre, de­test and abiure as impious and hereti­call, &c. and that I doe beleeue and in conscience am resolued, &c. and that it is lawfully ministred vnto me by good and full authoritie, and that I doe renounce all Pardons and Dispensati­ons to the contrarie. Whereupon the Oath concludeth thus: And I doe make this recognition and acknowledge­ment heartily, willingly and truly vpon the true faith of a Christian. So that the plaine and proper meaning of this Branch is, that whatsoeuer I doe sweare in this Oath, I doe sweare [Page 132]plainly and sincerely according to these expresse words, &c.

2. Secondly, the meaning of those words [without any equiuocation, &c.] is not, that there is not to be found in this Oath any equiuocall wordes, and which may not haue two proper and vsuall significations, especially if they be taken barely and by themselues a­lone (for if wee consider them as they be ioined with other words and make a full and perfect sentence, and doe al­so duly regard the intention of the Law-maker with the other obserua­tions before set downe, we shall hard­ly find any one sentence in this Oath so equiuocall or ambiguous, that ac­cording to the common vnderstand­ing of men it hath two senses, equal­ly common, which is properly to bee equiuocal.) But the plaine and proper meaning of those words is, that the Swearer must not in this Oath equi­uocate, or vse any equiuocation, men­tal euasion, or secret reseruation what­soeuer, but that he must deale plainly and sincerely according to the minde and intention of the Law-maker. For [Page 133]it is one thing to vse equiuocall words, and an other thing to equiuocate, or to vse equiuocation, because one may vse equiuocal words, and not deceiue or delude the hearer, for that hee v­seth the words in that sense, wherein the hearer vnderstandeth them. But to equiuocate implyeth a fraudulent, deceitfull, and vnsincere dealing by v­sing the words in an other sense, then the hearer vnderstandeth them.

3. Wherefore the plaine meaning of this Branch is, that albeit in this Oath there might bee found diuerse common senses of the same wordes, yet the Swearer must not equiuocate, but hee must take the wordes in that sense, wherin the Law-maker vnder­standeth them, with whome hee is bound, by vertue of this Branch, to deale plainly, sincerely, without any guile, fraude, deceit, euasion, or se­cret reseruation whatsoeuer. But if perchance there should any difficulty arise concerning any ambiguous word, or sentence contayned in this Oath, and the will, meaning, and in­tention of the Law-maker could not [Page 134]bee knowne, then wee must vse those rules, which, according to the appro­ued doctrine of all Diuines and Law­yers, wee haue aboue set downe for the interpreting of doubtfull and am­biguous speeches in any Law. And namely among the rest, that in penall Lawes and odious matters the mil­der and more fauourable sense, and which contayneth in it no absurditie, is to be chosen.

4 Seeing therefore that, according to the doctrine of all Diuines, it is not lawfull to equiuocate, or to vse equi­uocation, but we must answere plain­ly and sincerely according to the mea­ning and intention of the Iudge, when hee proceedeth iuridically, and de­mandeth no vniust and vnlawfull thing, but which hee hath authoritie to demand, it is manifest, that the ve­ritie of this Branch dependeth whol­ly vpon the lawfulnesse of the Oath, and vpon the authoritie of the ma­ker thereof, and that consequently there is no difficultie in this Clause, supposing the lawfulnesse of the for­mer Clauses, and that this Oath is [Page 135] lawfully ministred by good and full au­thoritie.

1. The lawfulnesse of this Branch dependeth wholly vpon the veritie and iustice of the former Clauses, and will cleerely appeare, if wee suppose, as hath beene shewed before, that this Oath of Allegiance contayneth in it no falshood or iniustice, and that it is ministred vnder great penalties by lawfull authoritie, to make a tri­all how his Maiesties subiects stand affected in point of their loyaltie and due obedience. For as Vasquez ob­serueth very well out of Aristotle, Vasquez 1. 2. Disp. 51. cap. 3. & disp. 73. cap. 7. & disp. 86. cap. 5. with whom all Diuines and Philoso­phers do herein agree, to make an act of vertue to bee morally good and [Page 136]vertuous, it is not only required, that it haue a good and vertuous obiect, but also it must bee done directly for the goodnesse and honestie of the vertue it selfe, and not for any other end or motiue. For otherwise if one doe acts of vertue, as of iustice, or temperance, not for iustice or tempe­rance sake, but for some other end, as for lucre, vaine glorie, feare of punishment, or any other motiue whatsoeuer, he sholl doe, saith Aristo­tle, Aristot. 2. E­thic. cap. 4. iust or temperate actions, but hee shall not doe them iustly or temperately, neither shall hee for doing those actions be accounted a iust or temperate man. Seeing therefore that euery iust and vertuous man ought to obserue iust Lawes, not for feare of punishment as the wicked do, but heartily, willingly, and truely, that is, sincerely, and vn­fainedly, for the loue of vertue, it is euident, that euery good and well af­fected subiect may and ought to take this Oath of Allegiance, supposing it to be lawfull and ministred by good and full authoritie, not for feare of punishment, as likewise we ought to [Page 137]obserue God his commandements, not for feare of eternall damnation, but heartily, willingly, and vnfained­ly, for the loue of vertue and obedi­ence. Wherefore it is manifest, that euery good and vertuous Subiect ought to haue a farre greater wil­lingnesse in obseruing iust Lawes, al­though they be imposed vnder paine of death, then hath a Merchant be­ing in danger of drowning, to cast o­uer board his goods for sauing his life: for that a Merchant in that case is only willing to lose his goods, for that otherwise hee cannot escape the danger of his life, but euery vertuous man ought to obserue iust Lawes heartily, willingly, and vnfainedly, for vertue and obedience sake, al­though hee were in no danger of be­ing punished for not obseruing the same.

2. And thus thou seest good Reader, that this new Oath of Allegiance doth not want either Ʋeritie, Iustice or Iudgement, as well in regard of the takers, as of the makers & propoun­ders of the same: That the State, [Page 138]supposing that horrible Powder Trea­son, which was grounded vpon co­lour and pretence of the Popes autho­ritie to take away the Crownes and liues of Princes in order to spirituall good, had iust cause to deuise a new Oath of Allegiance, wherein menti­on should bee made of the aforesaid authoritie, to make a true difference, betwixt ciuilly obedient Subiects, and the peruerse disciples of those Powder Traitors, it is euident by that which hath beene said before in the fourth obseruation: and that therfore the State in deuising and propounding such an Oath did not want Iudge­ment. Also that the Subiect hath iust cause to take the Oath, supposing it to bee lawfull and ministred by good and full authoritie, and that conse­quently in taking it, after he hath ex­amined and seene the lawfulnesse thereof, doth not want Iudgement, it is as euident, as that there is no want of Iudgement to obserue the iust commandement of his Lawfull Supe­riour, when after due examination he findeth the commandement to bee [Page 139]iust. And finally, that no assertorie Clause of the Oath wanteth Veritie, nor any Promissorie Clause wanteth Iustice, or, which is all one, that no falshood or iniustice is to bee found in any part or parcell of the Oath, it is manifest by the former Explicati­on of euery Branch in particular.

1. THere remaineth only one dif­ficultie to be explained con­cerning the Popes Breues, which for­bid English Catholikes to take this new Oath for that it containeth many things which are plainely against faith and saluation. And although Wid­drington both in his Theologicall Dis­putation, and also more fully in his Answere to Fitz-herberts Reply hath cleared this difficultie,Wriddrington in his Disput. Theolog. cap. 10. sec. 2. and in his Answere to Fitzherb. part. 3. cap. 7. yet I thinke it not amisse briefly to set downe some generall heads of his answere to the said Breues, whereby any iudicious man may haue sufficient grounds to [Page 140]iudge not only how farre the Popes a­foresaid Breues, but also all other of the like kind may without any irre­uerence or disobedience to the Sea Apostolike be contradicted, or not ad­mitted by good and vertuous Catho­likes.

2. First therefore, Widdrington sheweth out of the approued Do­ctrine of Suarez and other Diuines, that there bee two sorts of Lawes or Precepts, the one are called Constitu­tiue, for that they doe not suppose, but make the thing, which they for­bid, to be vnlawfull, which, if that Precept were not, would be lawfull, as the Precept of the Church to fast from Flesh in Lent, to abstaine from seruile works vpon commanded Ho­ly-daies, to receiue the Blessed Sacra­ment at Easter, or the like: And that no Constitutiue Precept of the Church doth binde, when by obseruing it there is danger to incurre some nota­ble corporall or temporall hurt. The other are called Declaratiue, for that they doe not make, but suppose and declare the thing to bee vnlawfull [Page 141]which they forbid, as being forbid­den by some former Law; as the for­bidding of Theft, Murder, Whore­dome, Vsurie, and such like, for that they are before forbidden by the Law of God and Nature: And that the obligation of Declaratiue Precepts doth only depend vpon the reason and former Law, which in the Decla­ratiue Precept is supposed and de­clared: So that if there bee no such former Law or prohibition, as in the Declaratiue Precept is supposed and declared, the Declaratiue Precept hath no force to bind.

3. Secondly, he sheweth, that the Popes Breues forbidding English Ca­tholikes to take the Oath, doe not containe a Constitutiue, but only a Declaratiue Precept, neither do they make, but suppose and declare the Oath to be vnlawfull, for that, say the Breues, it contayneth in it many things, which are manifestly against faith and saluation; and that conse­quently, if in the Oath there bee no­thing against faith or saluation, as the Breues suppose and declare, it is ma­nifest, [Page 142]that the Breues haue no force at all to bind English Catholickes not to take the Oath, for that they are grounded vpon a false reason, sup­position, and declaration.

4. Thirdly, he sheweth that all de­claratiue Breues are eyther definitiue, or grounded vpon some former defi­nition, of Pope or Councell, or else they are onely opinatiue, or grounded vpon the Popes opinatiue iudgement, perswasion, or probable opinion: And that if they bee grounded vpon the Popes opinion, no man is bound to o­bey them, as neyther to follow his o­pinion, whereon they are grounded: but hee may as lawfully contradict them, as he may contradict his opini­on, although the Pope thinke it to bee neuer so probable: And that vpon this ground, cause, and reason, it was law­full for Catholickes to contradict the declaratiue Breue of Pope Nicholas the First, De consecr. dist. 4. can. A quodam Iu­daeo. wherein he declared, that Baptisme ministred in the name of Christ without expressing the three persons of the B. Trinitie was valid and true Bap­tisme: And the declaratiue Breue of [Page 143]Pope Celestine the Third, Which was once extant in the Canon Law, in cap. Laudabilem de controuers. con­iugot. wherein he declared, and, as Alphonsus de Ca­stro saith,Castro lib. 1. de haeres. cap. 4. he defined, that Marriage is so dissolued by heresie, that the partie whose Consort falleth into heresie, may lawfully marry an other, which Do­ctrine is now condemned in the Coun­cell of Trent: Sec. 24. de Reform. can. 5. And the declaratiue Breues or Letters of Pope Iohn the 22. who publiquely taught and declared, that the soules of the Blessed should not see God, before the resurrection, See Castro lib. 3. contra haeres. verbo Beatitudo hae­res. 6. Bellar. lib. 4. de Rom. Pont. c. 14. Hadrianus Papa in quaest. de Confirm. circa finem, and other Hi­stories. where­in hee was contradicted by the Do­ctours of Paris, and caused to recall his Doctrine: And the declaratiue Breue of Pope Boniface the eight, wherein he declared, that Philip the French King was subiect to him in spi­ritualls and temporalls, wherein he was contradicted by the French Nation, and taxed of wonderfull impudency. See Nico­laus Vignerius ad annum 1300.

5. Fourthly, he sheweth, that the Popes declaratiue Breues forbidding Catho­licks to take the oath, for that it contay­neth many things which are manifestly against faith and saluation, are neyther definitiue, for that they are not dire­cted to the whole Church, nor doe [Page 144]contayne any of those rules, which, according to Cardinal Bellarmine and other Diuines, is required to a true and infallible definition of faith (for onely of this kind of definition now wee speake) and that although they were definitiue, yet considering that it is a probable Doctrine, that the Pope hath no authoritie infallibly to define without a generall Councell, no Ca­tholicke is bound to giue more credit to his definition, then to follow his probable Doctrine and opinion: ney­ther are they grounded vpon any for­mer definition of Pope or Councell, and which all Catholickes are bound to admit for a true definition, as Wid­drington hath proued at large by an­swering all the Decrees and Canons of Popes or Councells; which Lessius (masked vnder the name of D. Single­ton) hath scraped together. But they are grounded onely vpon the opina­tiue iudgement of the Pope, and some other Diuines of Rome, who then were of opinion, that many things are contayned in the Oath manifestly [Page 145]repugnant to faith and saluation, for one of these two grounds and reasons, or rather for both: The first, that the Popes power to excommunicate, and consequently his spirituall authoritie is denyed in the Oath: and that the Breues were chiefly grounded vpon this reason, Widdrington conuinceth by the Popes answer to Fa: Parsons; Widdrington a­gainst Fitzh. part 3. chap. 17. by the consult and resolution of the Diuines of Rome; by Cardinall Bellar­mine Bellarmine in his Answer to the Apologie, pag. 9. (who doubtlesse would not in this poynt dissent from the opinion and resolution of the Pope, and the o­ther Diuines of Rome, nor they from him) affirming that in the Oath is plainely or manifestly denyed to the Pope, power to excommunicate euen hereticall Kings, for which he is deseruedly tax­ed by his Maiestie of manifest fal­shood: and lastly, by those wordes of the Breues, that in the Oath are contay­ned many things, quae apertè aduersan­tur fidei, which are plainely or expresly repugnant to faith: But none of our learned Aduersaries dare affirme, that the denyall of the Popes power to de­pose Princes, is plainely and expresly [Page 146]repugnant to faith, but at the most, tacite, and tecte, conertly, and closely, and that by many farre fetcht (and ill deduced) inferences and suppositi­ons:See Suarez lib. 6. cap. 1. de Iu­ramento fide­litatis. and that therefore they suppo­sed with Cardinall Bellarmine, that the Popes power to excommunicate, is de­nyed in the Oath: The second ground or reason is, that the Popes power to depose Princes, to dipose of their tem­poralls, and to absolue subiects from their temporall allegiance, which doubtlesse is denyed in the Oath, is a cleare poynt of faith, and not in con­trouersie among Catholiques, both which grounds and reasons are mani­festly false, as hath beene sufficiently conuinced by the former Discourse: and consequently, that it is no more vnlawful not to obey the Popes decla­ratiue Breues forbidding Catholickes to take the Oath, they being groun­ded vpon the aforesaid reasons & sup­positions, which are manifestly false, then it is vnlawfull not to approue the said false reasons and suppositi­ons, for that a declaratiue precept hath no more force to bind, according to [Page 147]the Doctrine of Suarez, (which is also conforme to manifest reason) then hath the reason & supposition where­on it is grounded.

6. Lastly, he sheweth out of the do­ctrine of Dominicus Sotus, & other di­uines,Sotus de de de­legendo secreto­to memb. 2. nu. 2. See Wid­drington in the Discouery of the 15. colum of D. Schulked. that if a Prelate, or any other Superiour command a thing, which the Subiect doubteth to be vniust, and the thing which is commanded be in preiudice of a third person, who is in possession of his goods and good name, it is no irreurence, or disobe­dience in the Subiect not to obey, propounding to his Superiour with all humilitie and reuerence the rea­sons of his doubt. Seeing therefore that Widdrington hath in the name of English Catholickes propounded to his Holinesse the reasons which mo­ued them to doubt, that his declara­tiue Breues were not iust, as beeing greatly preiudiciall to his Mtiesties temporall Soueraigntie, and namely for that they were grounded vpon the two aforesaid false reasons and suppo­sitions, and that they haue not had as yet any satisfaction concerning those [Page 148]their doubts, it is not onely manifest, that they cannot be iustly taxed of a­ny disobedience or irreuerence to his Holinesse, for not obeying the afore­said Breues, but also it is an euident signe, that his Holinesse could not sa­tisfie their doubts, and that now hee plainly seeth, that he and his Diuines were mistaken, and that his declara­tiue Breues were grounded vpon those false reasons and suppositions which he could not iustifie or make good: Otherwise he would without all doubt, in regard of his Fatherly care, and Pastorall charge, haue sought to haue giuen them all possible satisfa­ction in this poynt, which so neerely concerneth not onely their soules health, and their temporall states and libertie, but which also is so iniurious to his Maiestie, and so scandalous to Catholicke Religion, giuing occasion to all Protestant Princes and subiects to perswade themselues, that the pro­fession of the Catholicke Roman Reli­gion cannot stand with true and con­stant loyaltie, but that it is a Nurcery of vniust Inuasions, Rebellions, and Powder-Treasons.

[Page 179]7. Wherefore, (for the last fare­well) I beseech you again and againe (deare Countrimen) not to forget those two most certaine Principles, where­on is chiefly grounded the Doctrine for the iustifying of the Oath, and for the securing of Princes from all tray­terous Conspiracies, practises, and at­tempts, vnder the colour and pretence of the Popes authoritie to depose them; to wit, that it is a great con­trouersie among learned Catholickes, and therefore not certayne, but true­ly probable, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue Soueraigne Princes, and that no power or title, which is not most certayn but in con­trouersie, can bee a lawfull ground, whereby immediately any man may be punished, or depriued of that right, dominion, or any other thing which hee really and bona fide possesseth; both which Principles, are, as you haue seene, so cleare and manifest, that no learned man can from his hart de­ny them, howsoeuer some one or o­ther for some temporall respect, end, or motiue, may speake or write con­trary [Page 180]to his mind and knowledge.

8. But, as Widdrington towards the end of his Answer to Fitzherberts Preface well obserueth out of Moli­na, and Lessius, both famous Iesuites, there is a great difference betwixt the possessing of temporall and corporall goods, as Lands, Houses, Crownes, Kingdomes, and the like, and the pos­sessing of authoritie, Iurisdiction, rights, and claymes, which one may pretend to haue to such temporall goods. For that possession properly is onely of temporall goods; and such goods may properly be possessed, al­though the party, who hath true right to those goods, contradicteth neuer so much; but rights, and claymes are not properly possessed, but they are one­ly said to be, as it were, in some sort, or improperly possessed: and besides, to the possessing of power, authoritie, iurisdi­ction, right; or claime to any tempo­rall thing, in such manner as right, iurisdiction, and claime may be sayd to be possessed, it is necessarie, that the right or claime, which is preten­ded, be without contradiction and re­sistance [Page 181]of the aduerse part. Other­wise if one should challenge any right or authoritie be it good or bad, true or false, and should exercise that pretended right or authoritie, the ad­uerse part contradicting, he might ne­uerthelesse be said to bee in possession of that right or authoritie, which is manifestly false and absurd. For so if a Lay-man should pretend to haue true spirituall iurisdiction ouer Cler­gie men, as power to excommunicate, and should exercise that pretended iurisdiction, hee might be said to be in possession of true spirituall iurisdi­ction, although the Clergie should neuer so much contradict and except against the same. And for this rea­son, albeit some Popes haue for as many hundreds of yeares, as haue beene since the time of Pope Gregorie the Seuenth, challenged a right and authoritie to depriue Kings of their regall Soueraigntie, yet they cannot be said to haue beene for one day or one houre in possession of that their pretended right and authoritie, be­cause Christian Kings and Subiects, [Page 182]from the time of Henrie the Fourth Emperour, who was the first Em­perour that was depriued by Pope Gregorie the Seuenth, vntill the time of Henrie the Fourth most Christian King, who was the last King who was depriued by Pope Sixtus the Fift, haue euer resisted and contradicted this pretended authoritie and clayme of Popes to depriue them of their tem­poralls. And although perchance there should haue beene, or hereafter shall be some or other Christian King, who for some priuate or pub­lique respect and interest, hath not, or shall not resist the Popes sentence of depriuation denounced or to bee de­nounced against him, but rather yeeld thereunto, yet this cannot preiudice his successors, or be a sufficiēt ground, that the Pope may be truely said to be in possession of his pretended right, au­thority, and claime to depriue Kings in general, but at the most to depriue that King in particular, who did not resist or gainsay, but rather acknow­ledged the right and authority, which the Pope claimed to depriue him.

[Page 183]9. Finally, although it may bee obiected, that diuerse Popes haue practized the deposing of Princes, and many learned Diuines haue approued the said practice, therefore the practice being approued by many learned and skilfull men in the Arte which they professe is truly probable, euen accor­ding to Widdringtons grounds, which he taketh from Ʋasquez: Yet this is easily answerd. For those Popes and learned men in approuing that practice for lawfull, did either thinke assured­ly, that the doctrine for the Popes power to depriue Princes was most certaine, vnquestionable, and out of all controuersie, and that the contra­rie doctrine was not at that time, nor could lawfully bee approued by any learned Catholike, which howsoeuer those Doctours might at that time thinke or be perswaded (wherein ne­uerthelesse they were greatly decei­ued, because euen from the first broa­ching of this doctrine and practice by Pope Gregorie the VII. A thing vn­heard of before that Age, saith Onu­phrius, Onuphr. lib. 4. de varia creat. Rom. Pont. it hath euer beene a great con­trouersie, [Page 184]saith Azor the Iesuite,Azor. cited a­boue in the Sixt Obseruat. be­tweene Popes and Emperours) yet now it is so cleere and manifest, that there is at this time a great controuersie a­mong learned Catholikes concerning this authoritie of the Pope. as that all the World both by the publike wri­tings and proceedings in this contro­uersie can giue sufficient testimonie of the same: Or else those Popes and Do­ctours, did not consider and examine the difference betwixt speculation and practice, but without any further ex­amination, thought euery doctrine that was probable and approoued by learned men in speculation, and might speculatiuely and abstracting from practice bee disputed in Schooles pro and contra, might also bee practised, and put in execution, not considering whether it tendeth to the preiudice of a third person, and to the disposses­sing him of that which hee actually and bona fide possesseth, or no, where­as it is most certaine and out of all controuersie, (as hath beene shewed aboue) that it is open iniustice to de­priue vpon a probable or controuer­sed [Page 185]power or title any man of that which hee hath really in his posses­sion.

10. Now it is euident, according to Vasquez doctrine which Widdring­ton followeth, and which stands with manifest reason; that the approbati­on, and authoritie of ancient or mo­derne Doctours is not sufficient to make their doctrine probable to other learned men, if either their doctrine bee grounded vpon some principle, which to those learned men is mani­festly false, or it may bee confuted by some reason, which to those learned men seemeth inuincible and not to be answered, and which reason those Do­ctours haue not seene, considered, and examined; Obseruandum tamen maxi­me est, &c. But it is greatly to bee ob­serued, saith Vasquez, Vasquez 1. 2. disp. 62. cap. 4. nu. 18. cited by Widder. in disp. Theolog c. 10. sec. 2. nu. 16. that it may sometimes fall out, that the ancient Writers, whose opinions are now in con­trouersie, did not consider some Reason, Law, or Decree, which hath great force against their opinion: but contrariwise that the later Doctors being conuinced with that Reason, Law, or Decree, doe [Page 186]now defend the contrarie opinion. If therfore a learned man seeing that Law or Decree, or considering that new rea­son doth defend the opinion of the later Writers against the ancient, hee cannot follow in practice the opinion of the an­cient Writers, against his owne opinion, or which is all one by reason of their authoritie and approbation, because the opinion of the ancient, who haue not seene, or considered that Decree, or Rea­son, ought not now to be accounted pro­bable. And therefore Widdrington de­fining probable to bee that, which is approued by learned and skilfull men, for the better vnderstanding and ex­plication of the last words, he added, who haue seene and examined the diffi­cultie, for if they haue not seene and considered that particular difficultie and controuersie, they cannot bee ac­counted learned and skilfull therein.

11. Now the particular difficulty, and controuersie concerning this point, and which those Popes and Do­ctours mentioned in the obiection did not consider and examine, is, whether, supposing it to bee now a [Page 187]controuersie, and to be apptooued by learned Catholikes, that the Pope hath no authoritie to depriue Princes, it be not open iniustice in the Pope to de­priue Princes of their Kingdomes and Dominions, which they really and bona fide doe possesse. And therefore vnlesse it can bee conuinced, that it is not at this day a controuersie among learned Catholikes, whether the Pope hath authoritie to depriue, which is as hard a matter, as to proue, that the Sunne doth not giue light at noone daies, or else that it is lawfull vpon a doubtfull, vncertaine, controuersed & probable power or title to thrust by violence any man out of that, which heeactually and bona fide possesseth, the practice of deposing Princes, vn­der pretence of the probability of the Popes power to depriue Princes, can­not bee accounted probable to any learned man, so much as to excuse him in conscience, and in the sight of God from formall sinne and iniustice.

12. But to conclude with this Obseruation, which I wish you (Deare Countremen) diligently to consider; [Page 188]That howsoeuer any Subiect concur­ring in practice with the Pope to the deposing of his lawfull Soueraigue Prince, may vnder pretence of some probabilitie of the doctrine to depose Princes by the Popes authoritie, per­swade himselfe, that hee is excused from sinne and formall Treason in his conscience, and before the sight of God, (wherewith Princes not know­ing the secrets of mens hearts, but lea­uing them to the iudgement of God, doe not intermeddle in their Tribu­nals) yet considering these two things: The first, that it is most certayne and out of all controuersie, that hee is excused in conscience, and before the sight of God from all sinne and of­fence in defending his lawfull Prince, who is in possession, and in resisting such inuasions and depositions which are grounded only vpon a probable power and title, whereas hee cannot with any reason assuredly perswade himselfe, that hee is secure in consci­ence by taking part with the Pope a­gainst his Prince, who is in possession of his Crowne: The Second, that it is [Page 189]also most certaine, and out of all con­trouersie, that hee may iustly in taking the Popes part against his Prince being inuaded and depriued vnder pretence of a probable power and title (al­though in very deed the power and title were neuer so probable) bee ac­cused and condemned both in the Se­cular and also Ecclesiasticall Court of the Prince inuaded of open and ma­nifest Treason, and as a manifest Trai­tour be deseruedly put to death: for that it is open iniustice in the Pope (saith the Authour of the Prelate and the Prince) to depriue a Prince of his King­dome to which hee hath probable right, and withall possession, and consequently it is open Treason in the Subiect to take part with the Pope in that case against his rightfull Prince. These two things, I say, being duly considered, I thinke those Subiects to bee starke mad and senslesse, and to haue neither the feare of God nor Man before their eyes, that can be drawne to ap­proue such damnable practices, and consequently neither the doctrine, grounds, and principles thereof: or [Page 190]to concurre with the Pope, to the de­posing, and dispossessing of their So­ueraigne Prince, vnder pretence of a power, title, and clayme, which euen in speculation, and abstracting from practice, can bee at the most but pro­bable. And so recommending to your prudent considerations this my serious and sincere aduertisement I make an end, and request you euer to haue in minde, that which I said in the be­ginning and cannot too often repeate: Feare God, Honour the King: Ren­der to God and Caesar (and con­sequently to Popes and Prin­ces) that which is their due. 1. Pet. 2. Mat. 22.