Annotations.

THe Art of Logike, as is declared already, layeth downe the right vse of naturall reason: and this that wée call shewing or declaring how to reason, is no giuing of reason to him that had it not, but an applying or directing of the minde to the view and contemplation of that, which of it selfe it might perceaue, if it were turned and framed therevnto. For, as Plato sayth, 7. de repub. the trueth of the things comprised in Arts is as na­turally propounded to the viewe of the minde, as colours bée to the sight of the eye: and therefore Aristotle in his first booke [Page 5] of Elenchs hath set downe that which common experience doth confirme, that euery common person or silly soule vseth Logike in some part, and practiseth of himselfe by naturall instinct that which artificiall Logike doth prescribe in her seuerall rules and constitutions. Artificiall Logike then is the polyshing of natural wit, as discouering the validitie of euerie reason, bée it necessary, wherof cometh science: or contingent, whence procée­deth opinion. Although I knowe there is a great controuersie and contention among the auncient Philosophers, concerning these two: whilest some of them mayntayne onely Science, some others holde with opinion onely. Heraclitus called opi­nion the falling sicknesse, for that thereby men many times fell headlong into diuers delusions and erronious conceiptes. So in like maner, the Stoikes held this for one of their Para­doxes, that Sapiens nihil opinatur, a wise man is not opina­tiue, a wise man neuer iudgeth according to opinion. On the other side Anaxarchus was of this opinion, that all mans iudg­ment was but opinion, and that his vnderstanding coulde per­fitly vnderstand nothing, which the Pyrrhonians taught after him, and the new Academikes: and a man may coniecture that Plato and Aristotle sometimes inclyned that way; for Plato in his booke called Timaeus, ascribeth truth to God and Gods chil­dren, leauing nothing but truelike to mortall men, and Ari­stotle in the second of his Metaphisikes compareth mans vn­derstanding in respect of perfect knowledge of trueth to the dazeling eyes of a Batt in the broade day light. But yet not­withstanding these forealledged places, both Plato and Aristotle haue elsewhere euidently declared that man is capable both of Science and certayne Knowledge, as in thinges contayned in Arts: and also of opinion, as in infinit affaires which are dayly incident: and this was long before their tyme, elegantly put downe by the famous Poet and Logician Parmenides.

[Page] Because of these two kinds of conceiptes, Aristotle would [...] néedes make two Logikes, the one for Science, the other for Opinion: wherein (if so it may be sayde of so great a Phi­losopher) it séemeth hée was but an Opinator. For although a­mong thinges conceaued and knowne, some bée necessary and vnfallible, some doubtfull and contingent, yet the Arte of Knowing and Reasoning of the same (I meane Logike) is only one and the same, as the sight of the eye in perceyuing all co­lours, bée they chaungeable or not chaungeable. And aswell might a man say there must be two arts of Grammer (if Gram­mer bée a distinct Art) one for courtly spéeche, an other for coun­try talke: or two distinct arts of making of cups, one for golden cuppes, an other for cuppes of siluer, as two Logikes, one for vnfallible Argumentes, and another for Contingent. There­fore one Logike suffiseth to dispute of all thinges, necessary or contingent whatsoeuer. Yet this one Logike her selfe in re­spect of her preceptes is alway necessary and neuer contingent, for otherwise it were no Art, but the application of it may bée in contingent causes aswell as necessary.

[Two partes of Logike:] The Stoicall diuision of Logike into Inuention and Iudgement, although both Aristotle him­selfe séeme to commend it in some places, as in 8. Topi. 3: Rhet: and Tully and Quintilian doo altogether obserue it▪ is yet re­prehended of some, who thinke that Iudgement is not any se­uerall part of Logike, but rather an adi [...]ct or propertie gene­rally incident to the whole Art: because, say they, there is vse of iudgement euen in inuention. But in my fancie they might better haue founde some fault with these wordes, Iudgement, and Inuention, then reprehended the distribution, which is most true, if they consider what the Stoikes did vnderstand by these woordes. For by the first part called [...], they intend the explication of the diuers kindes, natures, affections, relations, and proprieties of seuerall argumentes, which because it hel­peth inuention, is called Inuention, as I sayd before: although indéede a man shall no more finde argumentes by this first part [...]f Logike, then hée shall get Latine woords by Etymologie the first part of Grammer: which made me alter the woords, as not proper, but rather borowed from the Mathematikes, where two▪ [Page 6] or thrée numbers being receiued or put downe, a third or fourth number proportionable is found out, which of them is called [...], Inuention.

And by [...] ▪ Iudicium, Iudgement, is meant nothing els, but a Disposition, ordering or placing and setling of these seue­rall argumentes alreadie inuented, to the intent that a man may the better iudge of them, so that here Iudgement is taken for Disposition, the effect for the cause, for Iudgement ariseth of the ordering and disposing of arguments.

They might therefore haue chaunged the woordes, and kept the thing, which yet they haue not done: but brought in new diuisions of Logike, correspondent to the setling and pla­cing of Aristotles Logicall discourses in his booke called Orga­non: sometimes into thrée partes, as Apodicticall, Topicall, Elenchticall, sometimes into two, by name Apodicticall and Dialecticall▪ Topicall, or Dialecticall they will haue to bée a se­uerall kinde of Logike by probable argumentes. Apodicticall, that which disputeth by necessary conclusions, as though there were not one and the same Art, Science, and order of reasoning both by probable and necessary argumentes, as I sayde before, and the selfe same places of argumentes both in the one and in the other, as causes, effectes, subiectes, adiuncts, &c. both contin­gent and necessary. For, as for that third kinde of Logike, which they call Elenchticall, séeing it is no Logike at all, but rather the abuse and peruersion of Logike, I sée no cause why it shoulde be taught in Logike: yet if any man thinke that the true preceptes of Logike once knowne, will not be sufficient to des [...]ry the false­nesse of sophisticall argumentations, he may for his contenta­tion séeke for a full discourse thereof out of some commentarie, and not ouercharge the Art it selfe with vnnecessary instituti­ons. I graunt there is something profitable in the Elenches, as also in some other tractates of the same kind, but if wée shall put downe all in Logike, for true Logike, which doth in any respect helpe Logike, wée shall neuer make an ende of Logike.

[Exposition is the first part:] As in Grammer, Aetymolo­gie concerneth seuerall woords, and Syntaxis the due coherence of the same, so Exposition the first part of Logike, declareth the particular affection and nature of euery seuerall argument, and [Page] Disposition the second part, by ordering and setling the same, causeth iudgement and vnderstanding. And as seuerall woords bée in respect of Grammer, so seuered reasons in respect of Lo­gike, and as of many woords is made spéech, so of diuers argu­ments arise axioms.

Exposition and Disposition are not two seuerall arts of Lo­gike, as though wée should haue one Logike to expound the na­tures of seuerall arguments, and another to iudge of the same by Disposition, but they bée two essentiall parts of the whole, which ioyned togither make one true Logike.

The doctrine of Inuention or Exposition is generall, and not restrained onely to the finding out of a Medium, which they commonly take for the onely argument, but absolutely and vni­uersally appliable to the inuenting of any thing, either true or fained whatsoeuer.

Againe, the arguments in Inuention must bée considered se­uerally, singlely, and alone, then after to bée disposed and orde­red by certeine precepts, thereby to iudge of the truth or false­nesse of the same: as for example.

Paris A good sheepheard. These two singly put downe as two arguments, to wit, the subiect and the adiunct, are afterwards disposed in an axiome, to iudge of the truth thereof, as thus: Paris is no good sheepheard.

But because this proposition is contingent and doubtfull (for the arguments bée but in part agréeable) therefore it is confir­med by another argument, that is to say, by an effect and woor­king of Paris, I meane that which Thomalin putteth downe in Iuly, in these woords.

So then, héere bée thrée seuerall arguments, or two ioyned in the axiome before, and the third following in these verses of Thomalin: which third they call, Medium, or third argument, thus:

• [Page 7]1 Paris:
• 2 A good sheepheard.
• 3 To leaue his flocke to fetch a lasse.

Whereof it is concluded in this wise syllogistically, by dis­ioyning the two first arguments, the subiect and adiunct, Paris, and, The good sheepheard.

• Hée that leaueth his flocke to fetch a lasse, is no good sheepheard:
• But Paris did leaue his flocke to fetch a lasse,
• Therefore Paris is no good shéepheard.

That which they call Medium, and third argument, is, as it were, an Arbiter honorarius, a determiner, a reconciler, a daies man: which if it agrée with both the other arguments, maketh the conclusion affirmatiue: but negatiue, if with one onely, as in the former example of Paris, the Medium, the arbiter, the de­terminer, is that effect of Paris, To leaue his flocke to fetch a lasse: which because it is agréeable with the nature of Paris, but is flatly repugnant to the dutie of a good shéepheard, therefore is the conclusion negatiue, Paris is no good shéepeheard. So in Maister Ploidens reports, fol. 474. Saunders is a murderer. The Mediū is that effect of Saunders, to minister venim to the intent to poyson: which, because it agréeth as well with the nature of murder, as the affection of Saunders, maketh the conclusion affirmatiue, thus:

• Hée that dooth minister venim to poyson any one, is a murderer:
• But Saunders ministred venim to poyson one,
• Therefore Saunders is a murderer.

In this order, first of single arguments wée make axioms: which axioms, if of themselues they bée perceiued and graunted, they bée straightway iudged as true or false. And this is the first part of iudgement in axioms, called axiomaticall, determining only truth and falsenes in propositions or axioms. Now if these propositions bée doubtfull, then therof be made questions, which are to bée prooued by third arguments, fet from the affections of the other two which were ioyned in the axiome, and lastly are to be concluded by syllogisme, the onely iudge of all coherence or consequence: as finally, Methode hath only to deale with the ordering and setling of many axioms, thereby to giue sentence [Page] of methodicall procéeding or vnorderly confusion. And therefore I sée no reason why I should with the common Logicians, cho [...] in Canons, Maximaes, and rules of consequence, as they call them, applying them to euery argument of inuention, séeing that syllogismes, and onely syllogismes are the true and onely rules of consequence and inconsequence, as I said before.

The occasion, as I thinke, of this their errour, héereof arose: because if an Enthymeme be denied, we cōmonly confirme it by some axiome, which indéed is nothing els, but the supplying of the part wanting, as either the Maior, or Minor, as they terme them, or els some prosyllogisme. And this rule, Canon or Maxi­ma, béeing so supplied, a plaine syllogisme procéedeth, the onelie determiner of coherence. And as all the force of consequence is in syllogismes, so all the vertue of arguing is in the seuerall affection of euery argument to the thinge argued: whiche af­fection is truely and artificially put downe in Inuention: in such sort that from euerie definition, and precept in Inuention, such rules, maximaes, canons, axioms, consectaries, corollaries, or howsoeuer you tearme them, may easily bée deduced: and, when necessitie requireth, shall be of vs put downe distinctly in their seuerall places. For, as for most of those outworne maxi­maes hudled vp in schooles, they be either vnnecessarie, and may bée easily perceaued by the definitions and explications of the ar­guments, or els not generally true, but in part: and therefore in no wise to bée put downe in art, but rather to be reserued for Commentaries, as that, Quod efficit tale, magis est tale, &c. which cannot stand, but by a number of friuolous and sophisti­call distinctions. Let him read Beurhusius, if any list to sée the true canons of Ramus his Logike, compared at large with these lame rules. It shal suffice at this time to vnderstand, that y^e true maximaes, or canons of Inuention, are nothing els but certain rules concerning the seuerall force or affection of arguments: The canons of axioms, such precepts as declare the vse & force of axioms: and so, in a woord, the canons of syllogisms and me­thode, are precepts touching the consequence and inconsequence of the one, & the perspicuitie or confusion of the other. Neither are there any rules of consequence at all, but only those of syllo­gisms. I haue in my text kept my selfe onely to such maximaes [Page 8] both in Inuention and Disposition, as are put downe order­ly by Ramus, and are essentially belonging to this art: yet for the satisfiyng of the expectation of some yoong Logicians, some­what vnacquainted with this newfound Logike, as it pleaseth some to tearme it, I will héereafter, as occasion shall serue, put downe in the annotations, some of the other stampe.

But héere may a doubt arise? For, séeing that euery axiome and rule of Inuention is a part of Iudgement (because it is an axiome, and euery axiome is of iudgement) it may séeme that Inuention and Iudgement be not distinct parts, but rather, as was obiected before out of Carpentar, confounded the one with the other. I answere, the rules and precepts of Inuention bée indéed axioms, and therefore consequently procéed from Iudge­ment: but so, as you must take them to be the fruits of Iudge­ment already shewed in ordering the axiomes and rules of In­uention: or examples of Iudgement, teaching the part of In­uention: Not as though these precepts were put downe in In­uention to teach a man how to iudge, either axiomatically, syl­logistically, or methodically, which onely belongeth to the se­cond part of Logike called Iudgement or Disposition: And if you so take them, then euerie axiome is not straight way a part of Iudgement: but onely such rules and precepts, as teach to make, order, and frame axioms. For otherwise, euery precept of euery art, because it is an axiome, should bée taken for a part of Iudgement in Logike: whereas indéed they bée but the fruites and examples of that Logicall iudgement appéering in the or­derly constitution of euery art. And so in Inuention, euery rule is an axiome, euery rule doth iudge, but euery rule teacheth not how to frame an axiome, euery rule sheweth not how to iudge, which onely is the peculiar duetie of Logicall iudge­ment.

The art and doctrine of euery argument, is distinct, firme, constant, and immutable: yet the affection of arguments may bée altered, changed, and diuersly considered, either in the same things diuersly compared among themselues, or in one thing referred to diuers, as in those examples, put downe by Beurhu­sius and Talaeus,

[Page]

Where the things be as they were, I meane, God, and Man, which are héere compared togither, yet the diuers kinds of rela­tions and respectes, make the selfe same thinges haue diuers names and titles, according to their seuerall and diuers affec­tions.

In like manner also it is, if one thing be referred to many, and drawne, as it were, through the places of arguments, al­though some arguments bée not incident to some things:

Yet the art is certeine and immutable, for, that which is a cause, can neuer bée an effect in the same respect and relation, which relation chaunging, altereth the argument, not the art.

[An Argument:] Euery thing hath his seuerall name ac­cording to his naturall proprietie, or by the imposition and fan­cie of man, but Logike respecting a second vse in these seuerall [Page 9] thinges, hath giuen them an artificiall and secondary name. As, fire hath this his name vsually knowne: but because it is sometimes considered of Logicians, as a cause of heate, therefore hath it his second note and name, and is called a Cause, one of the arguments, for that it argueth heate as his effect, and so in others. And by this affection wée learne whe­ther one argument agrée or disagrée with another, and how it agréeth, whether as a cause with his effect (which is an abso­lute and full agréement) or as an adiunct with his subiect, which is but an agréement in part, and after a certeine man­ner, and so of the rest. So that argumentes bée nothing els, but singularum rerum affectiones extra collocationem consi­deratae, quibus ad arguendum sunt affectae & comparatae, sed vt Grammatica non voces, non vocum significationes, sed vo­cum affectiones, sic Logica non res, non rerum naturas, sed re­rum inter se habitudines explicat. Ita (que) omnia argumenta sunt relata: sed quia istae relationes variae sunt, ita (que) varia sunt argumentorum genera. This affection of argumentes is by Hottoman expounded in this manner. Affectio ista est ratio quam quae (que) res habet ad alterā. Graeci [...] appellant; itaque commodius rationem appellare possemus, sed vitandae ambi­guitatis causa, nomen affectionis delegimus, quo eodem Cicero, & in topicis, & in ꝑartitionibus hac eadem in re est vsus. Ra­tionis autē verbū á Mathematicis sumptum est, qui [...] de­finiunt duarum eiusdem generis quantitatum comparationem; interpretes proportionem Latinè nominarunt: quidam habi­tudinem: nonnulli habitum: qui commodius, respectum: bar­bari fortasse correspondentiam appellarent. Huius vis ac fa­cultas ea est, vt declaret, quaenam rei cuius (que) cum altera ratio sit, quemadmodum inuicem affectae sint, quomodò se inter se habeant, qualis inter ipsas comparatio aut affectio sit, sitne pars an totū, genus an species, consentanea an dissentanea, &c.

[To argue:] To argue, is generall; either in inuenting onely one argument by the affection of the other, as when by the notion of the cause we séeke the effect, or els in placing them axiomatically, syllogistically, or methodically, wée ar­gue some other thing either by explication or confirmation. The first consideration is of arguments seuerally conceaued [Page] and alone by themselues, the second as they bée placed by dis­position: and therfore Piscators animaduersion in this place is to small purpose, whereas hée reprehendeth Ramus, for say­ing that euery seuerall thing considered alone is an argu­ment. For he in so saying meaned not, that an argument should bée so alone, as though it had no affection or relation to any other thing, but so seuerally considered, as that in In­uention we should not intermeddle with axiomaticall, syllo­gisticall, or methodicall conioining and setting together of the same seuerall arguments, for that dooth wholy and only belong to Disposition.

[Any seuerall conceipt:] Except those woordes which doo but bind and knit together the parts of spéech, as coniunc­tions, which signifie no seueral and distinct thing in nature. Except againe copious and Rhetoricall phrases, where ma­ny woordes expresse but one thing, as, A man of an excellent and heauenly wit, where the woords be many, the arguments but two, that is, the subiect and the adiunct. Lastly, except full comparisons, diuisions, definitions, and descriptions, where the argument is put downe in a whole proposition. This is Beurhusius exception, although to small purpose: for Ramus saith not, all such woordes as are alone, but all such reasons, conceipts, and thinges as are alone, and by themselues con­ceaued seuerally, as these arguments bée which hée héere ex­cepteth: for though there bée many woordes, yet they all ex­presse but one conceipt of reason, and that is this single and sole argument which wée héere talke of.

But to let that passe, hée that taketh this woord Argu­ment, onely for a proofe or confirmation, deceaueth himselfe, and bereaueth Logike of halfe hir dignitie. Indéede it is vsually taken for that thing onely which dooth prooue and confirme, but héere it hath a more generall signification, and betokeneth not onely confirmations, but also declarati­ons without any syllogisme or forme of concluding, and so doth arguere in Latine signifie, declarare, ostendere, per­spicuum manifestum (que) facere, vt in Virgilio,

Degeneres animos timor arguit, id est, ostendit.

Yet neuerthelesse the same kinde of argument may com­monly [Page 10] serue both to declare and to confirme (although some there bée which onely declare) so in the end of the first Aeg­loge of the shepheardes Kalender, Hobbinol vseth an argu­ment of the cause, onely for explication sake.

And in the ninth Aegloge, Diggon Dauy vseth the same kinde of argument to the same purpose.

And yet here the cause argueth the effect, although there bée no syllogisticall probation intended, for that the propo­sition of it selfe séemed to Diggon true inough. And in our lawe, In euery count, barre, replication, reioynder, &c. Argumentes of asseueration and exposition bée asmuch vsed as those of proofe and conclusion. Now for the other parte, no man doubteth but that an argument of the cause may bée very well vsed for confirmation, wherof examples are euery where apparant. Let no man therefore thinke there is no Logike, where there is no syllogisticall conclusion, for euery argument serueth not euery where onely for confirmation.

[Inhaerent:] I vse this woord till I méete with a bet­ter. I meane not so Inhaerent, as though it should alwayes agrée with the thing argued, for many times it is flatly re­pugnant therevnto, but so conioyned, as that the thing ar­gued in maner offereth the argument to the Inuention of the Logician, and this is true in disagréeable argumentes: otherwise it is in testimonies, which bée as it were bor­rowed from other matters, and brought to the Logician to bée framed accordingly.

Ramus diuideth an argument into artificiall and inarti­ficiall, whervpon Piscator tooke occasion of reprehension. For I sée no reason, sayth hée, why testimonies shoulde bée called inartificiall argumentes, séeing that there is as good Arte shewed in applying them, as in finding other argumentes: and if in Art there ought to bée nothing without Art, either Inuention wanteth Art, or testimonies are not inartificiall, they answere him thus. They bée not called Inartificiall, for [Page] that they want Art, but because they argue not of thēselues, but by the force of some artificiall: Which answere doth not fully satisfie mée: For the testimonie of God argueth moste absolutely of it selfe, neither can wée well say, that his testi­monie were not to bée beléeued, vnlesse hée were verus, bo­nus, iustus &c. sith wée cannot distinguishe these so from his diuine essence, but that whatsoeuer is in God, is God: and therefore it is an vnfallible argument, God spake it, there­fore it is so, ipse dixit, is here sufficient, neyther néede wée séeke for any artificiall argument to confirme it, as wée doe in the testimonies of men.

I holde on the same course which Ramus dooth in deui­ding still by certaine steps and degrées, till I come at last to the lowest. For it were against Platoes precept and all Arte, to iumpe abruptly from the highest and most generall, to the lowest and most speciall, without passing by the subalternal.

[First:] First may bée conceiued of it selfe, without respect had to any other, as not depending on those that fol­low. So the cause may be knowne without any mention of a definition, but the definition can neuer bée conceiued with­out notice of the cause, as being made thereof: therefore the cause is first and originall, the definition secondary.

[Fully agreeable:] Seribonio & Piscatori non placet ista distinctio: nam si Logicè considerentur, aequalis & eadem est consensio: nam subiecta & adiuncta aequè non possunt alterum esse abs (que) altero, at (que) causa & effectū: sin physicè, tùm accidentalis illa consensio est ae (que) in his & illis: nam fa­ber po [...]est non facere, quomodò puer potest non esse tinctus literis. Et nec omnis causa essentialiter conuenit cum effecto, nec omne subiectum accidentaliter cum suo adiuncto. haec illi. Quia tamen diuersi sunt gradus dissentaneorum, ideò & consentaneorum videntur esse eodem modo. Ita (que) hic nihil mutaui. haereo.

These generall heades of argumentes haue béene diuersly tearmed of diuers Philosophers, as appeareth by Diogenes Laertius, and Aristotle. For sometimes they are called Ca­tegoremes, and the handling or discoursing of the same, Ca­tegories, both which are Gréeke woordes of like signification, [Page 11] borrowed from the place of iudgement, and applyed to phy­losophicall conceipts. [...] signifieth to say, or affirme one thing of an other, as in accusations it is vsually [...]éene, and in arguments easily perceaued: where one thing added to an other, is affirmed of the same, or else denied. Other­whiles the preceptes of them bée called [...], wherevpon, Aristotles bookes where these bée handled, are intituled [...] is a place, and therefore Tully called them in La­tine, locos, sedes, fontes, places, seates, springes or foun­taynes of argumentes. Sometimes they haue more apt and easie titles, as when they bée called Principles, Ele­mentes, Reasons, Proofes, Argumentes, Termini and Media. Of all which, I vse for the most part, this woord Ar­gument, and sometimes Reason, and Proofe, as most vsuall and significant, the rest béeing rather straunge and meta­phoricall.

Annotations.

ARistotle sometimes calleth the efficient, the beginning of motion and rest, as in the first of his Metaphysikes, and second of his Physikes. And otherwhiles hée vseth this very name, Efficient, as in his Topikes and Demonstrations.

The auncient Philosophers made great discourses con­cerning this cause, but some very fabulous, sayth Aristotle 3. Metap. As Hesiodus and Parmenides made Loue the maker of all things; some obscure and ambiguous, as Hermotimus and Anaxagoras sayde that a certaine diuyne spirite was the author of all; so Empedocles giues all to Concord & Discord, and diuers others to other diuers things. Wherfore Aristo­tle compareth them to yoong fresh souldiers and vnexperien­ced fellowes, that many times hit home, and lay on loade, but without eyther artor order.

[...] or [...] in Gréeke is a cause in English. It is som­times taken generally for any reason or argument by com­mon custome and vse of spéech: but héere it hath a more speci­all and proper signification, and conteyneth onely these foure kinds of causes following. [...] and [...], bée very sig­nificant woords to expresse the cause and that which is made of the cause: The Latinistes haue none so good, vnlesse you take that dunsicall deriuation, Causa, Causatum, which wée imitate in English to very good purpose, thus, the cause, and the thing caused: Where, as the woord, Cause, comprehen­deth efficient, materiall, formall, and finall cause, so, the thing caused, aunswering [...] in Gréeke, and Causatum in Latine, conteyneth the seuerall effectes of euery particuler [Page] cause, as proportionably wée may say, the ende and the thing whose end it is: the forme and the thing formed, the maker and the thing made, the matter and the thing materiate. For otherwise, although in Latine, Effectum doo stand for all foure, yet properly it onely betokeneth that which is caused by the efficient. For thus wée may distinguishe the seuerall vertues of the foure causes, although I knowe they all con­curre togither in causing, so that the constitution of the thing caused is not fet from this or that alone, but from all foure ioyntly.

Foelix qui potuit rerum cognoscere causas, sayth Virgill. For although by effects and other arguments wée may haue a probable gesse and make sensible coniectures at thinges: yet no true science or knowledge is had but from the causes: By the effectes and euentes wée sée [...], that thinges bée so: but by the causes wée knowe [...], why they be so: and that is onely woorthy the name of knowledge.

These diuers sortes and distinctions of efficients are greatly to bée considered in dayly affaires, as containing in them the reason of the well or ill dooing of any thing: of all punishments, rewards, excuse, compassion. &c.

Omnis procreatio & conseruatio fit natura, consilio, per se, vel per accidens: ita (que) illa primo, haec postremo in loco collocaui.

[Naturally:] So all naturall thinges bée made, marde, augmented, diminished, altered, and remooued from place to place by this operation of nature.

I sayd before that the efficient was rather distinguished then artificially deuided. For in trueth the preseruing cause is the efficient rather of the preseruation it selfe, than of the thing preserued. And the instrumentall cause, as it is an instrument, is no efficient at all, but rather a helping mem­ber or part of the efficient, sith it hath no power in it selfe to cause the thing caused. Causa sine qua non is of some refer­red to helping causes. Occasio est agendi tempestiuitas siue opportunitas casu oblata, quod postremum ex nominis ety­mologia intelligitur, reliquum ex appellationibus graecis, [...], quorum nominum extremum, [Page 17] notat tempus vnde agens initium agendi facit, quod graecè expressius sonat, [...]. vide­tur occasio esse causa per accidens, sed diuersa ab illis duabus a Ramo positis.

Aristotle in the second of his Physikes distinguisheth be­twéene Fortune and Chaunce, as making Fortune proper­ly incident to those efficients onely which woorke with ad­uise and deliberation, yet then vse it not, and this is called Imprudentia, when wée doo a thing vnawares. But Chaunce hée will haue that to bée which is found in things void of such deliberation. So that if a man should call the stones that co­uer some honourable personage, fortunate, for that they bée somewhat honored, this were but an vnproper kind of spea­king by Aristotles rule.

A man goeth towards Westminster to talke with his coū ­seller, and misseth of him, héere his going was in vaine: but in going hée findeth a ringe: His going to Westminster was the cause of the finding of the ringe, but yet such a cause as wée call Fortune, or Haphazard. So Ouid excuseth himselfe for seeing somewhat more than hée should, before he would.

In like maner Tully reporteth in his thirde booke de na­tura deorum, what good fortune befell Iason Phaereus, who hauing an impostume, as hée thought, incurable, went to fight with purpose to dye, but with a wound his impostume was opened, a thing which neyther himselfe nor his phisiti­ans euer imagined: Héere then was fortune on eyther side, in Iason that was wounded, and in him that gaue him the wound: good in the first, bad in the second. For the enemies weapon was by fortune a cause of Iasons vnexpected health, whereas death was desired of the one, and intended by the other, for he that gaue the stroake, thought rather to make a new wound than cure an olde disease. This is fortune with [Page] Aristotle. Nowe on the other side, if a thrée-footed stoole should fall from aloft, and yet in falling stand on his féete, this with him is chaunce, for the stoole fell for no such ende, and it is a thing altogether sencelesse. Epicurus said that the world was made by the casual concourse and mixture of litle round indiuisible bodies, like moates in the funne, whose ri­diculous blasphemy Tully mocketh not without deserued cause, 2. de nat. deorum: for so, if a man shoulde by chaunce cast abroad an hundred thousand or more of characters or Printers stampes, hée might as well reade on the ground all saint Austins woorkes or Cowpers dictionary by the casuall scattering of A. B. C. These bée examples of chaunce with Aristotle, not of fortune. But it is folly t [...] stand vpon this nice and friuolous distinction of Chaunce and Fortune, sith in common spéech they be taken all as one, and so they bée héere to bée vnderstoode.

In this kinde of cause, ignorance and vnwitting simpli­citie haue place as I sayd before, whereof come excuses and supplications, when a man pleadeth ignorance, and therefore hopeth to finde pardon, as Tully for Ligarius, Ignosce pater, errauit, lapsus est, non putauit, si vnquam posthac. And againe, Erraui, temerè feci, ad clementiam tuam confugio, delicti veniam peto, vt ignoscasoro. But indéede, this name of Fortune, Chaunce, Hap, or Hazard, was onely inuen­ted by such as knewe not the first cause, Gods prouidence: And therefore when any thing fell out contrary to theyr ex­pectation, whereof they neyther vnderstoode the cause, nor could yéeld any reason, they said it came by chaunce, fortune and hazarde. Wherevpon Fortune was made a goddesse of good luck: and many christians vse these prophane tearmes, God send mée good lucke, and good fortune. Whose idle pray­ers bée noted by an Ethnike Poet.

Aristotle calleth Fortune, [...], improuidum, incertum, dubium, hu­mano iudicio ambiguum, and yet [...], vt diuinum quiddam & beatum.

[Page 18] Canons incident to causes generally.

God onely is the first and principall cause of all thinges. All other causes whatsoeuer are secondary, and subiect so his eternall direction.

Nothing is without a cause.

If all the causes concurre, the effect will followe.

To whatsoeuer thing you ascribe the cause, or deny the cause to y^e same you attribute or deny y^e effect or thing caused.

Such as the cause is, such for the moste part is the thing caused: this holdeth not in destroying causes.

Particuler Canons of the efficient.

When many efficient causes ioine and concurre together in any action (as the principall cause with other helpers and instrumentes) there they all ioyntly together bée onely the full and perfect efficient cause of that effect.

Cause naturall, voluntary, accidentall, violent.

God hath distributed to euery creature some naturall pro­prieties, vertues and operations.

If the naturall vertue, and propertie of any thing bée af­firmed, the naturall effect will follow, vnlesse that naturall facultie bée otherwise let or hindered, and if the effect bée, the cause must also haue gone before.

If will, and aduise, or deliberation bée, then the effect may bée.

Such as the naturall disposition and will is, suche is the effect iudged to bée.

If the cause be in hazard, that is, if the cause bée to vs vn­certaine and vnknowne, then may the effect fall out vncer­tainely and by hazard, or when wée looke not for it.

Alone and with others.

If the sole cause woorke continually, the thing caused is alwayes, if not, then otherwise: if the efficient doo necessa­rily require the helpe of others in woorking, then without them nothing can bée doone: if not, then otherwise: if it woorke by instrumentes, then are those instrumentes re­quired. If the efficient woorke alone, then it dserueth the more, either prayse or condemnation, if with others, then the lesse, so Nisus 9. Aeneid. accuseth himselfe, and excuseth

[Page] Euryalus. Me, me, adsum qui feci, in me conuertite ferrum, ô Rutuli, mea fraus omnis, nihil iste, nec ausus, Nec potuit.

Procreant, conseruant. No efficient cause, except God, can make any woorke without matter. Hinc illud, gigni,

E nihilo nihil; in nihilum nil posse reuerti. And if the matter bée, the woorke may bée made.

If the procreant and conseruant cause bée, the thing may bée procreated and conserued. If the vndooing and destroi­yng cause bée, then must the thing decay.

If the cause efficient bée good, the effect will bée good: and bad, if bad.

If the destroying cause bée good, y^e thing destroyd was bad: If the thing destroyed bée bad, the cause destroying must bée good, y^• is to say, hath doon some good, hath brought some profit.

The efficient may bée expressed by variety both of Gram­maticall cases and Rhetoricall figures: as in procreant cau­ses, God is the father and fountayne and well of all goodnes. The beginning of euery good thing is in, of, and from God.

From procreant causes the Poets doo oftentimes fetch their epithites & circumloqutions, as, Sole satus Phaeton, &c. Phaeton borne of the sunne.

If you put downe, or take away, that is, if you affirme or deny the cause efficient, procreant and conseruant, in tyme fit and conuenient to woorke, and béeing not idle, then the ef­fect must bée put downe, or taken away: but diuersly, accor­ding to the diuersitie of the causes themselues. For,

If such a cause bée, as that it woorketh of his owne proper force, plainly and certainly, no other thing helping it, then must the effect follow certeinly.

Now let vs sée a little the vse of these Canons, in compa­rison of the plaine definitions and explications of proprie­ties put downe by Ramus. Let this serue for an example.

• He that is idle, is wanton:
• But Paris is idle,
• Therefore Paris is wanton.

[Page 19] In the proposition, which is the first axiome of the thrée, Idlenesse, as a procreant cause, doth argue Wantonnesse, as his effect. In the second axiome which maketh the assump­tion, the same Wantonnesse, is an adiunct of Paris; that is, a qualitie adioyned, or incident to the nature of Paris. Nowe according to the common Logicians, in this sorte must you iudge by disposition.

Paris is idle,

Therefore he is wanton,

For the cause béeing put downe, the effect will followe. But otherwise; if you beléeue Ramus, thus:

The proposition, which was this; He that is idle is wan­ton, is a doubtfull and contingent axiome, and yet, for the most part, most true, by reason of the affection of such a cause to such an effect. The assumption was this, But Paris is idle, which is also a contingent axiome, and must bée con­firmed by the maners and behauiours of Paris. The con­clusion it selfe doth follow necessarily, by force of the forme and constitution of the syllogisme: but yet, of it selfe, it is but a contingent axiome, although the deduction of it from the premises, bée, as I sayd, necessary, by reason of the law­full framing of the syllogisme. If therefore the proposition bée denyed, I aunswere, that it is a contingent axiome, for the most part true, and therefore you cannot iudge it altoge­ther false. And this I confirme by the definition of the effici­ent cause already put downe, thus; The efficient is a cause from which a thing is, which cause if it bée, the thing caused either is, or may bée. This nowe is a new and prosyllo­gisticall argument, fet from the very naturall definition of the argument it selfe, that is of the cause efficient: nay ra­ther this is that common maxime vsed of others, if the effi­cause bée (that is, in due time, and not hindered) the effect will follow. But héere, the variety of efficient causes is diligently to be marked, as some be alone, some with others, some accidentally, some of their owne force; as before I haue shewed. So then, by this we perceiue, that the Canon or Maxima, dooth nothing concerne the consequence, but onely the confirmation of the [Page] proposition and thing it selfe. Thus much for the pro­position.

Now if any man deny the assumption, it must, as I sayde before, bée prooued by the life and conuersation of Paris him­selfe. For in euery syllogisme, the premisses, as they terme them, that is, the proposition and the assumption, must bée prooued and confirmed, eyther by axiomaticall iudgement in Logike procéeding from the seuerall affection of argumentes to the things which they argue, or els by other arts and dai­ly affayres incident to mans life. And commonly the pro­positions are prooued to bée eyther contingent or necessary axioms, by Logicall definitions of argumentes, and certayne rules or canons, which are, as it hath béene tolde, brought in for new and prosyllogisticall arguments for the confirmatiō of the said proposition, and not as proofes of the conseqution. And if you thus apply rules, canons, and maximaes, whe­ther proper to this Art, or those common receiued ones, you shall not doo amisse.

Lastly, concerning the conclusion of this syllogisme, if a­ny man doo so much want good maners, as to deny it, you may iustly say, there is no reason why it should bée denied, vnlesse the constitution of the whole syllogisme bée not law­full and artificiall.

I will héere insert a few examples gathered out of our Law bookes, for the better vnderstanding of some of these ca­nons, & those distinctions of efficient causes put down before.

Cause principall and instrumentall. Hitherto may bée referred, what is sayde of principall and accessaries. Stamford, lib. 1. cap. 44. Nota que in grand treason, yly ad nul accesiories, eins touts sont principals. Vt patet, An. 3. H. 7, fol. 10. Issint que quecunque offence fait home accessarie en felony, mesme l'offence in grand treason fait luy principall. Mes en petit treason, ou felony, ou auters [...]els crimes, accessaries poient estre.

Accessaries sont deuant l'offence perpetrate, in procuring or commaunding auter de faire vn felony, mes n ient esteant present a le fait: issint, apres l'offence perpetrate sont ceux qui receuont vn felon attaint, bien conusants del fait que il [Page 20] ad fait, ou luy fauoront, ou aydont, &c. In attainder sur appa­rance et default, le principall doit estre attaint deuant l'acces­sory: et l'acquitel del principal est auxi acquitel del accessory.

Accidentall. De Homicide per misaduenture, vide Fitz. tit. co. 3. E. 3. P. 354. & P. 302. P. 2. H. 4. P. 69. & P. 11. H. 7. F. 24.

Si homicide soit fait nient per home, eins per auter casu­altie, de ceo surda Deodandum. Deodandum est ou home auient a sa mort per misaduenture d'ascun chose que chiet sur luy, ou per misaduenture dun laps que il mesme suffra, in chiant de ascun chose sans estre enche sonée per ascun auter ho­me; ceste chose quelle enchesona sa morte, serra forfet, et pris come Deodand. Vide Fitz. tit. coron. P. 403.

Concerning casuall homicide, I remember an odde histo­rie of a certaine man who falling from the top of a house, lighted on an other mans necke, and crushing him to death, preserued himselfe. The sonne of the dead man, procuring the reuenge of his fathers death, caused him that fell to bée had before the Iudge: Where hée no lesse pretily then rea­sonably, offered him this faire play: gett thée vp, ꝙ hée, to the top of the same house: I will stand where thy father did: and if by falling vpon mée thou bruse mée to death, and saue thy selfe, I promise thée, my sonne shal neuer séeke to reuenge my death.

Necessitie, Fortune, &c. Stamford: lib. 1. cap. 5. Homicide fait de necessitie ineui­table pur auancer iustice, est Iustifiable. Car le vicount, Baylie, ou ascun auter, qui ad garrant darrester home en­dite de felony peut bien Iustifier le tuer de luy, sil ne voile suffrir luy mesme estre arrest, eins estoit al defens tielment, que l'officer ne peut faire l'arrest sans luy tuer. et en tiel case l'officer serra discharge sans attender le grace le roy. s. sans, acquerer pardon, vt patet 22. lib. Ass. p. 55. et tit: coro in Fitz: P. 22. E. 3. P. 2. 61.

Item si plusors veignont a comburer ma meason, moy esteant la dedeins, et inuironnont la meason, mes ils ne ceo comburont: et ieo saetta hors, et occida vn de eux, ceo nest felony, vt patet 26. lib. ass. p. 23. Mesme ley est sils veignont a [Page] ma meason pur moy robber, et mon garcon qui est one moy in la meason, tua vn de eur. Fits: tit: coro: 3. E. 3. Itiner. North: P. 330. per Louth.

Mes coment necessitie serra interprete in homicide seip­sum defendendo. Vide Fitz. tit. coro: P. 266. an 43. lib. ass. P. 31. & 3. E. 3. P. 284. P. 286. P. 287. & P. 297.

Item, 21. H. 7. 39. Per Tremayle Iustice, seruant poit occider home in sauant le vie son maistre, sil ne poit auter­ment eschaper.

That this hath béene practised in England continually, it may appeare by the discourse of Bracton, who wrote in king Henry the thirds time, in this manner.

Est enim inter alia crimina, crimen quod ex parte tangit ipsum regem cuius pax infringitur, et ex parte priuatam per­sonam, quae nequiter & contra pacem regis occiditur. Vnde primò videndum est de homicidio, quid sit & vnde dicatur, quae eius species, & qua poena homicidae punientur.

Est enim homicidium, hominis occisio ab homine facta. Si autem àboue, cane, vel alia re: non dicitur propriè homicidiū.

Dicitur propriè homicidium, ab homine, & caedo, quasi hominis cedium.

Species homicidij sunt multae. Nam aliud spirituale, aliud corporale: de spirituali verò ad praesens non est dicendum.

Sed corporale est quo homo occiditur corporaliter: & hoc dupliciter committitur; lingua, & facto. Lingua tribus modis: s. praecepto, consilio, defensione vel tuitione. Facto quatuor modis; s. iustitia, vt cum iudex vel iusticiarius reum iustè damnatum occidit. Istud autem homicidium, si fit ex liuore, vel delectatione effundendi humani sanguinis, licet ille iustè occidatur, iudex tamen peccat mortaliter, propter intentionē corruptam. Si verò hoc fiat ex amore iustitiae, nec peccat iu­dex ipsum condemnando ad mortem, & praecipiendo mini­stro vt occidat eum; nec minister si iussus à iudice occidat con­demnatum. Et peccat vter (que) si hoc fecerint iuris ordine non seruato.

Necessitate: quo casu distinguendum est vtrum necessitas illa fuit ineuitabilis, an non: Si autem euitabilis, & eam eua­dere potuisset occisor abs (que) occi sione, tune erit reus homicidij. [Page 17] Si autem ineuitabilis, quia occidit hominem sine odij medita­tione, in metu & dolore animi, se & sua de liberando, cum ali­ter euadere non potuisset, non tenetur homicidij.

Casu, sicut per infortunium, cum quis proijcit lapidem ad auem, vel animal, & alius transiens ex insperato percutitur, & moritur. Vel siquis arborem inciderit, & per occasum arbo­ris aliquis opprimatur, & huiusmodi. Sed hic distinguendum est, vtrum quis dederit operam rei licitae an illicitae, vt si lapi­dem proijciebat quis versus locum per quem consueuerunt homines transitum facere: vel dum insequitur quis equum, vel bouem, & aliquis à boue vel equo percussus fuerit, & hu­iusmodi, hîc imputatur ei. Si verò licitae rei operam dabat, vt si magister causa disciplinae discipulum verberauit, vel dum quis deponebat foenum de curru, vel arborem incidebat, & hu­iusmodi, & adhibuit diligentiam quam potuit, s. respiciendo, & proclamando, nec nimis tardè aut dimissè, sed tempore con­gruo & ita clamosè, vt si aliquis ibi fuisset, vel illuc venisset, potuisset aufugere, aut sibi praecauere, non imputabitur ei. [...] [...]is est de magistro non excedendo modum verberan­di [...]ipulum.

Voluntate, vt siquis ex certa scientia, & in assultu praeme­d [...]tato, ira vel odio, vel causa lucri, nequiter & in felonia, con­tra pacem domini regis, aliquem interfecerit. Et fit aliquando hu [...]smodi homicidium pluribus astantibus & videntibus, ali­quando verò clanculum & nemine vidente, itá vt sciri non possit, quis sit occisor: huiusmodi homicidium dici poterit murd [...]m, secundum quod inferius dicetur.

Poena verò homicidij duplex est, spiritualis videlicet & corporalis: spiritualis tollitur per poenitentiam. Et occidit quis alium dupliciter: quando (que) lingua, quando (que) facto. Lin­gua, vt si quis dissuadendo, retrahit aliquem à proposito volen­tem alium liberare à morte. Et sic aliquandò indirectè facit quis homicidium. Poena verò homicidij commissi facto va­riatur. Nam pro homicidio iustitiae iusta & recta intentione facto, non est aliqua poena infligenda.

Si sit aliquis qui mulierem pregnantem percusserit, vel ei venenum dederit, per quod fecerit abortiuum, si puerperium iam formatum vel animatum fueri [...]t, & maximè si anima­tum, [Page] facit homicidium (Mes contrarium tenetur. Fitz. cor. P. 263. & 146. Car a faire homicide, il est requisite, que le cho­se occise soit in rerum natura.) Possunt & multi-culpabiles esse homicidij sicut & vnus, vt si plures rixati fuerint inter se in aliquo conflictu, & aliquis sit interfectus inter tales, nec ap­paret à quo, vel à cuius vulnere; omnes dici possunt homi­cidae, & illi qui percusserunt, & tenuerunt malo animo per­cussum dum percussus fuerit. Item & illi qui voluntate oc­cidendi venerunt, licet non percusserint. Item & illi qui non occiderunt, nec voluntatē occidendi habuerunt, sed venerunt ad praestandum auxilium & consilium occisoribus &c. Item & ille qui praecepit percutere & occidere, quia cum non sint immunes à culpa, immunes esse non debent à poena.

I haue written the whole discourse, for that there is here­in conteined the practise of most of these precepts concerning efficient causes.

Héerevnto may bée added also, our Essoynes de malo lecti, del creteine del eawe, &c. as standing all vpon the same grounds of violent and compulsiue causes, and therefore in themselues reasonable excuses of absence.

Ceux parols, Heyres, tantsolement font l'estate d'enheri­tance en touts feofmēts et graūts. Litleton pag. 1. for the sole cause. So agayne Littleton, fol. 166. a. Home ne voyt vn­ques que cest paroll, Defendemus, fuit en ascun fine, mes tantsolement cest paroll, Warrantizabimus. Perque semble que cest paroll et verbe, Warrantizo, fait la Garrrantie, et est la cause del Garrantie, et null auter verbe en nostre ley.

For the destroying cause, Vide 47. E. 3. fol. vltimo. Nota, que diuorce poet estre per cin (que) voyes, s. Causa professionis, praecontractus, cōsanguinitatis, affinitatis, frigiditatis. Et nota, que apres diuorce causa professionis le feme serra endowe, et le heyre inherite: mes en auters cases el ne serra endowe, ne le heyre inherite. Here diuorce is a dissolution of matri­mony, and the constitution of the one is the destruction of the other.

For instrumentall causes, sée 21. E. 4. 16. per Brigges: Qui fait per auter, fait per Luymesme; Come de seruant &c. [Page 22] et Fayrfax, la. 44. b. For voluntary aduise and delibe­ration, 41. E. 3. 30. per Finche. Si deux sont vouche per lour fayt demesne, et al sequatur sub suo periculo l'un vient, et l'auter fayt defaut; et le tenant surmit que cestuy que fist defaut n'ad rien de fayre en value, il auera l'entiere garran­tie vers cestuy que appiere, car fuit son folly de ioynder en garrantie oue cestuy que rien ad. Sic si feme sole ad title d'entre en terres, et prist baron, que suffer discent et ne en­tra, la feme serra barre del entry apres le mort son baron: car serra dit sa folly de prendre tiel baron, que n'entra en temps. Héere the frée choyse, will, and election taketh away all occasion of excuse.

Materiall cause. The materiall causes, as also all other arguments Logi­call, are not to bée tied onely to sensible or bodily matters: but generally to bée applyed to any whatsoeuer, bée it subiect to sence, or conceiued by reason. As, a man conceiueth in his mind or memory the Art of Logike or any other science, the matter whereof is their seuerall rules and preceptes, the forme, the due disposition of the same: and yet nether first nor last is subiect to sence, but onely vnderstoode by reason, and imprinted in the inward power of mans soule. The old honest philosophers haue had many odde conceiptes and fan­tasticall imaginations touching this cause, as appeareth by Aristotle in the first of his Metaphysickes. For Thales thought the water was the materiall cause of all thinges, as the Misticall fellowes and Pagan diuines thought y^e Ocean, Thetis, and Stix to bée. Anaximenes sayde it was the ayre, Heraclitus, the fire, Hesiodus the confusion of the worlde, Pythagoras numbers, Plato litle and great, all whiche and others also are but derided of Aristotle, as though they had thus spoken of the Logicall materiall cause, which should bée generall to all thinges, and not rather of the material ground of naturall thinges.

Canons. If the thing bée made, then the matter must néedes bée. If the matter bée, the thing materiate may bée: if not, then it cannot bée, in secondary causes.

[Page] The matter sheweth the excellency or goodnesse of the thinges made thereof: for if the matter bée good, the thing made is good: if better, better: therefore in deliberation and consultation of dyet, of building, of weapons, of gar­ments and such like, as also in praysing or dispraising of any thing made, there is an especiall consideration and regard had of the matter.

Theloall his definition of a writte contayneth both the materiall cause and others also. Un briefe est vn for­mal letter ou epistre del roy, escript en le langue latyne, en perchemyne, selée oues (que) son seale, direct al ascun iudge, offi­cer, minister, ou auter subiect, al suyte del roy mesme, ou al playnte et suyte d'auter subiect, commaundant ou autorisant ascun chose conteigne en mesme la letter de estre fait pur la cause brieffement en celle letter expresse, que est d'estre dis­cusse en ascun court le roy per la ley.

Annotations.

THe formall and materiall cause bée essentiall partes of the thing caused: the end and the efficient are not so.

The forme is alwaies made by the efficient, the matter is commonly prepared, not alwayes made by it, as the quill is the matter whereof a pen is made, here the maker of the pen, dooth but order, polish, and prepare the quill, but hée al­together maketh the forme and fashion of the pen. And al­though forma bée effectum efficientis, yet it is causa formati. [Page 24] Dicitur forma à formando, differentia verò quia differre facit: vna enim eadem (que) res est, etsi diuersa nomina: and according to these two names, hath Aristotle in the first of his Topiks assigned it two properties; The one for giuing essence and knowledge of the same essence, the other for causing diffe­rence: And in respect of the former, it is sometimes called, [...], quod quid erat esse, as 1. post. Sometimes [...], ratio essentiae, 1. de ortu animal: sometimes [...], essentia rei, 1. Philo: sometimes [...], [...]atio specifica & essentialis, 4. Phil: some­times [...], specifica, completiua, constitutiua, as in Porphyry: and sometimes [...], forma & ratio: sometimes [...], species & exemplar, 5. Phil. In consideration of the latter propriety, it is commonly called [...], differentia, for that especi­ally by the forme things differ one from another; so the for­mall cause of man is his reasonable soule, for this maketh man, to bée man, and to differ from all other thinges that bée not man. So eu [...]y naturall thing hath his peculiar forme, as a lyon, a horse, a trée, &c. the heauen, the earth, the sea, &c. So euery artificiall thing also, as a house, a shippe, &c. So things incorporall, as vertue, vice, &c. So in a woord, whatso­euer is, by the formall cause it is that which it is, and is dif­ferent from all other things that it is not.

Onely the forme among all other causes is [...], simul congenita, extant at the same instant with the thing formed: so that there is a most necessary and reciprocall consequence betwéene the forme and the thing formed. But now, as the vnderstanding of the formall cause causeth surest know­ledge, so hardly can wée vnderstand what the formall cause is; which peraduenture made Democritus thinke that truth lay hidden in the bottome, and plunged in the déepe. Indéede wée generally conceaue and gather, that euery particular thing hath his peculiar forme, but what is the peculiar forme of euery particular thing, that we know not; or if peraduen­ture wée gesse at them now and then, yet hardly can wée ex­presse our conceits with laboursome and tedious circumlo­cutions. So that, for the most part things bée not knowne, [Page] and if they bée in part perceiued, then haue wée no name [...] for the thinges. Here therefore the auntient philosophers were woonderfully troubled, as Aristotle reporteth 2. Meta. Pythagoras would haue his numbers to bée y^• cause of things, and that euery thing was an image or resemblance of num­bers: and Plato altered their woordes a little, saying that Idaea was the forme, and that thinges formed were commu­nications and participations of Idaeas: of whome Aristotle concludeth thus▪ that they valdè simpliciter & imperitè e­gerunt, & hée seemed but nugari, & poeticas metaphoras loqui.

Canons. IF you remooue the forme, it is impossible for the thing formed to consist.

Such is euery thing, as the forme permitteth it to bée.

The forme is the fountayne of actions.

The forme of euery thing is the especial part of y^e thinge, and the alteration of the forme chaungeth the thing formed, and maketh it an other thing: but héere wée must distinguish betwéene the vniuersall chaunging of the forme, and the par­ticuler alteration thereof. For if a house bée vtterly defaced, though it bée reedi [...]ied of the selfe same timber and stone, yet it is not the same house, but if it bée but a litle decayed and so repayred in part, it remayneth the same house still, though in continuance of time, euery stick and stone bée alte­red by often repayring of it.

The formall cause is generall, as all other partes of Lo­gike. For the declaration whereof I will purposely note out some examples of the formall cause in actions and exercises aswell as thinges corporall.

Formalitie in pleading is now partly abridged by the statutes of 32. H. 8. ca. 20. 18. Elis. ca. 14. and 27. Elis. but how much it was estéemed heretofore, sée 14. H. 8. 27. per Brooke Iustice. Car vn forme couyent d'estre tenus et vse, ou auter­ment touts choses serra en confuse et sans order. Car en tres­passe couyent doner colour (et vncore le sentence n'est le me­lieur en le veritie del matter) pur ceo (que) est formalitie. Et a vne plée en l'affirmatiue couyent prendre auerment: et si [Page 25] soit en le negatiue, couyent concluder al negatiue, et ceo n'est fors (que) formalitie: et formalitie est le pluis chiefe chose en nostre ley.

And the booke of Entries standeth all vpon formall preci­dents of declarations, barres, replications, reioynders, surre­ioynders, rebutters, issues, verdites, iudgements, executions, processe, continuances, essoynes &c.

Brytton, whose booke was published in Edward the first both time and name. Fol 42. describeth the order and forme of battayle, but somewhat discrepant from the forme described, 17. E. 3. and 19. H. 4.

In 11. H. 6. 7. the ioyning of battayle in a writ of right is solempnly set downe, betwéene sir Piers Colts and the Earle of Northumberland for the maner of Capenhow.

Sée 14. E. 4. 8. the forme of punishment called Fort et dure, pronounced in Newgate by Iustice Needham. vide 8. H. 4. 2.

Finall cause. Ramus in his French Logike placeth the end first, sith, ac­cording to Aristotle in the second of his Physikes, the ende is first in conceipt and consideration, though last in execution. But in the last edition of his Latine Logike hée setteth it in the last place, respecting rather finem rei, then efficientis sco­pum & intentionem, which last resolution of his I follow at this present, yet not so resolutely, but that I can bée con­tent to heare their aduise, who bid vs take héede that we con­found not the finall cause with the thing caused: which wée shall the better doo, say they, if wée consider exactly the order and due coherence of the foure causes in the absolute consti­tution of a thing caused. For first, the finall cause, the end, purpose, intent, drift, marke, or scope, as it were of the whole action, is propounded to the efficient, and so vrgeth and mooueth him to prepare the matter, and apply the forme therevnto for the full accomplishing of the enterprise: which beeing once performed, the efficient cause now ceaseth, as hauing obteined that it sought for. And this béeing thus atchieued, is not the finall cause, but the thing caused. As for example, I purpose to sweate, and therefore I daunce: héere [Page] the sweating is not the finall cause, but the intent and pur­pose which I had to sweate, is the cause that mooued mée to daunce, and so caused mée to sweate, which sweating is the thing caused: and although in vulgar spéech, the vse of a thing and the end of the same thing bée confounded, yet by art and reason they should bée distinguished, the one a cause, the other a thing caused. If any man obiect, that if wée say the end is onely the purpose of the efficient, then this place will bée re­strained to such things onely, as vse reason, and can purpose, where all Logike must bée generall, and applyable as well to Non ens, as to Ens, to that which is not, as that which is: they aunswere, that wée néede not take this woord, purpose or deliberation so strictly, as to apply it onely to reasonable cre­atures, but generally say, that euery thing woorketh for some end and purpose, whether it bée by natures instinct, or volun­tary consultation. Or if this séeme more philosophicall then religious, wée may say, that in all artificiall thinges, and such naturall things as haue no deliberation, that which wée call the ende, is but the thing caused by them, and the cause finall is the purpose of God in naturall thinges, and the in­tent of the artificer in things that bée artificiall.

Et finis mouet efficientem, & cogitatio de fine: finis vt obiectum, cogitatio de fine, vt adiunctum agenti inhaerens, sayth Piscator. Some others make the finall cause to bée nothing but a part of the efficient, and no distinct cause it selfe, sith it onely mooueth the efficient to forward the ope­ration.

The end is chiefe, or subordinate: chiefe, which the effici­ent desireth for it selfe, as the couetous man Riches, and it is either vniuersall, to the which all thinges in the world gene­rally be referred, as Gods glory; or speciall, whervnto euery thing in his kinde is referred, as the house is the ende of the builder, for hée séeketh no further. Subordinate is that which is not for it selfe desired, but referred to the chiefe end.

Canons. If the ende bée, then the thing must also be whose ende it is: and if the ende cease to bée, then the thing whose ende it was, can no longer bée,

[Page 26] Euery thing is referred to his ende.

The end dooth eyther allow or disallow euery mans acti­on; Or thus, that is good, whose end was good, and contrarily: Sic Aristotle 3. Rhet. Laco, cum rationem de Ephoratu in iudi­cio redderet, rogatus, an ipse alios iure perijsse existimaret, assensus est: Ille verò, nonne haec tu cum illis decreuisti? & ille assensus est: nonne igitur & tu (inquit) peribis? Minimè verò, inquit: illi enim pecunijs acceptis haec commiserunt, ego verò nequaquam, sed ex sententia.

The end is more to bée desired, than those things that bée referred to the end. He that séeketh the ende, séeketh also those things that bée referred to the same end.

All the arguments that common Rhetoricians fetch from Honestum and Vtile, are for the most part deriued from the end or finall cause, sith for the cause of these two, most things are enterprised. In like maner, the gesses and coniectures of Iudges are fet from the end, as, hée was most like to woorke the mischiefe, who might haue any end or profit in practising of the same.

Whose vse is good, that is good, but not contrarily, the thing is bad, because it is abused.

The end dooth not alwaies follow the efficient cause, ey­ther because the efficient could not accomplish the thing alone, or els because hée would not. Theloall. lib. 7. cap. 2. Le finall intent del chescun que pursuyte briefe, est, ou a re­couerer seisin ou possession de terre ou tenement, ou d'auer [...]hose dont home peut auer heritage, ou franktenement, ou terme; ou d'auer remedy et recōpence pur iniury et damage a luy auenue per le act, ou non feasance d'un auter, ou pur le non performance des contracts et obligations ou auters parts et causes que sont come contracts.

Home vient pur auower son atturney, cest presence ne ser­ra dit apparance, car son intent, ne fuit d'apperer al briefe &c. 8. H. 7. 8.

Abuses of causes. Sophistry, as I haue said elswhere, is no Logike: & there­fore least I should iniury the art by ioyning sophisticall fal­lacians with Logicall institutions, I haue rather reserued [Page] them to these annotations, then thrusted them in among the precepts. Some vse, I confesse, there may bée had of them (al­though I know, that who so throughly perceaueth the truth of this art, néedes to séeke no other meanes to auoyde these deceipts, sith Rectū est index sui, & obliqui.) But if wée shall put downe euery thing in Logike, which hath any litle shew of profite therevnto; Grammer will be good Logike, because it helpeth vs to vtter y^• which wée haue Logically conceaued.

The woord, Sophista, was at the first, a title of commenda­tion, and onely applyed vnto him that was a Philosopher or teacher of wisedome. But now it is become odious, as Ty­rannus, and such like. Sophistry therefore is the abuse of Lo­gike, deceiuing the simple with a glorious shew of counter­feit reasons, commonly called Fallacians.

Fallacians bée eyther in the woord, or in the reason. Fal­lacians in the woord bée of two sorts, some in a simple woord, some in the coniunction of woordes. In a simple woord bée three. The first is when v [...]uall and vpstart woordes bée foisted in, as hée putteth his felicitie in circumpugnable goods, circumpugnabilibus bonis, meaning Riches, because men fight about them. Le seignieur des Accords in his Bi­garrures, pag. 198. hath many of this making, although some­what more tollerable, because of the ridiculous application. Ils font (saith hée, speaking of some French Carmini [...]cators) de petitelettes descriptionettes qui sōt fort agreabletets aux oreillettes delicatelettes, principallettement des mignar de­lettes damoisellettes, Come

And after

And page 65. of another sputatilicall goose, he saith thus.

Un certayne predicant qui veuloit▪ Pindariser en chaire, et choisir des mots courtisans, pour applaudir a quelques [Page 27] damoiselles fraischemēt reuenues de la cour, auoit coustume [...]e [...]uenter des mots, et entre auters, il appelloit la destinée, Fatū in latyn, fat in Francois, sur quoy vn gentil personage rencontra ce distique

The like absurditie would it bée for a man of our age, to affectate such woordes as were quite worne out at héeles and elbowes long before the natiuitie of Geffrey Chawcer.

The second is, when doubtfull and ambiguous woords bée vsed, as in those verses of Martiall, where, tuus, is eyther thine by [...]argayne, or by inuention.

And that,

Of a little village by London, where Camberwell may be taken for the Well in the towne, or y^e towne it selfe. So that, Ware and Wadesmill bée woorth al London. Where Ware is either y^e towne Ware, or els merchandize. So lastly, the Mayre of Earith, is the best Mayre next to the Mayre of London. Where the towne, God knowes, is a poore thing, and the mayre thereof a séely fellow, in respect of the Mayres of diuers other cities, yet it is the very next to London, because there is none betwéene.

Accords pag. 96. vne ieune damoiselle interrogée en quelle espece d'oy seau elle desireroit veoir son amy, si nous estions aux temps des Metamorphoses, elle dit, qu'elle le voudroit veoir en Phaisant: vrayement vous aues raison, dit dame Iaquette caquillon, il ne scauroit estre plus agreable qu'en le [...]aisant. Heare not the woord written, but the voyce and sound caused the ambiguitie.

The third and last is, when store of Metaphorical woords is the cause of a ridiculous obscuritie, as if a man meaning to bée brief, should promise that hée would gallop ouer al the rest of his text. Wherefore Arist. reprehended Plato for that his spéeche was obscure and ambiguous by reason of Metaphors▪

[Page] When any of these thrée fallacians bée vsed, wée may say with him in Tully, Sputa quid sit, scio: Tilica, nescio. Wée may desire him to speake better English.

In the coupling or coniunction of woordes bée two: the first is Amphiboly, when the sentence may bée turned both the wayes, so that a man shall be vncertayne what waye to take, for this is the signification of the gréeke woorde Amphi­boly, and this fallacian commeth not from the diuers signi­fication of any one woord, but from the ambiguous construc­tion of many woordes, as that olde sophister the Deuill de­luded Pyrrhus by giuing him such an intricate answere.

Where this woord, ouerthrowne, may eyther bée the no­minatiue case and appliable to king Pyrrhus; or the accu­satiue, and attributed to the Romaynes. The like is that giuen to Craesus.

Craesus Halyn penetrans magnam peruertet opum vim. Where hée hoping to haue destroyed Cyrus and the Persian power, ouerturned his own estate, as Herodotus reporteth. Such an one was that also giuen to the countesse of Flaun­ders concerning the battell betwéene her sonne Ferrande and king Philip, Que le roy seroit abatu, foulle aux pieds des cheuaux sans sepulture, et Ferrand receu a Paris en grand pompe et triomphe apres la victorie. Where the king, al­though troden downe, yet dyed not, but ouercame, and tri­umphed at Paris ouer Ferrande, who was then taken priso­ner contrary to the expectation of the Countesse. Cardan de Martin Abbot of Assello, had this verse ouer his gate.

Where, by the error of the Paynter, the poynt béeing mace after, nulli, caused the Pope which roade that way, to displace Mar [...]yn, and preferre another to his roome, who re­teyned the verse, but altered the poynt, & put it immediately after esto, thus. Porta patens esto. Nulli claudaris honesto.

[Page 28] Wherevpon these verses went together.

The verse of it selfe is very ambiguous, if the poynt bée altogether omitted, Porta patens esto nulli claudaris honesto.

The seconde is in the vnorderly expounding of the woords, as

• No sicknes can bee health:
• Dido is sicke,
• Therefore she cannot be whole.

For if you turne the woords into good order of exposition, the falsenes of the proposition will easily appeare, thus, No sicke body can be whole.

Thus much of such fallacians as bée in the woords eyther seuered or conioined: which indéed are rather Grammaticall and Rhetoricall than belonging to Logike: Those that are in the reason be more Logicall: whereof some belong to In­uention, some to Disposition.

Fallacians of Inuention are eyther common to all the places, or peculiar to some certaine places.

Common to all bée two. The first is called, Petitio prin­cipij, the requesting of the thing in controuersie: when, to prooue any thing, wée séeke to haue, eyther the same in effect graunted vs, or some other thing as doubtfull. Petitio principij then, is eyther when the same thing is prooued by it selfe, as, The soule is immortall, because it neuer dyeth: Or when a doubtfull thing is confirmed by that which is as doubtfull, as

• The earth mooueth,
• Because the heauen standeth still.

The second is, Superfluitie: eyther when wée cast in things impertinent: or els in vnnecessary repetitions of the same things.

For the first, that may serue for an example, which Tully hath in his second booke of Diuination: as if a physi­tian should commaund his patient to take such a beast, as is bred of the ground, walketh on grasse, carrieth her cottage, and wanteth bloud, whereas hée might with lesse labour, [Page] and to better purpose haue willed him take a Snaile, which hée calleth

Terrigenam, herbigradam, domiportam, sanguine cassam.

To this example you may adde that of Martiall, as more conuenient. lib. 6.

Much like as if a preacher in expounding a text of chari­tie, should talk out his houre-glasse, in discoursing of Bell the Dragon of Babylon. To such fellowes wée may say, turne to your text, or Iam dic Posthume de tribus capellis.

For the second, which is vnnecessary repetition of the same thing, this shall suffice, that when I haue generally put downe the nature of an argument, it were sophisticall to repeate the same in euery particuler, as, when I haue once sayd generally, that an argument is that which is affected to argue, what néede I in the particuler discourse of a cause to say, a cause is that which is affected to argue.

Now let vs come to the particuler fallacians of seuerall places, And first for the causes. It is sophisticall to argue from that which is no cause: as if it were a cause. So Sinon the false caytife fayneth a cause why the woodden horse was builded.

It is, and alwayes hath béene a common practise among lewd men, to pretend counterfaite causes to cloake their malitious intent, and disgrace other mens good meaninges. The true cause therefore must bée carefully distinguished from the shadow ouercast: Arist. 2: Rh. à non causa quasi causa, quippe prop terea [...] simul, aut post eam euenerit: quod [Page 29] enim post illam est, aequè ac propter illam accipiunt, maxi­me (que) qui in republica versantur, vt Demades, Demosthenis poli­tiam causam calamitatum omnium extitisse, quia post eam bellum est excitatum.

Also in efficient causes, the diuers kindes of woorking must bée diligently considered, as, what causes can woorke alone, what require the helpe of others, what woorke necessa­rily, what voluntarily, and so foorth.

Annotations.

THis argument of the thing caused conteyneth not onely déedes and woorkes, but also thoughtes, and woordes, coun­sayles and deliberations, and all motions whatsoeuer. Par­menio the father, and Philotas the sonne, were both put to death for suspicion of treason against Alexander: Where, their cogitation and compassing of their Souereignes death, were such effectes as were plagued by death. For like occa­sion also were Lentulus, Cethegus and other complices of Catyline brought to confusion.

Yet when sayinges, writinges, counsayles, and delibe­rations bée brought in as testimonies, then are they argu­mentes borrowed, assumpta aliunde.

Canons. Wée commend men by their causes and adiuncts, as for their noble auncestors, great possessions, &c. but especially by reason of their effectes, as for that they did this or this &c.

And as for Riches, perinde sunt, as hée that vseth them: good, if hée apply them well: bad, if otherwise.

If the thing caused bée, then the cause eyther is or was, but not alwayes contrarily.

Such as the thing caused is, such commonly is the cause.

That which is attributed, or not attributed to the thing caused, must bée applyed or not applyed to the cause.

Fit. Cor. 22. E. 3. p. 26. Thorpe recita coment vn gaoler vient al gaole oue vn lanterne en sa maine a veier ses priso­ners, queux auoyent debruse lour fers, et estoyēt touts prests d'auer occise luy, et batoyent et naufroyent luy malement: mes il auoyt vn hatchet en sa maine, oue quelle il occist trois de eux, et puis eschapa, et fuit aiudge per tout le counsell, que il auoyt bien fayt.

Stanford: lib. 1. ca. 9. Nota, que en auncient temps la vo­lunt fuit cy materiall, que il fuit repute pur le fait. Fit. Cor. 15. E. 3. P. 383. ou vn compassant le mort d'auter, luy naufra [...]y gréeuousement, que il luy lessa giser pur mort, et pius s'en­fua, [Page] et l'auter reuiua, et non obstant, fuit aiudge felony, [...]; quant sa volunt apiert cy ouertment de luy auer tue, volun­tas reputabitur pro facto et oue ceo accorda Bracton qui dit, In maleficijs spectatur voluntas & non exitus, & nihil interest vtrum quis occidat, an causam mortis praebeat. Mes le ley n'est issint a cestiour. Car il doyt morir en fayt, auant que il serra aiudge felony. Et si home ferist auter oue intent de luy bater, mes nemy a luy tuer, vncore sil morust de tiel bater, il est felony en luy que ferist: per (que) a cest iour, home peut conuerter le dit tert de Bracton, et dire, (que) Exitus in malefi­cijs spectatur, & non voluntas dundaxat.

Elenchs. Martiall vseth this argument sophistically in his first booke.

As though this were an affect of an extemporall Rhetor, to salute a man by name without premeditation. But here hys meaning was to bée merry, in taunting the man for his ill memory, who could skarce remember his familiar friendes name, vnlesse hée had written it before, and learned it with­out booke.

Annotations.

HOttoman. Totum & partes vtrum prius an posterius sunt, anne simul? primum distinctio adhibenda est, vt aliud sit totum naturale, veluti arbor, fundus, auis, equus: aliud artifi­ciosum, veluti domus, nauis, currus. si naturale totum est, ve­rissimum [Page] est quod Aristoteles libro de natura octauo scribi [...] prius esse, & naturae, & temporis, & rationis ordine, id quod perfectum est, eo quod est inchoatum. sin autem artificiosum est, tum eiusdem Aristotelis monitu, altera distinctio adhiben­da est, vtrum subtiliter & artis ratione, an populariter ex ser­monis consuetudine disseratur. Nam quia subtili ratione ea demum pars verè propriè (que) dicitur, quae suo munere fungitur, fungi autem suo munere, nisi suo toti inhaerens, non potest, certè totum & pars naturae ac temporis ordine simul sint ne­cesse est. Nam vbi est domus, ibi necesse est esse tectum, & vbi tectum reuera tegens, ibi necesse est esse domum: vbi currus, ibi rota; & vbi rota reuera, & actu voluens est, ibi cur­rus: sin autem populariter loquamur, & homonymia, id est, communione nominis abutamur, tum verò pars dicetur esse prior, totum verò posterius, vt area, quam iuris consulti po­tissimam domus partem appellant, priòr est aedificio: & fun­dus priòr vitibus, aut arboribus, aut fructibus,

Canons of the part. If you put downe or affirme all the essentiall partes, you must also put downe the integrall it selfe. But if you put downe one, or some of the parts onely, you cannot therefore put downe the whole; for the partes, not seu [...]d, but all ioyntly, make vp the nature of the whole.

If you de [...]y or take any one essentiall parte away, the whole is also gone.

Of the Integrall. Prohibitus à toto, prohibitus est à qualibet parte.

He that hath the whole, hath also the principall or essen­tiall partes.

Although yée put downe all the parts, yet vnlesse they bée conioyned, the whole will not necessarily follow.

If you deny the whole, all the partes are not therefore straightway denyed, vnlesse you meane, that the whole bée­ing gone, the remnant is not properly to bée called a parte, Vt non est tectum, nisi tegat, &c.

7. H. 7. 8. a. b. 20 acres fueront agrée d'estre touts temps parcel del manor, Ergò sil deuy seisie del manor, il deuy sei­sie des. 20. acres.

[Page 33] That which agréeth with the whole Integrall, must also agrée with the parts conioyned, but not seuered.

If the whole bée not attributed to any thing, it will not follow, that therfore no part should bée applied vnto it.

The whole Integrall cannot bée affirmed of any one of his parts: for a part is not the whole: but all the parts toge­ther make the essence of the whole. But the generall may bée affirmed on one speciall, for that the whole nature and essence of the generall is in euery one of the specials, so that the speciall is the same thing indéede with the generall, (al­though not in such ample maner) or rather a patterne and resemblance of the generall. Yet, as the speciall conteyneth in it somewhat more than the generall (I meane, his proper formall cause moreouer and besides that hée had of his ge­nerall) so the generall comprehendeth vnder it more than one speciall; as béeing therefore common and indifferently applyable to many, because it is abstract from all, and not de­terminately bound to any. Wherevpon they say in schooles▪ Genus abstrahit ab vtro (que), vt possit esse vtrum (que), and con­teyne [...] vnder it, not in it, repugnant specials, according to Porphyry. Yet, notwithstanding all this, you may af­firme the Integrall on his parte in a simple axiome, so that this woorde, Part, bée added therevnto, as, Inuention is a part of Logike, the body is a part of man. Integrall.

21. H. 7. 21. per Fineux, & Tremayle Iustices, le person auera trespas de arbres coupes et emportes en le cimitorie, et d'entry et infreindre del eglise, car l'eglise, le cimitorie, et les dismes [...]ont le Rectorie. Generall.

Litleton. pag. 80. Si soit rent, il serra rent seruice, charge ou seck, mes n'est, &c. Ergo. Et pag. 90. Chescun que ad francktenement, ad vel fée, vel tayle, vel pur vie, vel auter vie: mes n'est issint icy. Ergo. Generall.

21. E. 4. 79. Si essoine gist pur corporation, tùm yel hoc vel illud, &c. sed nec l'essoyne de mal vener gi [...] pur ceo, nec de malo lecti: car ceur excuse defaut, et ils ne poient appearer in person; et ils touts ne serront sicke ensmble: nec de seruitio, nec de vltra mare, nec de terra sancta, car ils ne serrōt intendes d'estre touts in tiel case, Ergo nul essoin gist pur corporation.

[Page] In assise, le pl. dit, que le terre est tenus d'un tiel, come de son manor de D. que est auncient demesne: le def. in maner confesse ceo, et tamen il prist general auerment, que par­cell del mesme le manor, le quel il ad conus d'estre auncient demesne, serra francke fée, sans monstre coment per matter speciall; que n'est reason, car chescun chose serra intende del mesme le nature, come le chose est, dont il est parcell. Sic hic le manor de D. est conus d'estre auncient demesne, & sic per conseqnens serra intende, que tout ceo que est tenus del dit manor, serra del mesme le nature prima facie. 3. H. 6. 47. a.

Generall. Speciall. The generall is nothing els, but a multitude or vniuer­sality of thinges like in essence, or one like essence in many thinges.

Hottoman. [...] (vt Zeno apud Laertium definit) [...]. Ita (que) plures cognati qui sanguinis eiusdem communione inter se co [...]aerent, quam ab vno eodē (que) capite duxê [...]unt, idcirco à Graecis appellantur [...] vel [...], cum alij, qui gentis ac stirpis alterius sint, [...] vel [...], alieni & extranei nominentur. So that this woord, Genus; is Metaphoricall.

The higher you ascend, the more generall thinges bée: the more generall thinges bée, the fewer particuler proprie­ties are they tyed vnto: and therefore the moste generall doth agrée to most particulers. But, the lower you descend, the more is alwayes in particularitie comprehended in the words, so that they can not bée applied to so many.

The generall precepts put downe in all Artes, were first inuented by the induction of many particulers and specials.

The generall béeing affirmed vniuersally, euery one of his specials must also necessarily bée affirmed. But if the ge­nerall bée but indefinitely, simply, or vndeterminately put downe; some one of his specials must indéede bée put downe also, and that necessarily, but no certayne one aboue the rest, but onely contingently, as If there bée any driggle draggle in Shrewsbury shée must bée eyther Ienny Dymmocke, or some other: this is necssarily true: but it is but contingent [Page 34] to say, that if there bée any, it must néedes bée shée: for there may be many others also.

Generi per speciem derogatur. Nam qui de vna aliqua specie loquitur, is caeteras sub eodem genere contentas spe­cies non dissimulanter excludit, sic legatum speciale detrahit generali.

Denie the generall, howsoeuer you list, and all his speci­als bée denyed.

Whatsoeuer is attributed to the vniuersall nature of the generall, must bée giuen to the specials. But there may bée many thinges applyed to the indefinite nature of the gene­rall, which cannot bée ascribed to any of his particulers, vn­lesse the thing bée common both to the generall and speciall.

Of the speciall. The speciall dooth onely conclude affirmatiuely, vnlesse all the specials bée denied togither.

If you put downe one, more, or all the specials, you also put downe the generall, for that the nature and essence of the generall is in euery of the specials. If you deny one onely speciall, you deny the whole generall in his moste ample and largest vniuersalitie: but not as hée is indefinite. But if you deny euery speciall, then the generall is taken away, howsoeuer you meane it.

Whatsoeuer agreeth with the specials, agreeth also with the generall: if so bée that the thing applyed [...]ée common, and not peculierly proper to one speciall alone, as apud Tri­balos patrem immolare est laudabile, ergo [...]. Hottoman.

Quod vni speciei non conuenit, non continuò generi inde­finito non conuenit, vt, si homo est animal, quod non est ani­mal id non est homo: sed non, siquid non sit homo, id con­tinuò sequitur, non esse animal. Nam etsi contrariorum con­traria sunt consequentia, tamen differentiae causa hic est in negatione posita, quae cum priuatio sit; aff [...]matione, quae habitus est, semper est deterior ne (que) parē cum illa vim habet.

Species eiusdem generis sunt simul natura: est tamen aliqua differentia ordinis, vt in arte speciem hanc illi preponas.

The Grecians call the most speciall, [...], Indiuiduum, quod diuidi in partes corporatas sine interitu non potest. Nam [Page] si totum in partes distrahatur, nulla pars erit totum, ne (que) totius nomine appellari poterit. There was neuer any Logician before Ramus that durst absolutely pronounce an Indiuiduū, as Socrates, to bée a speciall, or a man to bée a generall: yet I could neuer sée eyther good reason, or reasonable experience to the contrary. Ne (que) enim audiendum est quod dici videtur à Porphyrio, & nonnullis praeterea in Aristotelea bibliotheca lo­cis, indiuidua non differre forma essentiali, sed proprietate ac­cidentiū, vt mas, & faemina: quae accidentia in He [...]maphrodito miscentur. Nam tum detractis (quod omnino saltem cogitati­one fieri potest) accidentibus, omnes homines essent vnicus & singularis homo: imo ne (que) deus, ne (que) daemon, ne (que) homo, ne (que) vlla prorsus essentia esset (quod est ab Aristotele nominatim improbatum, cum idealem hominem eiusmodi derideat) sed accidentia sola. Talaeus.

Hottoman. Plato ea demùm esse verè ac propriè dice­bat, quae à sensibus remota, tantùm ratione & animo percipe­rentur, propterea quod semper vniusmodi essent, ne (que) ortū ne (que) interitum haberent: cum indiuidua infinita, fluxa, & ca­duca essent, orirentur (que) & occiderent, nec diutiùs vno & eo­dem statu essent. Aristoteles verò nullas putabat esse extrin­secus substantias, sed intellectam plurimorum inter se diffe­rentium similitudinem, vel genus, vel speciem appellabat. Primus Aristoteles, ait Cicero, species labefactauit, quas mirificè Plato fuerat amplexatus, vt in ijs diuinum quiddam esse dice­ret. Ac de vtris (que) istiusmodi substantijs idem Cicero in lib. de vniuersitate ex Platonis Timaeo ita scribit.

Quid est quod semper sit (haec idaea est) ne (que) vllum habet ortum. Et quod gignatur (hoc indiuiduum est) nec vnquam sit. Quorum alterum intelligentia & ratione comprehenditur, quod vnum semper at (que) idem est: alterum quod affert opini­onem per sensus, rationis expers, quod totum opinabile est, id gignitur & interit, nec vnquàm esse verè potest?

Vtrius igitur illorum probabilior sententia videtur? Non est humilitatis nostrae tantam inter summos omnium philo­sophos controuersiam disceptare. Magis tamen aliquanto ad notionum nostrarū rationem accommodata Platonis sententia videtur: quippè cum satis constet, non omnes notiones ex ob­lata [Page 35] extrinsecus indiuiduorum corporum impulsione existere, sed quasdam per se constare; ne (que) vel aliundè originem ha­bere, vel alto quàm suo ac proprio fundamento niti. Quo in genere sunt intellectae res omnes, vt quantitates & qualitates, veluti longitudo, latitudo, & altitudo. Item iustitia, tempe­rantia, eloquentia: Item morbus, valetudo, imbecillitas: quae si in subiecto aliquo insunt, per se tamen, & tanquam auulsae & abstractae considerantur. Infra.

Videsnè quam sutores & calceolarij formam calceorum appellant? Nimirùm lignum oblongum, calcei instar, pro­portione aptum, at (que) incisum. At ijdem formam calcei aliam in mente at (que) intelligentia impressam at (que) insignitam habent: quae vna verè proprie (que), tum Idaea, tum forma, & est, & dici debet. Ad quam, tanquam pictores ad exemplar, suam pictu­ram; ità illi opus suum dirigunt. Forma igitur calcei lignea subiectum est: species in mente insita, auulsa at (que) abstracta est.

In an other place more plainly.

Iubent enim (s. Plato & Aristoteles) poni Calliam procul ad nos longo interuallo venientem. Ea species extrinsecus ob­lata sensibus continuò generis vniuersi notitiam in animo in­format. Primùm enim corpus esse intelligimus, mox, vbi pro­piùs accessit, animal: tùm hominem: ad extremum, Calliam, Sic, qui in statione sunt, & procul aliquem venientem intuen­tur, primum corpus esse animaduertunt; secundò, ex cursu animal esse iudicant: tertiò, equitem: quartò, ex colore, ami­cum vel hostem: postremò, Titium, vel Sempronium. At (que) hi sunt nimirùm notionum & intelligentiarum gradus.

So much I haue borrowed of Hottoman, concerning ge­nerall Idaeas: too little for Quidditaries: yenough for our purpose. Hée that desireth more shalbe sure to finde too much, if hée doe but once shew himselfe willing to entertaine those euerlasting praters de vniuersalibus.

Morrell in Iuly, to enforce the generall commendation of hils, bringeth in speciall examples, as saint Michaels mount, S. Brigets Bower, Mount Oliuet, Parnassus, Ida: &c.

Before I goe further, it were expedient to yéeld some reason why I seuer the generall, speciall, whole and parte from the tractate of diuision, where Ramus placed them. For [Page] Genus sayth Talaeus, significat causam speciei, & species ideo significat effectum generis. ita (que) originem suam e primis ar­gumentis ostendunt, quoties (que) genus explicatur à speciebus causa arguitur ex effectis; quoties contra species arguitur è genere, effectus arguitur è causis. Alia tamen est hic inuentio­nis via, quàm illic. Causa enim & effecta subtilius illic expli­cantur, hic comprehenduntur. Which yet can hardly make mée beléeue that they bée argumentes made of the first, as they should bée, if they were secondary argumentes: For I call that secondary which is made of some originall, as di­uision and definition is. For as for Coniugates and notation although I giue them leaue for a time to soiourne among the annotations, yet I dare not admit them into the text.

[The generall] haec definitio generis & speciei aduersas superioris & huius topici differentias ostendit: illic integrum sumit essentiam è membris: hîc genus essentiam speciebus tribuit: illic membra constituunt totum, hîc species constitu­untur à genere.

Theloall. Et sunt quaedam breuia formata super certis ca­sibus de cursu, & de communi consilio totius regni concessa & approbata, quae quidem nullatenus mutari possunt abs (que) consensu & voluntate eorum: il intende original briefs. Sunt etiam breuia ex ijs sequentia, dicuntur Iudicialia, & saepius variantur secundū varietatem placitorum &c. haec ex Bracton.

Done est vne nosme generall pluis que n'est feofment. Car done est generall a touts choses moebles et nyent moe­bles, et feffment est riens fors (que) de soyle. Britton 87. a.

Generale crimen falsi plura sub se continet crimina speci­alia, quemadmodum de falsis chartis, de falsis mensuris, de falsa moneta &c. Glanuil.

• Essoniū est
  • de malo veniendi
    • vltra mare
      • de seruitio regis.
      • terra sancta.
    • citra mare
  • malo lecti

Bracton. 339. 21. H. 7. 16. Frowike. Si ieo voyle prescriber, que ieo et touts ceux &c. ont vse de temps &c. a distreyner touts les te­nantes a terme de vie, ou d'ans del manor de D. pur vn ha­roit [Page 36] apres le mort de chescun tenant &c. ceo est bon prescrip­tion: car il est in le generalitie; issint (que) coment (que) vn ou deux, ou trois des tenures soyent determines, vncore auters poyent demurrer, issint la poet il estre vn contynuance de les tenants, coment (que) diuers morreront &c.

In 4. H. 6. 30. There is an argument vsed from the denial of all the specials to take away the generall. Recordare, le def. fist conusance come bayly A. B. file et heire P. le pl. dit, que A. B. est bastard &c. et sur ceo le def. pria ayd de A. B. et per Bab et Cott: il auera ayd: mes contra per Strang et Martin. car par luy, il doyt auer pria l'ayde in le conclusion de son conusance: et in ple personell home auera ayd puis plée plede et nemy deuant; mes in ple reall home auera ayd de­uant ple pleade. Et n'ad mes deux maners de entries de ayd: l'un est de ayd deuant ple pleade, s. ꝙ defendens vel tenens petit auxilium de A. sine quo ipse non potest respondere, et si soit puis ple plede, le entry est, quod def. petit auxilium de B. ad manutenendum exitum. Et in cest case il ne poet estre ad manutenendum exitum, car nul issue est ioyne: et il ne poet estre, sine quo non potest respondere, car il ad re­sponde al action, et in le conclusion del ceo ne ad prie ayde et ideo il est passa l'aduātage del ceo et ne sont plusors entries del ayd, mes ceux deux.

Elenchs of the whole.

A double Elench lurketh in this place, one of composition an other of diuision: for composition thus. Humfrey Crow­ther is a good fidler, therefore hée is good: and this fallacian is from the whole, because those two thinges so ioyned togi­ther séeme to make vp the whole, wherevpon afterward the part may bée concluded, as though in this example, Humfrey Crowther were a whole integrall thing, made and consisting of these two partes, goodnesse and fidlery. Some other call this à dicto secundum quid, ad dictum simpliciter, when wée apply that absolutely and generally which was spoken but in part and in respect, as heere Humfrey is called good, not generally, for his good conditions, but particulerly in respect of his gitterne. Issint in 9. H. 7. 19. a. Cestuy que est heyre al pere et mere, est heyre al pere, mes l'issue del baron et sa [Page] second feme donées in speciall tayle, est heyre al pere et mere, ergo il est heyre generallment al pere et simpliciter, non se­quitur, car le pere poet auer fits per le primer feme. Vauisor. expone Maiorem & apparebit fallacia, Cestuy que est heyre al pere et mere coniunctim, est heyre al pere diuisim; ore ceo est false. Vide. L. 5. E. 4. 43. Leas fuit fait per abbe et couent, ergo per abbe sole, nul reason. q. an serra intende mesme le leas.

Now on the other side, Diuision is a fallacian, as it were from the partes, when thinges are seuerally propounded and ioyntly concluded, as

• Antony Now-Now is good, and a singer, therefore
• Antony Now-Now, is a good singer.

For indéede these two thinges seuerally put downe are not essentiall partes of Antony Now-Now, but onely accidentall qualities: whereas if they had béene his essentiall partes the argument would haue followed, as here

• A man is a liuing and sensible creature, and also reasonable, therefore
• A man is a reasonable liuing creature.

And so in composition, thus,

• A man is a sensible creature endued with reason, therefore
• A man is sensible; or therefore A man is reasonable.

Elenchs of the part.

First when you inferre the who [...]e, some of the partes wanting. Isabell Greenesleeues hath a fayre hand, a good leg, a quick eye, therefore shée is a proper fayre woman: it fol­loweth not, for shée is splayfooted, crookbacked: tunnebellied, sawtoothed &c. The like is that of Catullus.

So elswhere of Formianus his trull.

Vide 44. E. 3. 13. a. b. Vbi Wickingham & Persay dis­putant, ytrum le playnt d'un molyn in assise abatera, eoque fuit troue, que parcell del molyn fuit sur auter terre, issint il n'auoit entier molyn. Et sic come vn sophister petit plus quā oportuit.

Home esteant seisie en fée de certeine terres in vn ville, et in deux hamlets del mesme le ville, deuisa touts ses terres esteants in le ville, et in vne de les hamlettes per nosme et deuy; riens del terre in l'auter hamlet passera: car son en­tent appere per l'expressing d'un des hamlets. Mes Browne ex rigore Logices fuit è contra, per vn argument à toto, car le ville conteigne les hamlets, Ergo &c. mes le ley fauour deuises, quia sont faits quant homes gisont in extremis, sans reason ou erudite counsell pur le pluis part, 9. Eliz. 27. Dyer. Mes certes auterment, le deuisor plaide but the sophister. Come in trespas vers I. del parish del Aluale in com. S. yeo­man; le def. dd. iudgement del briefe, car in le parishe del Aluale est vn ville appelle Wilton, et le def. iour del briefe purchase fuit demurrant en Wilton, sans ceo que il demurra in le parish del Aluale; cest, sans ceo, est repugnant al mat­ter deuant; car s'il demurra in le ville, et le ville est in le pa­rish, don (que) il demurra in le parish, L. 5. E. 4. 20. a. Issint in l'au­ter case, il dona touts ses terres in le ville, et ambideux les hamlets sont in le ville, Ergò il dona touts ses terres que sont in les hamlets.

Secondly, this place is abused, when the whole is diuided into such partes as bée not his owne: as when Rhetorike is diuided into Inuention, Disposition, &c. For both these bée the parts of Logike, not of Rhetorike, as they are commonly taken: but of Elenchs in diuision more in the tractate of Diuision.

Elenchs of Generall and Speciall.

If a man, when hée knoweth one or two specials, thin­keth that hée knoweth the generall; hée is much deceyued: [Page] but more, if when hée hath gotten a generall notion of any Art, hée thinketh himselfe a sufficient artificer. For it is one thing to haue a generall and superficiall sight in an arté, but another matter, to bée able to practise those general precepts in euery particularitie.

In 26. H. 8. 6. a. Shelley abuseth this argument: Si ieo ay le manor de grand Dirtleby, ieo ay le manor del Dirtleby. Et le case fuit, que fine fuit leuy del manor de D. et in mes­me le county fueront deux D, grand et petite, et null sans ad­dition, hîc Shelley dit, que passa per le fine pur le reason auāt dit: mes Fitz. denia ceo, car ne fuit ascun tiel manor, mes per feffment le manor intendus passeroit per le liuery. Shel­ley fuit deceaue in ceo que il prist grand D et petit D, d'estre specials, et D, sans addition d'estre le generall: et issint re­uera, st ieo ay grand D, ieo ay D, come, ceo que est, homo est animal: mes in veritie, grand D et petite D, s [...]nt indiuidua, s. singuler lieues conues per tiels nosmes sans ascun general chose que conteigne ambideux.

Issint 7. H. 6. 39. Hals arguit eodem modo, Uous ne de­dits, mes que il y ad D maior, & D minor deins le county, Ergo il yad D, argumentum ab inferiore ad suum superius, issint est proue, que il yad tiel ville. But by his fauour it followeth not, because there is vpper Dale and nether Dale, therfore there must be a third Dale, without addition at all, that is neyther vpper Dale nor neather Dale, but distinct from them both. For, if in one county there bée two manors, the one called grand Higham, the other petite Higham, t [...] true generall to these two singular manors, is, this word, Manor; and so it will follow well. Is. hath the manor of grand Higham, Ergò Is. hath a manor: but the manor of Higham is no such generall as should include the manors of grand Higham and petite Higham. Vide L. 5. E. 4. 47. Mesme le error, que Combe conteigne longe Combe et short Combe.

Annotations.

A [Subiect:] Not onely, [...], an essence, or substance, as the common Logicians vsually take it, but also whatsoeuer can [...]ée imagined or fayned to haue any thing adioyned vnto it, in it, or about it: so one quality may bée the subiect to another, as in this axiome, Uertue is com­mendable, where commendation is adioyned to vertue, be­ing the subiect thereof.

That subiect wherein the adiunct is exercised and (as it were) vsed, is called an obiect, or matter subiect, as colours bée the obiect of séeing, sounds of hearing, souldiers bée busied in fighting, plowmen in plowing, &c. as in those verses, &c.

Which béeing turned, tutch those that intermedle with mat­ters of other mens professions.

The verses bée made by Propertius, and by Ronsard transla­ted into French, thus,

Claudian hath the like.

Canons. If the subiect bée, then by nature, the proper adiuncts must also bée: the other that bée not proper, may bée, and may not bée.

If the subiect bée taken away, the adiunct cannot stand.

To whom you giue the subiect, to the same you giue the adiunct.

Whatsoeuer you attribute to the subiect, that you must giue the adiunct: but in due and conuenient order.

Of the subiect things bée sometimes praised and dispray­sed. The house is estéemed by him that dwelleth in the house. The place giueth occasion to iudge of that which was borne in the place, as, He was borne in Boeotia, there­fore hée is but a muddy-pated asse.

Explications, illustrations, amplifications, and extenua­tions are fet from this place: So Cicero to his sonne, Thou art at Athens, therefore thou shouldest bée learned. Tis a Northerne Nagge, therefore quicke, Tis a Shrewsbury fryse, therefore the best.

From hence are almost all poeticall epithetes deducted.

As the subiect is, such is the adiunct. The place often­times augmenteth the crime. Locus est entis & non entis, corporum, daemonum, &c. sic domus somni, hortus Hesperi­dum in loco collocantur.

2. H. 4. 19. Per touts les Iustices, que les Iustices de peace ne poyent prendre appel de nul approuer, ne de auter. Car lour commission n'extend cy auant.

9. H. 6. 5. In pleading d'arbitrement, le partie doyt mon­strer le lieu ou le submission fuit fait, et les nosmes des ar­bitrours.

[Page] Maister Crompton, Folio. 79. 80. &c. Les Iustices de peace enquirera ad chescun le lour generall sessions, de ceux que parlont irreuerentment de sacrament de corps et sanke nostre seigniour Iesu Christe. 1. E. 6. cap. 1. & 1. E. cap. 1.

Item de reteyners, liueries, maynteiners, imbracers, bowstaues, archers, illoyall games, forestallers, regrators, vitailers et Inholders, et de chescun de eux, per, 33. H. 8. cap. 10. & 37. H. 8. cap. 7.

Item de cestuy que tue weinlinges que sont desus l'age de deux ans, al intent de vender. contr. 24. H. 8. cap. 9. & 14. El. cap. 11. Et issint de plusors auters.

Pur le subiect del lieu, Vide L. 5. E. 4. 7. 8. En annuitie vers le Prior de S. Mary Oueres in Southwarke, in le county de Surrey, le pl. count sur fait a Londres in le parish de S. Dunstane, in le garde de Faringdone, et le fait est dated, in domo capitulari eiusdem domus. Per Choke, ceo ne poet estre per comen entendement, que le Chapter del S. Mary Oueres in Southwark que est in Surrey ferra le fait in Fleet­streete in Londres &c. mes per speciall matter monstre il poet, car vbi personae, ibi Capitulum: Mes si le date es­set, in monasterio domus praedictae, ceo per null intende­ment serra prise alibi, que in Southwarke ou le meason est, car le material meason n'est remouable, come le Chapter est.

Nam, non entis non sunt qualitates. Ieo enditera vn home pur asporter ieunes pigeons hors de mon Columbier, ou ieunes goshauks engendres en ma parke, car le propertie est in moy et ieo poy eux prendre a mon pleasure, car ils ne poyent aler de­hors. Contrà del auncient haukes ou pigeons que poyent suer. Sic ieo enditera pur prisel des pikes ou tenches hors d'un ponde ou troncke, causa qua suprà, contrà sils soyent pri­ses en le ryuer, eo (que) a ore ieo ay null propertie in eux, 18. E. 4. 8.

Elenchs. The Lawe abhorreth such thinges as are doone without [Page 41] or commission, coram non iudice. So 10. H. 4. 2. Praemunire facias issist de ceo que le def. auer sue al court de Rome de chose dont conusance apertient al court le roy. Sée the booke called, Diuersities des courtes et lour Iurisdictions, where­in the matter subiect of the Marshalsea, Kings bench, Com­mon place, Chauncery, Eschequer, Cinque portes, &c. is di­stinctly put downe. For the authoritie of courts is limited, neyther is it lawfull to intrude sophistically, or iniuriously incroache one vppon another. Vide 3. 4. P. & M. 14. Dyer. Fuit enact, que les quarter sessiōs de Anglesey serront tenues in Beaumaris: et les Iustices de peace teigne eux ad Newburghe, et la preigne inditements de felony: ceux indit­ments fueront voyde, et coram non iudice. Vide 22. E. 4. 33. a. b. Commission est direct as certeine homes de oyer tan­tum, et ils oyont et determinont, cest coram non iudice: Sic s'ils oyont matters hors del compas del commission. Sic si in common bancke vn appele de mort ou robbery soyt port, &c. et le party est attaint, cest coram non iudice, car lour patent ne dona al eux cest poyar et autoritie.

Annotations.

ADiunct:] The same almost which the Graecians call [...], and [...], circumstances, if you take that woord largely for whatsoeuer is added to a thing after it is once framed and made of his essentiall causes, and some of them procéede from the vniting and coniunction of the forme and matter immediately, which are commonly inseparable, as laughing to a man &c. Some are but hangbyes and remoo­uable, or separable, and, as it were, tenants at wil, as white, blacke to the wall, &c.

Adiuncts therefore, not Accidents are they heere called: for Accidens is of it selfe, infinite and vndeterminate, and dooth properly apperteine to the accidentall cause, which we before tearmed chaunce, hap, or hazard: and it conteyneth effectes, adiunctes and comparates; so that the name béeing neyther fitte, nor applyable to this place, I haue displaced it purposely.

[One and the same:] Héere is Logically put downe all that, which others peruersly teach in their diuers sortes of Idemtitie. as, Genere, Specie, Numero.

Some there bée that giue a proper and peculiar place to signes and coniecturall tokens: but friuolously. For they be­long all eyther to this of adiuncts, or that other of effectes, or els they bée testimonies and witnesses.

[Page] Canons.

If the proper adiunct bée, then the subiect must commonly bée: and if the subiect bée, the proper adiunct must also bée.

To whome soeuer you ascribe the adiunct, to the same you must attribute the effect procéeding from the same adiunct.

That which is rightly applied to the inherent adiunct, must bée applied also to the receiuing subiect.

Here are gathered diuers phisiognomicall coniectures, as that of Martiall.

Crine ruber, niger ore, breuis pede, lumine loesus,

Hence are also fet prayses and disprayses, deliberations and consultations. Herein are conteined all those Rhetori­call places concerning the giftes and qualities of body and soule, as also externall and those of fortune.

If the adiunct bée occupied or exercised, then the subiect must bée that exerciseth the same.

To whatsoeuer you ascribe the adiunct which is occupied, to the same you must giue the subiect: and what you apply to it, you must also attribute to this.

Sometime the adiunct together with the subiect is ta­ken but for one onely argument, as when I say: The mur­thering and vsurping Tyrant, Richard the third, was de­seruedly slayne: and yet neuerthelesse here the subiect is ar­gued in some respect by the adiunctes, in that it is thereby described and declared.

Some adiunctes bée antecedent or going before, some againe present and conioyned, lastly some others consequent and following. Therefore some other Logicians haue made these thrée kinds of adiuncts, thrée seuerall kindes of argu­ments, as Antecedentia, adiuncta, consequentia.

Naturall Philosophers, Phisitians, Astronomers, and other professors vse much this place: as when they dispute of chaunge of weather, diuersitie of causes and occasions of diseases, signes of stormes and tempestes, as, vento rubet aurea Phoebe, when the Moone is red, shée betokeneth wind. These common adiunctes bée called [...].

[Page 44] 10. H. 6. 21. Merchant est bon addition, & eadem lex de wydowe, on single woman.

Seruant n'est addition, car est trope generall. L. 5. E. 4. 22. Vide 14. E. 4. 7. quel serra le addition d'un feme, que est ne mayde, widow, ne wife.

Vide 31. & 32. H. 8. 5. Dyer. Spynster est addition cy­bien al home, come al feme, car per Spylman in Norfolke sont diuers homes qui sont woorsted spynsters.

Maister Lambard. Iustit. lib. 2. cap. 5. M. Marrow sayth, that fiue principall things bée most commonly requisite in presentments before Iustices of peace.

• 1 The name, surname, and addition of the party indited.
• 2 The yeare, day, and place, in which the offence was doone.
• 3. The name of the person to whome the offence was doone.
• 4 The name and value of the thing in which the offence was committed.
• 5 The manner of the facte, and the nature of the offence, as the manner of the treason, murder, felony, or trespasse.

Ad: Temp. Maister Lambard. Iust. lib. 2. cap. 19. Tou­ching the continuance of these quarter sessions, I haue short­ly but this one thing to say: that almost two hundred yéeres ago, it was ordeined by statute (12. R. 2. cap. 10.) that they should bée continued thrée dayes together, if néede were, vpon paine of punishment. And yet, in these dayes of ours, where­in the affayres of the sessions bée excéedingly increased (and consequently more néede to continue them now then before) many doo skantly afforde them thrée whole houres, besides that time which is spent in giuing of the charge.

Maister Crompton. Iust. Fol. 65. hath a number of ad­iuncts, effects, subiects, &c.

Inprimis couient consider le qualitie del home, lequel, il est semble a faire tiel felonious act, ou nemy.

Item quel chose doyt luy mouer d'attempter tiel enter­prise.

Item lequel il fist le murder, sur ascun displeasure deuant conceue, ou sur sodein anger.

[Page] Item lequel il expect per son mort, d'auer ou receiuer as­cun cōmedity, come terre, office, argent, ou ascun auter gaine.

Item lequel il est vn que ne regard le tuer de home, ou sil ad ew pardon ou ad estre acquite pur tuer de home auant cest tēps, car tiels choses face homes d'auer luy in suspicion.

Item le pais ou home fuit nee, declare ascun foits son naturall inclination, come sil vst etre née, ou educatus en­ter les homes de Tyddesdale et Ryddesdale, poet estre plu­tost suspect.

Item dequel trade il est, et per quel occupation il viue.

Item lequel soit gamester ou haunter de alehouses, ou vn companion inter ruffians.

Item dequel abilitie il est, et coment il auient a ceo que il ad, sil ad ascun chose.

Item quel apparel il vse, et lequel il ama daller braue­ment ou nemy.

Item dequel nature il est, lequel soit hastie, heady, ou prest de quarreler.

Item queux shyftes il ad de temps en temps, et quel chose luy moue de fayre tiel haynous act.

Item lequel le home fuit tue In le haut chemyn ou en boys, ou perenter deux hilles, ou lequel prochein vn hedge, ou auter secret lieu.

Item lequel fuit en le matyne, ou sere en le nuite, et le­quel fuit view la circa ciel temps.

Item lequel il senfua apres l'act commit, ou auera ascun sank sur luy, ou sil tremble ou staggar, ou soit contrary, en disant de son tale, et coment il gard son countenaunce.

Item lequel auer esperance de garder son fact secretment per reason del place, temps, et le maner de son secret feasans.

Item dauer tesmoignes examines de son esteant en ceo place, ou en auter place, al temps del act fait.

Item compare le force de murderer oue le weakenes, armor oue le nakednes, stoutnes oue le simplicity d'auter.

Item son confess ion demesne, Wilson Rhet. Fol. 17.

Item si soit vagarant, & nullam exercens a [...]tem, neclabo­rem, ou si certein d esbiens embles fuer in son possession. 7. E. 4. 10.

[Page 45] Item siquis appellatus fuerit à probatore, & f [...]gerit prop­ter appellum, & mortuo probatore redierit, est suspiciosus per Bracton.

Item fama quae suspicionem inducit, oriri debet apud bo­nos & graues, non quidem maleuolos & maledicos, sed proui­das & fide dignas personas, non semel, sed saepius; quia cla­mor innuit, & defamatio manifestat, & vanae voces populi non sunt audiendae. Idem Bracton.

Item si ascun soyt imprisone pur suspition de felony, et eschapa, ou fait tout que en luy est, de eschaper, est grand sus­pition que il est culpable. Stamf. 180.

Item si quis noctu cubauerit in domo solus cum aliquo qui interfectus sit, vel si duo vel plures ibi fuerint, & hutesium nō leuauerint, nec plagam à latronibus vel interfectoribus in de­fensione facienda acceperint, nec ostendunt quis, de se, vel de alijs hominem interfecerit, his casibus mortem dedicere non possunt. Bracton.

Item si quis notum vel ignotum in domum suam accepe­rit, qui viuus ingredi visus sit, verum postea nunquam nisi mortuus: dominus domus, si tunc domi sit, vel alij de familia qui tunc interfuerunt, poenam capitalem subibunt, nisi fortè per patriam fuerint liberati. Idem.

Item communis vox & fama est sufficient cause de suspi­tion de felony, sans auter especiall matter alledge. per Curi­am. 5. H. 7. 2. H. 7. 6.

Item si home soit robbe, ascuns voile prender le measure de les pées de les robbers, et de les chiuals, et si cesty que est robbe ad suspition d'ascun il voile causer le measure d'estre mis al pée de tiel person, et son chiuall, et sils accorde, il poet estre suspitious.

Item si home appelle auter traitour, et il dit rien a ceo, il est cause le luy arrester pur suspition, et pur ceo couient que il responde a ceo. Fitz. coro. 24. 37. H. 6. per les Iustices, issint semble ou home appelle auter théefe, et il dit rien a cell, &c.

Item Nota, il est vse, on home est suspect d'auer murdre auter, d'amesner luy al mort corps et sur cel il ad estre view, que le corps ad nouelment met hors sanke, videlicet, hath [Page] bled freshly, sicome vst este nouelment tue. Et sur ceo il ad este pris, et condemne, et quant il ale al executiō, il ad conus le fact.

Adiuncts bée more plentifull, saith Ramus, but subiectes more forcible in arguing, as, hée lookes, ergo hée loues, it fol­loweth not so well, as thus, hée loues, ergo hee lookes. Yet some like not of this note. For, say they, if you consider the subiect and the adiunct Logically, then the one dooth equally argue the other, but if phisically, then that is heterogeneum and impertinent.

As the place, so the time may inhaunce or diminishe the value of thinges. So that, as a man may plus petere loco, so may hée also tempore. Qui tardius soluit, minus soluit, sic qui commodori loco. Qui citius petit, plus petit, sic qui loco magis remoto. Nam vt dies est pars obligationis, sic tempus.

11. H. 4. 31. b. Hill. Home prist mon fits bien vestue, luy dispoyle, et dona a luy vn drape, ieo auera le drape quia ieo auera le corps que il couer: sic adulter vest ma feme &c.

A les Iustices pertient pur doner iudgment, oyer, recor­der, agarder proces &c. a les Clerkes pur escriuer ceo que les Iustices agardont, a le vicount pur returner briefs a luy directes &c. 7. H. 6. 30. Hals.

Si action de wast soit ore done generalment vers tenant in tayle apres possibilitie dissue extinct, treble dammages serront recouer vers luy sans plusors parols, car ceux sont adioynts a ceo per le former statute: et quant ceo est done in nouel case, tout que est adioynt a ceo est done oue ceo simi­liter.

Donatio officij del Exigenter de London &c. pertinet ad dispositionem capitalis Iusticiarij pro tempore existentis, vt incidens inseparabile ad personam dicti capitalis Iusticiarij spectans, & hoc ratione praescriptionis & vsus. 1. & 2. Elis. 25. Dyer.

1. H. 4. 6. per Gascoigne, si le roy per parols generals graunta choses a queux auters sont incidents queux ne sont seuerables, les incidents passont. Come sil graunta moy terre cum pertinentiis, a que comon est appendant, le comon passa.

Tyrwit dit, si le roy graunta moy le foundation d'un [Page 46] abbey, le corody passa: Issint sil graunta fayre, ieo auera vn court de pipouders incident a ceo.

Vide Parkins page. 24. Des incidents que passont per le graunt des principals: come fealtie est incident al homage et al rent, rent al reuersion, aduouson al manor.

Acquitall est incident al franckalmoigne, Littleton, 32. a. acquitall et garrantie sont incidents al Homage aunce­strel, Little. 32. Distresse al rent seruice, 51. Distres al rent reserue sur egalitie del partition, 55. Suruyuor al Ioynte­nancy. 62.

Vide 12. H. 8. 7. 8. 9. Brooke Iustice sayth that, le person ad le féesimple in iure ecclesiae, wherevnto agréeth Elyot. Brudnell, semble que le person ad le féesimple, car le patron n'ad ascun interest mes solement le presentment. But pol­lard will haue it in the Patrome.

Elenchs. This place, as others, is then abused, when false adiuncts [...]ée applied, or others not orderly applyed.

Annotations. Elenches.

ONely in respect:] not indeede, and naturally, in re­spect of the thinges themselues, which may very well oftentimes concurre in one, but onely in respect of his mea­ning, that so put them downe. Therefore the vse of diuers argumentes is in dinstinction, and euident explication, not in confirmation. L. 5. E 4. 7. per Bryan: les walles, timber, couerture, pieres &c. del Chapterhouse, ne serront dits pro­perment le Chapterhouse, mes lou le couent et Chapter sont, l [...] properment est le Chapterhouse. In that saying of Christ, I come not to send peace, but the sword, if wée en­tend this conclusion, I come to send the sword, therefore not peace, then the argumentes bée repugnant, sayth Wasser­leider: but if wée take it as spoken onely for explication and distinction, then they bée vsed as diuers.

Ramus first found, diuersa: Rodolphus Agricola, disparata, which he calleth differentia.

This place is abused, when such thinges bée put downe for diuers, which are not diuers properly.

Annotations.

AEQually:] not as though one Disparate shoulde differ equally from all the other. But equally signifieth vicis­sim, simul, alike, in like manner, againe, &c. Wasserleider.

Disparo signifieth to seuer, or separate. Of that word com­meth Disparata, that is, thinges seuered, or put a sunder one from another.

Canons. If one Disparate bée equally opposed to many, then cer­teinly, if one of them bée affirmed, all the rest must be denied. But if one among all bée denied, you cannot straightwayes infer any other what you list, but some one of the same kind of thinges. And therefore, from the first part of the Canon, commeth a necessary axiome, but from the seconde, a contin­gent. What then if I should thus reason?

If this man bée not a Lawyer, hée is a Diuine.

Or thus, out of Virgill.

[Page] If the Spartane mayd bée not a woman, shée is a goddesse. Bée these axiomes false or no? I answere, they bée not alto­gether false, but contingent. And therefore I said before, that if one of them [...]ée affirmed, the other must bée denyed, and con­tralily, that is, if one of them bée denyed, the other must bée affirmed: for, as in this argument, so in many others, the common Logicians very rashly say, it dooth not followe, if it doo not follow necessarily: Wheras notwithstanding it may follow, although it follow contingently. So then the one af­firmed, the other is denyed necessarily: but the one béeing de­nied, another shall bée affirmed contingently, as I sayde in the text.

Maister Lambard. Iust. lib. 1. cap. 12. Capitall or deadly punishment is doone sundry wayes, as by hanging, burning, boyling, or pressing.

Not Capitall is of diuers sortes also, as cutting of the hande or eare, burning or marking the hande or face, boaring through the eare, whipping, imprisoning, stocking, setting on the pillory or cucking-stoole, which in olde time was cal­led the tumbrell, and of olde, but not now, pulling out of the toong for false rumors, cutting off the nose for adultery, ta­king away the priuy partes for counterfeiting of money.

Pecuniary punishmēts bée diuers, as issues, fines, amer­ciaments, and forfeiture of offices, goods, and lands &c.

The Romanes vsed specially eight sorts of chastisements, Damnum, vincula, verbera, talio, ignominia, exilium, ser­uitus, mors.

Elenchs. When diuers bée put downe as Disparates. So in Martiall.

For both these things might bée doone together by Artemi­dorus well ynough, and yet his woorke displease no man.

Annotations.

THis woord, Contrary, betokeneth no distinct and speciall determinate argument, but is a generall affection inci­dent to diuers specials. Therefore in Iudgement we should not say, the argument is from the contrary, but from this or that kind of contrary, for all contraries argue not alike. And so in other arguments wée must not sticke in the generalitie, but descend to particulars, as, what cause, what subiect, what adiunct.

Cum res duae ità comparantur, vt ex earum altera affirmata, affirmetur altera, ex altera negata, negetur altera, tum illae sunt consentaneae, vt Aegistus est otiosus, ergò adulter: Effi­ciens non habet instrumenta ad aedificandum, ergò non potest aedificare: Causa & efficiens vtrobi (que): Sed cum ex vna affir­mat a, altera negatur, vel ex vna negata altera affirmatur, tùm sunt dissentaneae, vt Sophroniscus fuit pater Socratis, ergò non filius: & Socrates fuit Sophronisci filius, ergò non pater: hîc causa & effectum sunt, sed considerantur, vt dissentanea: quià ex altero affirmato negatur alterum. Et non est absurdū, quod vna eadem (que) res, diuerso respectu, sit & consentanea & dissentanea. Ita (que) te neamus Relata. Piscator.

Scribonius would haue the nature of Relatiues generally put downe immediat ely after the generall definition of an argument in the first chapter. Because, as a father cannot bée [Page 49] somuch as imagined without a sonne, nor a sonne without a father, so no more can a cause without a thing caused, thing caused without a cause, subiect without adiunct, adiunct with­out subiect &c.

Sometimes the Relatiues haue both distinct names, as father, sonne, sometimes but one name, as a brother is hée that hath a brother, a disparate is that which hath a disparate.

One Relatiue dooth define and expound another. So the cause is defined by the thing caused, and this by that &c.

Relata sunt simul natura, for though Dauid were Dauid before Salomon was borne, yet Dauid was neuer Salomons father, before Salomon was Dauids sonne.

Relata ita contraria sunt, vt non sint sine medio: nam inter patrem & filium, est medius, qui ne (que) pater, ne (que) filius est.

I. Guyer fuit endite deuant le Coroner super visum cor­poris, del mort Emeline Guyer sa feme. Et l'enditement fuit, que le dit Emelyne fuit in pace domini regis, quous (que) antedic­tus I. Guyer, vir praefatae Emelyne Guyer &c. cest inditement fuit challenge. Car il poet estre intend assets bien per l'en­ditement, que le feme n'est occise, mes est in vie, et issint re­pugnant en luy mesme, eo (que) le dit I. Guyer est appelle vir prefate Emelyne, ou il serroyt, nuper vir, car vir est correla­tiue al feme, et ne poet estre vir nisi in respectu vxoris &c. 31. 32. H. 8. 3. Dyer.

Il ne est possible, que vn person poet estre souereigne et subiect. 4. Elis. 22. Dyer.

That which agréeth with one of the Relatiues, commonly agréeth with the other, as if it bée honest to teach, it is no shame to learne.

Relatiues in our law bée, as, seignior tenant, paramount per auayle, playntife defendant, demandant tenant, garde gardeine, feffor feffée, donor donée, grauntor grauntée, lessor lessée, disseisor disseisée, conuser conusée, baron feme &c.

Repugnants. If one repugnant argument bée denyed, the other must bée affirmed, if there bée no third thing put betwéene them.

Although Contraries cannot bée applyed vnto the same thing, yet the same thing may be applied vnto contraries.

[Page] Priuatiues. Priuatiues they call those whereof one denieth onely in that subiect wherevnto the affirmatiue agréeth by nature (affirmatiue is that which dooth affirme and lay down some thing to bée or imagined to bée) and héere the affirmatiue is called the habite, the negatiue the priuation thereof. A stone therefore cannot bée called blinde, for that it was neuer fra­med of nature to bée capable of sight, but it may bée called, not séeing.

Crompton: Fol. 29. Home tua auter quant est ebrius, il serra pendus quant est sober.

Priuatiues be, In prison alarg, compos mentis, non sane memorie: auengle surde, mute. &c.

Priuatio praesupponit habitum, vnde illa consectaria, non videtur rem amittere cuius propria non fuit. Non potest vi­deri desisse habere, qui nunquam habuit. Quod quis, si velit, habere non potest, id repudiare non potest. Eius est non velle, qui potest velle. Expressa nocent, non expressa non nocent. Qui tacet, non vti (que) fatetur, sed tamen verum est eum non negare. Cum architecti quidam palatium aedificarent in via publica, & cum proiecto lapide proclamassent, quidam iter illac faciens, lapide vulneratus, architectos omnes in ius voca­uit: ab his consultus Pyleus, animaduertit, eos probare non posse, quod proclamassent: ita (que) non ius, ait, deficit, sed proba­tio. Cum igitur cras in iuditium veneritis, cauete, ne verbum proferatis, sed me solum loqui sinatis: die igitur iudicij con­stituto, cum à iudice accusationi respondere iussi essent, & Py­leus illos vt mutos excusaret, ibi aduersarius id pernegare cae­pit, quoniam ipsos, cum vulneraretur, clamantes audisset, vt sibi caueret: quae verba Pyleus statim ad acta referri iussit, & ita eos à lite liberauit. Baldus in sua pract. tit. de cautelis.

As for contradictories, it were vtterly impertinent to make any discourse of them in this place, as wholy belong­ing to axiomaticall disposition, wherevnto all contradictions are naturally incident, howsoeuer Beurhusius distinguish in this case.

Elenchs. In relatiues, Omnia castor emis, fic fiet vt omnia venda [...], [Page 50] Martiall. Indéed if Castor buy all, some body must néeds sel all: but it followeth not that therefore, Castor must sell all.

In Repugnant: Whitenes is a colour, therefore blacke­nes is no colour. It followeth not. For, as I sayd before, con­traries generally are not such, of the which one and the same thing cannot bée affirmed, but such as cannot be affirmed of one and the same thing.

So in Relatiues. Tibullus lib. 1.

It followeth not, that because a pray is to bée taken of a great flocke, therefore nothing is to bée taken of a little one.

So in Priuatiues,

• Hee that seeth is aliue, therefore
• Hee that is blinde, is dead.

Annotations.

RAmus to these two which I haue put downe, addeth other two, Coniugates, and Notation, as argumentes made of the first. As for Coniugates, I sée in them no new different force of arguing, as hée is iust, for hée dealeth iustly: héere is nothing in effect, but the cause and the effect. For as for the deriuation of this woord, Iuste, from Iustice, it séemeth alto­ther grammaticall: and whereas they both doo fitly allude in [Page] she ende and falling, thus, Iustice Iust, Iustly, that com­meth from a Rhetoricall figure, called Polyptoton, which concerneth the elegancie that is in the diuers fallinges and terminations of woords.

So in Notation, the interpretation of the name, séemeth rather the dutie of a dictionary, then of any Logicall institu­tion, as Argumentum ab arguendo: where againe there is no force of arguing but from the cause and the thing caused. For as for the pretty and co nceipted chaunge of the woord, argumentum ab arguendo, it séemeth also a Rhetoricall ag­nomination: yet as not fully resolued héerein, I leaue them in these Annotations.

Coniugates or offspringes, bée woordes diuersly deriued from one head, as Iustice, Iust, Iustly, hée dealeth Iustly, therefore hée is iust. The primitiue woord conteineth the cause of his offsprings, as here Iustice of iust dealing.

Aristotle commendeth this place highly 7. topie.

Canons.

If you put downe or remooue one Coniugate, you must put downe, or remooue the other: That which is giuen or taken, to or from the one: is giuen or taken, to or from the other: but here Contingency is more vsuall then necessitie, therefore héede is to bée taken in distinguishing the one from the other.

In 4. H. 7. 9. b. Un briefe de partitione facienda del terre et rent fuit port. Et Keble pleade pur le rent, que le def. fuit sole seisie, sans ceo que il tient pro indiuiso oue le pl. et per Bryan, cest bon plée, car il n'auera partition del chose dont il ne ad ascun parte.

Coniugates from the cause.

Terence in Hecyra Act. 3. scoen. 4. Dedecet iam ira haec, etsi meritò iratus es. This anger becomes you not, although you haue cause to bée angry.

From the thing caused.

Tully in his oration for his house: Primum dico, Senato­ris esse boni, in Senatum venire. First I say, it is the part of a good Senator, to come into the Senate house.

[Page 51] From the subiect.

Tully to Atticus, Quia homo es, humana tibi ferenda est ratio. Because thou art a man, thou must beare such thinges as are incident to men.

From the adiunct.

Tully in his epistles: Rege interfecto, regios omnes nutus tuemur. The king béeing killed, wée mainteine euery kingly becke and countenance.

Elenchs.

Some learned men bée lewd liuers, therefore learning is lewd: Where it should bée thus; Learned men liue lewdly, therefore they bée lewde: or thus, Learning maketh men lowd, therefore it is lewd.

Notation.

Notation or Etymologie, is the interpretation of the woord. For woords bée notes of thinges, and of all woords ey­ther deriuatiue or compound, you may yéelde some reason fet from the first arguments, if the notation bée well made. It is called Originatio, quod originem verborum explicet: and Etymologia, id est, veriloquium.

Nomina sunt argumenta, non quatenus ad rem significan­dam referuntur, sed quatenus referuntur vel inter se mutuò, vt coniugata: vel ad suae originis interpretationem, quae Notatio dicitur. Sed sic non considerantur vt nomina, id est symbola, sed vt res quaedam, seu [...] quaedam. Piscator.

Grammatica notatio exponit vocū adsignificationē: Logi­ca verò causam explicat, cur hoc nomen huic rei sit impositū.

Piscator putat, à nomine ad rem significatam argumentari, nihil aliud esse quàm a testimonio argumentari: vt Christus in scriptura dicitur Deus, ergò est Deus.

Canons.

To whome the interpretation of the name agréeth, to that also the name itselfe and contrarily. Yet, sayth Corasius, ab interpretatione ad nomen ipsum deriuatum, sicuti est à ge­nere ad speciem, desumpta argumentatio inanis est, quod ety­mologia latiùs pateat, quam nomen ipsum. Certè re cipro­catio in his obscura & incerta est. Sed à deriuato ad deriuatio­nem argui melius potest, vt tutor est, ergò tueri debet.

[Page] When the name is false, vnknowne, or ambiguous, then the reason is daungerous.

That which agréeth with the one, agréeth with the other.

Duips, taunts, iests, and conceipts are often fet hence.

All Platoes Cratilus is spent in the interpretation of woords after this manner.

Nihil ambigi potest, ait Cicero, in quo, non aut res contro­uersiam faciat, aut verbum, in dictionibus igitur aequè at (que) in rebus versatur Dialectica. Hottoman.

Billinsgate, a gate in London builded by king Belus.

From the effect.

Prouident, of foreséeing future chaunces. And so in the rest.

Gospell, a good spell, or Gods spell, or saying. A Lordane signifieth an imperious idle fellow, of a lord Dane. Win­chelsea, of wind, chilly, and sea: so in Latine it is called Frig­mareuentus, of frigus, mare, ventus. Little Iohn, for that hée was woonderfully tall and bigge, héere the notation is from the contrary, as Lucus, quia non lucet, parcae, quia non par­cunt, Bellum, q [...]a non bellum, & so of Ludus, Eumenides &c. Mutuum quasi meumtuum.

Arist. 2. Rhet. Draconis leges, non hominis, quod erant asperae. Dracoes lawes were a Dragons lawes, for their crueltie.

Territorium dicitur, quia magistratus eius loci, intra suos fines, terrendi, id est, coercendi ius habent.

The Court of pipowders incident to fayres, is called Cu­ria pedis puluerisati, for fayres commonly are dusty. 13. E. 4. 8.

Choke in 17. E. 4. b. Conclude que null contract serra, si non ambideux les parties simul consentiant. Car contractus dicitur à con, quod est simul, & traho, to draw together.

Seruus a seruando, as well as of seruiendo, quia seruaban­ [...] capti in bello, vt postea venderentur. Manumissio, quasi [...] manu dimissio. Mancipia, quasi manu capta. Bracton lib. 1. Fol. 4.

[Page 52] Dyer semble que vn remaynder al feme pur vie apres le mort le baron, ne poet estre termed ne prise pur vne ioyn­ture, purceo (que) el doit prendre estate ioyntment one son baron accordant al etymologie del parol, ioynture. 17. Elis. 50. Dyer.

Per Needham 4. E. 4. Praecipe quod reddat gist proper­ment vers le tenant del terre, de terris ou tenementis, car la il poet reddere: contra del comon de pasture appendant ou in grosse; la quod permittat gist que il suffer le demandant occupier son comon &c. Socage à soca. Littleton. 26. 7.

Fearmes, quasi feormian, qu'est vn Saxon paroll, signifi­ant pur féeder ou render vittayle, car les auncient reseruati­ons fueront pur le pluis part in vittayles et nemy argent. Termes of the law. pag. 967.

Aulnage, ex quo Aulnager, est le measure et le metter per le yarde, in Latine, Vlnagium & vlnator, ab vlna. 13. & 14. Elis. 49. Dyer.

Shyrréeue, of two Saxon words, Geresa, a ruler, and Scy­ran, which is to cut: as it were the ruler of the shire. For the Realme is diuided and cut, as it were, into such partes, cal­led héerevpon shires, and allotted to seuerall shyrréeues as their shires. In Latine hée is called Vicecomes, quasi vica­rius comitis, in séeing iustice executed in the shire, and the kinges reuenues brought in aerarium. Which the Counte, Earle, Comes himselfe should, but could not by himselfe, as attending for the most part vpon the king in warres, as the name beareth, Comes quasi comitans principem.

Constable, quasi Kyninstaple, or Kingstaple, the stay and hold of the king, for so was the Lord great Constable of Eng­land, who had authoritie in matters of warre within & with­out the Realme. Out of which office this lower Constable­ship was first fet. 13. E. 3. Stat. Winchester: where two con­stables in euery Hundred were appoynted to take view of armour.

Tythingman, Headborough, Chiefepledg, Borsholder, is in a manner all one with a petite Constable. Although be­fore William Conquerour it was ordeined, that all frée borne men should cast themselues in companies by ten in ech com­pany, and that euery of the ten should bée pledge and surety [Page] for his fellow, and amerced for his default if he escaped. Here­of these companies bée called Boroes or Bo [...]hes, a pledge, and Tything of ten. And because ten of these companies some­times met for matters of weight, and ten times ten is an hundred, their generall assembly was called an hundred. The speaker and chiefe man was called the Tythingman, the Borsholder, quasi elder Boroe, and head-borohe, chiefe pledge. In these méetings among other things it was obserued, that euery of these pledges should yearely bée presented by the chiefe pledge at a generall assembly, yet called the view of Frankepledge, visus Franciplegij, or the Léete court. Maister Lambard.

Lathes, Rapes, and Wapentakes, be so called of the diui­sions of partes of shires. Lathe is a barne, Rape a reaping. Sir Thomas Smith thinketh them to bée names of seruice, for that so many townes met in one day to reape or carry the Lords corne into his barne, and Wapentake of taking wea­pons, for that in those assemblies▪ hée that could not find sure­tie for his good abearing, had his weapon taken from him.

But M. Lambard in legibus Edwardi regis, writeth thus.

Totus ille conuentus dicitur Wapentac, eo quod per tac­tum armorū suorum ad inuicem confederati sunt: of W [...]pun & Tac, tangere vel confirmare, quià omnes praesentes cum lanceis suis tangebant hastam praefecti ipsius Wapentachij, & ità se consirmabant.

Bracton. Dicitur ideo breue, quia rem de qua agit, & in­tentionem petentis, paucis verbis breuiter enarrat, &c.

Maister Plowden. Fol. 357. a. Quia fines in curia nostra leuati finem litibus debent imponere & imponunt, ideo fines vocantur maximè. Sic Fol. 368. b. ex Bracton. Finis est extre­mitas vniuscuius (que) rei, hoc est, idem in quo vnaquae (que) res ter­minatur, & ideo dicitur finalis concordia, quia imponit finem litibus.

Fol. 250. a. b. Et le nosme del estate fée tayle fuit done sur le certeintie del inheritance, come Littleton dit, car il dit, que Talliare, idem est quod in certitudinem ponere. Et pur ceo (que) en le done il est expresse de que corps les heyres que en­heritont, isseront, pur cel cause il prist, que il fuit appelle [Page 53] tayle. Ou plustost puit auer le nosme de cest Francois paroll, tayler, lequel est decowper, car a tayler boys, est a cowpe [...] poys, et purceo (que) l'estate est docked, on cut off (car deuant il fuit fée simple, et a ore le fée est decise de ceo, et l'estate per ceo est docked, cut off, ou fait meynder) il poet bien estre dit estate tayle, cestascauoir, estate decoupe, decise, ou deminue.

Fol. 193. a. Terres venues en mains des [...]omes de reli­gion, sont appelle en ley de viender en mortmayne, per le re­semblance (come Weston Iustice dit) al tenure d'un home en extremes, que tient en son mayne quecon (que) que il soit, tanq▪ que il soit mort. Et issint le continuance del inheritance en ceux de religion est suppose cy longement, que le meason con­tinue. Vide Doctor & Student accordant oue ceo. pag. 172. a.

Fol. 198. b. Et le paroll, Expiration, est properment brea­thing vp, ou yéelding vp the breath, come le seigniour Dyer dit, et est apply al home ou auters choses animate: et est vse pur le mort d'un home; car quant il yéelde vp his breath, adonques il morust, car sans son breath il ne poet viuer. Et coment (que) il est properment vse a choses animate, que brea­thont, vncore per vn similitude il est referre al choses inani­mate. Come vsomus en nostre ley, Reuerter, que est proper­ment vse in choses animate que soy remouent: mes ascun foits nous vsomus ceo in chose inanimate, come diomus, lou tenant en tayle morust, le terre reuertera al donor. Et issint expiration vse icy per similitude del choses vi [...]ant, implye [...]ine quecon (que). Car come signifiomus per expiration le mort del home, et son darreine fine, queconque voy, que il vient, issint ceo paroll, expiration, adde al estate pur ans, poet ap­tement signifier le fine de ceo quecon (que). Et issint expiration del estate pur ans, et fine del estate pur ans, est tout vn.

Court baron, of Barones, quasi virones, magnates, among the Saxons called Thani. Court Léete, of the Saxon woord Lant, which is law, so Lant-day by corruption of spéech is come to be called Law-day. Barrettor, of the French Ba­rat, deceipt: or of the Latine, Baratro, or Balatro, a vyle knaue. Apprentice of Apprendre to learne. Sessions à sedendo. Acquittance, quasi acquietantia, &c.

Inditement, of the French woord, Enditer, which Ste­phanus, [Page] deriueth from the Gréeke [...], defero, accu­so, postulo in iudicio, and [...], deferor, causam dico quod circa publica secus aliquid admiserim. Hereof is [...], delatio, and [...], delator, quadruplator. Maister Lam­bard in his Iustice of peace. lib. 2. cap. 5. sayth thus. The vnderstanding or knowledge which the iustices of peace doe take by the trauaile of these enquirours is by the meane of their report, put in writing, and commonly called an en­ditement, or presentment: betwéene the which two woords (howsoeuer they bée confounded in common spéech) mée thin­keth that there dooth easily appeare a certaine difference. For I take a presentment to bée a méere denuntiation of the iurors themselues or of some other officer without any other information: and an enditement to be the verdict of the iu­rours, grounded vpon the accusation of a third person. So that a presentment is but a declaration of the Iurours, or of­ficers without any bill offered before, and an enditement is their finding of a bill of accusation to bée true. The one sée­meth to come of the Gréeke [...] I accuse, the other of the French, presenter, to offer vnto a man, or set before him.

Maister Lambard: Iust. lib. 2. cap. 16. Hereof also the fine tooke first his name, of the Latine Finis, because it maketh an ende with the Prince for the imprisonment, for the of­fence committed, against his law, and in that respect chiefly dooth it differ from an amerceament. For when the offender hath not so déepely trespassed, that thereby hée deserueth not any bodily punishment at all (as if hée bée nons [...]ite in an action, or doe commit any such like default) hée is sayde to fall into the kinges mercy, because hee is then mercifully to bée dealt with. And by the great charter, cap. 14. that amer­ciament and summe of money which hée is to pay for y^• same, ought to bée assessed and affeered by the good and lawfull men of the neighbourhood, which also Glannil, lib. 9. cap. 11. affir­meth to haue bene the lawe of the land long before that time, saying misericordia domini regis est, qua quis per [...]uramen­tum legalium hominum de vicineto eatenus amerciandus, ne aliquid de suò honorabili contenemento amittat. But when the offence or contempt falleth out to bee so great, that [Page 54] it asketh the imprisonment of the body it selfe, and that du­ring the kings wil and pleasure, then is the party to redéeme his liberty with some portion of money, as he can best agree with the king or his Iustices for the same, which composi­tion is properly called his fine, or his ransome, and in Latin Redemptio, as may be plainly seene by the statute of Marle­bridge. 52. H. 3. cap. 1. 2. 3. & 4. and by the statute called Rag­man, and diuers other auncient statutes.

The humanitie and conscience which Christian religion dooth teach, hath ingendred a certeine feare and scruple in the hartes of our men, to haue slaues and bondmen. Yet necessity on both sides, of the one to haue helpe, and the other to haue seruice, hath kept a figure or fashion thereof. So that some would not haue bondmen, villeins in grosse, as ye would say immediately bond to the person and his heires; but ascripti­tios glebae, or agris censitos, and villeins regardant and bond to the manor or ground, as members belonging to the place, and following him who had the place; to the intent their ser­uice might bée furnished, and that the country béeing euill, vnwholesome, and otherwise barren, should not be desolate. Others afterwards found out the wayes and meanes, that not the men, but the land should bée bound, and bring with it such bondage and seruice to him that occupyeth it, as to carry the Lords dunge vnto the fieldes, to plow his ground at cer­teine dayes, sowe, reape, come to his court, sweare faith vnto him, and in the ende to holde the land but by the copy of the Lords Court roll, and at the will of the Lord. This tenure is called also in our Law, villeine, bond, or seruice tenure. Yet, to consider more déepely, all land, euen that which is cal­led most frée land, hath a bondage annexed vnto it, not as na­turally the lower ground must suffer and receiue the water and filth which falleth from the higher ground, nor such as Iustinian speaketh of de seruitutibus praediorum rusticorum & vrbanorum; but the lande dooth bring a certeine kinde of seruitude to the possessor. For no man holdeth lande simply frée in England, but he or she that holdeth the crowne of Eng­land: all others holde their land in fée, that is vpon a fayth or trust, and some seruice to another Lord of a mannor as his [Page] superior, and he againe of a higher Lord, till it come to the prince and him that holdeth the crowne. So that if a man die, and it bée founde that he hath lande which he holdeth, but of whom no man can tell, this is vnderstood to be holden of the crowne, and in capite, which is much like to knights seruice, and draweth vnto it thrée seruices, Homage, ward, and ma­riage: that is he shall sweare to be his man, and to be true vnto him of whome hée holdeth the land. His sonne who holdeth the land after the death of his father, shalbe married where it pleaseth the Lorde. He that holdeth the land most fréely of a temporall man (for francke almes and francke mariage hath an other cause and nature) holdeth by fealtie onely, which is, hée shall sweare to bée true to the Lord. So that all frée land in England is holden in fée, or fedo, which is asmuch to say, as in fide or fiducia, that is, in trust and confidence, that hée shalbe true to the Lorde, of whome he holdeth it, pay such rents, doe such seruice, and obserue such conditions, as were annexed to the first donation. Thus all, sauing the Prince, bée not veri domini, but rather Fiduci­arij domini & possessores. This is a more likely interpreta­tion then y^e which Littleton doth put down in his booke, who sayth that foedum, idem est quod haereditas, whith it dooth be­token in no language. This happeneth many times to them who bée of great wit and learning, yet not séene in many tongues, or marke not the deduction of woordes which time dooth alter. Fides in Latine, the Gothes comming into Italy, and corrupting the language, was turned first into fede and at this daye in Italy they will saye, in fide, en fede, or a la fe. And some vncunning lawyers that would make a newe barbarous Latine woorde to betoken land giuen in fidem, or as the Italian sayth, in fede, or fe, made it, in feudum, or fedum. The nature of the woord ap­peareth more euident in those which wée call to feffe, feoffee or feoffees, the one be fiduciarij possessores, or fidei cōmissarij, the other is, dare in fiduciam, or fidei commissum, or, more Latinely, fidei committere. The like error is in Wyther­nam, which some interprete vetitum nauium: whereas in trueth it is in playne Dutch, and in our old Saxou language [Page 55] wyther nempt, alterum accipere: iterum rapere: nâm is, pig­noris ablatio, wyther, signifieth altera. But to returne thi­ther where wée did digresse: yee see that where the persons bée frée, and the bodies at full libertie and maxime ingenui, yet by annexing a condition to the land, there bee meanes to bring the owners and possessors thereof into a certaine ser­uitude, or rather Libertinitie: that the tenantes, besides paying the rent accustomed, shall owe to the Lord a certaine fayth, duetie, trust, obedience, and, as we terme it, certaine seruice, as Libertus or cliens patrono: which, because it doth not consist in the persons, (for the respect in them doth not make them bonde) but in the land and occupation thereof, it is more properly expressed in calling the one tenant, the other Lord of the fée, then either Libertus or cliens can doe the one, or Patronus the other: for these wordes touch rather the persons, and the office and duetie betweene them, then the possessions, but in our cause, leauing the possession and land, all the obligation of seruitude and seruice is gone.

So much haue I collected out of sir Thomas Smith, con­cerning this woord fee. lib. 3. cap. 8.

Maister Lambard. Iust. lib. 2. cap. 14. Arraignement sée­meth to haue borrowed the name out of the woorde Arraye, which is the pannell or iurie, because hee that is arraigned, must be tried by them, being first called, sworne, and tryed in order for that seruice.

Maister Lambard. Iust. lib. 1. cap. 13. This sauing then, or deliuery of a person out of prison, before hée hath satisfied the law, is vttered by three tearmes in our statutes, that is to say bailement, maineprise or manucaption, and repleuine: and they bée indifferently vsed to expresse that suretie, which the prisoner is to finde in such a case. Neuerthelesse it see­meth that a repleuine had his original of the word, pledges, which denoteth them that vndertake for the partie, that hee shall abide to be iustified by lawe: and it is vsed in diuers other cases▪ as in repleuine of cattell vpon distresse, reple­uine of fraunchises in a quo warranto, repleuyne of land vpon a grand cape in olde time, and repleuine of the person of a man in case of villenage.

[Page] Baylement is deriued from the French terme Bayler, and that also commeth of the Gréeke [...], they both signifi­yng to deliuer into hande. For hée that is bayled, is taken or kept out of prison, and deliuered, as it were, into the handes of his friendes, as sureties for him. Whereof also the woorde Manucaptio, or Maineprise, which is all one, giueth good eui­dence, the one mentioning the deliuery, the other the recey­ning. And in this respect, the booke of the Norman customes calleth baylement, a liue prison, for that the party thereby becōmeth prisoner to his friendes that doo vndertake for him.

Maister Lambard. Iust. lib. 1. cap. 21. As in olde time eue­rie killing of a man was of the effect, called Murder, because death ensued of it (and of the Hebrew woord Moth, saith Po­stellus, commeth the Latine Mors, which the Saxons our el­ders, called Morth and Morthor, as wée yet sound it) so was that wilfull manner of [...]aying with malice prepensed, long since, and most properly, called Felony, because it was doone felleo animo, in malitious heate and displeasure, and there­fore per feloniam, as the statute at Marlebridge cap. 15. dooth plainely tearme it.

Maister Lambard. Iust. lib. 2. cap. 19. Riot séemeth to come of the French woorde Rioter, which signifieth to brawle or scolde; for that commonly Riots indéede, doo follow of braw­ling in woord. And it is taken to bée where there is any vn­lawfull assembly (An vnlawfull assembly is the company of thrée persons or more gathered togither to doo such an vnlaw­full act, although they doo it not indéede) of men gathered to­gether, and going about to commit an vnlawful act, and they doo execute it indéede, as to beate a man, or to enter vppon a possession forcibly, or such like.

Our Rout is the same which the Germains yet call Rot, meaning a band or great company of men gathered togither, and going about to execute, or executing indéede any Riot or vnlawfull act. And, sayth Marrow, it is saide properly of the multitude that assemble themselues in such disorderly sorte for their common quarrell: as if the inhabitants of a towne­ship doo assemble to pull downe a hedge or pale, to haue their common, where they ought to haue none, to beate a man that [Page 56] hath doone them some publike offence or displeasure.

M. Lambard. Iust. lib. 1. cap. 17. The woordes Affray and Assault bée indifferently vsed of most men, and that in our booke cases, but yet in myne opinion, there wanteth not a iust difference betwéene them. For Affray, is deryued of the French, Effrayer, which signifieth, to terrifie, or bring feare, and is the more hainous irespasse: for the Law vnderstan­deth it to be a common wrong, and therefore it is enquirable and punishable in the turne of the shiriffe, and in a léete, 4. H. 6. 10. and 8. E. 4. 5. Otherwise it is of an assault, as it seemeth by those very bookes. Yet may an affray bée without woord or blow giuen: as if a man, shall shew himselfe furni­shed with armour or weapon, which is not vsually worne and borne, it wil strike a feare into others that be not armed, as hée is, and therefore both the statute of Northampton. 2. E. 3 cap. 3. made against the wearing of armour and weapon, and the writ therevpon grounded, doo speake of it, by the woords, Effray del pais, and, in terrorem populi.

But an Assault, as it is fetched from another fountayne, namely from the Latine Assultus, which denoteth a leaping or flying vppon a man: so can it not bée performed without the offer of some hurtfull blow, or at the least of some fearfull spéech. And therefore to rebuke a collector with fowle woords, so that hée departed for feare without dooing his office, was taken for an assault. 27. lib. Ass. Pl. 11. And to strike at a man although hée were neither hurt, nor hit with the blowe, was adiudged an assault. 22. lib. ass. pl. 60. For this assault dooth not alwayes necessarily imply a hitting: and therefore in trespasse of assault and battery, a man may bée founde guilty of the assault, and yet excused of the battery. 40. E. 3. 4. and 45. E. 3. 24.

Estreates are called of the woord Extracta, because they bée short notes or memorials, extracted or drawne out of the Records by the Clarke of the peace, and by him indented and deliuered sunderly to the shiriffe, and to the barons of the Eschequer, bearing this, or the like title: Extracta finium, amerciamentorum forisfactorum, ad generalem sessionem pa­cis tentam apud Maydstone &c. coram &c. For the whole [Page] forme of the making héereof, there is full direction giuen to all clerkes of estreates, by the statute. 7. H. 4. cap. 3. where­vnto I referre them.

I haue purposely inserted a number of notations, for that I would make it plain, how the notion of the thing is often­times expressed by the notation of the woord, contrary to the preiudicate opinion of some séely penmen, and illogicall law­yers, who thinke it a fruiteles poynt of superfluous curio­sitie, to vnderstand the woords of a mans owne profession.

Elenchs.

A Woman is a woe man, because shee woorketh a man woe. Agreamentum, quasi aggregatio mentium. But all the sport is to heare the Moonkish notations of woordes both Gréeke and Latine, whereof they knew neither sence nor sig­nification, as Diabolus, of Dia, that is two (say they) and bo­lus, which signifieth a morsell, because the deuill maketh but two morsels of a man, one of the soule, and another of the body. Hypocrisis, of [...], which is ouer, and [...], gold, because hypocrites bée cloaked with a golden shew ouercast: whereas the one commeth of [...], to cast in accusati­ons: the other of [...], to dissemble.

Annotations.

REciprocation:] In other arguments not necessary. For it is not in all causes, but onely betwéene the forme and the thing formed: not in all subiects, but betwéene the subiect and his proper adiunct, not in all contraries, but onely in Re­latiues. Whereas in distribution and definition, the reci­procation is perpetuall.

Such is the excellency of distribution and definition, that almost they alone doo suffice for the absolute putting downe of any art. Therefore Socrates in Phaedro Platonis sayth, that if he finde any man who can cunningly diuide, he will follow his steps, and admire him for a God.

[Induction:] Therefore as the one is an argument, and no argumentation, so also is the other. Nam Inductio arguit distributum siue totum, sine vlla dispositione tertij argumenti.

[More agree with the whole:] For in distribution of the subiect and adiunct, the partes and the whole doo not essenti­ally agrée, as we shall sée héereafter. Therefore by this rule the best diuision is from the cause and effect. Againe, the more that the partes doo disagrée among themselues, the better is the diuision. By which it appéereth that the best diuision must be of partes that be most repugnant, which can bee but two, therefore Dichotomia is most excellent, a diuision con­sisting onely of two partes. For, as among agreeable argu­ments the cause and thing caused doo best agrée, so of all disa­gréeable; the repugnant be most disagréeable. But as in the most generall and subalternall, Dichotomia must bee obser­ued, so in the most speciall it is not to be exacted.

Elenchs.

Plato in Phaedro compareth inartificial diuiders so bung­ling Cookes, who in stead of artificiall ear [...]ing, vse rudely to breake and dismember thinges. This is a lamentable want in our law, I meane exact diuisions, in place whereof wee haue nothing els, but eyther A B C methode without cohe­rence, or primo notandum, 2. not. 3. not. 4. not. & so on [...] till [Page] hée come to decimotertiò notandum, like dunses in schooles, and séelly bablers in pulpits: that a man were farre better make a new spéech, than remember their waste and confused Schediasmata. Lyttleton did what hée could in this behalfe, although it were but litle, as in those his distinctions, Estate taile is generall or speciall: Dower is per le comen ley, per custom, ad ostium ecclesiae, ex assensu patris, de la pluis beale. Uillen per prescription ou confession: Item in gros ou re­gardant. Rent est rent seruice, charge, seck. Conditions in fayt, en ley. Garrantie, lineall, collaterall, perdisseisin, &c.

Well then, one generall Elench in a distribution, is the not vsing of it, when the matter requireth. Another is, when wée vse it, but inartificially, when any thing eyther wanteth in it, or is supersiuous. Want, as in that which Virgil hath 5. Aeneid. where hée propoundeth in his distribution onely foure kindes of exercises, but afterwards expoundeth fiue.

For besides these foure, followeth the fift, not named here in the distribution, and that is the race of horses.

For superfluitie, that shall serue which Tully hath in his second booke De finibus, where hée speaketh thus of Epicurus.

Quomodo autem philosophus loquitur tria esse genera cu­piditatum? Naturales & necessarias, naturales & non necessa­rias, nec naturales nec necessarias. Primùm diuisit inleganter: duo enim genera quae erant, fecit tria: hoc est, non diuidere, sed frangere rem. Qui si diceret, Cupiditatum duo esse genera, naturales & inanes: naturalium quo (que) duo, necessarias & non necessarias, confecta res esset. Vitiosum est enim in diuidendo, partem in genere numerare.

Annotations.

ECausis singulis distributio esse potest. Ex efficiente, vt ius est naturale, ciuile, gentium; ex materia: vestes sunt la­neae, lineae, &c. Ex forma, lanx est, quadrata, rotunda, &c. Ex fine, vestes sunt induendi causa, vel praecingendi, inster­nendi, &c.

[Page] For the Elenchs touching distribution of the integrall, sée before in the tractate of the integrall.

Annotations.

PIscator would haue some diuisions to bée of thinges, as those that Ramus hath put downe: and some of woordes, to distinguish the diuers acceptions of ambiguous woordes, as Littleton pag. 51. in this woord Assise, which he saith is equi­uocum, &c. But that belongeth rather to a Dictionary-maker, then a teacher of Logike, saith one. And, indéede, as another aunswereth, woords bée diuided together with the things: as Liberty and fréedome is eyther bodily or spirituall: where, as well the thing, as the woord is diuyded.

All Logike is generall, and applyable as well to thinges imagined, as things that bée extant in truth: and therefore to woords also, as woordes haue causes, effectes, subiectes, ad­iuncts, and other arguments to bée considered. Logicus, saith Hottoman, insitam vocum inter se rationem, habitum, respec­tum, affectionem: Grammaticus tantùm accidentia, & popu­laris sermonis in ijs iungendis consuetudinem exquirit, &c.

Sith these two last kindes of distribution bée sayde to bée made of argumentes agréeable after a certeine manner; wée are to vnderstand, that neyther the whole héere, is of the es­sence of the partes, nor the parts of the nature of the whole: so that this is no true distribution indéed, but rather an ima­gined distinction. And these bée partes, not of any whole, but rather of order, distinction, and particular rehearsall or enu­meration.

Canons.

Therefore if you affirme or deny, either the adiunct which is the whole, or the subiects which bée the partes, you may contingently affirme or deny the one or the other.

And so in the other of the adiunct, the adiunctes as partes béeing affirmed, the subiect as whole may be also affirmed.

Distrib. in Sub.

[Page 60] Stamford. praerog. reg. cap. 1. For which cause the lawes doo attribute vnto him (the king) all honour, dignitie, prero­gatiue and preheminence, which prerogatiue dooth not onely extend to his owne person, but also to all other his possessi­ons, goods, and cattels. As, that his person shall bée sub­iect to no mans suite, his possessions cannot bée taken from him by any violence or wrongfull disseisin: his goodes and cattels are vnder no tribute, toll, or custome, nor otherwise distreignable.

Elenchs.

If a false adiunct bée diuided into false subiects: as argu­ments bée eyther affirmatiue or negatiue. Or if a false sub­iect bée diuided into vnfit adiuncts, as spirits some be white, some blacke.

Annotations.

DEfinition is not set among the last, as though it were one of the woorst, but because it is made of those other go­ing before, and therefore cannot bée conceiued without them.

Héere wée teach what a definition is, and how to make it, therefore it commeth after the other argumentes of which it is made: but in the tractate of Methode, wée shew how and where to place a definition already made; and therefore according to her excellency, we allow her the first place.

Diuisio est quasi sectio rei in partes: Definitio contra, quasi collectio & comprehensio partium ad rem explicandam.

Theloall hath taken some more paines in defining and diuiding a writ, than eyther the author of the Register, of old Natura breuium, or Fitzherbert. Theloals definition is alrea­die put downe elsewhere.

Tenant in fée simple est celuy que ad terres ou tenements a tener a luy, et a ses heyres a touts iours. Littleton pag. 1. Disseisin est vn tortious ousting del francktenant per entrée nyent congeable. 62. a. Plowden.

Nous voulons que prisone soyt tenue place per nous bounde dedeins certeyne bounds assignes pur le garde del corps del home. Brytton, 17. Appele est pleynte de home fait sur auter, oues (que) purpose de luy atteyndre de felony par mots a ceo ordeynes. Brytton, when hée had thus defined matry­mony, Fol. 246. Matrimony est assembly de home et de feme, a lour deux assents par ioynture de saynt eglise, pur demorer ensemble ausi come vn chayre a touts lour vies, sans espoyre de partir: afterwardes, Fol. 252. hée prooueth that if a man haue two wiues, the second is not feme de iure by this defi­nition, thus; et deux ne poyt il my auer a vne foits, sicome apiert per le definition de matrimony, ou est dit, que matri­mony est assembly de home et de feme, et nemy de home et femes, ou feme et homes, mes singulerment feme et home. It is shame that Brytton were not newly printed, and pittie that hée and Bracton bée no more reade: for though the Law bée much altered since their time, yet there is no essentiall part of the Law, which hée and Bracton doo not define, diuide, and handle accordingly. So that by discretion a man shall by [Page] one chapter of Brytton more plainely perceyue the nature of Garde, villen, &c. then by turning and tossing of forty vnco­herent cases in yeare-bookes, which doo not expound the na­ture of, Gard, villen, &c. but are spent in the determination of some obscure poynt touching Gard, villen, &c. and doo pre­suppose a generall notice of them, before wée come to the exa­mination of particular difficulties discussed in yéere-bookes. And indéed it séemeth a preposterous thing to iangle of moote conceiptes in Essoyne, Protection, &c. not knowing what an Essoyne is, what a Protection meaneth. But as in Uniuer­sities, so in Innes of Court, the gréedy desire of a superficiall shew in vnnecessary tryfles maketh vs want the true sub­stance: they for hast to get a prebend by a degrée, make light woorke and run ouer two or thrée Epitomes; and wée by a moote booke and a Brookes abridgement climbe to the barre, & bar our selues vtterly from the substance of the cōmon Law. But omnis definitio in iure ciuili periculosa est, and so in the common Law. Thats true, but M. Theloall, as also Freigius, who is of the same minde, mistooke the woord; for I thinke Vlpian, by this woord, Definitio, meaned not the Logical de­finition which expoundeth the nature of a thing, but breuem & circumscriptam quandam iuris sententiam, quam iuris­consulti regulam, Dialectici Thesin, seu positionem; Medici Aphorismum nominant. And yet, bée it as it may bée, I doubt not but who so attempteth to make Logicall definitions in the Law, shall finde it somewhat daungerous, because it is very difficult.

Cambiparticipes sunt, qui per se vel per alios placita mo­uent, vel mouere faciunt, & ea suis sumptibus prosequuntur, ad cambipartem, vel pro parte lucri habenda. Stat. an. 33. E 1.

Toftum est ou meason ad este, et ore est nul mesuage, mes le site del meason apier [...]. Curtilagium est vn soyle ou garden apperteignant a vne mease, quasi curta pecia ter­rae. Fayrfax. 21. E. 4. 52.

Glanuil. lib. 9. Fol. 7. Dicitur autem purprestura, vel por­prestura propriè quando aliquid supra dominum regem in­iustè occupatur, vt in dominicis regis, vel in vijs publicis ob­structis, vel in aquis publicis transuersis a recto cursu, vel [Page 62] quando aliquis in ciuitate super regiam plateam aliquid aedifi­cando occupauerit, &c.

24. H. 7. 12. Reade. Misprision properment est lou vn chose est agrée destre vray, come nosme del ville ou del pe rson, et puis en mesme cel plée, cel chose est autrement nosme, Come ou ieo sue nosme en formedome R. Reade, a que ieo face de­fence, et en mon barre ieo moy entitle per le nosme del T. R. ceo serra amend, car serra entend que le clerke fuit igno­rant que ceo escript issint. Mes si en briefe vers moy per le nosme de R. ieo dy, vous aues cy le dit T. ceo nest mispri­sion amendable.

In stead of geuing a true definition or explication of the nature & essence of any thing in our lawe, these singlesowld Lawyers and golden Asses aunswere, [...]: put downe a particuler case, as if I shoulde aske what is a man: A man, say they, is such a thing as Willy the milman: Robin the pannierman, &c. Where a generall definition béeing put downe, woulde giue a speciall light to the matter in hand.

Accurata definitione vtendum est in artibus, & cum doctis hominibus: in vulgus autem, & imperitorum sensus, descrip­tiones aptiores sunt.

Heriettum est quaedam praestatio, vbi tenens liber vel ser­vus in morte sua dominum suum respicit de meliori auerio suo, vel de secundo meliori: quae quidem praestatio magis de­gratia quam de iure fit. Fleta: lib. 4. cap. 3. Elis. 58. Dyer.

Collegium est societas plurium corporum inter se distan­tium: & dicitur collegium propriè, cum simul habitant, quo­niam simul colliguntur, & collegium constituitur in ecclesia vel per priuilegium concessum a superiori post fundatam ec­clesiam, vel si a principio fuit ordinatum, quod ecclesia esset collegiata, vel si longo tempore vixerint collegialiter & sunt in quasi possessione collegij. Item ecclesia potest fieri colle­giata cum consensu episcopi & patroni. 9. & 10. Flis. 13. Dyer.

If some of these examples by mée collected seeme rather good descriptions, then perfite definitions: thou that so thin­kest, must thinke this also, that I could finde no better.

Therefore

[Page] A definition is called of the Grecians, [...]. Which is a translated woord from boundes and limittes of grounde. For as they hedge in and include the ground: so dooth a definition limite and circumscribe, or, as it were binde in the nature of that which is defined.

And that also is the naturall signification of this woorde which the Latinistes vs [...], finire, or definire: from whence come finitio, and definitio: Which we now vse as an Eng­lish woord. Finis is an end, finire, and definire, signifie to li­mite and end, or circumscribe one from an other, that so it may be knowne from other. The chiefe vse then of a defini­tion is, to shew and make playne: yet an argument proouing may bée fet both from the definition to the thing defined, and from this to that, negatiuely, and affirmatiuely, and so it is in descriptions.

[The difference:] This difference is sometimes fet from the very internall forme and essentiall cause of the thing defined: which is best, but hard to bée found: and ther­fore, instead thereof, sometimes the ende is vsed, sometimes the proper adiunct, sometimes many adiunctes togither, sometimes the subiect.

One Relatiue dooth define an other.

Canons.

If the definition bée, then the thing defined must bée, and contrarily: but if not that, then neyther this, and contrarily.

To whatsoeuer, the definition eyther may or may not bée applied, to the same also the thing defined eyther may, or may not bée attributed, and contrarily.

Whatsoeuer agréeeth, or not agréeeth with the definition, the same thing eyther will agrée or not agrée with the thing defined and contrarily.

In genere asciscendo satis erit proximum ponere, ne (que) al­tius a capite repetere. Nam qui proximum genus po [...]suit, is etiam superiora omnia posuisse intelligitur. Quandoquidem (ait Aristoteles in topicis) in inferioribus ea quae suprà sunt in­telliguntur.

Hottoman.

Maister Lambert; Iust. lib. 1. ca. 1. Iustices of the peace [Page 63] be Iustices of record appoynted by the Quéene to bée iustices within certaine limites: for the conseruation of the peace, and for the execution of sundrie thinges comprehended in their commission, and in diuers lawes committed vnto them.

Annotations.

AS breuity is commended in a perfect definition, so copious amplification is fittest for a description: yet so as swel­ling superfluitie bée alwayes auoyded.

Descriptio is called of the Graecians [...]. Some call it in Latine, Allusio: it hath of diuers men, vppon sundry occasions diuers names. Sometimes [...], as it were a certeine delineation: if any persō be described, they call it Prosopographia, if a place, [Page 64] Topographia, if a nation, Chorographia, if the earth Geogra­phia, if the water, hydrographia, if the wind, Anemographia, if a trée, Dendographia, if the time, Chronographia, &c.

Aristoteles a [...]t, ne (que) vnam duarū rerum, ne (que) vnius rei duas definitiones esse posse. [...]. Nam cum vnius rei vna natura sit, quae defini­tione explicatur, rectissimè à Galeno scriptum est, [...]. Licet plures vnius rei definitiones conficere vocibus tantum differentes, non rationibus.

Quod Zeno de Dialectica & Rhetorica dixit, illam pugno, hanc palmae similem esse, idem de definitione dici & definito potest, id (que) multò magis accomodatè. Re nam (que) sunt eadem, sed alterum euolutum, alterum inuolutum.

M. Lambard. Iust. lib. 1. cap. 16. Budaeus in his Gréeke Commentaries is of the opinion, that the French woorde Arrest, which with them signifieth a decrée or iudgement of a court, tooke beginning of the Gréeke [...], that is Placi­tum, and, as wée might say, the pleasure or will of a Court. And albeit that it were not out of our way, to thinke that it is called Arrest, because it stayeth, or resteth the party, yet I beléeue rather that wée receiued the name from the Nor­man lawes, because wée vse it in the same sence with them: for commonly with vs, an Arrest is taken for the execution of the commaundement of some Court, or of some officer in Iustice. But howsoeuer the name began, An arrest is a cer­tayne restraint of a mans person, depriuing it of his owne will and liberty, and binding it to become obedient to the will of the lawe; and it may bée called the beginning of im­prisonment. The precepts and writs of the high courtes of lawe, doe vse to expresse it by two sundry wordes, as, Capias, and Attachias, which signifie to take or catch holde of a man. But this our precept noteth it by the wordes duci facias, cause him to bée conueyed &c. for that the officer hath after a sort, taken him before, in that hée commeth to him, and re­quireth him to goe to some iustice of the peace.

Ibidem. Suretie of the peace is an acknowledging of a bond to the prince, taken by a competent iudge of recorde for [Page] the kéeping of the peace, and it is called suretie of the woord securitas, because the partie that was in feare, is thereby the more quiet and secure.

Idem. Lib. 1. cap. 13. The Latine men vse, Recordor, when they will signifie, to kéepe in minde, or to remember, in which sence the poet sayd:

And after the same sence also doth our lawe vse it: For Recordes bée nothing els but memorials or monumentes of thinges doone before Iudges that haue credite in that behalf.

One may affirme a thing, and another may deny it, but if a Record once say the woord, no man shall be receaued to auerre or speake against it. For otherwise there would neuer bée any ende of controuersies.

Stamford. lib. 2. cap. 38. Sanctuary est vn lieu priuilege per le prince, ou soueraigne gouernour, pur le safegard de vie de home qui est offēdour, et est foūdue sur la ley de mercy, et sur le grand reuerence, honor et deuotion, que le prince ad al lieu, deins quel il granta tyel priuiledge, &c. An issue is sayd to bée status causae, it is called Issue, of an issue in some vessell, whence onely the water is voyded &c.

Elenchs of all definitions.

First, if it want where it should bée: Then if it bée, but bée false: or bée obscure, as that of the snayle, where the defi­nition is more obscure than the thing defined, and that in Pac [...]ius, Testudo est quadrupes tardigrada, agrestis, humilis, aspera, capite breui, ceruice anguina, aspectu t [...]ci, cuiscerata inanima, cum animali sono.

Arist. in 6. Top. compareth an obscure definitiō to the pic­tures of old bungling paynters, [...]; which had the names of the things paynted, put ouer the pictures, or else they would neuer haue béene taken to bée the pictures of such things.

Homo est animal bipes, implume, quod erectum ingredi­tur, ꝙ. Plato. And the next day after comes mée Diogenes with a cocke pluckt cleane without feathers, and throwing him into Plato his schoole, sayd, Ecce hominem Platonicum, lo héere is Platoes tall man, a twoo-footed creature, without fea­thers, going vpright.

[Page 65] Agayne, if it eyther want, or haue too much.

In an vnperfect definition, the conuersion and reciproca­tion of it with the thing so defined is not precisely to be exac­ted: but in the other, it is necessarily required, the wante whereof is an infallible token of a sophisticall definition.

Annotations.

ADrianus rectè rescripsit, se testibus, non testimonijs credi­turum, ita (que) testium dignitas consideranda est: ne (que) enim quia affirmatum sit, aut negatum, ideo erit, aut non erit, Arist, de interpret: but because he that spake it, was so ho­nest and wise a man, as that hée woulde not affirme an vn­truth. Arist. 20. Rhet.

God is to be beléeued without exception, because God spake it: but men are so much either more or lesse credited, by how much their behauiour & learning is more or lesse estée­med. Therefore the Pythagorians were very foolish in thin­king their maister Pythagoras so wise, as that it were a suf­ficient argument, the thing were so, because Pythagoras said it was so, [...] ipse dixit: ipse autem erat Pythagoras. Those men, saith Plato in Protagoras that vse the authoritie of others instead of argumentes of their owne, are like to séely soules of the country, when they kéepe their wakes: quum enim propter inscitiam nequeant inuicem propria voce suis (que) sermonibus ipsi colloqui, mercede exhibita tibicines introducunt, vt aliena voce, id est tibiarum flatu, conui­uium transigant. Vbi autem boni, praeclari (que) & eruditi viri conueniunt, ne (que) tibicines, ne (que) saltatrices, ne (que) cantatri­ces vllas videas, sed voce propria, remotis ijs nugis iocis (que) conuiuium celebrare & alternis interrogationibus responsio­nibus (que) modestè disserere, etiamsi vinum abunde bibant. And in Gorgias hée saith truely, that in these borrowed testimo­nies there is no reason or perswasion, but rather violence and compulsion. Therefore, in Charmide, he biddeth vs con­sider, [Page 67] not who speaketh, but how true that is which is spo­ken. So sayde Aristotle of his owne mayster Plato, Amicus Socrates, amicus Plato, magis amica veritas. I loue Socrates and Plato well, but I like the truth better. So in 5. E. 4. 112. est dit, que precedents et course ne rule le ley, mes le ley ru­lera cux. Et pur ceo la fuit dit, que vn vtlagary fuit reuers, quia il fuit ad Com. Lancaster ibidem tent. et ne dit apud Lancaster, ou tiel lieu certeyne, a que le ibidem poet estre refer, nient obstant que fueront 100 precedent de cel retorne. Don (que) à fortiori, d'un precedent, quia vna hirundo non facit ver. 1. & 2. M. 14. Dyer.

Canons.

Héere, they are vsually woont to say, Vnicui (que) in sua arte perito, credendum est. Euery man is to bée beleeued in that art which hée professeth, and wherein hée hath skill and ex­perience.

The Rhetoricians dispute with, and against extort testi­monies, as present occasion is euer offered vnto them.

In our law, twelue bée chosen and sworne; their verdict is quasi verèdictum. The suspected men may bée ousted by challenge. Héerevpon wée haue challenge peremptory, chal­lenge per cause, &c.

Maister Lambard Iust. But especially there ought to ap­peare such Iurors, as be returned by the shiriffe, and warned by his bayliffe, whether it bée for enquiry or tryall: and in this behalfe, both the commission, the common forme of the precept, and the Law it selfe (11. H. 4. cap. 9.) willeth that they should bée probi & legales homines. For if any of them be discredited in Law, as by attainder in conspiracy, attaint, Decies tantùm, subornation of periury, or such like, they bée not probi, and their presentment is voyde by it, vnlesse there bée 12. besides them, that are not so blemished. Agayne, if they bée outlawed, abiured, condemned in a Praemunire, or attaynted of treason, felony, or such like, then bée they not le­gales, and their presentment is méerely voyde also, as it may bée gathered vpon the case. 11. H. 4. 41.

And women, infants vnder fourtéene yéeres of age, aliens, and such as bée within orders of the ministery of the clergy, [Page] cannot bée impannelled amongst others. Generally also, these Iurors ought either to bée inhabiting within the shire, or els to haue landes there: for, the commission willeth, that they should be such per quos rei veritas melius sciri poterit: which must néedes bée vnderstoode of such, as haue cause to know the countrey: and the precept is vsually according to the same forme. But especially in the countie Palatine of Lancaster, each Iurour ought to haue to the yearely value of fiue poundes by order of the statute. 33. H. 6. ca. 2. Now by 27. Elis. euery Iuror must haue iiij. pound by the yeare.

But these men bée not truely Iurors, till they bée sworne, as their name pretendeth, and otherwise their presentment is vtterly voyde.

Each Iury of Enquiry ought to conteine twelue in num­ber at the least, & if there bée 18. or moe, it shal not bée amisse. Yea the common order with vs is, to haue them of an odde number, as 17. 19. or 21. to the ende (as it séemeth) that if they shoulde dissent in opinion somewhat equallie, yet there should bée alwayes one, to wey downe the side, and cast the ballance: but if 12. of them doe agrée, the gaynesaying of the residue cannot hinder the presentment. Les Iurors trye­ront le fayt, et nemy le ley, quia sont ignorants: mes les Iudges le ley, ita (que) trauers est prise sur le matter in fayt et non sur le matter en ley. Vide Plowden. Fol. 231.

Fortescue, Lord Chauncellor, in Henry the sixt his time, preferreth this order of triall before that vsed in the Ciuill Law. His comparison is to this effect.

Si coram Iudice contendentes, ad litis perueniant contesta­tionem super materia facti (quam legis Angliae periti exitum placiti appellant) exitus huiusmodi veritas per leges ciuiles, per testium depositionem probari debet, in qua duo testes ido­nei sufficiunt. Sed per leges Angliae veritas illa non nisi duo­decim hominum de vicineto vbi factum huiusmodi supponi­tur sacramento, Iudici constare poterit: and afterward.

Per leges ciuiles pars quae in litis contestatione affirma­tiuam dicit, testes producere debet, quos ipsemet ad libitum suum nominabit. Negatiua autem probari non potest, vide­licet directè: licet possit per obliquum. Ex illis quippè [Page 68] creditur esse potentiae, minoris quo (que) industriae, qui de omni­bus quos noscit hominibus, duos reperire nequit ita conscien­tia & veritate vacuos, vt timore, amore, vel commodo, omni velint contraire veritati. Hos potest tunc ipse in testimonium producere in causa sua; & si contra eos pars altera dicere ve­lit, vel contra eorum dicta, non semper continget eos, eorum quo (que) mores aut facta apud contradicere volentem agnosci, vt ex eorum foeditate & vitijs testes illi possint reprobari. Et dum eorum dicta affirmatiuam contineant, non facilè pote­runt illa per circumstantias aut obliqua alia improbari. Quis tunc poterit suorum aut suijpsius sub lege tali viuere securus, dum cuilibet sibi inimicari volenti lex tale praestat subsidium? Et qui iniqui duo tam incauti sunt, quod facti de quo ipsi exa­minabuntur in iudicio, non, antequam in testes producantùr, occulté fingant imaginem & figuram; componant quo (que) ei­dem omnes circumstantias, quales sibi affuissent, si illud in ve­ritate constitisset? Prudentiores nam (que), vt dicit Dominus, sunt filij huius mundi, quam filij lucis. Sic Iesabel sceleratissi­ma, testes duos filios Belial, contra Nabot in iudicio produxit, quo ipse vitam perdidit; & Achab rex, eius vineam posside­bat. Sic duorum senum etiam Iudicum testimonio, mortua fuisset pro adulterio vxor castissima Susanna, si non eam mi­raculosè liberasset Dominus inexcogitabili prudentia, quam à natura non habuit puer iunior nondum aetate prouectus. Et si ipsos depositione sua varia conuicerat puer ille esse falsa­rios, quis nisi solùm Dominus nouisse poterat eos in dictis suis taliter variaturos? dum non de arboris natura sub qua im­putatum facinus fiebat, lex aliqua eos arctabat reminisci, quia testes sceleris cuius (que) considerare non putantur omnia vmbra­cula & caetera vicina illi facto, quae ad aggrauationem vel de­tectionem criminis illius minimè operantur. Sed dum de arbo­rum speciebus, Iudices illi nequam vltrò deponentes varia­bant, eorum dicta ipsos veritatis fuisse praeuaricatores demon­strabant, quò & talionis poenam meritò incurrerunt. And so foorth in the example of one Iohn Fringe, that at his death protested hée was not guilty of the fault, whereof twoo men accused him. Et alibi. Non igitur contenta est lex Franciae, in criminalibus vbi mors imminet, reum testibus conuincere, [Page] ne falsidicorum testimonio sanguis innocens cōdemnetur. Sed mauult lex illa reos tales torturis cruciari, quoús (que) ipsi eorum reatum confiteantur, quam testium depositione, qui seepè pas­sionibus iniquis, & quandó (que) subornatione malorum ad per­iuria stimulantur. Quali cautione & astutia, criminsi etiam & de criminibus suspecti tot torturarum in regno illo generibus affliguntur, quod fastidit calamus ea literis designare. Qui­dam vero in equuleis extenduntur, quo eorum rumpuntur nerui, & venae in sanguinis fluenta prorumpunt. Quorundam verò dinersorum ponderum pendulis dissoluuntur compagi­nes & iuncturae: & quorundam gaggantur ora, vs (que) dum per illa tot aquarum infundantur fluenta, vt ipsorum venter montis tumescat more, quo tunc venter ille fossorio vel simili percussus instrumento, per os aquam illam euomat ad instar balaenae quae cum halecibus & alijs pisciculis mare absorbuit, aquam despumat, ad altitudinem arboris pini. Piget, proh pu­dor, iam penna exquisitorum ad haec cruciatuum enarrare im­mania. Nam eorum variatus numerus vix notari poterit mag­na in membrana, Leges etiam ipsae ciuiles deficiente testium copia, in criminalibus, veritatem consimilibus extorquent tor­mentis, qualiter & faciunt etiam quamplurima regna. Sed quis tam duri animi est, qui semel ab atroci tanto torculari laxatus, non potius innocens ille omnia fateretur scelerum ge­nera, quam acerbitatem sic experti iterum subire tormenti; & non semel mori mallet, dum mors sit vltimum terribilium, quàm totiens occidi, & totidem gehennales furias morte ama­riores sustmere? Then followeth an example of one that by torture confessed thinges vntrue &c. Taliter, proh dolor, & quamplures alij miseri faciunt, non veritatis causa, sed solum vrgentibus torturis artati. Qúid tunc certitudinis resultat ex confessionibus taliter compressorum?

Caeterum, si innocens aliquis non immemor salutis aeter­nae in huiusmodi Babylonis fornace, cum tribus pueris benedi­cat Dominum, nec mentiri velit in perniciem animi sui, quo iudex eum pronunciat innocentem, nonne eodem iudicio iu­dex ille, seipsum reum iudicat omnis seuitiae & poenarum quibus innocentem aff [...]ixit? ô quàm crudelis est lex talis, quae duni innocentem damnare nequit, iudicem ipsum condemnat?

[Page 69] Et alibi. Praeterea si ex contractibus illatisuè iniurijs, vel haereditatis titulo, ius accreuerit homini, agendi in iudicio, si testes non fuerint, vel si qui fuerint, moriantur, succumbet ipse agens in causa sua, nisi ius suum probare valeat iueuitabilibus coniecturis, quod facere crebrò non contingit. Quare de domi­nijs & alijs possessionibus iure ciuili regulatis similiter & in omnibus actionibus cadentibus sub eodem iure, actiones agen­tium pro defectu testium quampluries suffocantur, ita quod earum vix pars media optatum finem sortiatur, &c. The order of our common law followeth.

Regnum Angliae per comitatus, vt regnum Franciae per Balliuatus distinguitur, ita vt non sit locus in Anglia, qui non sit infra corpus alicuius comitatus. Comitatus quo (que) diuidun­tur in Hundreda, quae alicubi Wapentakia nuncupantur. Hundreda verò diuiduntur per villas, sub quarum appellati­one continentur & burgi at (que) ciuitates. Villarum etenim me­tae non muris, aedificijs aut stratis terminantur, sed agrorum ambitibus, territorijs magnis, hamletis quibusdam, & multis alijs, sicut aquarum, boscorum, & vastorum terminis, quae iam non expedit nominibus designare, quia vix in Anglia est lo­cus aliquis qui non infrà villarum ambitus contineatur, licèt priuilegiati loci quidam infrà villas, de eisdem villis pars esse non censentur. Praetereà in quolibet comitatu est officiarius quidam vnus regis vicecomes appellatus, qui inter caetera sui officij ministeria, omnia mandata & iudicia curiarum regis in comitatu suo exequenda exequitur. Cuius officium annale est, quo ei post annum in eodem ministrare non licet, nec duobus tunc sequentibus annis ad idem officium reassumetur. Offici­arius iste sic eligitur. Quolibet anno in crastino animarum, conueniunt in Scaccario regis omnes consiliarij eius, tam do­mini spirituales & temporales, quàm alii omnes iusticiarii, omnes barones de Scaccario, clericus rotulorū, & quidam alii officiarii, vbi hi omnes cōmuni assensu nominant de quolibet comitatu tres milites vel armigeros, quos inter caeteros eius­dem comitatus, ipsi opinantur melioris esse dispositionis & famae, & ad officium vicecomitis comitatus illius melius dis­positos: ex quibus rex vnum tantum eliget, quem per literas suas patentes constituet vicecomitem comitatus de quo eli­gitur, [Page] pro anno tunc sequente. Sed ipse antequam literas illas recipiat, iurabit super sancta Dei euangelia, inter articulos ali­os quod benè, fideliter & indifferenter exercebit & faciet officium suum toto anno illo, ne (que) aliquid accipiet colore aut causa officij sui ab aliquo alio quàm à rege. His iam sic praesup­positis, ad eorum quae quaerimus, indaginem procedamus.

Quotiescun (que) contendentes in curijs regis Angliae ad exi­tum placiti super materia facti deuenerint, concitò, Iustitiarij per breue regis scribunt vicecomiti comitatus in quo factum illud fieri supponitur, quod ipse venire faciat coram eisdem Iustitiarijs ad certum diem per eos limitatum, duodecim pro­bos & legales homines, de vicineto, vbi illud factum sup­ponitur, qui neutrum partium sic placitantium vlla affinitate attingunt, ad recognoscendum super eorum sacramenta, si factum illud factum fuerit, sicut vna earundem partium di­cit, vel non, sicut altera pars negat. Quo adueniente die, vicecomes returnabit breue praedictum coram eisdem Iustiti­arijs vna cum panello nominum corum quos ipse ad hoc sum­moniuit, quos, si venerint, vtra (que) pars recusare poterit, dicendo quod vicecomes panellum illud fauorabiliter fecit pro parte altera, viz. de personis nimis indifferentibus. Quae exceptio, si comperta fuerit vera per sacramentum duorū hominum de eo­dem panello ad hoc per Iustitiarios electorum, mox panellum illud quassabitur, & Iustiriarij tunc scribēt coronatoribus eius­dem comitatus, quod ipsi nouum faciant panellum. Quod cùm fecerint, si & illud consimiliter repertum fuerit viciatū, etiam & illud quassabitur: & tunc iustitiarij eligent duos de clericis curiae illius, vel alios de eodem comitatu qui in praesentia cu­riae per eorum sacramenta facient indifferens panellum, quod deinde per nullam partiū illarum calumniabitur. Sed cùm ve­nerint sic impanellati in curiam, quaelibet partium excipere potest contra personam cuiuscun (que) corū, ficut & potest in om­ni casu & omni tempore, quo aliquis qualitercun (que) impanel­latus comparuerit in curia super veritate exitus huiusmodi iuraturus: dicendo, quod impanellatus ille est consanguin eus vel affinis parti alteri, vel amicitia quacun (que) tali sibi coniunc­tus, quod indifferens ipse non est ostendere inter eos veritatē: qualium exceptionum tot sunt genera & species, quod non [Page 70] licet eas breui explicare sermone: quarum si aliqua reperta fuerit vera, non tunc iurabitur ille contra qùem exceptio illa proponitur, sed cancellabitur nomen eius in panello. Sic quo­que fiet de omnibus nominibus impanellatorum, quous (que) duo­decim eorū iurentur ita indifferentes, quod versus eos neutra partium habeat aliquam materiam calumniae. Horum autem duodecim ad minus quatuor erunt de hundredo vbi villa in qua factū de quo contenditur, fieri supponitur, sita est. Et quili­bet iuratorū huiusmodi habebit terras vel reditus pro termino vitae suae ad minùs, ad valorem annuū 40. s. (now 4. li. by stat. 27. Eli.) Et hic ordo obseruatur in omnibus actionibus & causis criminalibus, realibus & personalibus, praeterquam vbi damna vel debitum in personalibus non excedunt 40. marcas monetae anglieanae quia tunc non requiritur, quod iuratores in actioni­bus huiusmodi tantum expendere possint. Habebunt tamen terram vel reditū ad valorem competentem iuxta discretionē iustitiariorum, alioquin ipsi minime iurabūtur, ne per inediam & paupertatem iuratores huiusmodi de facili valeant cor­rumpi & subornari.

Et si per tales exceptiones, tot iuratorum nomina in panello cancellentur, quod non remaneat numerus sufficiens ad facien­dam inde iuratam, tunc mandabitur vicecomiti, per breue re­gis, quod ipse apponat plures iuratores: quod & saepius fieri potest, ita quod inquisitio veritatis super exitu placiti, non re­manebit ob defectum iuratorum &c.

Iuratis demùm in forma praedicta duodecim probis & le­galibus hominibus habentibus vltra mobilia sua, possessiones, vt praedicitur sufficientes, vnde eorū statum ipsi continere po­terint, & nulli partium suspectis nec inuisis, sed ijsdem vici­nis, legetur in Anglico coram eis per curiam totum recordum & processus placiti quod pendet inter partes: ac dilucidè exponetur eis exitus placiti de cuius veritate iurati illi curiam certificabunt. Quibus peractis, vtráque partium per se vel consiliarios suos in praesentia curiae referet & manife­stabit eisdem iuratis, omnes & singulas materias & euiden­tias quibus eos docere se posse credit veritatem exitus taliter placitati. Et tunc adducere potest vtra (que) pars corā eisdem iu­stitiarijs & iuratis omnes & singulos testes quos pro parte sua [Page] ipsa producere velit, qui super sancta Dei euangelia per iusti­ciaros onerati, testificabuntur omnia quae cognoscunt proban­tia veritatem facti de quo partes contendunt. Et si necessitas exegerit diuidentur testes huiusmodi, donec ipsi deposuerint quicquid velint, ita quod dictum vnius non docebit, aut conci­tabit eorum alium ad consuniliter testificandum. Quibus con­summatis, postquàm iuratores illi deinde ad eorum libitum super veritate exitus huiusmodi, deliberatione quantam ipsi opta bunt, colloquium habuerint, in custodia ministrorum cu­riae in loco eis ad hoc assignato, ne interim eos aliqui subornare valeant, reuenient illi in curiam, & certificabunt iustitiarios super veritate exitus sic iuncti, in praesentia partium, si inte­resse velint, & maximè, petentis. Quorum iuratorum dictum per leges Angliae, Veredictum nuncupatur; & tunc secundū huiusmodi veredicti qualitatem, iustitiarij reddent & forma­bunt iudicium suum. Tamen, si pars altera, contra quam vere­dictum huiusmodi prolatum est [...], conqueratur se per illud in­iustè esse grauatum, prosequi tunc potest pars illa versus iura­tores illos, & versus partem quae obtinuit, breue de attincta. Virtute cuius, si compertum fuerit per sacramentum viginti quatuor hominum in forma praenotata retornatorum, qui mul­to maiora habebunt patrimonia quàm iuratores primi, quod ijdem iuratores primi falsum fecerunt sacramentum, corpora eorundem primorum iuratorum prisonae regis committentur▪ bona eorum confiscabuntur, ac omnes possessiones eorundem in manus regis capientur; domus quo (que) eorum & aedificia pro­sternentur, bosci succidentur, & prata arabuntur, ipsi etiam iu­ratores primi extunc infames erunt, nec alicubi recipientur in testimonium veritatis, & pars quae succubuit in priori placito, restituetur ad omnia quae ipse perdidit occasione eius. Quis tunc, etsi immemor salutis animae suae fuerit, non formidine tantae poenae, & verecundia tantae infamiae, veritatem non di­ceret sic iuratus? Et si vnus forsan tantus sui honoris prodigus esse non pepercerit, aliqui tamen iuratorum tantorum famam suam non negligent, ne (que) bona & possessiones suas taliter di­strahi patiētur propria culpa sua. Nonne iā hic ordo reuelandi veritatem potior & efficacior est, quàm est processus qualem pariunt ciuiles leges? Non hîc pereunt cauiae aut ius alicuius [Page 71] per mortem, aut ob defectum testium, non hîc producuntur testes ignoti, conductitij, pauperes, vagi, inconstantes, aut quorum conditiones vel malitiae ignorantur. Vicini sunt testes isti de proprijs viuere potentes, famae integrae, & opinionis illesae, non per partem in curiam ducti, sed per officiarium nobilem & indifferentem electi, & coram iudice venire com­pulsi. Isti omnia sc unt quae testes deponere norunt, & isti te­stium productorum agnoscunt constantias inconstantias (que) & famam. Quid vltra? Verè nihil est quod veritatem dubij de quo contendi poterit, detegere valebit, quod iuiatoribus tali­bus latere quomodolibet potest aut ignorari, dummodo pos­sibile sit, illud venire posse in cognitionem humanam.

And then after, de causis criminalibus. Si reus quispiam de felonia aut proditione in Anglia rettatus, crimen suum co­ram iudicibus dedicat, mox vicecomes comitatus vbi facinus illud commissum est, venire faciet coram eisdem iudicibus vi­ginti quatuor probos & legales homines de vicineto villae vbi illud factum est, qui rettato illi nulla affinitate attingunt, & quorum quilibet centum solidatus habeat terrae & reditus, ad certificandum iudices illos super criminis illius veritate. Qui­bus comparentibus, rettatus ille eos calumniare potest eadem forma qua in actionibus realibus fieri debere superius deseri­bitur. Et insuper reus ipse, in fauorem vitae suae calumniare potuit olim trigintaquin (que) homines quos ipse maximè formi­dat, qui ad eius calumniam cancellabuntur in panello, aut sig­nis talibus notabuntur, quod (vt verbis legis vtar) illi super eum non transibunt, licet ipse nullam causam assignare sciat exceptionis seu calumniae suae. Quis tunc mori possit iniquè in Anglia pro crimine, cùm tot iuuamina habere ille poterit ob fauorem vitae suae? Et non nisi vicini eius, probi & fideles homines, versus quos ipse nullam habet materiam exceptionis eum condemnare poterunt? Mallem reuera viginti facinoro­sos mortem pietate euadere, quàm iustum vnum in iusté con­demnari.

Nec tamen reum quemplam sub hac sorma, reatus sui poe­nam euadere posse suspicandum est, dum eius vita & mores timori deinceps erunt eis qui eum sic purgatunt à crimine.

In hoc equidem processu nihil estcrudele, nihil inhuma­num, [Page] nec laedi poterit innocens in corpore aut membris suis, quarè nec formidabit ille calumniam inimicorum eius, quia non torquebitur iste ad arbitrium ipsorum. Igitur sub hac lege viuere, quietum & securum est &c.

Somuch I thought good to borrowe of Fortescue, concerning witnesses and testimonies, tortures, rackinges, and suche other gréeuous & extort confessions vsed, as he saith in France and elswhere. The rudenesse of the time wherein he wrate, must excuse the manner of his writing, which is not ouer elegant.

Reade the statutes made, 17. E. 2. and there sée the othe of a villeine doing fealtie vnto his Lord: from whence Lit­tleton, hath fet the precscript formes of oathes to be vsed of fréemen in dooing homage, and fealtie to their Lords, parti­tion, 91. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89.

Of the writing, ensealing, and deliuering of deedes and euidences, Parkins hath a special tractate cap. 20. Where the misdating, rasing, interlyning, adding new letters vpon the old, hāging in the smoke, breaking of y^e seale, vtter quashing of the print, heating of the waxe and fastning therof to the Labell from whence it was once seuered, with other such im­perfections, make the déede suspcious.

Of the auncient manner of sealing with crosses and such markes, of Edward the thirds fashion in biting the waxe with his tooth, reade the exposition of our Lawtearmes.

Elenchs.

A false testimonie is descried by the wickednesse, and ma­licious nature of him that gaue witnesse. The worlde is full of false forsworne knaues, desperate careawaies, and rascal­like shwashbucklers, that borrow citizens gownes to sell hired oathes, to the vtter subuersion of Iustice, and vndoo­ing of wel-meaning neighbours. So that no one thing is more common then that damnable spéech, Iuraui lingua, men­tem iniuratam gero, and Iura, periura, secretum prodere noli.

Annotations.

FAyned similitudes bée very populare and plausible, and haue in them this one good thing, that where as it is som­times hard to finde out true similitudes, it is an easie mat­ter, to fayne some odde parable. But like examples of things doone in déede bée best. Aristo. 2. Rhet. hath that of the brid­led horsse, and hungry flies.

Bracton: descen dit ius quasi ponderosum quid, cadens de­o [...]sum recta linea, vel transuersali, & nunquam reascendit ea via qua descendit post mortem ante cessorum: à latere tamen [Page 74] ascendit alicui propter defectum haeredū inferius prouenien­tium. Maister Lambard Iust. lib. 2. cap. 1. As a man that hath receiued hurt in his body by a stroake whereof hée blée­deth freshly, will be content for the present to admit the help of any leeche or surgeon comming next to hand, for the stan­ching of the bloud and binding vp of the wounde, and yet would more gladly haue vsed the conference of diuers expert surgeons for dooing the same if the danger of the hurt woulde haue graunted the time, that will be lost in calling them to­gether: so also, the common counsaile of this realme, finding that the body thereof may bée deeeply wounded in some one member, and perceiuing that some euils must bée resisted at the very first (least otherwise they grow past helpe and waxe incurable) hath many times thought it good to commit to one or to a few Iustices of the peace (for that they bée ready and at hand) the stopping of the bloud, as it were, and first dres­sing of the wound by repressing of force and other outrages that doo sodainly arise: and hath yet neuerthelesse, when as the time and matter will permit, politikely established an assemblie and conference of all the Iustices, at certayne times in a full court and open session.

When it appeareth that the thinges which we compare togither, be like, because that thing wherein they be compa­red, may be applied to them both; then wée looke whether it be applied to them in equal proportion and quantitie, or vn­equall: if in equall, then they bée pares, equall: if in vn­equall, then impares, of the which the one is the more, the other is the lesse, which is the comparison of quantitie: ther­fore I haue put qualitie before quantitie. For it were ab­surd to aske wheather Higs of Balkot, or Shepheard of Tug­ford, were the falser knaue, vnlesse it were first graunted that they were both false knaues.

Affectio similium inter se, (vt caeterorum argumentorum) est [...]: Inuerse & alterne. Inuerse quando in­uertitur ordo propositionis & redditionis tantum, aut etiam terminorum. Ita (que) si quaedam similia fuerint, inuersè similia erunt, vt aurum ad ignem, sic fides ad periculum, ergo vt fides ad periculum, sic aurum ad ignem, Item ergò, vt periculum, [Page] ad fidem, sic ignis ad aurum. Alternè, quando similitudinis antecedens antecedenti, & consequens consequenti compara­tur: si quaedam fimilia fuerint, alternè similia erunt, vt aurum ad ignem, sic fides ad periculum, ergò, vt aurum ad fidem, sic ignis ad periculum.

I haue made a second generall diuision of argumentes, into simple, and compared, as perceauing the nature of com­parison to bée incident to euery argument that is not simple.

Canons.

One like argueth an other: as this is in respect of that, so the other in respect of the other: As this is in that, so an other in another.

Of likes there is like reason. Lykes agrre to like.

Vbi eadem ratio, ibi idem ius. 19. H. 6. 18. b. Newton & Littleton, que sont en semblable reason, sont en semblable ley. pag. 301.

Vide 9. H. 6. 24. b. Bab. Home poet deuiser que sa terre serra vendue per les executors, et issint home auera franck­tenement de cestuy que ne auera riens, come home auera fire dun flynte, et vncore null fire est in le flynte. Sic in 19. H. 6. 24. Mark: Executors poyent doner chose que ils n'auoy­ent, come vn whetstone, que done sharpenes a vn cuttell, et vncore null est en luy.

Si cui simpliciter via per fundum cuiuspiam concedatur vel relinquatur, quà primum viam direxerit, ea demum ire, agere debet, nec amplius mutandae eius potestatem habet, argumento riui, quem primò qualibet ducere licet, postea­quam ductus est, transferre non licet.

Elenchs.

As a new coate is better than an old: so new friendship, and new wine; these bée not like.

Annotations.

DIssimilitudinis explicatae redditio, hîc appellatur [...], dissimilis redditio.

Ramus.

The difference betwéene argumentes vnlike and argu­ments diuers, is, that in diuers, the simple and absolute dis­agréeing of two thinges is considered: but in vnlyke argu­ments, the vnlike comparison of foure termes, that is of two [Page] things, and the two qualities of the same. In diuers wée af­firme the one, and deny the other after a certeine manner; in vnlykes wée deny neither, but onely distinguish the one from the other by the difference in quality. So that all disagréeable arguments may bée handled as vnlyke, if the diuers qualitie hée respected.

Canons.

Of vnlikes there is vnlike reason.

Unlikes agrée with vnlike, &c.

Examples bée euery where extant of likes and vnlikes in our lawe.

Elenchs.

Golde is tryed in the fire, but not so, is trust and fide­litie in aduersitie. This is false: for these thinges bée like, not vnlike.

Annotations.

Canons.

THis Logical quantity is most generally to bée vnderstood. And therefore all those woords bée vtterly reiected, which are not ample ynough to expresse the generall nature of this Logicall quantity: As [...], facilis, difficilis, credibilis, incredibilis. Aequè, magis, & minus probabilis; &c. As though no argument were of the more or greater, but that which were rather in, which had more probabilitie, which were more easie: And so in the lesse and equall. If a man will restrayne the generall nature of this quantity in this sort, hée shall finde himselfe intangled with repugnant exam­ples in such sort that for his heart hée shall not bée able to ryd himselfe out. If any thinke I doo but ieast, let him reade the third part of Beurhusius, and make a tryall of his owne skill.

Canons.

Of things that be equall, there is equall reason and iudg­ment.

Of equals, if one eyther bée, or not bée; the other must in like manner bée, or not bée.

Equall things agrée with equall.

Such thinges as are equall to any other thing, are also equall among themselues. This holdeth not in vnequals, as 3. and 3. are vnequall to 2, and yet equall among themselues.

[Page] If you doo either adde or detract equall things from things that bée equall, the whole, or remnant will bée equall.

You shall, as is sayde, sometimes méet with equals with­out any notes at all, as in Terence.

Quando ego non curo tuum, ne cura meum. Sith I med­dle not with thine, meddle not thou with mine.

Agayne, the equall is returned against the equall nowe and then, without any forme.

If any one thing bée, or séeme to bée in some two thinges equally: then if it bée not in the one, it shall not bée in the other, but if it bée in the one it shall bée in the other. For the last part, take this example.

If a tutor must bée faithfull, then also a procurator.

But a tutor must;

Therefore the procurator must also.

Or thus more briefly in a contracted syllogisme called an Ethymeme.

A Tutor must bée faythfull and true,

Therefore a procurator must bée so also.

Other Logicians commonly, to confirme and prooue the con­sequence in the Enthymeme, bring in the Canon before al­leaged out of Aristotle, if any one thing &c. But I had rather say, that this connexed syllogisme is good and artificiall, so that no man ought to doubt of the consequence, which is al­ready determined by the lawfulnes of the syllogisme, which is the onely rule of all consequence and coherence.

Now for the partes of this consequence, I meane the pro­position and the assumption; I say, the proposition is true, and that I prooue by the definition of the equall. Because there is one and the same, or equall quantity, that is to say, an equall reason in a tutor, and in a procurator. And as for the assumption, it is allowed by the ciuill law.

Yet wée are not altogether to reiect these rules and Ca­nons, but to vse them in writing and speaking, as certaine corollaries, or fruites of this art: and not to put them downe in the art, for that most of them bée too particular, or doubtful and contingent, and also vnnecessary and superfluous.

The second Canon is this. If two things bée equally in a [Page 77] third; then if the one bée, the other shall bée: if not this, ney­ther that. As, he vseth to lye, therefore to steale. It is not pro­per and peculiar to man for to sée, therefore neyther to heare.

The third and last. If two bée equally and indifferently in twoo, then if this bée not in that, the thirde shall not bée in the fourth: but if that bée, then this also, as in that out of Terence whereof wee spake before, Demea saide to his bro­ther Mitio:

Quando ego, non curo tuum, ne cura meum. Sith I care not for thy sonne, Aeschinus, meddle not thou with my sonne Ctesiphon.

To this place also belonge those consectaries, which pro­céede from contraries, but are handled by a certaine compari­son of equals, as that in Martiall.

Sosibian calleth his father maister, therefore hée confesseth himselfe to bée a seruant.

Arist. 2. Rhet. Iphicrates, when hée saw his yoongest son, because hée was bigge and tall, preferred to office; said thus. If you take great boyes for men; you will surely make litle men boyes.

4. E. 4. 33. b. Ardern. En precipe vers vn que n'ad riens in le dd. iour del briefe, mes puis il enter in le terre on pur­chase ceo, ore per son fait demesne il ad fait le briefe bon. Don (que) come le fait le tenant fait mal briefe bon, per mesme le reason, le fait le demandant fra vn bon briefe male, come en le case al barre, si le demandant enter en parcell del de­maunde pendant le plée on briefe.

Choke in 8. E. 4. 21. b. confuta Markam: Fol. 11. 4. Que sic argua, les parties que submittont &c. ne dischargeront les arbitrors sans notice, Ergò les arbitrors ne chargeront les parties sans notice. A que Choke dit, que ceux ne sont con­traries, s. discharger les parties sans notice: et charger les parties sans notice: mes charger les arbitrors sans notice, et discharger eux sans notice sont contraries, car come le charge, ne serra sans notice, issint le discharge ne serra sans notice.

[Page] This kinde of arguing is not alwayes effectuall, as a man is mortall, therefore a beast is immortall: it holdeth best when the argumentes be repugnant.

Elenchs.

Martiall in his first booke.

These bée not equall. For although Alpha and Beta séeme neighboures in the Gréeke Alphabet, yet they are nothing equall in signification. For Alpha signifieth the chiefe or principall: whereas Beta eyther signifieth that which is se­cond, or els hath no signification at all.

Annotations.

WHen this note is in the consequent, much more, then it is an argumēt from the lesse, that is, from the lesse pro­bable. But when it is said, Much lesse, it is an argument frō the greater, that is, from the more probable. This is Pisca­tors iudgement. So that all argumentes from the greater should bée negatiue; and, affirmatiue from the lesse. But, as I haue already shewed, so I now affirme againe; that wée may reason as well affirmatiuely as negatiuely frō equals, greater, lesse, and all other arguments whatsoeuer, except di­uers. For Ramus dooth not tye this Logicall quantity, to such particuler consideration of probability, as Piscator doth ima­gine and teach out of Aristotle (for if hée so did, contrary ex­amples would confute him) but leaueth it frée and generall, applyable to any thing whatsoeuer wée can imagine to bée equall, more, or lesse in any respect or consideration whatso­euer, and as fit for confirmation as confutation.

This Logicall quantity therefore may bée attributed to any thing incident and conuenient to our purpose, as, to dig­nitie, prayse, reproche, abilitie and power, greatnes, multi­tude, conueniency, commoditie, opportunitie, facilitie, diffi­cultie, care, neglect, excellencie, vilenes, and in a woorde, to whatsoeuer may bée saide to bée equall, more, or lesse.

They that doo otherwise determine of this matter, are, as I sayd, woonderfully troubled with repugnant examples, con­trary Canons, and variety of opinions.

They that will haue all arguments of the more to bée ne­gatiue and onely fit for confutation; all of the lesse, affirma­tiue and seruing for assertion, doo put downe these Canons out of the 4. chapter of the a. booke of Aristotles Topikes.

[Page] When two thinges are affirmed of one, if that which is more like to bée in it, bée not in it, neyther shall that which is lesse lyke, as,

If a Lord were her louer, hée could neuer maynteine her; much lesse thou.

When one thing is spoken of twoo, if it bée not in that, where in it is more like to bée, neyther shall it bée in that, wherein it is lesse like to bée: as, If the iust shall scarse bée saued, where will the wicked appeare?

When two thinges are affirmed of two thinges, if that which is more like to bée in the one, bée not in it, neyther shall the other bée in the other: as, You breake not the saboth day in loosing your oxe, and bringing him to the water; therefore much lesse I in loosing the daughter of Abraham from the bands of Satan.

Others, as Cicero, Quintilian, and sometimes Ramus, would haue the greater onely to serue for confirmation, and the lesse, for confutation: taking that to be the greater which is the more excellent, more difficult and more incredible: that to bée the lesse which is more abiect, easie, and sooner be­léeued: and therefore they lay downe these Canons.

That which hath force in the greater, must haue also force in the lesse, as,

Wée haue suffered woorse things then these;

Therefore these that bée lesse may bée borne of vs.

Ramus in his last edition leaueth this place frée, loose, and at liberty, fit for affirmations and negations. An affirmatiue argument from the greater, is this out of Virgil, which I put downe last.

If the Troianes haue suffered greater thinges, they may also suffer lesse.

But the Troianes haue suffered greater daungers then these.

Therefore they may also beare these lesse.

The proposition is true, as gathering the lesse of the more. For if the greater bée, the lesse will also bée: and in [Page 79] this place, that is called the greater, which is more vncre­dible and intollerable, as to suffer greater mischiefes.

The sillogisme itselfe is connexed, and artificiall, there­fore the consequence is good. A Negatiue example is, that in Terence.

If a Lord cannot mayntayne her, much lesse thou. But a Lord cannot, therefore neither thou.

Fayned argumentes from the greater haue good grace as in this last example.

From this place bée deriued pretty gradations conioyned sometimes with a Rhetoricall climax, and sometimes alone without it. With it as,

Ne (que) verò se populo solùm, sed etiam senatui tradidit: ne (que) senatui modò, sed etiam publicis praesidijs & armis: ne (que) his tantùm, verumetiam, &c. Tully pro Milone.

Without any climax, is that in Terence betwéene Thraso and Gnatho.

Th Magnas verò agere gratias Thais mihi? Gn. Ingentes. Th. A'in tu? laeta est. Gn. Non tam ipso quidem dono, quàm abs te datum esse: id vero seriò triumphat.

Where, (although there séeme to bée nothing but a simple exposition) is conteyned a syllogisticall probation, thus.

Thais giueth you excéeding great thankes, and shée tri­umpheth for ioy, that the gift came from such a giuer.

Therefore, no doubt, shée thanketh you, and is glad that you bestowed this on hir.

Sometimes the greater is vsed without any notes or signes at all, as in that of Virgill.

Counterfayt teares circumuented them, whome neyther the cruell Diomedes, nor fierce Achilles, nor ten yeares warre, nor a thousand ships could ouercome.

Canons.

If a greater quantitie bée (I take quantitie generally, as I sayd before) then the lesse may also bée: but if the greater [Page] bée not, neyther shall the lesse bée.

If the greater and more valiant cannot performe a thing, neyther can the lesse and weaker. But if the greater can doo it, it followeth not straightway that the lesse shall also doe it.

If any chaunce vnlooked for, happen to the greater, it may more easily light vpon the lesse and inferiour.

Si grammatica comparatio addatur ei quod comparatur & in quaestione versatur, reddit idipsum maius, vt id cui compa­ratur, sit minus, argumentum (que) sit a minori: si vero addatur ei, quod ad arguendum adhibetur, argumèntum est a maiori, ita (que) tam in maiorum quam in minorum collocatione locum habet. Nam comparatiuus & superlatiuus superant positiuum, & id cui adduntur, maius esse significant, vt etiam verba quae similem vim habent; vt malo, praestat &c. Wasserleider.

Falsum est, sayth Snellius, quod vulgò dicitur, propositio­nem hic continere maius, redditionem minus: imo respicien­dum est perpetuò ad id quod arguit, si enim illud est maius, ar­gumentum est a maiori, sin minus, a minori, quocun (que) in loco ponatur.

In maiori inest minus. Non debet, cui plus licet, quod mi­nus est, non licere. Vnde illa consectaria: Cui ius est donandi, eidem & vendendi, & cōcedendi ius est, plus enim est donare: (quod profusionem quandam patrimonij continet) quam ven­dere (quod administrationis & vtilitatis est propter pretium) aut concedere, quod amicitiae est, vt in commodato aut preca­rio. Et illud, cum quis poterit alienare, poterit & consentire alienationi.

3. E. 4. 24. Danby lest: de 8. H. 6. ca. 9. Done treble dammages vers cestuy que enter oue force, ou teigne oue force. Et si lesta: done treble dammages pur l'un tort tantum, à fortiori pur ambideux. Issint le briefe bon que ioyne vtrum (que).

Hée that may doe the more may doe the lesse: Doct. Stud. pag. 114.

Annotations.

AS before in the greater, so héere in the lesse, the common Logicians differ. Some wil haue that to bée lesse which is lesse probable: briefly, when the antecedent in the Enthy­meme is lesse probable than the consequent. These men will haue all arguments from the lesse, to bée affirmatiue; and they frame axiomes héereof accordingly, correspondent to those of the greater.

If any thing bée in that, wherein it is lesse like to bée, it shall also bée in that, wherein it is more like to bée, as, If brute beastes loue their young ones, how tender a care [Page] should we haue of our children?

If that bée in a thing which is lesse like to bée in it, then that must bée in it, which is more like to bée in it, as, God ca­reth for the fowles of the ayre, therefore much more for you.

If two thinges séeme to bée in two, the one in the other: and that bée in, which is lesse like to bee in, then the other shall bée in the other.

Others, (whome Ramus followed in two editions of his Logike) take that for the lesse, which is lesse difficult, which may sooner bée in the thing: Where they might perceiue, if they marked, that indéede, such things as are more easily in, bée commonly the greater in strength, power, and dignitie. But they, not regarding this, haue framed such an axiome or Canon.

If a thing bée not in that, wherein it is most like to bée, then it shall not bée in that, wherein it is lesse like to bée: so that, according to their mind this place should serue onely for negatiue arguments, they vse this example.

A Lord cannot kéepe her, therefore neyther thou.

Where the argument is rather from the greater.

Ramus therefore at the length left this place also generall and appliable as well to affirmation as negation. An af­firmatiue is this out of Ouid.

A Negatiue.

• If God doe not reiect the sparrowes, much lesse you:
• But he contemneth not them: therefore not you.

As the argument of the equall is vsed oftentimes in op­posing one equall against another, so these of vnequalles, bée sometimes in a very long continued spéeche matched toge­ther, as in Ouid, where hée by a continued comparison of his owne miseries with those of Vlisses, inferreth that which he [Page 81] intended, that hée was more to bée lamented then Vlisses: And these may bée fayned also, as ante leues ergò &c. in Vir­gil. Héere is also sometimes a gradation, as in this, facinus est vincire ciuem Romanum: scelus verberare: propè parri­cidium necare: quid dicam in crucem tollere? Ramus.

Glanuil chiefe iustice in H. 2. dayes, lib. 7. ca. 10. Notandum quòd si quis in capite de domino rege tenere debet, tunc eius custodia ad dominum regem plene pertinet, siue alios domi­nos habere debeat ipse haeres, siue non, quià dominus rex nul­lum habere potest parem, multò minus superiorem.

Elenchs.

As when you take that for lesse which is not lesse. As if a boy can paynt, then a man can paynt, for although a boy bée lesse then a man, yet a boy may sometimes sooner paynt then a man.

So then by these generall heades thus distinguished, wée haue the meanes and way of inuention put down. Although Menon make a great shewe of proofe that there is no art or order in inuention: for it were in vaine, quoth hée, to séeke for that which wée haue found alreadie, & it is impossible by search to find y^e which we know not when wée sée it: Socrates goeth about to dissolue this Dilemma, by I cannot tell what mistery of Pythagoricall philosophie, and saith that our Discere is nothing els but Recordari; and that our soules were adorned with perfection of all knowledge from eterni­tie, but enclosed in this fleshly dungeon of the body, waxed dull, yet by the application of one thing to an other, remem­bred that againe which they had forgotten before.

Aristotle aunswereth it after an other maner, and saith, that hée who séeketh, knoweth generally what hée séeketh, though not in particularitie: so by this generall note and marke hée may obserue the speciall, whereof hée was igno­rant before. And this is true in part, for when wée haue con­ceiued the generall precepts of any art, then doe wée search the particularities by the generall direction of those rules. But if Menon should goe further, and bring in that first in­uention of man, when there was no obseruation either of ge­nerall or speciall, how would this aunswere suffice? There­fore, [Page] for a finall resolution, I say, that mans soule hath in it a naturall power and abilitie, whereby it is apt to conceiue any thing, if it bée directed, turned, applied, and bent there­vnto: so saith Aristotle, 2. de demonst. that our soule brought not with it into the body the knowledge of thinges, as So­crates imagined, but onely a facultie and power of vnder­standing; as our eyes haue not the distinct kindes of colours ingrauen in them by nature, but onely an abilitie of séeing colours. So then, as a man looking on colours, séeth: in like maner by applying his spirit and vnderstanding to thinges vnknowne, he may by the diligent perusing of these generall heades, finde, what hée séeketh now, and knew not heereto­fore. But to him onely, as Tully sayth, will these gene­rall predicamentes or Categories of argumentes become profitable indéede, which hath béene a trauailed and a well experienced man in matters of importance, which age and continuance of time affoordeth, or hath read much and heard more, which studie and diligence yeeldeth. Subacto enim ingenio opus est &c.

If we shall for exercise sake vse to draw any one woord through these generall places of inuention, it will breede a great plentie and varietie of new argumentes, while wee marke what be the causes, effects, parts, whole, generall, speciall, subiectes, adiunctes thereof, and so foorth in all the rest: and this either in making and enditing our selues, or els in resoluing, and as it were dismembring that which others haue doone.

For the first, let that example of Nobilitas, serue, put downe by Sturmius: For the later, we will take, Amicitia, out of Tullies dialogue, called Laelius. The examples be placed according to the vsuall distribution of arguments fra­med by Ramus, not according to this lately put downe by my selfe. The matter is not great: it may soone bée altered, and should haue bene now, if time had suffered.

Causae efficientes Nobilitatis. [...].

Maiorum praeclara facta, & generis diuturna comprobatio, stirpis (que) antiquitas atque amplitudo: hae procreantes, conser­uantes istae.

[Page 82] Virtus & continentia in posteris, quae maiorum laudibus respondeat.

[...].

Liberalitas, fortitudo, clementia, caeterae (que) virtutes cum corporis pulchritudine copulatae.

Destruentes.

Morum turpitudo, ignoratio, inhumanitas, vultus Centau­ [...]icus, & habitudo Polyphemi Cyclopica.

Materia.

Ipsa generis antiquitas, & propria virtutis praestantia, fre­quenti actionum celebritate confirmata.

Forma.

Ista ipsa nominis amplitudo, longinquitate temporis con­firmata, & hominum comprobatione stabilita.

Finis.

Vt quae à maioribus praeclarè iacta sint nobilitatis funda­menta, à posteris perficiantur, vt & sibi honori, & amicis vo­luptati & reip. emolumento esse possint.

Effecta.

In Tyrocinio & exercitationibus militaribus aut caeteros aequales superasse viribus & virtute, aut melioribus & magnis, industria fuisse parem: Sub literarum magistris magnam & diuturnam operam nauasse, & progressus magnos in doctrina fecisse: summa semper temperantia & sobrietate praeditum fuisse: optimis & clarissimis imperatoribus stipendia fecisse: In nullo nisi iusto bello militasse: in hostem lenem & miseri­cordem, non saeuum & crudelem extitisse: in acie & oppug­nandis ciuitatibus femper inter primos visum fuisse: Duxisse exercitum: Appellatum imperatorem à militibus: Parua manu magnas copias saepè fudisse: Sese pro patria deuouisse, aut voluisse deuouere, si permisissent milites: Ex praeda, vel nullam pecuniam accepisse, vel ceteris parem: Res à se gestas historia complexum esse: Domi & in pace prudentem sena­torem, charum suis, iucundum omnibus sese praebuisse: Prin­cipem senatus fuisse: Bis triumphasse: Tertiò consulem fu­isse: semper fuisse verum & constantem, nunquam vanum & leuem.

[Page] Subiecta.

Animus reuera nobilis & magnanimus, & virtutum praesi­dijs vndi (que) circumseptus.

Adiuncta.

Clarum esse, & illustrem: omnium gentium literis ac lin­guis celebrari: deduci: assurgi: &c.

Diuersa.

Non omnem à maioribus habuit nobilitatis opinionem, sed & suis virtutibus exornatam.

Disparata.

Non in simulata ementitae nobilitatis vmbra delitescit, non pecuniarum copijs euectus est, sed & suis & suorum fac­tis illustratus.

Relata.

Nobilitas est rei nobilitatae nobilitas.

Aduersa.

Nobilitas & obsc [...]ritas: nouitas & antiquitas: humilitas & amplitudo.

Priuantia.

Nobilis & ignobilis. Clarus, obscurus.

Paria.

Claritas & splendor: Antiquitas & vetustas.

Maiora. Minora.

Pulchrius est fieri, quàm creari nobilem.

Ortus praeclarus est exoptandus, multò magis ita (que) animus generosus, & mens excelsa.

Similia.

Ciuitas in qua nobiles non sunt, similis est ijs hortis, in qui­bus flos nullus est insignior.

Dissimilia.

Non vt herbae vitiosae abijciuntur, ita si quis nobilis vitio­sus aliqua in parte sit, spoliari debet auito nomine.

Coniugat [...].

Nobilitas, nobilis, nobilitare, nobilitari, nobile factum, homo nobilitatus, & virtus nobilitata; nobili loco natus, & natus nobili genere, & nobiliss [...]a familia, aut stirpe [...] ortus, & generosa stirpe procreatus.

[Page 83] Notatio.

Nobilitas indè nominata est, quod eorum qui nobiles sunt, nota virtus esse debeat.

Distributio ex causis.

Nobilitas in ciuitatem, familiam, gentem distributa est.

Ex effectis.

Nobilitas alia vera, orta ex clara familia, & virtutibus maio­rum respondens, alia noua quidem, non adiuta maiorum glo­ria, bona tamen & industria, & cupida honestatis. Tertia, ca­lida & malitiosa, quae non virtute, sed simulatione, & falsa spe­cie virtutis sibi nomen [...]natur comparare. Quarta verò quae vitijs at (que) flagitijs dedita est, dedecus familiae suae, profundens omnes opes, amittens domesticam laudem, profligatae audatiae at (que) malitiae.

Ex subiectis.

Nobilitas, vel Graecorum est, vel Romanorum, vel Persarum, vel Medorum, vel gentium aliarum.

Ex adiunctis.

Hominum alij nobiles▪ alij ignobiles.

Definitio.

Nobilitas est generis antiquitas, ortum habens vel à dinino aliquo principio, vel maiorum virtute praeclara, humanae socie­tatis consensu comprobata.

Descriptio.

Nobilitas est nominis amplitudo, virtutis comes, virtu [...]e conformata, quae breuitatem vitae posteritatis memoria conso­latur, quae facit vt absentes adsimus, viuamus mortui: cuius de­ni (que) gradibus homines in coelum videantur ascendere.

Testimonia.

Nobilitas sola est, at (que) vnica, virtus. Vt rectè Poeta.

Non domus dominum, sed dominus domum nobilitare de­bet si fidem Cicer oni adhibeamus.

Thus haue we drawne this argument, Nobilitas, through­out most of the places of Logicall Inuention: which shall suffise at this time for an example of Genesis in this first [Page] part of Logike. Now let vs in order of Analysis. apply such arguments to this woord, Amicitia, as wée can readily find in the forenamed Dialogue.

Causa efficiens. Natura, Uirtus.

Quapropter a natura mihi videtur potius quàm ab imbe­cillitate orta amicitia, & applicatione magis animi cum quo­dam sensu amandi, quàm cogitatione quantum illa res vtilitatis esset habitura &c.

Quod si tanta vis probitatis est, vt eam vel in eis quos nun­quam vidimus, vel, quod maius est, in hoste etiam diliga­mus, quid mirum si animi hominum [...]oueantur, cum eorum, quibuscum vsu coniuncti esse poss [...]t, virtutem & bonitatem perspicere videantur?

Causa adiuuans.

Quanquam, confirmatur amor, & beneficio accepto, & stu­dio perspecto, & consuetudine adiuncta, qu [...]bus rebus ad ill [...] primum motum animi & amoris adhibitis, admirabilis quae­dam exardescit beneuolentiae magnitudo, quam siqui putant ab imbecillitate proficisci, vt sit per quam quis (que) assequatur quod desideret, humilem sanè relinquunt, & minimè genero­sum, vt ita dicam, ortum amicitiae, quam ex inopia atque indi­gentia nasci volunt &c.

Adiungitur etiam & rerum conuenientia, & morum simi­litudo, & voluntatum summa consensio.

Destrue [...].

Contentiones, luxuriae conditiones, vel commodi, honoris ambitus, pecuniae cupiditates, iniquae postulationes, morum dissimilitudo: dispares enim mores disparia studia sequun­tur: quorum dissimilitudo dissoluit amicitias, &c.

Materia.

Id in quo est omnis vis amicitiae, voluntatum, studiorum, sententiarum summa consensio.

Form [...].

Ipsa an [...]morum coniunctio.

Finis.

Vt vsu eius quem diligere cepêrunt, fruantur & moribus; sint (que) pare [...] in amore, & equales, propensiores (que) ad benè me­ [...]endum quàm ad reposce [...]

Et in [...]a.

[Page 84] Alios autem dicere aiunt etiam multò inhumanius, quem locum breuiter perstrinxi paulò antè, praesidij adiumenti (que) causa, non beneuolentiae neque charitatis, amicitias esse ex­petendas.

Effecta.

Cui potest esse vita vitalls, vt ait Ennius, qui non in amici mutua beneuolentia conquiescat? Quid dulcius, quàm habere quocum omnia audeas sic loqui vt tecum? Quis esset tantus fructus in prosperis rebus, nisi haberes qui illis aequè ac tu ipse gauderet? Aduersas verò res ferre difficile esset sine eo qui illas grauius etiam quàm tu, ferret. Deni (que), caeterae res quae ex­petuntur, opportunae sunt singulae rebus ferè singulis: diuitiae, vt vtare; opes, vt colare; honores, vt laudere; voluptates, vt gaudeas. Valetudo, vt dolore careas, & muneribus fungaris corporis: Amicitia plurimas res continet, quoquò te verteris prestó est, nullo loco excluditur, nunquam intempestiua, nun­quam molesta est.

Infra.

Nam et secundas res splendidiores facit amicitia, & aduer­sas patiens cōmunicans (que) leniores. Cum (que) plurimas & maxi­mas commoditates amicitia contineat, tum illa nimirum pre­stat omnibus, quod bona spe prelucet in posterum, nec debi­litari animos aut cadere patitur: verum enim amicum qui in­tuetur, tanquàm exemplar quoddam intuetur sui. Quocirca & absentes adsunt, & egentes abundant, & imbecilli valent, &, quod difficilius dictu est, mortui viuunt: tantus cos honos, memoria, desiderium prosequitur amicorum, &c.

Subiectum.

Sed hoc primum sentio, nisi inter bonos amicitiam esse non posse.

Et

Quanta autem vis amicitiae sit, ex hoc intelligi maximè potest, quod ex infinita so [...]ietate generis humani quam con­ciliauit ipsa natura, ita contracta res est, & adducta in angustū, vt omnis charitas aut inter duos, aut inter paucos iungeretur.

Et,

Ita (que) verae amicitiae difficilimè repe [...]iuntur in ijs, qui in ho­noribus re (que) publica versantur.

Adiuncta.

In amicitia autem, nihil est fictum, nihil simulatum: & [Page] quicquid in ea est, idem verum & voluntarium est.

Et,

Vt igitur & monere & moneri, proprium est verae amici­tiae, & alterum libere facere, non aspere; alterum patienter accipere, non repugnanter, sic habendum est, nullam in ami­citijs pestem esse maiorem, quam adulationem, blanditias, as­sentationem.

Diuersa.

Suis autem incommodis grauiter angi; non amicum, sed scipsum amantis est.

Disparat [...].

Quocircà, moerere hoc [...]ius euentu, vereor ne inuidi magis quàm amici sit.

Relata & Coniugata.

Sed vt tum ad senem senex de senectute, sic in hoc libro, ad amicum amicissimus de amicitia scripsi.

Aduersa.

Quae enim domus tam stabilis, quae tam firma ciuitas est quae non odijs at (que) dissidi [...]s funditùs possit euerti?

Priuantia.

Beneuolentia, amor, affectio, & [...].

Paria.

Ita (que) non aqua, non igni, non aēre, vt aiunt, pluribus locis vtimur quàm amicitia.

Et,

Verum enim amicum qui intuetur, tanquam exemplar quoddam intuetur sui.

Et,

In amicitia, èquè nefas sit, turpè aliquid & facere rogatum, & imperare.

Maiora. Minora.

Apertè enim odisse magis ingenuum est, quàm fronte oc­cultare sententiam.

Et,

Quid enim potest esse tam flexibile, tam deuium quàm ani­mus eius, qui ad alterius non modò sensum ac voluntatem, sed etiam vultum at (que) nutum conuertitur?

Quod si haec apparent in bestijs, volucribus, agrestibus, na­tantibus, cicuribus, feris, primùm se vt ipse diligant (id enim pariter cum omni animante nascitur) deindè vt requirant at (que) appetant ad quas se applicent eiusdem generis animantes, id (que) faciunt cum desiderio, & cum quadam similitudine amori [...] [Page 85] humani, quantò id magis in homine fit natura, qui & seipse diligit, & alterum requirit, cuius animum ita cum suo commis­ceat, vt efficiat poenè vnum ex duobus?

Similia.

Est igitur prudentis, sustinere, vt cursum, sic impetum be­neuolentiae: quò vtamur quasi aquis tentatis, sic amicitijs, ali­qua ex parte periclitatis moribus amicorum?

Et illud.

Veterimae quaeque, vt ea vina quae vetustatem ferunt, esse debent suauissimae: verum (que) illud est quod vulgò dicitur, multos modios salis simul edendos esse, vt amicitiae munus ex­pletum sit. Nouitates autem, si spem afferunt, vt tanquàm in herbis non fallacibus fructus appareat, non sunt illae quidem repudiande, vetustas tamen suo loco conseruanda est.

Dissimilia.

Nec enim illa prima vera est, vt quemadmodum in se quis­que, sic in amicum sit animatus.

Coniugata.

Plurimùm in amicitia amicorum benè suadentium valeat autoritas.

Notatio.

Vtrum (que) enim, & amor & amicitia, dictum est ab amando.

Diuisio.

Sed nescio quo pacto, ab amicitijs perfectorum hominum, id est sapientum▪ ad leues amicitias deflexit oratio.

Definitio.

Est autem amicitia nihil aliud nisi omnium diuinarum hu­manarum (que) rerum, cum beneuolentia & charitate summa con­sensio.

Descriptio breuis.

Amare autem nihil aliud est nisi eum ipsum diligere, quem ames, nulla vtilitate quaesita.

Descriptio explicata.

Equidem exomnibus rebus quas mihi aut fortuna aut na­tura tribuit, nihil habeo quod cum amicitia Scipionis possit comparari. In hac mihi de Republica fuit consensus, in hac re­rum priuatarum consilium, in eadem requies plena oblectati­on [...] fuit. Nunquam illum ne minima quidem re offendi, quod [Page] quidem sens [...]m, nihil audiui ex co ipso quod nollem: vna domus erat, idem victus, is (que) communis: ne (que) solùm militia, sed etiam peregrinationes, rusticationes (que) communes. Nam quid ego de studijs dicam cognoscendi semper aliquid atque discendi? In quibus remoti ab oculis populi, omne otium tem­pus (que) contriuimus?

Testimonium.

Agrigentinum doctum quendam virum, carminibus Graecis vaticinatum ferunt, quae in rerum natura toto (que) mundo consta­rent, quaeque mouerentur, ea contrahere amicitiam, dissipare discordiam.

Et,

Rectè Ennius, Amicus certus in re incerta cernitur.

Et illud.

Verum igitur illud est, quod à Tarentino Archita, vt opi­nor, dici solitum, nostros senes commemorare audiui, ab alijs senibus auditum; si quis coelum ascendisset, naturam (que) mundi & pulchritudinem syderum perspexisset, insuauem illam ad­mirationemei fore, quae iucundissima fuisset, nisi aliquem cui narraret, habuisset.

Postremò

Sed nescio quo modo verum est, quod in Andri [...] familiaris meus Terentius dicit, Obsequium amicos, veritas odium parit.

Thus much for these two woordes, Nobilitas and Amici­tia. The like would I haue all Logicall Lawyers to at­tempt in our common Lawe. At the first it will séeme harde and troublesome: but vndoubtedly the spéedy profite accom­panyed with a swéete delight, will soone ouertake, and quite ouercome the paynes before susteined: and so much the ra­ther, for that it is impossible, any profession whatsoeuer, to bée more Logicall then is the Law. For proofe; if you take but that little tractate of Uillenage in Maister Littleton, you shall finde, if not all, yet not many lesse then all these arguments, vsed in the same discourse, within the compasse of eight little leaues, whereof some bée be­stowed on some other matters.

Annotations.

[...] among the Grecians, is Disposition with the La­tinistes. So then the second part of Logike is called Disposition of the forme of the same second part, for that, as in Grammer Syntaxis béeing the second part, ordereth & dis­poseth simple woords handled in the first; so [...], Disposi­tion in Logike doth artificially place, settle, and dispose single argumentes one with an other, and that first axiomatically, in seuered axiomes: then, procéeding forwardes to a Syllo­gisme and methode, as occasion shall serue. For examples sake, this sentence, a villeine regardant is a villeine, is true English, because the nominatiue case and the verbe be pla­ced Grammatically, according to the prescription of Syn­taxis: so the same sentence is a true Logicall axiome, be­cause the generall is affirmed on the speciall, in a simple axiome, according to Art in Disposition. Now, this second part of Logike is also called [...], Iudicium, Iudgement, of the vse, commoditie, and ende thereof. For that, by a cer­teine direction, rule, and prescription of Disposition, ariseth iudgement of the trueth or vntrueth of any axiome; the consequence or inconsequence of any Syllogisme: and the perspicuitie or confused obscuritie of any methode or pro­céeding.

Annotations.

SIcut [...], à verbo [...], sic [...], à [...] dicitur. Illud verbum à nomine [...], meus; hoc à [...], mentis [Page 87] agitatio. [...] apud Aristotelicos est cognitio principiorum in­demonstrabilium. [...] verò, mentis seu rationis quidam quasi discursus, qui aliter [...], ratiocinatio dicitur, cùm ratio ex quocun (que) proposito aliud deducit, mouens se ab vno ad aliud inuestigandum, vt praepositio declaret motus tractum, ac transmissionem ipsius [...].

[An Axiome:] The Gréeke woorde, [...], signifieth dignitie, authoritie. The Logicians, as it should séeme, tooke it for any thing spoken, pronounced, tolde, as it were, with authority. It héere signifieth any sentence or proposition whatsoeuer, wherein one argument, reason, conceipt, thing, is so conioyned with, or seuered from another, as that there­by wée iudge the one eyther to bée or not to bée, the cause, ef­fect; whole, part; generall, speciall; subiect, adiunct; diuers, disparate, relatiue, repugnant, distribution, definition, testi­mony, like, vnlike, equall, more or lesse to the other.

[Affirmatiue:] It is proper then to axiomes, not to sim­ple arguments, to affirme or deny: as it is to a syllogisme, to confute or confirme. Affirmatio & negatio enunciati, nihil aliud est quàm partium compositio & diuisio.

[The bande:] The bande in a simple axiome is alwaies a verbe: but this verbe is sometimes put betwéene the twoo arguments, sometimes of it selfe it supplyeth the place of the second argument, as will appeare if you resolue such impli­cate propositions thus, Plato disputeth learnedly, Plato is a learned disputer.

[Contradiction:] In our Trauerse, which tooke name of the French Trauerse (that is de transuerso, on the other side) there is alwaies a manifest example of an exact and Logical contradiction betwéene twoo axiomes, the one affirming, the other denying the selfe same thing that was affirmed: Sée Maister Lambard Iust. lib. 2. cap. 13.

Home n'auera expresse auerment encounter le returne del vicount, quia il est officer al court, ita (que) le court doyt do­ner credence a luy. Mes si le vicount returne attache, le party dira encounter ceo, nyent attache per 15 iours: issint s'il re­turne, que le ten. est summons, le tenant poet dire, nyent summons solon (que) le ley del terre, car ceo ne trauerse expres­mentle [Page] returne del vicount, mes estoit oue ces assets bien sans ascun contradiction.

Vide 1. H. 6. 8. Rolf. Enseint et nyent enseint, bon issue.

Annotations.

THe first rule which Ramus calleth a rule of truth is tear­med of the Graecians [...], of the Latinists, de omni, because it is absolutely and in most generall manner pro­nounced of all, without any exception. And it must bée affir­matiue. For a negation dooth but depriue and take away; and not imprint in mans minde the knowledge of any thing certeinly. So that no negation, although it bée generally true, is fit to make any precept of art, exactly put downe: whose duety is, to teach truth; not vnteach vntruths, or to tell what is not true. Therefore sayth Aristotle, an affirma­tion is more honourable then a negation.

As a true axiome is eyther contingent, or necessary: so the false axiome in like wise is eyther variable, or els neces­sarily false, that is impossible. For, the necessary false hath a proper and distinct name, to wit, impossible: but the neces­sary true hath no seuerall name: but is called necessary, by that generall woord.

The second rule of artes is the rule of iustice: so called of Ramus, for that according to the nature of iustice, in this axi­ome euery argument hath that adioyned vnto it which is by naturall right, his owne, as the forme his thing formed, the subiect his owne proper adiunct, the generall his speciall: ex­amples whereof I thought it nothing necessary to heape vp [Page] in the text, for that in the chapters of the forme and formed, subiect and adiunct, generall and speciall, they are already discoursed vpon: and there wanteth nothing but the putting of them together in an axiome, which may soone bée perfor­med by the direction of rules of axiomaticall iudgment. This rule is called in Gréeke [...], in Latine, per se: for that both the argumentes in this kinde of axiome, bée essentially and by themselues, their owne nature, force, power, vertue, and inclination linked together. Of these Latine woords, per se, Paulus Venetus, and other schoolemen, haue framed this dunsical woord of art, Perseitas, and therof made many kinds, and long discourses.

The thirde and last rule, is named of Ramus, the rule of wisedome or discretion; of the effect which it woorketh in vs, which is wisedome, sayth Rodingus. For, then onely are wée wise, then onely haue wée the perfect knowledge of any thing, when wée know it by the first causes, that is, by such which are immediate, equall, neyther higher, nor lower, nei­ther too generall, nor too speciall, but iumpe, fit, méete, that is, first, and therefore reciprocall: and this is performed by this rule. This rule is therefore the rule of wisedome; teaching generall things in their due place, once, and generally: Spe­ciall thinges in their conuenient time and order, specially, with their seuerall specials. Whereas, if a man teach a spe­ciall thing generally, in generall, and in a generall place: or a generall thing in speciall, specially, and in a speciall place, hée shall bewray his folly and want of discretion in troubling the auditors with his grosse errour, and tedious Tautologie: Error, in applying a speciall and peculiar thing to a general and vniuersall matter: Tautologie and vayne inculcation of the same thing, in repeating that many times confusedly, which both might and should haue béene taught but once, and distinctly. For if I teach a generall thing specially, that is, in a speciall and inferiour place, I must of necessitie repeat that so many times, as there bée speciall things to which it is applyable, because I left it out in the beginning: whereas if I had put it downe generally, in his higher place, aboue his specials, this once putting downe had sufficed for all: because [Page 89] it is placed as a generall; and euery generall includeth the whole societie of his specials, and to euery of them is equally appliable, by the order of art and nature.

The Grecians call this rule, [...]: the Lati­nistes, vniuersaliter primum. [...], is then, as I said before; when in an axiome, both the arguments ioyned together bée iumpe, fit, méete, first, equal and therefore reci­procall: equall I call them, which are as generall or special, the one as the other: so that the one conteineth no more then the other, neither is the one higher then the other, such an one is this, A man is apt to laugh: A man is reasonable: A villeyne is either, in grosse, or els regardant: Logike consi­steth in Inuention, and Disposition: Logike is an Arte of reasoning, for here either the definition and the thing defi­ned, or the subiect and his proper adiunct; or the forme and the thing formed, or the generall and his specialles, or els whole and partes bée ioyned togither. Such as these, bée ac­cording to this rule, [...]. And it is so called be­cause the second part of the axiome (in this, A man is apt to laugh) is verified of no other thing before man in generall, but first of man, then secondarily of singuler men, as Plato, Socrates, &c. and whatsoeuer is thus spokē first of the whole antecedent, must needes be reciprocall with the same ante­dent. Herevpon, I say, was it called [...], vni­uersaliter primum.

Prima regula, sayth one, falsos; secunda peregrinos; ter­tia nimis elatos aut abiectos ciues è ciuitate philosophica ex­cludit. The first excludeth all false and lame preceptes, which if it were obserued in our lawe, then all repugnant dreames of Serieantes and Counsailers that serue the time and speake for money shoulde not runne so currant for good law: nay euery iudgement geuen either without reason, or with partialitie, should not stand for Iustice: euery Semble, should not passe for a sentence, nor euery Dictum fuit, for a Dictators constitution.

It is not necessary that euery ariome [...], should be general, saith Scribonius, for, in astronomy, there be many particulers, but it is therefore called De omni, for that it is [Page] necessarily true, with affirmation, without exception. Yet a general rule with his particular exception is [...], nam exceptio non solum restringit regulam, sed etiam confirmat.

The second rule reiecteth all impertinent matters which are not coherent, nor sutable to the proposed argument, but discrepant and disagréeable, as precepts of Rhetorike among axiomes of Logike, as in a discourse of Garrantie, to talke of Rickhils remaynders: in a chapter of releases, to lay downe the pleading in a writ of right: in the explication of conditi­onall estates, to declare the nature of a déede indented, and a déede polle: among the preceptes of tenants in common, to cast in péeces of releases; as the custome is among litle grand mootemen, who cast case vpon case, as Carters doo billets vpon billets, and for euery collaterall trifle, run ouer all the 633. titles of Brookes abridgement.

The third rule, as it is in practise hard, so in obseruation it is most commendable, and if it bée violated, it argueth a most grosse ouersight in the vnskilfull artificer. As if a pro­fessor of Logike should say, that a cause is euer inherent, or, as it were, ingrauen in, and together with tho thing caused; this were absurdly spoken, for in teaching a speciall thing generally, hée applyeth that generally to all causes, which is appropriate naturally to one cause, and onely one cause, I meane the forme, which is alwayes inherent in the thinge formed, and imprinted in the same, whereas other causes bée not so. Agayne, if the same Logicall Doctor should say, that the materiall cause were the fountayne of all knowledge, or should affirme the same of all the other kindes of causes spe­cially and in seueralty, hée might iustly bée reprehended for a double fault, the one, for making a generall adiunct bée re­strayned and tyed to one peculiar subiect: the other, for vain­lie repeating that in diuers specials, which was in genera­litie to haue béene layd downe but once for all. There is in effect no part of our Law that euer was ordered according to this rule: yet it appeareth that the founders of our Law had a liking thereof, in that they detested the contrary vice. Car nous eyomus vne erudition, que si home ad briefe framed in le Register pur son speciall case, praeter le generall briefe, et [Page 90] il vse le generall briefe pur son speciall case, c [...]o briefe aba­tera. Et vide 7. H. 7. In trespasse per le baron et feme, et count del trespas fayt al feme dum sola fuit, ceo abatera le briefe. 7. E. 6. 80. Dyer.

Aristoteles affectiones has tres ad propositiones syllogismi Demonstratiui restrinxit, sed Ramus eas ad omnia artium prae­cepta rectius accomodauit. In Logike, saith Scribonius, wee are not to giue peculiar preceptes fit onely to put downe arts (as Ramus in this place séemeth to doo, where hée maketh the foresaid rules of Truth, Iustice, and Discretion, proper and peculiar directions for the conformation of arts) but ge­nerall for Ens, and non Ens. So that hée would haue no men­tion made of the constitution and framing of artes purposely and ex professo, for that were impertinent, but onely obiter, and by the way, in manner of a Corollary or Consectary, that it might bée the more tollerable and Homogeneum, that is, the more sutable and coherent. And so I make it héere no di­stribution at all, but onely a Corollary.

Impossibile quadruplex, sayth one, Naturae, vt coelum di­gito attingere: Iuris, quod bonis moribus & rationi repugnat: Contradictionis: Facti; hinc impossibilium nulla est obliga­tio, the like whereof is in Parkins and diuers yeare bookes.

Annotations.

The iudgement of this simple axiome is moste naturall, but in part common to brute beastes aswell as to man, as in all singuler matters comprised in the axiomes called proper. For as Aristotle teacheth in the second of his demonstrati­ons, euery sensible creature hath a naturall power and fa­cultie of iudging, which is called sence; & this sence 2. Topic: is of him sayde to bée a certayne kinde of iudgement: and without doubt, the sence is a moste vpright iudge of suche thinges as are properly vnder his iurisdiction, as the sight of colours, the hearing of soundes, the smelling of smelles, 4. Metap.

This iudgement of the sences is more exact and exquisite in some sortes of beastes, then it is in man. For although man doe surpasse other creatures in tutching, yet the Egle seeth more clearely than hée, the Vultur smelleth better, and the Mowld heareth sooner, as Plynie reporteth in the second of his naturall historie. So that the iudgement of a simple axiome is not altogether proper and peculiar to man onely, but that of the generall axiome is mans alone. For although it séeme that beastes haue some little sparkes of reason, as Aristotle in the second of his Physikes speaketh of the Spi­der and the Ante, wherevnto Galen also séemeth to yéelde, yet in truth this iudgement is nothing els in them, but only the fantasy or imagination of sensible notions, neither can any beast conceiue any generall. And though Epicurus did so much abase mans dignitie, as to attribute the souereigne [Page] iudgement and determination of all thinges vnto sence, not vnto reason and vnderstanding, yet wée know what an infi­nite & vnspeakable capacitie mans soule is indowed withal, how farre the general is more honorable then the singuler, & how woonderfully mans minde woorketh of it selfe alone without any helpe of sence, whatsoeuer bée obiected by that sensuall, or rather sencelesse and brutish Philosopher Epi­curus.

[And in the generall, one of them contradictory to the other, is not alwayes true or alwayes false:] this is false, sayth Scribonius, therefore we must say thus,

• All that is lent to loue will be lost:
• Not all that is lent to loue will be lost.

For, saith he, the generall nature of a contradiction is, to diuide betwéene truth and falshoode. But there is a generall kinde of contradiction in propositions or axiomes, when two generall axiomes are so opposed the one against the other, as what the one dooth affirme, the other denieth of and in the selfe same thing, and these can neuer bée both true, but they may be, both false. This general contradiction is of Aristotle called a contrarietie in axiomes by a distinct name and title, not a contradiction.

An other kinde of contradiction there is which is special, and is called by the generall name, a Contradiction, not a Contrarietie, when y^e one is a generall affirmatiue axiome, the other a particuler negatiue, or contrarilie: which in­déede as Scribonius saith, can neuer bée either both true or both false; Thus then wée sée the cause of this reprehension, what it is and how much woorth. The diuers acceptation of this woord, Contradiction, caused an error, and this error a néedles reprehension.

Et quia quidam recognitorum modò comparentium non fecerunt visum, & quidam non venerunt, ideo iurata remanet vs (que) ad proximam assisam. Ceo fuit error per troys Iustices, car l'un part del recorde est contrariant alauter: car per le pri mer parcel, s. quia quidā recognitorum modò comparentiū; I' apparance de touts est affirme: et in le second part, s. & buid [...]m non venerunt, le non apparāce del parcel des Iurors [Page 92] est affirme, sic contrariant, s. omnes Iuratores venerunt (car comentq le generall note, Omnes, ne soit la mise, vncore est include et implye solon (que) cest opinion:) & quidam Iuratores non venerunt. 22. E. 4. 16. 17.

33. H. 6. 26. b. Prisot. Le briefe est repugnant en luymes­me, s. quod cum ipse habeat quoddam Cheminum ratione te­nurae suae ad ecclesiam de D. le def. leuauit quendam murum, per quem murum Cheminum habere non potest. Issint il re­herce coment il ad vn chemyne in le premis del briefe, et in le perclose, il reherce, quod habere non potest, nisi ita expo­nas, habeat de iure, habere non possit de facto.

A generall:] Axioma generale esse potest, etsi nullum symbolum generale adijciatur, cuiusmodi sunt omnis, nullus, &c. Ita (que) sententia axiomatis consideranda est, sic, Malus vsus abolendus est, generale est axioma. In euery general axiome both the former and later part must bée a thing generall and common to many: and also the later part must bée generally attributed to the former part, that is to say, to all the nature of the former parte, and to all thinges conteyned vnder the same former part.

A simple axiome, sayth Piscator, is generall or speciall: generall is vniuersall or particular: vniuersall eyther defi­nite, as euery man is reasonable, or indefinite, as man is reasonable: But Ramus expelleth that vncerteine and inde­finite axiome; for euery conceipt of the mind is determinatly eyther generall or speciall, and speciall, eyther particular or singular, as in that axiome vttered by Hanck. 11. H. 4. 47. Damnum poet estre abs (que) iniuria, the sence is determinate, that aliquod damnum est abs (que) iniuria, as in that case of the thrée schoolemaisters, where the thirds diligence withdrewe all the schollers from the other twoo.

As for those which they call Subcontrarias; or vnder con­traries, they make no true contradiction. For they may bée both true: nay they rather make an argument of partition. For, these axiomes:

• Some men be lawyers,
• Some men be not lawyers.

Be nothing els but a distribution of men, as if a man [Page] should diuide men into two partes, whereof the one should bee lawyers, the other shoulde bée no lawyers: and these axiomes may bée both true.

The other that are called Subalternae, bée both affirma­tiue, or both negatiue, the one béeing generall, the other his speciall: so that they make an argument, of the generall to his speciall: As,

• Euery knightes seruice draweth with it gard, mariage, and reliefe.
• Some knightes seruice draweth with it, gard, mariage, and reliefe.

Equipollence is Grammaticall, Brian in 11. H. 7. 23. in­tangleth a plaine case with this obscure sophistry of Aequi­pollentia. Conuersion of propositions turneth good axiomes many times out of their wit: whatsoeuer is good in it, is fet either from reciprocation in argumentes, or from syllo­gismes: De modalibus, they say, Non gustabit asinus: Let fine headed cloysterers loue them, sine riuali: they bée no­thing but additions of seuerall affections of argumentes in an axiome. Suppositions are built rather vpon idle sup­posals of schoolemen, then grounded vpon any sure founda­tion of naturall experience. For these and all like these, no more, but this, As good they were neuer named, as euer be­léeued.

Annotations.

COmpound:] the woorde, hypotheticall, which is héere commonly vsed, is neither proper nor fit for this purpose. For, in absolute copulatiue and discretiue axiomes, there is no [...], no condition at all.

Whereas I haue already oftentimes in this second booke vsed these woords, a Uerbe, and a Ceniunction: it is to be vn­derstoode, that I meane not the naked woords: (for that were [Page] Grammaticall, and belonging onely to spéech: not Logicall, and perteyning to reason:) but the verbe and coniunction of the minde, wit, and reason: which indéede is commonly, al­though not alwaies, expressed by some such Grammaticall Uerbe and Coniunction.

The negation in a copulatiue axiome is not the denying of the parts conioyned; but the denying of the conioyning of the p [...]rtes As thus,

Shepheardes must not be both meeke and milde, and welleyd, and vndefil'd, and stout, altogether.

Q. An copulatum axioma sit sine notis copulatiuis, vt Titius, Meuius, Decius haeredes sunto.

In 22. E. 4. 32. In dett sur le custome de Londres de for­reine attachement, le def. pleade en barre, vn copulatine, s. le record del recouery, et auxi le custome de Londres, le pl. trauerse l'un part, s. le custome, et est troue faux per certifi­cat, ergo tout est faux, car le nature d'un copulatyue, est que si part de luy soit faux, tout serra faux. Bryan.

Legulei aliquando accipiunt, Et, pio, aut, & contra. Vt, home bargaine ou vende sa terre a vn auter, et couenant de faire vn bone et sufficient estate in féesimple al bargainée et ses heyres in le terme de s. Michael, procheine; et deuant le terme de s. Michael, le bargaignée morust, hîc le bargaig­nor poet et doyt fayre estate in terme de s. Michael al heyre le bargaignée: et vncore les parolles fueront, que il fairoit estate al bargaignée et ses heyres: hîc, et, est prise, pro, aut. Sed barbarismus imperitorū ne doit estre preiudiciall al art.

In omni composito axiomate, praeter discretum, duplex est modus contradicendi. Primo, cum contradicitur vinculo com­positionis, & tùm contradictio diuidit verum & falsum, vt Esopus & ingeniosus fuit & formosus, Esopus non & ingenio­sus fuit & formosus. Secundo, cùm contradicitur compositi partibus, vt Esopus fuit & ingeniosus & formosus, Esopus nec ingeniosus fuit, nec formosus, & tum non diuidit verum & falsum ait Piscator.

Annotations. Elenchs.

THe other axiomes are not so easily abused as this. For here the negation is of no force at all, vnlesse it be di­rectly referred to the band which is a coniunction. Therefore although a man might thinke this to bée a Negation.

If Dido liue, she is not dead: Yet indeede, it is an affirmation, whose negation should bée thus.

Not if shée liue, therefore she is not dead, or, it doth not folow, that if Dido liue, therefore shée is not dead.

Beurhusius giueth this Canon, which séemeth strange to many. There may bée an affirmation, though both the partes be denyed, as, if hée bée not industrious, hée will not bée learned.

This is Berhusius his example: the like whereof is this.

If hée bée not in London, hée is not in Cheapeside. Ista ne­gatio aequipollet affirmation [...] s. hée that is out of London, is out of Cheapeside.

And vnlesse this bée graunted to bée an affirmatiue axiome, there will be a very good syllogisme made of onely Negatiues, contrarily to the common receaued verse: for, I can very well reason thus.

• If it bee not in London it is not in Cheapeside:
• But it is not in London, therefore
• It is not in Cheapeside.

A connexiue axiome is that also in Maister Plowden: [Page 95] Fol. 10. b. Et il y ad vn principall on foundation en le comen ley pur construction des parolles, ou clauses, ou sentences, s. que en chescun graunt, ou done, [...] les parolles soyent am­biguous et doubfull, que ils serra prise plus fort encounter les grauntors ou donors, et plus beneficiall a ceux as queux le graunt ou done fuit fayt.

[Connexion onely probable:] Contingens est connexio, quando partes pro sua probabilitate tantùm ponuntur, id est, ne (que) absolutè consentiunt, ne (que) planè dissèntiunt. Ita (que) etiam axiomatis veritas ex argumentis siue rebus dispositis, non ex sola connexione dependet: si enim necessitas ex sola connexi­one esset, omnis connexio esset necessaria, quod nemo dixe­rit. Wasserleider.

[Aduerbe of time:] Fit. cor. P. 385. P. 15. Quant le de­fendant pleda al appele de rien culpable, prist a defender per son corps, il doyt getter son gaunce in le court, &c. The same force is in an aduerbe of place in our law, as in that of 1. H. 5. 3. per Hull. Lou vn home demande certeine chateux, et per son briefe est proue, que le property est deuestue de son pos­session per le prise, la il couyent a luy de metter le price. Here these woords, lou and la, bée in sence no more but, if, and then, or when and then.

Connexum duobus modis negatur: simpliciter quando ne­gatio praeponitur coniunctioni; apertius, quandò inconsequen­tia etiam exponitur; vt fi dies est, lucet: non, si dies est, lucet. Et, si dies est, non ideò lucet, vel non sequitur lucere. Ita (que), non satis accuratè Boetius dicit, ad consequentem propositionem respiciendum esse, vt affirmatiua vel negatiua, propositio con­nexa iudicetur: vt, si est A, est B: affirmatiua est, ait Boetius: si est A, non est B; negatiua: at, inquam, tam est affirmatiua secunda propositio haec, quam illa prima. Deceptus est autor huius dogmatis dissensionis specie, quia illa enunciata dissen­tirent, nec simul esse vera possent, ideò contradicentia putauit. At contradictio est affirmatio & negatio eiusdem de eodem, illic, si est A, est B; affirmatio est consequentis affirmati de an­tecedente affirmato: hîc, si est A, non est B, affirmatio item, sed consequentis negati de affirmato antecedente: at affirma­tio affirmationi non contradicit, licet opponatur alio genere.

[Page] Connexiue axioms bée called Conditionall: of these there bée infinite in our lawe, as may appeare by the large titles and discourses of conditions in Littleton, Parkins, Fitzher­bert and Brooke. Conditio, saith one, triplex est: concipitur enim aut in praeteritum, praesens, aut futurum. In futurum conceptae sunt possibiles vel impossibiles. Possibiles sunt vel simpliciter voluntariae fortuitae (que) (volgo potestatiuae & casua­les dicuntur) vel mixtae.

Annotations.

PIscator ait axioma disiunctiuū praeponendum esse discreto, vt copulatiuum prius est connexo. Nam in copulatiuo & disiunctiuo, pars altera notio simplex est, altera verò notio­num complexio; at connexi & discreti vtra (que) pars tum ante­cedens tum consequens non simplex notio est, sed notionum complexio enunciatiua.

Idem Piscator putat axioma disiunctiuum differre à distri­butiuo. Nam disiunctio est qua partium disiunctarum vna ali­qua pro vera asseritur, ita vt caeterae res sint falsae, scilicet, cum partes de specie aliqua eius generis, ad quod partes propriè pertinent, enunciantur, vt Socrates est rationalis, aut irrationa­lis, sanus aut aeger. At distributio est, qua partes enumeratae omnes pro veris asseruntur, vnaquae (que) cum toto quod distribu­itur, particulariter disposita, scilicet cum partes de ipso genere aut integro, ad quod propriè pertinent, enunciantur, vt animal aut rationale est aut irrationale, aut sanum aut aegrum, ac si di­cerem, animalium aliud est rationale, aliud irrationale, aliud sanum, aliud aegrum.

[Laeander:] the verses bée these;

Lease fait pur ans, payant annuelment xx. s. ou vn toge. This, as also the whole title of Election dependeth on this disiunctiue axiome. The difference is now when it is but for once, or when continuall; if continuall, eliget grauntor &c. Vide 9. E. 4. & 17. E. 4.

Congregare, segregare, copulare, connectere, discernere, disiungere, bée Latine woordes, yet by vse made English. I néede not make any interpretation of them.

The necessitie of the disiunctiue axioms, as is said before, dependeth of the necessary opposition of the partes, not of the necessary truth of the same. Which thing béeing not conside­red, [Page] caused not onely Epicurus, who was but a dunsicall Logi­cian, to bée deceiued, but those also who thought themselues great experienced men in this profession, as Chrysippus and Diodorus: for they imagined that if the disiunction were ne­cessary, then the one or the other part of the axiome should be also necessary, and into the same error dooth Tully himselfe fall in his booke de fato.

Elenchs. Sith the disiunction is not necessary, but when the partes haue no third thing betwéene, this axiome is false when wée thus say, Paris must needes eyther walke or daunce, for hée may aswell holde his peace and stand still. So this, Euery francktenement is eyther feesimple or feetayle, for there bée other fréeholds, as pur terme de vie, and pur auter vie.

Annotations.

Dissentanea argumenta etiam congregatiuo axiomate enun­ciari possunt, vt mel & dulce est & flauum, hîc diuersa enun­ciantur congregatiuo copulato. Quin & simplici etiam axio­mate [Page 97] diuersa enunciari possunt, vt flauedo mellis non est du [...] ­cedo eius.

Vt occupatiua axiomata non admittunt contradictionem, ita nec discretiua; sed illa apta sunt ad respondendum & con­tradicendum consequentibus falsis enthymematum illlorum hominum quibuscum loquimur: haec ad contradicendum enunciatis copulatis ex parte falsis, vt Aesopus & ingeniosus fuit & fonnosus, hoc falsum est ex parte posteriore: Si ergò hanc falsitatem velim ostendere contradicendo, non satis erit negare copulationem, sic, Aesopus non & ingeniosus & formo­sus fuit. Hinc enim nondum liquet, vtram partem falsam pu­tem: instituenda est ergò discretio sic, Aesopus non fuit ille quidem formosus, sed tamen fuit ingeniosus, & hic solus est discretorum vsus.

Enunciata per, quanquam, et, tamen, videntur [...], non [...], vt,

Hic Priamus, quanquam in media iam morte tenetur,

Non tamen abstinuit &c. Vbi Virgilius, nihil dis­cernit, sed lectoris cogitationi occurrit, & contradicit, nam lector videns Pyrrhum a [...]matum, facilè obijceret, Priamum non audere loqui. Occurrit ita (que) Virgilius & dicit, quanquam &c. Non tamen &c. Hic est solus horum vsus. Piscator.

Elenchs. It is a ridiculous discretiue axiome wherein such things are seuered, which naturally go so together, as that they can not somuch as be seuered in respect, much lesse in déede.

Annotations.

A Man may héere aske, why I doe not aswell put down the nature of a false syllogisme as I haue done the definition of a false axiome. I aunswere: that, truth and falshoode be­ing incident to the nature of an axiome, both were to be put downe, for that in them both, appeareth the fruite of axio­maticall iudgement: but it is one thing to diuide an axiome into that which pronounceth trueth, and that which contey­neth falshoode: and another thing, to tell what is a false, [Page 98] and an inartificiall axiome, made against these rules and prescriptions of Arte: the one I did, for it was to bée doone: the other, as I did it not in the tractate of axiomes, so will I not doo it in this discourse of syllogismes: the ambiguous sig­nification therefore, of this word, false, was the onely occa­sion of this doubt.

As in Grammer, and Rhetoricke, the naturall ordering of nownes and verbes with other partes of speach is com­monly altered and chaunged into a more elegant and artifi­cial coniunction, so in Logike the proposition is not alwaies in the first place: but is diuersly disposed, to auoyde satietie, and suspicion of Arte.

Wée perceaue héere, by the definition of a syllogisme, that the necessitie and vertue of consequence dependeth vpon the orderly disposition of the question with the argument in­uented: so that, not the argument properly, but the syllogi­sticall disposition dooth eyther proue or disproue the question.

Hée is greatly deceaued who thinketh there is no part of iudgement but onely in syllogismes. For, besides methode; the first, and almost the chiefe kinde of iudgement is in ax­iomes, yea and the very foundation of all other iudgement. For hereby wée iudge of all the principles of all artes, of all playne and manifest axiomes. Yea all such questions to the which we cannot aunswere yea or nay (as these be: what is it? what partes hath it? where is it? what qualities hath it? when will it come?) are aunswered by this kinde of iudgement. For, if you make answere to that which is de­maunded; the hearer is satisfied.

But if these axiomes bée not playne inough of them­selues, they must bée sent to syllogisme, there to bée discussed, and so to methode, there to bée ordered. So that, whatsoeuer is eyther by syllogisme, or methode iudged, it is all iudged by the helpe of this first and axiomaticall iudgement. For if the premisses in a syllogisme bée not sometimes certayne and so iudged by axiomaticall iudgement, and graunted; there will bée no ende of making syllogismes: when still wée call the groundes thereof into controuersie, for want of axioma­ticall iudgement.

[Page] [A Syllogisme:] [...] is, as it were, [...], an Arithmeticall deduction of sums in accompts, and so héere metaphorically of axiomes and arguments.

The necessitie of the consequence in a syllogisme depen­deth on that olde ground, that such thinges as agrée in any third thing, must also agrée among themselues. As then, in thinges that bée to bée measured with line or by weight, wée iudge of them as they agrée both eyther in line or weight: so it is also when an axiome dooth affirme or deny any thing of an other, whereof wée doubt. For, if the line or measure, I meane the third argumēt, agrée with both y^• parts of the que­stion, it sheweth y^• then the affirmation is true: but if it agrée but with one of them, it declareth the negation to be true.

[...], sayth Aristotle, [...]. Non enim ex omnibus propositionibus veris syl­logismus duntaxàt efficitur, sed ex duabus necessario conse­quentibus, & inter se non minus cohaerentibus, quàm annuli inter se cohaerent. Oportet enim conclusionem ex superiorum propositionum consecutione exprimi.

There is but one kinde of argumentation, and, that is a syllogisme. For, an Enthymeme is nothing but a contracted syllogisme. If the subiect be one and the same in both the pro­positions, then the Maior wanteth: but if the predicate, then the Minor. Aristotle calleth it [...]. It hath his name [...], that is in Latine cogitare, & com­mentari, to thinke, to excogitate; to tosse a mans minde, and meditate. For the minde neuer rests when an imperfect syl­logisme is put downe, before it hath supplyed that which wanteth, the better to iudge of the whole perfect syllogisme: wherevpon the satyricall poet sayth, aut curtum sermone rotato, Torqueat Enthymema. Iuuenal satyr. 6.

Maister Plowden Fol. 361. a. Stowell le ayel fuit estrange al fine, et de pleine age al temps del fine leue, ergò il fuit lye. Adde the proposition herevnto, it will bée a playne and per­fect syllogisme. So agayne in the same place;

Stowell le demandant fuit estrange al fine, et deins age al temps del fine leue: Ergo il est exempt. Adde the proposi­tion, [Page 99] and this also will bée a full syllogisme.

[The proposition:] in a compound syllogisme, which they call hypotheticall, the proposition, that is, the Maior, as they tearme it, conteines the whole question: but in a simple one, which they tearme a Categoricall syllogisme, it contey­neth onely the later parte of the question, which is called of them praedicatum▪ or attributum, the predicate or attribute, because it is spoken, affirmed, attributed or applyed to the former.

[The assumption is taken out:] as from a thing put downe and graunted, and now applied more nearely to the purpose, of the Latine, Assumo.

The schoolemen haue commonly foure kindes of Argu­mentations, Syllogisme, Enthymeme, Induction, Example, to the which some adde Sorites and Dilemma: others also there bée, but these are the most famous: and all these, as I sayd before, come all to one. For an Enthymeme is but a contracted and short syllogisme: An example, but an argu­ment from the like or equall, a facto simili seu pari, and no ar­gumentation of it selfe without the helpe of a syllogisme: An Induction, which is called the Socraticall Argumentation, is but an argument concluded by a syllogisme, from the enu­meration of the partes: A Sorites, but an Enthymematicall progression by certainy degrees. Tully calleth it Penelopes telam, because it is wouen as it were, by ascending and af­firming, but vnwouen againe by descending and denying: the Stoykes vsed this very much: it is called Sorites of [...]. aceruus, a heape, because, as of many graynes is made a [...] heape of corne, so of many degrées an argument called So­rites, by this enthymemati [...]all progression. Wherevpon the Poet sayth:

Inuentus, Chrysippe, tui finitor acerui.

It is commonly called, à primo ad vltimum, but not so aptly, for as well may it bée called, ab vltimo ad primum. As in that which Themistocles was woont to vse:

The Athenians rule all the other Graecians: I rule the Athenians; my wife, mée; my boy, my wife:

Therefore my sonne ruleth all Greece. Or thus,

[Page] My sonne ruleth my wife; my wife commaundeth mée:

I the Athenians; the Athenians all Graece:

Therefore my sonne ruleth all Graece.

Maister Plowden Fol. 229. b. hath a Sorites of diuers degrées. Le playntife deriue son lease de Cocke, quel deriue son title del Counte del Pembroke, quel deriue son title del roy Ed­ward, quel deriue son title per discent del roy Henry le huict, quel deriue son title per discent del roy Henry le scpt, quel deryue son title per le fine, et per le morant del Marques sans issue. Issint (que) si le plaintife ne proue sufficientment, que le Marques est mort sans issue, et que le roy auoyt estate en la terre puis sa mort, il ne proue sufficientment sa title ne interest.

Bracton. lib. 5. Fol. 335. Item, cum nulla summonitio nec defalta, nulla sequi deberet Captio: & cum Captio nulla, nulla sequi deberet possessionis amissio: Ergò à primo, vbi nulla summonitio, nulla sequitur possessionis amissio, quia vbi pri­mum & principale, quod est summonitio, non subsistit, nec ea quae sequuntur, locum habere debent.

Lastly, a Dilemma, is nothing els, but an argument from the contraries or opposites, or any disagréeable argument. It is called Dilemma, of [...], and [...], to take on both the sides: because the argumentes are so set, as that there is no way left to escape, as in that of Protagoras the maister, and Euathlus the scholler: where Euathlus gaue some money in hande to his Rhetoricall Doctor Protagoras, and couenanted to pay the rest when Euathlus should win the first cause that euer hée pleaded for. Protagoras suing Euathlus for his mo­ney, saide, if Euathlus ouercome mée, then by bargaine & com­position hée must pay mée the money; if hée loose, then by the course of Law. Nay ꝙ Euathlus, if I loose, then by couenant you get nothing: if I winne, then will the iudgement dis­charge mée.

The like is that which Bias vsed, and was reforted by Phauorine: If you marry any woman, shée must either bée faire and so shall you haue her [...], common: or els fowle; and then you shall finde her [...], [...]: therefore mary none at all. Nay, saide Phauorine, there bée women of middle [Page 100] beautie, neyther so fine, as to make euery man to loue, nor so foule, as to make euery man hate them. Therforé a man must marry.

So in Arist. 2. Rhet. A certaine precise priest would not suffer his sonne to haue any dealing or conference with the people. For sayth he, if thou speake truth, thou shalt displease men, if vntrueth, God: Nay rather feare not to meddle with the multitude, sor if thou tell the truth, thou shalt please God, if vntruth, men.

Plowden: Fol. 362. Browne a most Logicall Lawyer con­cludeth his witty disputation with this Dilemma, si Stowell fuit lie per le puruieu del statute, il est apres except: si ne'stlye per le puruieu, ne besoigne destre except, ergo il est, alarge.

I sayd before, that Exemplum, an example, was but an ar­gument a facto simili, seu pari, and that the onely force of ar­gumentation therin procéedeth from disposition syllogisticall: so it is in 4. H. 6. 13. briefe de mayntenance fuit port per deux, ou le tort fuit fayt al troys, la Newton proue que le briefe aba­tera, quia ne fuit port per touts troys, sic, si le tort fuit en comon, donque eur couyent de prendre lour action en comon, et que le tort fuit en comon, ieo prouera, car si eux fue­sont nonsuit per cause del mayntenance, cest in comon: si soy­soyent barres per cause del mayntenance, cest in comon, et les expenses del suite sont en comon. ergo, &c.

Neither in these, nor in that called [...] Violentum, and such like, is there any new disposition or art of consequence, but onely that of syllogisme.

[A prosyllogisme:] Vide 4. H. 6. 30. In repl bastardie fuit alledge in le maister le auowant, le question fuit, an il auera ayd de son maister, deuant que il reioy [...] [...]l bastardy, et per Martyn, il ne auera.

• [Page]ou nul en­try del ayd, la nul ayd.
• Icy nul entry del ayd, car
  • Si ascun entry del ayd icy, [...] serra v [...]l [...]co que est du­uant ple, s. petit auxilium d'un ti [...]l, sine quo ipse non potest respondere: vel apres ple, s. petit auxiliū ad manu­tenendum exitum, le conse­quens est prou [...],
    • ne sont plusors que deu [...] maners de ent [...]ies del ayde, deuant ple, ou a­pres, [...]'un in reall acti­on, sauter in personell.
    • Ergo si sort omninò, opo [...] tet quòd sit vel hoc, ve illud.
  • mes icy.
    • il nauera l [...]ntry de­uant ple, s. fine quo nō potest [...] spondere, car [...] [...]sme ad responde, s. ad fayt Conusance.
    • Nec l'entry apres, ad manutenendū [...]xitum, car icy nul issue est ioyne inter eux.
  • Ergo nul entry omnino.
    • In 3. H 6. 21. b. Rolf vsa vne prosyllogisme, vide le lieu,
• Ergo nul ayd icy.

Canons, Elenchs. In euery simple syllogisme that is not proper, there must be some affirmatiue and generall argument.

Interdum quo (que) simplex syllogismus ex enunciatis compo­sitis constare potest, si modo compositio ipsa argumenti sim­plex sit. Vt apparebit aliâs. Freigius. Snellius. Ramus.

Héere then generally it is a false syllogisme, when all the ariomes bée either negatiue or proper. Ex omnibus enim spe­cialibus, aut negatis, nullus communis syllogismus in vlla figura simplici, concluditur. Ramus. 2. lib. animaduers.

Proximum genus syllogismi & Methodi ignoratur, ita (que) po­nitur dispositio.

[Page 101] Vt in connexo & disiuncto axiomate veritas pendet ex con­nexione & disiunctione, non veritate partium, sic syllogismus ex necessitate consequutionis, licet omnes partes sint impos [...]ibi­les, vt, omnis arbor est lapis, omnis leo est arbor, ergo omnis leo est lapis.

In euery syllogisticall conflict and controuersie, there is a defendant & an opponent. The first is to vrge, proue, conclude; the other to repell, auoyd, and driue backe. The disputation being once begon, it is an vnorderly confusion for the same man sometimes to aunswere, sometimes to reply, and neuer constantly to playe out his owne parte: much like the two clownes in Virgill, which, when they could not aun­swere what was propounded, begin a freshe with a new doubt on the necke of the olde: Dic, quibus in terris, quoth the one, and Dic, quibus in terris, quoth the other, Arréede me a riddle, sayth Damaetas: and Arreede me a riddle replyeth Menalcas, thincking it a faire conquest, to haue taken and giuen blowe for blowe, as Bakers and Butchers vse to doe, who neuer care for any curious wardes, but lay on loade like good fellowes, one for one, till both begin to stagger, with their valiant blood about their brused pates. I haue therefore in a word or two, layd downe some generall, instructions and directions for or­derly disputations.

Logicall exercise is that which ex­presseth that in particular practise which is generally put downe in art. For as art follo­weth nature, so ex­ercise foloweth art Herein let vs con­sider

• 1. The adiuncts & affecti­ons of it, for it is perfor­med. either by writing or spea­king. & ey­ther of these is ey­ther continued, as in long discourses & tractats. or inter­rupted as, in
  • Di [...] ­logues.
  • Dispu­tations. Vide B B.
• 2. The specials of it. Vide A A.

[Page] B B. Dis­putation is an ar­gumenta­ble discus­sing of a doubtfull propositi­on▪ where [...]te.

• 1. The disputers
  • The proponent, who defendeth the proposition or position: wherevnto also the modera for and deter­miner of the disputatton is referred, who commonly man [...]eyneth the position.
  • The opponent, whoe defendeth the contrary.
• 2. The duties of the dispu­ters, ey­ther,
  • commō to both them, as in
    • prepa­ration and fur niture,
      • of instruments for the disputatiion, as bee
        • Logike.
        • Rhetorike
      • things re quisite for the same, it must be noted therfore.
        • 1. What may con­firme or confute the position.
        • 2 What sect of phi­losophy the aduersary followeth.
        • 3. They must haue in memory the gene­rall heades of artes, which are commonly vsed in disputations.
    • Cōflict and as­assault: they must neither
      • Wrangle about trifling wordes,
      • Nor make long and impertinent excursion and vagaries.
      • Nor seeke starting holes.
      • Nor bring in any such thing as may rather make against them, then with them.
      • Nor seeke to supplant or circum­uent one another iniuriously.
      • [...]or ouerweene themselues, or be obstinate and singuler in conceipt.
      • Nor fa [...] to threatning and railing with vndecent tearmes.
  • Proper to eyther of them. C C.

[Page 102] C C. The proper due­ties of the

• Oppo­nent be
  • 1. To haue his weapons in a readines, that is, to haue his obiections framed artifi­cially with syllogisticall disposition.
  • 2. Not to cast his argumentes confu­sedly on a heape, but to vse them distinctly, one after another.
  • 3. To haue Prosyllogismes in a ready­nes, for the confirmation of such parts of his syllogismes, as may by likelyhood, be denied.
  • 4. To bring in nothing which hath not some probabilitie or shew of truth in it.
  • 5. Sometimes to deale directly & open­ly: sometimes couertly, and by bringing his aduersary to an absurditie or impossibilitie.
  • 6. Neuer to choppe in impertinent mat­ters, which make nothing at all to the matter in controuersie.
• Defen­dent be
  • 1. In choise of his posi­tion, that it be not
    • Repugnant to sence.
    • Contrary to equity & honesty.
    • Too hard and difficult.
  • 2. Both in
    • Repetitions of the obiections made, & that either by the selfe­same words, or with the selfe same sence, in the like order as they were propounded: with a kind of curteous preface: that both himselfe may haue some meane-space of conceauing a solution, and the auditors bet­ter vnderstand what was ob­iected.
    • And also in aunswering of the same.

[Page] D D. The obiectiōs be aun­swered.

• either
  • By skorning, and reiecting, if absurd fooleries be obiec­ted, or such as no man vnderstandeth.
  • By graunting and confessing, when such thinges bee brought in, as make nothing against the position.
  • By affirming or denying, when any interrogation is [...]adr: or els by asking what he meaneth by his interro­gation, if it [...]e ambiguous and sophisticall.
• Or by direct soluti on, & that
  • either per­fect, when the very cause is shewed, why the conclu­sion is not sufficient, and it is
    • 1. by deny­ing ei­ther of
      • The premisses and prosyllogisms when they be false,
      • Or the consecution & consequence, when the fault is in the forme of conclusion: for the conclusion it selfe must neuer be denied.
    • 2. ey­ther
      • by distin­guishing when ey­ther
        • The questions and interrogatiōs be cap­tious and doubtfull.
        • Or the premisses bee true not absolutly, but in part. And here fry­uolous distinctions must be auoyded.
      • Or conditionall graunting, as I graunt, if you so vnderstand it. Sometimes the defendent doub­teth of the truth of some one of the premisses, and doth therfore leaue it▪ of purpose to aunswere to the other that is more plaine, Thus, Let the Maior passe for a whyle, I now aunswere to the minor.
  • Imperfect by bringing in some instance, that is by ta­king a particular exception to a generall proposition.

[Page 103] A A. so­much of y^e affec­ctions of this logicall exercise y^e speci­als now fo­low, which bee

• Analysis, in vnd [...]ing & examining that w [...]ich is already made, & is
  • eyther be­lōgyng to Inuenti­on: as
    • to search and inuent the question it selfe.
    • to picke out the arguments and proofes.
    • do refer them euery one to their seueral heads, & there to inquire of their sufficiency, as whether y^• be vsed for a Cause which is no cause, &c.
  • or to Dis­position & that either
    • Axiomaticall, where all the axi [...]mes must be also brought to their heads, and their truth or fals­nes diligently examined.
    • or Dia­noeticall which is eyther
      • Syllogisticall, for the examination and triall of consequ [...]ion, what followeth, or not followeth.
      • Methodicall, for proofe of order and Methodicall handling of the ma [...]ter discoursed vpon.
• Genesis, in making or framīg of any thing by our owne in­dustrie, [...] that ey­ther by
  • way of imi­tation and that either of the whole worke or of some part eyther of these is
    • in wordes, called Tran­slation.
    • in things called properly imitatiō, wee must Imitate
      • neyther all autors, but the best of [...]l:
      • nor al things but the best, & that freely, not seruile [...]y, as bindyng our iudgemēt to othermens fancie.
  • Or by pro­per Inuen­tion, where we must
    • First peruse euery place of Logicall inuention for the inuenting of proofes and arguments.
    • then dispose them artifi­cially both by iudgmēt.
      • Axiomaticall:
      • and Dianoe­ticall & that both
        • Syllogistical,
        • & Methodicall.

Annotations.

THis chapter conteyneth the third figure of Aristotle.

In all those artificiall woordes, Darapti, Felapton, &c. and others of the same kinde, there bée certeine significant letters to be obserued, as, A, signifieth a generall affirmatiue axiome: E, a generall negatiue: I, a speciall affirmatiue: O, a speciall negatiue: besides some consonantes which bée notes of Reduction, which I little estéeme of.

The olde verses bée thus,

Valla reiecteth this contracted syllogisme, so dooth Scribo­nius, sith, as they thinke, there is no example héereof to bée found: and by Scribonius, there is no new syllogistical dispo­sition héere, but onely an argument from the speciall. But Lazarus Schonerus, adducit haec exempla, Primum est in Mi­loniana. Negant intueri lucem fas esse ei, qui à se hominem occisum fateatur. In qua tandem vrbe hoc homines stultissimi disputant? Nempè in ea quae primùm iudicium de capite vi­dit, M. Horatii fortissimi viri, qui nondum libera ciuitate, ta­men populi Romani comitijs liberatus est, cùm sua manu so­rorem esse interfectam fateretur, syllogismus hic est,

• M. Horatius populi comitijs absolutus est,
• M. Horatius confessus est se sua manu caedem fecisse,
• Ergò aliquis à se hominem occisum fassus, est absolutus.

Item in eadem. Quod si duodecim tabulae nocturnum fu­rem quoquo modo, diurnum autem, si se telo defenderit, inter­fici impunè voluêrunt, quis est, qui quoquo modo quis inter­fectus sit, puniendum putet, cum videat aliquando gladium ad occidendum hominem ab ipsis porrigi legibus?

• Syllogismus hic est,
• Furem nocturnum interficere licet,
• Furem nocturnum interficere, est hominem occidere,
• Ergò hominem occidere aliquando licet.

• Huius generis est illud,
• Riuos deducere est licitum diebus festis,
• Riuos deducere est opus rusticum,
• Quaedam igitur opera rustica sunt licita festis diebus.

[Page 105] Virgilius sic iudicat, 1. Georgic. sed pro argumento exem­plum sextuplex, subijcit particulari quaestioni.

Exempla specialia suo generi particulariter sic interdum in artium praeceptis accommodantur, quale est illud de similitu­dine, lib. 1. dialecticae Rameae, cap. 20. aliquando nota nulla est, Virg. Aeg. 2. O formose puer &c. Syllogismus hic est.

• In hoc exemplo nota est nulla,
• Est autem similitudinis:
• Ergò aliquando similitudinis nota est nulla.

Sic in Rami Arithmetica, lib. 1. cap. 1. Numerus potest esse minimus, vt vnitas, syllogismus hic est.

• Vnitas est res minima,
• Vnitas est numerus:
• Aliquis igitur numerus est minimus &c.

Elenchs. Among all these syllogismes, there is not any one good, where the assumption is negatiue.

Annotations.

NEgatiue if:] Here vpon the schoolemen giue out this rule. Conclusio sequitur deteriorem partem. For a Ne­gation is worse then an affirmation, as wée haue heard al­ready. But that which they put downe generally as inci­dent to all syllogismes is heere artificially set downe in his proper place.

Others haue left out these two last kindes of syllogismes; but iniuriously: for they are as artificiall as the rest, and of­tentimes vsed to discerne singulers that séeme to be the same. Singularia, say they, non considerantur in arte &c. absurdè. Nam tota Astrologia est de singularibus de sole &c. tamen praecepta sunt catholica. Sic in foro, curia, rostris, &c. omnia sin­gularia. Sic accusare solemus hunc, defendere illum, &c. Om­nia singularia.

As before, the contracted syllogisme was according to the disposition of the third figure put downe by Aristotle, where [Page] the Medium is the former part in eyther of the premisses: so this first kinde of the explicate syllogisme is the same that Aristotle comprehendeth in his second figure, where the Medium, or third argument is the later part in eyther pre­misse. Lastly, the second kind of explicate syllogismes, which followeth in the next chapter, is conteined in the first Aristo­telicall figure, wherein the third argument is the former part in the proposition, and the later part in the assumption: according to the verse:

Sub, prae, prima: bis prae, secunda: tertia, bis sub.

Annotations. Elenchs.

NO good syllogisme can bée made in this kind, if eyther all the axiomes bée affirmatiue, or the proposition bée speciall, as,

• That which vseth reason is best,
• The world is best,
• Therefore the world vseth reason.

For so (sayth Cotta in the third booke of Cicero concerning the nature of Gods) a man may conclude, that because no­thing is better then the whole world, therefore the world can play on the Lute.

Yet I say not this, as though no truth could bée concluded by the like disposition: for, true things are sometimes con­cluded by sophisticall and deceiptfull disposition, as that of Persius in his [...]st satyre.

• Hée is frée that liues as hée list,
• I liue as I list, therefore I am frée.

But it is therefore noted as sophisticall, for that, of true thinges, by the selfe same disposition, an vntrueth may bée concluded, As,

• A man is a liuing creature,
• A horse is a liuing creature. Therefore,
• A horse is a man.

Agayne,

• Hée that affirmeth a man to bée a liuing creature, sayth truely.
• [Page 107] Hée that sayth, thou art an asse, affirmeth a man to bée a liuing creature, Therefore
• Hée that sayth, thou art an asse, sayth truely.

Thus much for the first fallatian, when all the axiomes bée affirmatiue. The second followeth, when the proposition is speciall, as in that which was obiected against Diogenes.

• Thou hast that which thou didst neuer loose,
• But hornes thou didst neuer loose,
• Therefore thou hast hornes.

For if you resolue it thus,

• Hée hath hornes that neuer lost hornes,
• Diogenes neuer lost hornes,
• Therefore Diogenes hath hornes.

Then eyther the proposition will be false, if it bée gene­rall, or the syllogisme will prooue sophistical, if it be speciall.

The proper duetie therefore of a syllogisme is, to lay downe a certaine, true, and infallible rule of reasoning in such sort, that the premisses once graunted, the conclusion must in any case follow, and therefore this maner of reaso­ning, as all such like, is left out, as not artificiall, constant, and immutable; but, doubtfull, vncertaine, and deceiptfull. For, although sometimes thereby a trueth may bée conclu­ded, yet séeing that it also for the most part causeth error, it is not admitted as a law syllogisticall.

Annotations.

BArbara, is fittest for a general confirmation; Celarent, for a generall confutation; Darij, serueth to proue in parte, Ferio, to disproue in parte, according to those two olde schoole verses which I rehearsed before.

As for that kinde of demonstration of syllogismes which is doone by Reduction, it is more troublesome than néedfull. For, syllogismes, if they bée once artificially made, néede no further demonstration, as béeing of themselues sufficiently confirmed by their seuerall definitions, diuisions, examples, and explications.

Elenchs. The syllogisme is héere nought, if eyther the proposition bée speciall, or the assumption negatiue, as,

• A liquod animal est equus:
• Omnis homo est animal:
• Homo igitur est equuus.

And,

• Omnis homo est animal:
• Nullus equus est homo
• Nullus igitur equus est animal.

Annotations.

THe speciall contradiction:] when that which was affir­med in generall, is denyed in speciall: or contrarily, affir­med, when it was denyed: and when the same thing in spe­ciall, is both affirmed before and denyed after.

[Connexiue or disiunctiue:] So then of an axiome co­pulatiue or discretiue, wée vnderstand, that no seuerall and peculier disposition ariseth.

Vide 10. E. 4. Lyttleton contra Danby: si le proper­tie des biyus le mort soit en ascun, tunc serra in le testator, [Page 110] vel in les executors: mes est en ascun, ergò in l'un ou l'au­ter: [...]est connexiue: Then agayne:

• Le propertie est in le testator, ou in les executors,
• Mes nemy in le testator,
• Ergò in les executors: cest vn disiunctiue.

In composito syllogismo, assumptio, praeter argumentum, nihil assumit quaestionis; quod tamen fit semper in simplici syllogismo.

If not the whole question, but onely the latter part of it bée conteyned together with the argument inuented, in the proposition, then the syllogisme is simple, although the pro­position bée compound. For as I sayd elswhere, whenso­euer the disposition is simple, there the syllogisme is simple, though the partes bée compound. So that in Catullus is a simple syllogisme. 1. Gen.

• Ramus format sic:
• Quod optandum redierit, gratum est,
• Lesbia Catullo optata redijt:
• Optata igitur est.

• So in 2. Gen.
• Si quicquam sit homo, tum erit animal,
• Lapis non est animal,
• Lapis ergo non est homo.

Nay, which is more, the syllogisme may bée simple, though all the partes bée conditionall and compound, thus:

• Si sit honestum, erit laudabile,
• Si sit iustum, erit honestum,
• Ergò si sit iustum, erit laudabile.

As Ramus more at large putteth downe in his French Logike.

[Page] Elenchs. There bée two other connexiue syllogismes different from these already rehearsed: but because they are not certayne, constant, and alwayes infallible: therefore they be not put downe in the text, as precepts of Art: yet are they diligently to [...]e obserued, for they are often in autors: especially the first, which is very vsuall: but the second is not so common.

The first kinde is that which taketh away the former part, that it may also take away the later. Terence in A­dolphis.

Dem: Caeterum. Placet tibi factum Mitio? Mr: Non, si queam mutare: [...]nc cum non queo, aequo animo fero.

Cicero for Muraena.

Etenim si largitionem factam esse confiterer, idque recte esse factum defenderem, facerem improbe, etiamsi alius legem tulisset. Cum verò nihil commissum esse contra legem defendam, quid est quod meam defensionem latio legis impediat?

Ouid in his second booke of sorrowfull songs.

Caesar in Salust. Si digna poena pro factis corum reperitur, no­uum consilium approbo: sin magnitudo sceleris omnium in­genia exuperat, his vtendum censeo, quae legibus comparata sunt.

Colyn in Iune hath the like.

For, although all the examples of this kinde bée not false and deceiptfull, but good and sufficient, as in these now re­hearsed; yet, false may bée concluded by the selfe same dispo­sition, as

• Si arbor equus est, viueret:
• Sed arbor equus non est:
• Non igitur arbor viuit.

In which example, the proposition and assumption are both true, yet the conclusion is false: but it is the office of a syllogisme, as hath béene sayde, to lay downe, a necessary, perpetuall, and immutable rule, by the which, vppon the premisses once graunted, the consequence must bée ne­cessary.

The second, which is not so vsuall, is that which taketh the latter parte, that it may also haue the former concluded, as in that of Ouide in the fourth booke of his transforma­tions.

The argumentation is thus:

• Si dij statuêrunt vindicare Cadmum, fiat serpens:
• Sed fit serpens:
• Ergo dij statuêrunt vindicare Cadmum.

[Page] Take an other example, and you shall sée, that by the same rule you may conclude that which is starke false, As

• Si arbor equus esset, viueret:
• Sed viuit arbor:
• E [...]go, arbor equus est.

For heere the forerunning axiomes being both true, the conclusion for all that, is manifestly false. This is called of Aristotle an Elench of the consequent: yet in trueth it is no Elench of argument, but of argumentation: when wée are perswaded foolishly that the consequution is reciprocall, and that the putting downe of the one bringeth in of necessitie the other, and contrarily, As,

• Si cygnus est, albus est color.

This followeth.

• Sed albus est color,

It followeth not.

• Cygnus igitur est.

So, that of Melissus.

• Si quid factum est, habet principium,
• Ergo si principium habet, etiam factum est

The consequution, sayth Aristotle, is not reciprocall.

Ramus in the 20. of his Logicall animaduersions, the sixt Chapter sayth thus.

Theophrastus autem & Eudemus docuerunt in connexo, Antecedentis negati, & consequentis affirmati tolli posse an­tecedens, vt tollatur consequens; & consequens retineri, vt re­tineatur antecedens. In quo genere, etsi rarus error est, est ta­men aliquando: Vt,

• Si nullum animal est irrationale, omnis homo est ratio­nalis.
• Sed aliquod animal est irrationale:
• Ergo aliquis homo non est rationalis.

• Item,
• Sed omnis homo est rationalis,
• Ergo nullum animal est irrationale.

Cum maius aliquid concluditur, videntur esse tres termini, sed reuera, res illa maior contine [...]rem ante propositam in se, & quiddam amplius: Ita (que) tres tantum termini sunt.

Annotations. Elenchs.

FOr the first, if the assumption conteine not a speciall, but a generall contradiction, the syllogisme will bée sophi­sticall.

For the second, if the proposition haue not all his partes affirmatiue, the syllogisme is sophisticall.

The proposition in a syllogisme is commonly fet from some grounds of liberall arts, as Logike, Khetorike, Ethike, Physike, &c.

It is not a syllogisme, vnlesse it conclude and iudge neces­sarily: yea, notwithstanding, the premisses of themselues bée false.

Syllogisme is onely proper and peculiar to man; where­of, no beast dooth in any respect participate.

Strict syllogismes bée neuer lightly vsed among authors, but eyther contracted or amplified, or els inuerted, as I sayde before. The quicknes of mans wit is such, that it conceaueth [Page 113] the whole sometimes without any proposition, another while without any assumption, and now and then it preuen­teth and foretaketh the conclusion.

Ramus in his French Logike reduceth all the Oration which Tully made in defence of Milo to these thrée lines, making one simple syllogisme.

Le guetteur et espieur meschant est iustement occis:

Car l'autoritè du peuple, et des iudgements du Senate, de Marie, de la ley naturelle et humaine le tesinoignent: et n'y a aucune ley contraire ny du Senate, ny de Pompée. Tel est le profyllogisme de la proposition.

Or Clode est guetteur et espieur meschant:

Car il a espiè Milon, esmeu d'vtilité, de haine, de mauuaises meurs, d'esperance d'impunitè: Ce qui a estè entendue per ses parolles et sayts. Et qu'il ayt estè meschant, les faicts contre hommes et les dieus, le demonstrent. Tel est le prosyllogisme de l'assumption, dont est conclu.

Purtant Clode est iustement occis.

This is the briefe summe of all that long oration.

Annotations.

SOme thinke, the rule [...], to belong to methode; but it is not so. For, axiomaticall iudgement considereth [Page] the axioms alone, and seuerall by themselues; but Methode, the coherence of many distinct axiomes together. The rule [...] dooth simply and onely shew, what axiome is generall, and to bée taught generally; what speciall, and spe­cally to bée put downe, because such onely be reciprocall: but it telleth not which of these axiomes must in order haue first or second place, which onely is Methodicall.

[...], of [...] which signifieth, with; and [...], which is a way. For this is the right and compendious way, in wri­ting or speaking to bée obserued. The word therefore is me­taphorically applied to any orderly procéeding.

Methode then, as wée take it héere, is an ordering of dy­uers axiomes already inuen [...]ed: not a direction how to finde out ariomes. The inuenting of Artes came by obseruation of particulers; but the teaching and conformation of them now inuented, beginneth at the vniuersall. For, it both ge­ueth more light then the speciall, and may be knowne with­out the speciall: but not the speciall without it: as a tree, in respect of a pearetree.

Of a little sparke commeth a great flame. Yet the sparke is not therefore more cleare then the flame: so although the knowledge of generals commeth by obseruation of particu­lers; yet these particulers giue not more light then the ge­nerals.

Examples are alwayes lastly to bée put downe, for that they are most speciall; and cannot bée diuided into any other specials: as béeing nothing els but the singuler obseruation of this and that proper and peculier thing.

Methode is like to Homers golden chayne, whereby thinges are sweetly vnited and knit so together, that if one Lynk fall of, the whole chayne is broken and dissolued. And Plato calleth it Vinculum artis &c.

As farre as man excelleth a brute beast, by the iudgement syllogisticall; so farre doth one man surpasse an other by dis­position methodicall. As then the practise is harde, the praise most excellent, so the Elench in Methode, causing obscuritie, and tautologie, is most soule and detestable.

Homer is noted for his peruersion of Methode, insomuch [Page 115] that Tully writing to Atticus, where hée purposed to aun­swere the last question first, said hée would talke of the last question first, [...].

As in the other parts of iudgement, so in this especially, vse, practise, and continuall exercise woorketh all in all, hée that hath a generall sight in Logike, hath but the shadowe. He that is acquainted with the particuler practise, is the onely true and perfit logician.

I will neuer call him a Musitian that neuer sang: a Car­penter that neuer builded house: a Souldier that neuer fought, notwithstanding the generall speculation of the first in Musicke, of the second in building, of the third in figh­ting: no more will I thinke him worthie of the title & name of a Logician, that neuer put his generall contemplation of logicall precepts in particuler practise. For, as it is not yen­ough to know what vertue is, vnlesse you liue vertuously, and expresse your learning by your liuing, so it is but a fruit­lesse ostentation to bragge of a generall conceipt, without continuance in speciall and particuler exercise.

What precepts soeuer the common Rhetoricians put downe for ordering of Exordiums and framing and disposing of the whole course of their spéeche fitly and according to cause, auditors, time, place, and such like circumstances; all those I say, are altogether Logicall, not in any respect per­teining to Rhetoricke, but as a Rhetor may bée directed by Logicall precepts of iudgement and disposition.

[Coherent axiomes:] For otherwise a man may say heere, as Horace did of a Poeme patched lyke a beggers cloake, wherein no one peece is like another.

[Most generall:] Le chose generall serra tousiours mise en demande ou pleynt deuant le chose speciall, et l'entier de­uant ses partes, Come terre est genre a prée, pasture, bois, &c. et serra mise in pleint ou demaunde deuant eux.

Issint bois est vn genre de terre ou tours maners de ar­bres crescent, et pu [...]ed serra mise en demaunde deuant al­netum & salicetum, que ne sont que especes de bois. The­loall. lib. 8. cap. 20. Fol. 129.

Notiora sunt, saith Wasserleider, non quae facilius percipi­untur, sed quae percepta & intellecta plurimum notitiae & cognitionis afferunt, vt vniuersalia, quae pluribus insunt & conueniunt. Sic, obscu [...]iora, non quae difficilius percipiuntur, sed quae percepta & intellecta singula parum lucis & scientiae prebent, vt singularia, & specialissima, quae etiam sensibus percipiuntur. Héerevpon is the distinction of notiora naturae, and notiora nobis. But this is confuted of others.

[Syllogismus:] Nam est quaedam methodus in syllogismis. Methodus inueniendae artis dicta est in genere & specie. Hîc agitur de methodo disponendi.

[Definition first:] for it giueth light to all that foloweth.

[Partition first:] for it is made of causes, whereas diui­sion is of effects.

[Transitions:] Transitio inter figuras Rhetoricas à Cice­rone numeratur, cum sit planè logica. Transitio reficit audito­rem, certo singularum partiū fine, non aliter quàm facientibus iter multum detrahunt fatigationis notata inscriptis lapidibus spatia: Nam & exhausti laboris nosse mensuram, voluptati est: & hortatio ad reliqua fortius exequenda, scire quantum supersit: nihil enim longum videri necesse est, in quo, quid vltimum sit, certum est. Transitio imperfecta est conuenien­tior, quando longa partis disputatio non fuerit, vt memoriae renouatione minime sit opus.

Crypsis methodi est in Elleipsi vel redundantia. Elleipsis est, non omnium amissio, sed quarundam in methodo. Redun­dantia est Heterogenia vel Tautologia. In perfecta methodo docendus est auditor, in crypsei fallendus & mouendus. Sic [Page 116] enim mutato auditoris stomacho, salubria fiunt venenata, & contra.

As an Enthymeme is a defect of a ful syllogisme, so Elleip­sis is in methode; as a prosyllogisme is superfluous there, so digressions héere: as the inuersion of the premisses is in the one, so the intangled circumduction is in the other. Wherof, besides Homers Iliades, and Virgils Aeneis, the Ethiopicall history is a swéet example.

Argumentum semper disponitur, nunquam disponit: Me­thodus semper disponit, nunquā disponitur, vt summū genus & infima species: sed enunciatū & syllogismus sunt vt subal­terna. Nam enunciatum disponit argumenta, disponitur in syl­logismo, syllogismus disponit enūciata, disponitur à methodo.

Vbi materia nulla est, ibi forma nulla esse potest, vt si pars Rhetorices imperfecta in pronunciatione docenda sit, metho­dus perfecta non est desideranda.

Socrates compareth the oration which Lysias made of loue, to the foure verses which were written on Mydas tombe, wherein the matter did so wisely hang together, that the first might bée last, and last first without any daunger.

And like to Lysias spéech, or Mydas epitaph, be all our bal­ductum and vncoherent pamphlets, all our yeare-bookes and abridgements.

Imagine, sayth Ramus, that all definitions, diuisions, and rules of any art, as of Logike, were already inuented and allowed for true, and euery rule were written in a seuerall schrole, euery schrole béeing put into an earthen pitcher, as they vse in lottaries, and there shuffled together: what part of Logike now must order these confused rules and scattered schroles. Not Inuention, for they bée found out already: not axiomaticall Iudgement, for they bée iudged and allowed as true, euery Axiome seuerally: nor Syl­logisticall; for nowe euery question is aunswered, all [Page] controuersies concerning these rules, bée discussed: onely me­thode remaineth, by the direction wherof, I will séeke in this pot for the definition of Logike, and will set it in the first place: then for the diuision thereof into Inuention and Dis­position, placing it in the second roome. This doone, I will take the definition of Inuention and put it in the third de­grée; and consequently the definition and diuision of argu­ments, vntill all the first part of Logike bée thus put downe, by defining, diuiding, exemplifiyng, and binding together the seuerall tractates by conuenient transitious. Then will I in like manner procéede to Disposition.

Methode and order is the chiefest helpe of memory: ther­fore sith all methode is altogether Logicall: instructions for memory, if they belong to any art, must néedes bée Logicall. Therefore, Sit puer, sayth Ramus, qui querimoniam Penelo­pes apud Ouidium epistola prima de Vlyssis absentia post euer­sam Troiam memoriae commendare velit.

Hunc totum locum cum viderit puer primo connexo syllogis­mo comprehensum, partes singulas notabit, earum (que) praeci­puas exornationes. Propositionem igitur aspiciet initio in quatuor primis versibus positam.

Deinde sequitur assumptionis sententia: At tu abes: & am­plificatio ex adiunctis ruinis euersae Troiae: vbi sex sunt versus.

D [...]hinc repetitur assumptio, & augetur a maiori: non modò abes, sed ita abes, vt scire nequeam vbi lateas. Quod exaggeratur factis Penelopes, interrogo, scribo, mitto in omnes orbis partes, nec quicquam de te audio. Decem sunt hic versus.

[Page] Conclusionis sententia tandem vicesimo primo secundo (que) versibus per contrarium significatur.

Sed & ipsi conclusioni amplificatio accedit ex adiunctis: sex sunt versus:

Quamobrem cum hac interpretationis diligentia puer totam sententiam distinxerit, vel a diligenti pr [...]ptore distinctam acceperit, & ex octo & viginti versibus, quatuor propositioni, sexdecim assumptioni, & octo conclusioni tribuerit, hac syllo­gismi descriptione non solùm partes, sed partium quoque sen­tentiam sibi repraesentabit. Nam cum scie [...]t hic primo loco propositionem, secundo assumptionem, tertio conclusionem esse, sciet itidem ex cognitis syllogismi legibus quae vis cuius­que partis esse debeat: quinetiam hac ratione facilimè [...] animo concipiet, per quas, imagines rerum absentium ita subijciet animo, vt cernere oculis ac presentes habere vi­deatur. Vt in hoc exemplo concurrent antiquae vrbis ruinae, agricolae, ossa, nautae, mulier sollicitè inter [...]ogans, tabellarij, bella, naufragia, caedes. In longioris autem orationis & dispu­tationis ambitu, praesertim si methodus seruata sit, memoriae praesidium praecipuum erit. Exemplum nostra dialectica cōmo­dissimum erit, vt dialectica suijpsius inprimis memoriam con­firmet, que alijs opem confirmande memorie pollicetur. Figu­retur igitur hîc primis rerum notis, artis dialecticae summa & vniuersa partitio, quae quod dicimus, oculis etiam spectandum proponat.

[Page] [Page 118] Ita (que) propositis hoc modo distributis (que) rebus, vt verborum quo (que) contextus facilius ediscatur (qui ab arte auxilij nihil admodum capit, nisi forte quod res ordine distributae sua vo­cabula secum rapient▪

Verba (que) prouisam rem non inuita sequentur) accedat, si placet, meditatio, vt per partes paulatim memotia ducatur: quinetiam modica voce in meditando animus excitetur, vt du­plici motu dicendi & audiendi memoria iuuetur: tum siqua ratio memoriam possit adiuuare, illa dispositionis admonitio iuuabit: licebit (que) philosophis & oratoribus, qui locis & ima­ginibus artem quandam memoriae confinxerunt, per nos qui­dem valere: nihil enim pollicentur, quod non vberius multò facilius (que) teneamus. Aiunt enim ordinem prodesse memoriae, sed externis & commentitijs eam fignis & simulachris instru­unt, nos ordinis rebus insiti doctrinam certissimam & veros locos pro rerum gradibus & generibus distinctos, rerum (que) ve­rissimas imagines adhibemus: illi verborū memoriam infini­tate formarum conturbant, dum propter singula verba ad sin­gulas species est respiciendū: Nos hanc partem rerum compo­sitione & collocatione, quantum natura sert, adiuuamus. Qua­propter quicquid est, quod ad confirmandam memoriam do­ctrina possit efficere, id totum dialectice dispositionis doctri­na praes [...]abit.

Hitherto Ramus concerning the helpe of memory by Lo­gicall disposition: to the which counsayle of him, if we adde some comfortable simples, & haue a careful héed y^• we distem­per not our selues either with vnorderly dyet, or vnhonest exercise, I am perswaded it will be more auaileable, then all the volumes of the art of memory.

Examples of the perfect methode, appeare in the artificial putting downe of Arts (as in this type of Ramus his Logike already drawn) & also in some other philosophicall discourses.

For our Kalender, although shepheardes bee not woont to binde themselues to any ouer strict methode in speaking, yet that song of Colyn Clowt rehearsed by Hobbynoll in May, may make vs beleeue, that euen shepheardes, by the light of nature, did, asmuch as in them lay, expresse this methode in their speeches. For there he, after a poetical in­uocation, [Page] and generall proposition of that which he hath in hand, I meane the prayses of Elysa, commeth nearer y^• mat­ter, and first putteth downe the causes, then adiunctes, and other arguments, incident to Elysa.

In stead af a definition we may vse this generall pro­pounding of the matter: then deuide it into some fewe heades: and orderly discourse of euery head, vsing the pla­ces of inuention, the helpe of iudgement &c.

Sir William Stamfo [...]d in his crowne plees doth first de­ [...]ne and propound, thus:

Plées del corone sont les ples queux conteignōt l'offences faits encounter la corone et dignitie le roy, perque pur le mieulx entendement de eux, est requisite a veier queux sont les dits offences: et puis de la maniere coment ils serront pledus, et darreinement de la manier coment ils serront tries et iuges. And so goeth on forward, defining, diuiding, and making playne by examples all the speciall sortes of of­fences against the crowne.

Bracton foloweth the order of the ciuill law altogether, insomuch that he that hath seene the one, may easily iudge of the other.

Perkins in euery of his seuerall tractates doth, as Stam­ford, propounde, diuide, and adde examples.

Lyttleton in like maner, by definitions, diuisions, and induction of speciall cases insteede of so many examples, made vp his booke.

Maister Theloall tooke occasion (as in his preface to the Lord Chancellor he confesseth) by Stamfords good motion, to make a more methodicall discourse of writtes, then was ex­tant heeretofore. I will vse his owne wordes to shew hys owne order.

Pour ceo que mon entent est de entraiter de briefe, et des choses concernantes briefe, il moy semble conuenyent de commencer per la definition de briefe, et de monster quelle chose il est.

And afterwards, I'ay enterprinse de framer vn definition, on plust ost discription de briefe solon (que) le forme et doctrine [...]'eux, que le art de ceo professont, per les, genres, differences, [Page 119] proprieties, en tiel manner, &c. The definition I haue put downe in the first booke.

Then hauing defined it, he saith, me voyes a diuider mon briefe.

After the diuision hée vseth a transition, wherin he briefly telleth, what hee hath doone, and orderly declareth what re­mayneth to bée doone moreouer.

Which kinde of Transitions, wanting in Lyttleton, make the coherence of his discourses somewhat obscure, as in that tractate of estates sur condition, where hée first diui­deth conditionall estates, thus:

Estates que homes out en terres ou tenements sur condi­tion sont de deux maners, s▪ ou ils out estate sur condition en fait, ou sur condition en ley. And after the laying downe of so many seuerall cases of the first part, as could be conteyned within the compasse of sixteene leaues: hée immediatly, if not abruptly, proceedeth to the explication of the second, without any transition at all: Neither telling what was done, nor what was to be done. So also in the discourse of releases, he first deuideth releases thus. Releases sont in diuers maners, s. releases de tout le droyt que home ad en terres ou tenements; et releases d'actions personels et re­als et auters choses. And then hauing bestowed ten leaues wholly vpon the first member of his distribution, hée sets vp­on y^e second part sodenly without any warning giuen at all.

Digressions be sometimes tolerable vpon necessary occa­sion: but impertinent, or rather repugnant imaginations continually cast in, marre all. A man taketh vppon him to [...]ade vpon the statute of fines, and hée thrummeth in 50. s [...]attered & vndigested cases of estate tayle in possessiō, and as many of the same in reuersion, with a cluster of other sophi­sticall and vncoherent poynts, much like a foolish paynter, who because he had some litle skill in paynting a peare tree, but no cunning at all in expressing anything els, would be sure to make a peare tree grow on euery mans wal. So this fellow hauing met with some adde learning [...] of estate tayle, will needes haue vtterance for it. An [...]ther maketh euery case haue one idle poynt of a fine, for fashion sake, whereas [Page] hée foysteth in 6. 8. 10. 12. or more extrauagant conceipts, as­well agreeing with the nature of a fine, as a Harpe doth with a Harrow; yet, who but hee? Non equidem inuideo: miror magis, at the frenzie of the reader, and folly of the hearer. For if the readers intent be to explayne the statute, then quorsum haec tam putida tendunt? but if hée meane to make ostentation of all his imaginations, me thinks he should not make a well meaning statute the cloake of two hundred am­biguities. I graunt the matter may bee well worth the hea­ring, but Nunc non erat his locus: Therefore as Horace sayth.

To conclude I could heartily wish the whole body of our law to be rather logically ordered, then by Alphabeticall bre­uiaries torne and dismembred. If any man say, it cannot be, he should adde, by himself: if hée thinke it should not bée, then I doe not somuch enuy his great wisedome, as pitie his rusticall education, who had rather eate Acornes with hogs, then bread with men; and preferreth the loathsome toffing of an A. B. C. abridgement, before the lightsome perusing of a Methodicall coherence of the whole common law.

Yet I am not hée, that will once open my mouth, gene­rally to condemne the contracting and abridging of dispersed & tedious cases: But as, Lyttleton, Parkins, Stamford, The­loall, Bracton and Britton haue excelled the abridgers in light and order, so the paynefull abridgements of Statham and those reuerend Iudges Fitzherbert, and Brooke, are more conuenient for many purposes, then those vast heapes of scattered discourses, throwne into euery corner of our yeare bookes: Which, notwithstanding, are diligently to be r [...] teyned: but the matter may bée, for the benefite of studentes, more orderly contriued.

It is not my purpose, at this time to dispute, whether the law of England, being one onely proper, and singuler law, appropriate to our nation, consisting of so many particulari­ties, being subiect to such continuall change and alteration, can bée made an art: But that the confusion of writers may [...]e remooued, the maner reformed, the matter better ordered, [Page 120] I doo surely beléeue, because I know assuredly.

Thus haue I at last, made an end of a confused meditatiō, patched vp, I feare mee, rather in great hast, then with good spéed. Wherein I thinke the art of Logike to bée as I haue put downe: but the precepts of the same must bée continu­ally practised, as I haue elsewhere sayde, or els the generall contemplation thereof will prooue a fruitles conceipt & na­ked speculation. Let vs folow therefore the counsell of Apel­les; Nulla dies sine linea. Let no day passe without some practise, either in making, framing, and inuenting of our selues, or in resoluing & dissoluing of things doone by others, for the triall of their skil, and confirmation of our owne. Nei­ther would I haue this practise continued onely in reading or writing, but in euery ciuill assembly or méeting: where­in yet I will not bée so seuere a censor, as to exact euery speech to the formall rules of axiomes, syllogismes, &c. It shall bée sufficient for vs to folow a more easie and elegant kinde of disputation, ioyning Rhetorike with Logike, and referring that precise straitnesse vnto Philosophicall exer­cises.

Neyther let any man thinke, that because in common méetings and assemblies the woordes and tearmes of Lo­gike bée not named, therefore the force and operation of Lo­gike is not there vsed and apparant. For, as in Grammer wée name neyther Noune, Pronoune, Uerbe, nor any other parte of spéech: and as in Rhetorike, wée make mention neyther of Metonymia, Synecdoche, Exclama­tio, nor any other Rhetoricall figure or trope: yet vse in our spéech the helpe of the one in speaking grammatically, and the direction of the other in talking eloquently: so, al­though in common conference wée neuer name syllogismes, axiomes, propositions, assumptions, & other woords of art, yet doo wee secretly practise them in our disputations, the vertue whereof is, to make our discourses séeme true to the simple, and probable to the wise.

I haue, for examples sake, put downe a Logicall Ana­lysis of the second Aegloge in Virgill, of the Earle of [Page] Northumberlands case in Maister Plowdens reportes, and of sir William Stamfords crowne plées. For the Aeglogue although the verses of Vugill be better knowne in Latine, then I can make them vnderstoode in English, (especially obseruing the same order of verse) yet I haue attempted the interpreting of the same by a poeticall Paraphiasis, for the contentation of such as vnderstand no Latine: & with­all inserted the Latyne verses, for their pleasure, that dis­dayne the English.