1. I might demand here, why M^r. B. dealethT. G. Reply. onely with my Tenent, but taketh no notice at all of the Of Lots, chap. 2. Grounds fore-laid; contrary to In his Preface. his owne assertion, and my course with him, [Page 56] who deale with and discusse as well his Ground [...] as his Arguments. But that I let passe.

2. Requesting him [...]. Vlysses Homericus. Neque cu [...]m ij sumus, quos vituperare nec ini­mici quidē possint, nisi ut simul lau­dent. Plin. ep. 12. l. 3. to forbeare Honorifica contu­melia. Hieron. ad Pamm. & Ocean. his titles, which I neither desire nor deserue, of learned, and very learned, so oft both here and else-where inculcated Quomodo luctan­tes antagonistas al­tius attollunt, quo vehementius illi­dant. Cypr. epist. 2. lib. 2. Vti contra Plut. de adulat. [...]. to no very good purpose, as before I haue shewed: and passing by his gird of tur­ning ouer such a wonderfull number of Books; (for M^r. B. is not, it seemeth, out of his wondring vaine yet) I would faine know of him why he calleth my conclusion, a more fearefull tenent than beseemeth a learned man. For if by fearefull hee meane hideous and horrible, as he may well, if it be as he afterward chargeth it to be, contrary to the Loue both of God and Man, that must first be shewed of him; and how soundly hee hath shewed it, shall in the discussion of his charge appeare. If by fearefull he meane timorous, as may seeme the rather by the trembling that hereafter he cha [...]geth me with, [...] Arian. Epict. lib. 2. c. 21. I confesse my selfe indeed to be naturally of a timorous dispo­sition. And yet I suppose it no timiditie, but [...]. Plin. epist. 24. lib. 4. Ex prouidentia ti­mor, ex audacia te­meritas provenit. Donat. ad Eunuch. 4. 6. Ego Plinio ac­cedo ep. 17. l. 5. Ne­scio quo p [...]cto magis in stud [...]js homines timor, quàm fiducia decet. discretion rather for a man to speake [...] Zeno apud Laert. & Euslath. ad Odyss. [...]. warily. Nor is Haud insulsum est illud Martini Dumiens. de mor. c. 1. Lauda parcè, vitupera percius. Aequè enim repr [...]l easibilis est nimia laudatio, & immoderata vituperatio. he necessarily fearefull that doth not by and by cry out as M^r. B. doth of impious ini­quitie, when ought is allowed that he disliketh: or that doth not by and by commend euery thing as exceeding good and godly that he iu­stifieth and alloweth as lawfull. But to speake [Page 57] moderately belike is a fault and fearfulnesse with M^r. B. which I was not aware of before.

3. Examine we the ground of this prolix and fearefull Accusation, and we shall finde it to be but as they say of the sheering of Swine, much clamor and little wooll, Verbis veget, re­bus flaccet. Apul. apolog. many words indeed, but little matter of any worth. The maine mat­ter of the Charge is this, M^r. G. alloweth Luso­rious Lots onely as not euill in themselues. Where the word, onely, is M^r. B^s. insertion; which if he added for this end, as it seemeth he did, to make my words beare this sense, not euill onely, yet not lawfull, and warrantable neither, I disclaime it. Otherwise I confesse I conceiue my Conclu­sion in those termes to distinguish the Lusorious Lot it selfe from any abuse that may otherwise accompanie the Game wherein it is vsed, and so make it euill in that respect. But take the Tenent as it is, Lusorious Lots in themselues not euill. To omit the Distinction so cōmon in the Schooles, Per se, & per ac­cidens. of it selfe, and by accident; and the Phrase so frequent among Diuines and Writers of the best note, of things in themselues not euill, wicked, or vnwarrantable. Pictoria ars ex se mala non est. Rhenā. in Tertul. ad Her­mog. The Art of Painting, saith Rhenanus, is not euill of it selfe. Iuramentum per se non pugnat cum lege Dei morali. Chemnit. harmon. c. 51. To sweare, saith Chemnitius, is not of it self against the Moral Law. Per se vitiosum aut da [...]mabile non est, necessitatibus suis prospicere. Cal­vin. harmō. Euang. in Matth. 24. 38. It is not of it selfe vitious or condemnable, saith Caluin, for a man to prouide for himselfe. Of some Ceremonies vsed in our Churches, saith Beza, Quum non sint ex earum rerum ge­nere, quae per se impiae sunt, non videri tanti mo­menti, ut propterea deserendum mini­sterium. Beza. epist. 12. they are not things impious of themselues, nor such as a man should leaue his Ministerie for: and of other of them, Per se non sunt idololatrica. Ibid. They are not of themselues ido­latrous. [Page 58] And Bucanus, Res mediae quae in sese nec bonae, nec malae sunt. Bucan. loc. commun. 33. §. 13. Things indifferent are such as are neither good nor euill of themselues, &c. To passe by, I say, an infinite number of such speeches, that in learned writers occurre euery where. For to what end should I waste time and loose labour, in In sylvam quid lignaferam? quidve in mare lymphas? bringing wood to the wood, and casting water into the sea? Doth not the Apostle himselfe deliuer his tenents sometime in like manner as I doe? 1 Cor. 7. 28. If thou ta­kest a wife, thou sinnest not: and, if a virgin marry, shee sinneth not. And, Ibid. 7. 36. Let him doe as he will, he sinneth not; let them be married. And now let M^r. B. tell not M^r. G. but S. Paul, that such a tenent seemeth to him more timorous than beseemeth so worthy an Apostle, &c. setting downe his iudgement whether folke may marry or no, to say, they sinne not in so doing. I might adde a iudicious Diuines Comment on those words of the same Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. 23. All things are lawfull; Morton in 1 Cor. 10. that is, they may be taken without sinne. As also that M^r. Perkins in this very point concerning the vse of mixt Games, such as Tables and Cards are, passing his censure of them, saith, that they are Perkins Cases of Conscience, lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3. quaest. 2. not simply to be condemned. But of this enough.

4. Yea but M^r. G. affirmeth them else-where to be lawfull in themselues. And why is he fearefull now to allow them as good in themselues? Though such words of mine be not found in the place pointed to: yet I feare not to owne them, and it is like enough that else-where I may vse them. Nor did I euer vnderstand till now, that these [Page 59] two were not equiualent, not to be euill, and to be lawfull. Is there any medium in morall actions betweene lawfull and vnlawfull? Or any diffe­rence betweene vnlawfull and euill? If not, then euery thing that is not euill is not vnlawfull; and euery thing consequently that is not euill, is law­full. Yea I adde further, that euery thing that is not euill, is in some sense, and that a good sense too, good. The word, good, therefore in com­mon acception is taken two wayes; sometime more strictly for some such [...]. Matth. 5. 45. vertuous act, as deserueth Gloriosa. Senaep. 83. Honesta, & pulchritudine spe­cieque eximia lau­dabilia. Cic. de [...]in. l. 2. a speciall note of commendation and praise; and in this sense there is some medium betweene good and bad. For some actions there be, as for a man Psal. 49. 18. Quid magnifici est, se a­mare, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. de benef. l. 4. c. 14. to make much of himselfe, to drinke when he is a dry, Lament. 4. 3. Tit. 2. 4. Meus mihi, suus cuique charus est. Plaut. Capt. 2. 3. [...]. Plut. de sen. polit. to loue his owne, Matth. 5. 45, 46. Si quid [...] erga benefec [...], aut consu­l [...] fid [...], Non [...] lau­dem, [...]lpa caruisse arbitr [...]r. Plaut. [...]ri­num. 5. 2. Hinc [...]. ep. 11. l. 3. Non ideo [...]men eximi­am gloriam meru­isse me, ut ille praedicat, cred [...]; sed tantùm effugisse flagitiū. to befriend his friend, to Hinc Mitio Tere [...]t. Adelph. 4. 3. Ego in hacre nihil repe [...]io, quamobrem lauder tantopere: Meum officium faci [...]: quod peccatum à nobis ortum est, corrig [...]. make amends for what he hath done amisse, &c. which though they be allowable, yet are not greatly commendable; Neglecta quaedam offens [...]m contrahunt, [...]uae [...]pleta gloriam non merentur: & damnant praevaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de prae­cept. & d [...]ens. neither deserue they much praise and com­mendation when they are done, nor without much sinne many times may they be omitted. Sometime the word is taken in a greater lati­tude of sense, for any action that is warrantable and allowable whatsoeuer, and so there is no medium at all betweene good and bad, euery particular morall action being either warrantable or vnwarrantable, as Chap. 5. sect. 5. in my Lots I haue shew­ed [Page 60] at large. And in this sense I say, that Contra quam Tertull. ad [...]xor. l. 1. Non id [...]ò quid bonum, quia malum non est. not euill, and good are all one: as with the Apostle, not to sinne, and to doe well are all one. 1 Cor. 7. 36. If he marry her, he sinneth not; and afterward, Ibid. 38. He that marrieth her doth well. Where let M^r. B. againe demand of the Apostle (I dare not) why he was so fearefull to say, that he that maried did well, at the first, especially obseruing the Caution that he there giueth, In Domino. Ibid. 39. in the Lord: And let him take heed, lest while he reiecteth these, as quagmirie grounds, he plunge many weake Christians into deepe quagmires indeed, where­in no firme footing can be found, to fix and rest their perplexed mindes and consciences on.

5. This considered, all that followeth is but Ecquandone vi­disti flammam sli­pula exortam, claro crepitu, largo ful­gore, cito incremen­to? Sedenim ma­teria levi, caduco incendio, nullis re­liquijs? Hem tibi illa accusatio, iur­gijs inita, verbis aucta, argumentis defecta, nullis post sententiā latā reli­quijs calumniae per­mansura. Apul. in apol. a meere flash, that vanisheth so soone as it is fired, of it selfe. Nor will M^r. B. euer be able to proue, or to perswade any man, I beleeue, not sworne to stand to his sentence, beside him­selfe, that those Ezek. 36. 31. deeds not good in the Prophet were any other than Iunius refert ad Cap. 6. 9. euill works, such as the The like phrase is Psal. 36. 4. where Piscator, in actioni­bus malis: & Iuni­us, viam ut quam­que videt pessimam pergit in ea. So oft in the Pro­uerbs, To eat ouer much honey is not good, Chap. 25. 27. To respect persons in iudgement is not good, Chap. 24. 23. False weights are no good thing, Chap. 20. 23. De quibus & similibus vise Drus. observ. l. 1. c. 22. & H. Steph. ad Corinth. de dialect. Psalmist saith, wicked men addict themselues vnto: for who is bound to repent of ought that is not euill? Or that in Matth. 3. 10. Iohn the Baptists speech, the opposition is betweene fruit good, and fruit not euill; and not rather (as all Diuines that euer I read, vnderstand it) betweene Matth. 7. 17, 18, 19. & 12. 33. Esai. 5. 4, 7. good fruit, and euill fruit, or Luk. 13. 7. Ezek. 15. 2, 3. Sicut steriles arbores excidi solent. Calvin. harmon. no fruit; it being euill [Page 61] also, as Malum est non fecisse bonum. [...]. Chrysoft. in Matth. hō. & tom. 9. apanthism. 6. sive serm. de virt. & vit. Chrysostome well obserueth, not to doe well.

6. For the crying sinnes that M^r. B. saith ac­companie these Games. Doe crying sinnes accom­panie euery lusorie Lot, the shuffling of arrowes, for the siding of shooters, or the drawing of pawnes for the leading at Chesse, &c? For the Question is of any Lot at all vsed in disport; not of Cards or Dice alone. Or doe those crying sinnes arise from the Lot it selfe vsed in them? or not accompanie other Games, as bowles, and nine pins, &c. wherein no Lot is? Or must all Lots be necessarily banished from all Game, be­cause some Lot-games are with many attended with such sinnes? But M^r. B. hath no minde at all to keepe to the Question, or to come directly to that that he should deale with.

But here, perhaps, it may be said, The first Rea­son prouing that a Lot may be matter of recreation doth giue me a check. Is it a check? Then I will try if I cannot auoid the Mate.

M^r. B^s. mirth here I let passe, that wee may come to the purpose: and set downe my first Argument as it is in my Booke.

How faithfully M^r. B. hath related mine Ar­gument, T. G. Reply. any eye that compareth this his rela­tion and it, may soone see. I say, A Lot may be vsed ordinarily in other ciuill affaires, be they weighty or of lesse weight, as my Proposition re­quired that I should, and M^r. B. dealing as Matth. 4. 6. the Deuill did with Scripture, when he tempted our Sauiour, clippeth away those last words (for [Page 64] what purpose shall after appeare) and relateth thus mine Assumption, But a Lot may be ordina­rily vsed in other Ciuill affaires. If this be all faithfulnesse, I know not what faithfulnesse is. Here is but a bad beginning againe, I am sure; and Grauius enim sub pietatis professi­one peccatur. Salv. de provid. l. 4. c. 8. the worse, because the contrary is so so­lemnly and so seriously professed. But let vs heare his Answer.

Is not this a fearefull conclusion like the Te­nent?

How timorous the Tenent is, hath before been discussed. And if the Conclusion here be no more timorous, it mattereth not much.

Why doth not M^r. G. conclude positiuely thus? Therefore a Lot may be vsed for matter of recrea­tion and delight.

It is enough if the premises necessarily inferre the Conclusion. Which, what had it mattered, if it had wholly beene omitted? as Matth. 22. 32. it is some­time with our Sauiour himselfe in his disputes. But it is [...]. Plut. de adulat. the part of a bad pleader, as the Hea­then man well obserueth, to leaue the maine mat­ter, and trifle thus about termes.

He, forsooth, seeth not. Can a blind man goe stoutly on his way? But (blessed be God) M^r. G. seeth well, though not in this point. Bernardus non vidit omnia.

[Page 65]A little ouer flowing of the gall, I feare, troubled M^r. B. when he was about this im­ployment. But what I see not, I hope, Namque homo, qui erranti comi­ter ostendit viam, Quasi lumen de suo lumine accendit, facit: Nihilo ut minus ipsi luceat, cùm illi accenderit. Enn [...]us. Cic. offic l. 1. he will shew me, that seeth better than I doe in this businesse.

For if God had opened his eyes, he might haue seene plainely, what should banish a Lot out of disports more than out of other Ciuill affaires; to wit, because God alloweth a Lot to be vsed in them, but not in these: and it is presumption of set pur­pose to imploy God but as it may stand with his pleasure.

1. I maruell then why many others sharper sighted than M^r. G. and whose eyes I doubt not but that God hath opened as well as M^r. B^s, doe not see it.

2. That God hath allowed the one and not the other, will not for begging be thus had. But what answer is there in all this to mine Argu­ment? vnlesse the denying of the Conclusion be a legall kinde of Answer.

Hereof more hereafter. In meane while, in fur­ther answer to this Argument, I denie the Proposi­tion thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill matters, yet not for matter of re­creation. Whereof also more hereafter.

[Page 66]Here M^r. B. sheweth why he curtailed andT. G. cut off part of mine Assumption before, as Plutarch. in These [...]. Procrustes did those that were too long for his bed; It was too long to serue his turne, and that being cut off, he thought no more was said of a Lot in it, than might well be said of an Oath. Now therefore for further Answer (hauing gi­uen none at all before) either he denieth, not my Proposition, but an other of his owne forging correspondent to the Assumption that before he had framed; or else he bringeth an instance no­thing at all to the purpose. My Proposition is this as himselfe relateth it, That which may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill affaires, be thèy more or lesse weighty, may also be vsed for matter of recreation and delight. This thus conceiued M^r. B. denieth, and that he may seeme to haue some shew of reason for this his deniall, he ad­deth, that an Oath may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill matters, yet not for recreation. To let passe a large liberty giuen here for Oaths, which if it had in such termes slipt M^r. G^s. pen, he should soone haue heard of it with a witnesse, as a pa­tron of, and a pleader for ordinarie swearers; as if those places Matth. 5. 34. of our Sauiour and Iam. 5. 12. S. Iames well knowne, did not precisely condemne Sit sermo vester, Matt. 5. 37. i. sermo familiaris & quo­tidianus, Piscat. ser­mo cōmunis▪ Chem­nit. or­dinarie swearing. To let that passe, hoping that M^r. B. meant not amisse, howsoeuer his words seeme to sound. Vnlesse he put in, be those ci­uill affaires weighty or lesse weighty, wherein he saith an oath may be vsed, he saith nothing at all that concerneth my Proposition: If he doe, he [Page 67] directly crosseth Quod rectè sic expressit Chemnit. harmon. c. 51. Pha­risaeorum traditio erat, in quibusvi [...] casibus, in familiari sermone, & in cō ­munibus negotijs, rectè & sin [...] pecca­to posse nomen Dei ad Iuramentum as­sumi. Contra Chri­stus in qu [...]tidianis & communibus colloquijs, negotijs & commercijs, &c. vult omninò non esse nomen Dei ad juramentum assumendum: utpote quod [...]am sacro-sanctum nobis esse de­beat, ut illud non nisi in regra [...]issima in testimonium adhibeamus. Nam in re levine magnū qu. dem virum in testem vocare auderemus. the doctrine of our Sauiour; and his owne assertious else-where. Neither doe I beleeue that M^r. B. can giue instance of any one particular that may be vsed ordinarily in Ciuill affaires, be they more or lesse weighty, that may not be vsed also in disport. If he or any other can produce any, I will relinquish this Argument.

The former Argument was propounded vn­faithfully; T. G. Reply. this both vnfaithfully and negligently. Vnfaithfully, because diuers enforcements of some branches are omitted, as by comparing mine and his may appeare: Negligently, because the proofe of the Assumption is here said to be the proofe of the Proposition. Otherwise I acknow­ledge it indeed to containe for the maine sub­stance the matter of my principall Argument.

M^r. B^s. answer followeth.

[Page 69]A Lot is taken sometimes for the instrument of purpose disposed vnto Casualtie, as [The Lot is castProu. 16. 33. 1 Sam. 14. 41. into the Lap.] and sometime for the euent, as [Giue a perfect Lot.] Which howsoeuer it be casuall in relation to the former, yet falleth out certainly this or that, by Gods whole disposing the former. Prov. 16. 33.

I therefore denie both the Proposition and As­sumption, perswaded that M^r. G. would neuer haue set downe this supposed reason, if a Lot in the former acception had not drawne his religious eye from God as the only disposer thereof to be a Lot in the latter acception.

M^r. B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratiuely not for the casuall euent applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein vsed. But what is this at all to mine Argu­ment, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense.

For his deniall he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembred well what he de­nied. He denieth both Proposition and Assump­tion.

The Proposition is this, as himselfe also pro­poundeth it, That which best sorteth with the na­ture of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto▪ Will any man that hath common sense, beside M^r. B. denie this Proposition, or require a proofe of it? If any doe, I will for my part [Page 70] deale no more further with such an one, than Contra principia negantem non est ulterius disputan­dum. with one that denieth principles.

The Assumption is this, The lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot.

This M^r. B. denieth too, and by denying it therefore, it seemeth his deniall is grounded vpon his former distinction; which yet he seem­eth to apply not to the Proposition it selfe de­nied, but to the antecedent of the proofe, to wit, that a Lot is a matter of great vncertaintie. To which he answereth, that a Lot in relation to the Creature vsed in it is casuall; in relation to Gods whole disposing the creature, Prou. 16. 33. (which place will come to be examined hereafter in his due place) is certaine. If his meaning be this, that it is vncertaine in regard of the Creature either vsing it or vsed in it, but certaine in regard of God in his prouidence disposing it, who ei­ther doubteth of the one, or denieth the other? or what is said more of a Lot herein than is true See my Booke of Lots, Chap. 2. Sect. 7. of any contingent Act, whether casuall or other? But if his meaning be that God doth certainly euer dispose euery Lot according to the nature of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the better part in a diuision vnequally made, shall goe with him that hath the better right the office in an election, with him that is fittest for it: or againe, so that in the same case it shall euer fall out the same still certainly, as if in di­uiding of commodities bought in common, when for the parting of them the Lot hath beene cast once, and the one party shall remaine vnsa­tisfied, [Page 71] suspecting or pretending that some fraud was vsed in it, that vpon the second or the third casting too, it shall still certainly goe the same way; If this I say, be his meaning, (as the one of these two it must needs be, or else it is nothing to the purpose) experience it selfe will soone confute him; and as to him there­fore that denieth the fire to be hot, I will wish him onely to thrust his finger into the flame, so to him that shall denie a Lot to be of vncer­taine euent, I will wish him only to make triall of it.

So that I maruell much, that he findeth a Lot to be not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. For why? Diuiding the Land of promise, Num. 26. 55. by Lot: discouering Achan, Iosh. 14. Chusing a King, 1 Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle, Act. 1. 26. were they not weighty affaires? Nay rather the premises considered, a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires.

Leauing and passing wholly by the inforce­ments before spoken of brought for the strengthning of mine Antecedent, which hee should rather haue dealt withall; nor denying the Consequence, which [...]. Plato. Qui tacet, consen­tire videtur. Bonif. 8. in 6. de Reg. Iur. c. 43. he giueth therefore as granted; M^r. B. here contrary to all rules of dispute denieth the Consequent, or in plainer termes, the Conclusion of mine Enthymem or imperfect Syllogisme: And by another Enthy­mem grounded on foure instances, endeuoureth [Page 70] [...] [Page 71] [...] [Page 72] to proue the direct contrary to it. His Argu­ment is this:

For the Antecedent, I might well question one branch of it concerning the diuision of the Land of Promise by Lot, of which also I haue spoken Of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 10. pag. 67, 68. else-where at large, and to auoid pro­lixitie referre thither my Reader. Onely thus much for the present. Whether that Lot were ordinarie and now imitable or no, may be que­stioned. If it were done with respect to a for­mer prophecie, and with expectation that the seats of the seuerall Tribes should by vertue of the Lot fall out answerably thereunto, it was ex­traordinarie, and not imitable now of any with­out the like speciall ground. If it were done onely to determine which share each Tribe should haue of the Land as equally as could be diuided; though the businesse it selfe, to wit, the diuiding of the Land was weighty, yet that which the Lot was to doe in this businesse was it selfe of no great weight; for it was not much materiall which part this or that Tribe had, when little difference was betweene part and part; yea the lesse difference there was, the lesse inequalitie there could be; the lesse ine­qualitie there could be, the lesse weighty it was [Page 73] how the Lot went; againe, the lesse danger of inequalitie, the lawfuller the Lot, and conse­quently the lesse weighty the euent, the lawful­ler still the Lot. So that this instance either is of the same stampe with the other three, and must receiue then the same answer with them; or if it be of another kinde, yet it confirmeth not the consequent, because neither was that of much weight that the Lot was to doe therein, nor will it follow, A Lot was vsed once (yea say more than once) in a weighty affaire; therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty af­faires, than it may about those that are of lesse weight.

This premised for that branch of the Ante­cedent; I denie now M^r. B^s. not Consequent, but Consequence. And that for two causes: 1. Be­cause though it were granted that the instances were to purpose, yet the Consequent will not ne­cessarily flow from thence; In such three cases and vpon such occasions a Lot was vsed in weigh­tie affaires: therefore a Lot may more lawfully, &c. as before. All that will follow; all granted that M^r. B. himselfe requireth; is but this, Therefore in weighty affaires sometimes a Lot is not vnlawfull; or (for I had almost forgotten my selfe) the vse of a Lot is lawfull.

2. Because the instances are nothing to pur­pose, being of such Lots as were extraordinarie, and are not now imitable, as may appeare by M^r. B^s. owne grants in the very next words to these. The Question is about the lawfull vse [Page 74] of a Lot, that is, how and wherein we may law­fully vse Lots, & whether in such Lots as we may now lawfully vse, the lesse weighty the matter be, the lawfuller the Lot is. Now to disproue mine Affirmatiue herein, or to proue the contrary thereunto, M^r. B. produceth three Instances of Lots vsed in such cases, as none lawfully now may vse them in; in some whereof indeed, had not the Lot by an extraordinarie prouidence bin certainly directed, the euent was in hazard to haue beene of foule and fearefull consequence, either some innocent condemned, or some vn­fit person designed to a place of the highest mo­ment. That these examples are such, I haue shew­ed euidently Of Lots, chap. 10. sect. 3. & 5. else-where, which M^r. B. ought to haue taken notice of. Nor will any wise man, I trow, be so absurd or senslesse, as to imagine, that to finde out a theefe or a murtherer, or the like, a Lot may now be vsed, or that in choise of a King, where the place is electiue, a Lot may be cast vpon the bodie of the State without excep­tion of any, as in Sauls case it was, for the set­ling of the succession, lest it should fall out as it did Ioseph. capt. l. 4. c. 12. with the Iewes, when they cast Lots for an High-Priest, the Lot lighting vpon [...]. a most silly ignorant Asse. So that to reason on this wise is all one, the very self-same, with this, Our Sauiour Iohn 9. 6, 11. Christ opened ones eyes with clay, mat­ter fitter to put out than to open a mans eyes. There­fore such matter as will rather put out than open a mans eye is fitter to be vsed in the like case than any other. Or, A Lot was sometime vsed by Gods [Page 75] speciall appointment in some weighty affaires wherein we may not now lawfully vse it: There­fore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed of vs in weighty affaires, than it may be in those that be of lesse weight.

But will you heare M^r. B. controlling him­selfe, and ouerthrowing what he here buildeth? Read me but his next words.

But indeed, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, a Lot may be vsed about it, pro­uided it be with Gods allowance. For want whereof both Diuinatorie and Lusorious Lots be equally vn­lawfull.

1. Had M^r. B. before put in as much as here he doth, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, he had neither wronged mine Ar­gument, and hee might easily haue discouered much difference in this very point betweene the vse of a Lot, and the vse of an Oath.

2. Are all Diuinatorie Lots vnlawfull? then are all those three examples before alledged of Lots vnto vs at least wholly vnlawfull. For they were all Diuinatorie, ayming at the disco­uerie of that which no wit or skill of man was able by any meanes to reach to: and by M^r. B^s. owne ground and grant therefore not now al­lowable. As for lusorie Lots, sub iudice lis est; it is the Question, which M^r. B. too oft beggeth.

M^r. B. cannot (it seemeth) for his life relateT. G. Reply. any Argument of mine as he ought. For

1. Here in the Assumption he leaueth out that that ought not to haue beene omitted, to wit, of a Lot qualified and cautioned as before, without which mine Assumption were indeed very false.

2. He mangleth my Conclusion, leauing out the very principall part of it, to wit, Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, &c. that he might finde some matter of exception against it.

But his exceptions to it follow.

What a trembling Argument is this?

I see, a man must be very peremptorie that dealeth with M^r. B. or else he shall be nothing worth. But I shall desire him to pardon me, if I be not so peremptorie, as hee and some other are.

But wherein, thinke we, doth this trembling and timorousnesse discouer it selfe?

In the Proposition he speaketh of a Lot in the for­mer acception. In the Assumption, of a Lot in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creator himselfe.

What trembling argued this, if I did so? as indeed I doe not. And M^r. B^s. eye-sight, it [Page 78] seemeth, failed him when he made this excep­tion. For how can I in the Proposition take a Lot either in this or that acception, when there is no word at all of a Lot in it? as euen M^r. B. himselfe relateth it. In the Assumption I speake of a Lot as it is ordinarily taken, and as him­selfe out of Lyra in effect defineth it, for M^r. B. Dialog. a va­riable euent (or a casuall rather) applied vnto the deciding of some doubt, which that it hath any speciall relation to the Creator, more than any other ordinarie ciuill Actions haue, is denied.

In the Proposition he affirmeth lawfulnes: but concludeth onely, as not euill simply in themselues.

These [...]. Occidit miseros crambe re­petita legentes. Iu­ven. sat. 7. twise sod Coleworts wee had more than once serued in before: nor deserue they any answer.

Indeed the Conclusion is to follow the worse part. But in this Argument the Assumption is par­ticular, and the Conclusion is generall.

The Assumption is, But the vsing of a Lot in game, or in any other businesse serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before, is, &c. And the Conclusion, The vse therefore of a Lot in such cases is, &c. And where were M^r. B^s. wits (thinke we) then, when he writ this?

What? Is M^r. G. afraid to put (The vsing of a Lot in game) into the Conclusion?

[Page 79]M^r. G. is not afraid to put it in; for he doth it in effect. But M^r. B. (who with all faithful­nesse, if you will beleeue him, relateth M^r. G^s. Arguments) cutteth it out himselfe in the rela­ting of it, and then asketh M^r. G. why he put­teth it not in. If this be not childish, I know not what is. It is like the Papists dealing with vs, that clip the tongue of antiquitie, and then aske vs why we doe not or dare not alledge it.

Is not the Minor to be the Subiect, and the Ma­ior to be the Pradicate of the Conclusion? I will not question the figure of this pretended Argu­ment, if Sub, prae, prima, will serue the turne. And though I finde it in no mood, yet will I answer the two fore-peeces thereof.

That part of the Minor and Maior is to be so, I grant; and that I suppose M^r. B. meant. And that it is so in mine Argument would haue easi­ly appeared, if M^r. B. had related the Conclusion aright.

The Argument thus standeth.

To put a matter of meere indifferencie to be done or not done to the hazard of the vncertaine mo­tion of any creature whether it shall be done or left vndone, is lawfull.

But the vsing of a Lot in any businesse, be it se­rious or lusorious, so qualified and cautioned as be­fore, is no other than the putting of a matter of such meere indifferencie to the hazard of the crea­tures vncertaine motion.

[Page 80]Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, be the businesse serious or lusorious, is not euill of it selfe, or, if M^r. B. will admit no other termes, is lawfull.

Thus is the Argument it selfe cleared against M^r. B^s. exceptions; let vs heare his further An­swer to the two fore-peeces of it.

The former is not true, except M^r. G. vnder­stand a matter of meere indifferencie controuerted. For though such a matter may be the Subiect mat­ter of a Controuersie, yet a matter controuerted is the onely subiect matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as M^r. G. truly writeth euen in this case, p. 167. If M^r. G. so vnderstand, then there it some necessitie of ending the Controuersie put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then meerely in the will of a man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it.

That I say there is no Lot, where no Controuer­sie is, is vntrue. I say onely, Where no question or Controuersie is. For a question may be where a Controuersie is not. Since that a Controuersie is properly Controversia, quando de re qua­piam controverti­tur, vel lis aliqua instituitur. a Question betweene two parties contending; and a Question therefore more large than it. But vnlesse some such controuersie be about the matter of indifferencie to be done or not done, my former fore-peece, saith M^r. B. it not true. If it be then, belike it is. What M^r. B. would say, I know not. What he doth say is this: To put a matter of indifferencie so to the [Page 81] hazard of an vncertaine euent, in a matter of con­trouersie is lawfull. But, To put it to hazard so out of matter of controuersie, it is not lawfull. The reason hee giueth why it is lawfull in the for­mer, is because there is some necessitie then of ending the controuersie put to the determination of a Lot, and consequently it is not then meerely in the will of man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it. Where 1. M^r. B. is too busie with a Lot, when it is not at all in the Proposition. 2. He presumeth that where­soeuer any Controuersie is, there cannot be but by Lot a determining of it. Which is so vntrue, as that the contrary rather is most true, that nothing may be decided by Lot, but that that may by other meanes also be decided. 3. Hee misinterpreteth my words when I say of a thing that may be done, as if they were meant of putting or not putting the matter in question to the hazardous euent, whereas my words are plaine of the doing or not doing the thing it selfe, which for the doing or not doing is referred to that hazard. But if in any case it be law­full, that no way hurteth me.

The reason he rendreth why it is vnlawfull in the latter is, because such a matter vnlesse it be controuer­ted, cannot be the subiect matter of a Lot; which we haue nothing yet to doe withall. And the words therefore, as they are vntrue, nor doe I any where so say, so they are altogether impertinent to the pre­sent Proposition. Here is M^r. B^s. Argument: There can be no Lot where no Controuersie is. Therefore to put the question concerning a matter of indifferencie to the hazard of some casuall euent whether it shall be [Page 82] done or not done, vnlesse some controuersie be about it, is vnlawfull. Both the Antecedent is vntrue; and the Consequence vnsound. He might better haue said, Where no Controuersie is, no Lot can be: there­fore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a ca­suall euent, as there is no Controuersie of. For it is fri­uolous for one to say, it is not lawfull for a man to doe that, which by his owne grounds and grants is impossible.

In the other peece I obserue, that M^r. G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be vn­certaine. Which is begging the question, for the reason giuen to his former shaped Argument.

I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casuall, or as Dialog, ex Ly­rano. M^r. B. himselfe speaketh, a various euent, vsed for the de­ciding of some doubt. The vsing, say I, of a Lot in game or otherwise where the thing questioned is such as may be done or left vndone, is the putting of a mat­ter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncer­taine euent. Nor can any man that denieth not that definition, deny the truth of this proposition follow­ing necessarily from it.

Neither is it true that if in game, a controuersie (truly so termed) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of meere indifferencie is put to hazard.

Whether a controuersie in game be by Lot euer de­cided, [Page 83] though there be oft, is not by me here que­stioned, nor doth the strength of mine Argument depend thereupon. But that a matter of indiffe­rencie is put to the hazard of a Lot in euery Lot so qualified, as I had before required, must needs be, when Of Lots, chap. 5. sect. 4. one of the Cautions there required is that the matter put to the hazard and decision of a Lot be a thing indifferent. Yet it is against common sense to say that the matters put to the hazard of a Lot in Game vsually, (as who shall be on this side and who on that, who shall haue the precedencie at Tables or Chesse, who shall haue these and who those cards to make his Game with, and the like) are not things meerely indifferent. If they be such, and there be controuersie there-about, then by M^r. Bs. owne grants, they may be put to the hazard of a various euent, that is in short, to a Lot, as himselfe defineth it. That they are such no man of reasonable vnder­standing will denie; nor that controuersie may be about them in Game. It is lawfull therefore by M^r. B^s. grounds to vse a Lot in Game about them.

But more hereof in my third Reply. In meane while consider, whether this second shape be more particu­larly for the present businesse, so as to conclude the Question than the former.

Indeed as M^r. B. had dismembred my Conclu­sion it was not: otherwise it is.

And note, that in both these Shapes, onely lightnesse and indifferencie of matters put to Lotterie are pressed [Page 84] as causes most iustifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped Arguments Propo­sition, be positiuely affirmeth, that we shall finde a Lot not fit to be vsed in a weighty affaire. If so, then weightinesse and necessitie of matters controuerted make Lotterie lesse lawfull, if not altogether vnlawfull. But of that also more in that Reply.

Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightnesse of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the vse of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirme the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my margine may there shew; nor doe I nakedly affirme it, but adde something to strengthen it: And M^r. B. though he haue oft againe and againe carp [...]d at it, yet neither offreth he to refute it, nor ta­keth notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirme now further, what M^r. B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightinesse of the businesse, in regard of the euent, maketh Lotterie the lesse lawfull, nor to be condescended vnto without very great necessitie, and to be vsed with far much more care and cau­tion than were otherwise needfull in it. And I say therefore the lesse lawfull in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so vsing it, or in those that vrge the vse of it, when in such case [Page 85] it is condescended vnto. The reason is euident. For if the matter to be decided by Lot be weighty in regard of the euent of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the Lot falleth. If it be of great moment which way the Lot falleth, then as it may proue well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconuenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconuenience, the weigh­tier the thing is in regard of the euent. If it must needs then produce such inconuenience if it doe fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter vpon hazard of such inconuenience. But to put the matter vpon the ha­zard of a Lot, is to put it vpon hazard of falling that way, since that the Lot may fall out either way, for ought they know that make vse of it, or else it is no Lot; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a Lot, is to put it vpon ha­zard of much inconuenience. Which to doe (as some say of an Oath in some cases) Aut malum est, aut à malo. Matth. 5. 37. Non ait, qui amplus facit, ma­lus est; vel siquid sit amplius malum est: sed quod am­plius est à malo est. sed quaere cujus; & si non à malo ju­rantis, à malo est non credentis. i. à malo est, quando sine justa causa of­fertur, illius ultro qui offert: à malo est & quando exi­gitur, sed illius qui exigit. Aug. de verb. Ap. 28. A malo vel proprio vel alieno. Ianse [...]. concord. Eu­ang. c. 40. Ex bo­minum vitijs ori­tur, quia simplicita­tem non colunt. Cal­vin. harmon. Euang. it either is euill, or it is of euill; it is euill in the party himselfe that voluntarily doth it, it is from euill in others, when a man is vrged thereunto. But for the further confir­mation hereof, I refer the Reader to Of Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 6. that place, where I handle the Caution of Conuenience.

For matter of Indifferencie, I wonder that M^r. B. dare except against it: And I auow here confident­ly, without trembling and fearefulnesse, (which M^r. B. so oft layeth in my dish) that nothing but what is indifferent may lawfully be put vnto the decision of a Lot. And I would know of M^r. B. whether he dare defend that any either necessarie dutie, or act euill in [Page 86] it selfe, may lawfully be put to the decision of a Lot, whether it shall be done or no. If he dare not iusti­fie the putting of either to the decision of a Lot, he must needs grant that indifferencie (which here he sticketh so much at) is a necessarie affection of such things as may lawfully be put thereunto. But of this at large Of Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 5. in my first Caution; which M^r. B. ought to haue taken notice of, and to haue answe­red if he could.

For Necessitie, it is true, nor doe I denie it, but that it may make some Lotteries lawfull to some, that for them otherwise to condescend vnto were vtterly vnlawfull. As necessitie to preuent a greater mischiefe, may make a man yeeld to giue his purse to a theefe, Act. 27. 18, 19, 38. -Solet decidere ja­ctu Navita cum ventis; imitatus Castora, qui se Eu­nuchum ipse sacit, cupiens evadere damno. Iuvenal. sat. 12. or to cast his wares into the sea, which otherwise he ought not to doe: So necessitie to pre­uent a far greater inconuenience may inforce a man to put the losing of that to the hazard of a Lot which he hath very good right to, and but for the auoiding of such grieuous inconuenience he might not law­fully depart with, or put the losse of it to the hazard of a Lot. Nor is the Lot therefore the more vnlaw­full vnto him either in regard of the Necessitie, or of the Inconuenience that thereupon may accrue, being yeelded to to redeeme a greater. And yet well may the Lot it selfe in some sense be said truly, to be in regard thereof the more vnlawfull, than if no such either necessitie inforced, or inconuenience accompanied it, because the vse of it is not wholly free from ini­quitie on some side. And this, I hope, will suffice, for the present, to stay the mindes of any impartiall from entertaining a preiudice concerning my Iudge­ment [Page 87] deliuered in this point; (which M^r. B. is so oft snatching at, as if it were a most senslesse conceit, when indeed nothing is more euident, if it be well weighed) vntill the time come that M^r. B. will vouch safe to deale indeed with it, as Sed, Non semper feriet, quodcunque. minabitur arc [...]d Hor. art. poet. An, Threatned persons we say, liue long. he telleth vs still and hath told vs oft that he will.

I could wish that M^r. B. had dealt in this busi­nesseT. G. Reply. as fairely with me, as I haue done with him: that he would haue giuen me leaue at least Vt meis verbis sensum meum lo­quatur. Hieron. ad­vers. error. Ioan. Hieros. to tell my tale in mine owne words. The best is, mine owne Text before related will helpe both to shew what mine Arguments are, and how maimedly by M^r. B. they are euer propounded. But to the point.

Here I obserue one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the second Reason, to wit, The Con­clusion containeth more than the premises. For the Con­clusion saith, A Lot in game is agreeable to Gods word, and then it must be good of it selfe, which is more than not euill of it selfe. For that is good of it selfe, for doing whereof there is either precept or per­mission in Gods word, p. 137.

And, good Reader, be pleased to looke backe to what was before answered to this friuolous excep­tion. For I am euen weary of these cole-worts ser­ued in so oft. And take along with thee, I pray thee, also M^r. B^s. sawce that he setteth on with them, (if thou findest any more sauour than I can in it) to giue them the better rellish.

[Page 92] But to the Assumption and proofe thereof I answer; That the vse of a Lot in Game is of it selfe a sinne against Piety. For it profaneth a Lot hallowed by di­uine institution from the word: as shall be manifested hereafter.

Well, till that hereafter come then, mine Argu­ment standeth good.

Yet here I thinke fit briefly to shew two things. One is, That an Oath is hallowed to make an holy vse of the testifying presence of God. So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy vse of the determining presence of God. If M^r. G. denie a Lot to be holy, except it haue a more remote holy vse: I say, He may as well denie an Oath to be holy for that cause. More of this point in my se­cond Reply.

What M^r. B. meaneth by all this I doe not well vnderstand: saue that he beggeth the Question piti­fully, and applieth nothing of all this at all to mine Argument, or any part of it. Yet a word or two to it.

1. The Question is, utrum sit, and M^r. B. telleth vs here quorsum sit. The Question is, whether Lots be hallowed or no: and M^r. B. telleth vs to what end they be hallowed; [...]. Aristot. metaphys. l. 2. c. 3. [...]. presupposing that, that being in question is to be proued.

2. He telleth vs that an Oath is hallowed: Quomodo sancti­ficetur quod per se sanctum est? Hie­ron. ad Sun. & Fret. Sanctificatùr enim quod ex non sancto sanctum fit. What needs it? It is [...]. Cyril. Hieros. catech. mystag. Scitè itaque Aug. de spir. & lit. c. 26. Aliter dicimus, Deus sanctificat sanctos suos, &, Sanctificetur nomen tuum, nam illud ideò, quia ille sacit ips [...] esse sanctos, qui [...] erant sancti: hoc autem ideò, ut quod semper apud se sanctum est, sanctum etiam ab hominibus habeatur. holy of it owne nature and in it [Page 93] selfe: as the very definition of it it selfe will shew. And a man may as well say, that prayer is hallowed to make an holy vse of the inuocating of the name of God, as that an Oath is hallowed to make an holy vse of the testifying presence of God; or rather of calling in the testifying presence of God; if wee regard the true nature of an Oath. But so is not a Lot: they are nothing therefore alike.

The other is, That vse of a Lot is against Piety, which is (I say not [Not forbidden] but) [Not warranted] by the word. For it is without faith: therefore a sinne, yea impiety. So disputeth M^r. G. against a di­uinatorie Lot, pag. 313. and so doe I against a lusori­ous Lot.

Here wee returne to our old cole-worts againe, which, I see, will still be thrust vpon vs, and we must not refuse, vnlesse we will seeme to say nothing to that that M^r. B. saith to little purpose so oft.

1. Here is the distinction reuiued againe be­tweene not forbidden and warranted. As if that were not warranted, that is not forbidden. Let M^r. B. remember what he set vs on, when he ser­ued in the same before in effect: Contra quam Ter­tull. qui nulla rati­one firma nixus ne­gat, Bonum esse quicquid licet: Et licita esse asserit, quae non sant bona: exhort. ad castit. Et, Bonum, inquit, per­mitti non expectat. Ibid. Sed & idem ad Vxorem lib. 1. Quod permittitur, non est bonum. That is good for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission. Hence I reason, Whatsoeuer is good is warranted; whatsoeuer is permitted is good: whatsoeuer is not for­bidden is permitted: whatsoeuer therefore is not for­bidden, is warranted. But obserue what consequents will follow vpon this conceit of M^r. B^s. to wit, that Some things that are not euill, (for nothing is euill, [Page 94] that is not forbidden) yet are not warrantable by Gods word: Some things that are against no part of Gods Law; (for if they be against any part of it, they are thereby forbidden) yet are sinnes; for whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne; and whatsoeuer is not warranted, is not of faith. Here are strange Positions, and new Diuinitie; and such it may be, as M^r. B. scarce dreamed of when he deliuered this: and yet [...]. Aristot. l. 1. c. 2. & 3. Vno dato absurdo caetera sc­quuntur. fol­low they necessarily vpon the same.

2. M^r. B. passing by, as his manner is, the proofe of mine Assumption before denied by him, dispu­teth against the Conclusion, or the Proposition denied. But let vs heare his Argument:

The Assumption which he should proue especi­ally, he proueth not at all.

The Proposition, which indeed is vnsound also, he proueth sorily thus:

The Proposition taken in strict sense, as we dispute here of Piety and Charitie, the one comprehending the summe of the first Table distinct from the se­cond, and the other of the second Table distinct from the first, is not true. Many things are done without [Page 95] faith, that is, without warrant from the word, which yet are not offences properly and directly against the first Table. But the whole Syllogisme granted no­thing hurteth me.

3. How I dispute against a Diuinatorie Lot, I haue before shewed. Let M^r. B. proue his Assumption aboue of the one, as I haue done of the other, and I will yeeld him the lawfulnesse of them alike.

If then a lawfull Lot be holy, it is, saith M^r. G. in no case to be made matter of sport.

What meaneth this then here? can any man tell? Or how is this inferred vpon ought that went be­fore? Or what if M^r. G. say so? What doth that auaile M^r. B. vnlesse he can proue it so to be? Hypothesis nihil ponit in esse. A supposition, we say, giueth no being to ought. Let M^r. B. assume, and make good his Assumption; and all will soone be at an end.

Nay, I may make yet more aduantage. For I may say; That maintaining the vse thereof in Gaming, as it is a Lot, by practise, much more by writing, is against Charitie, as well as against Piety. For so a weake bro­ther is offended, and consequently Christ sinned against,1 Cor. 8. 11, 1 [...]. that brother being occasioned, by error of iudgement, to stumble. I haue this reasoning from M^r. G. himselfe, p. 255.

M^r. B. I see, is halfe weary of his worke, that giueth still but a short snatch at it, and then [Page 96] In via lassus quae­rit diverticula. Hieron. ad Laetā. starting aside from it, Quod canis in Aegypto, bibit, & sugit: de Antonio dictum Macrob. sa­turn. l. 2. c. 2. In illis siquidem regionibus constat canes raptu Crocodilorum exter­ritos currere & bi­bere. Macrob. as the Aegyptian Dogs vse to doe, drinking in Nilus, runneth out into by-mat­ters that nothing concerne it.

The Question is, whether a Lot vsed in game, as it is a Lot, be against Charitie or no. M^r. B. proueth it is, because some weake ones are thereby scandalized, as if the vse of euerie Lot in Game, whether in priuate, or in presence of others, strong or weake, must needs of necessitie euer scandalize one or another; or as if the scandall, when such were either taken or giuen, did not arise either from the inconsiderate act of the one, or the erroneous conceit, caused it may bee by M^r. B. of the other, or from both, and not from the Nature of the Lot so vsed it selfe. By M^r. B^s. rule, to eat flesh as it is flesh (to speake as he speaketh) or to eat it vpon such a day as it is such a day, shall be against Charitie, and of it selfe euill, because some, and not a few, are at some time scandalized thereat.

But I haue sinned against Charitie by writing my Booke. M^r. B. of all other should not charge mee therewith; for who seeth not, that in this Cause he will be deemed as In lite judex quisque corruptus sua est. a partie? He writeth against the vse of a Lot in Game, and thereby seeketh to possesse mens mindes with a superstitious conceit of it, which if another seeke to remoue and ease mens minds of, he condemneth them of breach of Charitie, sinning the meane while therein, though (I per­swade my selfe) ignorantly, both against Pietie and Charitie, and ministring thereby the cause of the scandall himselfe. Yea, obserue, I pray you, M^r. B^s. dealing in this businesse. Hee seemeth in his Epistle Dedicatorie to be Whether I erre or no; which yet I would gladly vnderstand. Epist. dedic. to Dialog. doubtful whether he erre or no, & [Page 97] affirmeth that he would be glad to vnderstand it, if he doe. And yet no sooner is any mans mouth open to debate the matter with him, but he crieth out by and by, that they sinne against Charitie, in offering to iustifie a lusorie Lot.

If it be indeed a breach of Charitie to discouer a grosse error, and to endeuour to remoue a scandall, by satisfying the mindes, and better informing the iudgements of those that are therefore scandalized because misinformed, I then confesse my selfe guil­ty herein. If not, let the blame lie on the heads of those that at first caused the scandall, and of those that will Si de veritate scandalum sumitur, utilius scandalum nasci permittitur, quam veritas relin­quatur. Aug. de lib. arb. Et Beda in de­cretal. de reg. Iur. c. 3. causlesly take scandall at those that seeke to remoue it.

With this Argument M^r. B. dealeth iust as withT. G. Reply. the first. Hee leaueth out (that hee may by that meanes finde matter to worke vpon) those words [Page 99] in the Proposition, within the bounds aboue-mentioned, that is, so that the same be not either against Piety, or Charitie, (which had beene in the former Argument insisted on;) or more particularly, as by way of further explication I adde after (which M^r. B. also omitteth) so that the same be kept free from super­stition and impiety, (in regard of the first Table) and from iniustice and dishonestie (in regard of the second.) So that the maine ground of the Argument is this, that Gen. 1. 28, 29. & 9. 2, 3. Psal. 8. 6, 7. Man being by God made Lord of the inferiour creatures; and that 1 Cor. 3. 21, 22, 23. his right and interest in them being restored againe to each Christian by his interest in Christ, Hebr. 1. 2. Apoc. 21. 7. the heire of all things, 1 Cor. 10. 23, 25, 26. he hath free liberty to vse any of Gods good creatures to such ends and purposes as by nature they are inabled vnto, the same being within compasse of the bounds before­mentioned.

True it is that Caluin from whom I take this Pro­position, deliuereth it Ipsae naturales re­rum dotes satis de­monstrant, quorsum & quatenus frui liceat. Calvin. insti­tut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 2. more indefinitely, and some­what after that manner as M^r. B. here propoundeth: as the Apostle also doth the like in some places, where he saith; 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Vbi univer­sales particulae non sunt in infinitū ex­tendendae, quasi li­ceat surari, scortari, &c. sed ad mate­riam subjectam re­stringendae. Chem­nit. harmon. Euang. c. 51. Omnis omniū creaturarū usus lege Dei non prohibitus licite & sine pecca­to haberi potest. Morton. in 1 Cor. 6. All things are lawfull: and, Tit. 1. 15. To the pure all things are pure: and, Rom. 14. 14. I know, and am assured that nothing of it selfe is vncleane, &c. But his meaning (Scriptum potius sequi, quam volun­tatem scriptoris, ca­lumnianus est. Cic. pro Caecin. which ought to be regarded) is ap­parent to be the same with that that I say; and be­ing so conceiued, it is sound and true, and of good vse for direction in the warrantable vse of the Crea­ture. Neither doe I suppose that M^r. B. will be able to giue any other good reason, why he may lawfully vse starch for the stifning of his band, or a flint and a steele to strike fire withall, or a spit to roast his meat [Page 100] with, or cord to girt his bed with, or feathers to lie on, or arrowes to shoot with, &c. saue this, that these Creatures haue a naturall power thereunto; and God hath vouchsafed vs the vse of his Creatures for such purposes as by nature they are enabled vnto, so that the same be conditioned as was before said. But let vs consider what M^r. B. obiecteth against this.

So generall and eager is the pursuit after Libertie in this licentious age, that a godly and charitable Christian, much more being a Minister, ought to take great heed, that he occasion not any, much lesse too too many, 1 Pet. 2. 16. to make liberty a cloake of naughtinesse.

Such a godly, charitable, christian Minister as M^r. B. deciphereth here, was M^r. Caluin, and one, I doubt not, wary of straining Christian liberty beyond its due extent: and yet speaketh he no otherwise than M^r. G. here doth, or rather not so cautelously as M^r. G. doth; as the Margine sheweth, where his owne words are alledged.

But M^r. G. speaketh of Christian liberty, not of li­centiousnesse. Then let vs consider what he saith. For both the premises of this Argument are flatly to be denied.

When M^r. B. saith, both the premises, his meaning is, not of mine Argument, but of this Argument, that is, of his owne, for the one of them, to wit the Pro­position, at least, as appeareth by the reason of his de­niall ann exed.

[Page 101] For sundry good creatures haue a naturall power to impoison. But Christian liberty giueth vs not free vse thereof to impoison at pleasure.

Nor doe I say, or M^r. Caluin meane that it doth. It giueth liberty to vse such creatures for impoisoning, where that vse is free from such taint as was former­ly mentioned; as for the impoisoning, and (by im­poisoning) destroying of vermine, &c. But how doth this instance touch my Proposition at all? As M^r. B. propoundeth it peraduenture it may. As I conceiue it my selfe, I am sure, it doth not. Neither is my Proposition therefore denied, but an other of M^r. B^s. owne put in the roome of it, nor any excep­tion at all here taken to it. Let vs proceed to see what to the Assumption he saith.

Neither is it true that any creature hath a naturall power to be a Lot, no more than a stone hath a naturall power to be caried vpward. For as a stone is caried vp­ward by a power that is without it: so all creatures are moued and applied to be Lots by a power without them.

Albeit this be nothing to that that I say, for I say not, that the creature hath a naturall power to be a Lot, but that the creature in such a Lot is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto. Yet is it most vndoubtedly and vndeniably true, that the creature that is vsed in a Lot hath a na­turall power to be made matter of a Lot; as a stone hath a naturall power to be driuen vpward: else could not either of them by any Art or humane [Page 102] power be effected with either, nor without some supernaturall worke. So that to the Assumption also rightly vnderstood here is nothing at all said.

God keepe me from teaching that Christian libertie warranteth the vnlawfull vse of any Creature, what­soeuer naturall power it hath to that vse.

Nor is any such thing here taught, either by me, or M^r. Caluin either, if his words be rightly vn­derstood.

If any Creature haue any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be vsed vnto Lotterie, but in cases (whereof gaming is none) wherein God alloweth such vse thereof.

This is but a deniall of the Conclusion; and a plaine begging of the point in Question: which is this, whether a Lot in game be (how, but by Gods word?) allowable.

To the inforcing of the Conclusion by a supposed con­firmation of the Assumption, I say, it is a begging of the Question. For though a Dog hauing a naturall power to hunt, be not exiled from recreation: yet ought a Lot­creature to be, for reasons giuen, and to be giuen, or rather defended hereafter.

What reason hath beene already giuen, we haue seene; what will be, we shall further then see, when it is. But meane while I would gladly vnderstand [Page 103] from M^r. B. (since he hath pleased to propound this instance) what reason he can giue why a man may lawfully vse an Hound or Spaniel to hunt with, other than before of the like was rendred. As for the supposed confirmation of the Assumption, what he vn­derstandeth thereby, I know not, vnlesse he meane the illustration of the Conclusion: which, by his in­stance, it seemeth, hee doth. For to that that is brought indeed for the proofe of it, here is not a word. So that, neither is my Proposition touched, nor either the Assumption it selfe, or the proofe of it dealt with: the Conclusion onely is denied; and the illustration of it propounded as a confirmation of the Assumption, which it hath nothing to doe with.

This is indeed the effect and maine summe ofT. G. Reply. mine Argument, though some inforcements of it be omitted. Let vs heare M^r. B^s. answer.

M^r. Fennors booke, from which these allegations be drawne, and from whence I learned that Lots may not be vsed in sport, doth proue that lusorious Lots are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What helpe then hath M^r. G. from M^r. Fennors grants?

Much euery way. For [...]. Isidor. Pel. l. 2. ep. 228. [...]. Greg. Naz. de Spiritu Sancto. no testimonie is stronger than that that the aduerse party giueth against him­selfe. If the grounds granted by him that holdeth and laboureth to proue a lusorious Lot vnlawfull, be of sufficient validitie to proue them lawfull and allowable, it is a matter of no small moment. Else why doth M^r. B. himself in his Dialogue reason from Peter Martyrs grants against Peter Martyr?

And his owne proofes helpe him as little.

I need none, when mine Aduersarie speaketh enough for me.

For it is granted, that if Lotterie be either com­manded or forbidden, it is not indifferent. To passe by the former: onely obseruing, that M^r. G. doth [Page 106] not absolutely denie it to be commanded, Prouerb. 18. 18.

Though he doe not denie absolutely, that it is at all commanded, yet he doth denie, that it is simply and absolutely commanded: For that that we are aduised to doe rather than some other thing, that we are not simply inioyned; which kinde of iniunction An indifferent thing in nature, is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it, &c. Fennor of Recreat. rules spec. 1. M^r. Fennor seuereth from things indifferent. And that which among many other lawfull courses is com­mended vnto vs, as behouefull and vsefull, is not therefore either simply or absolutely inioyned, yea or at all, where such other may be had.

I come to the other. I might here refer the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will ap­peare euidently, that a lusorious Lot is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent.

How [...]. Cic. ad Attic. l. 4. ep. 8. euidently this will there appeare, shall then appeare, when the Reply commeth to be discussed. Meane while M^r. B. here denieth onely the Con­clusion of my Syllogisme. For the second branch of the Assumption, to wit, that a Lot is a thing simply forbidden, (which he would seeme to denie, and should denie and disproue if he did ought) he nei­ther here opposeth, nor in his Dialogue or Reply, doth he either defend, much lesse make good, but maintaineth the contrary rather, that in some cases it is allowable, which it were not, if it were simply forbidden, and so absolutely euill. The Argument therefore from M^r. Fennor his [Page 107] Teachers grounds standeth good, if his grounds at least be good.

But to speake a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbid­den as well which is forbidden by iust consequence, as that which is expresly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by iust consequence, as that which is expresly permitted. M^r. G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) denie the for­mer. Againe, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoeuer it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expresly or by iust consequence, that is verily forbid­den. For all things, especially such as haue relation to God, ought to haue some warrant from the word. If M^r. G. put me to proue this, I dare vndertake to proue it demonstratiuely. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawfull, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or euill, and she wing how some say that to be in­different, which is neither good nor euill, he determi­neth the point thus. Neuerthelesse most true it is, That no particular morall action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from rea­son, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the Rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why M^r. G. should say here, Lotterie [Page 108] in game is not any where forbidden as euill of it selfe? That is good of it selfe which is either com­manded or permitted, p. 137. Therefore that is euill of it selfe that is forbidden.

M^r. B. hauing no more to say to the substance of mine Argument, falleth to quarrell againe with some termes vsed in it. [...]. Plato Phi­leb. [...]. Idem de leg. l. 6. [...]. Idem Gorgia. A good thing, they say, may doe well twise or thrise. But [...]. Pindar. Nem. 7. such friuolous exceptions so frequently inculcated, and so tedi­ously prosecuted, cannot but tire the patientest Rea­der that is.

He maruelleth much (falling into his wonted veine of vaine wonderment againe) why I should here say, that Lotterie in game is not simply forbid­den as euill of it selfe. I might well aske where I say it: not that I might not well so say, but because I no where here say it. But as I said at first, if M^r. B. might haue the framing of my Arguments, they should iudiciously be framed. The Minor should not be part of the Conclusion, as he speaketh else­where; but the whole Conclusion or the effect of it should be part of the Minor, or at least of the proofe of it. I say therefore in mine Assumption, or rather in the proofe of one part of it, not that Lotterie in game is this or that; (it belongeth to my Conclu­sion to tell what it is) but that Lotterie in generall is not simply forbidden ac euill of it selfe. And my reason (which I rendred of the like before) why I speake so, is; because a thing though not euill sim­ply of it selfe, yet may be sometime forbidden in regard of some abuse necessarily then annexed [Page 109] thereunto, or some other euill necessarily ensuing thereupon; and may therefore though not simply and absolutely, yet in that respect and in such case be forbidden. That is good of it selfe, that is com­manded or permitted; and yet by circumstances or manner of doing may be marred. And that is euill of it selfe that is simply forbidden, so as by no man­ner of doing, it can be made good. But that is not euill of it selfe, that Esai. 1. 11, 14. Dans legem mea dixerat, quae vestra nunc dicit. Hieron. in Ezek. 5. Quia secundum libidmem suam, non sec. reli­gionem celebrando, sua j [...]m, non Dei fe­cerant. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 2. being of it selfe good is by euill handling of it marred. A man might well wonder that any meane Christian, much more a graue Minister should wonder to heare some things said to be forbidden as euill of or in themselues; or not be able to distinguish betweene things simply euill of themselues, and things euill in regard of some consequence onely. I might here make vse of that Schoole distinction, some things Prohibita quia mala, mala quia prohibita. Angel. de Clav. sum. verb. Alea, & alij. prohibited because simply euill, some things euill onely because prohibi­ted. But of these things more than enough, vn­lesse they were more to our purpose than they are.

It grieueth my soule to see what a wide doore to lusorious Lotterie this doctrine will make. For now Lot-mongers will chop Logick, and say, What if a lu­sorious Lot be forbidden by iust consequence, yet they are not forbidden as euill in themselues, and therefore they are indifferent.

And it grieueth my soule to see M^r. B. to trifle so seriously or so sadly rather, and [...]. Cum larvis & um­bris [...]. to fight thus with fearefull shadowes and fancies of his owne framing. Where reach I any on this wise to argue? [Page 110] Or what difference enfueth from ought I say be­tweene that which is forbidden expresly, and that which by iust consequence is forbidden? That which is forbidden simply [...]. Greg. Naz. de Spiritu Sancto. by iust consequence, is simply euill; that which respectiuely, is so euill onely, and not otherwise. But what if no Gamester, but some honest and good Christian being reproued by M^r. B. for holding two pawnes in his hands, and bidding his Aduersarie chuse to determine who shall lead, alledging all Lot-games by iust consequence to be condemned in Gods word; should tell him, that though Lot-games may in some case or in some kinde by iust consequence be forbidden, yet they are not forbidden simply or as euill in themselues, and that they are therefore of themselues indiffe­rent. I know not well, how M^r. B. will be able to answer him. For to say that whatsoeuer is by iust consequence out of Gods word in any sort forbidden is simply and of it selfe euill, were senslesse. Since that nothing can be in any sort euill, otherwise than as it is forbidden.

What Rhetoricall amplifications M^r. B. findeth inT. G. Reply. this Argument, those may well wonder, that know what Rhetoricall Amplifications are. But be it Logi­call or Rhetoricall, heare, I pray you, not it, but one that M^r. B. hath put into the roome of it.

It is this. Where the wisdome of God hath not de­termined the subiect Matter, the Manner, and other Circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there all such are lawfull as the word doth not forbid; and as no Circumstance that a man shall make choise of, shall be against the generall Rules of the word concerning the same.

But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the Sub­iect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the gene­rall rules.

Therefore a Lot in Game is not prohibited, nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise.

He that should thus reason, were worthy either Ista siquidem, Non sani esse ho­minis non sanus ju­ret Orestes: ut Pers. sat. 3. to be sent to Bedlem, or Vt curatoris ègens à Praetore da [...]i. Hor. epist. 11. to be begged in the Court of Wards. Quem recitas, meus est, [...] Fidentine, lib [...]llus: Sed malè dum rocitas, incipit isse [...]us. Martial. Nor is mine this, nor is this [Page 116] mine, vnlesse I be out of my right wits. How they differ (not to be ouer-tedious) may appeare by my words, where hauing more largely discoursed of and discussed the seuerall parts of it, I thus briefly recollect it: Game in generall is allowed: no parti­cular matter or manner of it prescribed: any there­fore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable. Where prefix M^r. B^s. proposition, onely so knit as it may hang a little more handsomely together, turning, and as, into, so as, (which so framed I owne) and you haue two entire Syllogismes, and the maine summe of mine Argument.

The Proposition he confirmeth:

First, touching a thing lawfull in it selfe, by shew­ing that Act to be lawfull in it selfe, which in Gods word is either commanded or permitted expresly, or by iust consequence.

This is an explication indeed of one terme vsed in it: no confirmation of the Proposition, nor so pro­pounded.

Secondly, touching the manner, &c. by prouing the rest of the Proposition, which he endeuoureth to per­forme,

1. By the authoritie of Caluin.

2. By Luk. 9. 50. 3. By a glosse. 4. By shewing that the circumstance of time for free-will offerings being not determined, they might haue beene offered at any time; and Sacrifices: might haue [Page 117] beene in any place before a certaine place was deter­mined.

M^r. B. here maketh me much more plentifull in proofes than I am: as shall appeare further in his Answer, and mine thereunto.

Thirdly, touching the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, by shewing, that if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient di­rection, then must warrant be had out of Gods word, because, Rom. 14. [...]3. Whatsoeuer is not of faith is sin. Which word is giuen vs in morall matters to supply the defect of it caused by our first Parents their fall. Neither doth the word abridge vs of the helpe and vse of natu­rall reason for direction in such actions.

This is indeed all alledged for the clearing of my Proposition▪ not for the proofe of any part.

The Assumption is thus proued. Recreation in ge­nerall is warranted from the word as permitted and inioyned, if not expresly yet by iust consequence. For the matter or manner, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, there is nothing determined. There­fore any meanes that are not against the generall Rules of Comelinesse, and decencie, Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40. of conueniencie and expediency, 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14 21. of religion and piety, 1 Cor. 16. 31. Coloss. 3. 17. and the like, are by the word of God allowed.

This proofe and the Assumption by M^r. B. before [Page 118] assigned me (to wit, But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter, manner, and other Cir­cumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules) hang together, as we say, like [...]. Plut. harpe and harrow. He would make the world beleeue, that M^r. G. is a strange man, that brin­geth that to proue this.

But his Answer ensueth.

I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordi [...]ns knot with one chop, and say, The vse of Lots in Game is forbid­den in the word, referring my selfe to what I haue and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will an­swer more particularly, not doubting but that the Pro­uerbe may now proue true, viz. Prov. 10. 19. In many words there cannot want iniquitie.

Why doth M^r. B. vse so many words then ere he come to the matter? But the Iniquitie he mea­neth is on my part: let vs see it. For here, it seemeth, is the ranke poison, the blasphemy that M^r. B. obser­ued in my Booke.

First, I obserue fearefull shifting, and then vnsound arguing. The former thus appeareth: He supposeth the thing must be lawfull in it selfe, and disputeth onely about the subiect matter, &c.

True, I presume Recreation to be lawfull in gene­rall. Dare M^r. B. or any man denie it? And yet I presume it not without proofe neither. But you must remember that M^r. B. here sighteth not with [Page 119] me or mine Argument, but ^f with a man of straw ofg Quomodo apud Romanos contra pa­lum in terram de­sixum, tanquam contra adversarium cum crate & clava, si [...] tiro [...]es dimicabant, ut quasi praesentem adversarium, sic p [...]lum omni impetu, omni bellandi arte tentarent. Veget. de re mil [...]t. l. 1. c. 11. & l. 2. c. 23. his owne making. In his Assumption this is presu­med of Lotterie: whereas I presume it of recreation, not of it.

Againe in the introduction he saith; The vse of Lots in game is not against Gods word, but hath suffi­cient warrant from it, which may imply this position, That is against the word, which hath not sufficient war­rant from it. But in the Proposition of the maine Argument his ground is, Such things are lawfull, which the word dot [...] not forbid. Foure of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his Conclusion is answerable. Is not this a feare­full shifting course of reasoning?

This then, it seemeth, is one point of that feare­full shifting that M^r. B. chargeth me with. Concer­ning which enough hath already beene said; for this is no new exception. And though the words be not thus generally propounded in my Proposi­tion, as M^r. B. himselfe propoundeth it: Yet there is no contradiction betweene these two: since that Omnia licent, i. omnis omnium cre­aturarum & rerum usus lege D [...]i non prohibitu [...], licitè & si [...]e peccato h [...]beri p [...]test. Mor [...]on in 1 Cor. 6 12. qua­rumvis creaturarū & rerum usus lege mor [...]li non prohibi­tus l [...]e, [...]. siue pec­cato [...] po [...]. s [...]. I­de in 1 Cor. 10. 23. Whatsoeuer is not forbidden in Gods word, is by the same word warranted. What proofes he dreameth of shall hereafter appeare.

Touching the Proposition of his maine Argument, I maruell why M^r. G. auouching such subiect mat­ter [Page 120] &c. to be lawfull as are not forbidden, limiteth this Assertion with these words (of a thing lawfull in it selfe.) As if such a thing may warrant our retch­lesnesse in and about the subiect matter &c. As if God doth not, according to the old saying, loue Aduerbs. An Oath is a thing lawfull in it selfe. Are not we there­fore to make conscience, that the subiect matter &c. be agreeable to the word of GOD?T. G.

Why I insert those words into mine Assertion, may easily appeare to any that will not wilfully shut his eyes: because my dispute is concerning Recreation, a thing granted to be such, and the Que­stion onely about the subiect matter of it. And so far are my words from implying any such matter, as M^r. B. here thence would inferre, that I say in expresse termes, that As well for the doing of euery act, as for the doing of it in this or that manner there must be warrant had out of Gods word Ista itaque sunt pali vulnera, ut Iuvenal. sat. 6..

But I maruell much more at this ground, Such things are lawfull as the word doth not forbid. I set it downe thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are per­mitted: and therefore the subiect matter &c. of a thing lawfull in it selfe. I maruell, I say, because M^r. G. confirmeth a thing or act it selfe to be lawfull in it selfe, if it be in the word, either commanded, or permitted expresly, or by iust consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so cleare a truth, that (me thinks) M^r. G. cannot, but in proportion of reason, if he beleeue the word to be Psal. 19. 7. perfect 2 Tim. 3. 15, 16, 17. vnto euery good worke, hold all things [Page 121] to be vnlawfull, which are not lawfull one of these two waies; and the rather because he peremptorily affir­meth, p. 95. All particular morall actions, be they ne­uer so indifferent, to be either conformable or discon­formable to Gods word; and, by particular actions he meaneth Actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that M^r. G. would hold to this doctrine! Then should he thereby prouoke all who make conscience of their waies, and Iohn 3. 21. doe truth (that is, doe good works sincere­ly) to come to the light, that their deeds might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. On the contrary, if he bring not disciples, Isai. 8. 20. to the Law and Testimonie, by doctrine according to the word; but writh from it, by teaching that to be lawfull, which is not forbidden; as therein this light faileth, so thereby he shall make men carelesse to seeke for their warrant, and wilfull Num. 15. 39. to seeke after their owne heart and eyes, after which they goe a whoring.

Here is a long and sore accusation; which might all well without any one word more be answered, onely by pointing the finger to what formerly was said. But because M^r. B. so much presseth me, I will intreat the Readers patience for a little further discussion of what is here obiected. All I say here is this, that Where the circumstances of Actions in themselues lawfull are not determined in the word, all such are lawfull as are not in the same word forbid­den, or as are not against the generall rules of the said word of God otherwise. And is it not strange that this Assertion should to M^r. B. seeme so strange? Or is this any writhing from the rule of Gods word? [Page 122] Yea but I crosse my selfe else-where in it. For I say else-where that such things are lawfull as are in Gods word either commanded or permitted either expresly or by iust consequence. I say so indeed: and what con­tradiction is there betweene these two? For is not that by iust consequence permitted, that is not pro­hibited? Yea, (since we are come to these precise termes) that is, neither expresly nor by iust consequence prohibited? For I am sure M^r. B. will not denie that to be prohibited, as well that is by iust consequence prohibited, as that is prohibited in expresse termes. Ei­ther M^r. B. then must giue vs some medium between permission and non prohibition, or else these two po­sitions will haue very friendly agreement. Yea but M^r. G. himselfe may seeme to assigne some when he saith, that in circumstances determined, there is no permission, though no prohibition be of any other. I answer in a word, that the very stinting of an action to those circumstances is a virtuall prohibition of all other not expressed, albeit no exclusiue particle in the iniunction be adioyned. For example, when God bid Abraham Gen. 22. 2. take Isaak and sacrifice him on an hill that he should shew him: it was as effectuall a prohibition of sacrificing him in any other place but on an hill, and on any other hill but that hill, as if God had said expresly (as he doth of the Iewes sacrificing, Deut. 12. 13, 14. in the place that I assigne and not else­where) vpon that hill, and vpon no other: And the reason is apparent; because that commandement could not be fulfilled if any branch of it, whereof the precise place was one, were broken. This is that then that I say, that where the circumstances of acti­ons [Page 123] are stinted, there those onely that are inioyned in speciall are lawfull: where they are not, any are permit­ted, that are conformable to the generall rules of dire­ction giuen in Gods word. Against which in this whole heape of words M^r. B. bringeth nothing, but an other of mine owne assertions, which no whit crosseth it, his well wishes onely (Somnia enim sunt haec Democriti op­tantis, non docentis. Cic. Lucull. which might well haue beene spared) set apart.

Well, let vs examine his confirmations.

First M^r. Caluins testimonie in English is this. [When the Scripture deliuereth generall rules of a law­full vse, the vse is to be limited according to them.] From hence M^r. G. concludeth that a man hath a suffi­cient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choise of, that is not against those rules. M^r. Caluin speaketh of an Vse, and of an Vse doe we dispute. M^r. G. con­cludeth a circumstance. M^r. Caluin saith, according. M^r. G. concludeth, not against. Is this sound arguing? T. G.

It is true that I quote a sentence of M^r. Caluins in the margine, as concurring with me in one clause against which it is quoted. And I might aske why M^r. B. did not take notice of him a little before as well as he here doth. But that I frame any Argu­ment at all out of him, much lesse ground that I deliuer vpon his or any other mans authoritie, is vn­true. As for the differences betweene him and me herein by M^r. B. here imagined, they are very silly and friuolous. For first of all, doth not the vse of a thing consist in the circumstances of it, as in the manner of vsing, and the like? Or what doth Cal­uin meane by the limiting of the vse by those generall rules, but the assigning of it such circumstances as [Page 124] those rules giue allowance of. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 1. Many, saith he, take for granted, which yet I yeeld them not, that th [...] our liberty is by no qualification to be restrained, but that it is to be left to euery mans conscience, to vsurpe so much of it as to himselfe seemeth lawfull. I confesse indeed that Nec debere nec posse conscientias statis praecisisque le­gum formulis hîc alligari. mens consciences neither can nor ought to be tied herein to certaine precise formes of lawes: but since that the Scripture deliuereth generall Rules of the lawfull vse of them, according to those is it to be limited of vs. Where M^r. Caluin saith plainly, that for the vse of Necessaria prae­sentis vitae admini­cula. the outward necessaries of this life, (whereof recreation is one) there can no speciall precise rules be giuen out of Gods word, but it is suffi­cient for them that we be directed in the vse of them by such generall directions as the same word doth afford; which is all that I say. Yea he exten­deth this Calvin. ibid. cap. 19. §. 7. afterward to the very matter of our meat, drinke and apparell, where he falleth vpon the same point againe.

Yea but Caluin saith, according, and M^r. G. not against. M^r. B. is verie curious, that can Quaeris & in scirpo (soliti quod dicere) nodum. En­nius apud Fest. Qui inimicus est, etiam in scirpo nodū quae­rit. Hieron. ad error. Ioan. Hieros. finde a knot in a bulrush. If those generall rules be not viola­ted, are they not obserued? if there be nothing done against them, how are they violated? if nothing then be done against them, they are vndoubtedly obserued. It is all one therefore in effect to bee ac­cording to them, and not against them; and M^r. B^s. exception consequently idle.

Is the second confirmation from Luk. 9. 50. much bet­ter? The words set downe by M^r. G. be these, [Hee that is not against me is with me.] This place (forsooth) [Page 125] is a Rule holding in the Subiect Matter, &c. determined. As these words, [He that is not with me, is against mee, Matth. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subiect-matter, &c. de­termined. Both a like in conceit. And why may not M^r. G^s. conceit be the same touching things or actions? But let vs see whether the conceit bee not a be misted phantasie. In the former place Christs words are occa­sioned by his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Deuils in Christs Name. Forbid him not, saith Christ, for, He that is not against me is with mee. In the latter place Christ spake those words vpon occasion of the Pha­risies their opposition. So that consider the two senten­ces with their occasions together, this indeed is the summe. All men are either with or against Christ, for there be no Neutrals. So that those two sentences are like these. He that is not a goat is a sheepe; and he that is not a sheepe is a goat. But M^r. G^s. argument is this: All men who are not against Christ are with him. Ther­fore circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawfull. Is this sound arguing?

And where, I pray you, doth M^r. G. argue on this manner? But M^r. B. [...]. Plut de Isid & Osi­rid. Nam quod elim Vitius Crispus, Ego ve [...]ò ista non dico. Quintil. instit. l. 5. c. 13. frameth me Arguments at his pleasure: And then pleaseth himselfe in fin­ding faults in them; as if their defects concerned me, and not rather himselfe, who either must father them, or I know none else that will. For his exposi­tion of those places, to let passe what exception might well be taken thereunto, because it is not to the pur­pose. It is vntrue, that I produce them for confir­mation of ought that I had before deliuered. I imply onely that the distinction I deliuered (which may be [Page 126] extended also to things or actions, as well as their cir­cumstances; but my dispute now was of these) might in those two Rules or Sentences be not vnfitly con­ceiued. And the truth is, I had a notion in my head then of somewhat to that purpose, that in a learned Lord of Saint Albans his consi­derations. Noble-mans writings I had sometime read; which yet because I was not verie certaine of, nor had I the Booke by me then, I forbare then to cite. The spee­ches are alledged as by him, so by me, not in way of Confirmation, but by way of Illustration and Al­lusion; as if I should haue said, That rule which in another case our Sauiour giueth, holdeth well here. A course not vnusuall, in the writings of the lear­nedst and most religious. I alledge them but as Rom. 10. 18. the Apostle doth those Psal. 19. 4. words of the Psalmist; Their sound is gone thorow all the earth, and their words vn­to the worlds ends. Concerning which, I dare not say as Ierome doth ouer-boldly on another occasi­on, that Aliter in suis lo­cis, aliter in tuis epistolis sonant. Vi­demus exempla cap­tiva: servi erant tibi ad victoriam, quae suis in volumi­nibus non dimicant. Hieron. apolog. pro libr. contr. Iovin. the Texts alledged by the Apostle sound one way in their owne places, and another way in his allega­tions of them: because they are spoken of the [...], uti lo­quitur Basil. Sel. dumbe creatures publishing Gods glorie in the one place, of the Apostles preaching Christs Gospell in the other. They agree well and make good harmonie, since that the Apostle only alledgeth them by way of allusion, for illustration of the matter that there he dealeth in, not by way of illation or inference, for the confirmation of ought there deliuered, or the concluding of ought from thence. The like doe I here. And M^r. B. may as well frame an Argument thus out of the Apostles words, The Psalmist saith, that the heauens preach Gods glory to all the earth: therefore the Apostles [Page 127] haue preached to the whole world: as extract such an Argument as he doth here out of my words.

The third Confirmation is from a glosse. Here I re­member an old saying, [A cursed glosse corrupteth the Text.] Now let vs see whether M^r. G. haue any bles­sing by this glosse. The words whereof in English bee these, [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note that it speaketh of things. Ther­fore it maketh as well for Actions, as for Circumstances. Is this Diuinitie? But what Law? If the ciuill Law, what is that to the point? Except M^r. G. can proue the Ciuill Law to bee a perfect Rule to vs; and whatsoeuer it permitteth to be allowed of God. Howsoeuer (I say) this course of fetching proofes from any other Law than Gods Law is fitter for a Papist, who holdeth vnwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorize Traditions of men, then for oneDeut. 10. 12. that feareth God to walke in his wayes. Is then this glos­sing sound arguing?

Or rather is all this any more than Mera vitiligatio, uti Cato olim. Plin. praesat. meere cauil­ling? To let M^r. B^s. graue notes vpon this Glosse, and his serious inferences vpon the allegation of it passe, wherein hee maketh himselfe [...]; uti Ari­stoph. & Lucian. Iove Trag. most ridiculous. All this adoe is, because in the margine of my Booke (which a Scholler may make vse of) I al­ledge out of the Glossers of the Ciuill Law, cer­taine Rules that in their Law concurre some with the one branch, some with the other of the distinction I there vse. It is but as if one handling some point of Diuinitie about lawfull and vnlawfull silence [Page 128] should say, In some cases that Rule of the Canon Law holdeth▪ Qui tacet consen­tire videtur. Bonif. in 6. de reg. jur. c. 43. Silence is deemed as consent: in other cases that other Rule, Is qui tacet, non satetur: sed nec utique negare vide­tur. Ibid. c. 44. Silence is held no deniall, and yet no consent neither: or determining how far forth the desire goeth for the deed, should say, In this case, that of the Ciuill Law holdeth, Affectus tantum punitur sicut effe­ctus. Cod. ad leg. Corn. de Sicarijs. The Affection is punished, though it take not effect: in that case it hol­deth not, but that other rather, Affectus non pu­nitur, nisi sequatur effectus. Digest. de Poenis. The affection is not held faulty, if no effect follow. Which (forsooth) in M^r. B^s. conceit must needs therefore be one ground of the truth maintained, or else all is no­thing worth. But he wanted better matter, it seem­eth, to worke vpon.

Hath the fourth Confirmation more validitie in it than the rest? The former three proofes speake not di­rectly of Circumstances according to the Proposition; (so doth M^r. G. dispute ad idem) here he doth.

How should I dispute ad idem, where I dispute not at all? And yet are those ad idem, for that where­unto they are alledged. But M^r. B. now commeth De semita in vi­am. Plaut. Cas 3. 5. out of the Margine into the Text againe, wherein himselfe saith I doe dispute to the purpose.

Here then I enquire. If the circumstances of Time and Place, be at the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon, that the subiect matter and manner be so too? If God allow any thing to be done, of necessitie there must bee a time and place, when and where it may be done. Euen when and where there is iust occasion of the Act. It is to be obser­ued, [Page 129] that as here, so in the Proposition it selfe M^r. G. slideth from the subiect matter, and manner, to circum­stances onely. Is not this fainting?

Or rather is not this fopperie? M^r. G. slideth from the subiect matter and manner to circumstances onely, because he saith in his Proposition, the matter and the manner, or the other circumstances, meaning in­deed the subiect matter, as M^r. B. also expoundeth me. For to omit that my words doe not necessarily make them both Circumstances, though I ioyne that word with them; Are not the subiect matter and manner circumstances, that is, things about and with­out the essence and substance of those things that they haue reference vnto, as well as either Time or Place? If not, our Logicians are much amisse, Materia in quae subjectum propriè dicitur adjuncta in se recipiens. Mate­ria circa quam pro­priè Objectum dici­tur .i. subjectum ad­juncta occupans. Dounam. in Ram. Dial. l. 1. c. 6. Locus est subjectum rei locatae. Ram. Dial. l. 1. c. 10. that referre the Place and the Subiect matter both to one and the same Head. For as for the manner, if it be not a cir­cumstance, I know not what is.

But if it be true of these, saith M^r. B. that they are at the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon that the other are? Yea doubtlesse doth it; what reason can either M^r. B. or any other shew why it should not, where they are left alike free; and the one is no more stin­ted than the other. But who saith, that time and place are left (either wholly or generally) to the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe? This is another of M^r. B^s. spirits or ghosts that he raiseth, to shew his skill in coniuring them downe againe.

Yea but M^r. B. can shew you some difference [Page 130] betweene the one and the other. For, If God allow a thing to be done, there must be time and place when and where it may be done. And must there not be Subiect-matter and manner too? Or must not a man haue warrant as well for the one as for the other? Yes, saith M^r. B. for I hope he will not denie that. Well what warrant then? It may be done when, and where there is iust occasion of that act: and what is that, but at any time and in any place where there is iust occasion thereof offered? So that M^r. B. deni­eth not, but affirmeth the truth of that that I say concerning some Circumstances; onely he denieth therefore that it followeth concerning some other, which he saith are no Circumstances. Which whether they be or no, it is not a pin matter, since that war­rant from the word is required for the one as well and as much as for the other.

But I leaue this his friuolous [...], 1 Cor. 9. 26. Ho­die multi soli ad­versus aerem pug­nis, armis, brach [...]js exercent se. Drus. proverb. 1. 3. 4. beating the aire: hauing onely obserued, how Mr. B. that was so dili­gent to hooke in out of the Margine whatsoeuer he thought he might with any the least shew of colour, (though without any iust occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the Text it selfe that I presse, concerning the infinite perplexities, yea and impossi­bilitie, which by instances I shew, of making parti­cular actions good, or iustifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs en­sue vpon the deniall hereof. Which I desire by the vnpartiall and iudicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for confirmation, that he saith I doe, and taketh occasion thereby to deale with, and rather than he will let it passe, he will step aside into the [Page 131] Margine to fetch it into the Text: what I bring for confirmation, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not goe far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.

Let vs now proceed to that, which M^r. G. writeth touching both the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it in this and that manner. Neither of which nee­deth warrant from the word, if naturall reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Good Lord! What fearefull shifting from the word is here? But why doth he ioyne the doing it selfe of an Act with the man­ner thereof? Ile tell you: euen to make a way to his Assumption. For if he sticke close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an act it selfe is lawfull in it selfe, if in the word it be either commanded or permitted expresly or by iust conse­quence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his Assumption, that euery Lot is not law­full in it selfe. Therefore he would trouble the Readers head with a supposed direction therein of naturall rea­son, and that sufficient. I say supposed; for he sheweth no direction therein of naturall reason either sufficient or insufficient.

M^r. B. here beginneth to blesse himselfe; as if indeed some euill Spirit had appeared. This belike was the blasphemous matter that hee met with in my Booke. But hee must not thinke with such scar-bugs to carry it away. He hath not [Page 132] ^t babes and children onely to deale with. His iudi­cious [...]. Xenoph. Hellen. l. 4. [...]. Chry­sost. tom. 6. serm. 43. Persona pueris de­formis metum facit. Sen. de constant. sap. c. 4. [...]. Sed quae puelli formidant, ri­dent viri. Readers will not be scared with such out­cries, from scanning and discussing the things que­stioned; howsoeuer some simple, or some partiall ones may.

Before he commeth to exagitate the blasphemous Assertion, to cast some dust in his Readers eyes, and breed some preiudice of the aduerse party: Verum caveat, ne dum aliud studet notare culpae, ipse notetur calumniae. Hieron. adv. error. Ioan. Hieros. hee maketh Mr. G. no better than a Iugler, who fore­seeing the weaknesse of some thing in the Assump­tion or second part of his Argument, laboureth with other by-matter to trouble the Readers head be­fore-hand, that the same may not be discerned. And this was the cause, (as M^r. B. peremptorily telleth you, hauing discouered the mist that I cast before my Readers eyes, and knowing my minde herein much better than I did or doe my selfe) why I ioy­ned the doing it selfe of an Act with the manner there­of; and why I tell him of a supposed direction of na­turall reason. Hee had need of a long clew, that treadeth the maze of this wilde and intricate dis­course. But that it may appeare in a word to the Reader, how sincerely M^r. B. herein demeaneth himselfe: What is it in mine Assumption, that I made all this doe about, for feare my Reader should discouer the vnsoundnesse of it? Forsooth that A Lot is lawfull in it selfe. Which Proposition (though none of mine, and yet I denie it not neither) M. B. to oppose telleth vs (in such language as I thinke no learned man beside himselfe would vse) that Euery Lot is not lawfull in it selfe. But let that position be found in any part of mine Assumption, not as [Page 133] M^r. B. frameth it, but as it is in my Booke, and I will freely confesse the whole accusation, that to this very end I did it whatsoeuer it was that M^r. B. here saith I did; for I vnderstand not well what it is. If no such thing be in it, with what Conscience can M^r. B. say so peremptorily, that I did I know not what to keepe my Reader from discerning that, or the default of that in it, that indeed is not there at all? And thus hauing cleared my selfe from such finister intention, as M^r. B. here chargeth me with, and I not onely had not, but could not haue: let vs proceed now to the point it selfe.

But let vs with feare and trembling consider M^r. Gs. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford suffi­cient direction.] Let vs consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is giuen vs, in morall matters to supplie the defect of naturall reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction in morall matters from naturall reason, before wee consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times vrged thus. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion he haue sufficient direction from naturall reason? Doth the Maxime of Gods Spirit, quoted here by M^r. G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sinne,] intimate, thatRom. 14. 23. whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from natu­rall reason is of faith? Became naturall reason onely [Page 134] defectiue, and not corrupted also by our first ParentsRom. 8. 7. their fall? O God haue mercy vpon vs! For I see that the wisdome of the flesh is enmitie against thee: for it is not subiect to thy Law, neither indeed can be. But why doe I vex my soule with this fearefull do­ctrine, seeing M^r. G^s. heart fainteth in the prosecu­tion thereof? For at last he commeth to say: Neither doth the word abridge vs of the helpe and vse of natu­rall Reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authoritie (to wit, Of not abridging vs of the helpe, &c.) giuen to the word. For it doth imply, that the word might abridge vs, &c. Therefore our most warrantable way is to be well informed, when and how far the word doth giue vs leaue to vse the direction of naturall reason in morall matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the Scriptures quoted in the Margent.

The strange and fearefull Position, as M^r. B. con­ceiueth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient directi­on. Its this, as I deliuer it my selfe; For the doing of euery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word.

If the difference betweene these two be deman­ded; I answer:

First, M^r. Bs. Proposition may seeme to imply, that in any Act whatsoeuer sufficient direction may [Page 135] by naturall Reason be afforded, (which I say not:) in mine onely, that in some kinde and some cases there may. In the former manner (it seemeth) M^r. B. pleased to propound it, to procure the greater preiudice to that that I hold.

Againe, (wherein the most materiall difference consisteth) it is one thing for an action to haue war­rant from Gods word, (which I denie not but that euery action ought to haue) and another thing to haue that warrant taken immediatly out of it; as shall afterward appeare. So that neither doth M^r. B. here faithfully relate what I say, nor doe I affirme what he here relareth.

Yet for the point, as M^r. B. here propoundeth it, sauing what he would seeme to imply in it, and burden me and my cause with the enuie of; the Pro­position it selfe containeth such an vndeniable truth, as there is no man, I suppose, endued with com­mon sense, but will acknowledge it. For if Na­turall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there need no further warrant from ought else; since that it were not sufficient yet, if it needed ought else. And it was euen so with Adam in his originall estate. If any truth vndeniable then be fearfull and strange then this position peraduenture may be such; but not else.

But for the point as I propound it; (for with that now I deale not) that for the doing of euery act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word. If the question be demanded, why I speake in this manner, I answer, [Page 136] because many things in this kinde are so cleare and euident euen to naturall reason, that there can no doubt be made of them, or that they may vnan­swerably and necessarily be thereby concluded; for which therefore a man need not further war­rant out of the word; not that the warrant of Gods word is in any wise needlesse; but that a man may thereby be well assured, that it hath warrant in Gods word. For what is the word of God for morall things, but the perfection of true Reason, and a Summe or Body of that Law of Nature at first imprinted in mans soule? So that either it must be held that there are some things in the Law of God not agreeable to Reason; or else it must needs follow, that Gratia non de­struit naturam, sed eam perficit. Nam subordinata nō pug­nant. Nec est con­tra naturam, sed supra naturam▪ Ete­nim Deus est autor omnis boni in na­tura, five sit secun­dùm naturam, sive supra naturā. Deus autem sibi ipsi con­trarius non est. Pro­inde nullus fidei ar­ticulus est contra rationem. Adeoque quod est Philosophi­cè verum, etiam ve­rum est Theologicè, & contra: quia ve­rum vero consonat. Alsted. system. The­olog. l. 1. c. [...]. whatso­euer is agreeable to the rules and grounds of true Reason, is agreeable likewise to the Law of God: since that true Reason cannot possibly crosse it selfe, nor swerue or disagree in ought from it selfe. To say therefore that for the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall Reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be war­rant had out of Gods word: it is all one as to say, In prouing of points in controuersie betweene the Papists and vs by Authorities, if a man be not very sure that his memorie faile him not, he must haue recourse to his Bookes. Which when a man saith, his meaning is not that he may alledge ought that is not in the Bookes whence he alledgeth it, but that if the allega­tions be so fresh and so firme in his memory, that he is well assured thereof, he need not make further search into his Bookes for it. Or to come neerer home, to say, In morall things, as well for euery thing [Page 137] that a man doth, as for the manner of doing it, if the word of God else-where afford not sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of the Decalogue. Which speech should not argue that any action may be done of vs, that we haue no ground for in Gods Law: but that if we can finde ground for it in any other part of Gods word, we may thereby be sure that it hath vndoubted ground there. To the Reason that I adioyne taken from the end of the word, giuen in morall matters to supply the defect of naturall Reason, &c. M^r. B. answereth nothing at all; but asketh onely, if it be our best way to seeke sufficient direction from naturall Reason, before we consult with God in his word. No. Who saith it? But yet sometimes naturall Reason affordeth grounds more readily without seeking, than the word doth. And it is a certaine truth, that Mr. Hooker of Eccles. Politie, lib. 2. sect. 8. a Reuerend Diuine hath, that In euery action of common life (yea in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or que­stion is made by any) to finde out some sentence clearely and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to doe, seeme we in Scripture neuer so expert, would trouble vs more than we are aware.

To reflect vpon our former instance concerning the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a mans actions ought to be grounded vpon it, since that they are all lawfull or vnlawfull so far forth as they are either consonant vnto or dissonant from that that is therein contained. Yet how many actions are there, the lawfulnesse whereof may be demon­strated much more readily from some other, either proofes of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from [Page 138] any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft doe the Reade Mr. Per­kins his Cases of Conscience, his Treatise of Cal­lings, &c. best and religiousest Diuines resolue Ca­ses of Conscience concerning Ciuill actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scrip­ture?

Yea but, saith M^r. B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion hee haue sufficient direction from naturall Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it doe not, as it doth not, I might well returne it to M^r. B. and request him to returne an answer to it himselfe. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seeke further for it, saue for the further strengthning of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsly perswaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsly perswaded of sufficient direction either from naturall Reason, or the writ­ten word, Conscientia siqui­dem [...] non excusat. hee hath iust cause to looke further, though he be not aware of it.

But doth that Maxime, What is not of faith is [...], intimate, that whatsoeuer is done by sufficient directi­on from naturall Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor doe I, as M^r. B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoeuer is so done [...] of faith: because whatsoeuer is so done, as be­fore was shewed, hath sufficient warrant from the word.

Yea but naturall Reason is not defectiue onely, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so vtterly defaced [Page 139] that there is nothing left of it, that a man can haue any certainty at all of? [...]. Epic [...]et. Arian. dissert. l. 2. c. 20. Oculos bi no­bis effodiunt. Si Protagorae credimꝰ, nihil in natura re­rum est nisi dubi­um. Si Nausiphani, hoc unum certum est nihil esse certi. Non facilè dix erim, utrum magis iras­car illis, qui nos nihil scire voluerunt; an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire, Sen. epist. 88. No Sect of Philosophers was euer held more absurd, than those that held that men had no certaine knowledge of any thing. For morall grounds it seemeth M^r. B. holdeth the same with them: at least without holding so, that that he holdeth here cannot be vpheld. For if naturall reason be so corrupted by the fall of our first Parents, that nothing can certainly be from thence conclu­ded concerning the lawfulnesse or vnlawfulnesse of ought, then it is certaine that there is no certaine knowledge of ought in that kinde; and nothing is certaine therein, but that all things are vtterly and vniuersally vncertaine. That Hooker eccles. polit. lib. 2. sect. 8. reuerend Diuine be­fore mentioned, hath not amisse obserued, what infinite perplexities, doubts, and scrupulosities will arise in mens mindes, and what stops and rubs will be cast into the course of mens liues, with the weaker and simpler sort especially, concerning their ordi­narie and ciuill affaires, if this light be suppressed, and men should euer be constrained, though it burnt neuer so clearely, yet not to proceed by it in ought, till they had solemne accesse still vnto the written word, and fetched light from some particular sentence in it, for the further confirmation of them therein. But I adde further; since that the most of mens particu­lar actions, which they must haue ground for being infinite, are not expresly and precisely in the written word specified, and must therefore haue their war­rant by consequences deducted from it, in which [Page 140] deduction, sometime So Mat. 22. 32. Galat. 3. 15, 17. 1 Cor. 9. 9, 10. Rom. 4. 3, 4. & 3. 10, 19, 20. Hebr. 8. 13. a naturall principle is ioyned with a testimonie of Scripture for the concluding of the thing questioned, and though So Gal. 3. 11, 12. Heb. 1. 4, 7, 8, 13, 14. two places of Scripture be produced for it, which being in a Syllo­gisticall forme ioyned together, may truly and in­fallibly conclude the point questioned, yet it is Vise Keckerman. praecogn. Logic. tract. 1. & in sy­stem. Logic. lib. 2. & 3. passim. natu­rall Reason that must iudge of the force and strength of the Argument; take we all certainty of iudicature from naturall Reason in such cases, and we shall haue no certainty left of the lawfulnesse of ought, that is not in expresse termes comprised in Scripture. I might well adde, that by this M^r. B^s. manner of reasoning, an vtter vncertainty might be conclu­ded euen of all things contained in Scripture; at least to those that doe not exactly vnderstand the Originals: For if this Inference be sound, Naturall Reason is in part defectiue and corrupted: and there­fore it cannot certainly informe vs of ought: This must also of necessitie be allowed for a good Con­sequence; All Translations of Scripture are in part defectiue and corrupt: therefore nothing can certainly be learned out of them. Yea, Euery mans skill in the Originals is in part defectiue and corrupt; and there­fore no man can certainly gather ought thence. Let M^r. B. therefore, who professeth to haue his soule so much vexed with the fearefull doctrine that I here deliuer, take heed lest by that that he here main­taineth, he vex the soule and perplex the conscience of many a scrupulous Christian, and ensnarle them there­by in such inextricable difficulties, as he shall neuer be able with all the skill he hath to vnwinde them out of againe.

[Page 141]But he findeth me at last fainting and contradicting my selfe: and therefore all is now almost well againe. And wherein? Forsooth, because I affirme that the word doth not abridge vs of the helpe and vse of naturall Reason for direction in such Actions. And how doth this contradict (for I thought it had confirmed) that which before I had deliuered? M^r. B. will make it cleare vnto you.

For first when I affirme that the word doth not abridge vs, I doe imply that it might abridge vs, of such helpe. Is not this thinke you a strange Inference? As if when we say against Act. 17. 18. the Stoicks, that Affectus gratia moderatur, non au­fert. Stultique erant Stoici, qui in eo toti erant, ut affectus omnes perimerent. Pet. Martyr in 2. Sam. 13. Facessat ergò inhumana illa philosophia, quae ob­tinere non potest, nisi hominem sensi­bus omnibus sp [...]lia­tum in stipitem re­degerit. Calvin. in­stit. l. 3. c. 10. Quis [...] illā ubi nullus animū tan­git affectus, stupo­rem immanem, qui nullo prorsus eriga­tur & excitetur, nullo flectatur at­que inclinetur af­fectu, non omnibus vi [...]ijs judicet esse pejorem? Aug. de civil. l. 14. c. 9. Grace doth not strip men of humane affections; nor make them stocks and stones; we doe thereby imply, that Grace might strip them of it, and make meere blocks of them: As much to say, as that it might worke against it selfe, and the word worke against that end for which it was giuen. But this is too too senslesse.

Secondly, therefore our most warrantable way must then be to be well informed, when and how far the word giueth vs leaue to vse it. How followeth this vpon ought that I say, vnlesse this be a good conse­quence, Gods word doth not abridge vs; Therefore it is the best way to be well informed, when and how far it doth. But to omit, that to say, that It is the war­rantablest course to be well informed when and how far forth Gods word in matters concerning the Law of Nature, (for the Rom. 2. 14, 15. Morall Law is no other) giueth vs liberty to make vse of true reason: Is as much as to say, that it is the warrantablest way to be well infor­med how far forth Gods word warranteth vs to vse [Page 142] Logick in scanning of morall matters, or how farre forth it giueth vs leaue to be reasonable creatures. Let M^r. B. haue what he would: what followeth here­upon? Why? If that be so then is my strange doctrine thereby contradicted. Which way, thinke we? Marke the Consequence; (though the Antecedent also follow not vpon ought that I say:) It is the best way for vs to know how the word giueth liberty to vse this direction. Therefore there is no vse of it for direction at all in this kinde. Nay rather, therefore there is some vse euen in this kinde of it; or else to what end is it to labour to be informed, when and how far forth, of that that is not at all. Whether doth this contradict now M. B. or me? Iudge, Reader.

But that which best is, M^r. B. hereby taketh oc­casion to ouer-slip whatsoeuer my margine here affordeth for the confirmation of mine opinion in this Point. How fitly, you shall see, if you obserue how it followeth. M^r. G. saith, The word abbridgeth vs not of direction hereby: therefore it may abbridge: and therefore it is best to be informed how it abridgeth: and therefore M^r. G^s. doctrine is contradicted: and therefore I need answer none of his Arguments. Here are strange Ergoes. But where one hath no list to doe a thing, a small matter will serue to with-hold him. M^r. B. that was a little before so▪ curious in this Argument to pull in by head and eares euery marginall note, though containing no matter of proofe, and drawne out of the Ciuill Code; is easily induced here to let passe the marginall quotations, where they containe matter of confirmation, though extracted out of holy writ. But yet by his leaue, [Page 143] thou shalt haue them; and iudge when thou hast them, whether M^r. B. had need to haue answered them or no.

First then, for the Point it selfe that I here hold; it is neither new nor strange. It is all one, saith Tertull. de coron. milit. Ter­tullian, whether a point be proued by Scripture or by Reason: thereby implying that what was allowable by the one, was warrantable also by the other.

Secondly, for the proofe of it, we haue it both from the practise and the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. First for his practise; Idem de virg. ve­land. The Apostle, saith Ter­tullian, appealeth vnto Nature. 1 Cor. 11. 13, 14. Doth not Nature, saith he, teach you? speaking of some comely and vncomely habits: as [...]. Chrysost. in 1 Cor. hom. 26. by Nature both the comeli­nesse, and consequently the warrantablenesse of the one being iustified; and the vncomelinesse, and consequently also the vnwarrantablenesse of the other by the same also sufficiently detected. And againe, pleading to the Corinthians for the mainte­nance of the Ministerie, 1 Cor. 9. 7, 8. he vseth reasons drawne from the light of naturall reason in the first place; which yet it seemeth M^r. B. would controll him for, if any other should now doe.

Againe, Nature it selfe, saith Tertull. adv. Marc. l. b. 5. Tertullian, is in stead of the Law to those that are ignorant of it. Rom. 2. 14, 15. When the Gentiles, saith the Apostle, which haue not the Law, yet doe by Nature the things contained in the Law, they hauing not the Law are a Law to themselues. Which shew the effect of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witnesse, and their cogitations [...] alternati [...]. Vet. Inter sese. Quomodo Virg. Illi inter sese multa vi brachia tollunt. P. scat. interchangeably excusing and accusing. And surely, if the Law of Nature written in mans [Page 142] [...] [Page 143] [...] [Page 144] heart be the very same so far forth as it is yet vnde­faced, with the Law of God reuealed in the word: Then whatsoeuer by iust consequence of Reason may be deduced from the grounds yet in Nature remai­ning of the one, may be certainly knowne to be agreeable also vnto the other.

And thus we haue at length got out of this intri­cate Labyrinth which M^r. B. hath drawne or rather withdrawne vs into. If the Point were so perilous, as he here pretendeth, and it vexed his soule in such manner as he here professeth, it had beene a cha­ritable worke, I deeme, both to me and himselfe, to haue let me seene it before this, especially so in­stantly requiring the same, and so to haue freed his soule sooner from this grieuous vexation. But for the Point it selfe; Ador [...] Scripturae plenitudinem. Ter­tull. adv. Hermogē. I adore, with Tertullian, the ple­nitude of Gods word, as much as M^r. B. or any other man doth. I acknowledge it with Chrysostome, and Augustine, to be [...]. Chrysost. in 2 Cor. hom. 13. a most perfect and absolute Rule, In his quae apertè posita sunt in Scrip­tura inveniuntur illa omnia, quae cō ­tinent fidem mores­que vivendi. Aug. de doctr. Christ. l. 2. c. 9. containing in it all things necessarie vnto faith and good life. I should grieue at the heart to haue vtte­red the least tittle that should tend to the derogati­on either of it, or ought in it. If Reprehe [...]ures e­nim non audio; se­quor magistros. Hie­ron. apolog. prolib. in Iovin. I may be shewed that I haue so done in ought, I will readily recant it. Concerning this Point in particular, (besides those that viewed the whole worke, & aduertised me what they wished to haue altered, which was not much, nor materiall) I had conference with M^r. W. Brad­shaw. one not vnknowne to M^r. B. whom I haue before named in this Booke, as iudicious and as precise in his iudge­ment as the most; who not only concurred with me in it, making no doubt at all of it; but withall [Page 145] told how he was oft troubled to satisfie some in their Cases propounded vnto him, though he gaue them neuer so good reason for his resolution, be­cause they would not therewith be satisfied, vnlesse he could produce some place of Scripture for euery particular. But let the wise and learned iudge: and if I may from them be informed that I haue here­in erred, I will say as he did, Errare possum, Haereticus esse nolo. Erre I may, but an He­retike I will not be; I will not be obstinate in mine error; I will retract it: which I may well, without the least preiudice to the maine matter in Question, which it nothing concerneth, and will stand there­fore well enough without it. But Ad pensum rede­amus. Cic. de Orat. l. 3. returne we to our taske.

So then I proceed to the Assumption of the maine Argument. In the former part whereof it is to be de­nied (as was said before) that euery Lot is a thing law­full in it selfe. For as a Diuinatorie by him, Cap. 11. so a lusorious Lot by me and others is denied to be a thing lawfull in it selfe.

To passe by the strange manner of speech, that Euery Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe: which I sup­pose none but M^r. B. will vse. That a Lot is a thing of it selfe indifferent, and consequently lawfull in it selfe, was before shewed. But I haue nothing here to say to it: for in mine Assumption there is no mention of it. M^r. B. must answer, if he will, for his owne Argument.

More clearely to answer the other part. It is to be [Page 146] obserued, that in this large Argument, it cannot be ga­thered what M^r. G. meaneth by Subiect Matter. So the mind of the Reader may be troubled with words, which Acts 15. 24. ought not to be. But by that which he writeth, p. 230. I vnderstand, hee meaneth the matter whereabout the Lottery is imployed. If so, I affirme that the subiect matter of a Lot is determined by God, namely, A contro­uersie to be ended thereby: and therefore I also affirme, lusorious businesse (to vse M^r. G^s. owne word, p. 130.) to be a subiect matter of a Lot, no lesse against the gene­rall Rules of the Word, than was the finding out of Ionas in M^r. G^s. iudgement, p. 278. If then a lusorious Lot be not a thing lawfull in it selfe, and if Lusorious busi­nes be a subiect matter of a Lot, that is against the gene­rall Rules, then how can the manner and other circum­stances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the vse of a lusorious Lot.

Not to say, how fitly the place of Scripture in the Margine is here applied. For the simple Reader, if a man should stand to explaine euery Schoole terme, that, in such discourses and disputes as this, we are inforced oft to vse, it would be a very tedious taske both to Writer and Reader. Nor doth M^r. B. him­selfe obserue that Rule that he would tie others to: For doth he not oft speake of maior, minor, proposi­tion, assumption, mood and figure; Sub, prae, prima, &c. neuer informing his Reader what thereby is meant. But is it possible that so learned a man as M^r. B. should not vnderstand what so familiar and ordinary a Logicall terme as the Subiect Matter is, meaneth? But it is yet more strange that M^r. B. [Page 147] should not vnderstand what himselfe saith. For this Assumption he speaketh of, is not mine but his owne: nor doe I here speake any one word of the Subiect Matter of Lottery: it is himselfe onely that doth it. Which Subiect Matter whether it be, as he saith, determined to be such as he here saith, shall in his due place appeare. No more for the present, but that this Assumption I owne not, and therefore need take no care for it, whether it fall or stand, so far forth as it commeth here in question.

Let vs try the force of the Assumptions confirmation. It is true, that Recreation in generall, indefinitely vn­derstood, is warranted by Gods Word. But I beleeue M^r. G. will not affirme all recreations taken vp by men to be so warranted. Yes, (saith M^r. G.) we may recre­ate our selues with anything, that is not against the ge­nerall rules; because touching things wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.

That which indeed was mine Assumption, M^r. B. hath now at length by good hap light vpon. But knowing not well how to bring it otherwise in, he maketh it the Confirmation of mine Assumption, that is the confirmation of it selfe. Or rather, ac­cording to M^r. B^s. analysis and resolution of mine Argument, (which was not yet so hard to be brought into forme) the confirmation not of mine, but of his owne Assumption: and so the Argument should thus stand;

You need not maruell why M^r. B. de [...]ieth not this Consequence▪ albeit it be most senslesse. For if he should, he knoweth not any that would vndertake to defend it, but turne it home to him the true fe­ther indeed of it.

But as he dealeth with me for mine Arguments; so he doth the like with his owne inferences. He doth not beleeue, he saith, that I will defend all re­creations taken vp by men to be warrantable. And yet as controlling himselfe herein, he saith, Yes. What is that but as much as, he doth? Now how pro­ueth hee this grosse Calumnie? Thus forsooth. M^r. G. saith, we may recreate our selues with any thing that is not against the generall Rules. And doth he that saith so, defend that All recreations taken vp by men are allowable? This is [...]. Plato de rep. l. 8. & Euseb. adv. Hierocl. Vel caeco appareat. Liv▪ hist. l. 31. so palpable, that a man though starke blinde, yet might feele it with fingers.

Of this [...]uasion, [Not against] I need not speake at this instant.

No: we haue had more then enough of it alrea­dy too oft.

But touching things not determined, so much incule [...] ­ted. [Page 149] I aske whether things must be determined particu­larly, or by name, or else, if not so forbidden, they are law­full. If so, why doth M^r. G. (speaking of diuers parti­culars) as of a Key and a Booke, of a paire of sheeres, and a sieue, and such like, so earnestly aske, Are they any where found reuealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another mind then here, arguing thus: Not found there commanded or permitted; therefore vnlawfull. If it be said, not so found there, to find out a thiefe. I then say, Neither are Lots so found there for recreation.

What I meane by determined, may easily ap­peare by the instances giuen of Exod. 12. 6. the Passeouer tied to a certaine time, and the Deut. 12. 8, 9. sacrifices restrained to some one certaine place; to wit, stinted to some one or more particular matter, manner, time, place, &c. as on the other side, by not determined, such as are left free without such speciall restraint, as the free-will offerings, vowes, &c.

For the Obiection here brought, we had it once before; and there it was answered. Neither doth M^r. B. cite my words there vsed sincerely, but as he is wont: And the place it selfe, had he not clipt the tongue of it, would without further helpe haue afforded him an answer: to wit, that such Lots di­uinatorie must haue some speciall institution, because that is required of them, which by no naturall power that either is in them, or man can adde to them, they are able to effect. Let M^r. B. prooue as much by the sporting Lot; and there an end.

But if by not determined, he meant, Things where­with [Page 150] we may recreate, are not determined in the Word, either expresly, or by iust consequence, then, whosoeuer saith so, if he be wise, will adde [so far as I doe remem­ber and know.] For who can remember all the senten­ces of holy Scriptures, and know all iust Consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus adde, then his Negation is of no validity; but he himselfe is too bold in denying, vpon presumption, that another remembreth and knoweth no more than he.

Here M^r. B. thinketh he hath got me on the hip. And either he will condemne me of great presump­tion and want of much wisdome, or else ouerthrow the maine strength of mine Argument. That concer­ning recreation therefore there are no speciall rules prescribed in Scripture, whereby it is stinted to this or that particular matter, and is therefore (as from Cal­uin before was well and truly affirmed) to be directed by the generals; it that which I affirme, and Peter Martyr with me; as by my Margine (which M^r. B. had no list, it seemeth, to take notice of) may appeare.

Yea but no man without presumption, saith M^r. B. may so affirme, vnlesse he put in this exception, so far as I know or I remember▪ Besides that Peter Mar­tyr then was too presumptuous in this very particu­lar: Our Diuines that deale with the Papists are very^b Per Scripturam sanctū convinci non potest Petrum su­isse Romanum Epi­scopum, aut unquam Romae suisse. Mar­s [...]l. Pasav. defens. pac. part. 2. c. 16. far ouer-seene; with whom these assertions are so frequent and vsuall, Quinque spuria illa Sacramenta cū omnibus suis riti­bus & ceremonijs, sine verbo Dei ad­dita. Confess. Scotic. Verbo Dei destitui. Calvin. instit. l. 4. c. 19. §. 3. That [...] [...] [...] Sacra­ment, there is no Scripture for it; That Pen [...]nce, or Orders, or extreame Vnction, is a Sacrament, cannot out of Gods word be proued▪ [...] [...] Peter was euer at [Page 151] Rome, or was Bishop there, or that he had a superioritie of power and authoritie aboue the rest of the Apostles; or that the Pope succeedeth him either in his seate or in such right, cannot be made good out of Gods word. And againe, No place of Scripture can be shewed, where Christ or his Apostles hath bound vs to it. White way to Church, digress. 33. Non est Dei verbo praescriptura. Calvin. inst [...]t. lib. 3. c. 4. §. 8. Non habet Scripturae te­stimonium. Ex Scriptura probari non potest. Chem [...]it. exam. Conc. Trid. part. 2. for a man to repaire to the Sacrament vnshriuen; to eat flesh in Lent, &c. are not against any word of God. Yea this is a generall plea with them against most of the Popish superstitions, The most and greatest points of their religion, euen well nigh all wherein they dissent from vs, haue no founda­tion in the Scrip­tures. White ibid. sect. 5. nur [...]. 8. that there is no ground for them in Gods word. Whereas if they had consulted with M^r. B. before-hand, they should haue beene better aduised, and haue added alwaies this exception; So far as I know or remember: and so giuen their Aduersaries iust cause to haue laught at them for their labour▪ Where obserue we with­all, what aduantage M^r. B. here giueth to the Ad­uersarie, when he shall be pressed with ought in this kinde. For tell we one of them, that for a man to refuse Shrift is not against ought in Gods word: After aduice had with M^r. B. hee may soone shape you an answer, that you are very presumptuous so to say: for can you, or any man else, remember all the sentences in Scripture, or know all iust consequences that may be made from them? Which if it be a sound and sufficient answer, surely for many points of Po­pery, as some of their new Sacraments, &c. we must lay our hands vpon our mouthes, and let them alone with them, for ought that I see. As if the Scrip­ture were so vaste and diffused a peece of worke, that a man could not, without he had such an infinite memorie and an vniuersall vnderstanding, tell what were of some particular subiects deliuered in each part of it. Yea what a miserable perplexitie doth [Page 152] M^r. B. by this meanes plung Christian meny Consci­ences into, the more scrupulous sort especially, when for particular ciuill actions of ordinarie vse, their scrupulous hearts causlesly mouing doubt of them, hauing searched to and fro in Gods Booke, though they can finde nothing at all that may controll them in the vse of them, yet they shall still be per­plexed, because M^r. B. hath here informed them, that there may yet be somewhat in Gods word against them, neither can they, doe they what they can, haue any assurance of the contrary, vnlesse they had such memories and vnderstandings as M^r. B. here speaketh of? I cannot here passe by a passage of M^r. Caluins concerning such scruples; Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 19. §. 7. These and the like, saith he, se [...]me friuolous trifles: but there is more in them than men are commonly aware of. For when mens Consciences are once in this manner ens [...] ­red, they enter into a long and an intricase Labyr [...]th, from whence it is no easie mut [...]er to get out againe. Si dubitare [...]epe­rit, an lino uti li­ceat, nec de cannabe [...] securus erit, [...] & de stupis incidet dubitatio. If a man shall begin to doubt, whether he may vse flax, or linne [...] made thereof, in his sheets, shirts, hand­kerchefs, towels, table-napkins, &c. he will not long of­ter haue the like scruple of hempe; and after that of towe too. And he will begin to thinke whether he may not dine and sup without any Table-cloth or nap­kins▪ at all▪ and so consequently whether he may vse them or no, when he may well enough be with­out. Yea Denique coveni­et, ut super trans­versam, quod dici­tur, festucam ince­dere nefas ducat. at length, saith he, you shall haue a man come to that passe, that he will thinke it a sinne ( [...] [...] say) to stride ouer a straw. Such height of supersti­tion men grow vnto▪ when way is giuen to such frin [...]lous scruples, which yet M^r. B. here ministreth [Page 153] much matter vnto. For suppose we one of these scrupulous Christians, yea or any other, should re­paire to M^r. B. and moue this as a doubt to him, whether it be lawfull for him to weare band and cuffs either of cambricke or holland, and M^r. B. hauing affirmed that it is, he should demand of him, what warrant out of Gods word he could furnish him with for it. Answer him this way, that Apparell in gene­rall is inioyned, and for the matter of it there is no speciall direction of restraint giuen in the word, and therefore liberty left for any that is not against the generall Rules in the word, of decencie, modestie, fru­galitie, &c. resoluing him of such as doubt or que­stion may be moued of: and it is not vnlikely but you may giue him good satisfaction therein. Where­as goe M^r. B^s. way and tell him, that though appa­rell it selfe be allowed, yet whether the matter of it be determined or no, neither he nor any man can say, vnlesse he had all the Bible, and whatsoeuer is contained in it, or may be deduced from it, in his head: I suppose you will be so far from giuing him any good satis­faction, that you will leaue him more perplexed than you found him at first. I propound somewhat of this kinde in pursuit of mine Argument, which M^r. B. misdoubting he might run a ground there, slily saileth by, and not so much as once taketh no­tice of. Either he medleth with the Conclusion, and passeth by the premises: Or hee frameth me such matter of confirmation as hee pleaseth, and letteth passe that that I propound. I demand then, rubbing vp M^r. B^s. memorie a little, as before in my Booke, what other proofe can be brought for the iustifying [Page 154] of Bowles or Chesse-play, than such as is here pro­pounded, which it behoued him to haue answered if he knew any better, considering that the instance was of much more moment for the clearing and confirming of this branch of mine Assumption, than many things that it hath pleased him to be pidling withall.

For the thing it selfe: First, it is well knowne, that for many Heads, or Common places, what is found in the word may soone be laid all together, as for games, for markets, for mariage-feasts, for Lots, and the like: by consideration whereof a man may oft be informed what is in Gods word either for or against them. Secondly, such things as require a speciall Institution, (and of this kinde must a Lot be, if it be a diuine Oracle, and an immediate iudgement and sentence of God, as M^r. B. pretendeth that it is) the matter is much more obuious. Speciall Institu­tions in the word are as starres of the chiefe magni­tude, so eminent and conspicuous, that they cannot easily lie hid, nor need ouer-much search, and a man may boldly say therefore of such and such things, that there is no speciall institution of them in the word. Thirdly, for morall matters, wee may draw to a neerer scantling than the bodie of the whole Bible; Exod. 20. Deut. 5. the Summe of all is comprised in the Decalogue, and whatsoeuer a man is sure to be against none of those Exod 34. 28. Deut. 10. 4. ten Words, or to come yet to a narrower compasse, against neither Deut. 6. 5. Levit. 19. 18. Luk. 10. 27, 28. Piety, nor Charitie, the Summe of the Exod. 24. 12. & 31. 18. two Tables, hee may surely know not to be against Matth. 22. 37, 38, 39, 40. Mark. 10. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. any part of Gods word, and consequently to haue nothing in Gods [Page 155] word against it, though hee haue not such a vaste capacitie of vnderstanding or memory, as M^r. B. here requireth. But consider the whilst what an [...]. vtter vncertaintie and irresolution in this kinde M^r. B. driueth vs hereunto: For by his grounds a man may not safely say, that There is nothing against wearing of an Hat in Gods word; vnlesse he know all consequences that may be deduced from this Sen­tence of Scripture, Gen. 1. 1. In the beginning God made Heauen and Earth. For if he must needs know so much of all, that may safely say so of ought, then of that in particular, that being one of those all.

At last let vs religiously consider the generall Rules so oft spoken of, and we shall finde, that M^r. G. should haue done well not to haue pleased Libertines by plea­ding Not against, but to haue giuen the word due ho­nour by saying with M^r. Caluin. [The vse of things is to be limited according to the generall rules.] For these rules require Decency, Expediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the vse of things not vndecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be noted, that in 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Paul saith not, All things are lawfull, but some things are inexpedient; but in both places thus; All things are lawfull, but all are not expedient.

Of this distinction we heard before, and answer thereunto was there giuen. Yet lest I seeme to passe by so graue and serious obseruations with silence,

First, if those rules require more than not vnde­cent, [Page 156] not inexpedient, &c. then whatsoeuer is not more than so, is against those rules, and is no more by M^r. G. allowed than by M^r. B. himselfe, for ought that M^r. G. here saith: which M^r. B. also might soone see, if he knew what he would haue. And therefore his, It is to be noted, might very well haue been spared, for any hurt it doth M^r. G^s. cause, if that be all that it proue.

Againe, though this might suffice to keepe M^r. B^s. exception from fastning on ought that I say: Yet let vs see of what weight his annotation here is. The Apostle saith not, Some things are inexpedient, but, all things are not expedient. Why? what difference is there in the Apostles meaning here betweene these two? Heare we the exposition of Th. Morton. è Coll. Christi Cantabrig. as acute and iudicious a writer as the most of those that these times of ours haue afforded vs, though one that liued in much obscuritie; In 1 Cor. 6. 12. on the former place of the Apostle he thus paraphraseth his words, If we Christians ought to be so carefull in cherishing and im­prouing piety, Vt vel à licito rerum usu pietati officiente abstinen­dum putemus. that we deeme our selues restrained euen from the lawfull vse of things that hurt or hin­der piety, how much ought we to abstaine from things of their owne nature and euery way vnlawfull. In 1 Cor. 10. 23. On the other place yet more plainly: But all things are not expedient: i. at quarundam rerum usus inter­dū incommodus & noxius est. that is, but the vse of some things is sometimes incommodious and harmfull to a Christian man, in that that concerneth the defence and iner ease of his faith and piety, and the furtherance of his eternall safety. For it is not to be expected from earthly things, of which the Apostle principally here speaketh, such as are meat and drinke, that they should directly further [Page 157] our saluation: it is enough if they be not an impedi­ment thereunto. And againe afterward: Quod non aedifi­cat. i. quod fratris fidei, pietati, & sa­luti impedimento est. That doth not edifie; that is, is an hinderance to our brothers faith, piety, and safety. As for decencie and inde­cencie; piety and impiety, in actions capable of ei­ther, M^r. B. may as soone [...]. Insec [...]bilia secare. diuide the point of a Spanish neeale, as assigne any medium betweene the one and the other. Meane while M^r. B. hath set a new snare here to intangle and snarle scrupulous Consciences in. For though no indecency can be dis­couered in some kinde of attire, yet if they Et Magis audi­endū quàm auscul­tandum censeo: Vti de Ariolis Pacuv. Chryse. apud Cic. de divin. l. 1. de Phar­macopolis Cato in Coelium apud Gell. noct. Attic. l. 1. c. 15. heare M^r. B. they shall hang, vpon this new conceit of his, still in suspence, whether it may be auowed to be decent or no. I might adde, that with much diffi­cultie and no little adoe they must haue it proued to them by some sentence of Scripture, (which I would faine heare M^r. B. performe) for no reason will serue else, that it is so.

Let vs consider these rules yet somewhat more neerely to the point. Touching the first: The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14. 40. be these. [Let all things be done honestly, and by order.] In which is no intima­tion that all things are in themselues lawfull to be done, which are done honestly and by order: but a charge, that all things, be they in themselues neuer so lawfull, be done honestly and by order. Those drinke offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healths, per an­tiphrasin, are solemnized sometimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, alwaies with putting off hats, and some speech more or lesse: are they acceptable to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, then [Page 158] be Lots and the vsers of them in gaming neuer so or­derly disposed, yet are they not therefore iustified.

M^r. B^s. taske is to instance if he meane to doe ought, against what generall Rule of Gods word a lusorious Lot is; for that is the issue that we now are at. But in stead thereof M^r. B. telleth vs that that no man denies, that if it be in it selfe vnlawfull, it is not the more iustifiable, because it is not against this first rule of order. And what is this to the pur­pose? I [...]. Plut. [...]. vel quod Ru­fino Hieron. Manū posceris, & pedem porrigis. Vel Aca­demico Domino si serviret, facturum quod se Epictetus profitetur, [...]. Arian. dissert. l. 2. c. 20. aske for a pickaxe, and M^r. B. reacheth me a spade. This is mine Argument, Game in ge­nerall being allowed, and no particular matter or man­ner of it prescribed, any is lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: But Lottery is such, to wit, not against any generall Rule of Gods word: therefore Lottery is lawfull. That it is of it selfe lawfull is the Conclusion; that it is not against any generall rule of Gods word is the Assumption. M^r. B. denieth the Conclusion; saith it is vnlawfull; and that it cannot be made lawfull, though it be not against some one such Rule. What manner of answering call we this, wherein nothing is denied or answered to, but that that indeed ought neuer to be denied?

Touching the second Rule. It is true, That all things must be expedient, that is, edifie, 1 Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sinne who stumble or offend a brother, that is, occasion him to fall or be made weake, Rom. 14 13, 21. But lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and to be weake in goodnesse. Therefore they doe not edifie, and therefore are not expedient.

[Page 159]Here M^r. B. speaketh somewhat to the purpose indeed, if his Answer could be made good. For he saith, that a lusorious Lot is against this second Rule. But how proueth he it? Because lusorious Lots occa­sion thousands to fall into sinne, and grow weake in goodnesse. What doth euery Lot vsed in game doe so? Make that good and take all. Let M^r. B. proue, that euery Lot vsed in game, as for example sake, euery shuffling of arrowes, or choise of pawnes hid in the hand to decide leading, or euery game that chil­dren play at, euen and odde, heads and points, &c. doth occasion thousands, or some one at least or other to fall into sinne, or grow weake in goodnesse, and I will yeeld all lusorious Lots to be vnlawfull. If he can­not, he must no more condemne all lusorious Lots, because where they are abused they produce such effects, then all vse of boules for disport in generall, because bouling abused doth altogether as much.

Concerning the third Rule, Let all things be done to Gods glory, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Is this to Gods glory, to vse his Name in any other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed, and then to take that Name in vaine? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a Lot is to vse Gods name in another case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed; and then also to take that Name in vaine: and it is a grieuous tempting of God, as shall be proued. Therefore playing with a Lot is not to Gods glory, and by consequence not agreeable to religion and piety.

This is, to vse M^r. B^s. terme, the kill-cow indeed. [Page 160] But all that here a sporting Lot is charged with, is yet to be proued. It shall be, M^r. B. saith. In good time; but till then Nihil dicitur fu­isse factum, quam­diu aliquid agendū superest. Reg. Iur. nothing is done. Nor is it true that M^r. B. saith in the next words, vnlesse what shall be done, be done already.

Though it be sufficiently proued that lusorious Lots are directly against two of the generall Rules; and not warranted by the third: So that M^r. G. hath not bette­red his cause by appealing to them.

How sufficiently M. B. hath proued this, what­soeuer he will doe; I haue shewed: [...]. Aristoph. thes­moph [...]r. Nor is my cause yet any thing hereby impeached, vntill more be brought against it, than as yet is.

Yet it is to be obserued, that all the Rules require Things and Actions to be according to them. But M^r. G. by onely speaking of them, would iustifie circumstances, and meanes of playing with Lots, if (forsooth) they be not against them.

Of that friuolous exception, and distinction of according to them, and not against them, enough al­ready hath beene said.

For the rest here obiected, that by onely speaking of them, I would iustifie circumstances and meanes of playing with Lots, if they be not against them, albeit neither I, nor any man else, I beleeue, besides M^r. B. himselfe, vnderstandeth well what it meaneth: yet to cleare my selfe from such aspersion, as it may seeme to cast on me; I will briefly relate the summe [Page 161] of mine Argument reduced into due forme. Thus then it standeth:

The Proposition I thus proued:

In explication of the first Proposition, I relate those Rules: For confirmation of the Assumption, [...] require to be nominated, against what generall rule Lottery vsed in game doth offend. Now let M^r. B. shew which way herein I offend.

Thus hauing euidently shewed the Reasons inducing (not drawing) M^r. G. to allow lusorious Lots, to be [...]oth fearefull; as these euasiue speeches, [Not euill in themselues] [Not prohibited] [Not determi­ned] and [Not against the generall Rules] doe im­port; and otherwise vnsound; I will (with Gods [Page 162] helpe I hope) reply vpon M^r. G^s. answers to mine Ar­guments against playing with Lots contained in my Dialogue.

How well M^r. B. hath quit himselfe in this his opposition, there will no doubt, I see, be made, if he may be his owne Iudge. But if his Dextra sinistram meliorem & gladio scutum habere dice­bantur, qui sua me­lius defenderent, quàm aliena im­pugnarent. left hand steed him no better than his right, nor his shield doe him more pleasure than his sword hath, I doubt much whether his Reader will receiue from him any good satisfaction, howsoeuer he may therein please and sooth vp himselfe. As there is seldome Autor laudat opus. Ovid. de Pont. l. 3. el. 9. Quidni? Scruta quidem ut vendat s [...]rutarius laudat. Lucill. apud Gell. l. 3. c. 13. Sed & suum cuique pulchrum. Cic. Tusc. l. 5. [...]. Aristot. ethic. l. 9. c. 7. any workman but liketh well of his owne worke.