Unpublished
Those who, either by Writing or Discourse, have undertaken to defend the Proceedings of the Late Ministry, in the Management of the War, and of the Treaty at Gertruydenburg, have spent time in celebrating the Conduct and Valour of our Leaders and their Troops, in summing up the Victories they have gained, and the Towns they have taken. Then they us tell what high Articles were insisted on by our Ministers and those of the Confederates, and what Pains both were at in persuading France to accept them But nothing of this can give the least Satisfaction to the just Complaints of the Kingdom. As to the War, our Grievan-
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These are some of the Points I design to treat of in the following Discourse; with several others which I thought it necessary, at this time, for the Kingdom to be informed of. I think I am not mistaken in those Facts I mention; at least not in any Circumstance so material, as to weaken the Consequences I draw from them.
After Ten Years War with perpetual Success, to tell us it is yet impossible to have a good Peace, is very surprising, and seems so different from what hath ever happened in the World before, that a Man of any Party may be allowed suspecting, we have either been ill used, or have not made the most of our Victories, and might therefore desire to know where the Difficulty lay: Then it is natural to enquire into our present Condition; how long we shall be able to go on at this Rate; what the Consequences may be upon the present and future Ages; and whether a Peace, without that impracticable Point which some People do so much insist on, be really ruinous in it self, or equally so with the Continuance of the War.
And, as a War should be undertaken upon a just and prudent Motive, so it is still more obvious, that a Prince ought maturely to consider the Condition he is in when he enters on it; Whether his Coffers be full, his Revenues clear of Debts, his
Supposing the War to have commenced upon a just Motive; the next thing to be consider'd is. When a Prince ought, in Prudence, to receive the Overtures of a Peace: Which I take to be, either when the Enemy is ready to yield the Point originally contended for, or when that Point is found impossible to be ever obtained; or when contending any longer, though with Probability of gaining that Point at last, would put such a Prince and his People in a worse Condition than the present Loss of it. All which Considerations are of much greater Force, where a War is managed by an Alliance of many Confederates, which in the variety of Interests, among the several Parties, is liable to so many unforeseen Accidents.
In a Confederate War it ought to be considered, which Party has the deepest share in the Quarrel: For though each may have their particular Reasons, yet one or two among them will probably be more concerned than the rest, and therefore ought to bear the greatest part of the Burthen, in proportion to their Strength. For Example: Two Princes may be Competitors for a Kingdom, and it will be your Interest to take the part of him who will probably allow you good Conditions of Trade, rather than of the other, who possibly may not. However, that Prince whose Cause you espouse, though never so vigorously, is the Principal in that War, and You, properly speaking, are but a Second. Or a Commonwealth may lie in danger to be over-run by a powerful Neighbour, which, in time, may produce very bad Consequences upon your Trade and Liberty: 'Tis therefore necessary, as well as prudent, to lend them Assistance, and help them to win a strong secure Frontier; but, as They must in course be the first and greatest Sufferers, so in Justice, they ought to bear the greatest Weight. If a House be on Fire, it behoves all in the Neighbourhood to run with Buckers to quench it; but the Owner is sure to be undone first; and it is not impossible that those at next Door may escape, by a Shower from Heaven, or the stilness of the Weather, or some other favourable Accident.
But, if an Ally, who is not so immediately concerned in the good or ill Fortune of the War, be so generous, as to contribute more than the Principal Party, and even more in propor-
From these Reflections upon War in general, I descend to consider those Wars, wherein England hath been engaged since the Conquest. In the Civil-Wars of the Barons, as well as those between the Houses of York and Lancaster, great Destruction was made of the Nobility and Gentry, new Families raised, and old ones extinguished, but the Money spent on both sides was employed and circulated at Home; no Publick Debts contracted; and a very few Years of Peace quickly set all right again.
The like may be affirmed even of that unnatural Rebellion against King Charles I. the Usurpers maintained great Armies in constant Pay, had almost continual War with Spain or Holland, but managing it by their Fleets, they encreased very much the Riches of the Kingdom, instead of exhausting them.
Our Foreign Wars were generally against Scotland or France; the first being upon our own Continent, carried no Money out of the Kingdom, and were seldom of long continuance. During our first Wars with France, we possessed great Dominions in that Country, where we preserved some Footing till the Reign of Queen Mary; and though some of our latter Princes made very chargeable Expeditions thither, a Subsidy, and two or three Fifteenths, cleared all the Debt. Beside, our Victories were then of some Use as well as Glory; for we were so prudent to Fight, and so happy to Conquer, only for our selves.
The Dutch Wars, in the Reign of King Charles II. though begun and carried on under a very corrupt Administration, and much to the Dishonour of the Crown, did indeed keep the King needy and poor, by discontinuing or discontenting his Parliament, when he most needed their Assistance; but neither left any Debt upon the Nation, nor carried any Mony out of it.
At the Revolution, a general War broke out in Europe, wherein many Princes joined in an Alliance against France, to check the ambitious Designs of that Monarch; and here the Emperor, the Dutch, and England, were Principals. About this time the Custom first began among us of borrowing Millions upon Funds of Interest: It was pretended, that the War could not possibly last above one or two Campaign: and that the Debts contra-
The Ground of the first War, for ten Years after the Revolution, as to the Part we had in it, was, to make France acknowledge the late King, and to recover Hudson's-Bay. But during that whole War, the Sea was almost entirely neglected, and the greatest part of Six Millions Annually employed to Enlarge the Frontier of the Dutch. For the King was a General, but not an Admiral; and although King of England, was a Native of Holland.
After ten Years Fighting to little purpose; after the Loss of above an hundred thousand Men, and a Debt remaining of twenty Millions, we at length hearkned to the Terms of a Peace, which was concluded with great Advantages to the Empire and Holland, but none at all to us; and clogged soon after by the famous Treaty of Partition; by which, Naples, Sicily, and Lorrain, were to be added to the French Dominions; or if that Crown should think fit to set aside the Treaty, upon the Spaniards refusing to accept it, as they declared they would, to the several Parties at the very time of Transacting it; then the French would have Pretensions to the whole Monarchy. And so it proved in the Event; for, the late King of Spain reckoning it an Indignity to have his Territories cantoned out into Parcels, by other Princes, during his own Life, and without his Consent, rather chose to bequeath the Monarchy entire to a younger Son of France: And this Prince was acknowledged for King of Spain, both by Us and Holland.
It must be granted, that the Counsels of entring into the present War were violently opposed by the Church-Party, who first
The Declarations of War against France and Spain, made by Us and Holland, are dated within a few Days of each other. In that published by the States, they say very truly, That they are nearest, and most exposed to the Fire; that they are blocked up on all sides, and actually attacked by the Kings of France and Spain; that their Declaration is the Effect of an urgent and pressing Necessity; with other Expressions to the same purpose. They desire the Assistance of all Kings and Princes, &c. The grounds of their Quarrel with France, are such as only affect themselves, or at least more immediately than any other Prince or State; such as, the French refusing to grant the Tariff promised by the Treaty of Ryswick; the loading the Dutch Inhabitants settled in France, with excessive Duties, contrary to the said Treaty; the Violation of the Partition-Treaty, by the French accepting the King of Spain's Will, and threatning the States, if they would not comply; the seizing the Spanish Neitherlands by the French Troops, and turning out the Dutch, who by Permission of the late King of Spain were in Garrison there; by which means that Republick was deprived of her Barrier, contrary to the Treaty of Partition, where it was particularly stipulated, that the Spanish Netherlands should be left to the Archduke. They alledged, that the French King governed Flanders as his own, though under the Name of his Grandson, and sent great Numbers of Troops thither to fright them: That be had seized the City and Citadel of Liege, had possessed himself of several Places in the Archbishopsick of Cologn, and maintained Troops in the Country of Wolsenbuttel, in order to block up the Dutch on all sides; and caused his Resident to give in a Memorial, wherein he threatned the States to act against them, if they refused complying with the Contents of that Memorial.
The Queen's Declaration of War is grounded upon the Grand Alliance, as This was upon the unjust Usurpations and Encroachments of the French King; whereof the Instances produced are, His keeping in Possession a great Part of the Spanish Dominions, seizing Milan and the Spanish Low Countries, making himself Master of Cadiz, &c. And instead of giving Satisfaction.
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I think it plainly appears by both Declarations, that England ought no more to have been a Principal in this War, than Prussia, or any other Power, who came afterwards into that Alliance, Holland was first in Danger, the French Troops being at that time just at the Gates of Nimeguen. But the Complaints made in our Declaration, do all, except the last, as much or more concern almost every Prince in Europe.
For, among the several Parties who came first or last into this Confederacy, there were sew but who, in proportion, had more to get or to lose, to hope or to fear, from the good or ill Success of this War, than We. The Dutch took up Arms to defend themselves from immediate Ruin; and by a successful War, they proposed to have a larger Extent of Country, and a better Frontier against France. The Emperor hoped to recover the Monarchy of Spain, or some part of it, for his younger Son, chiefly at the Expence of Us and Holland. The King of Portugal had received Intelligence, that Philip designed to renew the old Pretensions of Spain upon that Kingdom, which is surrounded by the other on all sides, except towards the Sea, and could therefore only be defended by Maritime Powers. This, with the advantageous Terms offered by King Charles, as well as by Us, prevailed with that Prince to enter into the Alliance. The Duke of Savoy's Temptations and Fears were yet greater: The main Charge of the War on that side, was to be supplied by England, and the Profit to redound to him. In case Milan should be Conquered, it was stipulated that his Royal Highness should have the Dutchy of Moneseriat, belonging to the Duke of Mantua, the Provinces of Alexandria, and Valentia, and Lomellini, with other Lands between the Po and the Tanaro, together with the Vigevenasco, or in lieu of it, an Equivalent out of the Province of Novard, adjoining to his own State; beside whatever else could be taken from France on that side by the Confederate Forces. Then, he was in terrible Apprehensions of being surrounded by France, who had so many Troops in the Milanese, and might have easily swallowed up his whole Dutchy.
The rest of the Allies came in purely for Subsidies, whereof they sunk considerable Sums into their own Coffers, and refused to send their Contingent to the Emperor, alledging their Troops were already hired by England and Holland.
Some time after the Duke of Anjou's succeeding to the Manary they of Spain, in breach of the Partition-Treaty, the Question
On the other side, those whose Opinion, or some private Motives, inclined them to give their Advice for entring into a new War, alledged how dangerous it would be for England, that Philip should be King of Spain; that we could have no Security for our Trade, while that Kingdom was subject to a Prince of the Bourbon Family; not any hopes of preserving the Balance of Europe, because the Grandfather would, in effect, be King, while his Grandson had but the Title, and thereby have a better Opportunity than ever of pursuing his Design for Universal Monarchy. These and the like Arguments prevailed; and so, with- B2
The part we have acted in the Conduct of this whole War, with reference to our Allies abroad, and to a prevailing Faction at home, is what I shall now particular examin; where I presume it will appear, by plain Matters of Fact, that no Nation was ever so long or so scandalously abused by the Folly, the Temerity, the Corruption, the Ambition of its domestick Enemies; or treated with so much Insolence, Injustice and Ingratitude by its foreign Friends.
This will be manifest by proving the Three following Points.
First, That against all manner of Prudence or common Reason, we engaged in this War as Principals, when we ought to have acted only as Auxiliaries.
Secondly, That we spent all our Vigour in pursuing that Part of the War which could least answer the End we proposed by beginning of it; and made no Efforts at all where we could have most weakned the Common Enemy, and at the same time enriched our Selves.
Lastly, That we suffered each of our Allies to break every Article in those Treaties and Agreements by which they were bound, and to lay the Burthen upon us.
Upon the first of these Points, That we ought to have entered into this War only as Auxiliaries. Let any Man reflect upon our Condition at that time: Just come out of the most tedious, expensive and unsuccessful War that ever England had been engaged in; sinleing under heavy Debrs, of a Nature and Degree never heard of by Us or Our Ancestors; the Bulk of the Gentry and People heartily tired of the War, and glad of a Peace, tho' it brought no other Advantage but it self: No sudden Prospect of lessening our Taxes, which were grown as necessary to pay our Debts, as to raise Armies: A fort of artificial Wealth of Funds and Stocks in the Hands of those who for ten Years before had been plundering the Publick; Many Corruptions in every Branch of our Government, that needed Reformation. Under these Difficulties, from which twenty Years Peace, and the wisest Management, could hardly recover us, we declare War against France, fortified by the Accession and Alliance of those Powers I mentioned before, and which, in the former War, had
This true indeed, the Danger of the Dutch, by so ill a Neighbourhood in Flanders, might affect us very much in the Cons quences of it; and the Loss of Spain to the House of Austria, if it should be governed by French Influence, and French Politicks, might, in time, be very pernicious to our Trade. It would therefore have been prudent, as well as generous and charitable, to help our Neighbour; and so we might have done without injuring our selves: For by an old Treaty with Holland, we were bound to assist that Republick with Ten thousand Men, whenever they were attacked by the French; whose Troops, upon the King of Spain's Death, taking Possession of Flanders, in right of Philip, and securing the Dutch Garrisons till they would acknowledge Him, the States General, by Memorials from their Envoy here, demanded only the Ten thousand Men, we were obliged to give by virtue of that Treaty-And I make no doubt but Holland would have exerted themselves so vigorously, as to be able, with that Assistance alone, to defend their Frontiers: Or, if they had been forced to a Peace, the Spaniards, who abhor disinembring their Monarchy, would never have suffered the French to possess themselves of Flanders. At that time they had none of those Endearments to each other which this War hath created; and whatever Hatred and Jealousie were natural between the two Nations, would then have appeared. So that there was no fort of necessity for Us to proceed further, although We had been in a better Condition.
Thus We became Principal in a War, in Conjunction with two Allies, whose share in the Quarrel was, beyond all Proportion, greater than ours. However, I can see no Reason from the Words of the Grand Alliance, by which we were obliged to make those prodigious Expences we have since been at. By what I have always heard and read, I take the whole Strength of the Nation, as understood in that Treaty, to be the utmost that a Prince can raise Annually from his Subjects; if he be forced to Mortgage and Borrow, whether at Home or Abroad, it is not, properly speaking, his own Strength, or that of the Nation, but the entire Substance of particular Persons, which not being able to raise out of the annual Income of his Kingdom, he takes upon Security, and can only pay the Interest; and by this Method one Part of the Nation is pawned to the other, with hardly a Possibility left of being ever redeemed.
Surely it would have been enough for us to have suspended the Payment of our Debrs contracted in the former War, to have continued our Land and Malt Tax, with those others which have since been Mortgaged: These, with some Additions, would have made up such a Sum, as, with prudent Management, might, I suppose, have maintained an Hundred thousand Men by Sea and Land; a reasonable Quota in all conscience for that Ally, who apprehended least Danger, and expected least Advantage. Not can we imagine that either of the Confederates, when the War begun, would have been so unreasonable, as to refuse joining with us upon such a Foot, and expect that we should every Year go between three and four Millions in Debt (which hath been our Case) because the French could hardly have contrived any Offers of a Peace so ruinous to us as such a War. Posterity will be at a loss to conceive what kind of Spirit could possess their Ancestors, who after ten Years Suffering, by the unexampled Politicks of a Nation, maintaining a War by annually Pawning it self; and during a short Peace, while they were looking back with Horror on the heavy Load of Debts they had contracted; universally condemning those pernicious Counsels which had occasioned them; racking their-Invention for some Remedies or Expedients or mend their shattered Condition: That these very People, without giving them-
And as we have wasted our Strength and vital Substance in this profuse manner, so we have shamefully misapplied it to Ends at least very different from those for which we undertook the War, and often to effect others which after a Peace we may severely repent. This is the second Article I proposed to examine.
WE have now for Ten Years together turned the whole Force and Expence of the War, where the Enemy was best able to hold us at a Bay; where we could propose no manner of Advantage to our selves; where it was highly impolitick to enlarge our Conquests; uterly neglecting that Part which would have saved and gained us many Millions, which the perpetual Maxims of our Government teach us to pursue; which would have soonest weakned the Enemy, and must either have promoted a speedy Peace, or enabled us to go on with the War.
Those who are fond of continuing the War, cry up our constant Success at a most prodigious rate, and reckon it infinitely greater than in all human Probability we had reason to hope. Ten glorious Campaigns are passed, and now at last, like the sick Man, we are just expiring with all forts of good Symptoms. Did the Advisers of this War suppose it would continue Ten Years, without expecting the Successes we have had; and yet at the same time determine, that France must be reduced, and Spain subdued, by employing our whole Strength upon Flanders? Did they believe the last War left us in a Condition to furnish such vast Supplies for so long a Period, without involving Us and our Posterity in unextricable Debts? If after such Miraculous Doings, we are not yet in a Condition of bringing France to our Terms, nor can tell when we shall be so, though we should proceed without any Reverse of Fortune; What could we look for in the ordinary Course of Things, but a Flanders War of at least twenty Years longer? Do they in-
I say not this, by any means, to detract from the Army or its Leaders. Getting into the Enemies Lines, passing Rivers, and taking Towns, may be Actions attended with many glorious Circumstances: But when all this brings no real solid Advanrage to us, when it hath no other End than to enlarge the Territories of the Dutch, and encrease the Fame and Wealth of our Gmdash;l, I conclude, however it comes about, that Things are not as they should be; and that surely our Forces and Money might be better employed, both towards reducing our Enemy, and working some Benefit to our selves. But the Case is still much harder, we are destroying many thousand Lives, exhausting all our Substance, not for our own Interest, which would be but common Prudence; not for a Thing indifferent, which would be sufficient Folly, but perhaps to our own Destruction, which is perfect Madness. We may live to feel the Effects of our Valour more sensibly than all the Consequences we imagine from the Dominions of Spain in the Duke of Anjou. We have Conquered a noble Territory for the States, that will maintain sufficient Troops to Defend it self, feed many hundred thousand Inhabitants, where all Encouragement will be given to introduce and improve Manufactures, which was the only Advantage they wanted; and which, added to their Skill, Industry, and Parsimony, will enable them to undersell us in every Market of the World.
Our Supply of Forty thousand Men, according to the first Stipulation, added to the Quota's of the Emperor and Holland, which they were obliged to furunish, would have made an Army of near Two hundred thousand, exclusive of Garrisons; enough to withstand all the Power that France could bring against it; and we might have employed the rest much better, both for the common Cause and our Advantage.
The War in Spain must be imputed to the Credulity of our Ministers, who suffered themselves to be persuaded by the Imperial Court, that the Spaniards were so violently affected to the House of Austria, as upon the first Appearance there, with a sew Troops under the Archduke, the whole Kingdom would immediately revolt. This we tried, and sound the Emperor to have deceived either Us or Himself: Yet there we drove on the War at a prodigious Disadvantage, with great Expence; And by a most corrupt Management, the only General, who by a Course of Conduct and Fortune almost miraculous, had nearly
In common Prudence, we should either have pushed that War with the utmost Vigour, in so fortunate a Juncture, especially since the gaining that Kingdom was the great Point for which we pretended to continue the War, or at least when we had found or made that Design impracticable, we should not have gone on in so expensive a Management of it; but have kept our Troops on the Defensive in Caralonia, and pursued some other way more effectual for distressing the common Enemy, and advantaging Ourselves.
And what a noble Field of Honour and Profit had we before us, wherein to employ the best of our Strength, which against all the Maxims of British Policy, we suffered to lie wholly neglected? I have sometimes wondered how it came to pass, that the Style of Maritime Powers, by which our Allies, in a fort of contemptuous manner, usually couple us with the Dutch, did never put us in mind of the Sea; and while some Politicians were shewing us the way to Spain by Flanders, others by Savoy or Naples, that the West-Indies should never come into their Heads. With half the Charge we have been at, we might have maintained our original Quota of Forty thousand Men in Flanders, and at the same time by our Fleets and Naval Forces, have so distressed the Spaniards in the North and South Seas of America, as to prevent any Returns of Mony from thence, except in our own Bottoms. This is what best became us to do as a Maritime Power: This, with any common Degree of Success, would soon have compelled France to the Necessities of a Peace, and Spain to acknowledge the Archduke. But while We, for ten Years, have been squandring away our Mony upon the Continent, France hath been wisely engrossing all the Trade of Peru, going directly with their Ships to Lima, and other Ports, and there receiving Ingots of Gold and Silver for French Goods of little Value; which, beside the mighty Advantage to their Nation at present, may divert the Channel of that Trade for the future, so beneficial to us, who used to receive annually such vast Sums at Cadiz, for our Goods sent thence to the Spanish West-Indies. All this we tamely saw and suffered, without the least Attempt to hinder it; except what was performed by some private Men at Bristol, who, inflamed by a true Spirit of Courage and Industry, did, about three Years ago, with a sew Vessels, sitted out at their own Charge, make a most successful Voyage into those Parts, took one of the Aquapulco Ships, very C
And if it be true, as the Advocates for War would have it, that the French are now so impoverished; in what Condition must they have been, if that Issue of Wealth had been stopped?
But great Events often turn upon very small Circumstances. It was the Kingdom's Misfortune, that the Sea was not the D—of M—b's Element, otherwise the whole Force of the War would infallibly have been bestowed there, infinitely to the Advantage of his Country, which would then have gone hand in hand with his own. But it is very truly objected, That if we alone had made such an Attempt as this, Holland would have been jealous; or if we had done it in Conjunction with Holland, the House of Austria would have been discontented. This hath been the Style of late Years; which whoever introduced among us, they have taught our Allies to speak after them. Otherwise it could hardly enter into any Imagination, that while we are Confederates in a War, with those who are to have the whole Profit, and who leave a double thare of the But then upon Us, we dare not think of any Design, tho against the Common Enemy, where there is the least prospect of doing Good to our own Country, for fear of giving Umbrage and Offence to our Allies; while we are ruining our selves to Conquer Provinces and Kingdoms for Them. I therefore confess with Shame, that this Objection is true: For it is very well known, that while the Design of Mr. Hill's Expedition remained a Secret, it was suspected in Holland and Germany to be intended against Peru; whereupon the Dutch made every where their publick Complaints, and the Ministers at Vienna talked of it as as an Insolence in the Qu—n to attempt such an Undertaking; which, however it has sailed, partly by the Accidents of a Storm, and partly by the Stubbornness or Treachery of some in that Colony, for whose Relies, and at whose Entreaty it was in some measure designed, is no Objection at all to an Enterprize so well concerted, and with such fair Probability of Success.
It was something singular that the States should express their Uneasiness, when they thought we intended to make some Attempt in the Spanish West Indies; because it is agreed between us, that whatever is Conquered there, by Us or Them, shall belong to the Conqueror: Which is the only Article that I can call to mind, in all our Treaties or Stipulations, with any View of Interest to this Kingdom; and for that very Reason, I suppose, among others, hath been altogether neglected. Let those
This kind of Treatment from out two Principal Allies, hath taught the same Dialect to all the rest; so that there is hardly a petty Prince, whom we half maintain by Subsidies and Pensions, who is not ready, upon every Occasion, to threaten Us, that He will recal his Troops (though they must rob or starve at home) if we refuse to comply with Him in any Demand, however so unreasonable.
UPON the Third Head I shall produce some Instances, to shew how tamely we have suffered each of our Allies to infringe every Article in those Treaties and Stipulations by which they are bound, and to lay the Load upon Us.
But before I enter upon this, which is a large Subject, I shall take leave to offer a sew Remarks on certain Articles in three of our Treaties; which may let us perceive how much those Ministers valued or understood the true Interest, Safety, or Honour of their Country.
We have made two Alliances with Portugal, an Offensive and Defensive: The first is to remain in force only during the present War; the second to be perpetual. In the Offensive Alliance, the Emperor, England, and Holland are Parties with Portugal; in the Defensive only We and the States.
Upon the first Article of the Offensive Alliance it is to be observed, that although the Grand Alliance, as I have already said, allows England and Holland to possess for their own, whatever each of them shall Conquer in the Spanish Wist Indies; yet here we are quite cut out, by consenting, that the Archduke shall possess the Dominions of Spain in as full a manner as their late King Charles. And what is more remarkable, we broke this very Article in Favour of Portugal, by subsequent Stipulations; where we agree, that King Charles shall deliver up Estrarnadura, Vigo, and some other Places, to the Portuguese, as soon as we can Conquer them from the Enemy. They who were guilty of so much Folly and Contradiction, know best whether it proceeded from Corruption or Stupidity.
By two other Articles (besides the Honour of being Convoy's and Guards in ordinary to the Portuguese Ships and Coasts we are to guess the Enemies Thoughts, and to take the King of Portugass Word, whenever he has a Fancy that he shall be invaded; We also are to furnish him with a Strength superior to C2
In the Defensive Alliance with that Crown, which is to remain perpetual, and where only England and Holland are Parties with them, the same Care, in almost the same Words, is taken for our Fleet to attend their Coasts and Foreign Dominons, and to be under the same Obedience. We and the States are likewise to furnish them with Twelve thousand Men at our own Charge, which we are constantly to recruit, and these are to be subject to the Portuguse Generals.
In the Offensive Alliance we took no care of having the Assistance of Portugal, whenever we should be invaded. But in this it seems, we were wiser; for that King is obliged to make War on France or Spain, whenever We or Holland are invaded by either; but be sure this, we are to supply them with the same Forces, both by Sea and Land, as if he were invaded himself: And this must needs be a very prudent and safe Course for a Maritime Power to take upon a sudden Invasion; by which, instead of making use of our Fleets and Armies for our own Defence, we must send them abroad for the Defence of Portugal.
By the Thirteenth Article we are told, what this Assistance is which the Portugueze are to give us, and upon what Conditions. They are to furnish ten Men of War; and when England or Holland shall be invaded by France and Spain together, or by Spain alone; in either of these Cases, those ten Portuguese Men of War are to serve only upon their own Coasts; where, no doubt, they will be of mighty Use to their Allies, and Terror to the Enemy.
How the Dutch were drawn to have a Part in either of these two Alliances, is not very material to enquire, since they have been so wise as never to observe them, nor, I suppose, ever intended it, but resolved, as they have since done, to shift the Load upon us.
Let any Man read these two Treaties from the beginning to the end, he will imagine, that the King of Portugal and his Ministers fat down and made them by themselves, and then sent
The Barrier-Treaty between Great-Britain and Holland, was concluded at the Hague on the 19th of October, in the Year 1709. In this Treaty, neither Her Majesty, nor Her Kingdoms, have any Interest or Concern, farther than what is mentioned in the Second and the Twentieth Articles: By the former, the States are to assist the Q—n in Defending the Act of Succession; and by the other, not to Treat of a Peace till France acknowledges the Qu—n, and the Succession of Hanover, and promises to remove the Pretender out of his Dominions.
As to the first of these, It is certainly for the Safety and Interest of the States General, that the Protestant Succession should be preserved in England; because such a Popish Prince as we apprehend, would infallibly join with France in the Ruin of that Republick. And the Dutch are as much bound to support our Succession, as they are tied to any Part of a Treaty of League Offensive and Defensive, against a Common Enemy, without any separate Benefit upon that Consideration. Her Majesty is in the full peaceable Possession of Her Kingdoms, and of the Hearts of Her People; among whom, hardly one in five hundred are in the Pretender's Interest. And whether the Assistance of the Dutch, to preserve a Right so well established, be an Equivalent to those many unreasonable exorbitant Articles in the rest of the Treaty, let the World judge. What an Impression of our Settlement must it give Abroad, to see our Ministers offering such Conditions to the Dutch, to prevail on them to be Guarantees of our Acts of Parliament! Neither perhaps is it right, in point of Policy or good Sense, that a Foreign Power should be called in to confirm our Succession by way of Guarantee; but only to acknowlege it. Otherwise we put it out of the Power of our own Legislature to change our Succession, without the Consent of that Prince or State who is Guarantee; however our Posterity may hereafter, by the Tyranny and Oppression of any succeeding Princes, be reduced to the fatal Necessity of breaking in upon the excellent and happy Settlement now in force.
As to the other Article, it is a natural Consequence that must attend any Treaty of Peace we can make with France; being only the Acknowledgment of Her Majesty as Queen of Her own Dominions, and the Right of Success on by our own Laws, which no Foreign Power hath any Pretence to dispute.
However, in order to deserve these mighty Advantages from the States, the rest of the Treaty is wholly taken up in directing what we are to do for them.
By the Grand Alliance, which was the Foundation of the present War, the Spanish Low Countries were to be recovered and delivered to the King of Spain: But by this Treaty, that Prince is to possess nothing in Flanders during the War: And after a Peace, the States are to have the Military Command of about twenty Towns with their Dependances, and Four hundred thousand Crowns a Year from the King of Spain to maintain their Garrisons. By which means they will have the Command of all Flanders, from Newport on the Sea to Namur on the Maese, and be entirely Masters of the Pais de Waas, the richest part of those Provinces. Further, they have liberty to Garrison any Place they shall think fit in the Spanish Low-Countries, whenever there is an Appearance of War; and consequently to put Garrisons into Ostend, or where else they please, upon a Rupture with England.
By this Treaty likewise, the Dutch will, in effect, be entire Masters of all the Low-Countries, may impose Duties, Restrictions in Commerce, and Prohibitions at their Pleasure; and in that fertile Country may set up all forts of Manufactures, particularly the Woollen, by inviting the disobliged Manufacturers in Ireland, and the French Refugees, who are scattered all over Germany. And as this Manufacture encreases abroad, the Cloathing People of England will be necessitated, for want of Employment, to follow; and in sew Years, by help of the low Interest of Money in Holland, Flanders may recover that beneficial Trade which we got from them: The Landed-Men of England will then be forced to re-establish the Staples of Wooll abroad; and the Dutch, instead of being only the Carriers, will become the original Possessors of those Commodities, with which the greatest part of the Trade of the World is now carried on. And as they increase their Trade, it is obvious they will enlarge their Strength at Sea, and that ours must lessen in proportion.
All the Ports in Flanders are to be subject to the like Duties the Dutch shall lay upon the Scheld, which is to be closed on the side of the States: Thus all other Nations are, in effect, shut our from Trading with Flanders. Yet in the very same Article it is said, That the States shall be savoured in all the Spanish Dominions as much as Great Britain, or as the People most favoured. We have Conquered Flanders for them, and are in a worse Condition, as to our Trade there, than before the War began. We have been the great Support of the King of Spain, to whom the Dutch have hardly contributed any thing at all; and yet they are to be equally favorued with us in all his Dominions. Of all this the Queen is
It is to be observed, that this Treaty was only Sign'd by one of our Plenipotentiaries: And I have been told, that the other was heard to say, He would rather lose his Right-hand, than set it to such a Treaty. Had he spoke those Words in due season, and loud enough to be heard on this side of the Water, considering the Credit he had then at Court, he might have saved much of his Country's Honour, and got as much to himself: Therefore if the Report be true, I am inclined to think he only SAID it. I have been likewise told, that some very necessary Circumstances were wanting in the Entrance upon this Treaty; but the Ministers here rather chose to sacrifice the Honour of the Crown, and the Safety of their Country, than not ratifie what one of their Favourites had transacted.
Let me now consider in what manner our Allies have observed those Treaties they made with Us. and the several Stipulations and Agreements pursuant to them.
By the Grand Alliance between the Empire, England and Holland, we were to assist the other two, totis viribus, by Sea and Land. By a Convention subsequent to this Treaty, the Proportions which the several Parties should contribute. towards the War, were adjusted in the following manner. The Emperor was obliged to furnish Ninety thousand Men against France, either in Italy, or upon the Rhine: Holland to bring Sixty thousand into the Field in Flanders, exclusive of Garrisons; and we Forty thousand. In Winter, 1702, which was the next Year, the Duke of Marlborough proposed the raising of Ten thousand Men more by way of Augmentation, and to carry on the War with greater Vigour; to which the Parliament agreed, and the Dutch were to raise the same Number. This was upon a Par, directly contrary to the former Stipulation, whereby our Part was to be a Third less than theirs; and therefore it was granted, with a Condition, that Holland should break off all Trade and Commerce with France. But this Condition was never executed, the Dutch only amusing us with a specious Declaration till our Session of Parliament was ended; and the following Year it was taken off, by concert between our General and the States, with out any Reason assigned for the Satisfaction of the Kingdom. The next and some ensuing Campaigns, further and additional Forces were allowed by Parliament for the War in Flanders; and in every new Supply, the Dutch gradually lessened their Proportions; though the Parliament addressed the Queen that the States might be desired to observe them according to Agreement; which had no other Effect, than to teach them to elude it, by making their
Besides, the more Towns we Conquer for the States, the worse Condition we are in towards reducing the Common Enemy, and consequently of putting an end to the War. For they make no scruple of employing the Troops of their Quota, towards Garrisoning every Town as fast as it is taken, directly contrary to the Agreement between us, by which all Garrisons are particularly excluded. This is at length arriv'd, by several Steps, to such a height, that there are at present in the Field, not so many Forces under the Duke of M—'s Command in Flanders, as Britain alone maintains for that Service, not have been for some Years past. The Troops we maintain in Flanders (as appears by the Votes of the House of Commons for the Year 1709.) are Forty thousand, the original Quota; Ten thousand the first Augmentation; three thousand Palatines; four thousand six hundred thirty nine Saxons; Boshmar's Regiment of eight hundred Men; and a further Augmentation taken that Year into the Service, of about two thousand, making in the whole up wards of sixty thousand: And it is well known, that the Battles of Hochstes and Ramellies were fought with not above fifty thousand Men on a side.
The Duke of Marlborough having entred the Enemies Lines, and taking Bouchain, formed the Design of keeping so great a Number of Troops, and particularly of Cavalry, in Liste, Tournay, Doway, and the Country between, as should be able to harass all the Neighbouring Provinces of France, during the Winter, prevent the Enemy from erecting their Magazines, and by consequence, from subsisting their Forces next Spring, and render it impossible for them to assemble their Army another Year, without going back behind the Soame to do it. In order to effect this Project, it was necessary to be at an Expence extraordinary of Forage for the Troops, of building Stables, finding Fire and Candie for the Soldiers, with other incident Charges. The Q—n readily agreed to furnish Her Share of the first Article, that of the Forage, which only belonged to Her. But the States insisting that Her Majesty should likewise come into a Proportion of the other Articles, which belonged totally to them: She agreed even to that, rather than a Design of this Importance should fail. And yet we know it hath failed, and that the Dutch refused their Consent, till the time was past for putting it in Execution, even in the Opinion of those who proposed it. Perhaps a certain Article in the Treaties of Contributions, submitted to by such of
The Sea being the Element where we might most probably carry on the War with any Advantage to our selves, it was agreed that we should bear five Eighths of the Charge in that Service, and the Dutch the other three: And by the Grand Alliance, whatever we or Holland should Conquer in the Spanish West-Indies, was to accrue to the Conquerors. It might therefore have been hoped, that this Maritime Ally of ours, would have made up in their Fleet, what they sell short in their Army; but quite otherwise, they never once furnished their Quota either of Ships of Men; or if some sew of their Flect now and then appeared, it was no more than appearing, for they immediately separated to look to their Merchants and protect their Trade. And we may-remember very well when these Guarantees of our Succession, after having not one Ship for many Months together in the Mediterranean, sent that part of their Quota thither, and furnished nothing to us, at the same time that they allarmed us with the Rumour of an Invasion. And last Year, when Sir James Wishare was dispatched into Holland to expostulate with the States, and to desire they would make good their Agreements, in so important a part of the Service; he met with such a Reception as ill became a Republick to give, that lies under so many great Obligations to us; in short, such a one, as those only deserve, who are content to take.
It hath likewise been no small Inconvenience to us, that the Dutch are always slow in paying their Subsidies, by which means the weight and pressure of the Payment lies upon the Queen, as well as the blame, if Her Majesty be not very exact: nor will even this always content our Allies. For in July 1711, the King of Spain was paid all his Subsidies to the first of January next; nevertheless he hath since complained for want of Money; and his Secretary threatned, that if we would not further supply his Majesty, he could not answer for what might happen; altho K—g C—s had not at that time, one third of the Troops for which he was paid; and even those he had, were neither Paid nor Cloathed.
I shall add one Example more, to shew how this Prince has treated the Q—n, to whom he owes such infinite Obligations. Her Ma.—y borrowed Two hundred thousand Pounds from the Genoese, and sent it to Barcelona, for the Payment of the Spanish Army: This Mony was to be recoined into the current Species of Catalonia, which by the Allay is lower in Value 25l. per Cent, The Q—n ex- D
Teannot for bear mentioning here another Passage concerning Subsidies, to shew what Opinion Foreigners have of our Easiness, and how much they reckon themselves Masters of our Mony, whenever they think it to call for it. The Queen was by Agreement to pay Two hundred thousand Crowns a Year to the Prussian Troops, the Sadtes One hundred thousand, and the Emperor only Thirty thousand, for Recruiting, which his Imperial Majesty never paid. Prince Eugene happening to pass by Berlin, the Ministers of that Court applied themselves to him for Redress in this Particular; and his Highness very frankly promised them, that in Consideration of this Deficiency, B?lia in and the States should encrease their Subsidies to Seventy thoulded Crowns more between them, and that the Emperot should be punctual for the time to come: This was done by that Prince, without any Orders of Power whatsoever. The Dutch very reasonably refused consenting to it; but the Prussian Minister here, making his Application at our Court, prevailed on us to agree to out Proportion, before we could hear what Resolution would be taken in Holland. It is therefore to be hoped, that his Prussian Majesty, at the end of this War, will not have the same grievous Cause of Complaint, which he had at the Close of the last; that his Military Chest was enptier by Twenty thousand Crowns, than at the time that War began.
The Emperor, as we have already said, was by Stipulation to furnish Ninety thousand Men against the Common Enemy, as having no Fleets to maintain, and in Right of his Family, being most concerned in the Success of the War. However, this Agreement hath been so ill observed, that from the Beginning of the War to this Day, neither of the two last Emperors had ever Twenty thousand Men, on their own Account, in the Common Cause, excepting once in Italy; when the Imperial Court exerted it self in a Point they have much more at heart than that of gaining Spain or the Indies to their Family. When they had succeded in their Attempts on the side of Italy, and observed our blind Zeal for pushing on the War at all Adventures, they soon sound out the most effectual Expedient to excuse themselves. They computed easily, that it would cost them less to make large Presents to one single Person, than to pay an Army, and turn to as good Account. They thought they could not put their Affairs into better Hands; and therefore wisely left us to fight their Battles.
Besides, it appeared by several Instances, how little the Emperor, regained his Allies, or the Cause they were engaged in, when once
Another Instance of the Emperor's Indifference, or rather Dislike to the Common Cause of the Allies, is the Business of Toulon. This Design was indeed discovered here at home, by a Person whom every Body knows to be the Creature of a certain Great Man, at least as much noted for his Skill in Gaming as in Politicks, upon the base mercenary End of getting Mony by Wagers; which was then so common a Practice, that I remember a Gentleman in Employment, who having the Curiosity to enquire how Wagers went upon the Exchange, found some People, deep in the Secret, to have been concerned in that kind of Traffick, as appeared by PrÆmiums named for Towns, which no body but those behind the Curtain could suspect. However, although this Project had gotten wind by so scandalous a Proceeding, yet Toulon might probably have been taken, if the Emperor had not thought fit, in that very Juncture, to detach twelve or fifteen thousand Men to seize Naples, as an Enterprize that was more his private and immediate Interest. But it was manifest that his Imperial Majesty had no mind to see Toulon in Possession of the Allies; for even with these Discouragements the Attempt might have yet succeeded, if Prince Eugene had not thought fit to oppose it; which cannot be imputed to his own Judgiment, but to some Politick Reasons of his Court. The Duke of Savoy was for attacking the Eriemy, as soon as our Army arrived; but when the Mareschal de Thesse's Troops were all come up, to pretend to besiege the Place, in the Condition we were at that time, was a Farce and a Jest. Had Toulon fallen then into our Hands, the Maritime Power of France would, in a great measure, have been destroyed.
But a much greater Instance than either of the foregoing how little the Emperor regarded Us or Our Quarrel, after all we had done to save his imperial Crown, and to assert the Title of his Brother to the Monarchy of Spain, may be brought from the Proceedings of that Court not many Months ago. It was judged, that a War carried on upon the side of Italy, would cause a great Diversion of the French Forces, wound, them in a very tender Part, and facilitate the Progress of our Arms in Spain, as well as Flanders. It was proposed to the Duke of Savoy to make this Diversion; and not only a Diversion during the Summer, but the Winter too, by taking Quar- D
When Portugal came, as a Confederate, into the Grand Alliance, it was stipulated, That the Empire, England and Holland, should each maintain Four thousand Men of their own Troops in that Kingdom, and pay between them a Million of Pattacoons to the King of Portugal, for the Support of Twenty eight thousand Portugueze; which number of Forty thousand, was to be the Confederate Army against Spain on the Portugal side. This Treaty was ratified by all the three Powers. But in a short time after, the Emperor declared himself unable to comply with his part of the Agreement, and so left the Two thirds upon Us; who very generously undertook that Burthen, and at the same time Two thirds of the Subsidies for Maintenance of the Portugueze Troops. But neither is this the worst Part of the Story: For, although the Dutch did indeed send their own particular Quota of Four thousand Men to Portugal (which however they would not agree to, but upon Condition, that the other Two thirds should be supplied by us;) yet they never took care to recruit them: For in the Year 1706, the Portugueze, British, and Dutch Forces, having marched with the Earl of G—y into Castile, and by the noble Conduct of that General, being forced to retire into Valentia, it was sound necessary to raise a new Army on the Portugal side; where the Queen hath, at several times, encreased Her Establishment to Ten thousand five hundred Men, and the Dutch never replaced one single Man, not paid one Penny of their Subsidies to Portugal in six Years.
The Spanish Army on the side of Catalonia is, or ought to be, about Fifty thousand Men (exclusive of Portugal:) And here the War hath been carried on almost entirely at our Cost. For this whole Army is paid by the Queen, excepting only seven Battalions and fourteen Squadrons of Dutch and Palatines; and even Fifteen hundred of these are likewise in our Pay; besides the Sums given to K. Charles for Subsidies and the Maintenance of his Court. Neither are our Troops at Gibraltar included within this number. And further, we alone have been at all the Charge of Transporting the Forces first sent from Geno4 to Barcelona; and of all the Imperial Recruits from time to time: And have likewise paid vast Sums as Levy-Mony, for every individual Man and Horse so furnished to Recruit, tho' the Horses were scarce worth the Price of Transportation. But this hath been almost the constant Misfortune of our Fleet, during the present War; instead of being employed on some Enterprize for the Good of the Nation, or even for the Protection of our Trade, to be wholly taken up in transporting Soldiers.
We have actually Conquered all Bavarja, Ulm, Aushurg, Landau, and a great part of Alface, for the Emperor: And by the Troops we have furnished, the Armies we have paid, and the Diyersions we have given to the Enemies Forces, have chiefly contri-
Of the many Towns we have taken for the Dutch, we have consented, by the Barrier-Treaty, that all those which were not in Possession of Spain, upon the Death of the late Catholick King, shall be part of the States Dominions, and that they shall have the Military Power in the most considerable of the rest; which is, in effect, to be the absolute Sovereigns of the whole. And the Hollanders have already made such good use of their Time, that, in Conjunction with our G—I, the Oppressions of Flanders are much greater than ever.
And this Treatment which we have received from our two principal Allies, hath been pretty well copied by most other Princes in the Confederacy, with whom we have any Dealings. For Instance, seven Portuguese Regiments after the Battle of Almanza, went off, with the rest of that broken Army, to Catalonia: The King of Portugal said, he was not able to pay them, while they were out of his Country; the Queen consented therefore to do it Herself, provided the King would raise as many more to supply their Place. This he engaged to do, but never performed. Notwithstanding which, his Subsidies were constantly paid him by my Lord G—n, for almost four Years, without any Deduction upon Account of those seven Regiments, directly contrary to the Seventh Article of our Offensive Alliance with that Crown, where it is agreed, that a Deduction shall be made out of those Subsidies, in Proportion to the number of Men wanting in that Complement, which the King is to maintain. But whatever might have been the Reasons for this Proceeding, it seems they are above the Understanding of the present Lord Treasurer; who not entring into those Refinements, of paying the publick Money upon private Considerations, hath been so uncourtly as to stop it. This Disappointment, I suppose, hath put the Court of Lisbon upon other Expedients of raising the Price of Forage, so as to force us either to lessen our number of Troops, or be at double Expence in maintaining them; and this at a time when their own Product, as well as the Import of Corn, was never greater; and of demanding a Duty upon the Soldiers Clothes we carry over for those Troops, which have been their sole Defence against an inveterate Enemy; and whose Example might have infused Courage, as well as taught them Discipline, if their Spirits had been capable of receiving either.
In order to augment our Forces every Year, in the same Proportion as those, for whom we Fight, diminish theirs, we have been obliged to hire Troops from several Princes of the Empire, whose Ministers and Residents here, have perpetually importuned the Court
BUT if all this true: If, according to what I have affirmed, we began this War contrary to Reason: If, as the other Party themselves, upon all Occassons, acknowlege, the Success we have had was more than we could reasonably expect: If, after all our Success, we have not made that use of it, which in Reason we ought to have done: If we have made weak and foolish Bargains with our Allies, suffered them tamely to break every Article, even in those Bargains to our Disadvantage, and allowed them to treat us with Insolence and Contempt, at the very Instant when We were gaining Towns, Provinces and Kingdoms for them, at the Price of our Ruin, and without any prospect of Interest to ourselves: If we have consumed all our Strength in attacking the Enemy on the strongest side, where (as the old Duke of Schomberg expressed it) to engage with France, was to take a Bull by the Horns; and left wholly unattempted, that part of the War, which could only enable us to continue or to end it. If all this, I say, be our Case, it is a very obvious Question to ask, by what Motives, or what Management, we are thus become the Dupes and Bubbles of Europe? Sure it cannot be owing to the Stupidity arising from the coldness of our Climate, since those among our Allies, who have given us most Reason to complain, are as far removed from the Sun as our selves.
If in laying open the real Causes of our present Misery, I am forced to speak with some Freedom, I think it will require no Apology; Reputation is the smallest Sacrifice those can make us, who have been the Instruments of our Ruin; because it is That, for which in all Probability they have the least Value. So that in exposing the Actions of such Persons, I cannot be said, properly speaking, to do them an Injury. But as it will be some Satisfaction to the People, to know by whom they have been so long abused; so it may be of great use to Us and our Posterity, not to trust the Safety of their Country in the Hands of those who act by such Principles, and from such Motives.
I have already observed, that when the Counsels of this War were debated in the late King's Time, my Lord G—n was then so averse from entring into it, that he rather chose to give up his Employment, and tell the King he could serve him no longer. Upon that Prince's Death, although the Grounds of our Quarrel with France had received no manner of Addition, yet this Lord thought fit to alter his Sentiments; for the Scene was quite changed; his
With these Measures fell in all that Sett of People, who are called the Monied Man; such as had raised vast Sums by Trading with Stocks and Funds, and lending upon great Interest and PrÆmiums; whose perpetual Harvest is War, and whose beneficial way of Traffick must very much decline by a Peace.
In that whole Chain of Encroachments made upon us by the Dutch, which I have above deduced, and under those several gross Impositions from other Powers, if any one should ask, why our G—l continued so easie to the last? I know no other way so probable, or indeed so charitable to account for it, as by that unmeasurable love of Wealth, which his best Friends allow to be his predominant Passion. However, I shall wave any thing that is personal upon this Subject. I shall say nothing of those great Presents made by several Princes, which the Soldiers used to call Winter Foraging, and said it was better than that of the Summer; of Two and an half per Cent. substracted out of all the Subsidies we pay in those Parts, which amounts to no inconsiderable Sum; and lastly, of the grand Perquisites in a long successful War, which are so amicably adjusted between Him and the States.
But when the War was thus begun, there soon fell in other Incidents here at home, which made the Continuance of it necessary for those who were the chief Advisers. The Whigs were at that time out of all Credit or Consideration: The reigning Favourites had always carried what was called the Tory Principle, at least, as high as our Constitution could bear; and most others in great Employments, were wholly in the Church-Interest. These last, among whom several were Persons of the greatest Merit, Quality and Consequences, were not able to endure the many Instances of Pride, Insolence, Avarice and Ambition, which those Favourites began so early to discover, not to see them presuming to be the sole Dispensers of
I have here imputed the Continuance of the War to the mutual Indulgence between our General and Allies, wherein they both so well found their Accounts; to the Fears of the Mony-changers, left their Tables should be overthrown; to the Designs of the Whigs, who apprehended the Loss of their Credit and Employments in a Peace; and to those at home, who held their immoderate Engrossments of Power and Favour, by no other Tenure than their own Presumption upon the Necessity of Affairs. The Truth of this will appear indisputable, by considering with what Unanimity and Concert these several Parties acted towards that great End.
When the Vote passed in the House of Lords, against any Peace without Spain being restored to the Austrian Family, the Earl of W—n told the House, That indeed it was impossible and impracticable to recover Spain; but however, there were certain Reasons why such a Vote should be made at that time; which Reasons wanted no Explanation: For the G——l and the M—y having refused to accept very advantageous Offers of a Peace, after the Battle of Ramellies, were forced to take in a Set of Men, with a previous Bargain, to skreen them from the Consequences of E
So when the Q—was no longer able to bear the Tyranny and Insolence of those ungrateful Servants, who as they waxed the Fatter, did but kinck the more; our two great Allies abroad, and our Stock-jobbers at home, took immediately the Alarm; applied the nearest way to the Throne, by Memorials and Messages, jointly directing Her Majesty not to change Her Secretary or Treasurer; who for the true Reasons that these officious Intermedlers demanded their Continuance, ought never to have been admitted into the least Degree of Trust; since what they did was nothing less than betraying the Interest of their Native Country, to these Princes, who in their turns were to do what they could to support them in Power at home.
Thus it plainly appears, that there was a Conspiracy on all sides to go on with those Measures, which must perpetuate the War; and a Conspiracy founded upon the Interest and Ambition of each Party; which begar so firm a Union, that instead of wondring why, it lasted so long, I am astonished to think how it came to be broken. The Prudence, Courage, and Firmness of Her Majesty in all the Steps of that great Change, would, if the Particulars were truly related, make a very shining Part in Story: Nor is Her Judgment, less to be admited, which directed Her in the Choice of perhaps the only Persons who had Skill, Credit, and Resolution enough to be Her Instruments in overthrowing so many Difficulties.
Some would pretend to lessen the Merit of this, by telling us that the Rudeness, the Tyranny, the Oppression, the Ingratitude of the late Favourites towards their Mistress, were no longer to be born. They produce Instances to shew, how Her M—y was pursued through all Her Retreats, particularly at Windsor; where, after the Enemy had possessed themselves of every Inch of Ground, they at last attacked and stormed the Castle, forcing the Q—n to fly to an adjoining Cottage, pursuant to the Advice of Solomon, who tells us, It is better to dwell in a corner of the House top, than with a brawling Woman in a wide House. They would have it, that such continued ill Usage was enough to enflame the meekest Spirit: They blame the Favourites in point of Policy, and think it nothing extraordinary, that the Q—n should be at an end of Her Patience, and resolve to discard them. But I am of another Opinion, and think their Proceedings were right. For nothing is so apt to break even the bravest Spirits, as a continual Chain of Oppressions: One Injury is best defended by a second, and this by a third. By these Steps, the old Masters of the Palace in France become Masters of the Kingdom; and by these Steps, a G—l during Pleasure, might have grown into a G—l for Life, and a G—l for Life into a King. So that I still insist upon it as a Wonder, how Her M—y, thus besieged on all sides, was able to extricate Her self.
HAVING thus mentioned the real Causes, tho' disguised under specious Pretences, which have so long continued the War; I must beg leave to reason a little with those Persons who are against any Peace, but what they call a Good One; and explain themselves, that no Peace can be good, without an entire Restoration of Spain to the House of Austria. It is to be supposed, that what I am to lay upon this Part of the Subject, will have little Influence on those, whose particular Ends or Designs of any lott, lead them to wish the Continuance of the War. I mean the General and our Allies abroad; the Knot of late Favourites at home; the Body of such as Traffick in Stocks; and lastly, that Set of Factious Politicians, who were so violently bent, at least, upon Clipping our Constitution in Church and State. Therefore I shall not apply my self to any of those, but to all others indifferently, whether Whig or Tory, whose private Interest is best answered by the Welfare of their Country. And if among these there be any, who think we ought to fight on till King Charles is quietly settled in the Monarchy of Spain, I believe there are several Points which they have not thoroughly considered.
For, First, It is to be observed, that this Resolution against any Peace without Spain, is a new Incident, grafted upon the Original Quarrel, by the Intrigues of a Faction among us, who prevailed to give it the Sanction of a Vote in, both Houses of Parliament to justifie those, whose Interest lay in perpetuating the War. And, as this Proceeding was against the Practice of all Princes and States, whose Intentions were fair and honourable; so is it contrary to common Prudence, as well as Justice. I might add, that it was impious too, by presuming to controul Events, which are only in the Hands of God. Ours and the States Complaint against France and Spain, are deduced in each of our Declarations of War, and our Pretensions specified in the Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance; but there is not in any of these, the least mention of demanding Spain for the House of Austria, or of refusing any Peace without that Condition. Having already made an Extract from both Declarations of War, I shall here give a Translation of the Eighth Article in the Grand Alliance, which will put this Matter out of Dispute.
The Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance.
E2
Here, we see the Demands intended to be insisted on by the Allies upon any Treaty of Peace, are, a just and reasonable Satisfaction for the Emperor and King of Great Britain, a Security to the States-General for their Dominions, &c. and a sufficient Provision, that France and Spain be never united under the same Man, as King of both Kingdoms. The rest relates to the Liberty of Trade and Commerce for Us and the Dutch, but not a Syllable of engaging to dispossess the Duke of Anjou.
But to know how this new Language of No Peace without Spain, was first introduced, and at last prevailed among us, we must begin a great deal higher.
It was the Partition Treaty, which begot the Will in favour of the Duke of Anjou: For this naturally led the Spaniards to receive a Prince supported by a great Power, whose Interest, as well as Affection, engaged them to preserve that Monarchy entire, rather than to oppose him in favour of another Family, who must expect Assistance from a Number of Confederates, whose principal Members had already disposed of what did not belong to them, and by a previous Treaty parcelled out the Monarchy of Spain.
Thus the Duke of Anjou got into the full Possession of all the Kingdoms and States belonging to that Monarchy, as well in the old World, as the new. And whatever the House of Austria pretended from their Memorials to Us and the States, it was at that time but too apparent, that the Inclinations of the; paniards were on the Duke's side.
However, a War was resolved, and in order to carry it on with greater Vigour, a Grand Alliance formed, wherein the Ends proposed to be obtained, are plainly and distinctly laid down, as I have already quoted them. It pleased God in the Course of this War, to bless the Armies of the Allies with remarkable Successes, by which we were soon put into a Condition of demanding and expecting such Terms of a Peace, as we proposed to our selves when we began the War. But instead of this, out Victories only served to lead us on to further visionary Prospects; Advantage was taken of the
This was the Artifice of those here, who were sure to grow Richer, as the Publick became Poorer, and who after the Resolutions, which the two Houses were prevailed upon to make, might have carried on the War with Safety to themselves, till Malt and Land were Mortgaged, till a general Excise were established; and the dizieme denier raised, by Collectors in Red Coats. And this was just the Circumstance which it suited their Interests to be in.
The House of Austria approved this Scheme with Reason, since whatever would be obtained by the Blood and Treasure of others, was to accrue to that Family, and they only lent their Name to the Cause.
The Dutch might, perhaps, have grown resty under their Burthen; but care was likewise taken of that by a Barrier-Treaty made with the States, which deserveth such Epithets as I care not to bestow: But may perhaps consider it, at a proper Occasion, in a Discourse by it self.
By this Treaty, the Condition of the War, with respect to the Dutch, was widely altered: They fought no longer for Security, but for Grandeur; and we, instead of labouring to make them safe, must beggar our selves to render them Formidable.
Will any one contend, that if in the Treaty at Gertruydenburg, we could have been satisfied with such Terms of a Peace, as we proposed to our selves by the Grand Alliance, the French would not have allowed them? Tis plain, they offered many more, and much greater, than ever we thought to insist on, when the War began: And they had reason to grant, as well as we to demand them, since Conditions of Peace do certainly turn upon Events of War. But surely there is some Measure to be observed in this: Those who have defended the Proceedings of our Negotiators at Gertruydenburg, dwell very much upon their Zeal and Patience, in endeavouring to work the French up to their Demands, but say nothing to justify those Demands, or the Probability, that France would ever accept them. Some of the Preliminary Articles were so very Extravagant, that in all Human Probability we could not have obtained them by a successful War of forty Years. One of them was inconsistent with common Reason; wherein the Confederates reserved to themselves full Liberty of demanding, what further Conditions they should think fit; and in the mean time, France was to deliver up several of their strongest Towns in a Month. These Articles were very gravely Signed by our Plenipotentiaries, and those of Holland, but not by the French, tho' it ought to have been done interchangeably; nay, they were brought over by the Secretary of the Ambassy; and the Ministers here prevailed on the Queen to execute a Ratification of Articles, which only one Part had Signed: This was an Absur-
What could be the Design of all this Grimace, but to amuse the People, and raise Stocks for their Friends in the Secret, to Sell to Advantage? I have too great a Respect for the Abilities of those who acted in this Negotiation, to believe they hoped for any other Issue from it, than what we found by the Event. Give me leave to suppose the continuance of the War was the Thing at Heart, among those in Power, both Abroad, and at Home, and then I can easily shew the Consistency of their Proceedings; otherwise they are wholly unaccountable and absurd. Did those, who insisted on such wild Demands, ever sincerely intend a Peace? Did they really think that going on with the War was more eligible for their Country, than the least Abatement of those Conditions? Was the smallest of them worth Six Millions a Year, and an Hundred thousand Mens Lives? Was there no way to provide for the Safety of Britain; or the Security of its Trade, but by the French Kings turning his own Arms to beat his Grandson out of Spain? If these able Statesmen were so truly concerned for our Trade, which they made the Pretence of the Wars Beginning, as well as Continuance, why did they so neglect it in those very Preliminaries, where the Enemy made so many Concessions, and where all that related to the Advantage of Holland, or the other Confederates, was expressly settled? But whatever concerned us, was to be left to a general Treaty; no Tariff agreed on with France or the Low Countries, only the Scheld was to remain shut, which ruins our Commerce with Antwerp. Our Trade with Spain was referred the same way; but this they will pretend to be of no Consequence, because that Kingdom was to be under the House of Austria; and we had already made a Treaty with King Charles. I have indeed heard of a Treaty made by Mr. Stanhope, with that Prince, for settling our Commerce with Spain: But whatever it were, there was another between Us and Holland, which went Hand in Hand with it, I mean that of Barrier, wherein a Clause was inserted, by which all Advantages proposed for Britain, are to be in common with Holland.
ANOTHER Point which, I doubt, those have not considered, who are against any Peace without Spain, is, that the Face of Affairs in Christendom, since the Emperor's Death, hath been very much changed. By this Accident the Views and Interests of several Princes
To have a Prince of the Austrian Family on the Throne of Spain, is undoubtedly more desirable than one of the House of Bourbon; but to have the Empire and Spanish Monarchy united in the same Person, is a dreadful Consideration, and directly opposite to that wise Principle, on which the Eighth Article of the Grand Alliance is founded*
To this perhaps it will be objected, that the indolent Character of the Austrian Princes, the wretched Oeconomy of that Government, the want of a Naval Force, the remote distance of their several Territories from each other, would never suffer an Emperor, tho' at the same time King of Spain, to become Formidable: On the contrary, that his Dependance must continually be on Great Britain; and the Advantages of Trade, by a Peace founded upon that Condition, would soon make us Amends for all the Expence of the War.
In Answer to this, Let us consider the Circumstances we must be in, before such a Peace could be obtained, if it were at all practicable. We must become not only Poor for the present, but reduced by further Mortgages to a state of Beggary, for endless Years to come. Compare such a weak Condition as this with so great an Accession of Strength to Austria, and then determine how much an Emperor, in such a State of Affairs, would either fear or need Britain.
Consider, that the Comparison is not formed between a Prince of the House of Austria, Emperor and King of Spain, and between a Prince of the Bourbon Family, King of France and Spain; but between a Prince of the latter only King of Spain, and one of the former uniting both Crowns in his own Person.
What Returns of Gratitude can we expect, when we are no longer wanted? Has all that we have hitherto done for the Imperial Family been taken as a Favour, or only received as the Due of the Augustissima Casa?
Will the House of Austria yield the least Acre of Land, the least Article of strained and even usurped Prerogative, to resettle the Minds of those Princes in the Alliance, who are alarmed at the Consequences of this Turn of Affairs, occasioned by the Emperors Death? We are assured it never will. Do we then imagine, that those Princes, who dread the overgrown Power of the Austrian, as much as that of the Bourbon Family, will continue in our Alliance, upon a
Nor are the Dutch more inclined than the rest of Europe, that the Empire and Spain should be united in King Charles, whatever they may now pretend. On the contrary, 'tis known to several Persons, that upon the Death of the late Emperor Joseph, the States resolved, that those two Powers should not be joined in the same Person; And this they determined as a fundamental Maxim, by which they intended to proceed. So that Spain was first given up by Them; and since they maintain no Troops in that Kingdom, it should seem, that they understand the Duke of Anjou to be lawful Monarch.
THIRDLY, Those whose are against any Peace without Spain, if they be such as no way find their private Account by the War, may perhaps change their Sentiments, if they will reflect a little upon our present Condition.
I had two Reasons for not sooner publishing this Discourse: The first was, Because I would give way to others, who might argue very well upon the same Subject, from general Topicks and Reason, tho' they might be ignorant of several Facts, which I had the Opportunity to know. The Second was, Because I found it would be necessary, in the course of this Argument, to say something of the State to which this War hath reduced us: At the same time I knew, that such a Discovery ought to be made as late as possible, and at another Juncture would not only be very indiscreet, but might perhaps be dangerous.
It is the Folly of too many, to mistake the Eccho of a London Coffee-house for the Voice of the Kingdom. The City Coffee-houses have been for some Years filled with People, whose Fortunes depend upon the Bank, East-India, or some other Stock: Every new Fund to these, is like a new Mortgage to an Usurer, whose Compassion for a young Heir is exactly the same with that of a Stock jobber to the Landed Gentry. At the Court-End of the Town, the like Places of Resort are frequented either by Men out of Place, and consequently Enemies to the Present Ministry, or by Officers of the Army: No wonder then, if the general Cry, in all such Meetings, be against any Peace either with Spain, or without; which, in other Words, is no more than this, That discontented Men desire another Change of Ministry; that Soldiers would be glad to keep their Commissions; and, that the Creditors have Mony still, and would have the Deb-
Now, to give the most ignorant Reader some Idea of our present Circumstances, without troubling him or my self with Computations in form: Every body knows, that our Land and Malt Tax amount annually to about two Millions and an half. All other Branches of the Revenue are mortgaged to pay Interest, for what we have already borrowed. The yearly Charge of the War is usually about Six Millions; to make up which Sum, we are forced to take up, on the Credit of new Funds, about three Millions and an half. This last Year the computed Charge of the War came to above a Million more, than all the Funds the Parliament could contrive would pay Interest for; and so we have been forced to divide a Deficiency of Twelve hundred thousand Pounds among the several Branches of our Expence. This is a Demonstration, that if the War lasts another Campaign, it will be impossible to find Funds for supplying it, without mortgaging the Malt-Tax, or by some other Method equally desperate.
If the Peace be made this Winter, we are then to consider, what Circumstances we shall be in towards paying a Debt of about Fifty Millions, which is a fourth Part of the Purchase of the whole Island, if it were to be Sold.
Towards clearing our selves of this monstrous Incumbrance, some of these Annuities will expire or pay off the Principal in Thirty, Forty, or an Hundred Years; the Bulk of the Debt must be lessened gradually by the best Management we can, out of what will remain of the Land and Malt-Taxes, after paying Guards and Garrisons, and maintaining and supplying our Fleet in the time of Peace. I have not Skill enough to compute what will be left, after these necessary Charges, towards annually clearing so vast a Debt; but believe it must be very little: However, it is plain that both these Taxes must be continued, as well for supporting the Government, as because we have no other Means for paying off the Principal. And so likewise must all the other Funds remain for paying the Interest. How long a time this must require, how steady an Administration, and how undisturbed a state of Affairs, both at Home and Abroad, let others determine.
However, some People think all this very reasonable; and that since the Struggle hath been for Peace and Safety, Posterity, who is to partake the Benefit, ought to share in the Expence: As if at the breaking out of this War there had been such a Conjuncture of Affairs, as never happened before, nor would ever happen again. 'Tis wonderful, that out Ancestors, in all their Wars, should never fall under such a Necessity; that we meet no Examples of it, in Greece and Rome; that no other Nation in Europe ever knew any thing like it, except Spain, about an Hundred and twenty Years ago; which they drew upon themselves, by their own Folly, and have suffered F
'Tis easie to entail Debts on succeeding Ages, and to hope they will be able and willing to pay them; but how to insure Peace for any Term of Years, is difficult enough to apprehend. Will Human Nature ever cease to have the same Passions? Princes to entertain Designs of Interest or Ambition, and Occasions of Quarrels to arise? May not we Ourselves, by the variety of Events and Incidents which happen in the World, be under a Necessity of recovering Towns out of the very Hands of those, for whom we are now ruining our Country to Take them? Neither can it be said, that those States, with whom we may probably differ, will be in as bad a Condition as Ourselves; for, by the Circumstances of our Situation, and the Impositions of our Allies, we are more exhausted, than either they or the Enemy; and by the Nature of our Government, the Corruption of our Manners, and the Opposition of Factions, we shall be more slow in recovering.
It will, no doubt, be a mighty Comfort to our Grandchildren, when they see a few Rags hang up in Westminster-Hall, which cost an hundred Millions, whereof they are paying the Arrears, and boasting, as Beggars do, that their Grandfathers were Rich and Great.
I have often reflected on that mistaken Notion of Credit, so boasted of by the Advocates of the late Ministry: Was not all that Credit built upon Funds raised by the Landed Men, whom they so much hate and despise? Are not the greatest part of those Funds raised from the Growth and Product of Land? Must not the whole Debt be entirely paid, and our Fleets and Garrisons be maintained, by the Land and Malt-Tax, after a Peace? If they call it Credit to run ten Millions in Debt, without Parliamentary Security, by which the Publick is defrauded of almost half, I must think such Credit to be dangerous, illegal, and perhaps treasonable. Neither hath any thing gone further to ruin the Nation, than their boasted Credit. For my own part, when I saw this false Credit sink, upon the Change of the Ministry, I was singular enough to conceive it a good Omen. It seemed, as if the young extravagant Heir had got a new Steward, and was resolved to look into his Estate before things grew desperate, which made the Usurers forbear feeding him with Money, as they used to do.
Since the Monied Men are so fond of War, I should be glad, they would furnish out one Campaign at their own Charge: It is not above six or seven Millions; and I dare engage to make it out, that when they have done this, instead of contributing equal to the Landed Men, they will have their full Principal and Interest, at 6 per Cent. remaining of all the Money they ever lent to the Government.
Without this Resource, or some other equally miraculous, it is impossible for us to continue the War upon the same Foot. I have already observed, that the last Funds of Interest fell short above a Mil-
All we can propose, by the desperate Steps of pawning our Land or Malt Tax, or erecting a general Excise, is only to raise a Fund of Interest, for running us annually four Millions further in Debt, without any Prospect of ending the War so well, as we can do at present: And when we have sunk the only un engaged Revenues we had left, our Incumbrances must of necessity remain perpetual.
We have hitherto lived upon Expedients, which in time will certainly destroy any Constitution, whether Civil or Natural, and there was no Country in Christendom had less Occasion for them, than ours. We have dieted a Healthy Body into a Consumption, by plying it with Physick, instead of Food; Art will help us no longer; and if we cannot recover by letting the remains of Nature work, we must inevitably die. F2
What Arts have been used to posses the People with a strong Delusion, that Britain must infallibly be ruined, without the Recovery of Spain to the House of Austria? Making the Safety of a great and powerful Kingdom, as ours was then, to depend upon an Event, which, even after a War of miraculous Successes, proves impracticable. As if Princes and Great Ministers could find no way of settling the Publick. Tranquility, without changing the Possessions of Kingdoms, and forcing Sovereigns upon a People against their Inclinations, Is there no Security for the Island of Britain, unless a King of Spain be Dethroned by the Hands of his Grandfather? Has the Enemy no Cautionary Towns and Sea-Ports, to give us for securing Trade? Can be not deliver us Possession of such Places, as would put him in a worse Condition, whenever he should perfidiously renew the War? The present King of France has but few Years to live, by the course of Nature, and, doubtless, would desire to end his Days in Peace: Grandfathers in private Families are not observed to have great Influence on their Grandsons, and I believe they have much less among Princes. However, when the Authority of a Parent is gone, is it likely that Philip will be directed by a Brother, against his own Interest, and that of his Subjects? Have not those two Realms their separate Maxims of Policy, which must operate in Times of Peace? These at least are Probabilities and cheaper by six Millions a Year than recovering Spain, or continuing the War, both which seem absolutely impossible.
But the common Question is, If we must now surrender Spain, what have we been Fighting for all this while? The Answer is ready; We have been Fighting for the Ruin of the Publick Interest, and the Advancement of a Private. We have been fighting to raise the Wealth and Grandeur of a particular Family; to enrich Usurers and Stock-jobbers; and to cultivate the pernicious Designs of a Faction, by destroying the Landed Interest. The Nation begins now to think these Blessings are not worth Fighting for any longer, and therefore desires a Peace.
But the Advocates on the other side cry out, that we might have had a better Peace, than is now in Agitation, above two Years ago. Supposing this to be true, I do assert, that by parity of Reason we must expect one just so much worse, about two Years hence. If those in Power could then have given us a better Peace, more is their Infamy and Guilt, that they did it not; why did they insist upon Conditions, which they were certain would never be granted? We allow it was in their Power to have put a good End to the War, and left the Nation in some hope of recovering it self. And this is what we charge them with as answerable to God, their Country, and Posterity, that the bleeding Condition of their Fellow-Subjects, was a Feather in the Balance with their private Ends.
When we offer to lament the heavy Debts and Poverty of the Nation, 'tis pleasant to hear some Men answer all that can be said,
FOURTHLY, Those who are against any Peace without Spain, have, I doubt, been ill informed, as to the low Condition of France, and the mighty Consequences of our Successes. As to the first, it must be confessed, that after the Battle of Ramellies the French were so discouraged with their frequent losses, and so impatient for a Peace, that their King was resolved to comply on any reasonable Terms. But when his Subjects were informed of our exorbitant Demands, they grew jealous of his Honour, and were unanimous to assist him in continuing the War at any hazard, rather than submit. This fully restored his Authority; and the Supplies he hath received from the Spanish West-Indies, which in all are computed, since the War, to amount to Four hundred Millions of Livres (and all in Specie) have enabled him to pay his Troops. Besides, the Money is spent in his own Country; and he hath since waged War in the most thrifty manner, by acting on the Defensive, compounding with us every Campaign for a Town, which costs us fifty times more than it is worth, either as to the Value, or the Consequences. Then he is at no Charge of a Fleet, further than providing Privateers, wherewith his Subjects carry on a Piratical War at their own Expence, and he shares in the Profit; which hath been very considerable to France, and of infinite Disadvantage to us, not only by the perpetual Losses we have suffered to an immense Value, but by the general Discouragement of Trade, on which we so much depend. All this considered, with the Circumstances of that Government, where the Prince is Master of the Lives and Fortunes of so mighty a Kingdom, shews that Monarch to be not so sunk in his Affairs, as we have imagined, and have long flattered Our selves with the Hopes of. For an absolute Government may endure a long War, but it hath been generally ruinous to Free Countries.
Those who are against any Peace without Spain, seem likewise to have been mistaken in judging our Victories, and other Successes, to have been of greater Consequence than they really were.
When our Armies take a Town in Flanders, the Dutch are immediately put into Possession, and we at home make Bonfires. I have sometimes pitied the deluded People, to see them squandring away their Fewel to so little purpose. For Example, What is it to Us
In that War of ten Years, under the late King, when our Commanders and Soldiers were raw and unexperienced, in comparison of what they are at present, we lost Battles and Towns, as well as we gained them of late, since those Gentlemen have better learned their Trade; yet we bore up then, as the French do now: Nor was there any thing decisive in their Successes: They grew weary, as well as we, and at last consented to a Peace, under which we might have been happy enough, if it had not been followed by that wise Treaty of Partition, which revived the Flame, that hath lasted ever since. I see nothing else in the modern way of making War, but that the Side which can hold out longest, will end it with most Advantage. In such a close Country a Flanders, where it is carried on by Sieges, the Army that acts offensively, is at a much greater Expence of Men and Mony; and there is hardly a Town taken in the common Forms, where the Besiegers have not the worse of the Bargain. I never yet knew a Soldier, who would not affirm, That any Town might be Taken, if you were content to be at the Charge. If you will count upon sacrificing so much Blood and Treasure, the rest is all a regular, established Method, which cannot fail. When the King of France, in the Times of his Grandeur, sat down before a Town, his Generals and Engineers would often six the Day when it should surrender. The Enemy, sensible of all this, hath for some Years past avoided a Battle, where he hath so ill succeeded, and taken a surer way to consume us, by letting our Courage evaporate against Stones and Rubbish, and sacrificing a single Town to a Campaign, which he can so much better afford to Lose, than we to Take.
LASTLY, Those who are so violent against any Peace, without Spain being restored to the House of Austria, have not, I believe, cast their Eye upon a Cloud gathering in the North, which we have helped to raise, and may quickly break in a Storm upon our Heads.
The Northern War hath been on Foot, almost ever since our Breach with France: The Success of it various; but one Effect to be apprehended was always the same, that sooner or later it would involve us in its Consequences, and that, whenever this happened, let our Success be never so great against France, from that Moment France would have the Advantage.
By our Guaranty of the Treaty of Travendall, we were obliged to hinder the King of Denmark from engaging in a War with Sueden. It was at that time understood by all Parties, and so declared even by the British Ministers, that this Engagement especially regarded
However, the War in the North proceeded, and our not assisting Sueden, was at least as well excused by the War, which we were entangled in, as his not contributing his Contingent to the Empire, whereof he is a Member, was excused by the Pressures he lay under, having a Confederacy to deal with.
In this War the King of Sweden was Victorious; and what Dangers were we not then exposed to? What Fears were we not in? He marched into Saxony, and if he had really been in the French Interest, might at once have put us under the greatest Difficulties. But the Torrent turned another way, and he contented himself with imposing on his Enemy the Treaty of Alt Restadt; by which King Augustus makes an absolute Cession of the Crown of Poland, renounces any Title to it, acknowledges Stanislaus; and then, both he and the King of Sueden, join in desiring the Guaranty of England and Holland. The Q—n did, indeed, not give this Guaranty in Form; but, as a Step towards it, the Title of King was given to Stanislaus, by a Letter from Her M—y; and the strongest Assurances were made to the Suedish Minister, in Her M—y's Name and in a Committee of Council, that the Guaranty should speedily be granted; and that in the mean while, it was the same thing as if the Forms were passed.
In 1708, King Augustus made the Campaign in Flanders; what Measures he might at that time take, or of what Nature the Arguments might be that he made use of, is not known: But immediately after he breaks thro' all he had done, marches into Poland, and re-assumes the Crown.
After this, we apprehended that the Peace of the Empire might be endangered; and therefore entered into an Act of Guaranty for the Neutrality of it. The King of Sueden refused, upon several Accounts, to submit to the Terms of this Treaty; particularly, because we went out of the Empire to cover Poland and Jutland, but did not go out of it to cover the Territories of Sueden.
Let us therefore consider, what is our Case at present. If the King of Sueden returns, and gets the better, he will think himself under no Obligation of having any Regard to the Interest of the Allies; but will naturally pursue, according to his own Expression, His Enemy, wherever he finds him. In this Case the Corps of the Neutrality is obliged to oppose him, and so we are engaged in a second War, before the first is ended.
If the Northern Confederates succeed against Sueden, how shall we be able to preserve the Balance of Power in the North, so essential to
And lastly, if the King of Prussia, the Elector of Hanover, and other Princes whose Dominions lie contiguous, are forced to draw from those Armies which act against France; we must live in hourly Expectation of having those Troops recalled, which they now leave with us; and this Recal may happen in the midst of a Siege, or on the Eve of a Battel. Is it therefore our Interest, to toil on in a ruinous War, for an impracticable End, till one of these Cases shall happen, or to get under shelter before the Storm?
There is no doubt, but the present Ministry (provided they could get over the Obligations of Honour and Conscience) might find their Advantage in advising the Continuance of the War, as well as the last did, tho' not in the same Degree, after the Kingdom has been so much exhausted. They might prolong it till the Parliament would desire a Peace; and in the mean time leave them in full Possession of Power. Therefore it is plain, that their Proceedings at present are meant to serve their Country, directly against their private Interest; whatever Clamour may be raised by those, who, for the vilest Ends, would remove Heaven and Earth to oppose their Measures. But they think it infinitely better, to accept such Terms as will secure our Trade, find a sufficient Barrier for the States, give Reasonable Satisfaction to the Emperor, and restore the Tranquility of Europe, though without adding Spain to the Empire: Rather than go on in a languishing way, upon the vain Expectation of some improbable Turn, for the Recovery of that Monarchy out of the Bourbon Family; and at last be forced to a worse Peace, by some of the Allies falling off, upon our utter Inability to continue the War.
POSTSCRIPT.