A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.

A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.

Table of contents

Title page

TO HIS LOVING and much respected Friend, Mr. THOMAS GATAKER Bacheler in Diuinitie.

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THE FIRST PART. Mr. BALMFORDS PREFACE, WITH ANSWER TO IT.

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ANSWER TO Mr. Bs. POST-SCRIPT. TO THE READER.

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THE SECOND PART. Mr. BALMFORDS Answer to Mr GATAKERS Arguments for the lawfulnesse of a Lusorious Lot. Together with Mr. Gs. Reply in defence of his owne Arguments, which are word for word also here related.

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The first Argument.

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The second Argument.

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The third Argument.

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The fourth Argument.

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The fifth Argument.

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The sixth Argument.

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THE THIRD PART. Mr. BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending vpon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with Mr. GATAKERS Answer to them in his Booke of the Nature and Vse of LOTS. As also Mr. Bs. Reply in defence of them: and Mr. Gs. Reioinder thereunto.

The first Argument.

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The second Argument.

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The third Argument.

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The fourth Argument.

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AN ADVERTISEMENT to Mr. BALMFORD.

Some things omitted, or misprinted.

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A IVST DEFENCE OF CERTAINE PASSAGES in a former Treatise concerning the Nature and Vse of LOTS, Against such Exceptions and Oppositions as haue beene made thereunto by Mr. I. B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his Answers giuen to the Arguments brought in defence of a Lusorious Lot is manifested; The imbecillitie of his Arguments produced against the same further discouered; And the Point it selfe in Controuersie more fully cleared; BY THOMAS GATAKER B. of D. and Author of the former TREATISE.

LONDON, Printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, and are to be sold at his shop at the signe of the Bible in Cheapside. 1623.

TO HIS LOVING and much respected Friend, Mr. THOMAS GATAKER Bacheler in Diuinitie.

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SIR,

I haue perused your Answer to Mr. B. his Pamphlet against you; wherein you haue so cleared the point in controuersie betweene you; that I much pitty your opponents hard lot to fall vpon such a subiect and tenet concerning Lots, as afforded him so small store of Obiections against your Opinion, [Page] that he was euen constrained, according to the manner of some old Roman▪ Orators noted by Quintilian, Caussarum vacua convitijs implere. Neither the matter in hand, about which learned Protestants may differ in iudgement without breach of Charity, or preiudice to Christian vnity, nor your handling it dog matically and scholastically without any gall at all, could occasion such heats. I cannot imagine therefore, what should so much moue him, but the badnesse of his cause, and the weaknesse of his owne Arguments, which he seeth by your handling them to be like wier-strings ill-nealed, which would not endure the least straining. For albeit I confesse that we are all apt to take too much hold of any point of liberty reached vnto vs out of Gods word; and in particular I cannot but deplore sortem sortis, the Lot of Lot it selfe, which hath beene and is too much by the licentious abused, and thereby in a sort defamed, especially in Carding and Dicing: yet Gods truth must not be suppressed because of mans errors; neither is it a safe way to goe about to cure an error in practise, by another error in iudgement; [Page] I meane, to reforme the abuse in Lusorie Lots by totally condemning the vse it selfe of them. Though a Surgean meane neuer so well in letting his Patient bloud who needeth it, yet if he strike not the right veine, he had better haue spared his paines. The sinne too regnant in sports and games now a-daies is not in vsing the Lot, but in not obseruing those Rules and Cautions in these and other Recreations, which are iudiciously and piously set downe by you in your compleat Treatise of Lots. Let those Cautions be obserued, and set aside the authoritie of some Diuines, whose persons they haue in admiration aboue others; what is there in the casuall falling of the Dye, or dealing of the Cards, more than in the fall of a Coyte, or lighting of an Arrow neerer or further, or the turning of a Boule, to ensnare the Conscience? Art more ruleth the one, and Nature the other; Gods prouidence and concurrence being equall in either. For to conclude, that because some Lots haue beene consecrated to an holy vse sometimes, therefore all Lots are sacred, is a feeble kinde of arguing. And to impose a speciall and immediate [Page] worke of Gods prouidence, vpon the casuall euent of the Lot, more than vpon other naturall accidents and deliberate actions of men, is a temerarious and groundlesse assertion. And furthermore to charge all those seruants of God, who moderately vse their Christian liberty in these Games, with so hainous a sinne, as is the prophaning of a thing sacred, or taking in vaine Gods deciding Iudgements, is an vncharitable censure. The Lord open the eyes of all that seeke to serue him in sinceritie and singlenesse of heart, that neither by enlarging their Christian liberty they open a gap to licentiousnesse, nor yet by too much restraining it lay a snare on weake Consciences. To deliuer you my iudgement and aduice in a word; Satis actum est: you haue sifted this point of Lots to the bran. Let me aduise you hereafter non reciprocare serram contentionis de ludis sortiarijs, but rather to imploy your able pen against the Sorcerers of Aegypt now abounding in euery place, and making aduantages of the least differences among vs, who hold the like pretious faith purged from the drosse of their superstition. This [Page] aduice, I know, you will take in good part, as proceeding from

Your true affectionate friend and fellow-labourer in the Lords haruest, DANIEL FEATLY▪

Croydon Sept. 2. 1623.

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This Discourse or Defence consisteth of three Parts.

1. An Answer to Mr. Bs. Preface, and his Postscript.

2. A Reply vpon Mr. Bs. Answer to Mr. Gs. Arguments.

3. A Rejoinder to Mr. Bs. Reply in defence of his owne Arguments.

Mr. Bs. intire Context is without omission of ought inserted; as also Mr. Gs. owne Arguments and Answers are out of his former Booke transcribed, that neither of them may be wronged, nor the Reader inforced to run from Booke to Booke, to search for that that is either confirmed or confuted, or otherwise dealt with, hauing all represented here together vnto his view.

THE FIRST PART. Mr. BALMFORDS PREFACE, WITH ANSWER TO IT.

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To the Christian Reader, being none of I. B. those men, who (according to S. Pauls Prophecie) 2 Tim. 3. 4. loue pleasures more than God.

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To the same Christian Reader, beingT. G. none of those men, who (contrary to S. Iames his Rule) Iam. 2. 1. hold the Faith of Christ, or the Truth of God, with respect of persons.

I Could haue wished, good Reader, that Mr. B. had obserued those two Rules sometime prescribed their Orators at Athens, that they should speake when they spake, [...]. Lucian. de gynmas. without preface, or passion. For if any [...]. Plato de rep. l. 4. Nimis [...]diosa pempa res Circensibus. Sē. praefat. controvers. Preface whatsoeuer, [Page] as Plato saith, seeme long to those that desire to come to the maine matter; much more must a prolix and impertinent Preface, needs be no other than a meere Purgatorie to the studious Reader, either diuerting or with-holding him from that that most he desireth. And for passion and affection, it is apparent, that Ab ipsa veri contemplatione [...] abducunt. Quintil. inflit. l. 6. c. 3. Ratio id iudicari vult quod aequum est▪ iraid aequū videri vult quod iudicauit. Ratio nihil praeter ipsum de quo agitur, spectat: ira vanis & extra causam oberrantibus commovetur. Saepe infesta patrono reum damnat: & si ingeritur oculis veritas, amat & tuetur errorem: coargui nō vult; & in malè coeptis honestior illi pertinacia, quàm poenitentia (aut palnodia) videtur. Sen. de ira, l. 1. c. 15. they doe not onely not helpe or further ought, but hinder much the discouerie either of truth or of right. But Mr. B. it seemeth, liked not to be tied to either of those Lawes: for he beginneth his Booke with a long Proeme, and his Proeme with much passion. Which course since he hath taken, and there is a necessitie of examining what he here saith, I must intreat thee to blame him (who hath giuen the occasion) and not me, if thou be kept longer than is fit, from that which thou hastn [...]st vnto, and that should haue beene our principall aime in this worke.

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SOme yeeres are past since Mr. G. tooke occasion,I. B. from casting of Lots to finde out for whose sake a dangerous storme was, to iustifie playing with Dice, Cards, &c. and to confute me by Name in open Pulpit.

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It hath beene euer deemed that Pri [...]ipus omen inesse [...]. [...]. Eurip. Aeol. Rarus principi [...]est exi [...]us bonus mal [...]. Principi [...] qu [...] sunt incho [...]a [...]alo, vix est [...]t bon [...] per [...]gantur exi [...]. Leo ad M [...]ur. Ep. apud Gr [...]. caus. 1. q. 1. Vbi tamē Gl [...]a paulò seve [...]ius, Vix [...]. n [...]quam. Malum principium [...]alus finis sequitur. Petr. [...]ns r [...]g. i [...]r. [...]iv. Hinc Cic. ad Attic. l. 10. ep. 20. Malè p [...]suimus initia; sic caetera sequentur. Beginnings T. G. are ominous: and such matter as men meet with at the first entrance of a worke, they are [Page] wont commonly to looke for and expect in the processe. If this worke of Mr. B. should by this rule be iudged of, it would receiue no small preiudice; sithence it beginneth at the first entrance with a flat vntruth, to wit, that I confuted him by name in open Pulpit.

True it is, that handling the first of Iona. 1. [...]. Ionas, I tooke occasion, by the Lot there cast, to entreat at large of the Vse of Lots in generall, the rather for sundry doubts and scruples that by diuers had beene moued vnto me concerning the Vse of them: And that among other things I defended the Vse of a Lot generally vsed in disport, either for combination of the sporters onely, or for prosecution and determination of the sport; and consequently did iustifie the Lot vsed in Cards and Dice &c. rather than the Games themselues simply, or any otherwise, considered. For my maine question concerning lusorious Lots is, whether the light Vse of a Lot be a thing vtterly vnlawfull, as Mr. B. and some others auouch it to be; and so whether that make such games among others to be vnwarrantable, not whether in other respects they be vnwarrantable or no.

But that by name in open Pulpit I confuted Mr. B. or that in propounding of any Argument in this Argument by me refuted, I did in Pulpit once name any Author thereof, is a thing altogether vntrue; concerning which I haue cleared my selfe by solemne protestation to Mr. B. himselfe, as shall Post-script to his Preface. after by his owne confession in [Page] part also appeare: And many also that heard me and tooke notes of what was deliuered, can yet testifie as much.

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I hearing thereof by many sent him this message; I. B. If it would please him to send the substance of the Confutation (for I dare not relie vpon report) I would either reply or change mine opinion with thanks to God for him; though for the present I thought he failed in Iudgement, Discretion, and Charitie.

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By whom Mr. B. heard this I know not. IfT. G. they told him ought that was vntrue, the fault was not mine but Exod. 23. 1. Levit. 19. 16. Falson' an vero laudent, culpent, quem velint, Non floccifaciunt; dum illud quod lubeat sciant. Plaut. Trinum. 1. 2. theirs; peraduenture Atque egomet me adeò cum illis unâ ibidem traho, Qui illorum verbis falsis acceptor fui. Ibid. Multum enim derogatio praevalet, quando deroganti fides habetur. Foelix 2. ad Athan. c. 10. Detrabere an detrabentem libenter audire, utrum sit damnabillus non facilè dixerim. Bern. de consid. lib. 3. Pari reatu de [...]rabentes & audientes detinentur. Idem medit. cap. 42. Similiter culpabilis est is qui detra [...]it, & qui detrabentem audit. Idem mod. viv. c. 33. Itaque sci [...]e Hier. ad Nep [...]t. Cave ne aut ling [...] aut aures prurientes habeas, i. ne aut ipse alijs detra [...]as, aut detrabentes audias. Nemo invito [...] [...] ▪ Dis [...]at detractor, d [...]te videt non libenter audire, non facilè detra [...]ere. his also, in being ouer-credulous in that which the party, whom he made vse of betweene himselfe and me, could haue informed him to be otherwise. And I cannot but wonder by the way, that Mr. B. who here telleth his Reader that he dareth not relie vpon reports, yet hath not doubted vpon bare report, (if any such were) especially hauing since the same beene bettet informed, to auow peremptorily in print, that I confuted him by Name in open Pulpit. [...] These things sure doe not agree well together. If he durst not relie vpon report then, how dare he [Page] now so far forth relie vpon it, as to auerre that in print, which he could not haue but by report? vnlesse his iudgement be altred since concerning that point.

But hearing indeed, it seemeth, that among other Arguments answer was giuen to those also contained in his Dialogue; He shewed himselfe, as I was informed, therewith to be much offended, and sent me word, that if I would let him haue in writing what I had deliuered, it should be answered. Whereupon I sent him so much of it as concerned his Dialogue extracted out of the rest. Which he promised to consider of, and returne answer vnto.

Yea, but in this businesse, Mr. G. in Mr. B. his opinion, hath failed much many waies. If he had then either told me so meeting me, as he did many times, or had sent me such word, I might then haue giuen him some satisfaction therein. But let vs now at length heare, and others determine, wherein.

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1. In Iudgement: Because that Doctrine was I. B. not drawne from his Text; Except this be a iudicious deduction.

Gentiles cast Lots in a most serious matter: Therefore Christians may vse Lotterie in Dicing, Carding, &c.

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I perceiue if Mr. B. might haue the framingT. G. of Mr. G•s. Arguments, there would be very iudicious deductions in them indeed. But if without [Page] any such iniudicious deduction, the Question of the Vse of Lots in generall might well by occasion of that Text be discussed, then is Mr. B. his deduction nothing iudicious, from thence taxing Mr. G. as failing in Iudgement, for taking occasion thereby to discusse that Question. But herein Mr. B. dealeth with me as he doth with Peter Martyr in his Dialogue; where, because Petr. Martyr in Iud. cap. 14. Peter Martyr relateth in his discourse entreating of Dice-play, how [...] Plat. de repub. l. 10. & apud Plut. de tranquill. & consol. ad Apollon. Sed & Socrates apud Stob. c. 123. [...]. Plato compareth the Life of Man thereunto, he denieth, yea and seriously consuteth this Consequence, implying the same to be Peter Martyrs;

Plato compareth mans life to Table-play,

Therefore Table-play is lawfull.

I will not here stand vpon the Ordinarie plea, that it is Magnos bonestus error est sequi duces. Quintil. instit. l. 1. n [...] great disgrace for a man (a meane man, as my selfe especially) to goe astray with great Guides, before he be informed (as my selfe neuer was till now) of their error. Nor will I say, as one sometime did (it was no warrantable saying) Malo ego cū Platone errare, quàm cum istis vera sentire. Cic. Tascul. l. 1. Verum hoc est Platonem Deum sacere: prout ipse alibi de eodem; Deus ille noster Plato. Cic. ad Attic. l. 4. ep. 15. Melius sanctiusque Aristot. ethic. l. 1. c. 6. [...] Vnde & illud eiusdem sertur; Amicus Plato: sed magis amica veritas. Sed & Plin. ep. 8. l. 5. Honestissimum maiorum vestigia sequi, si mo [...]ò recto itmere processerint. I will chuse rather to erre with such, than to goe the right way with any other: as if it were safe, as some Cùm Pastor ordinarius & a [...]quis [...]lius qui praedicat non voca [...]us contraria docent, debet omninò populus Pastorem suum potius sequi quàm illum alterum qui non est Pastor, etiam si fortè contingeret, vt Pastor erraret. Bellarm. de Cleric. l. 1. c. 8. Quasi cum Cic. pro Balb [...] diceret, Vti [...]us bonesti [...]sque illo duce errare, quàm hoc magistr [...] erudi [...]i. Papists auow, to erre at all with any. But yet, considering the ordinarie [Page] practise of some Peter Martyr, Dr. Whitakers, Mr. Perkins, and others. An ego verear ne me non satis deceat, quod illos decuit? Plin. ep. 3. l. 5. principal Diuines of our times, and such as Mr. B. himselfe (I am sure) esteemeth for iudicious; as also treading in the track of The now Lord Archbishop of Canterbury; and the late L. Bishop of London. two Reuerend Prelates (besides others) in this very particular, who take occasion vpon the same Text (though not so largely as I doe) to consider of Lots in more generall manner than concerneth the particular Lot in the Text mentioned, and to speak the B. King on Ion. lect. 9. one of them somewhat of the Lusorie Lot also now questioned; I shall craue leaue of Mr. B. to incline to their Iudgements herein rather than his, till he bring better Reasons for his Opinion than as yet he hath brought. Nor will Mr. B. euer be able to proue that euery by-point handled by occasion of a Text, must of necessitie be necessarily deduced euer from the words of the Text. Howsoeuer it be, it mattereth not much, since it neither mendeth Mr. B. his cause, nor yet marreth mine in the Point betweene vs controuerted.

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2. In Discretion. Because that Doctrine (though I. B. occasioned by his Text, yet) so insisted vpon, incourageth Gamesters in their sinfull course, and buildeth vp those Abuses, which the Lawes of our Land would pull downe.

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The Charge, you see, riseth, From a grosseT. G. failing in Iudgement to a fouler faulting in Discretion, if all that Mr. B. here auerreth, be true. But whether my discourse doth, either incourage Gamesters vnto any sinfull course; (vnlesse to vse [Page] any Lot in Game be a sinfull course, which Mr. B. must not yet take for granted) or build vp such Abuses as our Lawes would pull downe; I appeale to the Booke it selfe; let Mr. B. either shew so much out of it, or else his Calumniatur, qui quod defert, non probat. Reg. Iur. Charge here is but a meere Calumnie.

But of this more hereafter.

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3. In Charitie: Because he confuteth me by I. B. Name (as I was certified) not hauing had any conference with me either by speech, or by writing, though I be his Neighbour Minister.

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The heauiest Charge commeth last. A breachT. G. of Charitie at least. To faile in Iudgement or Discretion, may argue some weaknesse of braine; to faile in Charitie argueth Ideò imperitiam confiteri solemus, ut malitiae suspicionem vitemus. Hieron. adv. error. Ioan. Hierosol. much more, an euill minde. But let Mr. Bs. words here and else-where be well weighed, and peraduenture they will giue ouer-much ground of suspition of some want of that in him, that he chargeth me here to haue failed in. Mr. G. saith he, failed in Charitie, because he confuteth me by Name, as I was certified, hauing had no conference with me by speech or writing, though I be his neighbour Minister. Not to insist much on by-matters; that Mr. B. is my neighbour Minister, is more than euer I heard before: that he is A divisis ad conjuncta nulla est consecutio. Aristot. soph. elench. l. 2. c. 3. my neighbour and a Minister, it may well be; yet it is more than I knew, when I dealt in this point; nor doe I yet know, where his place of abode is, saue that himselfe of late hath told me, that I [Page] goe oft by his doore; and so he may be termed my neighbour, yet in no very strict sense, as any other Inhabitant in the Borough of Southwarke may. But to let that passe, if Mr. B. his meaning be that I confuted him by name in the Pulpit, as he charged me at first, and which I vtterly denie; how will it stand with Charitie or Conscience vpon a bare report, which he saith else-where he dareth not relie on, and that a [...]ter better information acknowledged to haue beene giuen him, yet still so oft, and so peremptorily to charge me therewith, and with breach of Charitie therein? If his meaning be that I haue since that confuted, and doe (the Vox audita perit: litera scripta manet. letter of my Booke still abiding) by name confute him, not in the Pulpit, but in print, because he saith in the present tense, he confuteth me by name, I denie it not, nor doe I hold it any breach of Charitie so to doe. His Booke is abroad vnder his Name, as well as mine is vnder mine: Nor is it any more a breach of Charitie for me by Name so to confute him in the one, than it was in him by Name to controll and oppose Peter Martyr in the other. But neither could this be any ground for Mr. B. then to iudge me guilty of vncharitablenesse, when as yet it was not; nor could any certifie him then of it, vnlesse they knew more of my minde then, than I my selfe did; nor was it done before I had dealt with Mr. B. by writing, as himselfe in the next passage freely acknowledgeth. Mr. Bs. words therefore hang but vnhandsomly together, when he [Page] saith, he thought I failed in Charitie, because I confute him by Name, as he was certified, &c. His minde and his pen, or both, and the knowne truth, it may be feared, Illic mihi aliud dictabat animus, aliud scribebat calamus. Erasm epist. ad Ludov. Viv. lib. 19. had some strugling together, when he wrote thus.

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Well; Mr. G. sent me his Answer to my Dialogue.I. B. I acknowledge it with hearty thanks. But why haue I not replied in so many yeeres? I answer: Sat citò, si sat benè. To speake freely; I thinke I should neuer haue replied, in hope that the Question would haue died, had not Mr. G. confuted my Dialogue in Print. But now, the rather, being prouoked by many learned Ministers and other. who tell me, that seeing of all those whom Mr. G. confuteth, viz. Peter Martyr, Zwinglius, Cartwright, Danaeus, Perkins, Fenner, &c. I onely liue, I ought to reply, lest my silence should giue way to impious iniquitie; I am ready to performe my promise in replying. Which indeed I could not haue done so conueniently before, because the answer, which Mr. G. sent me, had not the positiue grounds of his Opinion, which the printed booke hath.

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True it is, I was not daintie to deliuer Mr. B.T. G. an Answer to the whole Substance of his Dialogue, but vpon promise returned me first from Mr. B. that in defence of his owne Arguments he would reply thereupon. Which himselfe also, after long delay, being vrged either to doe or tredeliuer it, did by word of mouth to my [Page] selfe againe oblige himselfe either to doe or to yeeld the truth; for so his words both times were. But after a yeere or twoes stay longer, when nothing would be returned, and I was by diuers informed, how I was in meetings oft traduced and backbited, mine intentions scanned, my positions taxed, some as senslesse, some as impious, diuers assertions fastned on me, that I neuer deliuered, diuers of those - nihil est, Quin malè narrando possit depravarier. T [...]r. Phorm. 4. 4. depraued that were deliuered, and that Mr. B. himselfe among others was not sparing herein: I condescended at length to the importunitie of those (yet hauing had the whole worke viewed and reviewed first by diuers, as well religious as iudicious Diuines, and hauing by writing dealt with diuers others of contrary Iudgement,) that had pressed me to the printing of it.

Now why Mr. B. did not all that while reply vpon mine Answer, which he was so instant to haue, he rendreth two Reasons; in my minde very weake ones.

1. He hoped, it would haue died. And how was that likely, when his Challenge had reuiued it; and that bruited abroad, a Replie was expected. But his former Dialogue belike was enough to dash all that either had beene or could be said without further Reply.

2. The writing I sent him, had not my positiue grounds. As if his owne Arguments, had they beene effectuall, could not without them haue beene sufficiently defended.

Why now at length he doth it, he hath two [Page] Grounds likewise, but those suggested to him from others, as the former were from himselfe.

1. Because he onely liueth of all those whom Mr. G. refuteth. Where in the Catalogue of those whom he saith I refute, he reckoneth some, as Zwinglius, whom I refute not at all, as not knowing certainly what they held, some that himselfe refuteth as well as I doe, and that allow Cards and Tables as not simply vnlawfull, as Peter Martyr, Danaeus, and Perkins; that so both I might seeme vtterly to dissent from them concerning the lawfulnes of those Games, whereas Mr. G. maintaineth no more cōcerning Cards and Tables, than Peter Martyr, Danaeus, and Perkins doe. I maintaine no more concerning the lawfulnesse of them in themselues than they doe, (though in our grounds, I confesse, wee differ) and that himselfe might seeme, as the last man aliue amongst them, to stand vp in the defence of them, when as indeed he opposeth and impugneth them, and these Games, by them not vtterly disallowed.

2. Lest by his silence he should giue way to impious iniquitie. Here is againe terrible imputations. They were before in the priuatiue; Want of Iudgement, want of Discretion, want of Charitie; in the manner of my dealing. They come now in the positiue: Impious Iniquitie; Not Iniquitie alone, but Impietie and Iniquitie, the breach of both Tables, combined in one: where, thinke we, but in the matter of my discourse? Surely, if such impious Iniquitie be maintained by me in this Argument, I beshrew Mr. B. for [Page] sparing his pen, when he might by discouerie of it in his reply haue preuented the printing of it: And little cause I haue to thanke those my friends before spoken of, that hauing had many the view of it before it came forth, would not any of them doe me the fauour to aduertise me thereof. But [...]. Plato apud Plut. de adul. & de util. ex inim. Amantium coeca sunt judicia. Hieron. ad Ioan. Hierosol. [...]. Greg. Naz. ep. 13. & 27. & erat. de Eccl. Naz. Fallit affectus. Plin. ep. 44. l. 4. affection peraduenture might ouersway iudgement in them. And [...]. Plut. de util. inim. [...]. Ibid. an Aduersarie many times is sharper-sighted then a Friend. Meane while remember, I pray thee, good Reader, that there is Si accusasse sufficiet, quis innocens erit? Iulianus Delphidio apud Ammianum hist. l. 18. nothing easier than to charge and accuse: all the skill is, which Mr. B. must looke to, to make good.

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Before I proceed, I protest before God, that II. B. esteeme Mr. G. as a learned, painfull, and faithfull Minister, and a right honest man; and therefore pray thee (Christian Reader) that whatsoeuer I write may be considered as concerning the Question betweene vs, and not in any wise applied to the least preiudice of so reuerend a Brother, or to any of his excellent parts.

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If Mr. Bs. purpose were to deale onelyT. G. with the Question in controuersie, why runneth he out into [...]. Aristot. rhet. l. 1. c. 1. such by-matters, as make nothing at all thereunto? Why doth he labour so much to cast such aspersions, to procure [Page] [...]. Arist. ib. preiudice, as well vpon my manner of my dealing, as on the matter that I deale in? Or what is this but as if one should cast filth and durt openly in a mans face, and yet beare the standers by in hand, that he did it not to disgrace him? But proceed we.

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So excellent that I wonder what moued him to I. B. publish his Opinion in print; and the more because of many passages in his Booke.

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Me thinks I heare some of those here, thatT. G. Videas praemitti alta suspiria, sicque quadam cum gravitate & tarditate moesto vultu, demissis supercilijs, & voce plangentiegredi maledictionem, & quidem tanto plausibiliorē, quanto creditur ab his qui audiunt, corde invito & condolentis affectu proferri. Doleo, inquit, vehementer de eo, quia diligo illum satis. Grande damnum: nam-alias quidem in pluribus valet: caeterū in hac parte excusari non potest. Bern. in Cant. 24. Bernard speaketh of, who when they desire most to disgrace a man, begin first to tell of his good parts, and how much it grieueth them that one otherwise so well qualified, should be so far ouer-seene. But to let that passe.

Mr. B. here wondreth what should moue me to put mine opinion (not relating what it is) in print. As if some new opinion were now broached by me that either had neuer beene heard of, or neuer published before. Whereas he cannot be ignorant, that both the Opinion held by me concerning the lawfulnesse of a lusorious Lot in generall, is, and hath euer beene (for ought that can be shewed to the contrary) more generally receiued than that that he holdeth, and hath beene in print maintained by others before me; yea concerning Cards and Tables, (which I deale with principally, in regard of the Lot in them, defending them onely as not in that regard vnlawfull) that they were in print defended by [Page] Peter Martyr, at least; if not Danaeus too. some of those that himselfe mentioneth, before I was borne, or he either.

I might wonder rather that Mr. B. should thinke either himselfe or any other now adayes so priuiledged, that they might take libertie to themselues to publish new conceits in Print, contrary to what is and hath beene generally receiued, and yet thinke much that any other in Print should oppose them.

But many passages in my Booke shew that I ought not so to haue done.

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First, He taketh knowledge of many enormiousI. B. Crimes, which accompanie Dice, Cards, &c. p. 193. and in the quotations.

Secondly, He giueth this Rule, That that, which is no necessarie dutie, but a thing indifferent onely otherwise, may not be done, where is strong presumption vpon good ground, that it shall spiritually endanger a mans selfe, or others, by giuing occasion of sin vnto the one or the other, p. 107, 108, 109.

If many and grieuous sins attend Dice, Cards, &c. If those games be too too commonly abused, as he confesseth, p. 194. and if an indifferent thing may not be done which giueth occasion of sinne: I wonder why Mr. G. writeth in defence of Dice, &c. And the more, because he granteth, that where the vse and abuse of a thing are so enwrapped and entangled together, that they cannot easily be seuered the one from the other, then the vse of the thing it selfe (if it be vnnecessarie otherwise) would be wholly abandoned, p. 262, 263.

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[Page]Here is the summe of Mr. Bs. Argument.T. G. Mr. G. taketh notice that many enormious Crimes oft (for so I say onely) accompanie Cards and Dice: and they are by many too commonly abused: and he granteth further, that things indifferent may not be done when they giue occasion of euill: and that where the vse of a thing and the abuse of it are so entangled together, that they cannot easily be seuered, the thing being vnnecessarie, would wholly be abandoned. Therefore Mr. G. ought not to haue deliuered his Opinion, that a Lot vsed in game is not simply vnlawfull; and that it is not the Lot either in these games or in any other (for it is vsed in many besides these) but such abuses attending them, when they are not, or cannot well be seuered from them, that makes them euill or vnlawfull. For this is my maine opinion giuen of them. Or rather, if you will haue the truth of it; Therefore Mr. G. ought not to haue contradicted M. B. his opinion, that no Lot in game is lawfull.

Hee might haue added, what Tu id quod boni est, excerpis, dicis quod mali est. Ter. Phorm. 4. 4. I adde, that those euils attend other Games wherein no Lot is, as well as those wherein it is: And that it is not the Lot therefore from whence they arise: and that the vse and the abuse may easily be seuered by those that be well affected, as well in these Games as in any other. And I might adde, that Martyr, Danaus, yea and Istiusmodi ludi nō ita prorsus damnarentur à nobis, si in eorum usu, quod licet, locum haberet. Calvin. epist. 374. Caluin himself, though they saw all that he saith I say, yet durst not passe such a sentence on them as Mr. B. hath done. But what force is in the Consequence, let any indifferent man iudge.

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[Page] Thirdly, He sheweth in many pages, how seuerely I. B. Tables, but especially Dice, be condemned by Lawes Ciuill, Canonicall, and Municipall, that is, our English Statutes, as he sheweth at large, Lib. 8. §. 5. 8. He wisheth the Lawes were yet more seuere, and put in better execution, p. 206. He saith, that our common dicers may be marshalled among the flocke of the Deuils followers, p. 217. He affirmeth most rifelings and Lotteries to be little better than vnlawfull Games, p. 120. And he teacheth that by these Games we must not giue offence to the Lawes vnder which we liue, p. 251. Now I wonder that so good a man is not afraid to offend our Law by allowing forbidden Games, euen Dice, as well as Cards &c. which consist not only of Lotterie. T. G.

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To all this, that is indeed nothing but a deale of dust and smoke raised to dasle mens eyes, that they may not discerne what the point in Controuersie is, I haue already in my Discourse of Lots Of Lots, chap. 8. sect. 8. answered at large. And it is a friuolous course for Mr. B. to produce it here, passing dry-foot by the Answer that is thereunto there giuen.

Thither therefore I might iustly send Mr. B. for an answer. But I answer here againe in few words.

1. Our Lawes doe not simply or generally condemne or forbid Cards or Dice, but to some onely, vsed in some manner, and at some times.

[Page]2. It is not in regard of any such superstitious conceit of the vnlawfulnesse of a Lot in them, as Mr. B. maintaineth, that either ours or any other Lawes condemne or inhibite them.

3. It is a grosse falshood that I offend our Lawes by allowing any Games that are thereby forbidden, so far forth as the Law forbiddeth them. Mine owne words by Mr. B. himselfe produced cleare me thereof: And it is too palpable a Calumnie to charge me therewith. If a man should defend the lawfulnesse in themselues of bowling, coiting and logeting against some fantasticall spirit that should question the same, (as Nihil tam absurdum est, quod non ab aliquo etiam Philosophorum dictum sit. Postremo nemo aegrotus quicquam somniat Tam infandum, quod non aliquis dicat Philosophus. Varro Eumenid. Anaxagoras nivem esse nigram dixit. Xenophanes Lunam habitari, eamque terram esse multarum urbium & montium. Cic. Lucull. Terram moveri, coelum consistere, Philolaus, Cleanthes, alij. Laert. Philol. Plut. Num. Cic. Lucul. Sen. nat. quaest. l. 7. c. 2. Iam Haeretici quorū illi Patriarchae, ut scitè Tertull. pr [...]siript. quae portenta dogmatū protulerunt? Nec nuptias contra [...]ere, [...]ec corpus vestire Ad [...]mitae; n [...]c vinū gustare, Severiani & Encratitae; nec carnibus vesci, Saturniani, & Ebionitae; nec panem frangere, aut olus scindere Manichaei; nec judicia exercere Tertullianistae; nec gladio uti, bellare, jurare, magistratum gerere, porcina, sangu [...]e, suffocato vesci Anabaptistae; nec nisi precibus. duntaxat vacare Mesaliani, &ç. licitum cense. bant. V. dendi Epiphan. Aug. Theodor. Danae. de Haeres. Iudaeuli verò quam in hoc genere foecundi? nec quo spinā è pede evellat, nummūve lapsum attollat, corā imagine incurvare se licitum; nec potandi causasimulacro labia admovere, cujus per os aqua profluat; nec ornamenti causa humanā effigiem, Solisve aut Lunae imaginē sculptā habere; nec mulieri et [...]icae obstreticari; nec per sabbatum super herbam ambulare, nec pomū assare, nec manus lavare, nec lucernam extinguere, nec supellectilem incendio subtra [...]ere, &c. Vide Pr [...]cept. Mos. negat. there is nothing almost so absurd but some or other haue held) would any man, thinke we, be either so malitious or so senslesse, as to tax him for the same as offending our Lawes, because in the same Lawes these are also prohibited, though there be no Lot in them, euen as strictly as those other are? Or were he a iustifier therefore of the abuses accompanying the same, that should defend them as in themselues not vnlawfull?

[Page]4. I will not answer Mr. B. here as the Philosopher did one, that telling idle stories, was still asking, [...] Is it not a wonder? [...]. Aristot. apud Plut. de garrul. It is a wonder, quoth he, rather that any man can endure to heare thee thus trifle. But I wonder that Mr. B. since he deemeth it so fearefull a thing to be faulty herein, is not afraid himselfe to offend our Lawes, I might say, by fastning vpon them or the makers of them such superstitious conceits concerning the vse of a Lot, as I verily thinke Mr. B. himselfe cannot imagine, euer entred into their braines; as supposing that these Lawes were framed vpon such Grounds as his Booke is built vpon: but I say rather, by condemning that that they allow and approue of, and that not in the meaner sort, but in those of best fashion, that should be examples vnto others, and I might adde, at such times, when, if at one time more than other, they ought to be most religious of any. Mr. B. therefore if he doe well remember himselfe, may turne his wonderment here from me to himselfe.

Lastly, though I grant that common Dicers may well be ranked among the Deuils followers, yet followeth it not that all vse of a Die is therefore to be condemned; no more than it will follow that because Tauerne-haunters may well goe in the same ranke with such, therefore all resort to any Tauerne on any occasion whatsoeuer is to be vtterly disallowed.

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Here I haue occasion to thinke, that I may haueI. B. [Page] some more comfort in mine opinion, than Mr. G. can haue in his. For he nameth famous, learned and godly men concurring with me in Opinion. [...]ut in the multitude of his quotations, I finde none approuing Dice in play. And whereas some learned Diuines, in some sort, allow Games consisting of Lot and wit, but altogether condemne Dice, Mr. G. defendeth mine Opinion, disapprouing a mixt, as well as a meere Lot, because, as he saith, a true Lot is in either, p. 126. and he deemeth them to be amisse, who allow Lots in Game, and y [...]t adde for a Caution, that religiousnesse be vsed in the action, in regard that holy things must be done in holy manner.

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1. How any man may haue sound comfortT. G. in any error, be it what it will, is more than I am aware of: since that euery error is vnsound and contrary to truth: nor can I see therefore how that should minister any sound or true comfort, that hath no soundnesse nor truth it selfe. Some Hin [...] Plin. ep. 5. l. 3. Ab illis, quibus notum est, quos quantosque autores sequar, facilè impetrari posse confido, ut errare me cum illis ferant. excuse there may be for it, but small comfort in it, when a man together with some great ones goeth out of the way. Mr. B. therefore must first be assured of the truth of what he holdeth, before he can from his company haue any true comfort of it. The rather since that by his owne confession, Mr. B. dedicat. epist to Dialog. he ought not to teach a [...] vntruth, though it were to Gods glory: and what comfort can he haue of doing that, that ought not by him to be done?

2. The Reason produced by him (supposing [Page] all he saith) is a very weake one, and such as I doubt not but he himselfe would haue waiued, had he beene of the first that had questioned some things yet in controuersie with vs.

3. Many famous, learned and godly concurring with Mr. B. I name not, because I know not many; howbeit indeed all I know, I name. And for those that concurre with me in the iustification of a Lot vsed in Game; I made no speciall or particular relation of them, not because none such were, for there are diuers, but because I was not so much to deale with them that concurred, as with those that either did indeed, or might seeme to oppose. Of which number I was religious not to misse or omit any one that I could light vpon, whom I found ought in to that effect.

4. Albeit it be not much materiall what humane Authorities are on either side: since that neither the Iam. 2. 1. Nec personarum, sed rerum pondere vnumquodque iudicandū est. Hieron. ad Pamm. & Ocean. Faith of Christ, nor the Truth of God are to be held with respect of persons: Yet since that Mr. B. would seeme herein at least to relie somewhat thereupon, and would make what I maintaine odious, or suspitious at least, by the nakednesse of it, and the want of famous, learned and godly concurring in it, such as he glorieth here to haue concurring with him: let me a little, good Reader, intreat thy patience, which Mr. B. enforceth me, I might well say, to abuse, I must needs say, to detaine with impertinent discourse all this while much against mine owne will, while, to remoue this imputation, [Page] I runne out a little further in relating the Opinions of others on either side, and in clearing the state of the Question in Controuersie, which Mr. B. to procure the more distaste to his opponents, (as the manner is of those that maintaine a weake cause, [...]. Greg. Naz. de pace 3. willing rather to fasten vpon any by-matter, that may breed some iealousie of the aduerse partie, than to keepe close to the point it selfe) propoundeth still in hypothesi, in one particular that he knoweth to be much abused, when the Question indeed is a great deale more generall.

The Question therefore is not betweene Mr. B. and me, whether Dice-play, which so oft he hath vp, that he might traduce mee as a maintainer of it, as it is ouer-frequently vsed or abused rather, is allowable or no; but whether any Lot at all in the largest sense taken, vsed in game, or to speake as himselfe doth in the very Title of his Booke, whether any Game at all consisting in chance, be allowable. So that Mr. B. if hee please, may put the Question as well of Euen and Od, or of Best by trust, or of Heads and Points, or of Crosse and Pile, as of Dice; and of Shuffling of Arrowes blind-fold or behind a mans backe, or of Casting Bowles together out of some one mans lap or armes to decide or sort who shall side, as of Cards & Tables, which come here into disquisition only, in regard that a Lot either is, or is deemed to be in them. And I maruell why Mr. B. as he peremptorily cōdemneth Cards & Tables, & requireth an vtter necessary abolition of them, [Page] doth not withall also very seriously and seuerely enioine all Parents to restraine and vtterly inhibit their Children from playing at Cockall, and Crosse and Pile, and Euen and Od, and Heads & Points, considering that these are Lotteries likewise or Games consisting of chance as well as those are; and there is impious iniquity therefore (to vse Mr. Bs. tragicall tearmes) by his Grounds, as well in the one as in the other. But it would peraduenture haue beene somewhat too ridiculous if he should so haue done.

But to leaue that, in their iudgement concerning such Games, there is the more seeming difference among Diuines and others, because See my booke of Lots. ch. 6. sect. 3. p. 126. they doe not generally agree about the Definition of a Lot, in regard whereof also it is ofttimes vncertaine whether they doe allow a Lot in Game or no, taken in that large extent of signification that Mr. B. and I vnderstand it.

Whereas therefore the Games controuerted are of two sorts, some depending wholly vpon Casualty, and some but in part onely; Fennor of recreat. cap. 4. Bamford Dialog. some hold a Lot in both, and therefore vtterly condemne either; Danae. de ludo aleae. Babington on Decalog. Perkins Cases of Conscience. lib. 3. cap. 4. some hold a Lot in the former, but not in the latter, and therefore allow those, but disallow these, some Iacob. Rex [...]. lib. 3. hold a Lot in neither, and therefore allow either; B. King in Ion. lect. 9. some hold a Lot in both, and yet allow either. Now in the generall Conclusion thus laid downe, it is true that Mr. B. goeth with the first, and I with the last; but in application of the Iudgements of the middle sort to the Games in question, I concurre [Page] in part with the former, wholly and fully with the latter, whereas M. B. dissenteth wholly and fully from both.

There concurre therefore with me in allowance of the Games of both sorts, First. Our most high and mightie Soueraigne himselfe Iacob. Rex vbi sup. King Iames, for his singular learning and iudgement admired as well abroad as at home, and whose voice therefore may well in a far greater controuersie beare weight. Secondly, the right Reuerend the late B. King on Ion. Lord Bishop of London: yea and thirdly Caluin. ep. 374. M. Caluine himselfe, who would not he saith, vtterly condemne Cards and Dice, were it not for the ordinary abuse of them.

In allowance of the latter there concurre againe with me, Babingt. on Command 8. Bishop Babington, P. Martir. on Iudg. 14. Peter Martyr, Danaeus de ludo aleae. c. 6. Danaeus, Perk. Cases of Conscience, l. 3. c. 4. S. 3. q. 2. Perkins. All whom, as well the latter as the former, yea the latter more specially, Mr. B. opposeth: Mr. Fenner only, Mr. Br. teacher, (for so Mr. B. answer to Argum. 5. and defence of Arg. 4. himselfe acknowledgeth him) for ought I know, (nor doe I name any other, howsoeuer M. B. say I name famous, learned and godly men, concurring with him in opinion) therein cleerely or directly passing sentence on his side.

Nor helpeth it Mr. B. that I grant, willing ingenuously to imbrace and acknowledge Vndecunque esfulserit Lux neuliquam spernenda veritatis est. whatsoeuer light of truth I can from any side discerne to discouer it selfe, that the grounds that some of them haue laid being duly considered, fight as well against the one sort of Games, which yet they defend, as against the other, [Page] which they disallow. For their Iudgement is to be framed by what they conceiued and apprehended, and doe themselues directly declare and deliuer vnto vs, not by what may be by vs deduced, though neuer so necessarily it follow (being more than they saw or were aware of,) from any other position or conclusion of theirs.

Schoolemen or other such writers of former times I name not now, though I might many, and haue done some obiter in my Chap. 3. sect. 1, 2. Booke; because Mr. B. would peraduenture except against them. As for the Ancients indeed little is to be found of this Controuersie in them; because the exception taken against them for the dependance vpon casualtie is in truth but a new conceit, neuer heard of till of late. And for Diuines among vs, I doubt not but a far greater number of our Reuerend Brethren in the Ministerie abiding here about the Citie, to goe no further abroad, yea euen of those that Mr. B. himselfe cannot but esteeme reuerently of, doe dissent from Mr. B. than concurre in Iudgement with him, in the condemning of all Lotterie whatsoeuer vsed in disport; or, because some of them may vnderstand Lotterie otherwise than he and I doe, in condemning all light and lusorious actions that either meerely or mixtly depend vpon Casualty.

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Fourthly, He granteth that Prayer specially applied I. B. to the Lot may be conceiued, where the matter is more weighty, and the euent of some consequence, [Page] p. 91. And yet he holdeth, that the lesse weighty the matter is, wherein a Lot is vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is, p. 111. The reason why I wonder at this passage, shall be giuen in my Reply.

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Mr. B. should haue done well then to haueT. G. forborne to trouble both himselfe and vs with telling vs of this his wonderment, till he meant to giue vs a reason of it. For I suppose hardly any man liuing beside himselfe can guesse what the, And yet, here should intimate, till he further explaine himselfe.

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The last passage now to be obserued as matter I. B. of my wondring, is this. Notwithstanding, he confidently affirmeth that we may not doe ought without warrant, p. 301. sufficiently confirmeth the same; because such an act is not done of Faith, and therefore not free from sinne, Rom. 14. 23. but is a meere presumption, and tempting of God, pag. 313. & quot. a. & b. and earnestly reproueth one kinde of Lotterie (why not all against which the same reason is of like validitie?) because not found reuealed in any word of God, but brought in either by Satan, or by some of his Instruments, who are addicted to vanitie, p. 315. & 316. and yet he auoucheth, That it is a sufficient warrant for the vse of Lots; in that the oppugners, being learned, can say nothing against them, but what hath beene, or may be sufficiently answered, pag. 235. May I not wonder that so iudicious a Scholler doth not obserue this discrepance? Lottery is vnlawfull, if not [Page] warranted by the word; which position supposeth the word to be perfect, as is the Author thereof; and secondly Lotterie is lawfull, if learned men can say nothing out of the word against it. Which position supposeth two things, viz. that the word is like the Lawes of Men, that is, imperfect, as be the Authors thereof: and, that learned men cannot so faile in diligence of reading, clearenesse of vnderstanding, and firmnesse of memorie, but that, if there were in the word any thing aginst Lotterie, they could not but see it.

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1. I feare there will not want those that willT. G. Iudex bonus esse nemo potest, qui suspicione certa non movetur. Ci [...]. in Verr. 5. strongly suspect that some speeches of Mr. Bs. here proceed rather from spleane and gall against Mr. G. than from loue to any truth supposed to be opposed by him; and that with much better colour, than Mr. B. can deduce that which he here chargeth me with from any words of mine here alledged. For what one title of all that Mr. B. alledgeth here out of my Booke, intimateth any such thing as is here by Mr. B. thence deduced, to wit, that the word of God is imperfect. As if that which there is nothing in Gods word against it, were not warranted by the word: or the word must needs be imperfect if this be held sufficient warrant for an action, that there is nothing in Gods word against it. For thence must this hainous Charge be inferred, if from any part of my Position at all. Which Position, or whatsoeuer else Mr. B. pleaseth to stile it, (for it is propounded by me only, as matter [Page] of consideration, not as a peremptory position,) he should haue done well to haue related all out in mine owne words, which are these; It may be thought a sufficient warrant for the vse of th [...]se Lots, in that the oppugners of them being m [...]n so learned, and so well read in Gods word, can say nothing against them, but what either hath beene or may be sufficiently answered by others. Which words are there spoken, not as presupposing that learned men cannot fail [...] in reading, vnderstanding, and remembrance, but as very probably presuming that men learned & well read in the word, bending their mindes and studies that way, might and should at length finde out such a speciall institution and consecration of Lotterie in generall to be a diuine sentence and an holy Oracle, that might not lightly therefore be dealt with, if it were any where to be found. And that the contrary issue of their diligent search and industrious opposition producing nothing but what had beene or might easily be answered, might seeme sufficient to produce such a morall certainty as in ci [...]ill Actions the Casuists doe ordinarily require. But I referre my selfe and Mr. Bs. dealing herein to the iudgement of any vnpartiall par [...]ie vpon due view of the place it selfe.

2. Howbeit to stay Mr. B• ▪ wonderment somewhat; that he may not make me an Owle sitting alone [...] [...] by my selfe: at least to set him vp another to wonder at as well as my sel [...]; (one that it se [...] [...] he would not, for [Page] else he could not but see, when he found him sitting together in the same bush with mee. Mr. Bradshaw (a man well knowne to M. B. while he liued, and one that it would be no disparagement to Mr. B. I suppose, if I should say he were as iudicious a man as himselfe,) in his Answer to Iohnson the Separatist, vseth these words, W. Bradshaw vnreasonablenesse of the Separation, Reas. 3. ans. 1. This is a sufficient iustification of our Ministerie, that such malitious Aouersaries thereof, who would seeme so expert in the Scripture, are no better able by Scripture to proue their vnchristian accusation. Here is Quod ille pronunciat, ego dubitot quod ille definit, ego sciscitor. Hierō. apolog. pro lib. adv. Iovin. a more peremptorie assertion than mine is by much, and that in a matter, I wisse, of much more weight. It is sufficient, saith he; it may be thought so, say I: that men that would seeme so expert in the Scripture, saith he; that men so well read in Gods word, say I. Now I will request Mr. B. to looke a while off me, and turning his speech to him tell him▪ that he wondreth that Mr. Br. though he doe confidently auow (as he need not doubt but hee would haue done) that wee may not doe ought without warrant; yet doth withall auouch, that this is sufficient iustification of our Ministerie, that men so expert in Scripture cannot make good ought against it: and that so iudicious a Scholler doth not obserue this discrepance; and how hereby Gods law is made, like humane lawes, imperfect. And let him imagine but what Mr. Br. would in all likelihood haue answered him, or Mr. Iohnson, if he should in that manner haue replied vpon him. Meane while he need not wonder, that [Page] I see not this discrepance, when one far more iudicious than my selfe could not see it, either in my worke, (for he had the viewing of it ere it came out, and was a chiefe instigator of me to the setting of it out,) or in his owne.

2. What by the way he alledgeth out of my booke by me there produced against Diuinatorie Lots, though mangled in citation, as the former, after his manner, that therefore they are to be condemned, because Of Lots, chap. 11. sect. 7. they are not found reuealed in any word of God, nor were euer deliuered by any Prophet of God, nor are grounded on any principles of reason and nature, or were learned by any course of naturall and ordinarie obseruation; but were brought in either directly by Satan, or by some lims and instruments of Satan, &c. persons addicted wholly to vanitie and to vngodly curiositie. And hereupon asketh, Why, if this reason be good against one kinde of Lotterie, it should not be of like validitie against all. I make no doubt but the consequence is firme and good. It remaineth for him to proue all kinde of Lotterie to be such, and he shall haue my suffrage for the condemning of all. Meane while I desire a little more faire dealing at Mr. Bs. hands in allegation of mine assertions.

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Well: it may be seene shortly, how Mr. Gs. diligence,I. B. vnderstanding and memorie haue serued him in defending lusorious Lots.

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It is very likely, that they haue all oft timesT. G. [Page] failed mee. [...]. Greg. Naz. de pac. 1. [...]. Idem de plag. grand. There is no man but they may; my selfe much more the meanest of so many.

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In the meane while sufficiencie of his answering I. B. is but vpon the Triall, and not yet adiudged.

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And of Mr. Bs. reply the like.T. G.

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All these passages well reuiewed by Mr. G. II. B. should thinke he cannot wonder that a man of 64 yeeres compleat (and therefore his wits may faile) doth wonder, that so godly, wise and learned a man, the faculties of whose minde are at the best, did not say to himselfe before he preached, much more before he penned this lusorious Doctrine, Iudg. 6. 31, 3 [...]. Let Baal plead for himselfe; and, These gamesters shall without any incouragement from me,Esai. 5. 18.draw on their iniquitie with their cords of vanitie; and the rather, because he acknowledgeth that accompt is to be giuen vnto God of gaming, p. 261. If of the act, much more of iustifying it. From which accompt good Lord deliuer me. For I feare that in iustifying lusorious Lots, I should put false spectacles on a gamesters nose, whereby the bridge seemeth broader than it is, and so he falleth in without feare; to use Mr. Gs. similitude, p. 264.

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Surely either Mr. G. is a wonderfull strange T. G. man, or else Mr. B. is very prone to wonder at [Page] things that are not very wonderfull. For here is nothing with him but wondering, and wonder vpon wonder. He telleth his Reader againe and againe that he doth wonder: he demandeth of him whether he may not wonder: he would not haue me, nay he thinketh, I cannot wonder, that he doth thus wonder. Some Heathen wisemen haue held it [...]. Zeno apud Laert. Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, Sola (que) quae possit facere & servare beatum. Horat. epist. 6. a point of the highest wisdome for a man to wonder at nothing. I am not of their mindes. Yet as another saith, that V [...]rum (que) vitium est, & omnibus & nulli credere; sed alterum honestius, alterum tutius. Sen. epist. 3. [...]. Hesiod. it is as well reproueable in a man for him Prov. 14. 15. inde [...] fatuus dicitur. Sirac. 19. 4. [...]. Epicharm. to trust euery one, as Butleri Contabr. epigraphe, Be faithfull to all, but trust no man liuing. not to trust any: so I hold it an vnwise part in any man, as well Vt pavere, sic Mirari cuncta infantile, insanum nihil. to wonder at euery thing, as to wonder at nothing; as well to wonder where iust cause of such wonderment is not, as not to wonder where it is. Now all that hath by Mr. B. beene said being well considered, I leaue it to others to iudge what iust cause of so much wonderment he hath produced hitherto out of my writings.

2. But let vs heare what further matter Mr. B. hath here found, for this his wondring humor to worke vpon: for the former passages haue already beene examined. That a man of 64. yeeres complete should see more than one some fourteene or fifteene yeeres younger than himselfe, as Mr. B. perswadeth himselfe that hee doth, it is no wonder. [...]. Plut. paedag. [...]. Eurip. Phoeniss. [...]. Idem Beller [...]ph. - non omnia grandi [...]r aetas. Quae fugiamus habet: seris venit usus ab annis. Ovid. met. l. 6. [...]. Sophocl. Oedip. Knowledge gathered by experience and continuance of studie, is [Page] wont to grow together with yeeres in Senectus eorū qui adolescentiam suam honestis artibus instruxerunt, aetate fit doctior, usu tritior, processis temporis sapientior. Hieron. ad Nepot. Talis Solen, qui se quotidiè aliquid addiscentem senem fieri gloriabatur. Cic. senect. [...]. Solon. those that be industrious, as I beleeue Mr. B. to be: It is not that therefore, I presume, that Mr. B. so much wondreth at. But that which he wondreth at, and I must not wonder that hee doth wonder at, is this, that so godly, wise, and learned a man, &c. (I would intreat Mr. B. Genus inimicorū pessimum est laudantium. Tacit. Agric. Callidum nocendi artificium accusatoriam dir [...]atē laudum titulis peragere. Mamert. panegyr. no more thus to commend me: I like not his manner of commendation. I obserue it to be euer but a foile to what here followeth, to be but a shooing horne still, the more smoothly to draw on some disgracefull aspersion or other, and to make my supposed failing therein the fouler; as before, so here:) that such an one, forsooth, should plead for Baal, and giue incouragement to gamesters: for that is apparantly implied. Which whether I be guilty of, I appeale to my Booke, and to all that will vouchsafe the reading of it. Must he needs be held to plead for Baal, that should maintaine that the trees growing in Baals groue, which Iudg. 6. 28. Gedeon cut downe, were naturall trees indeed as others are, and not enchanted Quales Heliadas fabulantur in arbores versas exclamasse, -nostrum laceratur in arbore corpus. Ovid. met. l. 2. Fairies in the likenesse of trees, against some fantastique that were possest with some such senslesse conceit: or that should haue defended the lawfulnesse of vsing the wood of them either for sewell or fence, contrary to the In quo genere adeò superstitiosi Iudaeuli, ut si arbor prope Idolum consita sit, nefas ducant sub umbra ejus considere, vel etiam per umbram ejus transire, nisi alia nulla via patu [...]rit, in quo casu cursu incitatissimo transire praecipiunt. Praecept. Mosaic. affirm. 45. Commodum nullum ab idolis, aut eorum supellectili percipiendum. Ibid. fancie of some superstitious Iewes, notwithstanding that superstitiously they had before beene abused, [Page] being consecrated vnto Baal? Or doe they plead for Baal, Paget against Ainsworth, and others. that maintaine against the Separatists, that our Churches are not now Idol-Temples, being rid of those abominations, that before they were defiled with? What incouragement I giue Gamesters, Mr. B. himselfe hath in part before shewed, and my Booke it selfe may further shew.

3. Account if I should not looke to giue to God for whatsoeuer I teach, it were strange indeed, when I teach that Tam otij quàm negotij reddendam rationē: tam silentij quàm sermonis. account is to be giuen euen of our lightest imployments. But let Mr. B. remember also, that account must be giuen of Psal. 50. 20, 21. wrongfull charging and Matth. 7. 1. groundlesse censuring of our brethren; and that an heauy one too, if Iam. 3. 1. S. Iames be beleeued.

4. As he feareth, which I hope not, that I haue failed one way; so let him take heed lest he faile the other way in the same place spoken of: Remembring that as well it is a sinne Deut. 4. 2. & 12. 32. Prov. 30. 6. [...]. Greg. Naz. de eutax. to adde to Gods word, as to detract from it, and Apoc. 22. 18, 19. Vae tam adjicientibus quàm detra [...]entibus destinatū. Tertull. contr. Hermog. as heauy a iudgement denounced against the one as the other: And that, as one saith well, though I remember not well who, M. Edgerton, if I mistake not. We must not [...]ick Gods measure an inch to some, because others will thereupon take an ell more than they should.

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But Mr. G. beleeueth that he hath written theI. B. truth, (Preface to the Reader) and is confident that truth is to be knowne, especially concerning matters of common practise, p. 263. and giueth foure reasons by which he was moued to defend lusorious Lots, p. 264.

[Page]The first is to draw men from superstition, in restraining themselues, when God doth not restraine them. This beggeth the Question, as, I hope, will appeare in the Reply.

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These words are not mine. Neither are theyT. G. found in the place quoted; nor would I haue spoken in that manner. Yet that I there imply a superstitious conceit in the contrary Opinion, it is true. Neither is it to be taxed as a begging of the Question, being not produced there as any proofe of the point in controuersie, but as my Iudgement of them, whereupon I was induced the rather to deale with them. As for the thing it selfe, let it appeare in the Reply; and it will come yet time enough.

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A second Motiue is, because Arguments againstI. B. lusorious Lots haue made many stagger in the necessarie Vse of serious Ciuill Lots. It may be so, some failing in their Iudgement. But it may be also, that many moe will be made to stagger by reading Mr. Gs. exceptions against Arguments for, & Cautions in those serious Ciuill Lots, cap. 5. and by his Maxime, The lesse weighty the matter is, wherein a Lot is vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is, p. 111.

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1. My second motiue Mr. B. here omitteth,T. G. and so also doe I therefore. This that he saith is part of the third; part, I say; because I say more than so, and yet no more than I can make good neither, that those Arguments, the chiefe [Page] of them, that are brought against the one kinde, will, if they be sound, necessarily ouerthrow also the other.

2. What mine Exceptions may chance to doe, is a matter meerely contingent; and [...]. Isocr. ad Demon. De futuris contingentibus non est determinata veritas. Aristot. de interpret. c. 10. there is of it therefore no certainty. But of the other that they haue made many stagger, I am very certaine; nor see I which way Mr. B. keeping to his owne grounds will euer be able to settle them. If my Exceptions be such, as is here implied, it had beene a good worke to haue remoued them, for their sakes, that might chance else to stumble at them.

3. That Maxime, as Mr. B. termeth it, was once before nibbled at. But the time of the triall of it, belike, is not as yet. What staggering it should cause in the vse of a Lot, vnlesse to those that wilfully put themselues vpon hazard of apparent inconuenience, I cannot as yet conceiue.

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A third Motiue is to take away much heartburning;I. B. Nay rather this iustifying lusorious Lots, will not only cause more heart-burning; but incourage also Gamesters to ouer-crow such as are scrupulous. For, if many well-affected haue beene constrained, in regard of scruple in this kinde to straine themselues to some inconueniences by refusall of those games, when by those, whom they had dependance vpon or familiaritie withall, they haue beene vrged occasionally thereunto: (which to preuent hereafter is a fourth cause of his writing,) How [Page] will these supporters, and familiars insult vpon the scrupulous, now they haue so learned a patron of their gaming? Some haue strained themselues to some inconueniences for not pledging drunken Healths, being drinke-offerings to Bacchus. To preuent which hereafter should Mr. G. doe well vnto edification to preach and write in iustification of these Healths?

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1. Mr. B. snappeth still at many things; butT. G. dealeth not entirely with any. One short shred he snatcheth out of my fourth Motiue, or as he stileth it, the third; and another somewhat longer out of the second, which he here calleth the fourth; letting the rest goe; for what reasons himselfe best knoweth. But if the inconueniences there mentioned, many more than Mr. B. here relateth, may (as it is no question but that they may, if the truth be found and cleared to be on this side) be thereby remedied, it is an effect of some consequence, and such as may well recompence the trauell therein taken.

2. But it will rather proue cleane contrary, if Mr. B. may be beleeued. For it will incourage Gamesters to ouer-crow such as are scrupulous; (and how can it doe so, if those scrupulous ones shall haue receiued satisfaction, and so shall haue deposed their scruple?) hauing gotten so learned a patron of their gaming? A pretty nip; of the same stampe with some other before: as if others more than one or two, whose learning I doubt not but Mr. B. deemeth deseruedly [Page] mine to come farre short of, had not before mee in Print defended the vse of a Lot in disport.

3. For drunken healths, if Mr. B. can shew that a lusorie Lot and they are of the like nature, hee saith somewhat: till that, his instance may stand by for a stale. But suppose that in detestation of these drunken healths, Mr. B. should publish a Booke, endeuouring therein by diuers Arguments to proue that it is vtterly vnlawfull for one friend to drinke to, or to pledge, another at Table, and much more to drinke at Table to, or to pledge (as we say) any that are then absent; and many weake ones should thereupon make scruple of such common curtesies; and both they and the profession of pietie should thereby be exposed to derision, and iust imputation of superstition, I thinke it would not be deemed labour amisse bestowed (for those weake ones sake at least) for some learned man to take paines to confute such a conceit. And this instance, if Mr. B. please to apply to the present controuersie, I suppose that it will proue somewhat more pertinent than that he produceth; it will in part at least cleare the meaning of one of my motiues.

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The Summe of his Causes (as he expresseth himselfeI. B. in his Preface to the Reader) is, To set at libertie the intangled Consciences of Godly-disposed persons. Indeed; If any Consciences, simply for playing with Lots, should seeke his satisfaction in [Page] priuate, then if Mr. G. quieted him by his grounds (supposed true) it were not amisse. But is euery Doctrine, though true, to be insisted vpon both by Preaching and Printing, and that affirming matter in Question, and of no necessarie vse?

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Here is the Summe indeed, it seemeth, ofT. G. that that Mr. B. would haue. He must haue libertie, (by what rule I know not) to preach and print (for Epistle dedicatorie before his Dialogue. what he hath printed, he saith himselfe that he had preached) what he will; but his doctrine must not be contradicted either in Pulpit or by Presse. He may insnare and intangle Christian Consciences in publike; but Mr. G. must not quiet them againe but in priuate. Especially so long as his doctrine runneth in the Negatiue, Coloss. 2. 21. Touch not, taste not, handle not: (it is a Text not vnfitly M. Yates Modell of Diuinitie, edit. 2. cap. 16. quaest. 1. error. 4. applied to the present purpose, by one sometime of another iudgement, but vpon better consideration now concurring in iustification of the lusorie Lot:) as if Rom. 14. 14, 17. 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 7. 1, 2, 9, 28, 36, 39. & 10. 23, 25. the Apostles had neuer affirmatiuely preached Christian liberty, or Gal. 2. 4, 5. & 5. 1, 10. Col. 2. 20, 21. opposed publikely the courses of those that sought to limit and restraine it, and that in things Rom. 14. 2, 6. 1 Cor. 10. 27, 28. not absolutely necessary neither, but such as might well haue beene forborne.

That is therefore to little purpose, that Mr. B. addeth;

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I say, Affirming, remembring the holy wisdome I. B. of the Apostles and Elders, who decreed touching Act. 15. 28, 29. [Page] offensiue things (yet some of them lawfull, if conueniently vsed) onely negatiuely; and deemeth it not necessarie to decree affirmatiuely things that were then, and might be in vse for a time.

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For neither is it equall that some one particular T. G. act should for all circumstances be a generall rule to all others: the practise of the Apostles themselues, and by name of See the places aboue cited. S. Paul being at other times in points of the very same kinde to the contrary that Mr. B. here vrgeth: See Calvin. institut. lib. 3. cap. 19. sect. 10, 15, 16. Neither is there the same reason of Dogmaticall Diuinitie, by grounds of faith informing the Conscience concerning the true Nature of the things themselues, and of Ecclesiasticall Discipline by Canons and Constitutions restraining not Christian Libertie▪ but the outward Vse of it for Order sake, and the benefit of our Brethren.

It is as if one should thus Reason. 1 Cor. 9. 14, 15. 2 Cor. 11. 8, 9. The Apostle tooke no stipend of the Church of Corinth: therefore no Minister of the Gospell may take stipend of his people. Or, Act. 18. 3. & 20. 34. 1 Thess. 2. 9. 2 Thess. 3. 8. S. Paul wrought with his hands for his liuing: Therefore all Ministers of the Gospell ought so also to doe. For such is Mr. Bs. Argument, or else it is none at all; The Apostles and Elders determined negatiuely only of some things offensiue: therefore no man may presume to deale in the affirmatiue of such.

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Many (I feare, too many) learned Diuines approue I. B. Vsurie in their Iudgement, though condemned by Law. Yet none that I know euer insisted [Page] vpon the iustification thereof by Preaching and Printing.

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Whether Many Diuines among vs be of thatT. G. minde or no, is more than I know. Nor list I to take notice what hath beene either preached or published of that Argument by any. This I am sure of, that Those very Lawes allow Cards and Tables. our Law, though it condemneth Vsurie, it alloweth Lotterie; and therefore the instance is not euen in that regard as it ought, and is intended here to be.

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Againe, Was there euer any so troubled with I. B. playing with Lots? I doubt it. But without doubt thousands will now more boldly vse Lusorious Lots, without regard of the Cautions, in these licentious times. As Vsurers regard not the Cautions which Diuines set downe. For it is enough to them that some godly Diuines affirme Vsurie to be lawfull. T. G.

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1. What Mr. B. meaneth by so troubled with Lots, I know not: But that many are by meanes of the Doctrine by Mr. B. and others maintained, superstitiously conceited of them, I am sure; and that diuers so conceited haue thereupon sometime strained to sinne against conscience, as themselues haue confessed, to their disquiet afterward, and sometime haue beene constrained to vndergoe no small inconuenience for the auoiding of the like againe.

2. But thousands now, saith Mr. B. (as if the [Page] vse of such Lots had neuer beene defended, or were neuer heard of till now) will now more boldly vse Lusorious Lots without regard of the Cautions. Mr. B. speaketh very peremptorily; and yet I take him for no Prophet; and his prediction therefore yet may faile. But if any be emboldned by my Booke vpon better information to vse a Lusorie Lot in due manner, where it is otherwise not vnlawfull, I haue no cause to be sorry for it. If any be emboldned to abuse it, not regarding the Cautions, it will be their owne fault, not mine, who deliuer nothing that tendeth to the emboldning of them thereunto. Not to adde, that the Cautions concerne not a Lot vsed in sport as it is a Lot, but Game rather and Recreation in generall: which neither Mr. B. nor any other sound Diuine disalloweth, Aug. de Music. l. 2. citante Martyre. Petr. Mart. in Iud. 14. Thom. Aquin sum▪ part. 2 2ae q. 168. Perkins Cases of Cons [...]. l. 3. c. 4. q. 3. Fennor of recreat. &c. many by writing defend, and yet doe they not thereby giue incouragement to any to vse Game or Recreation in vndue manner: nor are they held guilty therefore of the sinne of those that regarding not the Cautions by them annexed to the Doctrine of it, vse it otherwise than they ought.

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Oh that Mr. G. had considered what he writeth,I. B. p. 107. before cited; and what he writeth, p. 103. & 104. viz. Where inconueniences, that shall necessarily, or in good probabilitie appeare to accompanie the thing questioned, or ensue vpon the doing thereof, shall be such, and so great as the Conueniences, which stand on the other side, shall not be able to counteruaile; there that action is [Page] worthily disallowed as inconuenient, and a Lot consequently vnlawfull: what he writeth in his Spirituall Watch, p. 27. viz. The rifer any euill is in those places, or ages we liue in, the more carefull should we be to shun and auoid such a sinne. No doubt he would haue taken heed how by writing he make way to the sinne of, or by Lusorious Lots.

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1. I am much beholden to Mr. B. for hisT. G. good wishes. The Considerations that he wisheth I had taken into thought, are indeed good and needfull; but vnlesse he can assume, and make good his Assumption, that the penning and publishing of my Discourse is such and so inconuentent as is therin specified, he hath little reason to perswade himselfe, that it must needs doubtlesle haue preuailed with me to the staying and suppressing of my Booke. Which yet had it appeared in probabilitie and likelihood to haue beene, I should not haue failed to be as chary of the publishing of it, as Mr. B. himselfe would haue had me to be.

2. Nor doe I doubt, but as I writ, that Ephes. 5. 15, 16. [...]. Plut. de laud. sui. euils the rifer they are, the more carefull wee should be to shun and auoid them. But that by defending of the lawfulnesse of a Lusorious Lot in it selfe, I make way to sinne in the vse, or rather in the abuse of it, I denie; and my deniall standeth good, vntill the point it selfe be disproued. I doe no more make way to the one by defending the other: than some of the Ancient Epiphan. de haeres. & August. de morib. Manich. l. 2. c. 16. Fathers made way to the abuse of [Page] Wine either by Drunkennesse or otherwise, when they defended against the Vinum fel principis tenebrarū dicebant. Manichees, Tatiani, Encratitae, and others, that Wine was Gods good Creature, and men might lawfully drinke of it. Or than so many of our Calvin. Martyr. Bucer. Aretius. Bucan. Piscat. Perkins, &c. late writers, as defend the lawfulnesse of an Oath lawfully vsed, against the Anabaptists, that vtterly condemne all vse of it, doe thereby make way for the iustification of that ordinarie vaine swearing, that is Quis estoro, praeter paucos, qui non ad hoc semper Christi nomen in ore habeat ut pejeret? In id penitus deducta est res, vt Christi nomen jam non sacramentum esse videatur sed sermo. Plures (que) invenias qui saepius perjurent, quàm qui omninò non jurent. Salvian. de provid. l. 4. c. 10. as rife, yea far rifer, than any abuse of Dice or Lot-play either is or can be.

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Many Diuines and intelligent men, though ofI. B. Opinion that lusorious mixed Lots may be vsed lawfully, yet wish that Mr. G. had neuer published his Booke. For a running Horse, say they, needeth no spurring.

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And many Diuines and intelligent men pressedT. G. the publishing of it, and that more of them, and with more importunitie many of them than is fit for me here to relate: I may truly adde, that some euen of contrary iudgement aduised it.

Nor doe I spurre any running Horse in my Booke: but endeuour only to vngirt some, that Mr. B. and some others had girt in more than was meet, or than they had any good warrant so to girt in out of Gods word: and to ease such as might thereby be not girt onely, but galled too.

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[Page]For my part, I wish, that Mr. G. had beene affectedI. B. in writing, as he professeth himselfe to be in the vse of lusorious Lots, p. 266.

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Nor can I blame Mr. B. (though his wishesT. G. be vnequall) that he wisheth so oft that I had not by writing contradicted the subiect matter of his Dialogisticall Discourse; which yet hee himselfe by a peremptorie Challenge incited me first vnto; and by his after-demeanure (in a manner) inforced me further to publish.

But me thinks, if Mr. B. were so desirous to be informed if he erre herein, as My desire is either informatiō, if I erre, &c. But whether I erre or no; which yet I would gladly vnderstand; for I ought not to teach an vntruth though to Gods glory. M. B. epist. dedicat. before Dialog. else-where he professeth, and to haue 1 Thess. 5. 21. Try all things, &c. In the Frontispice. the Truth tried and cleared, as he would seeme else-where also to intimate; yea, or if he were not loth to haue his opinion herein scanned or discussed, or were not somewhat suspitious of it that it would not endure light, he should not be so vnwilling to haue it dealt with by others, he should not take it so euill as he doth, that he is contradicted in it; nor would he cast so much impertinent bymatter here in the way, that may rather hinder than further the pursuit of the truth with that Christian affection that in such cases ought to be held; but proceed rather directly to the making good of his owne Arguments, as in my writing giuen him, I came to the Answer of them directly. If hee would gladly vnderstand from others whether he be in an error, why excepteth he so much against me for doing no more than himselfe saith he would gladly haue done? If [Page] he mislike that it is by writing and publikely done, he may well blame himselfe for either; nor see I with what equitie he can require to be refuted onely in priuate, when his errors are in Print abroad. But let vs heare him yet once further, and so an end with his Preface.

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Well, whatsoeuer Mr. G. writeth dogmatically,I. B. he wisheth thee, good Reader, to imitate him in his practise, to wit, that albeit in iudgement thou art rightly informed of the truth concerning the lawfulnesse of these Games in themselues; yet in godly discretion thou wouldest rather abandon them, considering the too too common and ordinarie abuse of them; and that many, it may be, among whom thou liuest, may remaine vnresolued and vnsatisfied touching the lawfulnesse of them, p. 267.

I desire the same, and therewith a suspending thy iudgement vntill thou haue well considered my Dialogue, Mr. Gs. Answers, and my Reply, together with mine Answer to his positiue grounds.

Here I promise (with Mr. G. p. 128.) to raze what I haue reared, if my Reply and Answers be proued insufficient, and so Act. 20. 32. commend thee to God, and to the word of his Grace, which is able to build further. Onely, 2 Tim. 2. 7. consider what I say, and the Lord giue thee vnderstanding in all things.

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I wish indeed, as Mr. B. saith; but without T. G. preiudice to any that vse those games no otherwise than they ought: as 1 Cor. 7. 7, 8, 9, 27, 28. the Apostle wished others [Page] in another kinde as himselfe; yet withall acknowledging the libertie that Gods word and Spirit had giuen in that point, and not censuring others that therein did not as he did.

For the rest; I require of thee, good Reader, the same for this my Reioinder, that Mr. B. doth for his Reply; and of Mr. B. the performance only of what here he promiseth: And so requesting Gods grace for vs all, that both in this and in all other points in these queasie times controuersed, we may without all partialitie and by-respects bend our selues to the discouery of the Truth, and without pertinacitie, and endeuour by silly shifts to elude it, yeeld our selues to it where it is discouered vnto vs, not considering N [...]n quis dicat, attendendum; sed quid dicatur. Ne verum fiat quod v [...]lgo dicitur, Idem duo cum faciunt, non est idem. Ter. Ad [...]lph. 5. 3. Et i [...]tandum Areopag [...]tas, [...]. Lucian. de sectis. by whom it is either deliuered or discouered, but by what force and strength of Argument we are conuinced of it; I proceed in the next place, after one rub more remoued, from this tedious, needlesse and impertinent Preface, to the maine body of Mr. Bs. Booke.

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ANSWER TO Mr. Bs. POST-SCRIPT.
TO THE READER.I. B.

After the PREFACE is this Post-script added.

THAT I may doe Mr. G. no wrong, I am to let thee know, that the 14. of March 1622. Stil. Ang. Mr. G. denied naming me, when he confuted mine Arguments in Pulpit: yet confessing that hee named me in Pulpit with others diuersly dissenting from him in Iudgement touching Lusorious Lots, when he entred into the Question of playing with Lots.

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And that thou maist, good Reader, vnderstandT. G. the full truth; Be pleased, I pray thee, to spend yet a little more idle time with vs, while I relate, as briefly as I well may, as well vpon what occasion, as what it was, that I spake to Mr. B. at that time that here he mentioneth. Being informed that it was giuen out by some of Mr. Bs. acquaintance; that (vpon the offering of this his Discourse to be licenced for the Presse, and complaint made by him of supposed wrong that I had done him in confuting him [Page] in open Pulpit by Name) it was by that Reuerend Doctor that licenced my Booke, acknowledged that I had indeed done Mr. B. wrong, and that I should therefore giue him satisfaction in priuate, but that Mr. B. would not therewith be satisfied, but would haue it done in publike, since the wrong was such; and that the same Reuerend Doctor should say▪ that if my Treatise of Lots were againe to be licenced, he would not haue licenced it: (all which was vtterly vntrue) and supposing that this could come from none but Mr. B. himselfe, I desired meeting him neere Pauls Church, to haue a few words with him. Which granted, I related vnto him, what I had heard, & named the party said to haue made such report; demanded of him whether either any such report came frō him, or the things reported themselues were true. Mr B. denying both to be the Author of the report, and the truth of the things reported; for that I there rested. But I further told him, that I vnderstood that he had offered a Discourse for the Presse against part of my Booke, which I wished with all mine heart might come forth; Ex mutuo conflictu, velut ignis è silice, veritas elicitur & emicat. the truth, I hoped, would thereby the better be cleared, and I should willingly be informed of ought that I erred in; to which purpose I told him, that I had also dealt earnestly as well with Dr Westfield, (who I know well, will testifie as much) when it was tendred to him some three yeeres agoe; as also since with Dr Featly, the party before mentioned, (which Mr. B. also acknowledged to haue vnderstood from him) [Page] that they would be pleased at my request to allow it for the Presse. Which why they refused to doe, is needlesse here to relate. I told him further, that I was informed of two things in it; the one, that I was accused therein to haue confuted him in the Pulpit by name; the other, (which much more neerely touched me) that I was charged to maintaine in that my Treatise some Assertions that were blasphemous. The former he affirmed that he had heard by many. I told him, those many (if there were such) were very much to blame: And withall by solemne protestation, as in Gods presence, denied that I had by name in Pulpit refuted either him or any other that I dealt with in this Argument. How I named him or his Booke rather, and so him with it, I told him: to wit, that hauing propounded the Question concerning the light vse of a Lot, I recited those Authors that had written of this Subiect, viz. B. King vpon Ionas, B. Babington on the Decalogue, Peter Martyr on Iudges, Danaeus of Lot-play, Perkins Cases of Conscience, Fennor of lawfull Recreations, Easty historie of the Gospell, Bamford Dialogue of Games consisting in Chance: whereof some were of one minde, some of another; and if I should dissent in decision of the Question from any of them, I desired it might be without offence, adding that [...]. Aristot. ethic. lib. 1. cap. 6. Pijque ac prudentis cujusque illud est, [...]. Lucian. asino. promise that Mr. B. hath before related. After which hauing deliuered mine owne Iudgement, & propounded and prosecuted the Reasons that I had for it; I then answered the Obiectōs on the other [Page] side, reduced to some heads, and according to those heads handling them, taking sometime also some part of one and the same Obiection from one, and some part of it from another, who had somewhat further pursued it; but not naming (as those may testifie that haue my notes yet in their hands) any one of those whom then I dealt with. Vpon relation of this, or the effect of it, with such protestation, Mr. B. affirmed that he was therein satisfied, and beleeued it to be so as I said. And now iudge, I pray thee, what (I say not Charitie or Conscience, but) candor and ingenuitie at least Mr. B. hath shewed, in charging me peremptorily, and that more than once (after this my protestation and his owne acknowledgment of the truth) publikely in Print with confuting him by Name in open Pulpit, and breach of Charitie in so doing. If Mr. B. were so chary of doing Mr. G. wrong, that to preuent, or at least, auoid the same, hee added this Post-script, Nae tu, inquit ille, homo imprudens es, qui culpam maluisti deprecari, cùm posses praecavere. Nam tu quod caver [...] possis, stultum est admittere. Ter. Eunuch. 4. 6. Seráque nimis & praepostera oratio, quae peractum castigat, cui occurri potuerat. Plin. ep. 6. l. 6. why doth he wilfully wrong him in that very point, wherein hee would seeme here to salue his credit? Or what is this but Facere est facilius quàm sanare vulnera. Quintil. institut. l. 5. c. 13. Hinc Medius ille [...]. Plut. de adulat. Cùm vulnus sanatum est, manet cicatrix. Sen. de ira, l. 1. c. 16. first to wound a man, and then clap on a fig-leafe that may in part couer rather than cure the gash that he hath giuen?

For the other Accusation, I told Mr. B. that if, as Hierome said, Nolo in suspicione haereseos quenquam esse patientem. Hieron. adv. error. Ioan. Hieros. in case of Heresie, then of blasphemie much more, a Christian man ought not to be, I say not with him, patient, but at least silent, hauing any good ground and opportunitie to cleare himselfe therein. I signified therefore [Page] vnto him, that if he would doe but as much for me, as I had before done for him, (and I supposed in way of requitall I might haue required it) to deliuer me his Discourse or a Copie of it, I would vndertake within short time either to returne it with due answer, or to make publike acknowledgment of mine error, if I were thereby conuinced thereof. Or if he would none of that, (as he would in no wise heare of it) that he would yet informe me what those blasphemous assertions were that in my Booke I had broached, and shew me (which I as yet saw not) wherein they were such. That which in Charitie I held him bound vnto; Exod. 23. 4. Deut. 22. 1. Nedum fratrem ipsum errantem despicias. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 4. Quid enim tam malignum, quàm nolle prodesse, cùm possis. Ibid. l. 1. seeing me to wander so fouly out of the way, to lend mee his hand and helpe, especially crauing the same so instantly, for the bringing of me backe againe. But other answer to this request of mine from Mr. B. I could haue none, but that he had put that terme of blasphemie now out of his Booke. I replied againe hereunto: that that was but a silly satisfaction, hauing charged his Brother and fellow-Minister with blasphemie to more than a few, to say that he had now put that word out of his Booke. I might in his owne words haue told him, had I then beene acquainted with them; that I held he failed in Charitie, in that not hauing had any conference with me either by speech or by writing, though I be (as he saith) his neighbour Minister; he offered to accuse me of Blasphemie by Name publikely in Print. But I required him, as he would answer one day for the neglect of [Page] such a duty, to shew me mine error, that I might not continue in so foule and dangerous an offence; or to referre it to any one or more of our Reuerend Brethren of the Ministery about the City, such as himselfe should make choise of, whether that which I required of him were equall and reasonable, and whether he in Charitie might refuse it. But Surdo cecini, ut Ter. heaut. 2. 1. vel vanis auribus, ut Liv. hist. l. 40. I sung to a deafe man. I could get from Mr. B. no other answer but this, that He would be iudged by none but by the whole Church of God. And so wee parted. Now, since Mr. B. will so haue it, Let the whole Church of God iudge, or so many at least, to whose hands this Discourse shall come, on whose side the breach of Charitie (if any be) hath beene. And this is more by much than I would euer haue troubled my Reader withall, had it not beene for Mr. Bs. Post-script.

THE SECOND PART. Mr. BALMFORDS Answer to Mr GATAKERS Arguments for the lawfulnesse of a Lusorious Lot. Together with Mr. Gs. Reply in defence of his owne Arguments, which are word for word also here related.

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THE former grounds laid concerningT. G. of Lots, Cap. 4. Sect. 4. the Nature of Lots in generall, the Reasons that induce me to allow Lots of this kinde as not euill in themselues, among others are these.

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This Tenent seemeth more fearefull than beseemethI. B. Answer. a learned man, who after the turning ouer a wonderfull number of bookes to compile his Historicall and Theologicall Treatise of the Nature and Vse of Lots, setteth downe his Iudgement: Allowing lusorious Lots only as not euill in themselues; whereas he affirmeth them to be lawfull in themselues, p. 266. So that if these games be [Page] vsed with due obseruation of all his cautions, why is he fearefull to allow them as good in themselues? How then may a scrupulous man, who remembreth not only his wicked wayes, but his deedsEzek. 36. 11. also that are not good, build vpon such quagmirie grounds?

Againe; Allowing these games onely as not euill in themselues, doth not manifest that Loue of God, which (I doubt not) is in Mr. Gs. heart. For whereas God is glorified by good works, and these gamesMatth. 5. 16. be too too common, and accompanied with many crying sinnes, whereby God is euery where and daily much dishonoured, the Loue of God would haueIohn 3. 21. constrained him, if doing truth, to haue brought these games to the light, that thereby it might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God.

Lastly, By this Tenent he sheweth not due Charitie to his Neighbour. For now it is enough for Gamesters to plead; A very learned man holdeth our Gaming to be not euill in it selfe. Therefore they will not seeke further to know whether it be good in it selfe, forgetting that it is written; TheMatth. 3. 10. Axe is put to the root of the trees, therefore euery tree that bringeth not forth good fruit, is hewen downe, and cast into the fire. Is not then hereby his neighbours spirituall danger occasioned?

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1. I might demand here, why Mr. B. dealethT. G. Reply. onely with my Tenent, but taketh no notice at all of the Of Lots, chap. 2. Grounds fore-laid; contrary to In his Preface. his owne assertion, and my course with him, [Page] who deale with and discusse as well his Ground [...] as his Arguments. But that I let passe.

2. Requesting him [...]. Vlysses Homericus. Neque cu [...]m ij sumus, quos vituperare nec inimici quidē possint, nisi ut simul laudent. Plin. ep. 12. l. 3. to forbeare Honorifica contumelia. Hieron. ad Pamm. & Ocean. his titles, which I neither desire nor deserue, of learned, and very learned, so oft both here and else-where inculcated Quomodo luctantes antagonistas altius attollunt, quo vehementius illidant. Cypr. epist. 2. lib. 2. Vti contra Plut. de adulat. [...]. to no very good purpose, as before I haue shewed: and passing by his gird of turning ouer such a wonderfull number of Books; (for Mr. B. is not, it seemeth, out of his wondring vaine yet) I would faine know of him why he calleth my conclusion, a more fearefull tenent than beseemeth a learned man. For if by fearefull hee meane hideous and horrible, as he may well, if it be as he afterward chargeth it to be, contrary to the Loue both of God and Man, that must first be shewed of him; and how soundly hee hath shewed it, shall in the discussion of his charge appeare. If by fearefull he meane timorous, as may seeme the rather by the trembling that hereafter he cha [...]geth me with, [...] Arian. Epict. lib. 2. c. 21. I confesse my selfe indeed to be naturally of a timorous disposition. And yet I suppose it no timiditie, but [...]. Plin. epist. 24. lib. 4. Ex prouidentia timor, ex audacia temeritas provenit. Donat. ad Eunuch. 4. 6. Ego Plinio accedo ep. 17. l. 5. Nescio quo p [...]cto magis in stud [...]js homines timor, quàm fiducia decet. discretion rather for a man to speake [...] Zeno apud Laert. & Euslath. ad Odyss. [...]. warily. Nor is Haud insulsum est illud Martini Dumiens. de mor. c. 1. Lauda parcè, vitupera percius. Aequè enim repr [...]l easibilis est nimia laudatio, & immoderata vituperatio. he necessarily fearefull that doth not by and by cry out as Mr. B. doth of impious iniquitie, when ought is allowed that he disliketh: or that doth not by and by commend euery thing as exceeding good and godly that he iustifieth and alloweth as lawfull. But to speake [Page] moderately belike is a fault and fearfulnesse with Mr. B. which I was not aware of before.

3. Examine we the ground of this prolix and fearefull Accusation, and we shall finde it to be but as they say of the sheering of Swine, much clamor and little wooll, Verbis veget, rebus flaccet. Apul. apolog. many words indeed, but little matter of any worth. The maine matter of the Charge is this, Mr. G. alloweth Lusorious Lots onely as not euill in themselues. Where the word, onely, is Mr. Bs. insertion; which if he added for this end, as it seemeth he did, to make my words beare this sense, not euill onely, yet not lawfull, and warrantable neither, I disclaime it. Otherwise I confesse I conceiue my Conclusion in those termes to distinguish the Lusorious Lot it selfe from any abuse that may otherwise accompanie the Game wherein it is vsed, and so make it euill in that respect. But take the Tenent as it is, Lusorious Lots in themselues not euill. To omit the Distinction so cōmon in the Schooles, Per se, & per accidens. of it selfe, and by accident; and the Phrase so frequent among Diuines and Writers of the best note, of things in themselues not euill, wicked, or vnwarrantable. Pictoria ars ex se mala non est. Rhenā. in Tertul. ad Hermog. The Art of Painting, saith Rhenanus, is not euill of it selfe. Iuramentum per se non pugnat cum lege Dei morali. Chemnit. harmon. c. 51. To sweare, saith Chemnitius, is not of it self against the Moral Law. Per se vitiosum aut da [...]mabile non est, necessitatibus suis prospicere. Calvin. harmō. Euang. in Matth. 24. 38. It is not of it selfe vitious or condemnable, saith Caluin, for a man to prouide for himselfe. Of some Ceremonies vsed in our Churches, saith Beza, Quum non sint ex earum rerum genere, quae per se impiae sunt, non videri tanti momenti, ut propterea deserendum ministerium. Beza. epist. 12. they are not things impious of themselues, nor such as a man should leaue his Ministerie for: and of other of them, Per se non sunt idololatrica. Ibid. They are not of themselues idolatrous. [Page] And Bucanus, Res mediae quae in sese nec bonae, nec malae sunt. Bucan. loc. commun. 33. §. 13. Things indifferent are such as are neither good nor euill of themselues, &c. To passe by, I say, an infinite number of such speeches, that in learned writers occurre euery where. For to what end should I waste time and loose labour, in In sylvam quid lignaferam? quidve in mare lymphas? bringing wood to the wood, and casting water into the sea? Doth not the Apostle himselfe deliuer his tenents sometime in like manner as I doe? 1 Cor. 7. 28. If thou takest a wife, thou sinnest not: and, if a virgin marry, shee sinneth not. And, Ibid. 7. 36. Let him doe as he will, he sinneth not; let them be married. And now let Mr. B. tell not Mr. G. but S. Paul, that such a tenent seemeth to him more timorous than beseemeth so worthy an Apostle, &c. setting downe his iudgement whether folke may marry or no, to say, they sinne not in so doing. I might adde a iudicious Diuines Comment on those words of the same Apostle, 1 Cor. 10. 23. All things are lawfull; Morton in 1 Cor. 10. that is, they may be taken without sinne. As also that Mr. Perkins in this very point concerning the vse of mixt Games, such as Tables and Cards are, passing his censure of them, saith, that they are Perkins Cases of Conscience, lib. 3. cap. 4. sect. 3. quaest. 2. not simply to be condemned. But of this enough.

4. Yea but Mr. G. affirmeth them else-where to be lawfull in themselues. And why is he fearefull now to allow them as good in themselues? Though such words of mine be not found in the place pointed to: yet I feare not to owne them, and it is like enough that else-where I may vse them. Nor did I euer vnderstand till now, that these [Page] two were not equiualent, not to be euill, and to be lawfull. Is there any medium in morall actions betweene lawfull and vnlawfull? Or any difference betweene vnlawfull and euill? If not, then euery thing that is not euill is not vnlawfull; and euery thing consequently that is not euill, is lawfull. Yea I adde further, that euery thing that is not euill, is in some sense, and that a good sense too, good. The word, good, therefore in common acception is taken two wayes; sometime more strictly for some such [...]. Matth. 5. 45. vertuous act, as deserueth Gloriosa. Senaep. 83. Honesta, & pulchritudine specieque eximia laudabilia. Cic. de [...]in. l. 2. a speciall note of commendation and praise; and in this sense there is some medium betweene good and bad. For some actions there be, as for a man Psal. 49. 18. Quid magnifici est, se amare, sibi parcere, sibi acquirere? Sen. de benef. l. 4. c. 14. to make much of himselfe, to drinke when he is a dry, Lament. 4. 3. Tit. 2. 4. Meus mihi, suus cuique charus est. Plaut. Capt. 2. 3. [...]. Plut. de sen. polit. to loue his owne, Matth. 5. 45, 46. Si quid [...] erga benefec [...], aut consul [...] fid [...], Non [...] laudem, [...]lpa caruisse arbitr [...]r. Plaut. [...]rinum. 5. 2. Hinc [...]. ep. 11. l. 3. Non ideo [...]men eximiam gloriam meruisse me, ut ille praedicat, cred [...]; sed tantùm effugisse flagitiū. to befriend his friend, to Hinc Mitio Tere [...]t. Adelph. 4. 3. Ego in hacre nihil repe [...]io, quamobrem lauder tantopere: Meum officium faci [...]: quod peccatum à nobis ortum est, corrig [...]. make amends for what he hath done amisse, &c. which though they be allowable, yet are not greatly commendable; Neglecta quaedam offens [...]m contrahunt, [...]uae [...]pleta gloriam non merentur: & damnant praevaricatorem, nec glorificant autorem. Bern. de praecept. & d [...]ens. neither deserue they much praise and commendation when they are done, nor without much sinne many times may they be omitted. Sometime the word is taken in a greater latitude of sense, for any action that is warrantable and allowable whatsoeuer, and so there is no medium at all betweene good and bad, euery particular morall action being either warrantable or vnwarrantable, as Chap. 5. sect. 5. in my Lots I haue shewed [Page] at large. And in this sense I say, that Contra quam Tertull. ad [...]xor. l. 1. Non id [...]ò quid bonum, quia malum non est. not euill, and good are all one: as with the Apostle, not to sinne, and to doe well are all one. 1 Cor. 7. 36. If he marry her, he sinneth not; and afterward, Ibid. 38. He that marrieth her doth well. Where let Mr. B. againe demand of the Apostle (I dare not) why he was so fearefull to say, that he that maried did well, at the first, especially obseruing the Caution that he there giueth, In Domino. Ibid. 39. in the Lord: And let him take heed, lest while he reiecteth these, as quagmirie grounds, he plunge many weake Christians into deepe quagmires indeed, wherein no firme footing can be found, to fix and rest their perplexed mindes and consciences on.

5. This considered, all that followeth is but Ecquandone vidisti flammam slipula exortam, claro crepitu, largo fulgore, cito incremento? Sedenim materia levi, caduco incendio, nullis reliquijs? Hem tibi illa accusatio, iurgijs inita, verbis aucta, argumentis defecta, nullis post sententiā latā reliquijs calumniae permansura. Apul. in apol. a meere flash, that vanisheth so soone as it is fired, of it selfe. Nor will Mr. B. euer be able to proue, or to perswade any man, I beleeue, not sworne to stand to his sentence, beside himselfe, that those Ezek. 36. 31. deeds not good in the Prophet were any other than Iunius refert ad Cap. 6. 9. euill works, such as the The like phrase is Psal. 36. 4. where Piscator, in actionibus malis: & Iunius, viam ut quamque videt pessimam pergit in ea. So oft in the Prouerbs, To eat ouer much honey is not good, Chap. 25. 27. To respect persons in iudgement is not good, Chap. 24. 23. False weights are no good thing, Chap. 20. 23. De quibus & similibus vise Drus. observ. l. 1. c. 22. & H. Steph. ad Corinth. de dialect. Psalmist saith, wicked men addict themselues vnto: for who is bound to repent of ought that is not euill? Or that in Matth. 3. 10. Iohn the Baptists speech, the opposition is betweene fruit good, and fruit not euill; and not rather (as all Diuines that euer I read, vnderstand it) betweene Matth. 7. 17, 18, 19. & 12. 33. Esai. 5. 4, 7. good fruit, and euill fruit, or Luk. 13. 7. Ezek. 15. 2, 3. Sicut steriles arbores excidi solent. Calvin. harmon. no fruit; it being euill [Page] also, as Malum est non fecisse bonum. [...]. Chrysoft. in Matth. hō. & tom. 9. apanthism. 6. sive serm. de virt. & vit. Chrysostome well obserueth, not to doe well.

6. For the crying sinnes that Mr. B. saith accompanie these Games. Doe crying sinnes accompanie euery lusorie Lot, the shuffling of arrowes, for the siding of shooters, or the drawing of pawnes for the leading at Chesse, &c? For the Question is of any Lot at all vsed in disport; not of Cards or Dice alone. Or doe those crying sinnes arise from the Lot it selfe vsed in them? or not accompanie other Games, as bowles, and nine pins, &c. wherein no Lot is? Or must all Lots be necessarily banished from all Game, because some Lot-games are with many attended with such sinnes? But Mr. B. hath no minde at all to keepe to the Question, or to come directly to that that he should deale with.

I. B.

But here, perhaps, it may be said, The first Reason prouing that a Lot may be matter of recreation doth giue me a check. Is it a check? Then I will try if I cannot auoid the Mate.

T. G.

Mr. Bs. mirth here I let passe, that wee may come to the purpose: and set downe my first Argument as it is in my Booke.

The first Argument.

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FIrst, that which may be ordinarily vsed in otherT. G. of Lots, Cap. 4. Sect. 4. Argument. 1. ciuil affairs, be they more weighty or of lesse weight, that may also be vsed for matter of [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily vsed in other ciuill affaires, as, by the expresse Prov. 18. 18. authoritie of Gods spirit speaking by Salomon, for the ending of contentions, and matters in suit or strife, be they weightier or of lesse weight: For the words in the text are indefinite, neither is there ought to restraine the ordinarie vse of them in that kinde either there or else-where. The word vsed there, though in its originall propriety it signifie [...] ▪ sive - [...] à [...] vel [...] iudicare. Law-suits; yet in the ordinarie Prov. 6. 14. 19. & 10. 12. & 15. 18. & 16. 28. & 17. 14. & 18. 19. & 19. 13. & 21. 9. 19. & 22. 10. & 23. 29. & 25. 24. & 26. 20, 21. & 27. 15. & 28. 25. & 29. 22. vse of it, it extendeth it selfe to contentions of all kindes. And the practise of Gods people recorded in Scripture sheweth that euen meane matters haue beene decided and determined vsually by Lot: as in matter of Tithe, though it were not much material, which Lambe the Leuite had, so that he had one of ten, two of twenty, &c. yet was it decided Levit. 27. 32. & Iun. in annot. by Lot. It was a matter of no great weight what gate of the Temple such or such Leuites should wait at; I say not, that it was a meane matter to be a Porter in Gods house, (though Psalm. 84. 10. [...] ad limen residere. Leo Iud. Limen frequē tare. Iun. objectus Vulg. ad locū communem & ignobilem rejici. Calvin. be a doore-keeper. Angl. constant. Serum esse perpetuus, postiaffixus, ut Exod. 21. 6. i. vilissima conditione ibi agere, [...] quàm alibi liberè agentem commorari. Inde enim [...] liber [...]as. Leyfield. it seeme to be mentioned as one of the meanest places of imployment there;) but whether companie should wait at this gate, and whether at that other gate, (as who should stand at the North doore of the Church, and who at the South, to receiue peoples beneuolence, vpon occasion of some collection) was no matter of great moment, and yet was that also decided 1 Paral. 26. 13, 14, &c. by Lot. Neither was it greatly materiall which of the Priests offered Incense, or which dressed the [Page] Lamps, &c. so it were done by some one of them: yet that also went Luk. 1. 9. by Lot. Since that Lots therefore may lawfully be vsed in other ordinary affaires, Gods word indefinitely warranting it, the same else-where not restraining it, and the practise of the godly, carrying it euen to meane matters (for Parum itaque cautè Martyr ad 1 Sam. c. 10. sortibus designabantur Sacerdo [...]a. the offices themselues were not put by them to Lot, but the distribution of particular duties or stations among those of the same office) I see not what should banish them out of our disports, more than out of other our (though serious, yet) ciuill affaires.

§

The Argument collected with all faithfulnesseI. B. Answer. (as the rest, and his answers be) is this.

That which may be ordinarily vsed in other ciuill affaires, be they more or lesse weighty, may also be vsed for matter of recreation and delight. But a Lot may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill affaires. Therefore I see not what should banish it out of our disports, more than of other (though serious, yet) ciuill affaires.

§

How faithfully Mr. B. hath related mine Argument, T. G. Reply. any eye that compareth this his relation and it, may soone see. I say, A Lot may be vsed ordinarily in other ciuill affaires, be they weighty or of lesse weight, as my Proposition required that I should, and Mr. B. dealing as Matth. 4. 6. the Deuill did with Scripture, when he tempted our Sauiour, clippeth away those last words (for [Page] what purpose shall after appeare) and relateth thus mine Assumption, But a Lot may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill affaires. If this be all faithfulnesse, I know not what faithfulnesse is. Here is but a bad beginning againe, I am sure; and Grauius enim sub pietatis professione peccatur. Salv. de provid. l. 4. c. 8. the worse, because the contrary is so solemnly and so seriously professed. But let vs heare his Answer.

I. B.

Is not this a fearefull conclusion like the Tenent?

T. G.

How timorous the Tenent is, hath before been discussed. And if the Conclusion here be no more timorous, it mattereth not much.

I. B.

Why doth not Mr. G. conclude positiuely thus? Therefore a Lot may be vsed for matter of recreation and delight.

T. G.

It is enough if the premises necessarily inferre the Conclusion. Which, what had it mattered, if it had wholly beene omitted? as Matth. 22. 32. it is sometime with our Sauiour himselfe in his disputes. But it is [...]. Plut. de adulat. the part of a bad pleader, as the Heathen man well obserueth, to leaue the maine matter, and trifle thus about termes.

I. B.

He, forsooth, seeth not. Can a blind man goe stoutly on his way? But (blessed be God) Mr. G. seeth well, though not in this point. Bernardus non vidit omnia.

T. G.

[Page]A little ouer flowing of the gall, I feare, troubled Mr. B. when he was about this imployment. But what I see not, I hope, Namque homo, qui erranti comiter ostendit viam, Quasi lumen de suo lumine accendit, facit: Nihilo ut minus ipsi luceat, cùm illi accenderit. Enn [...]us. Cic. offic l. 1. he will shew me, that seeth better than I doe in this businesse.

I. B.

For if God had opened his eyes, he might haue seene plainely, what should banish a Lot out of disports more than out of other Ciuill affaires; to wit, because God alloweth a Lot to be vsed in them, but not in these: and it is presumption of set purpose to imploy God but as it may stand with his pleasure.

T. G.

1. I maruell then why many others sharper sighted than Mr. G. and whose eyes I doubt not but that God hath opened as well as Mr. Bs, doe not see it.

2. That God hath allowed the one and not the other, will not for begging be thus had. But what answer is there in all this to mine Argument? vnlesse the denying of the Conclusion be a legall kinde of Answer.

I. B.

Hereof more hereafter. In meane while, in further answer to this Argument, I denie the Proposition thereof. For an Oath may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill matters, yet not for matter of recreation. Whereof also more hereafter.

[Page] [...][Page] [...]

[Page]Here Mr. B. sheweth why he curtailed andT. G. cut off part of mine Assumption before, as Plutarch. in These [...]. Procrustes did those that were too long for his bed; It was too long to serue his turne, and that being cut off, he thought no more was said of a Lot in it, than might well be said of an Oath. Now therefore for further Answer (hauing giuen none at all before) either he denieth, not my Proposition, but an other of his owne forging correspondent to the Assumption that before he had framed; or else he bringeth an instance nothing at all to the purpose. My Proposition is this as himselfe relateth it, That which may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill affaires, be thèy more or lesse weighty, may also be vsed for matter of recreation and delight. This thus conceiued Mr. B. denieth, and that he may seeme to haue some shew of reason for this his deniall, he addeth, that an Oath may be ordinarily vsed in other Ciuill matters, yet not for recreation. To let passe a large liberty giuen here for Oaths, which if it had in such termes slipt Mr. Gs. pen, he should soone haue heard of it with a witnesse, as a patron of, and a pleader for ordinarie swearers; as if those places Matth. 5. 34. of our Sauiour and Iam. 5. 12. S. Iames well knowne, did not precisely condemne Sit sermo vester, Matt. 5. 37. i. sermo familiaris & quotidianus, Piscat. sermo cōmunis▪ Chemnit. ordinarie swearing. To let that passe, hoping that Mr. B. meant not amisse, howsoeuer his words seeme to sound. Vnlesse he put in, be those ciuill affaires weighty or lesse weighty, wherein he saith an oath may be vsed, he saith nothing at all that concerneth my Proposition: If he doe, he [Page] directly crosseth Quod rectè sic expressit Chemnit. harmon. c. 51. Pharisaeorum traditio erat, in quibusvi [...] casibus, in familiari sermone, & in cō munibus negotijs, rectè & sin [...] peccato posse nomen Dei ad Iuramentum assumi. Contra Christus in qu [...]tidianis & communibus colloquijs, negotijs & commercijs, &c. vult omninò non esse nomen Dei ad juramentum assumendum: utpote quod [...]am sacro-sanctum nobis esse debeat, ut illud non nisi in regra [...]issima in testimonium adhibeamus. Nam in re levine magnū qu. dem virum in testem vocare auderemus. the doctrine of our Sauiour; and his owne assertious else-where. Neither doe I beleeue that Mr. B. can giue instance of any one particular that may be vsed ordinarily in Ciuill affaires, be they more or lesse weighty, that may not be vsed also in disport. If he or any other can produce any, I will relinquish this Argument.

The second Argument.

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SEcondly, if we consider aright the natureT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 5. Argum. 2. of a Lot, and the great vncertaintie of it, we shall finde it fittest for such matters as are of least moment, and Sors est incertissima qua res gra [...]es quaelibe [...] no possunt [...]. Baro [...]on. c. 1. Non li [...]et uti in causis jud [...]ialibus au [...] [...], vel in obeu [...]is nego [...] ▪ js [...] ▪ [...]el bellicis. Ibid. Ne [...] imme itò notatꝰ a [...] Senato [...] Rom. quod [...] pridiè [...] d [...]ctā post [...]diè repud [...]asset. Suel. Tiber. c. 35. not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. In regard whereof, as those that make vse of it in serious matters, are wont, with all the Caution they can, so to dispose of things before-hand, that it may not be materiall which way the Lot light, or that as little, as may be, be left vnto it: so where it may be materiall and of some consequence whether it goe the one way or the other, (I say not now what the iniquitie of others may inforce a man vnto; a lesse inconuenience is allowable for the auoiding of a greater;) there [Page] [...]. Plato de leg. lib. 6. Vise & quae supra c. 5. § 5, 6. [...]. Secr. apud. Xenoph. [...]. will no wise man willingly put such a matter of weight to the vncertaine hazard of a Lot. That therefore that best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto: but the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot: and therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed.

§

Now I proceed to the second reason, which is setI. B. Answer. downe in two shapes.

The former is this:

That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto. But the lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot. Therefore about things of that nature may a Lot most lawfully be vsed.

The proposition he proueth thus. Great is the vncertaintie of a Lot. Therefore not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire.

§

The former Argument was propounded vnfaithfully; T. G. Reply. this both vnfaithfully and negligently. Vnfaithfully, because diuers enforcements of some branches are omitted, as by comparing mine and his may appeare: Negligently, because the proofe of the Assumption is here said to be the proofe of the Proposition. Otherwise I acknowledge it indeed to containe for the maine substance the matter of my principall Argument.

Mr. Bs. answer followeth.

I. B.

[Page]A Lot is taken sometimes for the instrument of purpose disposed vnto Casualtie, as [The Lot is castProu. 16. 33. 1 Sam. 14. 41. into the Lap.] and sometime for the euent, as [Giue a perfect Lot.] Which howsoeuer it be casuall in relation to the former, yet falleth out certainly this or that, by Gods whole disposing the former. Prov. 16. 33.

I therefore denie both the Proposition and Assumption, perswaded that Mr. G. would neuer haue set downe this supposed reason, if a Lot in the former acception had not drawne his religious eye from God as the only disposer thereof to be a Lot in the latter acception.

T. G.

Mr. B. here both distinguisheth and denieth. For his distinction. It is true, that a Lot is taken sometime figuratiuely not for the casuall euent applied to the deciding of some doubt, that which is properly a Lot, but for the creature therein vsed. But what is this at all to mine Argument, that dealeth nothing at all with a Lot in this latter sense.

For his deniall he is very large in it, and I doubt, he scarce remembred well what he denied. He denieth both Proposition and Assumption.

The Proposition is this, as himselfe also propoundeth it, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto▪ Will any man that hath common sense, beside Mr. B. denie this Proposition, or require a proofe of it? If any doe, I will for my part [Page] deale no more further with such an one, than Contra principia negantem non est ulterius disputandum. with one that denieth principles.

The Assumption is this, The lightest matters best sort with the nature of a Lot.

This Mr. B. denieth too, and by denying it therefore, it seemeth his deniall is grounded vpon his former distinction; which yet he seemeth to apply not to the Proposition it selfe denied, but to the antecedent of the proofe, to wit, that a Lot is a matter of great vncertaintie. To which he answereth, that a Lot in relation to the Creature vsed in it is casuall; in relation to Gods whole disposing the creature, Prou. 16. 33. (which place will come to be examined hereafter in his due place) is certaine. If his meaning be this, that it is vncertaine in regard of the Creature either vsing it or vsed in it, but certaine in regard of God in his prouidence disposing it, who either doubteth of the one, or denieth the other? or what is said more of a Lot herein than is true See my Booke of Lots, Chap. 2. Sect. 7. of any contingent Act, whether casuall or other? But if his meaning be that God doth certainly euer dispose euery Lot according to the nature of the thing that is by it questioned; as that the better part in a diuision vnequally made, shall goe with him that hath the better right the office in an election, with him that is fittest for it: or againe, so that in the same case it shall euer fall out the same still certainly, as if in diuiding of commodities bought in common, when for the parting of them the Lot hath beene cast once, and the one party shall remaine vnsatisfied, [Page] suspecting or pretending that some fraud was vsed in it, that vpon the second or the third casting too, it shall still certainly goe the same way; If this I say, be his meaning, (as the one of these two it must needs be, or else it is nothing to the purpose) experience it selfe will soone confute him; and as to him therefore that denieth the fire to be hot, I will wish him onely to thrust his finger into the flame, so to him that shall denie a Lot to be of vncertaine euent, I will wish him only to make triall of it.

I. B.

So that I maruell much, that he findeth a Lot to be not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire. For why? Diuiding the Land of promise, Num. 26. 55. by Lot: discouering Achan, Iosh. 14. Chusing a King, 1 Sam. 10. 20. 81. and of an Apostle, Act. 1. 26. were they not weighty affaires? Nay rather the premises considered, a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires.

T. G.

Leauing and passing wholly by the inforcements before spoken of brought for the strengthning of mine Antecedent, which hee should rather haue dealt withall; nor denying the Consequence, which [...]. Plato. Qui tacet, consentire videtur. Bonif. 8. in 6. de Reg. Iur. c. 43. he giueth therefore as granted; Mr. B. here contrary to all rules of dispute denieth the Consequent, or in plainer termes, the Conclusion of mine Enthymem or imperfect Syllogisme: And by another Enthymem grounded on foure instances, endeuoureth [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] to proue the direct contrary to it. His Argument is this:

The diuision of the land of promise, the discouerie of Achan, the chusing of a King, and an Apostle, all done by Lot, were weighty affaires.

Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires, than about affaires of lesse weight.

For the Antecedent, I might well question one branch of it concerning the diuision of the Land of Promise by Lot, of which also I haue spoken Of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 10. pag. 67, 68. else-where at large, and to auoid prolixitie referre thither my Reader. Onely thus much for the present. Whether that Lot were ordinarie and now imitable or no, may be questioned. If it were done with respect to a former prophecie, and with expectation that the seats of the seuerall Tribes should by vertue of the Lot fall out answerably thereunto, it was extraordinarie, and not imitable now of any without the like speciall ground. If it were done onely to determine which share each Tribe should haue of the Land as equally as could be diuided; though the businesse it selfe, to wit, the diuiding of the Land was weighty, yet that which the Lot was to doe in this businesse was it selfe of no great weight; for it was not much materiall which part this or that Tribe had, when little difference was betweene part and part; yea the lesse difference there was, the lesse inequalitie there could be; the lesse inequalitie there could be, the lesse weighty it was [Page] how the Lot went; againe, the lesse danger of inequalitie, the lawfuller the Lot, and consequently the lesse weighty the euent, the lawfuller still the Lot. So that this instance either is of the same stampe with the other three, and must receiue then the same answer with them; or if it be of another kinde, yet it confirmeth not the consequent, because neither was that of much weight that the Lot was to doe therein, nor will it follow, A Lot was vsed once (yea say more than once) in a weighty affaire; therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed about weighty affaires, than it may about those that are of lesse weight.

This premised for that branch of the Antecedent; I denie now Mr. Bs. not Consequent, but Consequence. And that for two causes: 1. Because though it were granted that the instances were to purpose, yet the Consequent will not necessarily flow from thence; In such three cases and vpon such occasions a Lot was vsed in weightie affaires: therefore a Lot may more lawfully, &c. as before. All that will follow; all granted that Mr. B. himselfe requireth; is but this, Therefore in weighty affaires sometimes a Lot is not vnlawfull; or (for I had almost forgotten my selfe) the vse of a Lot is lawfull.

2. Because the instances are nothing to purpose, being of such Lots as were extraordinarie, and are not now imitable, as may appeare by Mr. Bs. owne grants in the very next words to these. The Question is about the lawfull vse [Page] of a Lot, that is, how and wherein we may lawfully vse Lots, & whether in such Lots as we may now lawfully vse, the lesse weighty the matter be, the lawfuller the Lot is. Now to disproue mine Affirmatiue herein, or to proue the contrary thereunto, Mr. B. produceth three Instances of Lots vsed in such cases, as none lawfully now may vse them in; in some whereof indeed, had not the Lot by an extraordinarie prouidence bin certainly directed, the euent was in hazard to haue beene of foule and fearefull consequence, either some innocent condemned, or some vnfit person designed to a place of the highest moment. That these examples are such, I haue shewed euidently Of Lots, chap. 10. sect. 3. & 5. else-where, which Mr. B. ought to haue taken notice of. Nor will any wise man, I trow, be so absurd or senslesse, as to imagine, that to finde out a theefe or a murtherer, or the like, a Lot may now be vsed, or that in choise of a King, where the place is electiue, a Lot may be cast vpon the bodie of the State without exception of any, as in Sauls case it was, for the setling of the succession, lest it should fall out as it did Ioseph. capt. l. 4. c. 12. with the Iewes, when they cast Lots for an High-Priest, the Lot lighting vpon [...]. a most silly ignorant Asse. So that to reason on this wise is all one, the very self-same, with this, Our Sauiour Iohn 9. 6, 11. Christ opened ones eyes with clay, matter fitter to put out than to open a mans eyes. Therefore such matter as will rather put out than open a mans eye is fitter to be vsed in the like case than any other. Or, A Lot was sometime vsed by Gods [Page] speciall appointment in some weighty affaires wherein we may not now lawfully vse it: Therefore a Lot may more lawfully be vsed of vs in weighty affaires, than it may be in those that be of lesse weight.

But will you heare Mr. B. controlling himselfe, and ouerthrowing what he here buildeth? Read me but his next words.

I. B.

But indeed, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, a Lot may be vsed about it, prouided it be with Gods allowance. For want whereof both Diuinatorie and Lusorious Lots be equally vnlawfull.

T. G.

1. Had Mr. B. before put in as much as here he doth, whether the subiect matter be more or lesse weighty, he had neither wronged mine Argument, and hee might easily haue discouered much difference in this very point betweene the vse of a Lot, and the vse of an Oath.

2. Are all Diuinatorie Lots vnlawfull? then are all those three examples before alledged of Lots vnto vs at least wholly vnlawfull. For they were all Diuinatorie, ayming at the discouerie of that which no wit or skill of man was able by any meanes to reach to: and by Mr. Bs. owne ground and grant therefore not now allowable. As for lusorie Lots, sub iudice lis est; it is the Question, which Mr. B. too oft beggeth.

§

§

[Page]Or more particularly for the present businesse:T. G. of Lots, ubi supra. A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, such as a man may lawfully either doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, such may a man lawfully put either to the will of another, or to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of any creature whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in game (or the vsing of it in any businesse, be it serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before) is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent, to wit, who shall ioyne or stand out, who shall lead or follow, who shall ouercome or yeeld to the other side, &c. which are matters meerely indifferent, such as may without sinne be either done or forborne, either done the one way or the other. The vse therefore of a Lot in such cases, and the putting of such matters to the hazard of a Lot, is not euill simply in it selfe.

§

The other shape of his Reason, more particularly I. B. Answer. as he saith, for the present businesse is this.

A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, such as a man may lawfully doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, such may a man lawfully put to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature, whether he shall doe it or not doe it. But the vsing of a Lot in Game is but the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent. Therefore the putting [Page] of such matters to the hazard of a Lot is not euill simply in it selfe.

§

T. G.

Mr. B. cannot (it seemeth) for his life relateT. G. Reply. any Argument of mine as he ought. For

1. Here in the Assumption he leaueth out that that ought not to haue beene omitted, to wit, of a Lot qualified and cautioned as before, without which mine Assumption were indeed very false.

2. He mangleth my Conclusion, leauing out the very principall part of it, to wit, Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, &c. that he might finde some matter of exception against it.

But his exceptions to it follow.

I. B.

What a trembling Argument is this?

T. G.

I see, a man must be very peremptorie that dealeth with Mr. B. or else he shall be nothing worth. But I shall desire him to pardon me, if I be not so peremptorie, as hee and some other are.

But wherein, thinke we, doth this trembling and timorousnesse discouer it selfe?

I. B.

In the Proposition he speaketh of a Lot in the former acception. In the Assumption, of a Lot in the latter acception. Indeed a man may be bolder with the Creature, so it be without relation to God, than with the Creator himselfe.

T. G.

What trembling argued this, if I did so? as indeed I doe not. And Mr. Bs. eye-sight, it [Page] seemeth, failed him when he made this exception. For how can I in the Proposition take a Lot either in this or that acception, when there is no word at all of a Lot in it? as euen Mr. B. himselfe relateth it. In the Assumption I speake of a Lot as it is ordinarily taken, and as himselfe out of Lyra in effect defineth it, for Mr. B. Dialog. a variable euent (or a casuall rather) applied vnto the deciding of some doubt, which that it hath any speciall relation to the Creator, more than any other ordinarie ciuill Actions haue, is denied.

I. B.

In the Proposition he affirmeth lawfulnes: but concludeth onely, as not euill simply in themselues.

T. G.

These [...]. Occidit miseros crambe repetita legentes. Iuven. sat. 7. twise sod Coleworts wee had more than once serued in before: nor deserue they any answer.

I. B.

Indeed the Conclusion is to follow the worse part. But in this Argument the Assumption is particular, and the Conclusion is generall.

T. G.

The Assumption is, But the vsing of a Lot in game, or in any other businesse serious or lusorious, qualified and cautioned as before, is, &c. And the Conclusion, The vse therefore of a Lot in such cases is, &c. And where were Mr. Bs. wits (thinke we) then, when he writ this?

I. B.

What? Is Mr. G. afraid to put (The vsing of a Lot in game) into the Conclusion?

T. G.

[Page]Mr. G. is not afraid to put it in; for he doth it in effect. But Mr. B. (who with all faithfulnesse, if you will beleeue him, relateth Mr. Gs. Arguments) cutteth it out himselfe in the relating of it, and then asketh Mr. G. why he putteth it not in. If this be not childish, I know not what is. It is like the Papists dealing with vs, that clip the tongue of antiquitie, and then aske vs why we doe not or dare not alledge it.

I. B.

Is not the Minor to be the Subiect, and the Maior to be the Pradicate of the Conclusion? I will not question the figure of this pretended Argument, if Sub, prae, prima, will serue the turne. And though I finde it in no mood, yet will I answer the two fore-peeces thereof.

T. G.

That part of the Minor and Maior is to be so, I grant; and that I suppose Mr. B. meant. And that it is so in mine Argument would haue easily appeared, if Mr. B. had related the Conclusion aright.

The Argument thus standeth.

To put a matter of meere indifferencie to be done or not done to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of any creature whether it shall be done or left vndone, is lawfull.

But the vsing of a Lot in any businesse, be it serious or lusorious, so qualified and cautioned as before, is no other than the putting of a matter of such meere indifferencie to the hazard of the creatures vncertaine motion.

[Page]Therefore the vse of a Lot in such cases, be the businesse serious or lusorious, is not euill of it selfe, or, if Mr. B. will admit no other termes, is lawfull.

Thus is the Argument it selfe cleared against Mr. Bs. exceptions; let vs heare his further Answer to the two fore-peeces of it.

I. B.

The former is not true, except Mr. G. vnderstand a matter of meere indifferencie controuerted. For though such a matter may be the Subiect matter of a Controuersie, yet a matter controuerted is the onely subiect matter of a Lot; otherwise it is no Lot, as Mr. G. truly writeth euen in this case, p. 167. If Mr. G. so vnderstand, then there it some necessitie of ending the Controuersie put to the determination of a Lot. And consequently it is not then meerely in the will of a man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it.

T. G.

That I say there is no Lot, where no Controuersie is, is vntrue. I say onely, Where no question or Controuersie is. For a question may be where a Controuersie is not. Since that a Controuersie is properly Controversia, quando de re quapiam controvertitur, vel lis aliqua instituitur. a Question betweene two parties contending; and a Question therefore more large than it. But vnlesse some such controuersie be about the matter of indifferencie to be done or not done, my former fore-peece, saith Mr. B. it not true. If it be then, belike it is. What Mr. B. would say, I know not. What he doth say is this: To put a matter of indifferencie so to the [Page] hazard of an vncertaine euent, in a matter of controuersie is lawfull. But, To put it to hazard so out of matter of controuersie, it is not lawfull. The reason hee giueth why it is lawfull in the former, is because there is some necessitie then of ending the controuersie put to the determination of a Lot, and consequently it is not then meerely in the will of man whether he shall doe it, or not doe it. Where 1. Mr. B. is too busie with a Lot, when it is not at all in the Proposition. 2. He presumeth that wheresoeuer any Controuersie is, there cannot be but by Lot a determining of it. Which is so vntrue, as that the contrary rather is most true, that nothing may be decided by Lot, but that that may by other meanes also be decided. 3. Hee misinterpreteth my words when I say of a thing that may be done, as if they were meant of putting or not putting the matter in question to the hazardous euent, whereas my words are plaine of the doing or not doing the thing it selfe, which for the doing or not doing is referred to that hazard. But if in any case it be lawfull, that no way hurteth me.

The reason he rendreth why it is vnlawfull in the latter is, because such a matter vnlesse it be controuerted, cannot be the subiect matter of a Lot; which we haue nothing yet to doe withall. And the words therefore, as they are vntrue, nor doe I any where so say, so they are altogether impertinent to the present Proposition. Here is Mr. Bs. Argument: There can be no Lot where no Controuersie is. Therefore to put the question concerning a matter of indifferencie to the hazard of some casuall euent whether it shall be [Page] done or not done, vnlesse some controuersie be about it, is vnlawfull. Both the Antecedent is vntrue; and the Consequence vnsound. He might better haue said, Where no Controuersie is, no Lot can be: therefore (supposing that to be true) it is not possible for any man to put such a question to a Lot or to such a casuall euent, as there is no Controuersie of. For it is friuolous for one to say, it is not lawfull for a man to doe that, which by his owne grounds and grants is impossible.

I. B.

In the other peece I obserue, that Mr. G. speaking of a Lot in the second acception, supposeth it to be vncertaine. Which is begging the question, for the reason giuen to his former shaped Argument.

T. G.

I beg not any question; but dispute from the very definition of a Lot, to wit, a casuall, or as Dialog, ex Lyrano. Mr. B. himselfe speaketh, a various euent, vsed for the deciding of some doubt. The vsing, say I, of a Lot in game or otherwise where the thing questioned is such as may be done or left vndone, is the putting of a matter of meere indifferencie to the hazard of an vncertaine euent. Nor can any man that denieth not that definition, deny the truth of this proposition following necessarily from it.

I. B.

Neither is it true that if in game, a controuersie (truly so termed) be decided by a Lot, a matter then of meere indifferencie is put to hazard.

T. G.

Whether a controuersie in game be by Lot euer decided, [Page] though there be oft, is not by me here questioned, nor doth the strength of mine Argument depend thereupon. But that a matter of indifferencie is put to the hazard of a Lot in euery Lot so qualified, as I had before required, must needs be, when Of Lots, chap. 5. sect. 4. one of the Cautions there required is that the matter put to the hazard and decision of a Lot be a thing indifferent. Yet it is against common sense to say that the matters put to the hazard of a Lot in Game vsually, (as who shall be on this side and who on that, who shall haue the precedencie at Tables or Chesse, who shall haue these and who those cards to make his Game with, and the like) are not things meerely indifferent. If they be such, and there be controuersie there-about, then by Mr. Bs. owne grants, they may be put to the hazard of a various euent, that is in short, to a Lot, as himselfe defineth it. That they are such no man of reasonable vnderstanding will denie; nor that controuersie may be about them in Game. It is lawfull therefore by Mr. Bs. grounds to vse a Lot in Game about them.

I. B.

But more hereof in my third Reply. In meane while consider, whether this second shape be more particularly for the present businesse, so as to conclude the Question than the former.

T. G.

Indeed as Mr. B. had dismembred my Conclusion it was not: otherwise it is.

I. B.

And note, that in both these Shapes, onely lightnesse and indifferencie of matters put to Lotterie are pressed [Page] as causes most iustifying a Lot, yea so, as that in the confirmation of his former shaped Arguments Proposition, be positiuely affirmeth, that we shall finde a Lot not fit to be vsed in a weighty affaire. If so, then weightinesse and necessitie of matters controuerted make Lotterie lesse lawfull, if not altogether vnlawfull. But of that also more in that Reply.

T. G.

Albeit it be sufficient to carry my Cause, that the lightnesse of the matters questioned be no plea sufficient against the vse of a Lot; neither is it at all pressed here in the latter shape, as he termeth it: yet true it is that I affirme the lightest matters to sort best with the nature of it, and that it is not fit to be vsed in any weighty affaire; to wit, where it is a matter of weight and much consequence whether it fall this or that way. Which neither say I alone, as my margine may there shew; nor doe I nakedly affirme it, but adde something to strengthen it: And Mr. B. though he haue oft againe and againe carp [...]d at it, yet neither offreth he to refute it, nor taketh notice of the backing of it, but posteth it off still to a further place. Yea I affirme now further, what Mr. B. in part hereupon inferreth, to wit, that the weightinesse of the businesse, in regard of the euent, maketh Lotterie the lesse lawfull, nor to be condescended vnto without very great necessitie, and to be vsed with far much more care and caution than were otherwise needfull in it. And I say therefore the lesse lawfull in such case, because there must needs be a fault either in the party so vsing it, or in those that vrge the vse of it, when in such case [Page] it is condescended vnto. The reason is euident. For if the matter to be decided by Lot be weighty in regard of the euent of it, then must it needs be of great moment which way the Lot falleth. If it be of great moment which way the Lot falleth, then as it may proue well if it fall the one way, so it must needs produce much inconuenience if it fall out the other way, and the more inconuenience, the weightier the thing is in regard of the euent. If it must needs then produce such inconuenience if it doe fall that way, then to put it to the hazard of falling that way, is to put the matter vpon hazard of such inconuenience. But to put the matter vpon the hazard of a Lot, is to put it vpon hazard of falling that way, since that the Lot may fall out either way, for ought they know that make vse of it, or else it is no Lot; and therefore to put such weighty matter to the decision of a Lot, is to put it vpon hazard of much inconuenience. Which to doe (as some say of an Oath in some cases) Aut malum est, aut à malo. Matth. 5. 37. Non ait, qui amplus facit, malus est; vel siquid sit amplius malum est: sed quod amplius est à malo est. sed quaere cujus; & si non à malo jurantis, à malo est non credentis. i. à malo est, quando sine justa causa offertur, illius ultro qui offert: à malo est & quando exigitur, sed illius qui exigit. Aug. de verb. Ap. 28. A malo vel proprio vel alieno. Ianse [...]. concord. Euang. c. 40. Ex bominum vitijs oritur, quia simplicitatem non colunt. Calvin. harmon. Euang. it either is euill, or it is of euill; it is euill in the party himselfe that voluntarily doth it, it is from euill in others, when a man is vrged thereunto. But for the further confirmation hereof, I refer the Reader to Of Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 6. that place, where I handle the Caution of Conuenience.

For matter of Indifferencie, I wonder that Mr. B. dare except against it: And I auow here confidently, without trembling and fearefulnesse, (which Mr. B. so oft layeth in my dish) that nothing but what is indifferent may lawfully be put vnto the decision of a Lot. And I would know of Mr. B. whether he dare defend that any either necessarie dutie, or act euill in [Page] it selfe, may lawfully be put to the decision of a Lot, whether it shall be done or no. If he dare not iustifie the putting of either to the decision of a Lot, he must needs grant that indifferencie (which here he sticketh so much at) is a necessarie affection of such things as may lawfully be put thereunto. But of this at large Of Lots, Chap. 5. Sect. 5. in my first Caution; which Mr. B. ought to haue taken notice of, and to haue answered if he could.

For Necessitie, it is true, nor doe I denie it, but that it may make some Lotteries lawfull to some, that for them otherwise to condescend vnto were vtterly vnlawfull. As necessitie to preuent a greater mischiefe, may make a man yeeld to giue his purse to a theefe, Act. 27. 18, 19, 38. -Solet decidere jactu Navita cum ventis; imitatus Castora, qui se Eunuchum ipse sacit, cupiens evadere damno. Iuvenal. sat. 12. or to cast his wares into the sea, which otherwise he ought not to doe: So necessitie to preuent a far greater inconuenience may inforce a man to put the losing of that to the hazard of a Lot which he hath very good right to, and but for the auoiding of such grieuous inconuenience he might not lawfully depart with, or put the losse of it to the hazard of a Lot. Nor is the Lot therefore the more vnlawfull vnto him either in regard of the Necessitie, or of the Inconuenience that thereupon may accrue, being yeelded to to redeeme a greater. And yet well may the Lot it selfe in some sense be said truly, to be in regard thereof the more vnlawfull, than if no such either necessitie inforced, or inconuenience accompanied it, because the vse of it is not wholly free from iniquitie on some side. And this, I hope, will suffice, for the present, to stay the mindes of any impartiall from entertaining a preiudice concerning my Iudgement [Page] deliuered in this point; (which Mr. B. is so oft snatching at, as if it were a most senslesse conceit, when indeed nothing is more euident, if it be well weighed) vntill the time come that Mr. B. will vouch safe to deale indeed with it, as Sed, Non semper feriet, quodcunque. minabitur arc [...]d Hor. art. poet. An, Threatned persons we say, liue long. he telleth vs still and hath told vs oft that he will.

The third Argument.

§

THirdly, if the vse of Lots in game be of it selfeT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 6. Argum. 3. euill, then must it needs be a sinne either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charitie in the second. For euery morall euill must needs be a [...]. 1 Ioan. 3. 4. [...]. Rom. 4. 15. breach of Gods Law, the whole summe and substance whereof being comprised in those Deut. 10. [...] decem verba: siue decem edicta. Sic enim Est. 3. 15 & 4. 3. & 8. 14. &c. [...] ten Edicts of those Exod. 31. 18. Deut. 9. 10 & 10. 1. two Tables, euery breach thereof must of necessitie be brought within compasse of the one of those twaine, and so consequently conuinced to be a branch either of Impiety against the one, or of Iniquitie against the other.

But the Vse of Lots in game is not in it selfe, or of it selfe a sinne either against Piety, or against Charitie.

To spend time and words in prouing that the vse of a Lot in game as it is a Lot, is not against charitie, as that it is no breach of charitie for men to draw Cuts or cast Arrowes, who shall bowle or shoot first, were both superfluous and ridiculous; superfluous, because it were to proue what no man denieth; ridiculous, because it were to confute [Page] what no wise man will anow. And yet to charge a lusorious Lot with Impietie, hath as little ground as the other.

For the manifesting hereof let thus much be considered, that all Impietie may be referred to these Ezek. 22. 4. 26. two heads, either the prophaning of hallowed things, or the hallowing of things prophane: since it cannot be imagined how any Impiety should be cō mitted but either by denying holy things their due respect, or by giuing the same where it is not due. But lusorious Lots are not of themselues guilty in either of these kindes. In the latter kinde euen their greatest aduersaries will cleare them, there being no colour to charge them with the hallowing of ought that is not otherwise holy. And in the former kinde they may be cleared also by the grounds of Gods Law, to wit, from the prophaning of ought that is holy. For the thing vsed in them is a Lot: and nothing can be prophaned by them but what is vsed in them: (by Lots, I meane simply as they are Lots, for to make Lots of holy things, as of parcels of Scripture, or of the Elements consecrate in the Sacrament, &c. is not any thing concerning the nature of a Lot, but an abuse cleauing to it in some particular mens practise of it, and such as is to be seuered therefore in this our discourse from it.) But a Lot is no holy thing, either of it selfe and in it owne nature, or by vertue of any diuine institution. For of these two sorts are all holy things whatsoeuer, either they are holy of themselues and in their owne nature, as Iosh. 24. 19. Esai. 6. 3. Psal. 99. 5. 9. God himselfe, and Psal. 111. 9. & 99. 3. his titles and attributes are, or else they come to be [Page] such, whereas in their owne nature they are not, by meanes of some speciall diuine institution sanctifying and seuering them to some holy vse, as Num. 4. 5. 15. & 7. 89. Levit. 16. 2. the Arke, Exod. 29. 42, 43, 44. & 30. 25, 26, 29. the Tabernacle, Psal. 5. 7. & 11. 4. & 65. 4. & 68. 5. the Temple, Gen. 2. 3. Exod. 20. 8, 11. & 31. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17. the seuenth day of the world before Christ, and Apoc. 1. 10. Act. 20. 7. 1 Cor. 16. 2. the first day of the weeke since Christ. Now in neither of these respects can a Lot be said to be holy, not of it selfe, or in it owne nature, for it is nothing else but any casuall euent applied to the determining or deciding of some doubt: Where the matter of it, a meere casualtie, as it is a casualtie hauing no holinesse at all in it of it selfe (for Quod convenit tali, quatenus tale, convenit omni tali. then should all casualties in like manner be such) can much lesse gaine or procure any holinesse to it selfe by any mans application of it to any end whatsoeuer, much lesse by the applying of it to a prophane or common end, be it more or lesse weighty.

Neither is a Lot holy by any diuine institution; since euery such institution must haue warrant from some word; and there cannot be produced any word of institution, whereby Lots are specially sanctified and set apart to such vses as may bring them within the compasse of things holy and sacred. If any particular Lots haue at some time beene so vsed, that can no more impart holinesse to all Lots in generall, than the religious vse of Iohn 2. 26, 31. Ephes. 5. 26. water in Baptisme, yea in the Matth. 3. 16. Luk. 3. 21. Baptisme of our Sauiour, and the sacred vse of Matth. 26. 26, 27, 28, 29. 1 Cor. 11. 23, 24, 25, 26, 27. bread and wine in the Lords Supper can Vise Casaub. ad Baren. annal. ann. 31. num. 19. contra Chrysost. homil. de bapt. Chr. & Iacob. de Vitriac. c. 54. make all water, or all bread and wine in generall to be holy, and so consequently debarre men of the ordinarie and common vse of those creatures either for the necessitie of nature or for lawfull delight.

[Page]Those therefore are amisse that allow Lots in game, and yet adde for a Caution, that great reuerence and religiousnesse be vsed in the action; in regard that Sancta sanctè. Holy things must be done in holy manner. For if Lots in generall, euen ciuill as well as sacred, be holy things, they may in no case with no Caution be made matter of sport and pastime, or of gamesome recreation; nor can the light vse of them be so corrected and qualified, but that it will-haue deadly poyson euen in the heart and pith of it, not adhering or cleauing vnto the barke or outside of it only. But ciuill Lots are not such; and therefore the lusorious vse of them is not the prophaning of any holy thing. And if neither the vnhallowing of any thing hallowed, nor the hallowing of any thing vnhallowed, then can it not be brought within compasse of impiety or sinne against the first Table▪ And if it be cleared from all sinne against the first Table, and be not charged by any with any sinne against the second Table; it must needs rest discharged of all sinne in generall, and consequently be iustified as agreeable to Gods word.

§

I proceed to his third Reason, p. 131. Which is this:I. B. Answer.

If the vse of Lots in game be of it selfe euill, then must it needs be a sinne either against Piety in the first Table, or against Charitie in the second.

But the vse of Lots in game is not of it selfe a sinne against either Piety or Charitie.

Therefore it must be iustified as agreeable to Gods word.

The Assumption is proued thus:

[Page]No man auoweth the vse of a Lot in Game (as it is a Lot) to be against Charitie: and a lusorious Lot is not the prophaning of any thing hallowed by any diuine Institution, from the word, to any holy vse. Therefore not against Piety. Indeed if Lots be holy, they may in no case be made matter of sport.

§

I could wish that Mr. B. had dealt in this businesseT. G. Reply. as fairely with me, as I haue done with him: that he would haue giuen me leaue at least Vt meis verbis sensum meum loquatur. Hieron. advers. error. Ioan. Hieros. to tell my tale in mine owne words. The best is, mine owne Text before related will helpe both to shew what mine Arguments are, and how maimedly by Mr. B. they are euer propounded. But to the point.

I. B.

Here I obserue one of the faults which I found in the latter shape of the second Reason, to wit, The Conclusion containeth more than the premises. For the Conclusion saith, A Lot in game is agreeable to Gods word, and then it must be good of it selfe, which is more than not euill of it selfe. For that is good of it selfe, for doing whereof there is either precept or permission in Gods word, p. 137.

T. G.

And, good Reader, be pleased to looke backe to what was before answered to this friuolous exception. For I am euen weary of these cole-worts serued in so oft. And take along with thee, I pray thee, also Mr. Bs. sawce that he setteth on with them, (if thou findest any more sauour than I can in it) to giue them the better rellish.

I. B.

[Page] But to the Assumption and proofe thereof I answer; That the vse of a Lot in Game is of it selfe a sinne against Piety. For it profaneth a Lot hallowed by diuine institution from the word: as shall be manifested hereafter.

T. G.

Well, till that hereafter come then, mine Argument standeth good.

I. B.

Yet here I thinke fit briefly to shew two things. One is, That an Oath is hallowed to make an holy vse of the testifying presence of God. So a Lot is hallowed to make an holy vse of the determining presence of God. If Mr. G. denie a Lot to be holy, except it haue a more remote holy vse: I say, He may as well denie an Oath to be holy for that cause. More of this point in my second Reply.

T. G.

What Mr. B. meaneth by all this I doe not well vnderstand: saue that he beggeth the Question pitifully, and applieth nothing of all this at all to mine Argument, or any part of it. Yet a word or two to it.

1. The Question is, utrum sit, and Mr. B. telleth vs here quorsum sit. The Question is, whether Lots be hallowed or no: and Mr. B. telleth vs to what end they be hallowed; [...]. Aristot. metaphys. l. 2. c. 3. [...]. presupposing that, that being in question is to be proued.

2. He telleth vs that an Oath is hallowed: Quomodo sanctificetur quod per se sanctum est? Hieron. ad Sun. & Fret. Sanctificatùr enim quod ex non sancto sanctum fit. What needs it? It is [...]. Cyril. Hieros. catech. mystag. Scitè itaque Aug. de spir. & lit. c. 26. Aliter dicimus, Deus sanctificat sanctos suos, &, Sanctificetur nomen tuum, nam illud ideò, quia ille sacit ips [...] esse sanctos, qui [...] erant sancti: hoc autem ideò, ut quod semper apud se sanctum est, sanctum etiam ab hominibus habeatur. holy of it owne nature and in it [Page] selfe: as the very definition of it it selfe will shew. And a man may as well say, that prayer is hallowed to make an holy vse of the inuocating of the name of God, as that an Oath is hallowed to make an holy vse of the testifying presence of God; or rather of calling in the testifying presence of God; if wee regard the true nature of an Oath. But so is not a Lot: they are nothing therefore alike.

I. B.

The other is, That vse of a Lot is against Piety, which is (I say not [Not forbidden] but) [Not warranted] by the word. For it is without faith: therefore a sinne, yea impiety. So disputeth Mr. G. against a diuinatorie Lot, pag. 313. and so doe I against a lusorious Lot.

T. G.

Here wee returne to our old cole-worts againe, which, I see, will still be thrust vpon vs, and we must not refuse, vnlesse we will seeme to say nothing to that that Mr. B. saith to little purpose so oft.

1. Here is the distinction reuiued againe betweene not forbidden and warranted. As if that were not warranted, that is not forbidden. Let Mr. B. remember what he set vs on, when he serued in the same before in effect: Contra quam Tertull. qui nulla ratione firma nixus negat, Bonum esse quicquid licet: Et licita esse asserit, quae non sant bona: exhort. ad castit. Et, Bonum, inquit, permitti non expectat. Ibid. Sed & idem ad Vxorem lib. 1. Quod permittitur, non est bonum. That is good for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission. Hence I reason, Whatsoeuer is good is warranted; whatsoeuer is permitted is good: whatsoeuer is not forbidden is permitted: whatsoeuer therefore is not forbidden, is warranted. But obserue what consequents will follow vpon this conceit of Mr. Bs. to wit, that Some things that are not euill, (for nothing is euill, [Page] that is not forbidden) yet are not warrantable by Gods word: Some things that are against no part of Gods Law; (for if they be against any part of it, they are thereby forbidden) yet are sinnes; for whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne; and whatsoeuer is not warranted, is not of faith. Here are strange Positions, and new Diuinitie; and such it may be, as Mr. B. scarce dreamed of when he deliuered this: and yet [...]. Aristot. l. 1. c. 2. & 3. Vno dato absurdo caetera scquuntur. follow they necessarily vpon the same.

2. Mr. B. passing by, as his manner is, the proofe of mine Assumption before denied by him, disputeth against the Conclusion, or the Proposition denied. But let vs heare his Argument:

That vse of a Lot is against Piety, that is not warranted by the word. But the vse of a Lot in Game is not warranted by the word: Therefore it is against piety.

The Assumption which he should proue especially, he proueth not at all.

The Proposition, which indeed is vnsound also, he proueth sorily thus:

‘Whatsoeuer is not of faith is sinne, yea impiety. Whatsoeuer▪ is not warranted by the word, is not of faith: Whatsoeuer therefore is not warranted by the word, is against Piety.’

The Proposition taken in strict sense, as we dispute here of Piety and Charitie, the one comprehending the summe of the first Table distinct from the second, and the other of the second Table distinct from the first, is not true. Many things are done without [Page] faith, that is, without warrant from the word, which yet are not offences properly and directly against the first Table. But the whole Syllogisme granted nothing hurteth me.

3. How I dispute against a Diuinatorie Lot, I haue before shewed. Let Mr. B. proue his Assumption aboue of the one, as I haue done of the other, and I will yeeld him the lawfulnesse of them alike.

I. B.

If then a lawfull Lot be holy, it is, saith Mr. G. in no case to be made matter of sport.

T. G.

What meaneth this then here? can any man tell? Or how is this inferred vpon ought that went before? Or what if Mr. G. say so? What doth that auaile Mr. B. vnlesse he can proue it so to be? Hypothesis nihil ponit in esse. A supposition, we say, giueth no being to ought. Let Mr. B. assume, and make good his Assumption; and all will soone be at an end.

I. B.

Nay, I may make yet more aduantage. For I may say; That maintaining the vse thereof in Gaming, as it is a Lot, by practise, much more by writing, is against Charitie, as well as against Piety. For so a weake brother is offended, and consequently Christ sinned against,1 Cor. 8. 11, 1 [...]. that brother being occasioned, by error of iudgement, to stumble. I haue this reasoning from Mr. G. himselfe, p. 255.

T. G.

Mr. B. I see, is halfe weary of his worke, that giueth still but a short snatch at it, and then [Page] In via lassus quaerit diverticula. Hieron. ad Laetā. starting aside from it, Quod canis in Aegypto, bibit, & sugit: de Antonio dictum Macrob. saturn. l. 2. c. 2. In illis siquidem regionibus constat canes raptu Crocodilorum exterritos currere & bibere. Macrob. as the Aegyptian Dogs vse to doe, drinking in Nilus, runneth out into by-matters that nothing concerne it.

The Question is, whether a Lot vsed in game, as it is a Lot, be against Charitie or no. Mr. B. proueth it is, because some weake ones are thereby scandalized, as if the vse of euerie Lot in Game, whether in priuate, or in presence of others, strong or weake, must needs of necessitie euer scandalize one or another; or as if the scandall, when such were either taken or giuen, did not arise either from the inconsiderate act of the one, or the erroneous conceit, caused it may bee by Mr. B. of the other, or from both, and not from the Nature of the Lot so vsed it selfe. By Mr. Bs. rule, to eat flesh as it is flesh (to speake as he speaketh) or to eat it vpon such a day as it is such a day, shall be against Charitie, and of it selfe euill, because some, and not a few, are at some time scandalized thereat.

But I haue sinned against Charitie by writing my Booke. Mr. B. of all other should not charge mee therewith; for who seeth not, that in this Cause he will be deemed as In lite judex quisque corruptus sua est. a partie? He writeth against the vse of a Lot in Game, and thereby seeketh to possesse mens mindes with a superstitious conceit of it, which if another seeke to remoue and ease mens minds of, he condemneth them of breach of Charitie, sinning the meane while therein, though (I perswade my selfe) ignorantly, both against Pietie and Charitie, and ministring thereby the cause of the scandall himselfe. Yea, obserue, I pray you, Mr. Bs. dealing in this businesse. Hee seemeth in his Epistle Dedicatorie to be Whether I erre or no; which yet I would gladly vnderstand. Epist. dedic. to Dialog. doubtful whether he erre or no, & [Page] affirmeth that he would be glad to vnderstand it, if he doe. And yet no sooner is any mans mouth open to debate the matter with him, but he crieth out by and by, that they sinne against Charitie, in offering to iustifie a lusorie Lot.

If it be indeed a breach of Charitie to discouer a grosse error, and to endeuour to remoue a scandall, by satisfying the mindes, and better informing the iudgements of those that are therefore scandalized because misinformed, I then confesse my selfe guilty herein. If not, let the blame lie on the heads of those that at first caused the scandall, and of those that will Si de veritate scandalum sumitur, utilius scandalum nasci permittitur, quam veritas relinquatur. Aug. de lib. arb. Et Beda in decretal. de reg. Iur. c. 3. causlesly take scandall at those that seeke to remoue it.

The fourth Argument.

§

A Fourth Argument may be taken from the benefitT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 7. Argum. 4. of Christian liberty, by vertue whereof euery Christian man hath Libertatis Christianae pars tertia, ut nulla rerum externarum per se indifferentium religione coram Deo teneamur, quin [...]as nunc usu [...] [...], nunc omittere indifferenter liceat: hujus cognitio si aberit, [...]lla [...] js nestris quies, nullus superstitionum futurus est [...]inis: [...]o de [...]um [...], ut super [...] transversam incedere nefas ducatur. Calvin. instit. lib. 3. cap. 19 § 7. a free vse of all Gods good creatures to imploy them vnto such purposes as by any Ipsa [...] [...] dotes satis demonstrant, quorsum & quatenus [...] [...]. Ibid. cap. 10 §. 2. naturall power they are inabled vnto, within the bounds aboue mentioned. But in these ordinarie, ciuill and diuisorie Lots, be they serious or lu [...]orious, the creatu [...]e is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto, and Sortibus uti li [...]et in rebus potestati nostrae subditis. Krakevitz in Ion. c. 1. such as by the mutuall consent and agreement of [Page] those that vse it, it may be inabled to effect. For it is in the naturall power of the creature vsed to moue or to be moued diuersly, and vncertainly in regard of those that make vse of it: and it is further in the power of it by their mutuall agreement to determine such matters as are ordinarily wont to be determined thereby. Which therefore Sors non est mala nisi ex admixta irreligiositate, aut injustitia, aut imprudentia. Cajet. sum. vit. so long as the vse of it is kept otherwise free from superstition and impiety, or from iniustice and dishonestie, ought no more to be exiled from a Christian mans recreations, than any other creature or ordinance whatsoeuer that hath any naturall power to delight and giue contentment in that kinde.

§

Now then with some comfort I proceed to theI. B. Answer. fourth Argument, as Mr. G. calleth it, p. 134.

By vertue of Christian liberty, euery Christian man hath a free vse of all Gods good creatures, to imploy them vnto such purposes as by any naturall power they are inabled vnto.

But in lusorious Lots the creature is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto, and such as by the mutuall consent and agreement of those that vse it, it may be inabled to effect.

Therefore it is no more to be exiled from a Christian mans recreation, than any other creature that hath any power to delight.

§

With this Argument Mr. B. dealeth iust as withT. G. Reply. the first. Hee leaueth out (that hee may by that meanes finde matter to worke vpon) those words [Page] in the Proposition, within the bounds aboue-mentioned, that is, so that the same be not either against Piety, or Charitie, (which had beene in the former Argument insisted on;) or more particularly, as by way of further explication I adde after (which Mr. B. also omitteth) so that the same be kept free from superstition and impiety, (in regard of the first Table) and from iniustice and dishonestie (in regard of the second.) So that the maine ground of the Argument is this, that Gen. 1. 28, 29. & 9. 2, 3. Psal. 8. 6, 7. Man being by God made Lord of the inferiour creatures; and that 1 Cor. 3. 21, 22, 23. his right and interest in them being restored againe to each Christian by his interest in Christ, Hebr. 1. 2. Apoc. 21. 7. the heire of all things, 1 Cor. 10. 23, 25, 26. he hath free liberty to vse any of Gods good creatures to such ends and purposes as by nature they are inabled vnto, the same being within compasse of the bounds beforementioned.

True it is that Caluin from whom I take this Proposition, deliuereth it Ipsae naturales rerum dotes satis demonstrant, quorsum & quatenus frui liceat. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 2. more indefinitely, and somewhat after that manner as Mr. B. here propoundeth: as the Apostle also doth the like in some places, where he saith; 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Vbi universales particulae non sunt in infinitū extendendae, quasi liceat surari, scortari, &c. sed ad materiam subjectam restringendae. Chemnit. harmon. Euang. c. 51. Omnis omniū creaturarū usus lege Dei non prohibitus licite & sine peccato haberi potest. Morton. in 1 Cor. 6. All things are lawfull: and, Tit. 1. 15. To the pure all things are pure: and, Rom. 14. 14. I know, and am assured that nothing of it selfe is vncleane, &c. But his meaning (Scriptum potius sequi, quam voluntatem scriptoris, calumnianus est. Cic. pro Caecin. which ought to be regarded) is apparent to be the same with that that I say; and being so conceiued, it is sound and true, and of good vse for direction in the warrantable vse of the Creature. Neither doe I suppose that Mr. B. will be able to giue any other good reason, why he may lawfully vse starch for the stifning of his band, or a flint and a steele to strike fire withall, or a spit to roast his meat [Page] with, or cord to girt his bed with, or feathers to lie on, or arrowes to shoot with, &c. saue this, that these Creatures haue a naturall power thereunto; and God hath vouchsafed vs the vse of his Creatures for such purposes as by nature they are enabled vnto, so that the same be conditioned as was before said. But let vs consider what Mr. B. obiecteth against this.

I. B.

So generall and eager is the pursuit after Libertie in this licentious age, that a godly and charitable Christian, much more being a Minister, ought to take great heed, that he occasion not any, much lesse too too many, 1 Pet. 2. 16. to make liberty a cloake of naughtinesse.

T. G.

Such a godly, charitable, christian Minister as Mr. B. deciphereth here, was Mr. Caluin, and one, I doubt not, wary of straining Christian liberty beyond its due extent: and yet speaketh he no otherwise than Mr. G. here doth, or rather not so cautelously as Mr. G. doth; as the Margine sheweth, where his owne words are alledged.

I. B.

But Mr. G. speaketh of Christian liberty, not of licentiousnesse. Then let vs consider what he saith. For both the premises of this Argument are flatly to be denied.

T. G.

When Mr. B. saith, both the premises, his meaning is, not of mine Argument, but of this Argument, that is, of his owne, for the one of them, to wit the Proposition, at least, as appeareth by the reason of his deniall ann exed.

I. B.

[Page] For sundry good creatures haue a naturall power to impoison. But Christian liberty giueth vs not free vse thereof to impoison at pleasure.

T. G.

Nor doe I say, or Mr. Caluin meane that it doth. It giueth liberty to vse such creatures for impoisoning, where that vse is free from such taint as was formerly mentioned; as for the impoisoning, and (by impoisoning) destroying of vermine, &c. But how doth this instance touch my Proposition at all? As Mr. B. propoundeth it peraduenture it may. As I conceiue it my selfe, I am sure, it doth not. Neither is my Proposition therefore denied, but an other of Mr. Bs. owne put in the roome of it, nor any exception at all here taken to it. Let vs proceed to see what to the Assumption he saith.

I. B.

Neither is it true that any creature hath a naturall power to be a Lot, no more than a stone hath a naturall power to be caried vpward. For as a stone is caried vpward by a power that is without it: so all creatures are moued and applied to be Lots by a power without them.

T. G.

Albeit this be nothing to that that I say, for I say not, that the creature hath a naturall power to be a Lot, but that the creature in such a Lot is vsed to no other end or vse, but what it hath a naturall power vnto. Yet is it most vndoubtedly and vndeniably true, that the creature that is vsed in a Lot hath a naturall power to be made matter of a Lot; as a stone hath a naturall power to be driuen vpward: else could not either of them by any Art or humane [Page] power be effected with either, nor without some supernaturall worke. So that to the Assumption also rightly vnderstood here is nothing at all said.

I. B.

God keepe me from teaching that Christian libertie warranteth the vnlawfull vse of any Creature, whatsoeuer naturall power it hath to that vse.

T. G.

Nor is any such thing here taught, either by me, or Mr. Caluin either, if his words be rightly vnderstood.

I. B.

If any Creature haue any power to be a Lot, yet that power is not to be vsed vnto Lotterie, but in cases (whereof gaming is none) wherein God alloweth such vse thereof.

T. G.

This is but a deniall of the Conclusion; and a plaine begging of the point in Question: which is this, whether a Lot in game be (how, but by Gods word?) allowable.

I. B.

To the inforcing of the Conclusion by a supposed confirmation of the Assumption, I say, it is a begging of the Question. For though a Dog hauing a naturall power to hunt, be not exiled from recreation: yet ought a Lotcreature to be, for reasons giuen, and to be giuen, or rather defended hereafter.

T. G.

What reason hath beene already giuen, we haue seene; what will be, we shall further then see, when it is. But meane while I would gladly vnderstand [Page] from Mr. B. (since he hath pleased to propound this instance) what reason he can giue why a man may lawfully vse an Hound or Spaniel to hunt with, other than before of the like was rendred. As for the supposed confirmation of the Assumption, what he vnderstandeth thereby, I know not, vnlesse he meane the illustration of the Conclusion: which, by his instance, it seemeth, hee doth. For to that that is brought indeed for the proofe of it, here is not a word. So that, neither is my Proposition touched, nor either the Assumption it selfe, or the proofe of it dealt with: the Conclusion onely is denied; and the illustration of it propounded as a confirmation of the Assumption, which it hath nothing to doe with.

The fifth Argument.

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A Fifth Argument may be drawne à concessis. from theT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 8. Argum. 5. grounds and grants euen of those that oppose in this point; and may be framed on this wise. Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation: But Lottery is a thing Videtur sortium usus inter adiaphora constitui. Greg. Tolos. syntagm. lib. 34. c. 5. indifferent: Lottery therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport. The Proposition is confirmed by their definition of recreation, to wit, Fennor of recreat. rules spec. §. 1. Christian recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessarie refreshing of body or minde.

The Assumption, namely, that Lottery is a thing in it owne nature indifferent, is thus proued likewise by their definition of things in nature indifferent. [Page] Idem ibid. §. 2. rule 1. Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it, but as we shall finde it in Christian wisdome beneficiall or hurtfull vnto vs. But such is Lotterie, or the vse of Lots; not simply commanded, (for Prov. 18. 18. that of Salomon before alledged is rather a permission than a precept, or not so much a commandement as an aduice and counsell, commending that to vs as a wise and prudent course, not enioyning or imposing it as a duty necessary to be done, seeing by other courses beside it such controuersies may without sinne be composed as are there mentioned, and that effected oft by other meanes without a Lot, for which a Lot by Salomon is there allowed▪) nor againe any where forbidden or condemned as euill in it selfe: by the former definition therefore consequently indifferent, and so lawfull matter of Christian recreation and delight.

§

I. B.

Now then to a fifth Argument à concessis, as Mr. G. I. B. Answer. termeth it, p. 135.

Any thing indifferent is lawfull matter of recreation. But Lottery is a thing indifferent. Lotterie therefore may be made lawfull matter of disport.

The Proposition is confirmed by the words of Mr. Fennor. Christian, saith he, recreation is the exercise of some thing indifferent for the necessarie refreshing of bodie or minde.

The Assumption is also proued by Mr. Fennor.

Indifferent in nature is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it. But such is Lotterie, saith Mr. G. Not simply commanded. [Page] For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission than a precept: or, Not so much a commandement, as an aduice commending that as a prudent course. Nor any where forbidden as euill in it selfe.

§

This is indeed the effect and maine summe ofT. G. Reply. mine Argument, though some inforcements of it be omitted. Let vs heare Mr. Bs. answer.

I. B.

Mr. Fennors booke, from which these allegations be drawne, and from whence I learned that Lots may not be vsed in sport, doth proue that lusorious Lots are forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. What helpe then hath Mr. G. from Mr. Fennors grants?

T. G.

Much euery way. For [...]. Isidor. Pel. l. 2. ep. 228. [...]. Greg. Naz. de Spiritu Sancto. no testimonie is stronger than that that the aduerse party giueth against himselfe. If the grounds granted by him that holdeth and laboureth to proue a lusorious Lot vnlawfull, be of sufficient validitie to proue them lawfull and allowable, it is a matter of no small moment. Else why doth Mr. B. himself in his Dialogue reason from Peter Martyrs grants against Peter Martyr?

I. B.

And his owne proofes helpe him as little.

T. G.

I need none, when mine Aduersarie speaketh enough for me.

I. B.

For it is granted, that if Lotterie be either commanded or forbidden, it is not indifferent. To passe by the former: onely obseruing, that Mr. G. doth [Page] not absolutely denie it to be commanded, Prouerb. 18. 18.

T. G.

Though he doe not denie absolutely, that it is at all commanded, yet he doth denie, that it is simply and absolutely commanded: For that that we are aduised to doe rather than some other thing, that we are not simply inioyned; which kinde of iniunction An indifferent thing in nature, is that which is left free, so as we are not simply commanded or forbidden to vse it, &c. Fennor of Recreat. rules spec. 1. Mr. Fennor seuereth from things indifferent. And that which among many other lawfull courses is commended vnto vs, as behouefull and vsefull, is not therefore either simply or absolutely inioyned, yea or at all, where such other may be had.

I. B.

I come to the other. I might here refer the Reader to my Dialogue, and to my Reply, by which it will appeare euidently, that a lusorious Lot is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent.

T. G.

How [...]. Cic. ad Attic. l. 4. ep. 8. euidently this will there appeare, shall then appeare, when the Reply commeth to be discussed. Meane while Mr. B. here denieth onely the Conclusion of my Syllogisme. For the second branch of the Assumption, to wit, that a Lot is a thing simply forbidden, (which he would seeme to denie, and should denie and disproue if he did ought) he neither here opposeth, nor in his Dialogue or Reply, doth he either defend, much lesse make good, but maintaineth the contrary rather, that in some cases it is allowable, which it were not, if it were simply forbidden, and so absolutely euill. The Argument therefore from Mr. Fennor his [Page] Teachers grounds standeth good, if his grounds at least be good.

I. B.

But to speake a little more (generally) of things not indifferent, because forbidden; I say, That is forbidden as well which is forbidden by iust consequence, as that which is expresly forbidden: As that is permitted as well which is permitted by iust consequence, as that which is expresly permitted. Mr. G. affirmeth the latter, p. 137. and will not (I dare say) denie the former. Againe, The word of God is so perfect, that whatsoeuer it neither commandeth, nor permitteth expresly or by iust consequence, that is verily forbidden. For all things, especially such as haue relation to God, ought to haue some warrant from the word. If Mr. G. put me to proue this, I dare vndertake to proue it demonstratiuely. But I presume he will not. For in the last mentioned page, he describeth that to be indifferent, which is (at least) permitted by the word. If a thing be not so much as permitted, it cannot be lawfull, and therefore not indifferent. Here I wish he would remember what he writeth, pag. 95. speaking of this word [Indifferent] as it is opposed to good or euill, and she wing how some say that to be indifferent, which is neither good nor euill, he determineth the point thus. Neuerthelesse most true it is, That no particular morall action, or, No action of the reasonable Creature proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the Rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto. So that I wonder why Mr. G. should say here, Lotterie [Page] in game is not any where forbidden as euill of it selfe? That is good of it selfe which is either commanded or permitted, p. 137. Therefore that is euill of it selfe that is forbidden.

T. G.

Mr. B. hauing no more to say to the substance of mine Argument, falleth to quarrell againe with some termes vsed in it. [...]. Plato Phileb. [...]. Idem de leg. l. 6. [...]. Idem Gorgia. A good thing, they say, may doe well twise or thrise. But [...]. Pindar. Nem. 7. such friuolous exceptions so frequently inculcated, and so tediously prosecuted, cannot but tire the patientest Reader that is.

He maruelleth much (falling into his wonted veine of vaine wonderment againe) why I should here say, that Lotterie in game is not simply forbidden as euill of it selfe. I might well aske where I say it: not that I might not well so say, but because I no where here say it. But as I said at first, if Mr. B. might haue the framing of my Arguments, they should iudiciously be framed. The Minor should not be part of the Conclusion, as he speaketh elsewhere; but the whole Conclusion or the effect of it should be part of the Minor, or at least of the proofe of it. I say therefore in mine Assumption, or rather in the proofe of one part of it, not that Lotterie in game is this or that; (it belongeth to my Conclusion to tell what it is) but that Lotterie in generall is not simply forbidden ac euill of it selfe. And my reason (which I rendred of the like before) why I speake so, is; because a thing though not euill simply of it selfe, yet may be sometime forbidden in regard of some abuse necessarily then annexed [Page] thereunto, or some other euill necessarily ensuing thereupon; and may therefore though not simply and absolutely, yet in that respect and in such case be forbidden. That is good of it selfe, that is commanded or permitted; and yet by circumstances or manner of doing may be marred. And that is euill of it selfe that is simply forbidden, so as by no manner of doing, it can be made good. But that is not euill of it selfe, that Esai. 1. 11, 14. Dans legem mea dixerat, quae vestra nunc dicit. Hieron. in Ezek. 5. Quia secundum libidmem suam, non sec. religionem celebrando, sua j [...]m, non Dei fecerant. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 2. being of it selfe good is by euill handling of it marred. A man might well wonder that any meane Christian, much more a graue Minister should wonder to heare some things said to be forbidden as euill of or in themselues; or not be able to distinguish betweene things simply euill of themselues, and things euill in regard of some consequence onely. I might here make vse of that Schoole distinction, some things Prohibita quia mala, mala quia prohibita. Angel. de Clav. sum. verb. Alea, & alij. prohibited because simply euill, some things euill onely because prohibited. But of these things more than enough, vnlesse they were more to our purpose than they are.

I. B.

It grieueth my soule to see what a wide doore to lusorious Lotterie this doctrine will make. For now Lot-mongers will chop Logick, and say, What if a lusorious Lot be forbidden by iust consequence, yet they are not forbidden as euill in themselues, and therefore they are indifferent.

T. G.

And it grieueth my soule to see Mr. B. to trifle so seriously or so sadly rather, and [...]. Cum larvis & umbris [...]. to fight thus with fearefull shadowes and fancies of his owne framing. Where reach I any on this wise to argue? [Page] Or what difference enfueth from ought I say betweene that which is forbidden expresly, and that which by iust consequence is forbidden? That which is forbidden simply [...]. Greg. Naz. de Spiritu Sancto. by iust consequence, is simply euill; that which respectiuely, is so euill onely, and not otherwise. But what if no Gamester, but some honest and good Christian being reproued by Mr. B. for holding two pawnes in his hands, and bidding his Aduersarie chuse to determine who shall lead, alledging all Lot-games by iust consequence to be condemned in Gods word; should tell him, that though Lot-games may in some case or in some kinde by iust consequence be forbidden, yet they are not forbidden simply or as euill in themselues, and that they are therefore of themselues indifferent. I know not well, how Mr. B. will be able to answer him. For to say that whatsoeuer is by iust consequence out of Gods word in any sort forbidden is simply and of it selfe euill, were senslesse. Since that nothing can be in any sort euill, otherwise than as it is forbidden.

The sixth Argument.

§

SIxtly and lastly, that the vse of Lots in Game isT. G. of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 9. & 10. Argum. 6. not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, may appeare by this Argument. Where the wisdome of God in his word hath not determined the matter, and the manner, or the other circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there they are left to mans discretion and wisdome. Else [Page] should we hang euer in perpetuall suspence, hauing no rule at all to direct vs by in them. And where they are left thus to mans discretion and wisdome, there is warrant sufficient for any circumstance that man shall make choise of (the Magistrate publikely to inioyne, or priuate persons to practise) that shall Quum Scriptura generales legitimi vsus tradat regulas, secundum illas nobis limitandus est. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 1. not be against the generall rules of Gods word concerning the same.

For the better conceiuing of this point, it is to be considered, that for the doing of euery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word: and a man must know that he hath warrant thence, because Rom. 14. 23. Whatsoeuer is not of faith, is sinne. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction; for the word is giuen vs in morall matters to supply the defects of it caused by our first Parents their fall; 1 Cor. 9. 7, 8. & 11. 13, 14. Ad naturā Apostolus provocat. Tertull. de virg. vel. Nec differt Scriptura quid an ratione consistat. Idem cor. mil. neither doth it abridge vs of the helpe and Rom. 2. 14, 15. Ipsa natura legis est instar ignorantibu [...] legem. Tertull. ad Marc. l. 5. vse of it for direction in such actions, but adde a further and fuller helpe thereunto.

First then for the act it selfe in generall; that is of it selfe good and lawfull, and allowable by Gods Law, for the doing whereof there is either precept or permission in Gods word, and that either direct and expresse, or collected by iust consequence: Deut. 5. 29, 32, 33. & 12. 32. Quod praecipitur, imperatur: quod imperatur, necesse est fieri. Tertull. ad uxor. l 2. Vbi praeceptum, necessitas est servientis. Ibid. if a precept, it is necessarie and must be done; Deut. 12. 15, 20, 21, 22. if permission onely, it is indifferent and may be done or not done, as shall seeme good to the party whom it concerneth.

Secondly, for the subiect matter, the manner of it, and other such circumstances, where they are by [Page] Gods word determined, there such onely are lawfull as the word of God hath inioyned.

Where they are not determined, there all such are lawfull as the same word Concessum videtur quod non prohibetur. Accurs. ad Cod. Iust. l. 10. t. 1. l. 4. doth not forbid. In the former that rule holdeth, Matth. 12. 30. Omnia sunt prohibita, qu [...] non reperiuatur concessa. Gloss. ad Dig. l. 47. t. 23. l. 3. He that is not with me, is against me: in the latter that other, Luk. 9. 50. Omnia per legem sunt permissa, quae non inveniuntur prohibita. Gloss. ad D. l. 4. t. 6. l. 28. He that is not against me, is with me. Thus for sacrifice and the place of it, before it was determined, Deut. 12. 8, 9. Gen. 8. 20. & 12. 7. & 13. 18. & 20. 25. & 26. 25. & 33. 20. Exod. 17. 15. & 24. 4. it was lawfull in any place, because no certaine place was designed: but after it was once determined, Deut. 12. 5, 6, 11, 13, 14. it was lawfull in no place but that alone, that God had expresly thereunto assigned. So for the Passeouer and other offerings, and the time and season of either, the ordinary sacrifices (I meane the voluntarie or free-will offerings) Lev. 1. 2, 3. & 2. 1. Deut. 12. 5, 6, 26, 27. might be offered at any time, because for them was no time determined: but Exod. 12. 6. Num. 9. 13. the Passeouer might be celebrated onely at one time, because the time of it was determined.

This would the rather be obserued for the readier answering of some friuolous obiections made by some Separatists; What warrant, say they, haue you to vse this or that forme of prayer, or to pray vpon a booke? I answer; It is warrant sufficient that Luk. 18. 1. 1 Thess. 5. 17. 1 Tim. 2. 1. 8. we are inioyned to vse praier, and Matth. 6. 9, 12. Act. 8. 22. 1 Ioh. 1. 9. such kinde of praier, confession of sin, and supplication for pardon, &c. no set forme thereof determined; therefore any fit forme warrantable: this forme that we vse, not vnfit otherwise; this forme therefore allowable. And let a man demand of one of them when he praieth, what warrant he hath to vse that forme that he then vseth, he can answer no otherwise; or if in effect [Page] otherwise, he shall answer otherwise than well. So for a booke; the meanes of helpe are not determined; and this one among others; this therefore not vnwarrantable. And if one of them should be asked, how he proueth it warrantable to vse a printed booke to reade on in the Church; he shall not be able to make other answer than as before: for neither precept nor practise can be found in the word for the vse of a thing that was not knowne in those times wherein the word of God was written.

But to apply this to the present. First, Eccles. 3. 4. Zech. 3. 10. & 8. 5. Recreation in generall is granted by all to haue good warrant from Gods word, as a thing both allowed by permission, and inioyned by precept, if not directly and expresly, yet at least by iust consequence: and therefore I will not stand vpon the proofe of it.

Secondly, for the matter and manner of it, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, Certum est in divinis literis nullam de ludis aut regulā aut formam praescribi: quamvis in eis multa ludorum genera leguntur. Martyr in Iud. c. 14. there is nothing determined; any meanes therefore of recreation that are not against the generall Rules of Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40. comelinesse and decencie, of 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14. 21. conueniencie and expediencie, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Coloss. 3. 17. of religion and pietie, and the like, are by the word of God allowed, and haue from thence sufficient warrant. For example; If question be whether Boules or Chesse be lawfull or no: what can there be said in iustification o [...] them more than this, that recreation in generall is by Gods word allowed; the matter of it in particular not determined: these games not prohibited; therefore lawfull and allowable. Now the very same may be said of Lots and Lotterie. Game in generall is [Page] allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable.

If any shall say, that the particular matter or manner of recreation is determined, Affirmanti incumbit probatio. Paulus in Dig. lib. 22. tit. 3. leg. 2. Et Vlpian. ibid. leg. 22. he must shew where. Or if any shall say, that this particular by Lots is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise, he must shew which and how. Otherwise there is no ciuill action almost that shall be iustifiable, as Hebraeis & Asiaticis omnibus ignotum & invsitatum id genus vestitus, decent phrases illae lumbos acc [...]gendi, Exo. 12. 10. & pedes contegendi, Iud. 3. 24. sed nec Romanis in usu, quod Casaub. notat ad Suet. Iul. going in doublet and hose, Et haec illis olim, & plaerisque Orientalibus adhuc invsitata. wearing band and cuffs, In zona siquidem olim gesta [...]utur pecumi [...] ▪ Ma [...] ▪ 10. 9. Ma [...]. 6. 8. carrying a mans purse in his pocket, A [...]ubitus priscus conviv [...]tium & [...] gest. [...] ▪ 26▪ 20▪ [...] Marc▪ 14. 18. [...]. Luk. 22. 14. [...] ▪ Ioan. 13. 23. [...]. sitting on a stoole at the Table, crossing the water in a Boat when one may goe about by the Bridge, Olim v [...]tum. Levit▪ 11. 7▪ Deut. 14. 8. de qu [...] Plut. symp. l 4. q. 5. à Troskistis nostris renovatum. eating of Porke, Et hoc olim prohibitum▪ Lev. 7. 26▪ & 17. 10. fed & ab Arianis nostratibus [...]uper re [...]catum▪ bloudings or ought strangled, and the like, if it shall be deemed enough to make an action vnwarrantable, either because there is no particular precept or precedent for it in Scripture, or because it is questioned or condemned by some without any reason or sufficient cause rendred why it should be questioned and condemned in that sort.

And so I conclude and leaue this sixt and last reason, taken from the common grounds of other ordinary recreations not questioned; which must all with this either stand or fall; the selfe-fame grounds supporting either; that this particular is not prohibited▪ nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise; which as in the former; so in this case must stand good, till the contrary can be proued.

§

[Page]Now to come to Mr. Gs. last Reason, which likeI. B. Answer. an Orator he amplifieth, to leaue a deepe impression behinde. But let it be well considered, as in it selfe, so whether it proue that the vse of Lots in Game is not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, as he pretendeth in his introduction, p. 136.

§

What Rhetoricall amplifications Mr. B. findeth inT. G. Reply. this Argument, those may well wonder, that know what Rhetoricall Amplifications are. But be it Logicall or Rhetoricall, heare, I pray you, not it, but one that Mr. B. hath put into the roome of it.

I. B.

It is this. Where the wisdome of God hath not determined the subiect Matter, the Manner, and other Circumstances of a thing lawfull in it selfe, there all such are lawfull as the word doth not forbid; and as no Circumstance that a man shall make choise of, shall be against the generall Rules of the word concerning the same.

But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the Subiect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall rules.

Therefore a Lot in Game is not prohibited, nor is against the generall rules of Gods word otherwise.

T. G.

He that should thus reason, were worthy either Ista siquidem, Non sani esse hominis non sanus juret Orestes: ut Pers. sat. 3. to be sent to Bedlem, or Vt curatoris ègens à Praetore da [...]i. Hor. epist. 11. to be begged in the Court of Wards. Quem recitas, meus est, [...] Fidentine, lib [...]llus: Sed malè dum rocitas, incipit isse [...]us. Martial. Nor is mine this, nor is this [Page] mine, vnlesse I be out of my right wits. How they differ (not to be ouer-tedious) may appeare by my words, where hauing more largely discoursed of and discussed the seuerall parts of it, I thus briefly recollect it: Game in generall is allowed: no particular matter or manner of it prescribed: any therefore lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: this of Lotterie such; and therefore allowable. Where prefix Mr. Bs. proposition, onely so knit as it may hang a little more handsomely together, turning, and as, into, so as, (which so framed I owne) and you haue two entire Syllogismes, and the maine summe of mine Argument.

I. B.

The Proposition he confirmeth:

First, touching a thing lawfull in it selfe, by shewing that Act to be lawfull in it selfe, which in Gods word is either commanded or permitted expresly, or by iust consequence.

T. G.

This is an explication indeed of one terme vsed in it: no confirmation of the Proposition, nor so propounded.

I. B.

Secondly, touching the manner, &c. by prouing the rest of the Proposition, which he endeuoureth to performe,

1. By the authoritie of Caluin.

2. By Luk. 9. 50. 3. By a glosse. 4. By shewing that the circumstance of time for free-will offerings being not determined, they might haue beene offered at any time; and Sacrifices: might haue [Page] beene in any place before a certaine place was determined.

T. G.

Mr. B. here maketh me much more plentifull in proofes than I am: as shall appeare further in his Answer, and mine thereunto.

I. B.

Thirdly, touching the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, by shewing, that if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, then must warrant be had out of Gods word, because, Rom. 14. [...]3. Whatsoeuer is not of faith is sin. Which word is giuen vs in morall matters to supply the defect of it caused by our first Parents their fall. Neither doth the word abridge vs of the helpe and vse of naturall reason for direction in such actions.

T. G.

This is indeed all alledged for the clearing of my Proposition▪ not for the proofe of any part.

I. B.

The Assumption is thus proued. Recreation in generall is warranted from the word as permitted and inioyned, if not expresly yet by iust consequence. For the matter or manner, or the things wherewith we may recreate our selues, there is nothing determined. Therefore any meanes that are not against the generall Rules of Comelinesse, and decencie, Rom. 13. 13. 1 Cor. 14. 40. of conueniencie and expediency, 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Rom. 14 21. of religion and piety, 1 Cor. 16. 31. Coloss. 3. 17. and the like, are by the word of God allowed.

T. G.

This proofe and the Assumption by Mr. B. before [Page] assigned me (to wit, But a Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter, manner, and other Circumstances thereof are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules) hang together, as we say, like [...]. Plut. harpe and harrow. He would make the world beleeue, that Mr. G. is a strange man, that bringeth that to proue this.

But his Answer ensueth.

I. B.

I might, as did Alexander, loose Gordi [...]ns knot with one chop, and say, The vse of Lots in Game is forbidden in the word, referring my selfe to what I haue and shall write. But for better satisfaction, I will answer more particularly, not doubting but that the Prouerbe may now proue true, viz. Prov. 10. 19. In many words there cannot want iniquitie.

T. G.

Why doth Mr. B. vse so many words then ere he come to the matter? But the Iniquitie he meaneth is on my part: let vs see it. For here, it seemeth, is the ranke poison, the blasphemy that Mr. B. obserued in my Booke.

I. B.

First, I obserue fearefull shifting, and then vnsound arguing. The former thus appeareth: He supposeth the thing must be lawfull in it selfe, and disputeth onely about the subiect matter, &c.

T. G.

True, I presume Recreation to be lawfull in generall. Dare Mr. B. or any man denie it? And yet I presume it not without proofe neither. But you must remember that Mr. B. here sighteth not with [Page] me or mine Argument, but f with a man of straw ofg Quomodo apud Romanos contra palum in terram desixum, tanquam contra adversarium cum crate & clava, si [...] tiro [...]es dimicabant, ut quasi praesentem adversarium, sic p [...]lum omni impetu, omni bellandi arte tentarent. Veget. de re mil [...]t. l. 1. c. 11. & l. 2. c. 23. his owne making. In his Assumption this is presumed of Lotterie: whereas I presume it of recreation, not of it.

I. B.

Againe in the introduction he saith; The vse of Lots in game is not against Gods word, but hath sufficient warrant from it, which may imply this position, That is against the word, which hath not sufficient warrant from it. But in the Proposition of the maine Argument his ground is, Such things are lawfull, which the word dot [...] not forbid. Foure of his confirmations, and his Assumption are to that effect, or rather defect, and his Conclusion is answerable. Is not this a fearefull shifting course of reasoning?

T. G.

This then, it seemeth, is one point of that fearefull shifting that Mr. B. chargeth me with. Concerning which enough hath already beene said; for this is no new exception. And though the words be not thus generally propounded in my Proposition, as Mr. B. himselfe propoundeth it: Yet there is no contradiction betweene these two: since that Omnia licent, i. omnis omnium creaturarum & rerum usus lege D [...]i non prohibitu [...], licitè & si [...]e peccato h [...]beri p [...]test. Mor [...]on in 1 Cor. 6 12. quarumvis creaturarū & rerum usus lege mor [...]li non prohibitus l [...]e, [...]. siue peccato [...] po [...]. s [...]. Ide in 1 Cor. 10. 23. Whatsoeuer is not forbidden in Gods word, is by the same word warranted. What proofes he dreameth of shall hereafter appeare.

I. B.

Touching the Proposition of his maine Argument, I maruell why Mr. G. auouching such subiect matter [Page] &c. to be lawfull as are not forbidden, limiteth this Assertion with these words (of a thing lawfull in it selfe.) As if such a thing may warrant our retchlesnesse in and about the subiect matter &c. As if God doth not, according to the old saying, loue Aduerbs. An Oath is a thing lawfull in it selfe. Are not we therefore to make conscience, that the subiect matter &c. be agreeable to the word of GOD?T. G.

I. B.

Why I insert those words into mine Assertion, may easily appeare to any that will not wilfully shut his eyes: because my dispute is concerning Recreation, a thing granted to be such, and the Question onely about the subiect matter of it. And so far are my words from implying any such matter, as Mr. B. here thence would inferre, that I say in expresse termes, that As well for the doing of euery act, as for the doing of it in this or that manner there must be warrant had out of Gods word Ista itaque sunt pali vulnera, ut Iuvenal. sat. 6..

But I maruell much more at this ground, Such things are lawfull as the word doth not forbid. I set it downe thus, because the confirmations tend to make this good, and so conclude. All things not prohibited are permitted: and therefore the subiect matter &c. of a thing lawfull in it selfe. I maruell, I say, because Mr. G. confirmeth a thing or act it selfe to be lawfull in it selfe, if it be in the word, either commanded, or permitted expresly, or by iust consequence. Which I acknowledge to be so cleare a truth, that (me thinks) Mr. G. cannot, but in proportion of reason, if he beleeue the word to be Psal. 19. 7. perfect 2 Tim. 3. 15, 16, 17. vnto euery good worke, hold all things [Page] to be vnlawfull, which are not lawfull one of these two waies; and the rather because he peremptorily affirmeth, p. 95. All particular morall actions, be they neuer so indifferent, to be either conformable or disconformable to Gods word; and, by particular actions he meaneth Actions clothed with circumstances, pag. 94. O that Mr. G. would hold to this doctrine! Then should he thereby prouoke all who make conscience of their waies, and Iohn 3. 21. doe truth (that is, doe good works sincerely) to come to the light, that their deeds might be made manifest, that they are wrought according to God. On the contrary, if he bring not disciples, Isai. 8. 20. to the Law and Testimonie, by doctrine according to the word; but writh from it, by teaching that to be lawfull, which is not forbidden; as therein this light faileth, so thereby he shall make men carelesse to seeke for their warrant, and wilfull Num. 15. 39. to seeke after their owne heart and eyes, after which they goe a whoring.

T. G.

Here is a long and sore accusation; which might all well without any one word more be answered, onely by pointing the finger to what formerly was said. But because Mr. B. so much presseth me, I will intreat the Readers patience for a little further discussion of what is here obiected. All I say here is this, that Where the circumstances of Actions in themselues lawfull are not determined in the word, all such are lawfull as are not in the same word forbidden, or as are not against the generall rules of the said word of God otherwise. And is it not strange that this Assertion should to Mr. B. seeme so strange? Or is this any writhing from the rule of Gods word? [Page] Yea but I crosse my selfe else-where in it. For I say else-where that such things are lawfull as are in Gods word either commanded or permitted either expresly or by iust consequence. I say so indeed: and what contradiction is there betweene these two? For is not that by iust consequence permitted, that is not prohibited? Yea, (since we are come to these precise termes) that is, neither expresly nor by iust consequence prohibited? For I am sure Mr. B. will not denie that to be prohibited, as well that is by iust consequence prohibited, as that is prohibited in expresse termes. Either Mr. B. then must giue vs some medium between permission and non prohibition, or else these two positions will haue very friendly agreement. Yea but Mr. G. himselfe may seeme to assigne some when he saith, that in circumstances determined, there is no permission, though no prohibition be of any other. I answer in a word, that the very stinting of an action to those circumstances is a virtuall prohibition of all other not expressed, albeit no exclusiue particle in the iniunction be adioyned. For example, when God bid Abraham Gen. 22. 2. take Isaak and sacrifice him on an hill that he should shew him: it was as effectuall a prohibition of sacrificing him in any other place but on an hill, and on any other hill but that hill, as if God had said expresly (as he doth of the Iewes sacrificing, Deut. 12. 13, 14. in the place that I assigne and not elsewhere) vpon that hill, and vpon no other: And the reason is apparent; because that commandement could not be fulfilled if any branch of it, whereof the precise place was one, were broken. This is that then that I say, that where the circumstances of actions [Page] are stinted, there those onely that are inioyned in speciall are lawfull: where they are not, any are permitted, that are conformable to the generall rules of direction giuen in Gods word. Against which in this whole heape of words Mr. B. bringeth nothing, but an other of mine owne assertions, which no whit crosseth it, his well wishes onely (Somnia enim sunt haec Democriti optantis, non docentis. Cic. Lucull. which might well haue beene spared) set apart.

I. B.

Well, let vs examine his confirmations.

First Mr. Caluins testimonie in English is this. [When the Scripture deliuereth generall rules of a lawfull vse, the vse is to be limited according to them.] From hence Mr. G. concludeth that a man hath a sufficient warrant for any circumstance he shall make choise of, that is not against those rules. Mr. Caluin speaketh of an Vse, and of an Vse doe we dispute. Mr. G. concludeth a circumstance. Mr. Caluin saith, according. Mr. G. concludeth, not against. Is this sound arguing? T. G.

It is true that I quote a sentence of Mr. Caluins in the margine, as concurring with me in one clause against which it is quoted. And I might aske why Mr. B. did not take notice of him a little before as well as he here doth. But that I frame any Argument at all out of him, much lesse ground that I deliuer vpon his or any other mans authoritie, is vntrue. As for the differences betweene him and me herein by Mr. B. here imagined, they are very silly and friuolous. For first of all, doth not the vse of a thing consist in the circumstances of it, as in the manner of vsing, and the like? Or what doth Caluin meane by the limiting of the vse by those generall rules, but the assigning of it such circumstances as [Page] those rules giue allowance of. Calvin. institut. l. 3. c. 10. §. 1. Many, saith he, take for granted, which yet I yeeld them not, that th [...] our liberty is by no qualification to be restrained, but that it is to be left to euery mans conscience, to vsurpe so much of it as to himselfe seemeth lawfull. I confesse indeed that Nec debere nec posse conscientias statis praecisisque legum formulis hîc alligari. mens consciences neither can nor ought to be tied herein to certaine precise formes of lawes: but since that the Scripture deliuereth generall Rules of the lawfull vse of them, according to those is it to be limited of vs. Where Mr. Caluin saith plainly, that for the vse of Necessaria praesentis vitae adminicula. the outward necessaries of this life, (whereof recreation is one) there can no speciall precise rules be giuen out of Gods word, but it is sufficient for them that we be directed in the vse of them by such generall directions as the same word doth afford; which is all that I say. Yea he extendeth this Calvin. ibid. cap. 19. §. 7. afterward to the very matter of our meat, drinke and apparell, where he falleth vpon the same point againe.

Yea but Caluin saith, according, and Mr. G. not against. Mr. B. is verie curious, that can Quaeris & in scirpo (soliti quod dicere) nodum. Ennius apud Fest. Qui inimicus est, etiam in scirpo nodū quaerit. Hieron. ad error. Ioan. Hieros. finde a knot in a bulrush. If those generall rules be not violated, are they not obserued? if there be nothing done against them, how are they violated? if nothing then be done against them, they are vndoubtedly obserued. It is all one therefore in effect to bee according to them, and not against them; and Mr. Bs. exception consequently idle.

I. B.

Is the second confirmation from Luk. 9. 50. much better? The words set downe by Mr. G. be these, [Hee that is not against me is with me.] This place (forsooth) [Page] is a Rule holding in the Subiect Matter, &c. determined. As these words, [He that is not with me, is against mee, Matth. 12. 30.] is a rule in the subiect-matter, &c. determined. Both a like in conceit. And why may not Mr. Gs. conceit be the same touching things or actions? But let vs see whether the conceit bee not a be misted phantasie. In the former place Christs words are occasioned by his Disciples their forbidding one who cast out Deuils in Christs Name. Forbid him not, saith Christ, for, He that is not against me is with mee. In the latter place Christ spake those words vpon occasion of the Pharisies their opposition. So that consider the two sentences with their occasions together, this indeed is the summe. All men are either with or against Christ, for there be no Neutrals. So that those two sentences are like these. He that is not a goat is a sheepe; and he that is not a sheepe is a goat. But Mr. Gs. argument is this: All men who are not against Christ are with him. Therfore circumstances not determined, nor forbidden, are lawfull. Is this sound arguing?

T. G.

And where, I pray you, doth Mr. G. argue on this manner? But Mr. B. [...]. Plut de Isid & Osirid. Nam quod elim Vitius Crispus, Ego ve [...]ò ista non dico. Quintil. instit. l. 5. c. 13. frameth me Arguments at his pleasure: And then pleaseth himselfe in finding faults in them; as if their defects concerned me, and not rather himselfe, who either must father them, or I know none else that will. For his exposition of those places, to let passe what exception might well be taken thereunto, because it is not to the purpose. It is vntrue, that I produce them for confirmation of ought that I had before deliuered. I imply onely that the distinction I deliuered (which may be [Page] extended also to things or actions, as well as their circumstances; but my dispute now was of these) might in those two Rules or Sentences be not vnfitly conceiued. And the truth is, I had a notion in my head then of somewhat to that purpose, that in a learned Lord of Saint Albans his considerations. Noble-mans writings I had sometime read; which yet because I was not verie certaine of, nor had I the Booke by me then, I forbare then to cite. The speeches are alledged as by him, so by me, not in way of Confirmation, but by way of Illustration and Allusion; as if I should haue said, That rule which in another case our Sauiour giueth, holdeth well here. A course not vnusuall, in the writings of the learnedst and most religious. I alledge them but as Rom. 10. 18. the Apostle doth those Psal. 19. 4. words of the Psalmist; Their sound is gone thorow all the earth, and their words vnto the worlds ends. Concerning which, I dare not say as Ierome doth ouer-boldly on another occasion, that Aliter in suis locis, aliter in tuis epistolis sonant. Videmus exempla captiva: servi erant tibi ad victoriam, quae suis in voluminibus non dimicant. Hieron. apolog. pro libr. contr. Iovin. the Texts alledged by the Apostle sound one way in their owne places, and another way in his allegations of them: because they are spoken of the [...], uti loquitur Basil. Sel. dumbe creatures publishing Gods glorie in the one place, of the Apostles preaching Christs Gospell in the other. They agree well and make good harmonie, since that the Apostle only alledgeth them by way of allusion, for illustration of the matter that there he dealeth in, not by way of illation or inference, for the confirmation of ought there deliuered, or the concluding of ought from thence. The like doe I here. And Mr. B. may as well frame an Argument thus out of the Apostles words, The Psalmist saith, that the heauens preach Gods glory to all the earth: therefore the Apostles [Page] haue preached to the whole world: as extract such an Argument as he doth here out of my words.

I. B.

The third Confirmation is from a glosse. Here I remember an old saying, [A cursed glosse corrupteth the Text.] Now let vs see whether Mr. G. haue any blessing by this glosse. The words whereof in English bee these, [All things are permitted by Law, which are not found prohibited.] Note that it speaketh of things. Therfore it maketh as well for Actions, as for Circumstances. Is this Diuinitie? But what Law? If the ciuill Law, what is that to the point? Except Mr. G. can proue the Ciuill Law to bee a perfect Rule to vs; and whatsoeuer it permitteth to be allowed of God. Howsoeuer (I say) this course of fetching proofes from any other Law than Gods Law is fitter for a Papist, who holdeth vnwritten verities (so called) to be a supplement to the Scriptures, thereby to authorize Traditions of men, then for oneDeut. 10. 12. that feareth God to walke in his wayes. Is then this glossing sound arguing?

T. G.

Or rather is all this any more than Mera vitiligatio, uti Cato olim. Plin. praesat. meere cauilling? To let Mr. Bs. graue notes vpon this Glosse, and his serious inferences vpon the allegation of it passe, wherein hee maketh himselfe [...]; uti Aristoph. & Lucian. Iove Trag. most ridiculous. All this adoe is, because in the margine of my Booke (which a Scholler may make vse of) I alledge out of the Glossers of the Ciuill Law, certaine Rules that in their Law concurre some with the one branch, some with the other of the distinction I there vse. It is but as if one handling some point of Diuinitie about lawfull and vnlawfull silence [Page] should say, In some cases that Rule of the Canon Law holdeth▪ Qui tacet consentire videtur. Bonif. in 6. de reg. jur. c. 43. Silence is deemed as consent: in other cases that other Rule, Is qui tacet, non satetur: sed nec utique negare videtur. Ibid. c. 44. Silence is held no deniall, and yet no consent neither: or determining how far forth the desire goeth for the deed, should say, In this case, that of the Ciuill Law holdeth, Affectus tantum punitur sicut effectus. Cod. ad leg. Corn. de Sicarijs. The Affection is punished, though it take not effect: in that case it holdeth not, but that other rather, Affectus non punitur, nisi sequatur effectus. Digest. de Poenis. The affection is not held faulty, if no effect follow. Which (forsooth) in Mr. Bs. conceit must needs therefore be one ground of the truth maintained, or else all is nothing worth. But he wanted better matter, it seemeth, to worke vpon.

I. B.

Hath the fourth Confirmation more validitie in it than the rest? The former three proofes speake not directly of Circumstances according to the Proposition; (so doth Mr. G. dispute ad idem) here he doth.

T. G.

How should I dispute ad idem, where I dispute not at all? And yet are those ad idem, for that whereunto they are alledged. But Mr. B. now commeth De semita in viam. Plaut. Cas 3. 5. out of the Margine into the Text againe, wherein himselfe saith I doe dispute to the purpose.

I. B.

Here then I enquire. If the circumstances of Time and Place, be at the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon, that the subiect matter and manner be so too? If God allow any thing to be done, of necessitie there must bee a time and place, when and where it may be done. Euen when and where there is iust occasion of the Act. It is to be obserued, [Page] that as here, so in the Proposition it selfe Mr. G. slideth from the subiect matter, and manner, to circumstances onely. Is not this fainting?

T. G.

Or rather is not this fopperie? Mr. G. slideth from the subiect matter and manner to circumstances onely, because he saith in his Proposition, the matter and the manner, or the other circumstances, meaning indeed the subiect matter, as Mr. B. also expoundeth me. For to omit that my words doe not necessarily make them both Circumstances, though I ioyne that word with them; Are not the subiect matter and manner circumstances, that is, things about and without the essence and substance of those things that they haue reference vnto, as well as either Time or Place? If not, our Logicians are much amisse, Materia in quae subjectum propriè dicitur adjuncta in se recipiens. Materia circa quam propriè Objectum dicitur .i. subjectum adjuncta occupans. Dounam. in Ram. Dial. l. 1. c. 6. Locus est subjectum rei locatae. Ram. Dial. l. 1. c. 10. that referre the Place and the Subiect matter both to one and the same Head. For as for the manner, if it be not a circumstance, I know not what is.

But if it be true of these, saith Mr. B. that they are at the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe, doth it follow thereupon that the other are? Yea doubtlesse doth it; what reason can either Mr. B. or any other shew why it should not, where they are left alike free; and the one is no more stinted than the other. But who saith, that time and place are left (either wholly or generally) to the pleasure of him that vseth a thing lawfull in it selfe? This is another of Mr. Bs. spirits or ghosts that he raiseth, to shew his skill in coniuring them downe againe.

Yea but Mr. B. can shew you some difference [Page] betweene the one and the other. For, If God allow a thing to be done, there must be time and place when and where it may be done. And must there not be Subiect-matter and manner too? Or must not a man haue warrant as well for the one as for the other? Yes, saith Mr. B. for I hope he will not denie that. Well what warrant then? It may be done when, and where there is iust occasion of that act: and what is that, but at any time and in any place where there is iust occasion thereof offered? So that Mr. B. denieth not, but affirmeth the truth of that that I say concerning some Circumstances; onely he denieth therefore that it followeth concerning some other, which he saith are no Circumstances. Which whether they be or no, it is not a pin matter, since that warrant from the word is required for the one as well and as much as for the other.

But I leaue this his friuolous [...], 1 Cor. 9. 26. Hodie multi soli adversus aerem pugnis, armis, brach [...]js exercent se. Drus. proverb. 1. 3. 4. beating the aire: hauing onely obserued, how Mr. B. that was so diligent to hooke in out of the Margine whatsoeuer he thought he might with any the least shew of colour, (though without any iust occasion) be snarling at: yet passeth by all in the Text it selfe that I presse, concerning the infinite perplexities, yea and impossibilitie, which by instances I shew, of making particular actions good, or iustifying of them against those that may question them, that must needs ensue vpon the deniall hereof. Which I desire by the vnpartiall and iudicious to be well weighed. What I bring not for confirmation, that he saith I doe, and taketh occasion thereby to deale with, and rather than he will let it passe, he will step aside into the [Page] Margine to fetch it into the Text: what I bring for confirmation, that he slippeth by, and letteth alone, as if he saw it not, though it lie full in his way, and he need not goe far for it, or as if at least, which I suppose rather, he had no list to see it.

I. B.

Let vs now proceed to that, which Mr. G. writeth touching both the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it in this and that manner. Neither of which needeth warrant from the word, if naturall reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Good Lord! What fearefull shifting from the word is here? But why doth he ioyne the doing it selfe of an Act with the manner thereof? Ile tell you: euen to make a way to his Assumption. For if he sticke close to that which he teacheth in immediate words, to wit, that an act it selfe is lawfull in it selfe, if in the word it be either commanded or permitted expresly or by iust consequence, he foreseeth, that it will be answered to the fore-part of his Assumption, that euery Lot is not lawfull in it selfe. Therefore he would trouble the Readers head with a supposed direction therein of naturall reason, and that sufficient. I say supposed; for he sheweth no direction therein of naturall reason either sufficient or insufficient.

T. G.

Mr. B. here beginneth to blesse himselfe; as if indeed some euill Spirit had appeared. This belike was the blasphemous matter that hee met with in my Booke. But hee must not thinke with such scar-bugs to carry it away. He hath not [Page] t babes and children onely to deale with. His iudicious [...]. Xenoph. Hellen. l. 4. [...]. Chrysost. tom. 6. serm. 43. Persona pueris deformis metum facit. Sen. de constant. sap. c. 4. [...]. Sed quae puelli formidant, rident viri. Readers will not be scared with such outcries, from scanning and discussing the things questioned; howsoeuer some simple, or some partiall ones may.

Before he commeth to exagitate the blasphemous Assertion, to cast some dust in his Readers eyes, and breed some preiudice of the aduerse party: Verum caveat, ne dum aliud studet notare culpae, ipse notetur calumniae. Hieron. adv. error. Ioan. Hieros. hee maketh Mr. G. no better than a Iugler, who foreseeing the weaknesse of some thing in the Assumption or second part of his Argument, laboureth with other by-matter to trouble the Readers head before-hand, that the same may not be discerned. And this was the cause, (as Mr. B. peremptorily telleth you, hauing discouered the mist that I cast before my Readers eyes, and knowing my minde herein much better than I did or doe my selfe) why I ioyned the doing it selfe of an Act with the manner thereof; and why I tell him of a supposed direction of naturall reason. Hee had need of a long clew, that treadeth the maze of this wilde and intricate discourse. But that it may appeare in a word to the Reader, how sincerely Mr. B. herein demeaneth himselfe: What is it in mine Assumption, that I made all this doe about, for feare my Reader should discouer the vnsoundnesse of it? Forsooth that A Lot is lawfull in it selfe. Which Proposition (though none of mine, and yet I denie it not neither) M. B. to oppose telleth vs (in such language as I thinke no learned man beside himselfe would vse) that Euery Lot is not lawfull in it selfe. But let that position be found in any part of mine Assumption, not as [Page] Mr. B. frameth it, but as it is in my Booke, and I will freely confesse the whole accusation, that to this very end I did it whatsoeuer it was that Mr. B. here saith I did; for I vnderstand not well what it is. If no such thing be in it, with what Conscience can Mr. B. say so peremptorily, that I did I know not what to keepe my Reader from discerning that, or the default of that in it, that indeed is not there at all? And thus hauing cleared my selfe from such finister intention, as Mr. B. here chargeth me with, and I not onely had not, but could not haue: let vs proceed now to the point it selfe.

I. B.

But let vs with feare and trembling consider Mr. Gs. most strange position, to wit, [Neither the doing of any act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction.] Let vs consider it, I say, together with his reason. For, saith he, the word is giuen vs, in morall matters to supplie the defect of naturall reason caused by our first parents their fall. Is it our best way then to seeke sufficient direction in morall matters from naturall reason, before wee consult with God in his word? For the said direction is two times vrged thus. I say, where naturall reason doth not of it selfe afford sufficient direction. And need not a man know, that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion he haue sufficient direction from naturall reason? Doth the Maxime of Gods Spirit, quoted here by Mr. G. to wit, [What is not of faith is sinne,] intimate, thatRom. 14. 23. whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from naturall reason is of faith? Became naturall reason onely [Page] defectiue, and not corrupted also by our first ParentsRom. 8. 7. their fall? O God haue mercy vpon vs! For I see that the wisdome of the flesh is enmitie against thee: for it is not subiect to thy Law, neither indeed can be. But why doe I vex my soule with this fearefull doctrine, seeing Mr. Gs. heart fainteth in the prosecution thereof? For at last he commeth to say: Neither doth the word abridge vs of the helpe and vse of naturall Reason for direction in such actions. Here is some more authoritie (to wit, Of not abridging vs of the helpe, &c.) giuen to the word. For it doth imply, that the word might abridge vs, &c. Therefore our most warrantable way is to be well informed, when and how far the word doth giue vs leaue to vse the direction of naturall reason in morall matters. If this be so, then the former strange doctrine is contradicted, and I need not make any answer to the Scriptures quoted in the Margent.

T. G.

The strange and fearefull Position, as Mr. B. conceiueth it, is this: Neither the doing of any Act, nor the manner of doing needeth warrant from the word, if naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction. Its this, as I deliuer it my selfe; For the doing of euery act, and the doing of it in this or that manner, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word.

If the difference betweene these two be demanded; I answer:

First, Mr. Bs. Proposition may seeme to imply, that in any Act whatsoeuer sufficient direction may [Page] by naturall Reason be afforded, (which I say not:) in mine onely, that in some kinde and some cases there may. In the former manner (it seemeth) Mr. B. pleased to propound it, to procure the greater preiudice to that that I hold.

Againe, (wherein the most materiall difference consisteth) it is one thing for an action to haue warrant from Gods word, (which I denie not but that euery action ought to haue) and another thing to haue that warrant taken immediatly out of it; as shall afterward appeare. So that neither doth Mr. B. here faithfully relate what I say, nor doe I affirme what he here relareth.

Yet for the point, as Mr. B. here propoundeth it, sauing what he would seeme to imply in it, and burden me and my cause with the enuie of; the Proposition it selfe containeth such an vndeniable truth, as there is no man, I suppose, endued with common sense, but will acknowledge it. For if Naturall Reason of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there need no further warrant from ought else; since that it were not sufficient yet, if it needed ought else. And it was euen so with Adam in his originall estate. If any truth vndeniable then be fearfull and strange then this position peraduenture may be such; but not else.

But for the point as I propound it; (for with that now I deale not) that for the doing of euery act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word. If the question be demanded, why I speake in this manner, I answer, [Page] because many things in this kinde are so cleare and euident euen to naturall reason, that there can no doubt be made of them, or that they may vnanswerably and necessarily be thereby concluded; for which therefore a man need not further warrant out of the word; not that the warrant of Gods word is in any wise needlesse; but that a man may thereby be well assured, that it hath warrant in Gods word. For what is the word of God for morall things, but the perfection of true Reason, and a Summe or Body of that Law of Nature at first imprinted in mans soule? So that either it must be held that there are some things in the Law of God not agreeable to Reason; or else it must needs follow, that Gratia non destruit naturam, sed eam perficit. Nam subordinata nō pugnant. Nec est contra naturam, sed supra naturam▪ Etenim Deus est autor omnis boni in natura, five sit secundùm naturam, sive supra naturā. Deus autem sibi ipsi contrarius non est. Proinde nullus fidei articulus est contra rationem. Adeoque quod est Philosophicè verum, etiam verum est Theologicè, & contra: quia verum vero consonat. Alsted. system. Theolog. l. 1. c. [...]. whatsoeuer is agreeable to the rules and grounds of true Reason, is agreeable likewise to the Law of God: since that true Reason cannot possibly crosse it selfe, nor swerue or disagree in ought from it selfe. To say therefore that for the doing of euery Act, and the doing of it thus or thus, if naturall Reason will not of it selfe afford sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of Gods word: it is all one as to say, In prouing of points in controuersie betweene the Papists and vs by Authorities, if a man be not very sure that his memorie faile him not, he must haue recourse to his Bookes. Which when a man saith, his meaning is not that he may alledge ought that is not in the Bookes whence he alledgeth it, but that if the allegations be so fresh and so firme in his memory, that he is well assured thereof, he need not make further search into his Bookes for it. Or to come neerer home, to say, In morall things, as well for euery thing [Page] that a man doth, as for the manner of doing it, if the word of God else-where afford not sufficient direction, there must be warrant had out of the Decalogue. Which speech should not argue that any action may be done of vs, that we haue no ground for in Gods Law: but that if we can finde ground for it in any other part of Gods word, we may thereby be sure that it hath vndoubted ground there. To the Reason that I adioyne taken from the end of the word, giuen in morall matters to supply the defect of naturall Reason, &c. Mr. B. answereth nothing at all; but asketh onely, if it be our best way to seeke sufficient direction from naturall Reason, before we consult with God in his word. No. Who saith it? But yet sometimes naturall Reason affordeth grounds more readily without seeking, than the word doth. And it is a certaine truth, that Mr. Hooker of Eccles. Politie, lib. 2. sect. 8. a Reuerend Diuine hath, that In euery action of common life (yea in many of them, say I, whereof no doubt or question is made by any) to finde out some sentence clearely and infallibly setting before our eyes what we ought to doe, seeme we in Scripture neuer so expert, would trouble vs more than we are aware.

To reflect vpon our former instance concerning the Decalogue, who doubteth but that all a mans actions ought to be grounded vpon it, since that they are all lawfull or vnlawfull so far forth as they are either consonant vnto or dissonant from that that is therein contained. Yet how many actions are there, the lawfulnesse whereof may be demonstrated much more readily from some other, either proofes of Scripture, or grounds in Nature, than from [Page] any Branch of it? Yea in resolution of doubts, how oft doe the Reade Mr. Perkins his Cases of Conscience, his Treatise of Callings, &c. best and religiousest Diuines resolue Cases of Conscience concerning Ciuill actions, by grounds of Reason, without allegation of any Scripture?

Yea but, saith Mr. B. need not a man know that he hath warrant from Gods word, if in his perswasion hee haue sufficient direction from naturall Reason? How doth this follow from ought that I say? If it doe not, as it doth not, I might well returne it to Mr. B. and request him to returne an answer to it himselfe. But I answer: If he be sure he hath, he may thereby know it, and need not therefore in that regard to seeke further for it, saue for the further strengthning of his faith, if some doubt should arise of it. If he be falsly perswaded of it, the case is all one, concerning direct warrant from the word. For be he falsly perswaded of sufficient direction either from naturall Reason, or the written word, Conscientia siquidem [...] non excusat. hee hath iust cause to looke further, though he be not aware of it.

But doth that Maxime, What is not of faith is [...], intimate, that whatsoeuer is done by sufficient direction from naturall Reason is of Faith? Here is a new quare, that I am not bound to answer. Nor doe I, as Mr. B. would intimate, deduce any such thing from thence. Yet I say, that whatsoeuer is so done [...] of faith: because whatsoeuer is so done, as before was shewed, hath sufficient warrant from the word.

Yea but naturall Reason is not defectiue onely, but corrupted also. What then? Is it so vtterly defaced [Page] that there is nothing left of it, that a man can haue any certainty at all of? [...]. Epic [...]et. Arian. dissert. l. 2. c. 20. Oculos bi nobis effodiunt. Si Protagorae credimꝰ, nihil in natura rerum est nisi dubium. Si Nausiphani, hoc unum certum est nihil esse certi. Non facilè dix erim, utrum magis irascar illis, qui nos nihil scire voluerunt; an illis qui ne hoc quidem nobis reliquerunt, nihil scire, Sen. epist. 88. No Sect of Philosophers was euer held more absurd, than those that held that men had no certaine knowledge of any thing. For morall grounds it seemeth Mr. B. holdeth the same with them: at least without holding so, that that he holdeth here cannot be vpheld. For if naturall reason be so corrupted by the fall of our first Parents, that nothing can certainly be from thence concluded concerning the lawfulnesse or vnlawfulnesse of ought, then it is certaine that there is no certaine knowledge of ought in that kinde; and nothing is certaine therein, but that all things are vtterly and vniuersally vncertaine. That Hooker eccles. polit. lib. 2. sect. 8. reuerend Diuine before mentioned, hath not amisse obserued, what infinite perplexities, doubts, and scrupulosities will arise in mens mindes, and what stops and rubs will be cast into the course of mens liues, with the weaker and simpler sort especially, concerning their ordinarie and ciuill affaires, if this light be suppressed, and men should euer be constrained, though it burnt neuer so clearely, yet not to proceed by it in ought, till they had solemne accesse still vnto the written word, and fetched light from some particular sentence in it, for the further confirmation of them therein. But I adde further; since that the most of mens particular actions, which they must haue ground for being infinite, are not expresly and precisely in the written word specified, and must therefore haue their warrant by consequences deducted from it, in which [Page] deduction, sometime So Mat. 22. 32. Galat. 3. 15, 17. 1 Cor. 9. 9, 10. Rom. 4. 3, 4. & 3. 10, 19, 20. Hebr. 8. 13. a naturall principle is ioyned with a testimonie of Scripture for the concluding of the thing questioned, and though So Gal. 3. 11, 12. Heb. 1. 4, 7, 8, 13, 14. two places of Scripture be produced for it, which being in a Syllogisticall forme ioyned together, may truly and infallibly conclude the point questioned, yet it is Vise Keckerman. praecogn. Logic. tract. 1. & in system. Logic. lib. 2. & 3. passim. naturall Reason that must iudge of the force and strength of the Argument; take we all certainty of iudicature from naturall Reason in such cases, and we shall haue no certainty left of the lawfulnesse of ought, that is not in expresse termes comprised in Scripture. I might well adde, that by this Mr. Bs. manner of reasoning, an vtter vncertainty might be concluded euen of all things contained in Scripture; at least to those that doe not exactly vnderstand the Originals: For if this Inference be sound, Naturall Reason is in part defectiue and corrupted: and therefore it cannot certainly informe vs of ought: This must also of necessitie be allowed for a good Consequence; All Translations of Scripture are in part defectiue and corrupt: therefore nothing can certainly be learned out of them. Yea, Euery mans skill in the Originals is in part defectiue and corrupt; and therefore no man can certainly gather ought thence. Let Mr. B. therefore, who professeth to haue his soule so much vexed with the fearefull doctrine that I here deliuer, take heed lest by that that he here maintaineth, he vex the soule and perplex the conscience of many a scrupulous Christian, and ensnarle them thereby in such inextricable difficulties, as he shall neuer be able with all the skill he hath to vnwinde them out of againe.

[Page]But he findeth me at last fainting and contradicting my selfe: and therefore all is now almost well againe. And wherein? Forsooth, because I affirme that the word doth not abridge vs of the helpe and vse of naturall Reason for direction in such Actions. And how doth this contradict (for I thought it had confirmed) that which before I had deliuered? Mr. B. will make it cleare vnto you.

For first when I affirme that the word doth not abridge vs, I doe imply that it might abridge vs, of such helpe. Is not this thinke you a strange Inference? As if when we say against Act. 17. 18. the Stoicks, that Affectus gratia moderatur, non aufert. Stultique erant Stoici, qui in eo toti erant, ut affectus omnes perimerent. Pet. Martyr in 2. Sam. 13. Facessat ergò inhumana illa philosophia, quae obtinere non potest, nisi hominem sensibus omnibus sp [...]liatum in stipitem redegerit. Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 10. Quis [...] illā ubi nullus animū tangit affectus, stuporem immanem, qui nullo prorsus erigatur & excitetur, nullo flectatur atque inclinetur affectu, non omnibus vi [...]ijs judicet esse pejorem? Aug. de civil. l. 14. c. 9. Grace doth not strip men of humane affections; nor make them stocks and stones; we doe thereby imply, that Grace might strip them of it, and make meere blocks of them: As much to say, as that it might worke against it selfe, and the word worke against that end for which it was giuen. But this is too too senslesse.

Secondly, therefore our most warrantable way must then be to be well informed, when and how far the word giueth vs leaue to vse it. How followeth this vpon ought that I say, vnlesse this be a good consequence, Gods word doth not abridge vs; Therefore it is the best way to be well informed, when and how far it doth. But to omit, that to say, that It is the warrantablest course to be well informed when and how far forth Gods word in matters concerning the Law of Nature, (for the Rom. 2. 14, 15. Morall Law is no other) giueth vs liberty to make vse of true reason: Is as much as to say, that it is the warrantablest way to be well informed how far forth Gods word warranteth vs to vse [Page] Logick in scanning of morall matters, or how farre forth it giueth vs leaue to be reasonable creatures. Let Mr. B. haue what he would: what followeth hereupon? Why? If that be so then is my strange doctrine thereby contradicted. Which way, thinke we? Marke the Consequence; (though the Antecedent also follow not vpon ought that I say:) It is the best way for vs to know how the word giueth liberty to vse this direction. Therefore there is no vse of it for direction at all in this kinde. Nay rather, therefore there is some vse euen in this kinde of it; or else to what end is it to labour to be informed, when and how far forth, of that that is not at all. Whether doth this contradict now M. B. or me? Iudge, Reader.

But that which best is, Mr. B. hereby taketh occasion to ouer-slip whatsoeuer my margine here affordeth for the confirmation of mine opinion in this Point. How fitly, you shall see, if you obserue how it followeth. Mr. G. saith, The word abbridgeth vs not of direction hereby: therefore it may abbridge: and therefore it is best to be informed how it abridgeth: and therefore Mr. Gs. doctrine is contradicted: and therefore I need answer none of his Arguments. Here are strange Ergoes. But where one hath no list to doe a thing, a small matter will serue to with-hold him. Mr. B. that was a little before so▪ curious in this Argument to pull in by head and eares euery marginall note, though containing no matter of proofe, and drawne out of the Ciuill Code; is easily induced here to let passe the marginall quotations, where they containe matter of confirmation, though extracted out of holy writ. But yet by his leaue, [Page] thou shalt haue them; and iudge when thou hast them, whether Mr. B. had need to haue answered them or no.

First then, for the Point it selfe that I here hold; it is neither new nor strange. It is all one, saith Tertull. de coron. milit. Tertullian, whether a point be proued by Scripture or by Reason: thereby implying that what was allowable by the one, was warrantable also by the other.

Secondly, for the proofe of it, we haue it both from the practise and the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. First for his practise; Idem de virg. veland. The Apostle, saith Tertullian, appealeth vnto Nature. 1 Cor. 11. 13, 14. Doth not Nature, saith he, teach you? speaking of some comely and vncomely habits: as [...]. Chrysost. in 1 Cor. hom. 26. by Nature both the comelinesse, and consequently the warrantablenesse of the one being iustified; and the vncomelinesse, and consequently also the vnwarrantablenesse of the other by the same also sufficiently detected. And againe, pleading to the Corinthians for the maintenance of the Ministerie, 1 Cor. 9. 7, 8. he vseth reasons drawne from the light of naturall reason in the first place; which yet it seemeth Mr. B. would controll him for, if any other should now doe.

Againe, Nature it selfe, saith Tertull. adv. Marc. l. b. 5. Tertullian, is in stead of the Law to those that are ignorant of it. Rom. 2. 14, 15. When the Gentiles, saith the Apostle, which haue not the Law, yet doe by Nature the things contained in the Law, they hauing not the Law are a Law to themselues. Which shew the effect of the Law written in their hearts, their Consciences also bearing witnesse, and their cogitations [...] alternati [...]. Vet. Inter sese. Quomodo Virg. Illi inter sese multa vi brachia tollunt. P. scat. interchangeably excusing and accusing. And surely, if the Law of Nature written in mans [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] heart be the very same so far forth as it is yet vndefaced, with the Law of God reuealed in the word: Then whatsoeuer by iust consequence of Reason may be deduced from the grounds yet in Nature remaining of the one, may be certainly knowne to be agreeable also vnto the other.

And thus we haue at length got out of this intricate Labyrinth which Mr. B. hath drawne or rather withdrawne vs into. If the Point were so perilous, as he here pretendeth, and it vexed his soule in such manner as he here professeth, it had beene a charitable worke, I deeme, both to me and himselfe, to haue let me seene it before this, especially so instantly requiring the same, and so to haue freed his soule sooner from this grieuous vexation. But for the Point it selfe; Ador [...] Scripturae plenitudinem. Tertull. adv. Hermogē. I adore, with Tertullian, the plenitude of Gods word, as much as Mr. B. or any other man doth. I acknowledge it with Chrysostome, and Augustine, to be [...]. Chrysost. in 2 Cor. hom. 13. a most perfect and absolute Rule, In his quae apertè posita sunt in Scriptura inveniuntur illa omnia, quae cō tinent fidem moresque vivendi. Aug. de doctr. Christ. l. 2. c. 9. containing in it all things necessarie vnto faith and good life. I should grieue at the heart to haue vttered the least tittle that should tend to the derogation either of it, or ought in it. If Reprehe [...]ures enim non audio; sequor magistros. Hieron. apolog. prolib. in Iovin. I may be shewed that I haue so done in ought, I will readily recant it. Concerning this Point in particular, (besides those that viewed the whole worke, & aduertised me what they wished to haue altered, which was not much, nor materiall) I had conference with Mr. W. Bradshaw. one not vnknowne to Mr. B. whom I haue before named in this Booke, as iudicious and as precise in his iudgement as the most; who not only concurred with me in it, making no doubt at all of it; but withall [Page] told how he was oft troubled to satisfie some in their Cases propounded vnto him, though he gaue them neuer so good reason for his resolution, because they would not therewith be satisfied, vnlesse he could produce some place of Scripture for euery particular. But let the wise and learned iudge: and if I may from them be informed that I haue herein erred, I will say as he did, Errare possum, Haereticus esse nolo. Erre I may, but an Heretike I will not be; I will not be obstinate in mine error; I will retract it: which I may well, without the least preiudice to the maine matter in Question, which it nothing concerneth, and will stand therefore well enough without it. But Ad pensum redeamus. Cic. de Orat. l. 3. returne we to our taske.

I. B.

So then I proceed to the Assumption of the maine Argument. In the former part whereof it is to be denied (as was said before) that euery Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe. For as a Diuinatorie by him, Cap. 11. so a lusorious Lot by me and others is denied to be a thing lawfull in it selfe.

T. G.

To passe by the strange manner of speech, that Euery Lot is a thing lawfull in it selfe: which I suppose none but Mr. B. will vse. That a Lot is a thing of it selfe indifferent, and consequently lawfull in it selfe, was before shewed. But I haue nothing here to say to it: for in mine Assumption there is no mention of it. Mr. B. must answer, if he will, for his owne Argument.

I. B.

More clearely to answer the other part. It is to be [Page] obserued, that in this large Argument, it cannot be gathered what Mr. G. meaneth by Subiect Matter. So the mind of the Reader may be troubled with words, which Acts 15. 24. ought not to be. But by that which he writeth, p. 230. I vnderstand, hee meaneth the matter whereabout the Lottery is imployed. If so, I affirme that the subiect matter of a Lot is determined by God, namely, A controuersie to be ended thereby: and therefore I also affirme, lusorious businesse (to vse Mr. Gs. owne word, p. 130.) to be a subiect matter of a Lot, no lesse against the generall Rules of the Word, than was the finding out of Ionas in Mr. Gs. iudgement, p. 278. If then a lusorious Lot be not a thing lawfull in it selfe, and if Lusorious busines be a subiect matter of a Lot, that is against the generall Rules, then how can the manner and other circumstances, though neither determined, nor forbidden, be sufficient warrant for the vse of a lusorious Lot.

T. G.

Not to say, how fitly the place of Scripture in the Margine is here applied. For the simple Reader, if a man should stand to explaine euery Schoole terme, that, in such discourses and disputes as this, we are inforced oft to vse, it would be a very tedious taske both to Writer and Reader. Nor doth Mr. B. himselfe obserue that Rule that he would tie others to: For doth he not oft speake of maior, minor, proposition, assumption, mood and figure; Sub, prae, prima, &c. neuer informing his Reader what thereby is meant. But is it possible that so learned a man as Mr. B. should not vnderstand what so familiar and ordinary a Logicall terme as the Subiect Matter is, meaneth? But it is yet more strange that Mr. B. [Page] should not vnderstand what himselfe saith. For this Assumption he speaketh of, is not mine but his owne: nor doe I here speake any one word of the Subiect Matter of Lottery: it is himselfe onely that doth it. Which Subiect Matter whether it be, as he saith, determined to be such as he here saith, shall in his due place appeare. No more for the present, but that this Assumption I owne not, and therefore need take no care for it, whether it fall or stand, so far forth as it commeth here in question.

I. B.

Let vs try the force of the Assumptions confirmation. It is true, that Recreation in generall, indefinitely vnderstood, is warranted by Gods Word. But I beleeue Mr. G. will not affirme all recreations taken vp by men to be so warranted. Yes, (saith Mr. G.) we may recreate our selues with anything, that is not against the generall rules; because touching things wherewith we may recreate, there is nothing determined.

T. G.

That which indeed was mine Assumption, Mr. B. hath now at length by good hap light vpon. But knowing not well how to bring it otherwise in, he maketh it the Confirmation of mine Assumption, that is the confirmation of it selfe. Or rather, according to Mr. Bs. analysis and resolution of mine Argument, (which was not yet so hard to be brought into forme) the confirmation not of mine, but of his owne Assumption: and so the Argument should thus stand;

‘[Page]Recreation in generall is warranted, and [...] particular manner of it prescribed, &c. Therefore a Let is a thing lawfull in it selfe, and the subiect matter and manner &c. are not determined by Gods word, nor against the generall Rules.’

You need not maruell why Mr. B. de [...]ieth not this Consequence▪ albeit it be most senslesse. For if he should, he knoweth not any that would vndertake to defend it, but turne it home to him the true fether indeed of it.

But as he dealeth with me for mine Arguments; so he doth the like with his owne inferences. He doth not beleeue, he saith, that I will defend all recreations taken vp by men to be warrantable. And yet as controlling himselfe herein, he saith, Yes. What is that but as much as, he doth? Now how proueth hee this grosse Calumnie? Thus forsooth. Mr. G. saith, we may recreate our selues with any thing that is not against the generall Rules. And doth he that saith so, defend that All recreations taken vp by men are allowable? This is [...]. Plato de rep. l. 8. & Euseb. adv. Hierocl. Vel caeco appareat. Liv▪ hist. l. 31. so palpable, that a man though starke blinde, yet might feele it with fingers.

I. B.

Of this [...]uasion, [Not against] I need not speake at this instant.

T. G.

No: we haue had more then enough of it already too oft.

I. B.

But touching things not determined, so much incule [...] ted. [Page] I aske whether things must be determined particularly, or by name, or else, if not so forbidden, they are lawfull. If so, why doth Mr. G. (speaking of diuers particulars) as of a Key and a Booke, of a paire of sheeres, and a sieue, and such like, so earnestly aske, Are they any where found reuealed in the Word of God? Where he is of another mind then here, arguing thus: Not found there commanded or permitted; therefore vnlawfull. If it be said, not so found there, to find out a thiefe. I then say, Neither are Lots so found there for recreation.

T. G.

What I meane by determined, may easily appeare by the instances giuen of Exod. 12. 6. the Passeouer tied to a certaine time, and the Deut. 12. 8, 9. sacrifices restrained to some one certaine place; to wit, stinted to some one or more particular matter, manner, time, place, &c. as on the other side, by not determined, such as are left free without such speciall restraint, as the free-will offerings, vowes, &c.

For the Obiection here brought, we had it once before; and there it was answered. Neither doth Mr. B. cite my words there vsed sincerely, but as he is wont: And the place it selfe, had he not clipt the tongue of it, would without further helpe haue afforded him an answer: to wit, that such Lots diuinatorie must haue some speciall institution, because that is required of them, which by no naturall power that either is in them, or man can adde to them, they are able to effect. Let Mr. B. prooue as much by the sporting Lot; and there an end.

I. B.

But if by not determined, he meant, Things wherewith [Page] we may recreate, are not determined in the Word, either expresly, or by iust consequence, then, whosoeuer saith so, if he be wise, will adde [so far as I doe remember and know.] For who can remember all the sentences of holy Scriptures, and know all iust Consequences, that may be made from them? If he thus adde, then his Negation is of no validity; but he himselfe is too bold in denying, vpon presumption, that another remembreth and knoweth no more than he.

T. G.

Here Mr. B. thinketh he hath got me on the hip. And either he will condemne me of great presumption and want of much wisdome, or else ouerthrow the maine strength of mine Argument. That concerning recreation therefore there are no speciall rules prescribed in Scripture, whereby it is stinted to this or that particular matter, and is therefore (as from Caluin before was well and truly affirmed) to be directed by the generals; it that which I affirme, and Peter Martyr with me; as by my Margine (which Mr. B. had no list, it seemeth, to take notice of) may appeare.

Yea but no man without presumption, saith Mr. B. may so affirme, vnlesse he put in this exception, so far as I know or I remember▪ Besides that Peter Martyr then was too presumptuous in this very particular: Our Diuines that deale with the Papists are veryb Per Scripturam sanctū convinci non potest Petrum suisse Romanum Episcopum, aut unquam Romae suisse. Mars [...]l. Pasav. defens. pac. part. 2. c. 16. far ouer-seene; with whom these assertions are so frequent and vsuall, Quinque spuria illa Sacramenta cū omnibus suis ritibus & ceremonijs, sine verbo Dei addita. Confess. Scotic. Verbo Dei destitui. Calvin. instit. l. 4. c. 19. §. 3. That [...] [...] [...] Sacrament, there is no Scripture for it; That Pen [...]nce, or Orders, or extreame Vnction, is a Sacrament, cannot out of Gods word be proued▪ [...] [...] Peter was euer at [Page] Rome, or was Bishop there, or that he had a superioritie of power and authoritie aboue the rest of the Apostles; or that the Pope succeedeth him either in his seate or in such right, cannot be made good out of Gods word. And againe, No place of Scripture can be shewed, where Christ or his Apostles hath bound vs to it. White way to Church, digress. 33. Non est Dei verbo praescriptura. Calvin. inst [...]t. lib. 3. c. 4. §. 8. Non habet Scripturae testimonium. Ex Scriptura probari non potest. Chem [...]it. exam. Conc. Trid. part. 2. for a man to repaire to the Sacrament vnshriuen; to eat flesh in Lent, &c. are not against any word of God. Yea this is a generall plea with them against most of the Popish superstitions, The most and greatest points of their religion, euen well nigh all wherein they dissent from vs, haue no foundation in the Scriptures. White ibid. sect. 5. nur [...]. 8. that there is no ground for them in Gods word. Whereas if they had consulted with Mr. B. before-hand, they should haue beene better aduised, and haue added alwaies this exception; So far as I know or remember: and so giuen their Aduersaries iust cause to haue laught at them for their labour▪ Where obserue we withall, what aduantage Mr. B. here giueth to the Aduersarie, when he shall be pressed with ought in this kinde. For tell we one of them, that for a man to refuse Shrift is not against ought in Gods word: After aduice had with Mr. B. hee may soone shape you an answer, that you are very presumptuous so to say: for can you, or any man else, remember all the sentences in Scripture, or know all iust consequences that may be made from them? Which if it be a sound and sufficient answer, surely for many points of Popery, as some of their new Sacraments, &c. we must lay our hands vpon our mouthes, and let them alone with them, for ought that I see. As if the Scripture were so vaste and diffused a peece of worke, that a man could not, without he had such an infinite memorie and an vniuersall vnderstanding, tell what were of some particular subiects deliuered in each part of it. Yea what a miserable perplexitie doth [Page] Mr. B. by this meanes plung Christian meny Consciences into, the more scrupulous sort especially, when for particular ciuill actions of ordinarie vse, their scrupulous hearts causlesly mouing doubt of them, hauing searched to and fro in Gods Booke, though they can finde nothing at all that may controll them in the vse of them, yet they shall still be perplexed, because Mr. B. hath here informed them, that there may yet be somewhat in Gods word against them, neither can they, doe they what they can, haue any assurance of the contrary, vnlesse they had such memories and vnderstandings as Mr. B. here speaketh of? I cannot here passe by a passage of Mr. Caluins concerning such scruples; Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 19. §. 7. These and the like, saith he, se [...]me friuolous trifles: but there is more in them than men are commonly aware of. For when mens Consciences are once in this manner ens [...] red, they enter into a long and an intricase Labyr [...]th, from whence it is no easie mut [...]er to get out againe. Si dubitare [...]eperit, an lino uti liceat, nec de cannabe [...] securus erit, [...] & de stupis incidet dubitatio. If a man shall begin to doubt, whether he may vse flax, or linne [...] made thereof, in his sheets, shirts, handkerchefs, towels, table-napkins, &c. he will not long ofter haue the like scruple of hempe; and after that of towe too. And he will begin to thinke whether he may not dine and sup without any Table-cloth or napkins▪ at all▪ and so consequently whether he may vse them or no, when he may well enough be without. Yea Denique coveniet, ut super transversam, quod dicitur, festucam incedere nefas ducat. at length, saith he, you shall haue a man come to that passe, that he will thinke it a sinne ( [...] [...] say) to stride ouer a straw. Such height of superstition men grow vnto▪ when way is giuen to such frin [...]lous scruples, which yet Mr. B. here ministreth [Page] much matter vnto. For suppose we one of these scrupulous Christians, yea or any other, should repaire to Mr. B. and moue this as a doubt to him, whether it be lawfull for him to weare band and cuffs either of cambricke or holland, and Mr. B. hauing affirmed that it is, he should demand of him, what warrant out of Gods word he could furnish him with for it. Answer him this way, that Apparell in generall is inioyned, and for the matter of it there is no speciall direction of restraint giuen in the word, and therefore liberty left for any that is not against the generall Rules in the word, of decencie, modestie, frugalitie, &c. resoluing him of such as doubt or question may be moued of: and it is not vnlikely but you may giue him good satisfaction therein. Whereas goe Mr. Bs. way and tell him, that though apparell it selfe be allowed, yet whether the matter of it be determined or no, neither he nor any man can say, vnlesse he had all the Bible, and whatsoeuer is contained in it, or may be deduced from it, in his head: I suppose you will be so far from giuing him any good satisfaction, that you will leaue him more perplexed than you found him at first. I propound somewhat of this kinde in pursuit of mine Argument, which Mr. B. misdoubting he might run a ground there, slily saileth by, and not so much as once taketh notice of. Either he medleth with the Conclusion, and passeth by the premises: Or hee frameth me such matter of confirmation as hee pleaseth, and letteth passe that that I propound. I demand then, rubbing vp Mr. Bs. memorie a little, as before in my Booke, what other proofe can be brought for the iustifying [Page] of Bowles or Chesse-play, than such as is here propounded, which it behoued him to haue answered if he knew any better, considering that the instance was of much more moment for the clearing and confirming of this branch of mine Assumption, than many things that it hath pleased him to be pidling withall.

For the thing it selfe: First, it is well knowne, that for many Heads, or Common places, what is found in the word may soone be laid all together, as for games, for markets, for mariage-feasts, for Lots, and the like: by consideration whereof a man may oft be informed what is in Gods word either for or against them. Secondly, such things as require a speciall Institution, (and of this kinde must a Lot be, if it be a diuine Oracle, and an immediate iudgement and sentence of God, as Mr. B. pretendeth that it is) the matter is much more obuious. Speciall Institutions in the word are as starres of the chiefe magnitude, so eminent and conspicuous, that they cannot easily lie hid, nor need ouer-much search, and a man may boldly say therefore of such and such things, that there is no speciall institution of them in the word. Thirdly, for morall matters, wee may draw to a neerer scantling than the bodie of the whole Bible; Exod. 20. Deut. 5. the Summe of all is comprised in the Decalogue, and whatsoeuer a man is sure to be against none of those Exod 34. 28. Deut. 10. 4. ten Words, or to come yet to a narrower compasse, against neither Deut. 6. 5. Levit. 19. 18. Luk. 10. 27, 28. Piety, nor Charitie, the Summe of the Exod. 24. 12. & 31. 18. two Tables, hee may surely know not to be against Matth. 22. 37, 38, 39, 40. Mark. 10. 30, 31, 32, 33, 34. any part of Gods word, and consequently to haue nothing in Gods [Page] word against it, though hee haue not such a vaste capacitie of vnderstanding or memory, as Mr. B. here requireth. But consider the whilst what an [...]. vtter vncertaintie and irresolution in this kinde Mr. B. driueth vs hereunto: For by his grounds a man may not safely say, that There is nothing against wearing of an Hat in Gods word; vnlesse he know all consequences that may be deduced from this Sentence of Scripture, Gen. 1. 1. In the beginning God made Heauen and Earth. For if he must needs know so much of all, that may safely say so of ought, then of that in particular, that being one of those all.

I. B.

At last let vs religiously consider the generall Rules so oft spoken of, and we shall finde, that Mr. G. should haue done well not to haue pleased Libertines by pleading Not against, but to haue giuen the word due honour by saying with Mr. Caluin. [The vse of things is to be limited according to the generall rules.] For these rules require Decency, Expediency, and Piety, and therefore they are not obeyed by the vse of things not vndecent, not inexpedient, and not impious. For it is to be noted, that in 1 Cor. 6. 12. & 10. 23. Paul saith not, All things are lawfull, but some things are inexpedient; but in both places thus; All things are lawfull, but all are not expedient.

T. G.

Of this distinction we heard before, and answer thereunto was there giuen. Yet lest I seeme to passe by so graue and serious obseruations with silence,

First, if those rules require more than not vndecent, [Page] not inexpedient, &c. then whatsoeuer is not more than so, is against those rules, and is no more by Mr. G. allowed than by Mr. B. himselfe, for ought that Mr. G. here saith: which Mr. B. also might soone see, if he knew what he would haue. And therefore his, It is to be noted, might very well haue been spared, for any hurt it doth Mr. Gs. cause, if that be all that it proue.

Againe, though this might suffice to keepe Mr. Bs. exception from fastning on ought that I say: Yet let vs see of what weight his annotation here is. The Apostle saith not, Some things are inexpedient, but, all things are not expedient. Why? what difference is there in the Apostles meaning here betweene these two? Heare we the exposition of Th. Morton. è Coll. Christi Cantabrig. as acute and iudicious a writer as the most of those that these times of ours haue afforded vs, though one that liued in much obscuritie; In 1 Cor. 6. 12. on the former place of the Apostle he thus paraphraseth his words, If we Christians ought to be so carefull in cherishing and improuing piety, Vt vel à licito rerum usu pietati officiente abstinendum putemus. that we deeme our selues restrained euen from the lawfull vse of things that hurt or hinder piety, how much ought we to abstaine from things of their owne nature and euery way vnlawfull. In 1 Cor. 10. 23. On the other place yet more plainly: But all things are not expedient: i. at quarundam rerum usus interdū incommodus & noxius est. that is, but the vse of some things is sometimes incommodious and harmfull to a Christian man, in that that concerneth the defence and iner ease of his faith and piety, and the furtherance of his eternall safety. For it is not to be expected from earthly things, of which the Apostle principally here speaketh, such as are meat and drinke, that they should directly further [Page] our saluation: it is enough if they be not an impediment thereunto. And againe afterward: Quod non aedificat. i. quod fratris fidei, pietati, & saluti impedimento est. That doth not edifie; that is, is an hinderance to our brothers faith, piety, and safety. As for decencie and indecencie; piety and impiety, in actions capable of either, Mr. B. may as soone [...]. Insec [...]bilia secare. diuide the point of a Spanish neeale, as assigne any medium betweene the one and the other. Meane while Mr. B. hath set a new snare here to intangle and snarle scrupulous Consciences in. For though no indecency can be discouered in some kinde of attire, yet if they Et Magis audiendū quàm auscultandum censeo: Vti de Ariolis Pacuv. Chryse. apud Cic. de divin. l. 1. de Pharmacopolis Cato in Coelium apud Gell. noct. Attic. l. 1. c. 15. heare Mr. B. they shall hang, vpon this new conceit of his, still in suspence, whether it may be auowed to be decent or no. I might adde, that with much difficultie and no little adoe they must haue it proued to them by some sentence of Scripture, (which I would faine heare Mr. B. performe) for no reason will serue else, that it is so.

I. B.

Let vs consider these rules yet somewhat more neerely to the point. Touching the first: The words of the Apostle, 1 Cor. 14. 40. be these. [Let all things be done honestly, and by order.] In which is no intimation that all things are in themselues lawfull to be done, which are done honestly and by order: but a charge, that all things, be they in themselues neuer so lawfull, be done honestly and by order. Those drinke offerings to Bacchus, commonly called Healths, per antiphrasin, are solemnized sometimes with standing, sometimes with kneeling, alwaies with putting off hats, and some speech more or lesse: are they acceptable to God, because they are thus orderly carried? If not, then [Page] be Lots and the vsers of them in gaming neuer so orderly disposed, yet are they not therefore iustified.

T. G.

Mr. Bs. taske is to instance if he meane to doe ought, against what generall Rule of Gods word a lusorious Lot is; for that is the issue that we now are at. But in stead thereof Mr. B. telleth vs that that no man denies, that if it be in it selfe vnlawfull, it is not the more iustifiable, because it is not against this first rule of order. And what is this to the purpose? I [...]. Plut. [...]. vel quod Rufino Hieron. Manū posceris, & pedem porrigis. Vel Academico Domino si serviret, facturum quod se Epictetus profitetur, [...]. Arian. dissert. l. 2. c. 20. aske for a pickaxe, and Mr. B. reacheth me a spade. This is mine Argument, Game in generall being allowed, and no particular matter or manner of it prescribed, any is lawfull that is not against the generall rules of Gods word: But Lottery is such, to wit, not against any generall Rule of Gods word: therefore Lottery is lawfull. That it is of it selfe lawfull is the Conclusion; that it is not against any generall rule of Gods word is the Assumption. Mr. B. denieth the Conclusion; saith it is vnlawfull; and that it cannot be made lawfull, though it be not against some one such Rule. What manner of answering call we this, wherein nothing is denied or answered to, but that that indeed ought neuer to be denied?

I. B.

Touching the second Rule. It is true, That all things must be expedient, that is, edifie, 1 Cor. 10. 23. Therefore they sinne who stumble or offend a brother, that is, occasion him to fall or be made weake, Rom. 14 13, 21. But lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and to be weake in goodnesse. Therefore they doe not edifie, and therefore are not expedient.

T. G.

[Page]Here Mr. B. speaketh somewhat to the purpose indeed, if his Answer could be made good. For he saith, that a lusorious Lot is against this second Rule. But how proueth he it? Because lusorious Lots occasion thousands to fall into sinne, and grow weake in goodnesse. What doth euery Lot vsed in game doe so? Make that good and take all. Let Mr. B. proue, that euery Lot vsed in game, as for example sake, euery shuffling of arrowes, or choise of pawnes hid in the hand to decide leading, or euery game that children play at, euen and odde, heads and points, &c. doth occasion thousands, or some one at least or other to fall into sinne, or grow weake in goodnesse, and I will yeeld all lusorious Lots to be vnlawfull. If he cannot, he must no more condemne all lusorious Lots, because where they are abused they produce such effects, then all vse of boules for disport in generall, because bouling abused doth altogether as much.

I. B.

Concerning the third Rule, Let all things be done to Gods glory, 1 Cor. 10. 31. Is this to Gods glory, to vse his Name in any other case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed, and then to take that Name in vaine? Is tempting of God any glory to God? But playing with a Lot is to vse Gods name in another case, than wherein God is well pleased his Name should be vsed; and then also to take that Name in vaine: and it is a grieuous tempting of God, as shall be proued. Therefore playing with a Lot is not to Gods glory, and by consequence not agreeable to religion and piety.

T. G.

This is, to vse Mr. Bs. terme, the kill-cow indeed. [Page] But all that here a sporting Lot is charged with, is yet to be proued. It shall be, Mr. B. saith. In good time; but till then Nihil dicitur fuisse factum, quamdiu aliquid agendū superest. Reg. Iur. nothing is done. Nor is it true that Mr. B. saith in the next words, vnlesse what shall be done, be done already.

I. B.

Though it be sufficiently proued that lusorious Lots are directly against two of the generall Rules; and not warranted by the third: So that Mr. G. hath not bettered his cause by appealing to them.

T. G.

How sufficiently M. B. hath proued this, whatsoeuer he will doe; I haue shewed: [...]. Aristoph. thesmoph [...]r. Nor is my cause yet any thing hereby impeached, vntill more be brought against it, than as yet is.

I. B.

Yet it is to be obserued, that all the Rules require Things and Actions to be according to them. But Mr. G. by onely speaking of them, would iustifie circumstances, and meanes of playing with Lots, if (forsooth) they be not against them.

T. G.

Of that friuolous exception, and distinction of according to them, and not against them, enough already hath beene said.

For the rest here obiected, that by onely speaking of them, I would iustifie circumstances and meanes of playing with Lots, if they be not against them, albeit neither I, nor any man else, I beleeue, besides Mr. B. himselfe, vnderstandeth well what it meaneth: yet to cleare my selfe from such aspersion, as it may seeme to cast on me; I will briefly relate the summe [Page] of mine Argument reduced into due forme. Thus then it standeth:

‘Any meanes or manner of recreation that is not against the generall Rules of Gods word, these and the like, is allowable. Lottery is such a meanes of recreation as is not against any of the generall rules of Gods word, these or the like. Lottery therefore is a meanes of recreation allowable.’

The Proposition I thus proued:

‘Where a thing is allowed, and the meanes, manner, and other circumstances are not in particular determined; there is any meanes or manner of it allowed that is not against those generals. But such is recreation: for it is allowed in generall, nor are the meanes, and manner, and other circumstances of it determined in particular. Any meanes or manner of it therefore is allowed that is not against the generall rules of Gods word.’

In explication of the first Proposition, I relate those Rules: For confirmation of the Assumption, [...] require to be nominated, against what generall rule Lottery vsed in game doth offend. Now let Mr. B. shew which way herein I offend.

I. B.

Thus hauing euidently shewed the Reasons inducing (not drawing) Mr. G. to allow lusorious Lots, to be [...]oth fearefull; as these euasiue speeches, [Not euill in themselues] [Not prohibited] [Not determined] and [Not against the generall Rules] doe import; and otherwise vnsound; I will (with Gods [Page] helpe I hope) reply vpon Mr. Gs. answers to mine Arguments against playing with Lots contained in my Dialogue.

T. G.

How well Mr. B. hath quit himselfe in this his opposition, there will no doubt, I see, be made, if he may be his owne Iudge. But if his Dextra sinistram meliorem & gladio scutum habere dicebantur, qui sua melius defenderent, quàm aliena impugnarent. left hand steed him no better than his right, nor his shield doe him more pleasure than his sword hath, I doubt much whether his Reader will receiue from him any good satisfaction, howsoeuer he may therein please and sooth vp himselfe. As there is seldome Autor laudat opus. Ovid. de Pont. l. 3. el. 9. Quidni? Scruta quidem ut vendat s [...]rutarius laudat. Lucill. apud Gell. l. 3. c. 13. Sed & suum cuique pulchrum. Cic. Tusc. l. 5. [...]. Aristot. ethic. l. 9. c. 7. any workman but liketh well of his owne worke.

THE THIRD PART. Mr. BALMFORDS Arguments against Games consisting in or depending vpon Chance, taken out of his Dialogue. Together with Mr. GATAKERS Answer to them in his Booke of the Nature and Vse of LOTS. As also Mr. Bs. Reply in defence of them: and Mr. Gs. Reioinder thereunto.

[Page]

The first Argument.

§

WHatsoeuer directly, or of it selfe, orI. B. Dialog. Arg. 1. in a speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of Gods name is to be vsed religiously Mala. 1. 6, 7., and not to be vsed in sport; as we may not pray or sweare in sport: Exod. 20. 7. Esai. 29. 13. Ierem. 4. 2. But the vse of Lots directly, or of it selfe and in speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of the name of God in attributing to his speciall Prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and expecting the euent Prov. 16. 33. Act. 1. 24, 26..

Therefore the vse of Lots is not to be in sports.

§

[Page]I answer: The Assumption is not true if it be vnderstoodT. G. Answer. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 5. vniuersally: it concludeth nothing to the Question if it be taken particularly.

The proofe annexed to it scarce carrieth good sense: the Printer, it may be, is in fault. But if the meaning of the Author be, as I conceiue it, (for I must in part goe by guesse) that the disposition of euery Lot is wholly attributed to, and the euent wholly expected from the speciall and immediate Prouidence of God; I denie it, neither doe the places produced proue it. The Prov. 16. 33. former of them, concerning ordinary Lots, or Lots in generall, was examined and answered sufficiently before.

The Act. 1. 24, 26. latter is an example of an extraordinary Lot, wherein there was indeed an immediate and speciall prouidence. But Vise Hieron. sup. §. 4. Sic & Greg. in Ezech. homil. 4. Aliud est quod de doctrinae usu atque disciplinae dicimus, aliud quod de miraculo scimus. extraordinary examples make no generall rules. Neither is it a good course of arguing, to reason from the speciall, or a singular, to the generall and vniuersall; much lesse from one extraordinarie act or euent, to all ordinarie courses of the same kinde. Herein is the difference betweene the one and the other, betweene the extraordinarie Lot, wherein there is an immediate hand of God for speciall purpose, and the ordinarie Lot, wherein there is not; that the one could not but fall certainly, were it neuer so oft cast, as in the Lots vsed for the discouery of Iosh. 7. 16, 17, 18. Achan and Ion. 1. 7. Ionas, and in the election of 1 Sam. 10. 20, 21. Saul and Act. 1. 23, 24, 25, 26. Matthias, and the like: whereas the other cast oft in the same case, as for partition of goods and chatels descending by inheritance vpon, or bought in common by diuers, would not constantly and certainly fall out still the same.

§

[Page] The Assumption vnderstood generally is true: and I. B. Reply. the places quoted make good the proofe thereof, as shall be made manifest.

§

This is said; but should be done. But Mr. B.T. G. Reioinder. hauing said, it shall be, presently slincketh away from it: nor doth euer after doe what here he vndertaketh, vnlesse it be by saying that it is manifest to all that will see, that it is so as he saith.

I. B.

First therefore let vs consider the supposed distinction betweene ordinarie and extraordinarie Lots. Mr. G. speaketh of a distinction, but sheweth not wherein (touching the Lots themselues) it doth consist. Indeed touching themselues (as they be Lots) there is no difference. For in an ordinary, as well as an extraordinary Lot, the things are by man of purpose intentionally disposed vnto a variable euent, and they are wholly disposed by God vnto this or vnto that euent, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. If so, then it followeth, that the vse of all Lots (as they be Lots) whether ordinarie or extraordinarie, directly or of it selfe, and in speciall manner, tendeth to the aduancing of the name of God. How? The vse of Lots attributeth to Gods speciall prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the euent. Doth this scarce carry good sense?

T. G.

Against the proofe of the proofe of Mr. Bs. assumption, [Page] from Act. 1. 24, 26. I obiect two things:

1. That it is but one particular example, and therefore cannot proue a generall. To which exception Mr. B. here answereth not a word; and the exception therefore standeth good still; and is enough to infringe the validitie of all proofe drawne here from that place.

2. That it is of an extraordinary Lot: and from extraordinarie actions, much more from some one of them to conclude of all ordinarie, is an vnreasonable kinde of reasoning. And indeed it is as if a man should thus reason; There was a speciall hand of God in Pharaohs

Gen. 41. 19, 25.

dreame: There is the like therefore in all dreames whatsoeuer. Or,

Exod. 3. 2.

The Bush was holy that God appeared to Moses in; And therefore euery common Hawthorne is holy. So, The Lot whereby Matthias was elected, was by Gods speciall prouidence immediatly disposed: Therefore the like is in euery Lot.

Now Mr. B. that he might seeme to say somewhat to this at least; Saith that I deliuer a distinction of Lots ordinarie and extraordinarie, but shew not wherein touching the Lots themselues it consisteth. He that readeth Of Lots, Chap. 4. Sect. 1. & chap. 10. sect. 1. my Booke may soone see where I define either, what difference I assigne betweene them: and Mr. B. himselfe in part also hereafter acknowledgeth it.

Yea but saith he so far forth as they are Lots, there is no difference betweene them. No reason there should; for the same generall nature of a Lot is common to both: as the same nature of a dreame is common to all dreames: the same nature of a bush is [Page] common to all bushes. Nor did Pharaohs dreame, as it was a dreame, differ from other dreames: nor that holy bush, as it was a bush, differ from any other bush.

But what is the common nature of a Lot? Heare Mr. B. himselfe, and he will tell you truly and fully else-where, that Balmford. Dialog. it is the variable euent of some sensible thing applied to the determining of some doubtfull matter. But because that will not here serue his turne, he changeth his note now, and maketh this the generall nature of a Lot common to all Lots, (begging withall pitifully that that is in controuersie) that things be by man of purpose intentionally disposed vnto a variable euent, and wholly disposed by God vnto this or that euent, which the vser of a Lot expecteth. That which is so far from being the common nature of a Lot, that neither the one branch, nor the other is common to all Lots, much lesse both iointly together. For neither is it true, that in euery Lot things are by man disposed to a variable euent: as where a controuersie is put to be decided by the track and turning of some beast that hath passed before: nor are the things by man disposed in Lot, by God euer wholly and immediatly disposed, as in the proofe of his Assumption is affirmed, and here onely repeated; and much lesse are they euer disposed to such euent, as by the vsers of the Lot is expected, but rather cleane contrary sometime, as in Ester 3. 7, 13. Hamans example. But if it be so in all Lots, saith Mr. B. then mine Assumption is true. That is as much as to say, if you grant me what I affirme in the proofe of mine Assumption, though I barely repeat it onely, and doe [Page] not at all proue it; then mine Assumption standeth firme; to wit, that a Lot doth directly or of it selfe and in speciall manner tend to the aduancing of the name of God, in attributing to his speciall prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of the Lot, and in expecting the euent. Which by the way he demandeth, whether it scarce carry good sense or no: because I said it scarce did, being withall willing to salue the matter by supposing that the Printer might be in fault. But I see now, Mr. B. will take it vpon himselfe; and I must shew reason for what I said. What others therefore may deeme of it I know not. But I supposed the word, to attribute, to be a verbe transitiue, requiring somewhat therefore to be expressed that should be attributed, as well as some thing or person to which or whom it should be attributed; which in Mr. Bs. words doth not appeare. It were senslesse for any man to say, that hee doth in his words and deeds attribute to God, not expressing ought that he doth therein attribute vnto him. But let vs heare Mr. B. further.

I. B.

Is there then no difference betweene an ordinary, and extraordinary Lot? The only difference is the Subiect matter whereabout the Lot is imployed. The subiect matter of an ordinary Lot, is by Gods allowance, a controuersie to be ended. The subiect matter of an extraordinary Lot, is any other matter, whereabout a Lot is imployed by Gods speciall direction: otherwise it is vnlawfull, as be lusorious and diuinatory Lots.

T. G.

[Page]I might well Supervacua enim refutare, nullius artis est. Quintil. instit. l. 5. c. 13. let all this wild discourse passe; since it is nothing at all to the purpose, neither to the iustifying of his Assumption, nor of the proofe of it; yet since he saith it, we will see what he saith. That there is difference betweene an ordinary and extraordinary Lot, in regard of the subiect matter, is most true, but no such difference as Mr. B. here assigneth. Of Lots, chap. 4. sect. 1. & chap. 10. sect. 1. What it is I shew where I handle the nature of either. But that the subiect matter of an ordinarie Lot is euer some controuersie, is not true, as I haue formerly shewed: nor if it were so, did it hinder, but that the Lot vsed in sport might be an ordinarie Lot, since that a controuersie is thereby also oft times ended. And againe, that no controuersie, but some other matter is the subiect matter of an extraordinarie Lot, is also as vntrue: since that a controuersie also may and oft is the subiect matter of it also. Not to adde, that lusorious Lots are without all reason here ranked among extraordinarie Lots, no reason rendred why they should be so termed. So that here is much vnsound matter packt together to no purpose.

I. B.

In regard of which difference onely Mr. Gs. Logick holdeth good as thus. From the vse of a Lot about another matter than ending a Controuersie, and that by Gods speciall direction, it followeth not, that it is lawfull to vse a Lot about any other matter, than ending a Controuersie, as gaming, without Gods speciall direction.

T. G.

In stead of making good his owne Logick, Mr. B. [Page] telleth vs what will hold good in Mr. Gs. Logick. What he meaneth by my Logick, I neither know nor inquire. When I make such an Argument as Mr. B. here frameth, then let him answer it and not before. For this is but to set vp men of straw, and then hauing runne a course or two at them, to ride away in triumph, as if he had done some great matter, and laid Mr. G. or I know not whom in the dust. But meane while Mr. B. forgetteth to shew vs the validitie of his owne Logick; to wit, how an Argument will follow, from one singular example of an extraordinarie Lot (by himselfe confessed to be such) vsed therein by Gods speciall direction, to the ordinarie vse of Lots in generall.

I. B.

But Mr. G. maketh another difference, to wit, an immediate and speciall prouidence in an extraordinary Lot, which is not in an ordinary Lot. He doth so: and therefore in his Logick, he cunningly ioyneth a supposed extraordinarie Euent to a supposed extraordinarie Act, and declineth the proofe of an extraordinarie Act, which rather he should haue done, because mine Argument standeth vpon the vse of Lots.

T. G.

Nay by Mr. Bs. leaue, Mr. G. doth not so. He saith onely that there is great difference betweene an extraordinarie Lot wherein an immediate diuine prouidence is, and an ordinarie one, wherein the same is not. Not presuming that there is necessarily such an immediate diuine prouidence in euery extraordinarie Lot, but that such there was in that extraordinarie Lot by Mr. B. alledged, as also there is euer [Page] in all such of that kinde as are done by Gods speciall direction. I spare to speake much of the idle distinction here betweene an extraordinarie Lot, which by Mr. Bs. owne grant this was, and an extraordinarie Act, which he would here imply that it was not, when he requireth proofe of it. If the euent were extraordinarie, it is enough for my purpose, because Mr. Bs. Argument is in expresse termes concerning the euent, wherein somewhat, but I know not what, (for he mentioneth nothing) is said to be attributed vnto Gods speciall prouidence; which if it be therefore more than ordinarie in such a Lot, there is no reasoning from it to any where it is not so, much lesse to all whatsoeuer in generall. That this Act it selfe, or occasion and manner of vising it, was extraordinarie, though neither I stand bound here to proue it, and the reason is senslesse whereupon Mr. B. here requireth it, yet I haue proued euidently Of Lots, chap. 10. sect. 3. where I entreat particularly of it. But M. B. must remember that here it is his part to proue: it is mine onely to answer, denie, or distinguish; and his to take away mine answers, if he will make his Arguments good.

I. B.

Neither doth he soundly proue an immediate and speciall prouidence, or extraordinary euent to be in an extraordinary, and not in an ordinary Lot.

T. G.

Neither doe I affirme it generally of the former, but of all such of that kinde as are vsed by Gods speciall direction, in which Mr. B. himselfe here acknowledgeth it: and of the latter what I say, I haue [Page] Of Lots, chap. 2. sect. 5. & chap. 7. sect. 4. in diuers places proued. Here I speake onely by way of distinction betweene the one and the other, which let Mr. B. if he can disproue▪

I. B.

For as it is a tempting of God to cast [...] [...] ry Lot the first time without Gods speciall direction, p. 313. so it is a tempting, yea, a agr [...]er tempting of God, when be [...]ath giue [...] his iudgement already by the [...] of the Lot, to cast the Lot againe without hi [...] speciall [...] rection. How then c [...] Mr. G. so confidently affir [...], that an extraordinary Lot could not but fall certainly▪ were it neuer so oft cast?

T. G.

Whether it be a tempting of God or no, vpon my occasion what▪soeuer to cast a Lot more then on [...] i [...] such a businesse as God hath giuen speciall▪ direction [...] vse it in, is not the Question▪ th [...]gh I suppose it be more then Mr. B. will be able euer to make good that it is. And whether vpon so doing, because it were a tempting of him, God [...]ould refuse to giue answer or no, might also be questioned. He was content Iudg. 6. 37, 39, 40. by a Signe to answer Gid [...] the second time, though he had giuen assurance sufficient before, and as much as he at first required. He answered the sea-man in Ionas 1. [...]. Of Lots, chap. 10. sect. 5. the Lot that lighted vpon [...], though it were in them a meere tempting of God, by Mr. Bs. owne grant, hauing no speciall direction from God for the doing of it. Nor dare any man say, but that if it had beene by them for their [...] satisfaction cast oft, as Ari [...] Montan. in Io [...]. 1. some thinke it was, it would haue lighted vpon Ionas still. But all that I say is this, that in [...] [...] Lot, wherin there i [...] [...] [...] diate [Page] hand of God for speciall purpose (good ground supposed for the reiteration of it) the euent were it neuer so oft cast, would be euer the same. For God certainly would neuer giue a sentence contrary to himselfe. And of the certaine steedinesse of such a Lot, we see a pregnant proofe in Iosh 7. 16, 17, 18. Achans case, where the Lot soure seuerall times cast, kept on his due course, till it came to seize on that particular person that was aimed at. And the like may be presumed certainly of euery such Lot so reiterated. If God refuse further to answer, there is no such immediate hand of God for speciall end in it: if there be, and he doe answer, hee will bee euer like himselfe, there shall be no, Est, & non. 2 Cor. 1. 18, 19, 20. tis, and tis not, with him.

§

§

I. B.

Indeed, the certaine euent of an extraordinory Lot may in faith be expected, because of Gods speciall direction. And why not so in an ordinary Lot? Seeing God aduiseth vs pag. 135. to vse Lots for the ending of Controuersies, Prou. 18. 18. and assureth vs that the whole disposing of them is of him, Prou. 16. 33.

§

T. G.

I might answer in a word: Let Mr. B. make triall. But I referre my selfe to Answer to Mr. Fennors reason 4. chap▪ 7. §. 10. p. 158, 159. the instances giuen by me elsewhere, of diuers in seuerall places casting Lots vpon the same persons for the selfe same places, and to what hereof hath been here before said. Only I adde that no such speciall assurance is giuen vs by God for the one, as in such cases was for the other. Nor doth any such thing follow thence, because God hath aduised vs rather thereby to end controuersies than to giue way to courses more inconuenient, that therefore God will by a speciall [Page] hand of his guide the Lot thus or thus, to wit, to fauour him that hath the better right in this, as to seuer the innocent from the nocent in that. How far forth Prov. 16. 33. the place produced proueth any such thing, commeth hereafter to be discussed.

I. B.

But Mr. G. hath answered this place before. Let vs then consider what he hath answered.

T. G.

For the sentence of Salomon, there want notT. G. Answer. Of Lots, chap. 7. sect. 3. good Authors that expound it of De singularibus, mirabilibus, divinis, quas disterminant à politicis. Chytrae. in Iud. c. 1. 10. Winkelman profess. Marpurg. & Barthold. Krakevitz in Ion. c. 1. & Pe [...]cer. de divinat. singular extraordinarie; and miraculous Lots only: such, to vse the words of one of our Eastie hist. Gosp. Aduersaries, as are vsed immediatly to finde out Gods will: whereas these that we now dispute of are no such; Authores pra [...]ominati. neither is it now lawfull to vse any Lot at all to that end.

But the words seeme to be more generall, and are word for word thus in the originall, Prov. 16. 33. [...] Sicut Num. 26. 55. [...] terram tamen (quod attinet) sorte dividetur. Et Nehem. 9. 32. - [...] [...].) The Lot, it is cast into the lap; [...] [...]. but euery iudgement or disposition of it (for there is no article there answering our English The) is of God. As hee saith else-where, [...]. [...]. 26. Many seeke the Rulers face or fauour; [...] but each mans iudgement is from God. And, Prov. 21. 31. The Horse is prepared for the day of fight: [...] sicut Psal. 3. 9. [...] Et Ion. 2. 9. [...] but saluation is of God, or belongeth to God, i [...] Gods. Which words so read [...] providentia, etiamsi [...] providentia in alijs [...], [...] [...] munis providentia c [...]sum. Bellarm. de▪ cleric. l. 1. c. 5. import onely thus much, that there is a prouidence of God in all things, euen in the least, in the [Page] most casuall things, and among the rest by name in a Lot: And so is there no more said of Lots there, than is spoken else-where not of Lots alone or things casuall onely; but of all mens thoughts and purposes, and words and works, and counsels and courses; as we haue Chap. 2. §. 3. formerly shewn; and as beside the Authors there alledged, some of those that vrge this place for the proofe of this point, confesse else-where against themselues, when they say, that Balmford. dialog. Et Zanch. de sort. D [...]um omnia regere, igitur sortes etiam. The disposing of the Chance is secret, that it may be Chance indeed and wholly of God, who directeth Prov. 16. 1, 3, 9, 3 [...]. Balmf. ibid. all things.

Yea take the words as they are vsually read, The Lot is cast into the lap, but Genev. translat. the whole disposition, or The Kings Edit. the whole disposing thereof, is of the Lord; It may as truly be said with good warrant from diuers I [...]sal. 33. 10, 11, 13, 14, to 20. & 37. 6, 7, 9, 12, to 16. & 127. 1, 2. Prov. 10. 22. & 19. 21. & 20. 24. & 21. 30, 31. Esai. 26. 12. & 34. 15, 16. Ierem. 10. 23. Matth. 6. 26, 30. & [...]0. 29, 30. other places of Scripture beside supra. those by the Aduerse party produced, that the whole issue or euent and disposing of all things great and weighty, or lesse and lighter, is of the Lord: which yet excludeth not the meanes, that God worketh by or with, in the most of them, nor implieth an immediate prouidence vniuersally in them: but is therefore so said, and may truly be said, to shew, that it is wholly in Gods hands to dispose of the euent and issue of all things, and to crosse or giue way to them, as he shall see good. So that a man may as well, and vpon as good ground out of the places concerning all other mens speeches and actions alledged by themselues, (together with those other, which are some of them yet more generall and of larger extent) exclude all things else whatsoeuer from game, [Page] as they may Lots, in regard of ought that concerning them can be picked out of this place.

§

I. B.

Before he saith, p. 144. Good Authors expound this I. B. Reply. place of singular extraordinary and miraculous Lots onely.

§

T. G.

And if Mr. G. had stucke to this, I suppose Mr. B.T. G. Reioind. would not easily haue beene able to refute it, and so his Argument had stucke fast. But I refuse to take aduantage of ought that in mine owne iudgement I deeme vnsound. For it is Disputa [...]is [...] is Christianae scopꝰ nō victoria, sed verita [...]. [...]. Greg. N [...]z. epist. 15. not victory, but truth onely that I stand for.

I. B.

But, saith he, the words seeme to be more generall, and are, word for word, thus in the Originall, [The Lot is cast into the lap: but euery iudgement or disposing of it, is of God.] Doth not confuting them, who hold onely extraordinary Lots to be meant in this place; and translating the Text [Euery iudgement] and expounding it [or disposing it] shew plainly that this place proueth mine Assumption to be vniuersally true?

T. G.

I perceiue a man must not be ouer-liberall with Mr. B. for i [...] a man giue him an inch, hee will too soone take an ell. He might well thinke me very silly, freely to grant him all this, and yet denie his Assumption, i [...] this were so plaine a Confirmation of it.

That I confute them is not true: I shew onely my dissent from them. I leaue it to Mr. B. if he can, to confute them.

That I so translate and expound the Text, is true: [Page] but very sorry assistance ariseth to Mr Bs. Assumption from thence.

I. B.

So that I maruell that he denieth this place to proue mine Assumption, because it concerneth Lots in generall.

T. G.

And maruell well he might, did I reason on that manner. But hee wanteth matter, it seemeth, to maruell at, that he frameth such to himselfe. In eadem urna & aurum est & vipera. Si aurum ex urna sustuleris; quia illic & viper [...] est, non ideò mihi urna aurū dat, quia vipera [...] habet; sed aurum dat, cùm & viperā habeat. Sen epist. 87. It is one thing to say, It proueth not Mr. Bs. Assumption, though it concerne Lots in generall: and another to say, It proueth not Mr. Bs. Assumption, because it concerneth Lots in generall. That is all that can be gathered out of ought that I affirme. But Mr. B. his earnest desire belike to haue his Assumption confirmed, suggested this to him.

I. B.

For if it doe so, then it proueth that ordinary as well as extraordinary Lots, tend to the aduancing of the Name of God.

T. G.

It seemeth that Mr. B. hath forgotten his owne Assumption. If he haue, I will make bold to put him in mind of it. It is this, The vse of Lots directly, or of it selfe, and in speciall manner tendeth to the aduancing of Gods Name, in attributing to his speciall prouidence in the whole and immediate disposing of them, &c. Here is a great deale more than barely tending to the aduancing of Gods Name, which all things that are disposed by him (and Esai. 26. 12. Dan. 4. 35. Math. 10. 29, 30. what is not disposed by him?) in some degree or other doe. A man might [Page] maruell therefore rather why Mr. B. should not so much, but at all maruell at Mr. Gs. deniall, that this place so vnderstood, doth proue Mr. Bs. Assumption; yea, he might maruell, that Mr. B. should not see that it did not, if he remembred what his Assumption was.

I. B.

Againe, p. 145. Mr. G. taking the words, as they are vsually read in the Geneua Translation, and the Kings Edition, to wit, [The Lot is cast into the lap, but the whole disposition, or disposing thereof, is of the Lord] granteth that the whole euent is of God.

T. G.

1. What I yeeld of my liberalitie, Mr. B. is one thing: What you must make good, if you will maintaine your owne cause, is another thing. That is the translation, say I, [...]. word for word. Which vnlesse therefore he can either disproue, or proue his Assumption out of it, his Argument is vndone, and his cause with it, hauing indeed no colour of ground beside that place much wrung and wronged to support and vphold it.

2. I take not the words so, but supposing them so to be taken, I say, that no more is therein said of Lots, than may be said of all things that are done in the world, though by meanes the most of them, that the whole issue and euent of them is of God, because he not only hath an hand in them, but it is in his power either to afford or to deny such issue vnto them. And what hath Mr. Bs. cause gained hereby more than was granted it before? Or how is his Assumption hereby confirmed, when no more is [Page] yeelded to be said therein of Lots, than may be said of a game at boules?

I. B.

A grant, though true, yet turning the Reader aside from seeing the whole truth. For the Text is, [The whole disposing of the Lot cast into the lap.]

T. G.

And doe not I speake of Lots in generall? Or do I exclude any such as be cast into the lap? Or is it materiall, whether they be cast into lap, or Into a bonnet, Litleton Tenures, l. 3. c. 1. hat, or In galeam. Homer. Iliad. n [...]. helmet, or [...]. de quo Aenigma apud Athē. dipnos. l. 10. Vide Casaub. ibid. c. 18. lot-box, or In bydriam, five si [...]ulā. Plant. Casin. water-pot, or into none of all these, as in crosse and pile, or not cast at all, as in best-betrust? That Mr. G. should so slily seeke to conceale that, and by leger-demaine seeke to turne his Readers eye aside from it. But, saith Mr. B.

I. B.

If then the Lot cast into the Lap, that is, of purpose disposed by man vnto a variable euent, be wholly disposed by God, so as the euent be that which pleaseth him, then God doth not mediately dispose the Lot to this or that euent: if not mediately, then immediately, because the whole disposition is of him.

T. G.

And what if the Lots then be not cast into the lap, or be not by man disposed at all? If that alter the case, as may seeme here implied, then that will not be true of euery Lot, nor of many a Lot, that Mr. B. here saith.

But if Mr. Bs. meaning be (for I would faine vnderstand him) that there is an opposition betweene mans Act and Gods Act in the Text. So is there in those words, Prov. 16. 1. The preparations of the heart are in [Page] man: but the answer of the tongue i [...] of the Lord. Which yet proue not an immediate worke of God therefore to be in euery answer that a man giueth, or in euery word that he vttereth.

But vnlesse Mr. B. can find some stranger matter in those words, cast into the lap, more than here he discouereth, or any man (I beleeue) seeth beside himselfe, he saith no more than he said that I granted before, to wit, that the whole disposing of the Lot is of God, so as the euent is what he pleaseth. Which doth not necessarily inferre an immediate act of God in it: No more than, if a man should say, as he truly may say, that Psal. 18. 29, 39. & 44. 3. 6, 7. & 60. 11, 12. [...]. In Dei arbitrio posita est victoria. Lactant. Contra quā Sen. Herc. fur. 1. Omnis in ferre est salus. the whole disposition of warre and battell (which Sicut urbium expugnati [...], ita sorti [...] temperatio à Domino est. Hebrae [...]rum nonnulli, teste Mercero in Prov. 16. 33. the Rabbines, some of them, compare here with a Lot, and so make this verse▪ cohere with the next before it) is of God the Lord of Hoasts, so that the issue and euent of it is such as he pleaseth; it would follow thereupon, that he denied Prov. 21. 30, 31. 2 Sam. 10. 12. armes to be of any vse in warre, or affirmed all victorie to come immediatly, and without meanes from God.

I. B.

Doth not this then make good mine Assumption?

T. G.

No indeed; not a whit: Vnlesse the asking of the Question doe ought in it.

I. B.

But for all this Mr. G. will not haue it so. For as he translateth this place, he saith▪ It importeth thus much, [That there i [...] a Prouidence in all things, euen the least, & most casual.] And this he would confirme by these my words, viz. [The disposing of the Chance i [...] secret, that [Page] it might be Chance indeed, and wholly of God, who disposeth all things.] Doe these words iustifie Mr. Gs. interpretation of this place? Yes: for they say plainely, God directeth all things; and they say withall, The [...] of the Chance (that is, of the things purposely [...]isposed by a man vnto a variable euent) vnto a certaine euent, is secret, that it may be Chance indeed, that [...], an euent not by the will of man, but wholly of God. [...]o that my words imply this Argument. God directeth [...]ll things: therefore much more, in our discerning a Lot, the whole disposing whereof is of him. This is far from saying that thi [...] place importeth only, That there is a prouidence in all things.

T. G.

Mr. B•. words I haue faithfully related; and they [...]ustifie as much as I alledge them for, to wit, a con [...]ession, that God directeth and disposeth as well all [...]ther things as Lots. What Mr. B. may please to fish further out of his owne words, I am well content he doe: what the words themselues of themselues import, any man may soone see.

I. B.

Neither doth Mr. Gs. translation inferre this imported interpretation.

T. G.

What it will necessarily inferre, is not materiall; what it will well beare, is for me enough. It is sufficient, that no more can be inferred out of it: and that is all that I auerre. But Mr. B. (you shall see) will shew that there may.

I. B.

For this discretion [But] doth so oppose euery [Page] iudgement, or disposing of it (as he expoundeth Iudgement) to a Lot cast into the lap, as that euery disposing, is all one with the whole disposing.

T. G.

The discretiue (for so I suppose his meaning is) but, doth no otherwise oppose here than in the place before cited; but Prov. 16. 1. the answer of the tongue is of the Lord: nor doth it any more proue, that euery disposing is all one with the whole disposing, (though I refuse not that also in such sense as I haue shewed) than that euery mans iudgement is all one with the whole iudgement of euery man; in that speech also of Salomon, Prov. 29. 16. Many seeke to the Rulers face, but euery mans iudgement is of God.

I. B.

This place so troubleth Mr. G. that from it he would haue no more gathered, than that the whole euent (as of all things, so) of a Lot, is of the Lord. Yet so, as working by meanes in the most of them, and not implying immediate prouidence vniuersally in them.

T. G.

Rather this place so troubleth Mr. B. being indeed the only maine bulwarke of his cause, that like a man in a maze he runneth backward and forward, from Mr. Gs. to the Geneua translation, and then backe to Mr. Gs. againe, as not enduring the triall of, or triall by either.

It is true, I auerre it, nor doth Mr. B. himselfe here denie, but that the whole euent of all things is of the Lord: nor haue the words of the Text in the ordinary Translations any one word more of a Lot, and no necessarie implication therefore of any immediate [Page] prouidence in them, which Mr. B. would pick out of them.

I. B.

I neede not examine the meanes or immediate prouidence of all the instances quoted in the margent. For here it is impliedly granted, (for he saith not, all, but, the most of them) that in some things God worketh not by meanes, and that there is an immediate prouidence particularly; for he denieth such a prouidence only, as being vniuersally.

T. G.

Mr. B. it seemeth, little passeth what hee say, though neuer so little to the purpose, so hee may seeme to say something. The instances some of them are by Mr. B. himselfe, though contrary to his owne purpose, alledged. Mine Argument standeth thus:

‘Nothing is said by Salomon in this place of Lots, but what may with good warrant from Gods word be truly said of all other humane actions, in the most whereof yet God worketh not immediatly, but by meanes. There is nothing therefore said of a Lot in this place, that may proue any immediate prouidence of God therein.’

Now what is it to the purpose whether there be an immediate prouidence of God in some of them or no. This phrase that may be truly vsed, where none such is, proueth it not. The impropriety of speech here vsed I passe by, because it is nothing to the purpose. But till either the Antecedent here be disproued, or the Consequence (which I suppose no [Page] man will once question) infringed, Mr. B. remaineth cleane put beside his maine bulwarke.

I. B.

Howsoeuer it be in other things, I thinke it is manifest to all, that will see, that God without meanes, and therefore immediatly, doth dispose the Lot cast into the lap vnto this, or that euent, what pleaseth him, whereas man disposeth the things onely vnto a variable euent. As at cards a man shufleth them of purpose to dispose them vnto a variable euent. But by the immediate prouidence of God, they are so shufled as that this or that euent followeth.

T. G.

Here Mr. B. letteth goe his hold of that Text, and without any direct Answer at all giuen to mine Argument against his deduction, now vpon his bare word onely telleth vs, that it is so here, howsoeuer it be else-where, and we are all wilfully blinde if we see it not to be so as he saith. Let him pardon me; [...]. Theocr. idyll. 7. Sed non ego credulus illi. Virgil. [...]clog. 9. I beleeue him not. He must first shew better Cards for it than he hath done yet, or else few wise men and well aduised, I suppose, will beleeue that either all Lots in generall, or the shufling of the Cards so and so, are effected without meanes. Any man, I thinke that hath his eies in his head, may soone see it to be otherwise.

I. B.

Therefore (with Mr. Gs. fauour) any reasonable man may iudge it not senslesse to say (which he doubteth of. p. 147.) that in Childrens plaies at euen and odde, or at Heads & Points, there is an immediate prouidence, in inclining the will of the Child, & guiding his coniecture.

T. G.

[Page]And with Mr. Bs. good fauour, I beleeue any iudicious Reader will smile to heare Mr. B. here affirme it. But I would gladly know of Mr. B. why he skippeth thus from place to place in his Answer, and doth not goe thorow with my discourse and Argument about this very particular, but balke or stride ouer all that lieth betweene that he last dealt with, and this that commeth in the very end of it. But especially I would haue him tell what hee can answer to that instance of a Lot propounded next immediatly before this, wherein two appeale to the Cards as they lie left by those that last vsed them without further shuffling, who (suppose it) left the Cards (though vnknowne to the appealants) in some certaine manner sorted as to themselues then best seemed; whether the euent fall out by an immediate prouidence therein or no. Or, which I now adde, when two shall determine to shape their course by the tracke of a beast gone before them, which being driuen to the market by its owner, taketh this rather than that way, because the market that way lieth, whether this be also by an immediate prouidence or no.

I. B.

Thus we see this place doth confirme mine Assumption, and the proofe annexed, Mr. Gs. interpretation notwithstanding.

T. G.

But no man, I am sure, vnlesse he borrow Mr. Bs. spectacles, will be able euer to see it.

I. B.

But he giueth two reasons against an immediate prouidence in ordinary Lots.

T. G.

[Page]Though I needed not to giue any: Affirmanti incumbit probatio. Negans probare nō tenetur. Reiswich. reg. Iur. he that saith it, should proue it: yet I giue indeed not two onely; but more than two, if Mr. B. had pleased to take notice of them in the very same place where I giue these.

I. B.

The former is this. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such. Therefore if there be an immediate prouidence in a Lot, as it is casuall, then there is an immediate prouidence in all things that are casuall. But the latter is not true: ergò not the former, p. 143. Why not the latter, if these Positions be true? That which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God (saith Bernard,Sermo quidam. but Mr. G. translateth it, is as a word of God) acquainting vs with his will, p. 17. and, In casuall euents there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence, p. 22.

T. G.

But for ouer-burdening this Booke, I would insert here mine owne Argument at large: but so much as Mr. B. relateth shall suffice. Hee denieth (it seemes) here the Assumption; and so auerreth that which all euidence of daily experience doth abundantly confute; and which some of those therefore that haue heretofore made this the maine ground of their opinion in this point now doe relinquish; that there is a speciall and immediate prouidence of God in euery thing that falleth out casually, as in euery meeting of any by the way vnsought for (though his businesse lying this way and mine that way at that time are the meanes of our meeting) the stumbling at a stone, or stepping in some vncleane thing, [Page] while a man looketh vp or aside at some sight in a shop-window, and the like infinite accidents that daily occurre. For mine owne part the Assertion to me seemeth so senslesse, that I will no more spend time to dispute it with him that shall offer to defend it, than with one that shall affirme all the Riuers in the world to run with salt water.

Yea but there be some sayings in mine owne Booke that auerre it. Let vs heare them.

Why first Bernard saith, Bern. de divers. serm. 26. That which seemeth Chance to vs, is a certaine word of God acquainting vs with his will.

First for the Translation, then for the Exposition, and the end for which it is alledged. The words of Bernard are Sermo quidam, that is, word for word, some kinde of word, or to auoid ambiguitie, a word in some sort. For I hope Mr. B. when he translateth it, a certaine word, doth not take certaine in that sense that he did, who expounding the words of the Gospell, Luk. 16. 19. There was a certaine rich man, obserueth thence, that though the Rich man there mentioned, were otherwise an euill man, yet he was sure and certaine of his word. But Mr. G. translateth it, as a word. And who knoweth not that quidam and quoddam are vsually notes of diminution and qualification? I wish Mr. B. had committed no greater fault in relating my words both here and elsewhere, than I haue committed in translating Bernard in that manner.

For the exposition of it how it is to be vnderstood, because I shew Of Lots, Chap. 2. Sect. 3. there at large whence by Mr. B. it is cited, I doe thither refer my Reader. Only I adde [Page] thereunto, vpon further view of the place, that it is euidently apparent by the whole sequell of the Sermon, (the maine scope whereof is to perswade men to rest satisfied with Gods will and pleasure in all accidents and occurrents, as losse of friends by decease, and the like) that Bernards Dictorum siquidem intelligentia ex dicendi causis sumenda est Hilar. de trinit. Et Ioan. Savisber. ep. 254. Dictum determinatur secundùm suam causam. Reg. Iur. meaning is, that when ought falleth out, whether by casualtie (which hee mentioneth, because that might most be stuck at) or otherwise, Gods will was thereby manifested that so it should be, and therefore that we were to submit to Gods will in it. But no more will it hence follow, that there is an immediate prouidence of God in all casuall things, more than in any other sort of euents. Gods decreeing will in euery euent is reuealed by his worke. And euery euent, be it casuall, or not casuall, is a word of God reuealing his pleasure vnto vs, and acquainting vs with his will.

For the latter allegation Mr. B. most shamefully abuseth me, or himselfe, and his Reader rather, clipping off iust so much of the sentence spoken by me; as to make it speake directly contrary to that that it doth. He bringeth me in affirming, that In casuall euents there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence. Whereas my words are these, Of Lots, chap. 2. sect. 4. If in casuall euents we consider ought beside the creature and the vncertaine motion thereof, (vncertaine, I say, to vs, because not determinable by vs, though determined ordinarily by some naturall cause or other) there is nothing guiding them but Gods prouidence. I remember one that in the Schooles gaue this Position to be disputed of, Virtus est vitium; and being required to shew some Author for it, produced Horace, where he saith, [Page] Horat. epist. 1. Virtus est vitium fugere. And I could relate the like trick that a Popish Priest sometime shewed me in some things that passed in writing betweene him and me. And such shifting may well be seeme such as they are. But I would wish Mr. B. to be better aduised than to deale thus, if he regard his owne credit. Which I wonder he would thus hazard the calling in question, vnlesse he thought that no body would take the paines to search the places quoted by him: where how that that I say, fitteth his turne, may soone be seene, or rather how directly it contradicteth it.

I. B.

But suppose there is not an immediate prouidence in all things that be casuall, what is that to the purpose? For all things casuall are not such with a Lot, wherein things are of purpose disposed by man vnto an vncertaine euent: which things so disposed by man, are wholly disposed by God vnto a certaine euent, this or that; so it is not in all other things that be casuall. Therefore all other casuall things and Lots are not such.

T. G.

Mr. B. before denied mine Assumption. Now he denieth either the Conclusion, or nothing. Though it be so, saith he, in other casuall things, yet in a Lot it is not so; for they are wholly disposed by God, that is, in Mr. Bs. vnderstanding, there is an immediate prouidence of God in them, which is the contradictorie of my Conclusion.

What he talketh to no purpose in the world, of Lots not being such, is very friuolous. For either he vnderstandeth not what I say, or what himselfe [Page] would. I ground my Proposition, vpon a generally receiued Axiome thus;

‘Quod convenit tali quatenus tale, convenit omni tali. That which agreeth to a thing as it is such or such, agreeth necessarily to all things that are such; Therefore whatsoeuer agreeth to a Lot as it is a Casualty, must necessarily agree to euery Casualtie.’

Mr. B. denieth neither Antecedent nor Consequence: but telleth vs, that all casuall things are not such with a Lot. To what, thinke we, doth this Answer? Euery Casualty as it is a Casualty is such with each Casualty. For the same reason and common nature of Casualtie is in each; though each of them haue something ouer and beside distinct either from other. And what agreeth therefore to any Casualty as it is a Casualty, must needs agree vnto all.

I. B.

Neither is it said, an immediate prouidence is in a Lot, as it is casuall, but as the Lot being made casuall is wholly disposed by God to this or that euent.

T. G.

Mr. B. hath here giuen so sore a cut to his owne cause, as Afferat ipse licet sacras Epidamius berbas, Nulla sanabit hoc tibi vulnus ope. uti Ovid. ferè Pontil. 1. he will neuer be able to cure againe with all the skill that he hath. For what hath beene the maine ground, yea the onely ground in effect whereupon these Games haue beene by his Master herein, himselfe, and those that concurre with them condemned, but this, because they depend vpon Casualty either in whole or in part? Aske Mr. B. himselfe why these Games are vnlawfull; the very The vnlawfulnesse of games consisting in Chance. Title of his Booke telleth you, because they consist in Chance. In his Epistle dedicatory hee repeateth the [Page] same againe. In the entrance into his Dialogue, Dice are therefore vnlawfull, because they depend vpon Chance. And after, Dice wholly euill, because they depend wholly vpon Chance; Cards and Tables somewhat euill because they depend somewhat vpon Chance: And are therefore Lots, for from thence they haue the denomination of a Lot, which in Latine is called Sors, that is, Chance or hazard; and therefore vnlawfull. And againe, Whether you call Cards and Tables Lots or no, you play with chance or vse Lottery, and by so doing make God an vmpire in play, which must needs be a sin: because you take the name of God in vaine and tempt the Almighty by a game some putting of things to hazard, and making play of Lotterie. Againe what doe those words imply, the disposing of chance is secret that it may be chance indeed, and wholly of God: but that therefore it is wholly (that is in Mr. Bs. meaning immediatly) of God, because it is Chance, which else it were not. Go [...] we a little higher from Mr. B. to his Teacher (as himselfe termeth him) herein Mr. F. Fennor of Recreat. rule spec. 4. The Nature of a Lot, saith he, lieth wholly in this, that although the thing be of vs, yet the disposition is wholly of God, that is, he vseth not our meanes of cunning, practise, strength, &c. but taketh it wholly to himselfe. And therefore Dice, dealing of Cards, &c. where the matter is laid on hazard (as they call it) or rather Gods prouidence, without vsing any cunning of ours to dispose, is vpon the same reason of a Lot vnlawfull. Yea hence he inferreth that to say, Idem ibid. what lucke is this! how crooked! is in plaine termes (so he speaketh) as much as to say, what a God, or a crooked prouidence of God is this! as presuming that lucke, chance, or hazard, [Page] (for all is one in effect) is nothing else but Gods prouidence. Now what doth all this tend vnto but this: That therefore these games are vnlawfull because they depend vpon Casualty, which maketh them to bee Lots: and that therefore it is vnlawfull to vse any game depending vpon Casualty; because in that regard there is an immediate prouidence of God in it? Whereas Mr. B. therein crossing all this, and ouerturning his owne grounds, here telleth vs, that It is not said an immediate prouidence is in a Lot, as it is casuall. But how then? forsooth as being casuall it is wholly disposed by God to this or that euent. That is as much as to say, An immediate prouidence of God is not in a Lot, as it is casual, (though that be the ground whereupon we haue formerly affirmed it to be) but as there is an immediate prouidence of God in it; (idem per idem) for that is, to be wholly disposed by God; as Mr. B. still meaneth. Thus you see how Mr. B. hath now mended the matter, and made good his owne grounds. But he will haue somewhat out of my words yet, before he haue done with them.

I. B.

So that from Mr. Gs. axiome this Argument may be framed. An immediate prouidence in an extraordinary Lot is acknowledged by Mr. G. as it is a Lot (say I) wholly disposed by God: Therefore an immediate prouidence is in an ordinary Lot, (as it is a Lot) wholly disposed by God. For there is no difference betweene these sorts of Lots (as they be Lots) and so disposed. For Mr. G. hath shewed that Prou. 16. 33. speaketh as well of one sort of Lots, as of another.

T. G.

How this that followeth commeth in with a, [Page] So that, I know not. Yet let vs see what it is. Mr. G. he saith, hath shewed, (I grant it indeed, but I shew it not; it is he that should shew it, or hee will neuer be able to conuince those that say otherwise) that Prou. 16. 33 speaketh of Lots in generall as well ordinary as extraordinarie. Be it so, what of that? But I acknowledge also an immediate prouidence in an extraordinary Lot; and that is therein as it is a Lot; saith Mr. B. and therefore by Mr. Gs. Axiome, it must bee so in an ordinary one also. For this I suppose it is that he would say. But he must first shew where I acknowledge an immediate prouidence to be in euery extraordinary Lot, which I deny to be in many thousands of them: and then proue it to be in such a Lot as it is a Lot; which to affirme and not proue, is to require that in effect without proofe to be granted, which all the controuersie is about, and which he must not thinke will be yeelded vpon his bare, I say.

I. B.

The other Argument is this, which is the Kil kow. If in euery Lot there be necessarilie an immediate worke and prouidence of God, then it is in the naturall power of man to make God worke immediatly at his pleasure.

But to say that it is in mans power naturally to set God on working immediately at his pleasure, is absurd. There is not therefore an immediate worke and prouidence of God necessarily in euery Lot. Mr. G. like an Orator seemeth desirous to draw his Aduersary into hatred by these words, [Necessarily, Naturall power, Set God on working, At pleasure, To say, and Absurd] [Page] Verba dum sint, surdo canit. But hoping better, I answering his Logicke deny the Assumption. For it is as much in mans naturall power to set God on working immediatly in an ordinarie, as in an extraordinary Lot. For both God and man doe respectiuely as much in the one Lot as in the other.

T. G.

It is Mr. Bs. guise not mine to seeke to draw his Aduersaries into hatred, by traducing them as Pleaders for Dice play and such abuses as attend thereon, where it is vsed otherwise than it ought, because they deny euery lusorious Lot to be vnlawfull, or diceplay simply euill in regard of the Lot vsed in it. I reason but here from what Mr. B. himselfe granteth, as shall hereafter appeare.

But Mr. B. denieth the Assumption, which is this, To say that it is in mans power naturally to set God on working immediatly at his pleasure, is absurd. And dare Mr. B. then deny this Assumption? He might as well say, It is in mans power naturally to set God on working of miracles at his pleasure; as say, It is in his power naturally to set God on working immediately at his pleasure. For is not euery immediate worke of God, or euery worke wrought without means, miraculous? Some miracles haue beene wrought by meanes: but nothing is wrought wholly without meanes, that is not miraculous. Well, I will not say, that it is blasphemous to [...]erre this: but yet I beleeue it commeth neerer blasphemy than any thing in my Booke doth.

Yea but Mr. B. hath some good reason for the deniall of mine Assumption. For, It is as much in [Page] mans power naturally to set God on working immediatly in an ordinary as in an extraordinary Lot. Very true, Quod ille olim, tam doctrina quam moribus: cum neutra ex parte idoneum ad gradum offerret. as much in the one as in the other. That is in very truth in neither. If there be in an extraordinary Lot of Gods speciall appointment, (for in no other is there any certainty of it) an immediate prouidence, neither is that there by any power of man naturally procured, nor is God set a worke therein at mans pleasure, but he worketh therein vpon his owne pleasure, and man onely by his appointment. This Mr. B. himselfe saw well, and addeth therefore,

I. B.

But an extraordinary Lot is by the speciall direction of God. True; So is an ordinary Lot by Gods speciall aduice to end a controuersie.

T. G.

It followeth not from the one to the other. And the reason is apparent. Because in the extraordinary Lot the euent required, be it, to finde out a malefactor, as in Iosh. 7. 14, 15, 16, 17, 18. Achans case, or to discouer who the man is that God hath fore-appointed to such an office, as in 1 Sam. 10. 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22. Sauls case, cannot certainly bee effected without such an immediate prouidence; whereas in the ordinary Lot, nothing is to be determined, but may well and certainly be decided without it. But if it be so, as Mr. B. saith, that therefore in an ordinary Lot there is an immediate prouidence; and therefore a setting of God on working immediately so oft as such a Lot is vsed, because an ordinary Lot is by Gods speciall aduice to end a Controuersie: How is that true both in his Dialogue, and in the very next words implied [Page] by him, that in a lusorious Lot God is thus set on working? For if God haue giuen no allowance for lusorious Lots, how is he in them set so on working, who doth not so worke, but where Lots are vsed by his owne allowance? Or how sinne they in setting God on working there, where he doth not worke? Mr. B. therefore here hangeth fast in the briers.

I. B.

If then euery Lot be a setting of our glorious God on working, there ought to be praier, if not by words, yet in heart in the vse as well of ordinarie as extraordinarie Lots. If so, then Lots are not to be vsed in sports.

T. G.

If euery Lot be, saith Mr. B. contrary to what before he implied, that vnlesse it be done by Gods assignement, it is not. If it be so indeed, the rest will follow. But that is it that is to be proued. And for Conclusion of this Argument, let it be obserued, that Mr. B. cannot make this good, whereupon the whole strength of this his principall Argument dependeth, & for the proofe wherof he alledgeth, Pro. 16. 33. to wit, that there is an immediate prouidence of God in euery Lot whatsoeuer, vnlesse this absurd Position be also granted him, that

‘It is naturally in euery mans (nay in euery childs) power, to set God on working immediately at pleasure:’

And that little children as oft as they cast for crosse and pile, cause God therein to worke a miraculous worke. That which the rather I require to be obserued and remembred, because the whole pith of the [Page] next Argument, yea of all the rest in a manner, dependeth vpon this point.

The second Argument.

§

WE are not to tempt the Almighty by a vaine desireI. B. Dialog. Arg. 2. of manifestation of his power and speciall prouidence.

But by vsing Lots in sport we doe so: therefore we may not vse Lots in sport.

T. G.

The Assumption they seeme to proue on thisT. G. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 6. wise.

Dan. de lud. al. c. 9. rat. 1. To call God to sit in iudgement where there is no necessitie so to doe, or for the determining of trifles, is to tempt, nay to mocke God:

But by the vse of Lots in sport, God is called to sit Tanquam rei gerend [...] extraordinarius modeŕator & arbiter. Dan. ibid. in iudgement where there is no necessitie, for the determining of trifles.

By the vse of Lots in sport therefore we tempt and dishonour God.

The Proposition is confirmed à simili, Eastie historie of Gosp. Reas. 5. by the King and Councell, by whose gouernment though we all liue, yet were it a dishonour to them to be called vpon by children to determine their sports.

I. B.

The Assumption is proued à pari, by comparing I. B. Dialog. Ground 3. together a Lot and an Oath: A Lot in the nature thereof doth as necessarily suppose the prouidence and determining presence of God, as an Oath in the nature thereof doth suppose the testifying presence of God. Balmf. ibid. & Zanch [...]ia miscell. ar. de sort. E [...]iamsi actu non invoces, tamen re [...]psa Deum invocas so [...]titus. Yea so, that as in an Oath, so in a Lot, 1 Sam. 14. 41. Praier is expressed or to be vnderstood. In which regard also as [Page] an Oath, so a Perkins Cas. of Consc. lib. 3. cap. 4. §. 4. q. 2. Lot is an Res sacra. Dan. lud. al. c. 9. rat. 1. Religi [...]sa. Iun. in Ion. c. 1. act of religion, in which we refer vnto God the determining of such weighty things as can no other waies be determined: and therefore Perkins ibid. in the vse of it is euer infolded, and sometime also expressed, both a confession that God is a soueraigne Iudge to determine such things, and Act. 1. 24, 25, 26. a supplication to him that by the Lot, when it is cast, he will be pleased so to doe. A Lot, therefore, as an Oath, is not to be vsed but Vise sup. cap. 5. § 3. in case of necessitie and extremitie: and Perkins ibid.being a solemne act of religion may not be applied to sporting: Eastie hist. of Gosp. Reas. 6. We may as well iest with the Word, and Sacraments, and Oaths, as with Lots.

§

There might be diuers seuerall Arguments framedT. G. Answer. out of these allegations; but because they build all on one ground, and stand vpon one bottome, I haue thought best to put them in this manner together, that the same common answer might serue them all.

First therefore the vsing of Lots either in mattersibid. sect. 7. sage and serious, or of sport and delight is In Iudo taxillatorio iudicium divinum non requiritur, sed fortunae res cōmittitur. Thom. de sortib. c. 5. & Lyra in Prov. c. 16. not of it selfe any desire of the manifestation of Gods speciall power and prouidence by an immediate disposition, vnlesse men offend against the caution before giuen in doing it to this end, to try thereby whether God will vouchsafe to worke immediately and extraordinarily or no; which being not of the nature of the thing it selfe, is not necessarily implied in the ordinary vse of it. Neither is there any such calling in of God to decide doubts in game, but Iudice fortuna cadat alea. Petron. satyr. Fortuna sit optionis iudex, & sorte d [...]rimatur. Iustin. inst [...]t. l. 2. til. 20. the matter in question is put to the casuall disposition of the Creature; no more than there was any solemne calling of God in, or calling vpon him to [Page] determine the Tithe, in the example before alledged out of Levit. 27. 37. the Law. And therefore consequently Non est [...] ne Deum tentare vide [...] mur. Martyr in 1 Sam. c. 10. no such tempting of God, as is here charged, in the vse of a Lot, be it vsed either in case of necessitie or otherwise.

Yea rather if a Lot be such, as here they say, it is not to be vsed in my businesse at all vpon any occasion whatsoeuer. For, It is Deut. 6. 16. Matth 47. not lawfull to tempt God Praecepta negativa lig [...]nt semper & ad semper. Gerson. reg. mo [...]al. in any case whatsoeuer: But to vse Lots in any case whatsoeuer is to tempt God: It is not lawfull therefore to vse Lots in any case whatsoeuer.

The Assumption is thus proued euidently Ex con [...]essis. by the former grounds and grants: Exod. 17. 2. 7. Psal. 7 [...]. 18, 19, 20. To require a worke of Gods immediate power and prouidence in this or that kinde, is to stint, and so to tempt God: But to vse a Lot in any case, is to require a worke of Gods immediate power and prouidence: (for euery Lot, say they, is such:) Therefore to vse a Lot in any case whatsoeuer is vnlawfull.

But this Conclusion is vntrue: for Prov. 18. 18. a Lot in some cases may lawfully be vsed: the former ground therefore is false.

It is indeed Nō permittit nos Deus voluntate suam per media extraordinaria investigare. [...] disq. mag. tom. 2. l 4. c. 4. q. 5. §. 2. vnlawfull and a tempting of God to vse a Lot so as they would haue it vsed only, to wit, requiring and expecting an extraordinary worke of God in it, in any case or vpon any occasion whatsoeuer, without Gods expresse appointment of it, though all meanes should faile otherwise. For to haue recourse to extraordinary meanes when ordinary faile, is to tempt God by refusing to depend and wait vpon God, as our Sauiour implieth, when Math. 4. 3, 4, 2. at the Deuils motion he refused to [Page] [...], &c. sicut [...] 1 Reg. 2. 17. malè vulgò exponunt, Iube, impera, &c. speake to his Father to haue stones turned into bread, lest by so doing he should tempt God, though it were in case of extremitie: that which was Exod. 17. 2, 3. Psal. 78. 41. the sinne of the Israelites sometime in the Wildernesse. No such Lot therefore at all as they allow of is allowable. And to speake as the truth is, by the course and force of this their discourse, the only lawfull vse of a Lot is disallowed and condemned, and an vnlawfull and vnwarrantable vse of it is allowed in the roome of it.Ibid. sect. 8.

Secondly, an Oath and a Lot are not alike: the comparison therefore laid betweene them will not hold. For neither is the right of ought in an ordinary Lot put to the speciall prouidence or immediate and extraordinary worke of God; as 2 Cor. 11. 31. Galat. 1. 20. Phil. 1. 8. the truth of the thing testified is in an oath put to his testimonie: neither is there in euery Lot any such solemne inuocation of God, as there is in an Oath euer either 2 Cor. 1. 23. expressed or implied, by which God is called to witnesse with vs the truth of that we auow, or the truth of our purpose to performe what we promise: as may hereby appeare.

The definition of each thing containeth the whole nature of the thing defined. Now a Lot may be defined without this: but so cannot an Oath. Yea so Balm. Dialog. some of the aduerse party define Lottery out of Lyra in Pr. c. 16. Lyra, To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull or vncertaine matter. Which definition of Lottery containeth no such matter as is here supposed to be of the very nature and essence of a Lot, as it is of the essence of an Oath; which cannot be defined therefore without it.

[Page]Neither doe the 1 Sam. 14. 41. Act. 1. 24, 25, 26. places produced proue it. They proue only that Prayer was sometime vsed (but Precatur, sed prorsus absque omni fide. Martyr in Sam. c. 14. a faithlesse prayer 1 Sam. 14. 41. the one of them without word or warrant) before an extraordinary Lot for an extraordinary power and prouidence to direct the euent of it; Act. 1. 24. the thing intended being such as the Lot by no naturall power, either of the Creature vsing it, or vsed in it, was able to effect: which kinde of prayer hath no place, nor is lawfull in ordinarie or meere diuisory Lots. For example: Levit. 27. 32. In assigning and setting out Tithe, it was not lawfull, much lesse necessarie, to pray God so to giue a right Lot, that euery Lambe or Kid that were indeed in course of time the tenth, might certainely or constantly so come to hand. But they proue not that prayer is part of a Lot, or is in the Lot, as it is part of an Oath, and is included in the Oath, as by the vsuall Hoc est iurare, Deum testari. Aug. in Psal. 109 Deum testem adhibere Cic. Offic. l. 3. Quid est iurare, nisi nes veritatis Deo reddere. Aug. de verb. Ap. serm. 28. Iurare est testem adhibere Deum. Lomb sent. l. 3. d. 29. F. Deum in testem vocare. Thom. sum. par. 2 [...]. 2ae. q. 89. a. 1. 4. & q. 98. a. 2. implorare testimonium Dei exhibendum. Ibid. q. 89 a. 1. Iuramentum est Dei attestatio ad veritatem sermonis nostri consirmandam. Calv. instit. l. 2. c. 8. §. 23. Invocatio Dei qua petimꝰ ut Deus sit testis de animo nostro quod fallere nolimus, & vt vindex fit si sefellerimus. Melan [...]h. loc. com. in definit. Iuratio itaque ad invocatione pertinet. Ibid. de 20 praecept. definitions of an Oath may appeare. In election of offices sacred or ciuill, prayer is vsed or at least ought to be vsed: yet it followeth not therefore that praier is a part of the choise, or that therefore the election in the nature of it doth necessarily suppose a speciall prouidence and determining presence of God. Yea prayer may be vsed both before game and in game, as both before and at meat, and yet is not therefore of the nature of game, nor supposeth therefore a speciall prouidence of God and a determining presence in it.

Lastly, a Lot is no religious act, nor holy thing of it selfe, as Chap. 6. §. 6. before hath beene shewen: there is much difference therefore betweene Lots, and the word of God, Sacraments, and Oaths. For these things [Page] are holy of themselues and in their owne nature, as the very definitions of them will soone shew: and therefore cannot but be holy. Whereas a Lot is not in the nature and the definition of it holy, and therefore is not alwaies and necessarily sacred. Yea those things are now holy, as euer, in our ordinary vse; whereas no Lot is holy that we can vse now adaies; nor indeed was euer any so, saue extraordinarily. But Gods taking of any thing sometime extraordinarily, or from ordinarie vse, to apply it to some holy and extraordinarie vse, doth not exempt the kinde in generall, but the thing only it selfe so vsed in speciall from ciuill or light and ordinarie vsage; and that also so long only as it is so set apart: As the vse of water in Baptisme hindreth not but that a man may play with water, yea and with that very water that may afterward be a Sacrament in Baptisme, or that hath so beene, but is not now. In like manner, when a Lot shall be extraordinarily vsed for a speciall signe of Gods immediate election and choise, whosoeuer shall then contemne or set light by that Lot, he shall abuse an holy thing and Gods name in so doing; but not whosoeuer shall vse otherwise any Lot to disport, yea though it were that Lot that had beene vsed in such a businesse before; there remaining no more holinesse in it after that vse is ouer, than in Exod. 3. 2, 5. the bush that burnt but wasted not, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, after that manifestation was once ended.

§

To this long Answer I might make a short Reply.I. B. Reply. For whereas Mr. Gs. maine ground i [...] this: There is [Page] no immediate prouidence of God in an ordinary, as is in an extraordinary Lot, and thereupon he buildeth these Answers. Therefore there is no tempting of God by vsing Lots in sport. Therefore Praier expressed, or to be vnderstood, is (not) required in ordinary Lots: and Therefore an ordinarie Lot is not an holy thing in it selfe. I might (referring my selfe to the defence of my former Argument) briefly reply and say: There is an immediate prouidence of God in an ordinarie Lot: Therefore God is tempted by vsing Lots in sport: Therefore Praier expressed, or to be vnderstood, is required of them who vse an ordinary Lot: and Therefore an ordinarie Lot is an holy thing.

§

Here that appeareth that I told you before, thatT. G. Reioinder. vnlesse you grant Mr. B. what he could not in the former Argument make good, all is gone. For here is nothing that will stand, vnlesse that be made good. So that by his owne acknowledgment nothing needed to be anew answered to this Argument, if sufficient Answer haue beene giuen to the former.

But Mr. G. hee saith vpon such ground denieth all this.

1. Mr. G. need lay no ground at all for his deniall: It is enough for him barely to denie some Proposition, which vpon his deniall Mr. B. is to proue.

2. Mr. G. doth not denie all this vpon such ground as Mr. B. here pretendeth, because there is no immediat prouidence in any ordinary Lot; which he saith not; no more than that it is in euery extraordinary one: [Page] for who can hinder God from working immediately when he will, either in that or in ought else? or who can enforce him to worke in such manner saue when he himselfe will? But because it cannot be proued that there is so ordinarily in ordinarie Lots, nor doth the nature of a Lot require that it should be. Yea because that ordinarily it is not, as hath already beene shewed.

3. I might demand of Mr. B. how the vse of a lusorious Lot can be a tempting of God, by desiring the manifestation of his speciall prouidence in his immediate disposing, if such an immediate prouidence of God be generally in all Lots. For what is it to tempt God, but to stint him to that, or to try him whether he will doe that, or no, which it is vncertaine whether he be willing vnto or no? But if in all Lots such an immediate prouidence of God be, then it is certaine before hand that God will so worke in it. And if it be said, that God is not willing to haue lusorious Lots [...]ast; yet he is not vnwilling, if this ground be good, when they are cast so to worke in them: for who can enforce him to it, vnlesse he will? A man might reason therefore rather backward from Mr. Bs. grounds, and say, An immediate prouidence of God is in euery Lot necessarily: And, Therefore it is no tempting of God to expect that of it, that cannot but be in it, to wit, a speciall prouidence in disposing the Lot without meanes.

I. B.

But something more in replying, will haue more sauour in reading.

T. G.

[Page] Vt enim aliae benae res, ita bonus liber melior est quisque, quo major. Et M. Tull [...]j oratio optima fertur esse quae maxima. Plin. epist. [...]0. True: if it be not so vnsauourie as some things before haue beene. [...]. Callama. h. apud Ath [...]n. [...] s. l. 3. E [...], [...]. Diogenian. in Pa [...]m. Otherwise the more and the longer, I suppose, the lesse sauour.

I. B.

Therefore I first maruell that Mr. G. forgetteth himselfe in concluding: That all Lots be vnlawfull, if there be an immediate prouidence in all Lots. What? Were extraordinary Lots vnlawfull too? Nay; he vnderstandeth an exception of them, because they were commanded by God. So I say, ordinary Lots were aduised by God to end controuersies. Therefore vsing them in that case is no tempting of God.

I. B.

Mr. B. might, if he pleased, easily haue seene what my Conclusion intendeth, not to determine ought concerning any such Lots as by Gods speciall appointment were sometime vsed with expectation of such a speciall and extraordinary prouidence in them, but of such only as may in these daies be lawfully vsed, which alone we now deale with. Betweene which two sorts there is much difference in the case now questioned. It being no tempting of God to expect such an extraordinary worke of his in the one, because without it that could not be certainly effected, for which he had inioyned them to be vsed. Whereas in the other it is; because neither the businesse whereunto they are vsed, requireth it, nor hath God himselfe any where promised it. So that [Page] it is not the want of either command or warrant for the vse of them, but the expecting or requiring that which there is no ground or promise of God for in the vse of them, that maketh them guilty in that kinde.

That which followeth therefore I auow still, and can easily make good; both that all extraordinarie Lots now vsed are vnlawfull, and no better than meere Soreeries; as the attempting by Lot to discouer a malefactor would be, which yet was lawfull when Iosh. 7. 14, 15. God enioyned it.

And againe that to vse any Lots in that manner as Mr. B. prescribeth, to wit, with inuocation for and expectation of a speciall and immediate worke of Gods prouidence therein, or to put things to Lot vpon presumption of such prouidence, is to tempt God, he hauing no where promised any such thing.

I. B.

I maruell also, why Mr. G. should so confidently affirme, that by this course, that is, by maintaining an immediate prouidence in all Lots, an vnlawfull vse of a Lot is allowed in the roome of the onely lawfull vse.

T. G.

The reason is apparent, because such an vse is allowed, as is superstitious, and without warrant. Yea such as Mr. B. himselfe, I doubt not, but will condemne, if that position be vnsound, to wit, that such an immediate prouidence, as Mr. B. pretendeth, is ordinarily in Lots; which Mr. B. knowing that Mr. G. denieth: why should hee maruell that hee holdeth that, that doth necessarily follow vpon the deniall of it?

I. B.

[Page] But I referre the discussing hereof to the defence of my third Argument.

T. G.

There then we shall deale further with it.

I. B.

Againe it is to be obserued, that he sets downe a Comparison betweene an Oath and a Lot, which I set not downe, whereby the minde of the Reader may be troubled. For I say not: As the truth of a thing is by an Oath put to Gods Testimony; so in an Ordinary Lot the right of a thing is put to Gods immediate prouidence. This is it that I say: As an Oath in the Nature thereof supposeth the testifying presence of God: so a Lot, in the Nature thereof, supposeth the determining presence of God. My reason is, Ending a Controuersie; I say not, Deciding a right: For before diuiding the land of promise by Lot, no Tribe, or family could challenge more right to one portion than to another. Ending (I say) a controuersie is by a Lot referred to Gods determining, the same by his whole or immediate disposing the vncertaine Lot to a certaine euent.

T. G.

I set downe no more as Mr. Bs. but what is his, and he himselfe in precise termes hath set downe before me. Onely I shew diuers differences, and those materiall betweene an Oath and a Lot, in regard whereof there is no sound reasoning from the one to the other. And among other things withall shew, that there is no necessitie of Gods determining presence in such manner as is here presumed in a Lot, because there is nothing in an ordinary Lot put vpon Lottery, that requireth any such diuine determining presence.

[Page]But whereas Mr. B. here auerreth that no right of ought is in an ordinary Lot put to Question, because the vse of it is onely to end Controuersie; the reason is most friuolous: For are not Controuersies most frequent about matter of Right? and many of them more impossible to be ended by any other course, than other Controuersies ordinarily are? And sure if there be such an immediate prouidence and a determining presence of God in them, as by Mr. B. is presumed, why should not questions of right, where they cannot well be determined otherwise, be referred to a Lot, as well, if not rather, than any other? Since also that that place in the Prouerbs speaketh of Controuersies in generall, without distinction or exclusion of any. For to reason, as Mr. B. heere from a particular to a generall, There was no question of right (though that also may be questioned by those that ranke that among extraordinary Lots) in the diuision of the land of Canaan; Therefore there is none in any: I say no more but that it is like Mr. Bs. reasoning oft else-where.

I. B.

It is also to be obserued that in the 2. Comparison betweene an Oath and a Lot, touching Praier, he saith, Neither is there in euery Lot any such solemne inuocation. Therefore in some Lot, there is, that is, in an extraordinary Lot, because of an immediate prouidence to direct the euent of it. For the same cause (say I) praier to be expressed, or vnderstood in the vse of an ordinary Lot to.

T. G.

You see, if a man grant Mr. B. what he will, hee [Page] can proue what he list. Wee had this before in the briefe Answer at first: Why doth hee trouble his Reader now with it againe? But you see, he cannot goe on an inch vnlesse that be still granted; which will neuer be made good.

I. B.

But, saith Mr. G. Praier is of the essence of an Oath, and not of a Lot. I haue said nothing to the contrary. So that he might haue spared his definition of a Lot.

T. G.

But if he say nothing now to it, hee answereth not mine Argument; that therefore prayer is not necessarily in euery Lot either expressed or implied. Wherein also because I spake somewhat short then, it being sufficient to giue the contradictory to Mr. Bs. assertion, I speake further home now and say, that it is not in any Lot at all; for it is one thing to be vsed about it, another thing to be in it. Prayer, and other discourse is vsed oft about or at our meales, but is not therefore in them.

I. B.

But because he taketh a Definition, (such as it is) out of my Dialogue, I will say somewhat thereto. The definition (so called) is from Lyra, viz. To vse Lots is by a variable euent of some sensible thing to determine some doubtfull, or vncertaine matter. How is this matter to be determined indeed? Euen by Gods whole or immediate disposing the Lot. Hath God the principall hand in the determination? And is not then Prayer to be expressed, or vnderstood in a Lot, that is, in the managing by the vsers thereof.

[Page]

1. If that definition be but a sory one, why did

T. G.

Mr. B. giue no better? Or why doth he not shew wherein it is defectiue?

2. You see still, he must haue that granted him, which so oft hee inculcateth, or else nothing will fadge with him.

3. Hath not God an hand, and if an hand, I hope, a principall, because a ruling and ouer-ruling hand in all things. Must solemne prayer therefore be necessarily vsed before euery thing, euery step that a man strideth, or euery chery that he eateth?

4. It is one thing to haue prayer vsed about a thing; an other thing to haue prayer necessarily vnderstood or implied in it.

5. By this silly reason it may be proued that any serious affaire about which solemne praier is to bee vsed, is of the same nature with an Oath.

I. B.

Now then let vs consider the places produced to proue it. The former (saith Mr. G.) was faithlesse. I say so too. Because that Lot was without any warrant. This notwithstanding, praier in this and the other place, doth shew that Gods people beleeuing that God doth signifie his iudgement by the whole or immediate disposition of that Lot, did therefore thinke themselues bound to pray.

T. G.

What is all this to proue that in a Lot, as in an Oath, praier is euer vnderstood or implied. A man might as well reason thus; Our Sauiour Matth. 14. 14. Luke 24. 30. more than once praied, before he brake bread: Therefore in all breaking of Bread praier euer is implied.

I need not adde, that in those being extraordinary, [Page] there was necessary cause to craue by prayer some speciall presence and prouidence, because Mr. B. himselfe in his next words obserueth it.

I. B.

But both their Lots were extraordinary, wherein was an immediate prouidence of God. Therefore they might well beleeue that they should pray. True: so all Christians may, yea and must beleeue, they ought to pray in the vsing ordinary Lots, because of Gods immediate prouidence exercised therein.

T. G.

True, if they will beleeue Mr. B. on his word: but not else: for out of Gods word, I am sure, he cannot make this good, which yet so oft he repeateth, and buildeth all vpon.

I. B.

Nay; It was vnlawfull in setting out Tithe. If so; not because it was an ordinary Lot, (if a Lot) but because the Lord expresly saith, of all that goeth vnder the rod the tenth shall be holy.

T. G.

I no where deny that any Praier might haue beene vsed at that manner of assignement, but praier onely to such particular purpose. Which yet if it had beene vsed, did not require ought against the tenths being holy, but that each tenth might come forth according to the due order of being yeaned.

I. B.

The instance of election of Offices is besides the purpose. For it is not argued thus: Because Gods people praied when they vsed a Lot; therefore there is an immediate [Page] prouidence of God in a Lot. But thus: There is an immediate prouidence of God in a Lot: Therefore Gods people praied when they vsed a Lot.

T. G.

Then belike it was produced to proue nothing at all that was to be proued. For the point to bee proued was not that Gods people praied at the vse of a Lot, but that that a Lot doth suppose the determining presence, or immediate prouidence of God. Which hereby also Mr. B. endeuoured to proue. But now Mr. B. it seemeth, taketh that for a thing granted; which is the point that he is to proue.

The instance is to the purpose; for it doth shew that Praier is not therefore implied in a Lot, as in an Oath, though it be vsed thereabout.

I. B.

If then there be an immediate prouidence of God in a Lot, and in regard thereof praier is to be expressed or vnderstood in the lawfull vse of a Lot, then praying and playing (though they rime well together, yet) run not well together in the lawfull vse of a Lot. Nay rather it followeth from both, That a Lot is not to be vsed but in a case of necessitie more or lesse. And therefore strange (I will not say, absurd) is Mr. Gs. Position p. 111. to wit, The lesse weightie the matter is, wherein a Lot is vsed, the lawfuller the Lot is. Except it be proued, that the lesse weightie the matter is, the greater is the necessitie of ending the controuersie by a Lot. The said Position is more strange, because he granteth p. 95. That Prayer specially applied to the Lot may (in some case) be conceiued, where the matter is more weightie, as in the choise of a Magistrate. But concerning [Page] this also more shall bee said in my next Reply.

T. G.

If a man grant Mr. B. his Ifs still, hee can proue any thing: else nothing. He said but euen now that he doth not here proue it, and yet presently vpon it, he telleth vs, If then it be so &c. as if it were heere proued to hand. But vnlesse that bee proued, all that followeth is iust nought. For nought and nought and nought maketh nought; as in Ciphering they vse to say.

Yet that praying & playing doe not at all runne well, I hope Mr. B. will not affirme. For albeit a man may not play with praier, yet hee may pray, I hope, before he play; yea and vpon iust occasion too at his play.

That absurd Position, as Mr. B. here implieth it to be, hath beene sufficiently canuased already; and hath more truth in it, I beleeue, than Mr. B. is aware of. If ought further come against it, it shall in his due place be answered. That here alledged of Praier vsed with some Lot, no way crosseth it; nor doth Mr. B. shew wherein it any way doth.

I. B.

Lastly, It serueth my turne that Mr. G. acknowledgeth that Gods name, and an Holy thing is abused, whensoeuer an extraordinary Lot is contemned, because an immediate prouidence of God is therein. For the same cause an ordinarie Lot is the Name of God and an Holy thing, and therefore not to be abused in sport. But Mr. G. hath shewen before, that a Lot is not in it selfe an Holy thing. Indeed; he would haue shewen in his third [Page] Reason, inducing him to allow lusorious Lots, as not euill in themselues, that a Lot is not holy either in it selfe, or by diuine institution. Whereunto I haue already answered somewhat. But hauing learned more (occasionally) by his further dispute, I will now for some more satisfaction, answer somewhat more. A Lot (saith Mr. G. p. 132, & 133.) is not holy either in it selfe, because a Casualtie hath no holinesse in it selfe: For then all Casualties should be holy: or by diuine institution in the word sanctifying it to some holy Vse.

I answer briefly. Is an extraordinary Lot the Name of God, an holy thing in it selfe, because of Gods immediate prouidence therein, and not an ordinary Lot in respect of the same prouidence? If it be, Then though all casualties be not holy in themselues, yet all lawfull Lots be holy in themselues. So that as the Bush that burnt and wasted not, was holy, when God manifested himselfe to Moses in it, p. 156. So a Lot is holy, because of Gods speciall presence therein. Herein they differ. The Bush was holy but for a time, because God was present in it but for a time: Where as a Lot is holy from time to time, so oft as it is lawfully vsed, because of Gods speciall presence therein from time to time. Therefore howsoeuer sport might haue beene made with the Bush, the presence of God being remoued; yet ought sport neuer be made with a Lot, because Gods speciall presence is euer therein.

T. G.

This should haue come before. Yet better at last, we say, than neuer. But Mirabar, inquit ille, si quid afferres novi. Ter. Phorm. 3. 2. what new matter hath Mr. B. here brought? Doth hee any more than [Page] At enim taedet iam eadem audire millies: dum eandē semper cantilenam canis. Ibid. abuse his Reader by singing ouer and ouer his wonted song, that in euery lawfull Lot (it must be in euery one lawfull or vnlawfull, if it be of the nature and essence of a Lot) there is an immediate prouidence: and if so, then that such and such things follow; that which no man doubteth of or denieth. I passe by, that he saith, I grant that euery extraordinary Lot is Gods Name, and Gods Name abused in it, when it is contemned; whereas I hold many extraordinary Lots, as all Diuinatorie ones vsed now adaies, to be rather the Deuils Name; and Gods Name most honoured, when they are most, not contemned only, but detested too.

I. B.

Againe, I need not proue that an ordinary Lot to end controuersies is by diuine institution in the word, seeing Mr. G. granteth that God in Prou. 18. 18. aduiseth vs to vse it to that end.

T. G.

What I grant, is to be seene. But by this Argument a man may as well proue, euery peare-plum, or Lectise-leafe, to be holy, because Gen. 1. 29. by diuine institution in the word, all herbs and fruits are for mans vse. Mr. B. himselfe saw the slightnesse hereof: and addeth therefore to mend the matter:

I. B.

But it is not sanctified to an holy vse. I haue shewed otherwise.

T. G.

Where? Can you tell?

I. B.

But what then? Is not a Lot therefore alwaies holy in it selfe? as Mr. G. saith in this passage.

T. G.

[Page]I no where say, that a Lot is not alwaies holy in it selfe, (nor is any at all so) but onely, that Lots are not alwaies sacred.

I. B.

Were all extraordinary Lots sanctified to holy vses?

T. G.

Yea: all that were vsed by Gods speciall direction, if Mr. B. speake of such, were sanctified to an holy vse, to wit, to be diuine Oracles. And what then?

I. B.

Yet Mr. G. deemeth them all holy in themselues, because of immediate prouidence in them.

T. G.

Rather: therefore he deemeth them sacred, and in that regard holy, though not holy otherwise of themselues.

I. B.

Why may not I for the same cause, thinke the same of all ordinary Lots?

T. G.

Proue the same, and then thinke the same of them. But this is nothing but Versat Sisyphus ingens Saxum sudans nitendo; neque proficit hilum. Cic. Tuscul. l. 1. the rowling of Sisyphus his stone forward and backward: and taking still for granted [...]. the maine Question it selfe.

I. B.

And the rather because Mr. G. saith, p. 227. Mariage being Gods ordinance is holy in it selfe. But (as he acknowledgeth, p. 1.) a Lot is Gods ordinance. Therefore from his grant a Lot is holy in it selfe. If then a Lot is holy in it selfe, I conclude with Mr. G. p. 133. It may in no case be made matter of sport.

T. G.

This belike is the new matter that M. B. had of late better learned, and which hee thought good [Page] therefore to close vp this his wilde and diffused discourse with; [...]. Liban in Demosth. Quae excellunt ad perorandum serventur. Cic. de [...]rat. l. [...]. reseruing that that he thought would strike all dead to the last. But so sory and silly a thing it is, that I wonder a man of his grauitie, vnlesse he did it a little to recreate himselfe, would produce it. For what man of the meanest vnderstanding seeth not▪ that there is a meere equiuocation in the word holy: taken in the Proposition in a generall sense, as all Gods ordinances, recreation and meat (which in 1 Tim. 4. 4. Si [...] Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Coitus viri & mulieris res pura est, honesta, & sancta; quia Dei institutie. one of the places of Scripture there by me cited, is conioyned with it) as well as mariage, are said to be holy: but concluded in the strict sense here disputed of, as those things only are termed holy, that haue speciall relation vnto God: which of Mariage, I suppose, vnlesse it be, as the Popish sort say, a Sacrament, Mr. B. will not auouch. What such poore shifts as these are argue, I had rather others should say than my selfe.

Let me adde but a word, to solue a seeming contradiction; (howsoeuer I say not in that place, that Mariage is holy in it selfe, which yet I well might;) that it is one thing to say, a thing is holy of it selfe, not requiring therefore any further speciall institution to make it such; and another thing to say, that it is holy in it selfe, in way of opposition to mans corrupt and euill vsage of it, that Tit. 1. 15. Hegg. 2. 13. may pollute and vnhallow that that is holy in it selfe.

[Page]

The third Argument.

§

WHatsoeuer God hath sanctified to a proper end, isI. B. Dialog. Arg. 3. not to be peruerted to a worse endMath. 21. 12, 13..

But God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end; viz. to end controuersiesNum. 26. 55. Prov. 18. 18..

Therefore man is not to peruert them to a worse; viz. to play, and by playing to get away another mans money, which without controuersie is his owne.

§

This Argument thus conceiued is faulty twoT. G. Answer. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 13. waies. For first it goeth from the question, which is not whether any Creature or ordinance of God may be peruerted, or peruersly vsed; but whether the vse of Lots questioned; be a peruerting of them or no; whereas in the conclusion it is taken for granted that it is. Neither againe is the question whether men may vse Lots playing for money; (a thing incident to other games as well as these; which whether it belawfull or no, I shall not need now to diseusse) much lesse, whether they may be vsed in game to that end, to get another mans money from him, or no; (which is no generall vse of them, nor hath any place at all there, where either there is no wagering at all, or where the Lot is vsed onely at the beginning of the game, to decide who shall ioyne, who lead, or the like:) but whether Lots may in any wise be vsed in sport.

Secondly, there is more inferred in the conclusion than was in the premisses, and that which followeth [Page] not from ought in them. For the vse of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie, though a light one it is like, yet a question or controuersie truly so termed; otherwise it were no Lot.

For the mending of these faults, the Argument may better be conceiued on this manner:

That which God hath sanctified to some proper vse, is not to be applied to any other, especially a worse vse. But

Their proper vse is to decide great controuersies. Perkins gold. chaine, chap. 20. on precep. 3.

God hath sanctified Lots to this proper vse, to wit, the deciding of controuersies in matters of weight. A Lot therefore may not be applied to any other vse, much lesse to a worse.

The Proposition is proued by Matth. 21. 12, 13. ex Esai. 56. 7. & Ier. 7. 11. an instance of the Temple, set apart for praier, which the Iewes therefore are reproued for applying to market and merchandise.

The Assumption is confirmed principally by that saying of Salomon, Prov. 18. 18. The Lot stinteth strife, and maketh partition among the mighty. For Num. 26. 55. the other place is but an instance that a Lot once was by Gods owne appointment so vsed. It is amplified à simili, The proper end of a Lot, as of an Oath, is to end a controuersie. Balmford dial. ground 2. by the like vse of an Oath: concerning which there is a further speech of the Apostle brought Fennor of recreat. spec. rule 4. reas. 1. to proue that Salomons purpose in those words before alledged, is to shew the only lawfull vse of a Lot, (viz▪ to end controuersies, which otherwise conueniently cannot, when each Contender without the Lot is too mighty to yeeld) thus: Fennor ibid. As when the Apostle saith, Hebr. 6. 16. An Oath for confirmation among men is an end of all strife, his purpose is not so much to teach [Page] vs, that men vse an Oath to end controuersies; (which euery man knoweth) but that God hath dedicated and made an Oath holy and sure onely for that vse of necessarie deciding of doubts-of importance among men: so the like words vsed of a Lot must be vnderstood in the same sense▪ not so much to teach vs that a Lot ended such controuersies among men, which all know, but that God hath ordained it onely for that vse.

For the fuller answer to this Argument and theibid. sect. 14. proofes of it, diuers distinctions, of some good vse, would be obserued.

First therefore the word, sanctifie, is diuersly taken. For to omit all other acceptions; it is taken sometime in a larger sense; and so to sanctifie signifieth to assigne a creature to any speciall or singular vse whatsoeuer, either sacred or ciuill: thus are Esai. 13. 3. the Medians said by God to be sanctified for the subduing and sacking of Babel: and so are 1 Tim. 4. 4. meats said to be sanctified by Gods word for mans food; and 1 Cor. 7. 14. the vnbeleeuing Mate sanctified to the maried beleeuer▪

Sometime againe it is taken in a stricter sense; and so to sanctifie signifieth to set apart a Creature beside his ordinary vse to some sacred and spirituall imployment: as where it is said▪ that Gen. 2. 3. God sanctified the seuenth day of the world; and where Exod. 20. [...]. men are commanded to sanctifie the same: he by precept inioyning that imployment of it; they by practise imploying it according to his precept.

Now in both these kindes may the Lord well be said sometime to sanctifie, but not to appropriate; when by his ordinance he either inioyneth or granteth the vse of a Creature so in some kinde, as yet [Page] he restraineth not, nor inhibiteth the vse of it in any other kinde. Thus are the fruits of the earth so Gen. 1. 29. sanctified for mans food, as they are Esai. 38. 21. not yet restrained from physicke: yea thus was the water that Num. 20 10, 11. miraculously gushed out of the rocke so 1 Cor. 10. 4. sanctified to a spirituall imployment, as yet it was not denied vnto ciuill and prophane vses, euen Num. [...]0. [...], 11. to the watering of brute beasts: sometime to sanctifie and to appropriate, when God sequestreth and seuereth the Creature so sanctified vnto some one speciall or proper vse from all other vses else whatsoeuer.

And thus he sanctifieth and appropriateth either the whole kinde of the Creature; as Exod. 30. 31, 32, 33. that curious composition of pretious and holy ointment expresly inhibited to all other vses; or some particular onely of that kinde; as Exod. 30. 23. the spices and odours ingredients of that holy ointment; as Exod. 30. 26, 27, 28, 29. & 29. 44. the Tabernanacle, 1 King. 8. 10, 63, 64. & 9. 3. the Temple, and the appurtenances of either: and as those Elements of Matth. 3. 11. Ephes. 5. 25. 1 Cor. 6. 11. water, 1 Cor. 10. 16. bread and Matth. 26. 27, 28, 29. wine that in the Sacraments are sanctified to be signes and pledges of spirituall grace: and that againe, either so to continue during the date of that law, as in the vnguent before spoken of; or during the time onely of the speciall vse to those ends, as in the Elements last mentioned.

To apply these distinctions then to the present Argument: If they take the word sanctifie in the stricter sense, the Proposition is true, but the Assumption is vnsound: for Lots are not set apart, or said so to be in either of the Prov. 18. 18. Num. 26. 55. places produced, to any holy or spirituall, but to a ciuill vse onely.

If in the larger and more generall sense, then either [Page] they speake of things sanctified onely but not appropriated, or of things both sanctified and appropriated too, and that either the whole kinde in generall, or some of the kinde only.

If of things sanctified onely, but not appropriated, the Proposition is not true; For 1 Cor. 11. 23, to 28. bread and wine are sanctified to be seales of Gods couenant, and yet doth not that hinder Psal. 104. 15. the lawfull vse of them otherwise: so was oyle sometime Leuit. 21. 8, 10, 12. Psal. 89. 20. & 133. 2. sanctified to annoint 1 Sam. 10. 1. & 24. 7. & 26. 11. & 16. 13. 2 Sam. 2. 4. & 5. 3. 1 Kin. 1. 39. 2 King. 11, 12. & 23. 30. Kings and Leuit. 8. 2, 10. Priests, and yet did not that then restraine Psal. 104. 15. Eccles. 9. 8. Matth. 6. 17. Luke 10. 34. the ciuill vse of it for food, physicke, necessity or lawfull delight. Or to vse a more familiar instance and neerer the present purpose, Gen. 1. 29. the fruits of trees are sanctified to bee mans food; yet doth not that let but that children, as of old time they did, may lawfully play and make themselues pastime as well with Da nuces pueris. Catul. epithal. Sparge, marite, nuces. Virg. Eclog. [...]. Iam tristis [...]cibus puer relictis. Martial. l. 5. ep. vlt. Et, Alex [...]rua nuces & non [...] videtur, Saepe tamen pueris abstulit illa nates. Idem l. 14. epig. 18. Quatuor in nucibꝰ non amplius al [...]ae tota est, Cum sibi suppositis additur vna tribus. Ouid. [...]. [...]. Aug. c. 83. nuts or [...] ▪ Pollux l. 9. c. 7. In comment. Rabbin. iubetur pater familias die festo poma, nuces amygdalas, pueris▪ praebere. Casaub. ad Suet. Aug. almonds, as with cheri-stones, or with checkstones, and the like.

If of things sanctified and appropriated; as it was in that Exod 30. 31, 32, 33. holy ointment inhibited to all other vses; and as it is in the Rom. 4. [...]. Exod. [...]. 11. Sacraments sequestred and set apart to certaine spirituall purposes onely, the Assumption is vnsound.

If of the sanctification and appropriation not of the whole kind, but of some particulars of the kind, the premisses might bee granted, and yet nothing concluded against the vse of Lots in generall.

[Page]If of the whole kinde, the Proposition is true, though the proofe be not so pertinent; but the Assumption is not sound.

For the proofe of it out of Prou. 18. 18. Salomon: that place sheweth onely Summa est singularem esse sortis vsum in componendis litibus. Cartwr. in Prou. c. 18. how a Lot may well and wisely be vsed; but neither inioyneth that vse of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. It approueth onely the vse as good and commendable in that kinde: But it is one thing for a Lot to bee vsed well and wisely to that end; and another thing to haue that the proper or onely end of it.

But Hebr. 6. 16. the Apostles speech of an Oath sheweth that Salomon meant so, when he vsed the like speech of a Lot.

It doth nothing lesse. For neither is it true that the Apostles scope was to shew that this is the only end of an oath, to stint strife and controuersie, neither is it so indeed.

His purpose is not to shew it: for Hebr. 6. 13, 16, 17, 18. it is only to shew how sacred, firme and inuiolable an Oath is among men from man to man; (which he proueth by that which all men know and acknowledge) and how much more then from God to man, when Iurat vobis per quem iuratis. Cassiod. Var. l. 8. ep. 3. he sweareth to vs by whom we sweare: like the Argument vsed by the Apostle else-where, Galat▪ 3. 15. A mans couenant or testament once ratified no man annulleth; much lesse can any annull or abrogate Gods.

Neither is that the only lawfull end of an Oath. For there be other ends of it; as, to giue assurance of the performance of couenants and promises. For what controuersie was there betweene Ionathan and Dauid to be ended by Oath, when 1 Sam. 20. 16, 17, 42. they sweare [Page] either to other? or what controuersie was there betweene God and Abraham, or Dauid and God; when Gen. 22. 16, 17. Heb. 6. 13, 14, 17, 18. God sware to Abraham, and Psal. 119. 106. & 132. 2, 3. Dauid to God? or what controuersie is there to bee ended by those Oathes, that men vsually take at entrance into office both in Church and Common▪ weale?

The like may be said of that Prou. 18. 18. other place of Salomon. The scope of the place is not to stint or restraine the vse of a Lot to the ending of strife, much lesse to the ending of great quarrels onely; or among men of might alone, though Salomon expresly name such: For he speaketh of contentions in generall: And why may not a meane inheritance be diuided by Lot among meane men as well as a rich one among mighty men? Or doe not contentions arise among mighty men many times about meane matters? But the scope of it is rather Vise Lauat. &. Bain [...] in Prou. 18. to perswade all sorts of men to compose their controuersies, be they great or small, rather by such a course so easie and so equall, than to plunge themselues by eager pursuit of Law-suits into further inconueniences; and Cartwr. ibid. to induce men of meane condition the rather so to doe, when euen men of might are content oft to submit themselues thereunto.

Not to adde, that Lots haue beene vsed Iosh. 7. 14. Ion. 1. 7. 1 Sam. 14. 42. Leuit. 16. 8; 9. oft to other ends (for it is but one vse among many that is there mentioned) as both hath beene in part, and shall further hereafter be shewed, and as Vsus particular is sortis litium diremptio. Valet porrò ad veritatem investigandam; ad concordiam ubi prius culta est alendam, &c. Cartwr. in Prou c. 18. some of them that in this point oppose vs, confesse.

§

I would thanke Mr. G. for mending mine Argument,I. B. Reply. though there be not any great need, if he had not [Page] put into his Assumption these words [In matters of weight] for his owne purpose, as shall appeare.

§

What need there was both of mending it, and ofT. G. inserting those words, that it might conclude, and the conclusion might not be wholly impertinent, by mine Answer may appeare.

I. B.

But to the matter. In mine vnderstanding and meaning, the proposition doth sufficiently expresse all that which moueth Mr. G. to grant it.

T. G.

Yea and somewhat more too; for it beggeth the question in controuersie, and presumeth that that is to be proued; which the Conclusion following it must needs also haue done; as in mine Answer I shew.

I. B.

Well; then let vs consider his Opposition made to the Assumption, and the amplification thereof. Doth Mr. G. imply a Lot not to be sanctified, because (as he saith now peremptorily) it is not inioyned? What? Is Recreation (in generall) inioyned by precept, if not directly, yet (at least) by iust consequence? as Mr. G. in his allowance of lusorious Lots saith is granted by all, p. 138. And is not so vsefull an Ordinance, as is a Lot, to end controuersies, inioyned by precept, either directly or by iust consequence? Doth God more carefully prouide for recreations, than for peace among his people? But Mr. G. is not so peremptory in another place, p. 135. where he saith: The vse of Lots is not simply commanded. For Prou. 18. 18. is rather a permission [Page] than a precept; and not so much a commandement, as an aduice and counsell. I will come to an issue. If it will please Mr. G. to set downe his iust consequence to proue Recreation inioyned by precept, I will vndertake to set downe as iust a consequence to proue, that a Lot to end a Controuersie is likewise inioyned by precept. In meane while, I cannot be perswaded, that our God of peace, who commandeth vs to seeke peacePsal. 34. 14. and follow after it, and hath ordeined a Lot, wherein he is specially present by his immediate prouidence, to end controuersies, which otherwise cannot bee ended conueniently, doth leaue vs at liberty in that case, to vse or not to vse a Lot.

T. G.

1. Mr. B. is somewhat like those Lawyers of whom Aristotle saith, that [...]. Aristot. rhet. l. 1. c. 1. they would haue little to say, if they were held to the matter that they are to deale in. He taketh occasion here to run out into a by-matter, which though all were granted him is [...]. Nihil ad rem ipsam. not a pin to the purpose. For the question is, whether Lots be not onely sanctified, but appropriated so to the ending of Controuersies, that to no other purpose they may be vsed, and whether Salomons testimonie, Prou. 18. 18. proue as much. Now grant all that Mr. B. here pleadeth for, and that I deny not; That the vse of Lots is inioyned in some cases, such as hee last mentioneth, or, that it is inioyned by iust consequence out of the word, is this sufficient to proue that it is therefore to that vse onely appropriated, or that this place of Salomon proueth the same? This I deny to follow; and (besides that reason it selfe euidently discouereth as much) Mr. B. himselfe Dialogue. elsewhere [Page] cutteth the very sinewes of his owne Argument, where hauing obiected that Bread and Wine are in the Sacrament to holy vses sanctified, and yet we may recreate our selues therewith; as also that singing of Psalmes is sanctified to the praise of Gods Name, and yet with singing also we may recreate our selues, he answereth that those ends be not proper, though they be holy. So that all this granted, yet is his Assumption, by his owne grant, as far from being proued as euer it was.

2. He chargeth me most vntruly to deny that the vse of a Lot for ending of any Controuersie is no where inioyned in the word, either expresly, or by iust consequence. I say onely, that Salomon in that particular place questioned, neither inioyneth that vse of it, nor restraineth it thereunto. Which latter branch it is especially, that Mr. B. must oppose & disproue, if he will from thence haue any proofe. But this is like Vide Bellarm. praefat. ad Controvers. 2. & Apolog. Erasmi adv. articulos à monachia Hispanis sibi objectos. Sed & Aegid. Hunnium in Calv. Iudais. & Paraum in Calv. Orthod. praefat. the Argument that Bellarmine and some others vse to proue Caluin and Erasmus, Arrians, because they denie some places to be vnderstood of Christs Deity, out of which the same is supposed to be confirmed by others. Doth a man necessarily say, Such a thing cannot at all be proued out of Scripture; if he say, that Out of this or that place it cannot be proued? Scripturae docent non aequalem s [...]re gloriae modum in coelis. Calvin. instit. l. 3. c. 25. §. 10. Caluin holdeth degrees of glory in heauen; and yet denieth that Da [...]. 12. 3. 1 Cor. 15. 41. Vide Calv. cōment. in haec loca. some places affirme it, which are yet alledged commonly for the proofe of it. But whether either this or any other place of Scripture doe proue that the vse of Lots is inioyned for the ending of Controuersies, is nothing to the purpose, vnlesse it be proued also that they restraine it wholly thereunto.

[Page]3. A man if it were to the purpose, might well make question, whether the vse of Lots to end controuersies, be so necessary as recreation is. Since many an one haue liued quietly enough, and done well enough without vse of the one, which no man liuing can doe without the vse of the other.

4. Why doth Mr. B. offer to ioine issue hereupon here, where it is nothing to the purpose, and not rather accept of it before offred him, in the last of my Arguments, concerning other recreations, as Boules, Chesse, &c. generally iustified, and some other ciuill actions; but slily slincke by it there, as if no such matter had at all beene once mentioned? And I would gladly yet heare what proofe he would bring out of Gods word for recreation by Boules or Chesse, or for wearing band and cuffs, ruffs or falls, and the like. Here it needeth not: for I grant all he requireth; and doubt not but that in some speciall cases, though very few, a Lot is inioyned necessarily, & that by the word the same may be shewed. But Mr. B. is very forward indeed to proue that that is not denied: but that that is most denied, he still obtrudeth vpon vs without proofe, to wit, that God is in a Lot present by his immediate prouidence. For that commeth in also here againe. It is as the Crosse with the Papists; Crucis signum in omnibus rebus adhibendum. Ex Pseud [...]-Dionysio & Martiale Steph. Durant. de rit. Eccles. l. 2. c. 36. In omni [...]ꝰ sacramentis Crucis signum adhibetur. Bellarm. de Imag. c. 29. Quod Lucian. de Rhetor. [...]. nothing can be done without it.

I. B.

But suppose the vse of a Lot be not (thus) inioyned; yet doth not Gods counsell (which me thinks is a commandement, though it be said of a mans counsell, that it is no commandement) sanctifie it to be vsed to end controuersies? This (I thinke) will not be denied.

T. G.

[Page]1. If it will not, as indeed it is not: why doth Mr. B. keepe such a coile about it; as if it were denied, when it is not. But thus Mr. B. as he saith of some, [...]. Agatho apud Clem. strom. l. 5. & Athen. dipnos. l. 5. Observanda trajectio, ne lepos intercidat. loueth to be briefe in the maine point, and long (euen to tediousnesse) in by-matters.

2. Whether difference be or no betweene Gods counsels and commands, (the Apostle seeming 1 Cor. 7. 5, 6, 7, 25, 27, 28, 39, 40. De virginibus, inquit, praeceptum Domini non habe [...]. Cur? Quia & ipse ut esset virgo, non suit imperij sed propriae voluntatis. Hieron. ad Eust [...]ch. de custod. virgin. Coelibatum ut laudet, nihil audet praescribere; nemini necessitatem vult imponere; sed suam cuique libertatem relinquere. Coelibatum commendat, liberum tamen conjugium facit; ut quod nemini negari debeat. Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Coelibatus res est indifferens à Domino in lege nemini vel praecepta vel prohibita, sed tantum omnibus permissa. In istis verò rebus indifferentibus imperium quidem peremptorium jubens vel ve [...]ans, nullum; at consilium earū commoditatē vel incommoditatem ostendens, magnum & usum & locum habet. Morton. ibid. to allow some things, which yet he would not aduise, and not absolutely to inioyne some things, which yet he wisheth and aduiseth to) I stand not now to dispute. Sure I am, that he that aduiseth a man rather to diuide by Lot, than to waste himselfe at Law, doth not inioyne him thereby to diuide by Lot, but onely to vse that course, or some other of like nature, (for it tieth him not to that particular) whereby a quiet end may be had.

3. But to what end should words be multiplied more about this, when as it is acknowledged, whether it be a counsell or a command, a permission or iniunction, it is sufficient to sanctifie Lots to that vse? So that Mr. B. need not haue strained himselfe to vtter herein an vntruth, and then dilate vpon it with so many Rhetoricall amplifications, if he had not beene disposed [...]. Homer. Iliad. v. to picke a quarrell without cause.

I. B.

But it is denied, That the vse of a Lot is restrained to end controuersies, much lesse great quarrels onely; and [Page] [...] [Page] [...] [Page] sundry instances are giuen of vsing Lots to other ends than to end Controuersies. But all those Lots were extraordinary. Therefore whereas in the beginning of this Answer, where he would finde fault with mine Argument, he saith, That the vse of Lots in play is euer to determine some question or controuersie, though a light one (it is like) yet a question or controuersie truly so termed, otherwise it were no Lot. If he meane a Lot in generall, then (with his fauour) he forgetteth himselfe, in saying, Lots by him quoted were not to end controuersies. If he speake of a Lot in play, as being an ordinarie Lot, then he faileth in iudgement, In denying that the vse of ordinary Lots (whereof is the question) is restrained to end controuersies: and the instances which he giueth being extraordinary Lots, are not to the point.

T. G.

1. Let it be obserued, that Mr. B. hath neuer a word here to proue that that is denied. It is denied, as Mr. B. himselfe here confesseth, that that place, Prou. 18. 18. doth restraine the vse of Lots wholly to the ending of Controuersies, so that they may not in any other case be vsed with good allowance. For this in effect I cite some of those that seeme to concurre in opinion with Mr. B. at least in part, Mr. Cartwright by name: Nor is there ought either in the Text or about it, as I there plead, to inforce any such thing out of it. Hoc est quod dici solet, [...]. Hyperides apud Suidam. All which Mr. B. sliding by, and not offering by any Argument to make good any such thing out of the Text; pitcheth at length vpon some instances in the very taile of my discourse, giuen of Lots wherein no controuersie was to be ended.

[Page]His exceptions against them are two:

1. That they were all extraordinary Lots; which yet is more than of all he can make good. For how will he proue it to haue beene an extraordinary Lot, that was

Let it. 16. 8, 9.

cast vpon the scape goat? But suppose there could be no instance giuen of any Lot in Scripture vsed where no controuersie were. Would that proue that the place of Salomon restraineth it onely to such? Nothing lesse: Nor doe I offer to hazard my cause thereupon. My maine Answer, which I relie vpon is this, that out of the Text no such restraint can be proued or produced: Not to adde, say I afterward, that Lots haue beene vsed oft to other ends, &c. as some also that in this point oppose vs, confesse. Besides that, it would be obserued, that Mr. B. who hath so oft offred to argue from extraordinary to ordinary Lots, yet can by no meanes here endure to heare of any such arguing. He shall doe well to remember that Rule giuen in both Lawes,

Non licet actori, quod reo licitum nō existit. Bonisac. in 60. de Regul. Iur. c. 32. Non debet actor [...] licere, quod reo non permittitur. Pandect. Reg. Iur. l 42. ex Vlpian. ad Sabin. lib. 26.

What is not lawfull to the one party, neither is lawfull to the other. Though indeed neither doe I, as may appeare, frame any Argument at all out of it.

2. That by mine owne confession, if they be not to end controuersies they are no Lots at all. But he taketh my words, as I haue shewed formerly, a little too short. For I say not simply, controuersie, but, question or controuersie, as he himselfe here citeth me; the former whereof is a terme more generall than the latter, and easily salueth the seeming repugnancy.

I. B.

Besides the subiect matter of an extraordinary Lot, [Page] being by Gods speciall direction, if it be lawfull; there may haply be no present controuersie. Where as the subiect matter of an ordinary Lot being something questioned betweene man and man, there may be a great controuersie. I say, May be. For if it be well obserued, in an ordinary Lot there is not alwaies a present controuersie to be determined: But alwaies some question to be decided to preuent a controuersie. As may appeare by Mr. Gs. owne words, partly here, where he saith, [That there must be some question or controuersie, or else it is no Lot] but more euidently where he saith; that the Lot vsed by the Souldiers about Christ his garments, which he truly calleth a serious diuisorie Lot, was to preuent all contention and strife, p. 176. & 177. Such was the Lot also which was vsed about the Land of Promise, about which was no present controuersie. For God who would haue no controuersies, would haue such things remoued, which may cause or iustly occasion controuersies. Therefore m Christ expounding the Commandement, Thou shalt not kill, forbiddeth words of prouocation. About which ordinary Lot, God, who knoweth how ordinary or common controuersies, and the occasions thereof be, giueth direction in Prou. 18. 18.

Oh Quod Passunus olim cuidam, teste Plin. ep. 6. l 7. Benè, benè: sed quo istud tam benè? Benè scripsisti, sed nihil ad causam pertin [...]ns. Hieron. ad Ioan. Hier. how plentifull Mr. B. can be where no proofe needeth! But [...]. Greg. Naz. in Christi natal. & in Pasch. ex Homer. Iliad. [...]. Idem ad Eunom. keepe the horse, as they say, home to the hedge. That Lots may be vsed also for the preuenting of controuersies; (and that is more than [Page] the bare ending of them: for Non potest videri habere des [...]sse, qui nunquam habuit. Reg. Iur. Civ. 208. a thing cannot be ended ere it be begun) Mr. B. hath at large shewed vs. Though I know not by what Logick he can gather out of my words, that it must needs euer be either for the one or the other; because I say, it was for the one of them in the Lot cast vpon Christs coat. But [...]; Quid haec ad Bacchum? what is all this to the purpose? How doth all this proue a restraint of Lottery to the deciding onely of some controuersie? which it may be Mr. B. hoped that this long discourse would haue put cleane out of his Readers head. That, he told you, was denied; and that, not onely is not proued, but no assay of proofe made of it. For Mr. B. in the whole ensuing discourse giueth it cleane ouer, and spending many words about other by-matters leaueth his Argument to shift as well as it can for it selfe. [...]. Aristot. rhet. l. 3. c. 14. It is the manner of those, saith the Heathen man, that maintaine a bad cause, that they desire to dwell rather on any thing than that that they should deale in.

I. B.

That which is said of an ordinary Lot, may iustly be also said of an Oath, that the vse of it is sanctified to end controuersies by present determination, or preuention. For, as it is true that Hebr. 6. 16. implieth, that Gods oath to man is more inuiolable, than an Oath from man to man, whereof onely Mr. G. taketh knowledge: so it is true, that Hebr. 6. 16. intimateth, That as an Oath, for confirmation, is among men an end of all strife: so Gods Oath for confirmation of his promise to Abraham, was to put the matter out of doubt, question, or controuersie. Else these words [An end of strife] were to no purpose. But that they were to the purpose by me [Page] vnderstood, appeareth in the two next verses, where it is written, That God bound himselfe by oath, as to shew the stablenesse of his counsell, so that the heires of promise might haue strong consolation. So that Gods oath to Abraham tooke away doubting, questioning, and all strife that might be, not onely in Abrahams minde, but also in the mindes of the heires of promise. Therefore an Oath doth not onely and present contronersies, according to Mr. Gs. vnderstanding, but confirming a promise or couenant, doth also end a strife, though there be none present, when the Oath is giuen, to wit, by preuention.

T. G.

I wil notstand (lest I either seeme too contentious, or proue ouer-tedious) to frame such exceptions, as well I might, against diuers particulars of this discourse, built mainely vpon a meere equiuocation: Nor to presse anew the Oaths taken vsually at entrance into office: Onely I demand, how all this proueth, that the Apostles purpose there is to limit the vse of an Oath, and to restraine it wholly to such an end. Which though it were also granted, as it neuer can be proued, yet it leaueth that place of the Prouerbs still as free as before. But Mr. B. hath forgotten, it seemeth, what he was to proue out of it.

I. B.

Now let vs somewhat consider Mr. Gs. purpose in putting into the Assumption these words, [In matters of weight] Forsooth, by denying the same, to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. Because (as he saith, p. 130.) they best agree with the nature of Lots, that is, with vncertaine hazard.

T. G.

[Page] [...]. Homer. Odyss. [...]. A Witty man, they say, can soone finde a fault, where none is. Why I put or required those words to be put into Mr. Bs. Assumption, I render a reason in his due place; to wit, because without them the Conclusion could not haue gone currant against a lusorie Lot. Now Mr. B. if any man can be so filly and senslesse as to beleeue him, telleth vs, that I did it to make way for light matters, and consequently for playing with Lots. God hath sanctified Lots to a proper end, viz. to end controuersies; saith Mr. B. in generall. I wish him to put in, lest his Conclusion else against lusorious Lots come short, in weighty matters. Whether this be to make way for the bringing of them in, or the shutting of them out, let [...]. Philostr. vit [...] Apollon. any iudge that hath but common sense onely. He might as well haue said, that Mr. Perkins put in the word great for the same purpose, when in the place cited there in my margine, he saith, Perkins gold. Chaine, chap. 20. on precept. 3. The proper vse of Lots is to decide great controuersies. But belike Mr. B. had no other way to hooke that in here, that he is now falling foule on.

I. B.

Surely if Mr. G. had acknowledged Gods speciall presence by his immediate prouidence in a Lot, as being a Lot ordained by God to end controuersies, he would not haue so written, but deemed weighty matters best agreeing with the nature of a Lot.

T. G.

I beleeue Mr. B. that if I beleeued as he doth, (for I hope he thinketh as he writeth) I should beleeue otherwise than I doe. But these coleworts come so oft in still, that I feare there is the lesse sauour for [Page] them in this his tedious discourse, which yet he promised vs should haue the more sauour in it for the length of it.

He must proue, he must proue this his immediate prouidence and imaginarie speciall presence, before he controll others either for not admitting of it, or not obseruing what would necessarily ensue vpon it.

But why was he offended with me for putting that into his Assumption, that he himselfe, as appeareth here, would haue therein maintained?

I. B.

It is true, that a matter of lesse weight in it selfe, may be the subiect matter of a controuersie, as a controuer sie may be among men, as well meane, as mighty in their estate, as Mr. G. here saith, p. 137. For by mighty men (as in Gen. 6. 4. so) in Prou. 18. 18. are meant men strong in affections, so as the controuersie cannot be well ended without a Lot, whether the subiect matter of the Controuersie be of more or lesse weight in it selfe, so as there is a necess [...]ie that one or both parties be satisfied. For otherwise there may be a great quarrell about a matter of lesse weight. Neither doe I say, that onely great quarrels are to be ended, or preuented by a Lot, as Mr. G. denieth not, but some may. For (as he saith truly, p. 173.) God speaketh in Prou. 18. 18. of contentions in generall.

T. G.

1. Not to question the exposition of the word mighty here and Gen. 6. 4. (albeit the word be [...] Gen. 6. 4. [...] Prov. 18. 18. not the same also in either) which yet I beleeue Mr. B. is not able to make good. All granted that is here said, [Page] how doth it hence appeare, that the vse of Lots is in that place of the Prouerbs restrained to such quarrels or controuersies, as Mr. B. here speaketh of? Or how appeareth it hence, that for some sinister end I put in those words?

2. If any Controuersies but weighty, may by a Lot be decided; how holdeth the comparison betweene a Lot and an Oath, both by himselfe, and by those that herein concurre with him, so oft vsed and vrged, for the excluding off from light matters the vse equally of either?

I. B.

Here then we may enter into further consideration of that which Mr. G. writeth, p. 135. to wit, That by the force of our discourse against playing with a Lot, the onely lawfull vse is condemned, and an vnlawfull vse is allowed in the roome thereof. What is that onely vse of a Lot? I can finde none other than the putting of that to a Lot which he calleth, (p. 130.) A matter of meere indifferencie, that is, Such as is not materiall, whether a man doe or omit. Howsoeuer there may be a lawfull vse of a Lot about such a matter questioned, to determine, or preuent a Controuersie, yet I wonder that Mr. G. deemeth that onely lawfull.

T. G.

Mr. B. is like children, that are willing rather to goe any whither than to come home. But it is our taske now to follow him; and to tread in his steps. What I there say therefore, I stand still vnto. And I maruell as much at Mr. B. that he should once imagine that a man may safely put any other matter then is here specified, to the hazard of a Lot. For [Page] may a man put it to the hazard of [...] Lot, Non iussa quidem licitè vel admittantur vel omittantur: jussa verè non sine culpa negligantur, non sine [...]rinune contemnantur. Ber. de praecept. & dispens. whether he shall either omit some necessary duty, inioyned him of God, or commit ought that is naught and euill. If he may neither, of those there is nothing left for a Lot to deale but such things as are indifferent, and may consequently be either done or omitted.

I. B.

Doth he not grant p. 91. that Praier may be conceiued in weighty matters, as in the choise of a Magistrate, which is not a matter of meere indifferency, that is such as is not materiall whether it be done or omitted.

T. G.

And in the choise of a Magistrate, if there appeere a materiall difference betweene party and party, in regard whereof it may bee of consequence whether the one haue the office or the other, it is not lawfull to put it to the hazard of a Lot, vnlesse some far greater inconuenience enforce it. Which when it shall so doe; it may be lawfull to entreat God so to direct the Lot, that the mischiefe may not ensue; but yet there is no assurance (it is but as prayer for other temporall things) that the Lot shall be so directed. For whither the choise of a Magistrate be a matter of meere indifferency or no, is no whit to the purpose. It is not Magistracy it selfe that is put to the Lot, in such cases, whether men shall liue without it or no, but that presumed that Magistracy must be maintained, and Magistrates consequently designed, whether this man or that man shall haue the place, which i [...] they be both alike fit for, it is a thing indifferent, and not materiall at all, whether o [...] them haue it.

I. B.

[Page] Did God specially appoint Lots to be vsed about only matters of weight? and must man so farre swerue from Gods example as to striue onely about matters of such indifferencie, and then to put onely such controuerted to the determination of a Lot?

T. G.

Mr. Bs. Rhetoricke will not so carry it. What men may striue or not striue about is not now to bee discussed (and yet who dare condemne lusorie controuersies: or what strifes in themselues are more harmelesse than they are?) nor what one mans iniquitie may enforce another to put to the hazard of a Lot. But in all controuersies bee the matter in question of more or lesse weight, the more equality things are reduced vnto on either side, the lesse materiall it is which way the Lot goeth; and the lesse materiall it is which way the Lot goeth, the lesse danger of wrong or inconuenience; and consequently the lawfuller the Lot. Let Mr. B. lay aside his Rhetoricall amplifications, and answer this Argument.

I. B.

So that I doubt not, but that with sound iudgement, and a cleare conscience not accusing me of not duly respecting the speciall prouidence of God by his immediate disposing of a Lot, I may affirme, That the more weightie the subiect matter of a controuersie is, the more iustifiable is the Controuersie: and be that matter of more or lesse weight, the greater the necessitie of ending a Controuersie is, the more iustifiable is the vse of a Lot. Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abusing of Gods ordinance?

T. G.

[Page]It is the manner of bad pleaders Probationibus deficientibus fidem suam interponunt. when proofes faile them to fall to protesting. And it is reported to be the guise of your preaching Friers, when they know not how to confute our doctrine, to assure their hearers vpon their saluation that it is herefie [...] Mr. B. methinkes should doe otherwise. I say nothing in this point without reason; which Mr. B. must refute, if he will haue me alter my iudgement. But if it may be had with protestations, Mr. B. will not misse of it. Which when he hath thus solemnly made, grounded still vpon a false supposall, (which vnlesse you grant him, all is gone,) he then demandeth, Is not then playing with a Lot an irreligious abuse? Why so? what is the reason. Because Mr. B. is perswaded so as he saith. All This Pali aura paleas non triticum ex area dispergit. Aug. de verb. Dom. 18. wind will shake but little corne, saue with such, if there be any, that haue pinned their faith vpon Mr. Bs. sleeue, and must depend vpon his perswasions. It is the property of Veritas docend [...] suadet, non suadendo docet. Tertull. adv. Valent. truth, saith one, not to instruct by perswading, but by instructing to perswade.

I. B.

But, (saith Mr. G. glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot) The vse of a Lot in play is euer to decide some question or controuersie truly so termed. If so, then he might haue called it a serious Lot according to his doctrine, the lightnesse of the subiect matter controuerted not withstanding.

T. G.

Mr. G. is not so glad of any thing to pleade for playing with a Lot, as Mr. B. is [...]. Greg. Naz. de pace [...]. glad to lay hold on any thing to be girding at Mr. G. what a silly toy hath he found here to cast in his dish, that if any question [Page] or controuersie be by a lusoricus Lot decided, it may be by Mr. Gs. doctrine termed a serious Lot. If you aske how; you may goe seeke. But suppose it were so, (as he cannot, I know, make good,) what then?

I. B.

But where about is that controuersie? Mr. G. in his written Answer to my Dialogue before mentioned saith; The controuersie tendeth to victorie, which till it be decided, there is a Controuersie, though a light one, yet a Controuersie truly so termed. But is that truly or worthily to be called a victory, which falleth out by haphazzard (according to Mr. Gs. esteeming a Lot) without any desert? But (say I) Is it not a tempting of God to put him by his immediate prouidence in disposing the Lot, to humour (I say not, honour) some of the vaine-glorious fooles with supposed victory, who make a pretended controuersie thereabout, whereas (before they entended so to play with a Lot) there was none indeed? Is this a controuersie truly so tearmed? I need say no more.

T. G.

No: you haue said, though not enough, because [...]. nothing at all to the point, not one tittle to make your Argument good, or to proue the maine matter denied in it; yet a great deale Quomodo ille, Fortuna multis dat nimis, nulli satis. Martial. too much; because so much cleane beside the matter. And here nothing but vnsauoury stuffe, vnworthy to be answered.

You tell here of Mr. Gs. writing, which you neuer returned any answer to. Why picke you this alone out of it, letting passe many other things in it of more moment still vnanswered?

But what is the fault here I maruell, that hath [Page] moued Mr. Bs. choler thus much? I say, forsooth there is in play a controuersie, and that it tendeth to victory. And is it not so in all games and sports ordinarily? Or doth not [...]. Eustath. ad Il. [...]. ex Pausan. Lex. Attic. [...]. Pollux. l. 9. c. 7. [...]. Ibid. Vicissem velquinquaginta millia Aug. apud Sueton. c. 71. Aliquandò ut vineat, ludit assiduè aleam. Ibid. c. 70. Verū in rebus apertis argumentari tam sit stultū, quam in clarissimū Solē mortale lumen inferre. Quint inst. l. 5. c. 12 common vse of speech confirme as much? matter of desert, I thinke, is not vsually much respected in play. Yet in those Games that Mr. B. condemneth there is [...]. Sophocl. Palā. [...]. Hesych. vse of wit and Art to in managing what the Chance affordeth. I might adde that there is in Game question, and controuersie also, if with Mr. Bs. leaue I may so speake, whether of the two shall leade, and who shall ioyne either with other, either of which in some cases may well be termed a controuersie, though it tend not directly vnto victory, and which by Lot also is and may be lawfully decided, for ought Mr. B. hath hitherto to the contrary discouered.

But what kinde of controuersie or victory soeuer it be, that is in Game and disport, must they needs all be stiled vaineglorious fooles, that in game striue, as we say, who shall beat either other. This fauoureth too much of supercilious (for I will not say superstitious) either Stoicisme or Pharisaisme.

But his reason hereof is worth all: for that is it that is all in all with Mr. B. which if you once debarre him of, [...]. Lucian. Gallo. he is as mute as a Fish, and standeth stone still, as Ad incitas redact'. Plaut. Trin. 2. 4. one at his wits end. It is a tempting of God, by putting him to dispose the Lot by his immediate prouidence, and thereby to humour such vaine-glorious fooles. This is the [...]. Prora & puppis. Cic. epist. sam. l. 16. ep. 24. head and foot of all, the perpetuall burden of Mr. Bs. song, which if you grant him, he is able to proue all that euer he would: but if it goe, [...]. Philostr. in Hero. c. all is gone with it.

[Page]

The fourth Argument.

§

I. B.

THat which there is neither precept for, nor practise of in Gods word, generall or speciall, expresse or implyed, that there is no warrant for in the Word.

But such is the vse of Lots in game: for we readeI. B. Dialogue, Ground 1. not in Scripture that Lots were vsed but in serious matters onely, both by Iewes and Gentiles: Eastie hist. of Gosp. Reas. 2. neither is there any warrant in the Word for the ludicrous vse of them by precept, or practise, generall or speciall, expresse or implyed.

There is no warrant therefore for lusorie Lots in Gods word: and so consequently they are vnwarrantable.

§

This is like Ambroses argument against merryT. G. Answ. Of Lots, chap. 7. Sect. 16. iests; Ioca videntur dulcia & suavia, cùm tamen à Christiana regula sint aliena: non enim in divinis literis invenitur, quemadmodum ea debeant, usurpari. Ambros. offic. l. 1. c. 23. We reade nothing of them in Scripture: therefore they are not to be allowed. Which yet is no good kinde of reasoning. The consequence of his Enthymem, and the Proposition likewise of their Syllogisme is vnsound.

For first an Argument holdeth indeed from the negatiue in matter of Faith, but not in matter of Fact: as to say, Hebr. 1. 4, 5. Quod non lego, non credo. [...], &c. Cyrill [...]. 4. Sine au oritate Scripturarū garrulitas nō habet fide. Hierō ad Tit. c. 1. Quod de Scripturis autoritatē non habet, eadē facilitate cōtemnitur qua probatur. Idem in Mat c. 23. Sancta Scriptura doctrinae nostrae regulam sigit. Aug. de bon. vid. c. 1. In bis quae apertè posita sunt in Scriptura, inveniuntur omnia illa quae continent fidem moresque vivendi. Idem de doctr. Christ. l. 2. c. 9. Cùm hoc (Euangelium) credimus, nihil desideramus vltra credere: hoc enim priùs credimus, non esse quod ultra credere debeamus. Tertull. in praescript. such a thing is not expressed or reuealed in the word, therefore it is no matter of [Page] Faith, nor such as a man is necessarily bound to beleeue: but not to say, Scriptura multa dissimulat, multa tacitè praeterit, &c. Aug de nat. & grat. contr. Pelag. c. 37. & 38. & de mend. ud Consent. c. 10. such a thing is not mentioned or related in Scripture, therefore it was not done, or it neuer was: as for example, Gen. 4. 17. Cain hath but one sonne mentioned by Moses, therefore he had no more sonnes or children but him. Much lesse may a man reason A facto ad jus: à non fieri ad non licere. from matter of Fact to matter of Right, as to say, such or such a thing we neuer reade in the word to haue beene done, and therefore it may not be done. For how many things are there whereof there is no example in Gods word, and yet the vse of them is generally allowed as lawfull and good? Many things there are whereof no precedent of the vse of them but in some one kinde onely, which yet may be vsed also vnto others. No vse of butter recorded in the word but for food onely: may it not therefore be vsed also for physicke? Yea many things there are of ordinarie vse, whereof there is no mention at all in Gods word, which yet all generally allow: as sugar for sweetning, printing of books, shooting in guns, and the like, which all by this argument are vtterly condemned; or if they be iustified, then the grounds of it faile.

Secondly, an Action may haue Voluntas Dei dicitur praeceptio, prohibitio, consilium, permissio. Lomb. sent. l. 1. d. 45. G. warrant sufficient by permission without precept or practise. For where God hath not limited the vse of any Creature or ordinance, there he hath left the vse of it free. Where he hath not determined the circumstances of any acton, there what he hath not prohibited, that hath he permitted, and that is warrant sufficient for it. Where therefore circumstances are determined, [Page] the argument holdeth from the negatiue to make that vnwarrantable, that is not either expresly or by good consequence inioyned. But where they are not determined, the argument is strong enough from the negatiue to proue that warrantable that is not either expresly or by iust consequence prohibited.

For this cause in the point of Gods worship the argument holdeth Ier. 7. 31. & 19. 5. Coloss. 2. 22, 23. from the negatiue for the substance of it, because Deut. 12. 30, 31, 32. God hath determined it. But in ciuill affaires it will not hold from the negatiue to disallow ought; because God hath not so determined them. Else what warrant is there for boules, for tennis, for foot-ball, for chesse, &c. which yet no man disalloweth? Let one example serue for all to shew the weaknesse of this kinde of arguing. There is neither precept, nor practise, (1 Sam. 14 31, 10 35. at least allowed or allowable) of eating bloud in Scripture: therefore a man may not eat a blacke pudding. In which conclusion I assure my selfe these Authors will not accord with the Familists and new Sectaries. And yet may they say more against the one, than these can any of them against the other. For the one is found expresly forbidden both in the old and new Testament both Gen. 9. 4. before the Law, Lev. 7. 26, [...]7. & 17. 10, to 15. Deut. 12. 16, 23, 24, 25. & 15. 23. vnder the Law, and Act. 15 20, 29. after the Law, (to omit what [...]. Clem. constit. apost. l. 6. c. 12. [...]. Canon. Apost. 62. [...]. Greg. Naz. de pasch. In Christo omnia revocantur ad initium, &c. c [...]borum libertas, & sanguinis solius abstinentia, sicut ab initio fuit. Tertull. de mon [...]gam. Sacra Scriptura nobis praecipit, ut abstineamus à sanguine & suffocato: meritò igitur damnamus [...] qui cuiuscunque animalis sanguinem arte aliqua condiunt, & sic comedunt. Qui hoc secerit, Clericus deponatur, Laicus excommunicetur. Synod. 6. can. 67. Qui suffecatum aut sanguinem manducarit, biberitve, 40. dies poeniteat. Greg. 3. pa [...]itent. c. 29. sundry of the Ancients [Page] haue held of it) but the other no where in neither. And if Galat. 5. 1. Christian liberty notwithstanding bought with the bloud of Christ, giue Gods children a free vse of the one, how much more then of the other. If Act. 10. 13, 14, 15. Rom. 14. 14. Tit. 1. 15. it loose them there, where they were bound before; sure it bindeth them not there, where they were free before.

§

Mr. G. in his booke sheweth many instances of LotsI. B. Reply. vsed both by Iewes and Gentiles, and all in serious matters. Which intimateth to me, that they by the light not onely of the word, but of Nature too discerned, that Lots are to be vsed onely in serious matters. O let vs take heed how we put out so great light.

§

True: out of the word I relate many instances of T. G. Reioind. Lots vsed in serious matters both by Iewes and Gentiles: nor doe I finde any lusorious Lots mentioned there to haue beene vsed by either. Gods word dealeth most with serious, not with lusorious affaires. Nor doth the Spirit of God busie it selfe to tell vs what sports and pastimes men did vse in those daies. But doth it follow therfore that both Iewes & Gentiles did by the light both of Gods word and Nature discerne that they might not be vsed in any other affaires than such? Nothing lesse. For what an infinite number of examples are there, Of Lots, Chap. 6. Sect. 1. & 2. whereof not a few Mr. B. might haue found also in my Booke, of Lots vsed in sport and recreation, whereof in that regard neither Iew nor Gentile that Mr. B. can shew, euer made scruple? Which doth euidently rather infer the contrary to that that Mr. B. here affirmeth. But [Page] to quit Mr. Bs. close, If a man should say to Mr. B. We reade of many garments in Scriptures vsed both by Jewes and Gentiles: But we reade of none that euer wore band or cuffs; which intimateth to me, that it is by the light both of Gods word and Nature too, discerned that such are not to be worne: O take heed, Mr. B. how you neglect this light, and doe that that you haue no warrant for, in wearing such. I suppose that euen Mr. B. himselfe would deeme him to be ridiculous, that should so argue. I say nothing more, but leaue the application either to Mr. B. himselfe or any other. Onely I adde, that there is Magno contu magnas nugas agere. Iul. Scal de subtil Et trisles meptias ut Caecilius, eoque magis ridiculas, habere, ut Sen. ep. 113. nothing more vnsauoury than to trisle so seriously.

I. B.

But let vs consider his answer, which is onely to the Proposition, though I haue already confuted many principall parts thereof.

T. G.

He may doe well to shew what parts and where. For I know not, for my part, what he hath as yet either confuted or confirmed.

Yet a little, by his leaue, to the Assumption; though not his, yet Mr. Easties, ioyned here with his; and by him acknowledged: It is this in effect; There is not any warrant in the word for the ludicrous vse of Lots either by precept or practise, generall or speciall, expressed or implied. Now if we beleeue Mr. B. this is a very presumptuous Assertion, and such as no man may auow, vnlesse he had a memorie able to containe euery sentence of Scripture, and an vnderstanding so absolute, as to know euery consequent that might be deduced and drawne from each of them. And therefore [Page] Mr. E. or Mr. B. ought to haue said, There is no such warrant, by precept or practise, so far as I know, or to my best remembrance. And thus might Mr. G. with a knife lent him by Mr. B. cut a sunder this Nodu [...] Gordius, a [...] Gordianus: à Gordio Midae patre, ut Curt. de gest. Alex. lib. 3. non à Gordiano nescio quo. Gordians knot, to vse Mr. Bs. words, and so let the deniall of the Proposition alone. But we will not take all aduantages that Mr. Bs. offers may afford.

I. B.

In my Dialogue, to shew that the Spirit sometime reasoneth from a matter of fact to a matter of right negatiuely, I quote these Scriptures, Ioh. 8. 39, 40. 1 Cor. 11. 16. The words of the former are these; Yee goe about to kill me, a man that hath told you the truth: This did not Abraham. The Argument is this: Abraham did not kill any that told him the truth: Therefore yee ought not to goe about to kill mee, if yee would be the sonnes of Abraham. This is Christs Logick, wherewith I dare finde no fault. Neither doth Mr. G. For he saith nothing to it, because the Printer putteth for vers. 40. the 48. vers. wherewith Mr. G. maketh pastime. But I will let passe time now to take further knowledge of it.

T. G.

Mr. Bs. Proposition in truth is this: That which there is no example of in Gods word is not warrantable by it. This to make good, he setteth against his first ground in the margent, a quotation of those two places. The Printer, it seemeth, had misprinted the one, and directed me to a wrong place, where finding nothing that caried any the least semblance of confirmation for the Point propounded, it may be, I say, that There needs a Delian diver. A Prouerbe vsed by either Crates or Socrates, vpō view of an obscure discourse. [...]. Laert. in Heraclit. opus est Delio natatore, to fetch ought out of those words; or that I am no One famous for arreading of riddles. Hinc ille apud Terent. Andr. 1. 2. Davus sum, non Oedipus. Oedipus to assoile Mr. Bs. riddle, or some such like, (for I haue no [Page] copie now by me of that writing, nor had Mr. B. (I will not say, the honestie, but) that care of his word, that he should haue had, to returne me either answer, or it againe) and that is all the pastime that Mr. B. here saith, I make with it. He should haue done well to haue set downe my words, whereby it might haue appeared, whether I had vsed any other termes therein, than might well stand with due reuerence and regard to him. In which kinde, whether either in that writing, or in my Booke, after it published, I haue beene faulty, I appeale to any that haue seene the one, and to all that may, if they will, take a view of the other.

But for the thing it selfe, how I should haue knowne what it was that was intended, vnlesse it were by [...]. Euripid. Hippol. Non sum divinus. Martial. diuination; or how should I haue answered it, before I knew what was intended, vnlesse it had beene by prophecie, (as he said sometime that Master of Pauls Schoole in Rich. 3. his time. Tho. More story. a proclamation was penned) I know not. But Mr. B. dealeth herein as Bellarmine is wont, who when he hath produced a testimonie out of some new-found, and it may be new-coined Author, that hath not beene long abroad; and those he dealeth with, it is like, neuer so much as once heard of; Ad haec testimonia neque respondent adversarij, neque respondere aliquid possunt. Bellar. de Euchar. l. 2. c. 19. &c. 21. and to this, saith he, the Heretikes giue no answer at all. But now we know what it is that Mr. B. would haue, he shall not be long without an Answer. Where to omit that Mr. B. speaketh, as if our Sauiour CHRIST had a Logick by himselfe, or would either here or elsewhere teach vs a new Logick, or another Logick, than I say not Aristotle the Heathen, but Ramus and other Christian Logicians haue taught: when as indeed he [Page] wrongeth our Sauiour in deducing from his words that which they will not beare, yea if they should beare, he that is Iohn 14. 6. Truth it selfe, should be contrary to himselfe. Our Sauiour, as it is apparent, reasoneth on this manner; They that doe such wicked works as Abraham neuer did, nor would euer haue done, (for euen this also Mr. B. himselfe hereafter acknowledgeth to be intimated; which if it had here beene mentioned, would haue marred all) shew themselues to be such as are no children of Abraham: But you doe such wicked works as Abraham neuer did, nor would euer haue done: for you offer to kill me for telling the truth: which Abraham would not haue done:

Therefore you shew your selues thereby to be none of his children. So Piscator analysing and explicating the place:

‘Piscat. in Ioan. 8. The Lord thus conuinceth them from their doings: If yee were Abrahams sonnes, you would doe Abrahams works; that is, such as he did, to wit, good. But you doe not Abrahams works, that is, such as he did, to wit, good: and I instance in one, for you seeke to slay me that haue deserued well of you. Therefore you are not Abrahams sonnes.’

And it is well obserued by Caluin, that not all things simply that Abraham did or did not, but Quid enim praecipuè in Abraham laudatur nisi obedientia fidei? Haec igitur discriminis nota est, quoties ab extrancis discernere oportet ejus filios. Calvin. in Ioan. 8. those for which he is specially commended, are notes to distinguish the children of Abraham from others. Now obserue but, I beseech you, what absurd, if not Logick, yet deductions and consequences Mr. B. would fasten vpon our Sauiour. For if this place helpe Mr. Bs. cause, or doe proue that a man may reason in the [Page] point now controuersed, from matter of fact to matter of right, this must be the Argument:

‘That which Abraham did not, no Christian man may doe: But Abraham neuer plaied at Cards, or Abraham neuer vsed a sporting Lot: Therefore no Christian man may doe either.’

Or put we some other Assumption to the former Proposition:

‘But Abraham went not in doublet or hose: or, Abraham wore not bands and cuffs: or, Abraham neuer walkt London streets, &c. Therefore no Christian man may warrantably doe any of these.’

Yea to goe a little further: if we should stretch, as Mr. B. doth, the words of our Sauiour, we might thus reason:

‘They that doe not as Abraham did, are none of Abrahams children: But they that denie not their wiues, doe not as Genes. 12. 13, 18. & 20. 2, 5. Abraham did: Therefore they that deny not their wiues, are not Abrahams children.’

Nor is this to controll our Sauiours Logick, but to shew, what manner of Logick Mr. B. would either teach our Sauiour, or make vs beleeue that our Sauiour vsed. In a word, here is the proofe of Mr. Bs. Proposition:

‘Our Sauiour proueth the Iewes not to be the children of Abraham, because they would haue killed him, which Abraham did not: Therefore whatsoeuer there is no example for in [Page] Gods word, is vnwarrantable.’

But let vs see whether his next quotation stand him in any better steed.

I. B.

Of the other quotation the words be these: We haue no custome, nor the Churches of God.

The consequent implied is: Therefore women ought not to pray vncouered. Hereunto Mr. G. answereth indeed, but so, that he doth not deny that Paul argueth negatiuely from a matter of fact to a matter of right: which is all that I intended by the quotation; and not, to imagine this Argument, The Churches of God, and faithfull men doe not vse Lots in gaming. Therefore such gaming is vnlawfull.

T. G.

Mr. B•. would make his Reader beleeue here that Mr. B. had laid this for a ground in his Booke, that from matter of fact a man might reason in some case to matter of right; (which yet would doe him as much good for the proofe of his Proposition, if it were granted him, as a little water would in his shooe) and that for proofe thereof Mr. B. hauing produced this place, Mr. G. in his writing had granted the same; (for so he would seeme to imply, when he saith, Mr. G. doth not deny it) whereas indeed all this is but Fictio juris, or giuing of Colours to haue matter to worke vpon. A course vsuall in legall proceedings. See Doctor & Student, lib. 2. c. 53. a fiction, and a meere made matter. For howsoeuer in mine answer to the entire Argument, peeced vp partly out of Mr. B. and partly out of Mr. Eastie, I speake of such arguing, yet in Mr. Bs. Dialogue there is no mention at all of it. But Mr. Bs. Proposition is, or must be, to make vp his Conclusion, That which there is no example of in Gods word, is [Page] vnlawfull. Now how doe the Apostles words proue this? Or what other Argument to further Mr. Bs. cause could be framed out of them, but such as is aboue by him mentioned, and I supposed he would haue made? But since he waiueth that, let vs see how it will proue that that it should. 1 Cor. 11. 16. It is not the custome, saith the Apostle, of Christians, to be contentious; as Chrysostom. Morton. some expound it; or as Tertullian. Theodoret. Hervaeus qui Anselmi nomine prostat. Lyran. Hugo Cardin. Heming. others, It is not a custome among Christians, for women to be vnueiled. Therefore none ought to be such, to wit, contentious: or none ought to doe so, that is, bring in such new fashions, as are both vndecent, and vnusuall. Will it now follow hence, that because the Apostle either condemneth contentiousnesse, because Utrum (que) conjungunt Theophylact. Oecumen. Piscator. Aretius. it is not the manner of Christians to be contentious: or womens appearing in the publike congregation vnueiled, because it was contrary to the custome of the Christian Churches; and [...]. Greg. Naz. [...]. Faciat quisque, quod in ea Ecclesia, in quam venit, invenerit: duminodo nihil contra fidem aut mores fiat. Ipsa quippe mutatio consuetudinis etiam quae adjuvat utilitate, novitate perturbat. Quapropter quae utilis non est, perturbatione infructu [...]sa consequenter [...]oxia est. Aug. epist. 118. [...]. 6. to breake setled order in such things is not allowable: Will i [...], I say, follow hence therefore, that nothing is warrantable, whereof no example is in the word? If it doe not, either let Mr. B. put it out of his Booke, or else forbeare at least to vrge it.

I. B.

So that I need not herein reply vpon Mr. G.

T. G.

No: but he hath need to proue his Proposition, vnlesse he will haue vs to take it vpon his word.

I. B.

I onely wonder that he saith: The vse of Lots in [Page] games hath beene common in the Churches of God. What? In the publike assemblies? as was the fault of women their heads vncouered in the Church at Corinth?

T. G.

To put Mr. B. out of his wonderment; (you see how faine he would be quarrelling) I meane by the Churches of God, the whole multitude of men professing the faith of Christ, distinguished into particular Churches or Congregations, consisting of diuers housholds and persons: among whom these lusorious Lots hath beene frequent and ordinary in all ages, nor hath there beene scruple made of them till of very late times. And by Mr. Bs. leaue, the Apostle vnderstandeth no other Churches, when he saith, Tum nos Christi Apostoli, tum Christiani Deum Patrē in Christo colentes. Morton. The Churches of God haue no such custome. But this is but [...]. Greg. Naz. monod. shooting beside the marke.

I. B.

But Mr. G. in this answer speaketh of things meerely naturall or ciuill, as sweetning with sugar, &c.

T. G.

Name all, good Mr. B. There is besides, printing of Bookes, and shooting in guns, playing at boules, tennis, chesse, foot-ball, &c. against which the Argument will hold as well as against either Cards or Tables.

And must not warrant be had as well for ciuill actions as for others? Or is not recreation, whereof we now dispute, a ciuill thing? Or must warrant be had by some example out of the word for Cards and Dice, more than for Chesse, or else they are in that regard vnlawfull?

I might here exclaime, as Mr. B. vseth to doe, yea [Page] and that with better ground than Mr. B. so oft doth; Oh what a wide gap doth Mr. B. open here to licentiousnesse, when he implieth that for actions meerely naturall or ciuill, there needs no warrant at all be had out of Gods word! It grieueth my soule to see what will ensue hereupon. For now will vngodly men, when they are reproued for ought amisse in the course of their life and conuersation, and required to shew what warrant they haue for it, be ready to say, These are but things meerely either naturall or ciuill: and therefore we need not care whether we haue any warrant out of Gods word for them or no. And either Mr. B. must imply no lesse, or else his exception is idle, and of no vse.

I. B.

I will not endeuour to proue, that in the word there is matter of iust consequence, either generall or implied (which is a part of the Proposition) to allow, as well sweetning with sugar, &c. as Recreation in generall: and therefore they may be lawfull, though they be not mentioned in the word.

T. G.

Here Mr. B. telleth vs, that he will not endeuour to proue that which he need not, because it is not in question: and withall Hoc ipsum evertit quod est confirmandum; confirmat idipsum quod est diluendum. Quintil. instit. l. 9. c. 2. in stead of prouing what he should proue, he doth vtterly himselfe ouerthrow it.

That that he saith he will not endeuour to proue, is not at all questioned. For the entire Proposition made vp out of Mr. Eastie and him doth not say, that whatsoeuer thing hath no allowance from Gods word is vnlawfull: but, whatsoeuer hath not allowance [Page] either by precept or practise in Gods word is vnlawfull. In neither kinde whereof, I suppose, Mr. B. can finde ought touching diuers of the particulars before mentioned, which yet he denieth not to be lawfull.

That hee ouerthroweth directly that that hee should proue, is apparent. For his Proposition is this; Whatsoeuer there is no example of in Gods word, is vnwarrantable: And yet here he saith, that some things may be lawfull, though they be not mentioned in Gods word. What is this but a direct contradiction of that?

I. B.

But suppose Mr. Gs. Axiome holdeth in them: what is that to Lots, wherein is the Name of God by his immediate prouidence, and the vse whereof is limited, to end serious controuersies? In regard whereof doubt I not, but an Argument concerning the vse of them may hold from the negatiue in matter of fact, as well as in matter of faith, or of the point of Gods worship for the substance of it. For I presume that as Abraham would not, if he had had occasion, as he did not, kill a man that told him the truth: so that all that feared God, and knew the nature and vse of a Lot, would not, as they did not, vse a Lot in game.

T. G.

If Mr. Gs. Axiome hold in any, your Proposition is infringed. Any one particular denied, ouerthroweth an affirmatiue generall. Let his Axiome alone therefore, and proue your Proposition. But that you will neuer be able to doe: and doe wisely therefore to let it alone.

[Page]Yea but if you will suppose and take that for granted, which was the ground of Mr. B. his first Argument, and without which neuer an one of them can subsist, then Mr. B. presumeth that Abraham would not haue plaied at Cards or Dice, nor no other godly man: And what then? Why? Then we should haue had no example either of Iew or Gentile recorded in Scripture that had done so. And consequently, (for that is the Proposition in Question) Nothing is warrantable, whereof there is no example in the word. Here is a deale of Arena fine calce. Quod de Senc [...] scriptis C. Caligula. Sueton. Caio c. 53. loose sand without ought to binde it together. The maine matter in Question still begged, and yet nothing inferred out of it, that is ought to Mr. Bs. Argument. No due proceeding in ought, onely [...]. Plut. adv. Stoic. [...] (an [...]) [...]. Hesych. a wheeling round about with a returne to the old principle, of an immediate prouidence in euery Lot, the ground of the first Argument: For that commeth in still to helpe at a dead lift, and is as good as the Tragoedians their [...]. Lucian. Philops. vel [...]. Idem de sect. [...]. Plato Cra [...]yl. Vt Tragici poetae, quum explicare argumenti exitū non potestis, confugitis ad Deum. Cic. de nat. Deor. l. 1. God in an Engine, that serued to helpe out still when they were at a stresse.

I. B.

Secondly, why may there not be for a thing permitted, some precept in the word, generall or implied? The permission of any thing must be in the word, either expresse or by iust consequence, and then the thing so permitted is indifferent. But Mr. G. reconcileth these two Axiomes, [Euery Action is indifferent] and [No Action is indifferent] thus, Euery naked and bare Action simply conceiued, is indifferent: But no action clad with his particular circumstances is indifferent, p. 94. So that he concludeth it to be most true, That no particular [Page] morall Action, or no Action of the reasonable Creature, proceeding from reason, can possibly be so indifferent, but it must of necessitie be either conformable to the rules of Gods holy word, or disconformable thereunto, p. 95. These things, especially these words (rules of Gods word) considered, I may say, that howsoeuer a naked indifferent thing be by permission, yet a clothed indifferent thing, if lawfull, is by precept, or rule, as well as Mr. G. saith, Recreation in generall is both by permission and by precept, if not expresly yet by iust consequence p. 138. Doth then Mr. G. make permission a iust exception against the Proposition?

T. G.

Mr. B. hauing in stead of prouing it ouerthrowne his owne Proposition: now commeth to try, if he can yet make good Mr. Easties.

A thing may be warranted, say I, though neither by precept or practise, yet by permission.

Against this Mr. B. obiecteth, that for a thing permitted some precept may be. I answer.

1. Vnlesse he say, must be, he saith nothing; because he saith nothing to the purpose.

2. If there be a precept for ought, so farre forth it is not barely permitted: for where permission is, Libera res relinquitur. Calvin. in 1 Cor. 7. Huc illud in Iure Canonico, Quod licet, non praecipitur. Zachar. Ferrer. addit. ad Abbat. de Cohab. Cler. & mul. the thing is left free.

Yea but Mr. G. saith, that recreation is warrantable both by permission and by precept. True by precept in some cases, by permission in other: or by precept in generall, by permission in particular, for balls or bowles, and the like.

Yea but againe Mr. G. saith, (to let the rest passe of Mr. Bs. Scopae dissolutae. Cic. de orat. perfect. Besomes here without bands) that euery [Page] thing indifferent, is lawfull, if by rule, and consequently, if you giue Mr. B. leaue to expound it as he list, by precept. Let me minde Mr. B. what before he told vs, it is Maledicta glossa quae corrumpit textum. a cursed glosse that corrupteth the Text. Doth euery Rule necessarily imply a precept? Then belike of things Indifferent, that is, (not, of things neither good nor bad; in which sense my former words cited by Mr. B. iumbling things heere together, nothing to the purpose, are to be vnderstood; but) of things neither inioyned nor inhibited, no Rules can be giuen. But let vs try (though it be too palpable) the truth hereof. When the Apostle saith, 1 Cor. 7. 39. A woman is free to marry againe if her husband be deceased. Is it not a Rule? Or is it therefore a precept? when he saith, 1 Cor. 10. 27. If an infidell inuiteth you, you may goe if you will: for Ire vel non ireliberum vobis relinquo. Morton. that is also implied: and, when you are there, you may eat of all that is set before you without scruple of conscience. Are not these Rules, and yet no precepts? If they bee, by Mr. Bs. owne grant, Mr. Gs. exception against Mr. Easties proposition standeth good, and the proposition consequently is vnsound.

T. G.

Touching his proofe, that permission is a sufficient warrant: I first would know, what ordinance of God that is, which hath not some limited or appointed vse thereof.

I. B.

That Gods permission is a sufficient warrant, he that requireth to haue it proued may as well require it to be proued, that Gods word is a good warrant. Idle had the Apostle beene if in so weighty affaires being [Page] craued his aduice, he should haue deliuered that that would not warrant those things that he gaue way for, yea and iustified them as free from sinne. 1 Cor. 7. 28. If she marry, saith he, she sinneth not. And he that denieth it, may as well Mero meridie si dixerit illi tenebras esse, credet. Petron. satyr. deny that the Sunne is vp at high-noone.

His friuolous question therefore is to no purpose in the world: For what if God hath by certaine generall Rules restrained in some kindes and cases the vse of his ordinances: doth it follow therefore that there is nothing in them left free? God hath restrained Recreation by such Rules as by way of Caution are in my Booke of Lots Of Lots Ch. 8. deliuered. Doth it follow therefore that it is not free for men to recreate themselues either with bowles, or with coites, whether they themselues will, and to make bowles indifferently either of beech or of brasil, and coites either of tile sherds or of horse-shooes. For, I hope, none of all these may be done without warrant.

I. B.

I am sure and haue shewed that Gods ordinance touching a Lot hath.

T. G.

If your owne word without further proofe may be taken, you haue.

I. B.

Secondly, I grieue to obserue what a gap Mr. G. hath by this doctrine opened to Licentiousnesse. What! may man disposed to sinne, imploy any creature, whose vse God hath not limited, to what vse he will? No: for here is to be vnderstood that exception which is expressed in the next part of the reason touching circumstances, viz. [Page] [Any vse, but that which is prohibited] Howsoeuer I could demurre thereupon, especially if an expresse prohibition be vnderstood, yet herein I will be silent hauing enough granted me.

T. G.

These be all but -velut aegri somnia, vanae Finguntur species. - Hor. art. idle fancies of Mr. Bs. owne braine. I open no greater gap to any licentiousnesse, than [...]. Greg. Naz. de eutax. [...]. Eccles. 7. 16. Ibid. the word of God warranteth: which Mr. Bs. vniust charge must therefore consequently fall vpon, and vpon the Apostle himselfe together with me. I spare to obserue what grieuous and inextricable streits Mr. B. would cast Christian Consciences into by his contrary Assertions; such, I am sure (let him take heede Matth. 23. 4. whom he followeth therein) as himselfe will neuer indure to be tied to: to wit, to bring some (I say not warrant, but) precept out of Gods word, for euery particular Act that he doth, euery sort or part of apparell he weareth, euery kinde of recreation that at any time he vseth, and the like.

Onely▪ I wish that Mr. Bs. ordinary faithfulnesse may here also be obserued. He saith hee could demurre vpon this position, that I giue for the circumstances of such Actions, in which they are not determined, viz. [Any vse, but that which is prohibited, is lawfull] especially, if an expresse prohibition be vnderstood. When as my words are expresly, not either expresly or by iust consequence prohibited. I would know of Mr. B. what precept, (for vnlesse precept, no warrant, saith Mr. B.) or what permission at least there is for such dealing in Gods word.

But he hath enough granted him by Mr. G. without this. Let vs heare how.

I. B.

[Page] For the vse of Lots in game is prohibited by iust consequences, as I haue demonstrated.

T. G.

If Mr. G. left it indefinite, as Mr. B. in his very next words before intimated, and expressed not himselfe, whether he meant prohibited expresly only, or by iust consequence also: how hath Mr. B. enough by Mr. G. granted for the effecting of ought that here he would haue? If he did expresse himselfe therein, why was Mr. B. pleased to question what his meaning was?

But how Mr. B. hath not proued onely, but [...]. Ne magna nimium dixeris, mirande vir. Aristoph. Ranis. Nam, Multa fidem promissa levant, ubi plenius [...]quo Laudat, venales qui vult extrudere merces. Horat. ep. 2. l. 2. demonstrated, what he here saith he hath done, I know not; vnlesse Qui per metempsychosin in Homero, Ennio revixisse ferebatur, ut Tertull. de resurr. & alij. Pythagoras bee reuiued againe in him, and Notum illud Pythagoreorum, [...], Ipse dixit: in quo per omnia acquiescebant. his bare word be as authenticall as the best proofe that is. Such [...]. Samijs Lacones. Plut. apoph [...]b. great words might haue beene well spared, vnlesse his proofes had beene more pregnant: least it be said of him, as he said sometime of the Athenians, that they were like old men, that [...]. Democrates apud Stob. c. 22. blew hard, but did little.

I. B.

For the better vnderstanding of the second part of the reason (hasting to an end) I onely desire an Answer to this Question. Is any vse of a Lot lawfull, where the circumstances of Time, Place, and Persons be not determined?

T. G.

Mr. B. weary, it seemeth, of arguing, commeth now to asking. The end of his Question, he saith, is for the better vnderstanding of the second part of my Reason. Why? admit my reason or some part of it were not worth a button, how doth Mr. B. make [Page] good the Proposition, which all this while he should haue proued? But to the Question, I answer as the Spartans sometime in a word: Ad prolixam Philippi Maced. qua quaedam ab eis deposcebat epistolam, unica vocula an vocali respōdebant, [...], vel (ut Scal. ad Euseb. ex Athen. itemque ad Auson ex Athen. & Gell.) Hinc Auson. epist. 25. Vna suit quondam, qua respondere Lacones Litera, & irato Regi placuere negantes. Idem & Dionysio rescripsit Philoxenus: unde Prouerbium, [...]. Suidas. No. And what then? Are there no more circumstances to be obserued but these onely? Or are there not generall Rules according to which I require the vse of such things to be regulated?

I. B.

If Mr. G. except an extraordinarie Vse, I may as well except the lusorious vse of Lots.

T. G.

Can any man liuing tell what this meaneth? I answer as before; and if Mr. B. can picke ought our of mine Answer for his aduantage, he may.

I. B.

I answer to the exemplification of this reason, granting that an Argument holdeth from the negatiue for the substance of Gods worship. I yet make this Quaere, whether onely because God hath determined it?

T. G.

Whether Mr. B. grant this part of mine Answer or no, yea whether it be sound or vnsound is nothing materiall, since that the strength of mine Answer for the disproofe of the Proposition resteth wholly vpon the other part, to wit, that from matter of fact not expressed in Scripture, it is no good arguing to matter of right or wrong; and that a thing may be lawfull without either precept or practise recorded in the word expresse or implicite: and much lesse is it [Page] materiall what become of Mr. Bs. quaeres: which I needed not therefore stand to answer; nor doth ought therefore that followeth here, at all touch our cause.

But let vs heare Mr. Bs. quaere. He maketh it a Question; Whether the Argument therefore onely holdeth from the negatiue for the substance of Gods worship, because God hath determined it? I answer: It is enough for my purpose if it doe hold therefore. Which Mr. B. it seemeth, doth not deny. And in many cases it holdeth onely therefore: For why we should vse water and not Nam & vino lavare gentibus quibusdam hodieque nō est insolens. Quo & forsan allusit Iacobus Gen. 49. 11. wine in Baptisme: why bread, rather than As in the Passeouer, Exod. 12. 9. rosted flesh in the Lords Supper, and why bread onely and not cheese too, as Haeretici quidam Artotyritae hinc dicti. Epiphan. haeres. 49. Aug. haeres. 28. ex Isidor. Grat. decr▪ caus. 24. quaest. 3. some haue vsed, no reason can be rendred, but Quia tibi sic placitum: uti Christus ad Patrem, Matth▪ 11. 26. Quanquam nolim ex hoc loco argumentum contexere: prout supra D. B. voluit ad Arg. 6. because God so pleased to determine the elements in either. It is true indeed that some sorts of Worship are in themselues Deut. 12. 31. Talia Ethnicorum Sacra Taurica, Cabirica; sed & Floralia, Lupercalia, Saturnalia, Bacchanalia, Aphrodisia, Priapeia, &c. impious, and are therefore also disallowed. But let vs heare the reason why this Quaere is made.

I. B.

For in those places of Ieremie, God doth blame his people onely for vsing a worship [which he commanded not] without any intimation that he prescribed his owne worship.

T. G.

Is there not an euident intimation that God had prescribed his owne worship, (vnlesse it be presupposed that he would not at all be worshipped) when for this very cause he reiecteth some kinde of worship, because he had not prescribed the same.

I. B.

[Page]To the same purpose writeth Paul to the Colossians against the Traditions of men, and will-worship, not for Mr. Gs. cause, but because in so worshipping they held not the Head, vers. 19. which is Christ, King of his Church, teaching and gouerning the same in all things.

T. G.

The Apostle expresly condemneth one sort of the superstitious he there speaketh of, because they were meere [...]. Col. 2. 22, 23. will-worships, and humane inuentions (wherein let Mr. B. take heed lest he be found faulty in denying vnto Christians the lawfull vse of Gods creatures vpon conceits meerely superstitious, as those false teachers then did) that is, as Piscator well, Quum Deus istarum autor non sit. Piscat. because God was not the Author of them. Which is in effect for the very same cause that I auerre.

As for that of Col. 2. 19. not holding the Head, it is not vrged by the Apostle for any such purpose as Mr. B. here affirmeth, confounding and blending together those things that are to be distinguished; but against those that would haue brought in the [...]. Coloss. 2. 18. Adoration of Angels, who in so doing the Apostle saith Quod Christum isti dignitate sua spolient, ut qui un▪ toti suo corporitum fovendo, tum augendo sufficiat. Piscat. relinquished Christ the Head, who is of himselfe all-sufficient to foster and propagate his Church, without such sending of his seruants to seeke assistance from any other.

I. B.

But in Deut. Mr. Gs. cause is implied. It is true, that there God forbiddeth his people to inquire how other Nations serued their Gods, and sendeth them to his word to obserue the same, without putting anything to, or taking ought from the same. Surely I should not gather from hence Mr. Gs. cause. Because I feare it [Page] would▪ incourage Papists in their superstitious rites and ceremonies called Circumstances, though indeed parts of the substance of outward worship. For they are ready to take hold thereof and say, God hath determined nothing touching these supposed Circumstances, and they are not against the word of God; therefore they are permitted and so warranted.

T. G.

Is it not implied, when God saith, they should not serue the true God as the Heathen serued their false Gods▪ but so onely as he had himselfe prescribed; is it not implied, I say, that God had for the substance of it determined his owne worship?

Or is not this a senslesse consequence, Mr. G. holdeth that God hath determined the substance, but not all particular Circumstances of his seruice and worship: Therefore Mr. G. giueth incouragement to Papists to adde to Gods worship such things as they call Circumstances, but are indeed parts of the substance of it. It is as if one should say, 1 Tim. 5. 8. The Apostle chargeth all Christians to prouide for themselues and theirs: Therefore hee giueth worldly men incouragement to be greedy of the world, which they call prouiding for them and theirs.

I. B.

But I should gather from that and the other places, (I thinke, directly, and not auckwardly,) this Conclusion: Because all things in and vnto the seruice of God ought to be precisely according to Gods will reuealed in his word; therefore whatsoeuer is not commanded ought not to be. And the rather (God being iealous) because of the meaning of the fringes vponExo. 20. 5. [Page] the Israelites their garments, to wit, That you may remember all the commandements of the Lord, and thatNum. 15 39. yee seeke not after your owne heart, not after your owne eies, after which you goe a whoring.

T. G.

Now we haue Mr. Bs. collection, not auckward, as mine, but direct, as his are wont to be.

Where first I would vnderstand wherein Mr. Bs. cause differs from Mr. Gs. cause: that is, whether that, whatsoeuer it be, that is there forbidden, be not therefore, yea and therefore onely there forbidden, because God had determined his owne worship. That which was Mr. Bs. exception against Mr. Gs. cause before.

2. I would be informed whether Mr. B. will affirme that all particular circumstances of Gods seruice and worship be precisely determined in the word, for if that be not his meaning here, what saith hee more than I say? If it be, let him returne answer to the instances produced to the contrary before. For the conceit it selfe is so senslesse, that Demonstrare solummodo, destruere est. Tertull. adv. Valent. it deserueth not further to be refuted; neither doe I thinke that any man liuing will concurre with Mr. B. therein.

3. For the place out of Numbers produced by him, whereby he would proue that, (whatsoeuer it is) that he saith, it doth no more proue that all things in the seruice of God ought to be precisely according to Gods will reuealed in his word, than that all other humane actions as well ciuill as sacred ought so to be. For the place speaketh of Hinc Iudaeorum commentum, eum qui mandatum de fin brijs istis observet, tantundem facere atque si legem totam servaret. Primò enim nodi 5. sunt in unaquaque fimbria. His nodis si fila 8. adnumeraveris, 13. existent. Iam vocabulū Heb. [...] 600 facit: quibus 13. illa adjecta 613. confiunt: quot nimirum mandatis lex constat universa, &c. Purtorf. synag. Iud. cap. 4. Gods commandements in generall▪

4. How followeth it hence that no action or circumstance [Page] in Gods seruice, yea or in other affaires i [...] left free, because all such things ought to be precisely according to Gods will reuealed in his word? I suppose that that Christian that being inuited by a Gentile, when there was no iust cause otherwise to hinder his going, did as well in going to an Infidels table walke according to the precise rule of Gods word, as he should haue done in not going: and in eating indifferently of each dish, as in forbearing either this or that when he was there. And I suppose they walke precisely according to the rule of Gods written word, as well where they begin their solemne seruice of God on the Sabboth day at seuen of the clocke, as where they begin it at eight, or at nine. Which yet were not, if that circumstance of time were precisely determined, and nothing at all therein left free.

I. B.

To the last I answer, That a Lot is no more a ciuill affaire than is an Oath, though it (as is an Oath) be vsed in ciuill affaires.

T. G.

Here is no Question about it whether it be or no: but a Proposition, which Mr. B. hath all this while forgot, to be iustified. As for the rancking of a Lot and an Oath together; and the supposed sacrednesse of a Lot, enough already hath beene said. But why doth not Mr. B. answer here, the Question of Boules and Balls, (for it is very materiall) and the point concerning a blacke pudding?

I. B.

And lastly, I affirme againe, that God hath determined the vse of a Lot to determine Controuersies, so as [Page] without Gods speciall appointment (which is not now to be expected) it cannot be lawfully vsed to any other purpose: Therefore an Argument from the Negatiue will hold by Mr. Gs. rule to disallow the vse of any other Lot, as well lusorious as diuinatorie.

T. G.

I will not stand to discusse here how this helpeth Mr. Bs. arguing, That is not lawfull whereof no example is found in the word, &c.

I obserue onely how Mr. B. can conclude, by helpe of my Rule, what he would, if you grant him withall, what he can not proue. But the Antecedent should in the former Argument haue beene made good: which yet Mr. B. there not onely hath not done, but hath not so much as indeauoured to doe. And without proofe for him to Propter nostrum affirmare aut negare nihil ponitur in esse. Beda in Axiom. affirme it againe and againe, is but lost labour both to his Reader and himselfe.

I. B.

Thus hauing answered Mr. Gs. reasons inducing him to allow Lusorious Lots as not euill in themselues: and remoued Mr. Gs. answers to mine Arguments, I may more confidently hold mine opinion, which Mr. Dudley Fennor (of reverend memory) his godly Treatise of Recreations hath taught me, to wit, That Tables and Cards, as well as Dice, and all other Games consisting in Chance (wherein there is vse of a Lot) are vtterly vnlawfull.

T. G.

Thus hauing within lesse than three weekes space since this booke of Mr. Bs. came first to mine hands, [Page] which he hath beene Partus plus quàm Elephantinꝰ. Quem etsi decem annis uterum gestare vulgꝰ existimet: (unde Plaut. Stich. 1. 3. Audivi saepe hoc vulgò dici [...]r, solere Elephantum gravidam perpetuas decem-esse annos:) Aristoteles tamen biennio tantùm. Plin. hist. nat. l. 8. c. 10. Verùm Aristoteles juxta alios sesquiannum, juxta alios tri [...]nnium. hist. animal. l. 6. c. 27. Adjicere liceat Plinij illud ex praefat. ad Vespas. Audio, inquit, quosdam, quod semper expectavi, parturire adversus libellos meos, & subinde abortus facere, jam decem annis, quum celerius etiam Elephanti pariant. about some I handled this Argument anno 1613. and shortly after the handling thereof deliuered Mr. B. in writing at his request the Answer to his Arguments, which he vndertooke then to returne Answer vnto. ten yeeres a breeding, runne through the same, and shewed that it containeth nothing materiall, or of iust exception to ought in my Booke, neither confuting any of mine Arguments produced in the defence of lusorious Lots, nor confirming and strengthning any of his owne against them, I may the more confidently conclude, the rather holding that, that till now of late, was scarce euer questioned of any, that Games depending vpon casualtie are not in that regard vnlawfull, nor is a Lot excluded from being matter of disport by any ground or warrant forth of Gods word.

AN ADVERTISEMENT to Mr. BALMFORD.

[Page]

IF Mr. B. shall thinke good to surreioyne, I would desire some few things of him (as I suppose) neither vnreasonable nor vnequall.

One is, that he will deale more faithfully than he hath here done, in relating either mine Arguments or mine Answers both for matter and manner; that is,

1. That he doe not in producing them mangle and maime them, cutting that away that is materiall.

2. That he alter not my phrase, but giue me leaue, as I doe him, to vtter my minde in mine owne termes.

Another is, that he would be pleased [...]. Aristoph. eccles. to keepe close to the point: Or if he desire to be dealing [...]. in by-matters, as in most of this he doth; that he would handle them apart from those things that concerne the maine [...]. matter in controuersie, that the Reader who desireth to be therein more fully informed, may not be constrained to hunt after, what should giue him satisfaction, as if he sought Acum in acere. Iul. Scalig. de subtil. exerc. 216. a needle in a bottle of hay.

To which purpose I require him to take notice what issue we are at, and as well what either is denied, or is to be denied, as what also is to be performed and made good, either in his Answer to mine Arguments, or in the defence of his owne.

[Page]For his Answer to mine Arguments.

In the first he denieth this Proposition: That which may be vsed in other Ciuill affaires either weighty or lesse weighty, may be vsed also in disport. I reply by way of Induction▪ and require [...]. Aristot. l. 2. c. 2. an instance to be giuen of any thing that may be vsed indifferently in the one and not in the other: that of an Oath will not serue.

In the second Argument, the former shape, he denieth this Proposition, That which best sorteth with the nature of a Lot, may a Lot most lawfully be vsed vnto: which for my part shall neuer be further proued.

In the latter shape (the vaine cauill to the forme of it omitted) he denieth this Proposition; A matter of meere indifferencie, such as a man may lawfully doe or not doe, and it is not materiall whether he doe or omit, a man may lawfully put to the hazard of the vncertaine motion of the Creature whether he shall doe or no: yet with a restraint, vnlesse it be a matter controuerted. And let that, for me, rest too, and others iudge of it.

In the third Argument he affirmeth, The vse of a Lot in Game, as it is a Lot, to be against Piety, because it is not of faith; against Charitie, because it scandali [...]eth. That is an idle consequence; this euidently vntrue of a Lot in Game simply considered: and he maintaineth euery Lot to be holy by some diuine Iustitution, which I require to be produced.

In the fourth Argument, he denieth nothing at all that I say, not conceiuing or vnderstanding mine Argument aright. I affirme any vse of the Creature [Page] lawfull, that it hath a naturall power vnto, so the same be kept free from superstition, impiety, iniustice, and dishonestie. Which qualification he suppresseth, and so denieth the forepart.

In the fift Argument, he denieth nothing at all, but some Assertions of his owne framing, and the effect of the Conclusion. Lottery, say I, is a thing of it selfe indifferent, neither simply commanded nor forbidden: therefore by Mr. Fennors grounds, lawfull to be made matter of disport. Alusorious Lot, saith Mr. B. is forbidden, and therefore not indifferent. Which crosseth nothing but the Conclusion onely in mine Argument.

The sixth Argument he miserably peruerteth, and in roome of it setteth vp one of his owne, which he keepeth much adoe with: Which I would wish him now to take better notice of, being in the plainest manner that may be laid open to his eyesight.

For the fuller answer whereunto, (because it is much materiall to the clearing of the present point in Controuersie) I would desire him onely to shew by what Arguments or Argument deduced from Gods word, the vse of Boules and Chesse-play may be iustified. Not that I doubt whether it may be done or no; but that I may vnderstand how Mr. B. will doe it: not doubting but his manner of doing it, if it be sound and such as it should be, will bring much light to this matter.

For the defence of his owne Arguments.

In the first hee must proue, if he will make it [Page] good, that an immediate prouidence of God in euery Lot, is proued out of Prou. 16. 33. which as yet he hath not done.

And if hee will disproue or ouerthrow mine Arguments against it, hee must affirme such an immediate prouidence in euery Casuall Occurrent: as also a naturall power in man to make God worke immediately, and consequently miraculously at pleasure: and answer my reasons produced to the contrary.

In the second hee must proue the same, to wit, an immediate diuine prouidence in euery Lot: for that is the ground of this also; and is oft repeated, neuer proued: and that once proued will effect all.

In the third he must proue that that place, Prou. 18. 18. doth so restraine the vse of a Lot to the ending of Controuersies in serious matters, that to no other vse it may be applied: to which purpose there is not a word here.

In the last, hee must make good, if hee will maintaine his owne Proposition, that nothing is lawfull whereof there is no example in Gods word.

Or if Mr. Easties, that nothing is by permission warrantable; or, Nothing warrantable but by precept.

These few points if hee can make good, all will soone be at an end. And these would be handled apart, (other by-matters discussed by themselues) that so what is said to the purpose may the better be seene, and the truth in the [Page] Point controuersed receiue the more light, which it cannot so well doe, [...]. Plut. eretic. Hinc▪ Aristot. Topic. l. 6. c. 1. [...], &c. when it is shuffled vp together with so much impertinent matter.

FINIS.

Some things omitted, or misprinted.

PAg. 6. lin. 24. after a [...]ow, put in it to be, yea and * meritorious too. and in the margine against it, * Si [...]usticus citra articulos credat suo Episcopo propon [...]nti aliquod dogma [...], meretur in credendo, licet sit e [...]rer, &c. Tol [...]t▪ instruct. [...]. l. 4. c. 3. §. 6. Pag. 213. l. 11. after well, put in together. Pag. 232. lin. 19. in the margine put in • Matth. 5. 21, 22. Pag. 238. l. 4. put out the point after neither, and put it in after these. l. 5. after de [...], put in, i [...]. Pag. 239. l. 8. after d [...]e, put in wholly, and after controuersies, put an interroga [...]ine point. Pag. 240. l. 14. put the like after reason? Pag. 257. l. • in the margine, for [...]- reade [...]- Pag. 259. l. 1. for [...] lawfull, if by rule, reade if lawfull, is by rule. Pag. 260. l. 3. for iustified, reade iustifie. Pag. 261. l. 9. after on, put in it. Pag. 263. • in the marg. after Gell [...]) put in [...]. Pag. 270. l. • in the marg▪ for perpetu [...], reade perpetuos.

Information about this book

Title statement

A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise.

Gataker, Thomas, 1574-1654.

Edition statement

1623

Publication

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Text Creation Partnership,

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Ann Arbor, MI ; Oxford (UK) :

Date

2004-03 (EEBO-TCP Phase 1).

ID [DLPS]

A01540

ID [STC]

STC 11666

ID [STC]

ESTC S102920

ID [EEBO-CITATION]

99838680

ID [PROQUEST]

99838680

ID [VID]

3067

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(EEBO-TCP ; phase 1, no. A01540)

Transcribed from: (Early English Books Online ; image set 3067)

Images scanned from microfilm: (Early English books, 1475-1640 ; 1066:04)

Source

— A iust defence of certaine passages in a former treatise concerning the nature and vse of lots, against such exceptions and oppositions as have beene made thereunto to Mr. I.B. Wherein the insufficiencie of his answers giuen to the arguments brought in defence of a lusorious lot is manifested; the imbecillitie of his arguments produced against the same further discouered; and the point it selfe in controuersie more fully cleared; by Thomas Gataker B. of D. and author of the former treatise., Gataker, Thomas, 1574-1654., Balmford, James, b. 1556. Modest reply to certaine answeres, which Mr. Gataker B.D. in his treatise of the nature, & use of lotts, giveth to arguments in a dialogue concerning the unlawfulnes of games consisting in chance..

Extent

[8], 270, [6] p.

Printed by Iohn Haviland for Robert Bird, and are to be sold at his shop at the signe of the Bible in Cheapside,. London :: 1623.. (A defense of Gataker's "Of the nature and use of lots", in reply to "A modest reply to certaine answeres, which Mr. Gataker B.D. in his treatise of the nature, & use of lotts, giveth to arguments in a dialogue concerning the unlawfulnes of games consisting in chance" by James Balmford, which is reprinted here.) ("An aduertisement to Mr. Balmford", [6] p. at end.) (Reproduction of the original in the British Library.)

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